THE SHAN STATES
AND THE BRITISH ANNEXATION

by Sao Saimong Mangrai

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The author of this work, Sao Saimong Mangrai, is the son of a past Sawbwa of the Shan State of Kengtung, the husband of Daw Mi Mi Khaing, herself the writer of a well-known book on Burmese family life, and was, until the army coup d'etat of 2 March 1962 in Burma, Chief Education Officer of the Shan and Kayah states. In these pages he essays to present the full story of the British occupation of this area consequent upon the deposition of Thibaw, the last king of Burma, in November 1885, and the subsequent annexation of his kingdom to British India on 1 January 1886. He has drawn upon unpublished documents in the India Office archives in London, official publications and contemporary published works now long out-of-print and only available in a few libraries. He quotes copiously from his sources, partly for this reason, but also because he has found them fascinating, and his own words inadequate to convey their distinctive flavour.

In his introduction, Sao Saimong explains why he has been unable to carry out the full plan suggested to him by Professor Gordon Luce, the sayagyi (great teacher) of all students of Burma's history. He has, however, preaced his main story with a chapter in which he recounts the stories of earlier Shan history to be found in their chronicle literature. They present the historian with many problems, and it may be a long time before a definitive history of the Shans can be written. But they must not be lightly disregarded for they offer a mirror to the mind of the Shan: they reflect conceptions of the past which have become part and parcel of the outlook of more recent generations; and failing an authentic picture of their past, it is next in importance that the reader should know what the Shans themselves have been told about it by their own writers.

During his year's furlough from Burma, when Sao Saimong was researching in London, he and I had regular weekly discussions, and I read each section of his work as it came hot from his pen. His intelligence, urbanity and wit
made these meetings delightful and memorable; they display themselves repeatedly in this book. More than that, the author's ability to stand above the fray and assess situations fairly -- with nevertheless the occasional touch of amusement -- gives his book what to me is its special quality.

D. G. E. Hall
Visiting Professor
Southeast Asia Program

Ithaca, New York
December 1963
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RANSS = Report on the Administration of the Northern Shan States.

RASSS = Report on the Administration of the Southern Shan States.
In August, 1957, I wrote to Professor G. H. Luce in the following vein: A friend had suggested that, as the only history of the Shan States existed piece-meal in several works, I should attempt to put together those pieces in one convenient volume. I thought I would spend six months in London reading up all available material on the Shan States from English, Burmese, Siamese and Shan sources, and spend the next three months in putting them together in a book of perhaps 200 - 300 pages. I asked Saya Luce what he thought of the idea.

The following are extracts from his very kind reply.

Your letter of August 17th reached me yesterday evening, and I hasten to reply. If you are just required to put together, in your spare time, a pleasant tissue of 'historical' legends for the delectation of school-children, go ahead; but I'm afraid I can't be of much use to you. But if you really mean, or are really meant, to write the history of the Shans, you yourself (it can't be delegated) will have to do an enormous amount of research (never yet done), and you can't possibly do it "as part of your work." They must put you on special, whole-time duty.

You can't write such a history, even of the Shan States of Burma, within one year. And are you going to ignore the Shans (Tai) of China and Further India, of whom the Shans of Burma are only a small fraction? God forbid that I should say anything to dissuade you from this task - the biggest and most important historical job still to be done in S. East Asia. I know of no one more competent to do it than you are. But I want your Government to realize how big a job this is, and how full of pitfalls.

What strikes me immediately about the plan you outline, is that it entirely omits the two most important sources of all:-

(i) Chinese sources, which go back at any rate to the 1st. C. B. D., and are far fuller and more trustworthy than any source except original inscriptions;

(ii) Original Old Tai inscriptions, which appear to exist in considerable quantities at least as far north as Mong Yang - There appear to be 20 faces or more at Mong Lwe
alone. We know of 60 more in N. Siam (I can give you particulars) - none yet edited. And there are certainly others (I know not how many, but one can find out by references to books in London) in Laos, around Vieng Chan and Luang Phrabang.

Any history of the Shans which ignores these 2 basic sources will be, in my opinion, not only no good, but definitely bad and misleading. You don't want to feed your Shan school boys and school girls on legends and lies; they deserve something better....

Your assistants can be useful in collecting and translating materials. Card-indexing, which is the longest and most tedious job, must be done by yourself. (I speak from experience, and know that I am right here). The reflecting that goes in your mind as you card-index, breeds the imaginative alertness and careful insight, which finally may lead you to the truth. An assistant, however good, will not extract half the historical value of a single sentence of Chinese or Old Shan that you will, and the half that he will miss, is precisely the half that gives the key to the problem.

With your knowledge of Shan, Thai, Lao and Burmese, you are wonderfully well equipped to tackle Old Tai; and if you are sufficiently interested, and prepared to spend not less than 5 years on the job, you could do it to admiration....

I also wrote to Professor D. G. E. Hall at the School of Oriental and African Studies, London, in identical terms. In his reply, Saya Hall said he was delighted at the idea and that he would do all he could to help me in my contact with learned men and various libraries in London.

It is plain the two professors regarded my "project" in different lights. I was flattered by Saya Luce's compliments and encouraged by Saya Hall's open arms. One expected that I would be able to do a thorough research on the subject; the other, probably more aware of my limitations and the limited time at my disposal, was of the opinion that any aspect or period of the history of the Shan States was worth attempting.

That was the beginning of the present work. I knew, of course, of the existence of the Chinese sources and of the inscriptions, but, at the time of writing my letters, neither was in my plan because both were beyond my ability to cope with. After pondering over the two replies I decided to work backward. The British Annexation of the Shan States at once offered itself as a starting point and there would be no lack of material for reference in the British official records. The starting point has, in fact, become the whole compass of the work. This book which, in view of its limited nature, may, I hope, be the prelude to others in English or in Shan, concerns itself mainly with the years 1886 to 1900, which was the period of the British annexation...
of the Shan States, following on their annexation in 1885 of the Upper Burma Kingdom of Ava which had been the suzerain authority over the Shan States.

Three preliminary chapters have been affixed as introduction to my subject. The first is a brief account of the geography and population of the Shan States as they are today. The second concerns movements in earlier times of the Tai race, of which the Shans are a part, which might give to the reader some idea of the place of the Tais in Southeast Asian history; it also contains accounts of some old Shan kingdoms or what are generally considered Shan kingdoms, in the period before the Shans made their historically accepted mark in Burmese history, which I hope, with the theories I have put forward concerning them and words associated with them, will help to clarify the association of names at present connected vaguely and romantically with the cherished past of the Shans. The third preliminary chapter concerns such incidents of Shan-Burmese relations, from the historically accepted period up to the time of the British entry into the Shan States, which might help to relate these states adequately to the Burmese background.

In many of the chapters, I have quoted liberally from sources which I found in London. These extensive quotations have been included partly because I address myself primarily to that important section of my compatriots who read English but have not the good fortune to gain access to these rare old books and correspondence papers.

For my own good fortune in having gained such access the following benefactors must be given my deep and abiding thanks:

Seo Nkun Hkio (Head of the Shan State until November 1958) and the Shan State Government for so generously allowing me to accept the Asian Fellowship, and for their blessings.

Professor G. H. Luce for his ever inspiring example and his kind encouragement of the humble efforts of others.

Professor D. G. E. Hall for initiating this whole work and for greatest possible help in every way, not the least of which was the regular discussions which he patiently allowed me to have with him so that I would gain a better insight into my work.

The School of Oriental and African Studies and its Director, Professor G. H. Phillips, for granting me the Rockefeller Foundation's Asian Fellowship, without which I could not have undertaken the work; and for all facilities given to me and the fortnightly seminars in which I was privileged to take part.

Dr. Htin Aung, then Chairman of the Burma Historical Commission, and the Ford Foundation for enabling me to visit Bangkok and Chiengmai for collection of material in Thai.
T. S. H. Prince and Princess Piya Rangsit and Mr. and Mrs. Kraisri Nimmanhemindr for every help so kindly given to me while in Thailand.

Miss Dorothy Woodman for encouragement and help in finding source material which I could not otherwise have found in the short time available to me in London.

Various sawbwas and state authorities, as well as numerous friends, including the cheerful and willing staff of the India Office Library and of my own office, who have helped me in various ways, sent me local chronicles or lent me relevant books and records in their possession.

Mi Mi Khaing, my beloved wife, for relieving me of all family cares during my years of study in her usual kind and able way; and for help in reading over the final manuscript.
CHAPTER I

Shanland and Its People

The Shan States, with its 60,416 square miles, the size of England and Wales, form the eastern part of the Union of Burma. It lies on a plateau whose average height is about 2000-3000 feet, with peaks rising to 6000 and 8000 feet. Some of the valleys, however, have an altitude as low as 800 feet.

The boundaries of these Shan States touch China, Laos and Thailand in the north, east and south. The State of Kayah which, like the amalgamated Shan States, forms a constituent state in the Union of Burma, is part of the boundary in the south. In the east, it runs with those districts of Central Burma from Pyinmana to Shwebo.

Rivers and streams in the Shan States empty themselves into three world famous rivers, the Irrawaddy, the Salween and the Mekong, and the water divided between these three drainage systems can be discerned quite clearly falling within the Shan States on a large-scale physical map of Burma. Of the three big rivers mentioned only the Salween passes through the whole length of the country, while the Mekong forms the eastern boundary for a distance of some two hundred miles. Unlike the Irrawaddy, neither of these two are navigable for more than a few dozen miles at a stretch because of the swift current and rapids in them. The same is true of all the small rivers and streams that flow through the Shan States into the three "mother rivers", but many of them can be harnessed for hydro-electric power and irrigation, should the economy of the country demand it. Some of the better known tributary streams are the Namlwe, Namkha, Nampang, Namteng, Nampawn, Namtu (Myitnge), and Nammao (Shweli). The Nampilu (Baluchaung) which drains the Taungthu valley and the Inle Lake is being harnessed at Loikaw to supply electricity for the whole of Central and Lower Burma and parts of the Shan and Kayah States. The Paunglaung flows through the Shan States for a distance before it enters the plains at Pyinmana to become the better-known river of Sittang.

The highest peak in the Shan States is the Loileng (8777 feet) in Mongyai or South Hsenwi. Other high peaks are Loi Pangnau (8406) in Kengtung; Loimaw (8096) and Menetaung (8265) which separate the two main branches of the Paun rivers, namely the Tampak and main

---

Nampawn itself; and Loisang (8129) near Mongkung. Innumerable peaks towering between 6000 and 8000 feet are found all over.

Some of the better known hill-station towns in the Shan States are Loimwe (5200 feet), Loilem (4500), Taunggyi (4700), Kalaw (4200), Namhsan (5300), and Kutkai (over 4000 feet).

With these peaks and hill stations, it must not be imagined that most people in the Shan States live at high altitudes. There are people of various racial tribes who believe they cannot live below the height of 5000 feet, but the more populated areas are those river valleys on the plateau itself. In some of these valleys the winter mists seldom rise before ten o'clock in the morning. It is here that most of the Shans live to cultivate their rice fields and tend their gardens and orange orchards.

With its 60,16 square miles, the Shan States make up about one quarter of the area of all Burma which is 235,492 square miles. But for this big area, the population is incomparably small. The following population figures are from the 1931 census:

<table>
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<tr>
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<th>All Burma including the Shan States</th>
<th>The Shan States alone</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>14,667,146</td>
<td>1,506,337</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The rate of growth of population is not fast, as can be seen from these figures:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Population</th>
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<tr>
<td>1901</td>
<td>1,236,357</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1911</td>
<td>1,348,710</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921</td>
<td>1,433,542</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>1,506,337</td>
</tr>
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</table>

At this rate of growth the present population should be between 18 and 19 hundred thousand.

Like the rest of Southeast Asia, the Shan States have a monsoon climate with the well-known hot, wet and cold seasons, with this difference: the monsoon rain is not unbearably continuous and the height of the plateau turns the oppressive hot air of the Irrawaddy-Sittang basin into a cooling breeze even in the warmest months, while the winter is pleasantly cold with a cloudless sky.

Thus, all the hill stations and most areas in the Shan States have one of the pleasantest climates in the world. From November to March it is pleasant to have a log fire in one's house, though most indigenous homes make do with charcoal braziers even in December and January, in homes of either split bamboo or unseasoned timber, neither of which can be called draught-proof. On the treeless plains of the Myelat and Central Shan States and some of the high plateaus, it can be bitingly cold at night. These places normally have ground frost for

---

1. The 1933 (urban) and 1954 (rural) census of Burma does not yet include the Shan States.
two or three weeks every winter. This frost turns a thin sheet of water in a flat receptacle into ice, and the children love to make this ice, much as European children do their snowballs.

With such a climate, it is natural to find both tropical and temperate products in the Shan States.

Of agricultural products, rice, by both wet and dry cultivation methods, is the most important. After providing the staple diet of the people it leaves a small surplus for local export. Rice forms song themes and inspires poetry among the Shans, as among other rice-growing and rice-eating people in Asia.

Potatoes and opium are the next most important products. Potatoes grow largely in the Myelat, the highland that borders Central Burma districts in the west almost the length of the Shan States. Almost all the potatoes consumed in Burma come from this area.

The word opium conjures up a picture of dreamy, lotus-eating peasants. Many Shans may be dreamy, but few are opium addicts. The opium is legally grown east of the Salween on mountain slopes or small stream valleys well above the height of 3000 feet. Part of the crop is bought up by the Government at fixed rates which vary from year to year. By far the larger part finds its way through smugglers' caravans and inaccessible jungles into the world, or rather under-world, market of morphia and cocaine. The country is too undeveloped for the opium-grower to change from this crop to anything that will fetch him as much money from such a small area of ground, and the Government resources are too limited to affect the change by force.

Next in importance among the agricultural produce are tea, thanapat (cigar wrapping leaf), coffee, oranges and cabbages. These are produced in sufficient quantity to take their place in all-Burma trade. Traders and middlemen dealing in them have become rich, out of proportion to the money received by the cultivators or actual producers; but that is enterprise and free trade.

Garlic, indigo, wheat, other fruits (e.g. strawberries, pears and pine-apples) and vegetables (especially introduced European varieties), cotton and tobacco form products that are important to local economy and a small amount of them finds a market outside the Shan States.

Among forest products, teak is the most important. It is found in areas below the altitude of 3000 feet in the basins of streams that find their way into the lower reaches of the Salween, the Faunglaung, the Nammao or Shweli, the Namtu and the Zawgyi. Some hardwood, such as chestnut, ingyin and padauk (ironwood of Burma), and soft wood like in and pine are found all over. Lac is another important forest produce. Buteau frondosa (or mawkkae in Shan, pauk in Burmese) the true flame of the forest and one of the chief host trees for stick lac, bombax (mawkngiu or letpan), the
silk cotton tree, bauhinia (mawksio) and many other less-known flowering trees adorn the countryside up to the height of 5000 feet from January till March or April. These together with such introduced varieties as the wild cherry, pink cassia, jackaranda, gul mohur or flamboyant, yellow laburnum, and blossoming shrubs and creepers (e.g. the golden shower or venus's flower, bongainvilleas, poinsettia), give much colour to the Shan hills and valleys.

The chief cottage industries are silk weaving, Shan bag weaving, pottery, lacquer ware, silver ware, Shan hats or khamauk or kup, fine split bamboo weaving, and Shan dah or sword.

Not least of the cottage industry products is the wooden figure-carving of Mongnai. These figurines of tribes of Burma, carved out of yemane- and six or eight inches high, make extremely practical gifts of aesthetic value. There are many carvers but the only master who can give proportions and individuality to his figures is Maung Nyun, a home-loving Shan who prefers to produce just enough to keep his family happy in Mongnai.

Apart from silk and Shan bag weaving none of the cottage industries is well organised. Properly managed, all could increase their output and market value tenfold and help their producers to raise their standard of living.

One hears a great deal about the mineral wealth of the Shan States, but apart from the big mine at Bawdwin (silver, lead, zinc and copper) and its huge, modern processing plant at Namtu, no really big-scale operation is seen anywhere. A small but primitive pit mine at Bawzaing produces enough to make its owner a wealthy man. Tungsten and wolfram ores are worked by open cast method around Taunggyi and Mongnawng-Mongshu areas. A small mountain of iron ore near Taunggyi is reported to contain a very high percentage of good iron, but there is no prospect of any large-scale development in the foreseeable future. Perhaps more is needed of capital, surveying and prospecting, managerial and organisational skill, and practical encouragement of foreign capital by Government.

The Shans are reputed to be good traders. This statement seems truer of the past than of the present. Even in the past when they were good and great traders it was on a petty scale. Caravans of bullock carts, pack bullocks and occasionally mules can still be seen, but their importance is on a much reduced scale and they serve mostly areas inaccessible to motor traffic. From the time of the British annexation of Upper Burma and the Shan States till the early thirties of this century, Shan traders roamed Burma and northern Siam dealing in various agricultural produce as well as precious or semi-precious stones. The more lucky ones sometimes obtained teak leases and became rich. But

1. *Gmelia arborea.*
through governmental regulations and other causes, many such Shans in the southeast have since lost their identity and become citizens of Siam.

Even in ordinary trading, modern progress and competition demand education, organization, capital and, above all, perseverance, which the Shans as a whole lack.

This is not to say that the Shans as traders are dead. Some are adjusting themselves to modern needs and methods, and can claim a five-figure income, but the majority need to exert themselves more.

The plague of many of the Shans is gambling. During a pwe or festival in the Shan States there is always a gambling den; and there are three, four, or more pwes annually in every big township. As likely as not, a whole year's earning can literally go down the drain at one of these gambling pwes. Some of the big pwes last as long as ten or fifteen days and each will yield to authorities gambling contract money of ten thousand kyats or more per night. Two or three weeks before the gambling nothing much can be done in the locality because of the preparations for it. During the pwe no one talks of anything else except gambling. After the pwe two or three weeks are spent in recovering from physical and mental effects of the gambling. Thus, each pwe really consumes about two months of time, energy and money of the people. The dispensing of the gambling contract and the receipt of its revenue were the exclusive prerogatives of the local sawbwas or chiefs before the surrender of their powers in April 1959. Now those rights are maintained by boards appointed by Government, except in Kengtung and Manglon where the present arrangements are that their sawbwas will give up their powers at the end of the year (1960).

The Shans are almost all Buddhists and their three or four pwes take place in a locality or capital of a State in April (new year), at the end of the Buddhist lent in October, in March (Tabaung pwe or the pwe of Lonsee, i.e. the 4th month), and during the pleasant months between October and March in honour of some local pagodas. In these pwes the people with their families are out in their best clothes and jewellery. Here petty traders with their bullock carts or pack bullocks can be seen doing brisk business in competition with those coming in lorries and buses from afar. Rows of sellers of food and of trinkets make a pretty scene at night with their kerosene lamps. Many a wedding has come about as a result of meetings and sweet coquettish words during pwes. Many Shan folk tales have their setting in pwes. Everybody is happy and care-free. The whole scene presents a perfect picture of pastoral mirth and gaiety, until one sees around the gambling booth the dead-serious faces of both grown-ups and children (sometimes under ten years of age).

In a society that has just emerged from the feudal age and wants to call itself modern, the effect of such an unproductive
activity as gambling on the moral principles and morale of the rulers and the ruled is devastating.

But the Shans are not so bad as a sight of these pves might lead one to think. They have their good side: their past contains incidents of vigour and glory, and their near-present has revealed to foreign observers many positive quantities which I hope the following quotations from some British writers of the period just before their entry into the region (when writing was not intended for the Shans to read of themselves) will show.

Before quoting these it might just be noted that the Shan States is also inhabited by peoples other than the Shans. The following is a break-down of the various races:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Race</th>
<th>Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Burma Group</td>
<td>190,523</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lolo-Musho Group</td>
<td>84,421</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kachin Group</td>
<td>63,895</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tai (Shan) Group</td>
<td>697,147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palaung-Wa Group</td>
<td>171,101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karen Group</td>
<td>178,283</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese Group</td>
<td>64,749</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian Races</td>
<td>32,604</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European &amp; Anglo-Indians</td>
<td>1,157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>1,887</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total (excluding East Manglun) = 1,486,688.

These figures are out of a population of 1,506,337 excluding East Manglun (19,649). It is often forgotten that the number of real Shans is slightly less than half of the total.

What sort of people are the Shans?

Temptation is great for the writer to describe them in superlative terms, but it will be better to record what other people say. The people are not what they see or think of themselves, unless confirmed by their own deeds, or by opinions of others. The Japanese and the Germans may not openly call themselves great, but the way they have risen from the unconditional defeat and utter ruin of the last war has made a mark in the world and has entitled them to greatness.

The following is an opinion on the Shans:

The Shans are a thrifty people. Being the inhabitants of a mountainous region, the necessities of life are not so easily obtained as in the fertile deltas of the Irrawaddy and Menam. They are good agriculturists, but excel in trading, by which they supply themselves with food and merchandise not obtainable in their own country. The houses of the better class exhibit a cleanliness and comfort not found among Burmans of the same rank. They have independence of characters and are
given to jealousies and personal dislikes which have kept them divided politically and socially. In warfare they are often cruel and vindictive, not only seeking to put to the sword all men of a hostile region, but often slaughtering the male children which fall into their hands. In time of peace, they are cheerful, hospitable and ready to render help to one another. An innate restlessness gives rise to frequent change of residence in the Shan country itself, so that often, a good percentage of the population in a principality is not native born to that principality. This would doubtless cease to a considerable degree under the peaceful rule of a wise government which secured to the people a reasonable taxation and security in the possession and enjoyment of prosperity. 1

This is another:

The Shans are endowed with many of the natural qualities which are bound to make for success when allowed to develop under stable government affording protection against oppression and robbery, and giving encouragement to agriculture, trade, and commerce. They have artistic instincts, and some of their silver work is very fine. As there was no coined money in the States even within the last twelve or thirteen years, Shan travellers used to bring down finely wrought and richly chased silver bowls which they exchanged for their weight in rupees in order to make purchases in the bazaars. They are a thrifty people, and they have keen commercial instincts. Sprung from a race of mountaineers, and themselves occupying lofty tracts, they share the natural inheritance of qualities characteristic of the races which have to struggle with nature for the necessities of life. The same natural causes which created differences of this sort between those living north of the Humber and the Mersey, and those living in the more genial southern portion of England, - between North Germans and South Germans; between Norwegians or Swedes, and Italians or Spaniards, - have been in operation to make the Shan of the Burmese-Shan plateau an entirely different man from the Burmese of the Irrawaddy valley, or the Siamese of the Menam valley. Consequently, they have greater independence of character, are better agriculturists, are keener traders, and have a much better knowledge of the value of money than either the Burmese or the Siamese. But the political and social strife and the constant internecine warfare of the last two centuries have made them prone to intense jealousy and personal dislikes, and have rendered them apt to be cruel and vindictive, defects which may probably soon become obliterated under peaceful, good government. 2


And yet another:

In person the Shans greatly resemble both the Siamese and Burmese, but, as a rule, they are fairer. They are muscular and well formed, and average at least an inch higher. The eyes are moderately linear; the nose is small rather than flat, and here and there has enough bridge to be almost aquiline. The mouth is large, and is made to seem more large by betel-chewing, which discolors the teeth and gums, and rivets attention. The hair is long, straight, and lank, and rarely any other colour than black. The Cis-Salween Shans tattoo to mid-calf, and also higher up the trunk than the Burman. Some of the chief's bodyguard in former days were tattooed from the neck to the ankle, and a few had even the face and the back of the hands tattooed in blue. In addition to the regulation "breeches," charms, usually in red, appear on the chest, back, and arms, as they do in the case of the Burmese. The Shan tattooers are said to be the best, but the custom seems to have begun with the Burmese. The Siamese do not tattoo, and the Lao are specially divided into the Lao Pung-kao, or White-paunch Lao, who live in the east, along the Mekhong River; and the Lao Pung-dam, or Black-paunch Lao, who live in the west. The black and white sobriquets apply accordingly as the man is tattooed or not. The tattooed Lao extend to Muang Nan.

The Shan dress is a pair of trousers and a jacket. The coat is of Chinese pattern. The cut of the trousers varies considerably. Sometimes they are much the same as the Chinese, with well-defined legs, but in the north, and among the better-to-do classes generally, the seat is often down about the ankles, and the garment generally is so voluminous as to look more like a skirt than a pair of trousers. The turban is usually white in the north; of various colours in the south. The Shan-Chinese wear indigo-dyed, somore head-dresses. The broad-rimmed, limp, woven grass hat is the great characteristic of the Tai of British territory. These flapping straws are made in China, and are not worn by the Shan-Chinese, or by the Siamese Shans. During the rains and the hot weather they wear a huge conical covering, like a candle extinguisher crushed down.

These are foreign opinions on the Shans of the Shan States of Burma, and they have been reproduced without comment. The three writers have been regarded as qualified to express sane opinions on the subject.

A fourth opinion may be harmlessly added; and it concerns the Shans of Mengwu, French Laos at the time, and those of Monglem, now in South Yunnan.

2. 1898-99.
Personnaly, i.e.* in their face and figure, the Shans resemble the Japanese, and the women are, to say the best, just as unconventional and fascinating. But there the resemblance ends. The men are lazy good for nothing fellows; who never, unless absolutely obliged, do any work. The women toil during the summer in the rice fields, and when at home are industriously employed in weaving cloth. Their costume is very pretty, consisting of a turban embroidered with gold thread, a short tight-sleeved jacket, a long white petti coat, and a coloured shirt. Their skirts are so much more becoming than the ugly misshapen trousers of the Chinese women, and it is this difference in costume which strikes the eye of the traveller coming from China....

The principal town of Meng Lien is situated on the side of a sloping hill at the northern end of a large cultivated plain, 3600 feet above the level of the sea. The mountains around are covered with thick forest, and the plain is watered by the Nam Lien, a cool, limpid, and sluggish river, which runs at the foot of the incline on which the town is built. It was certainly the prettiest place that we had visited during our trip. In the plain, nestling among the woods, are many other villages, and the total population must be nearly 20,000....

Amongst the other races of this part of Yunnan the immorality of the Shans is proverbial; but it is not at first apparent to the passing stranger, who is often at a loss to know how such a bad reputation has been established. The fact that both sexes mix freely together, and are on terms of social equality, however contrary to Chinese ideas, does not offend the foreigner's sense of propriety. Further acquaintance, however, will show him that the Shan girls, outwardly so pleasing, modest and industrious, are utterly wanting in virtue; whilst the men are dissolute, even the students in the temples throwing off their priestly dress and demeanour at nightfall. The unmarried women are allowed the most absolute freedom, and have many lovers; but once married, they become as a rule, good and faithful wives, and take a prominent part in the management of the household.¹

This opinion is certainly unflattering; but every race has its weaknesses. If it is considered that this opinion does not concern the Shans in the Shan States, the following comment will not be out of place.

If a disaster occurs somewhere in the world, some Shans are apt to say that it is not in Burma and therefore it matters not.

¹ Carey, F. W., Journeys in the Chinese Shan States, Geographical Journal, May 1900.
Should the disaster take place in Burma, the same people say it is not in the Shan States. If it happens in the Shan States, they say it is outside their State. If it does in their State, they will say it is not in their town or village. If it comes to their town or village, they say: "That is not our house." If the disaster befalls their own house ....

Such a way of thinking of course had been responsible for the World War II, beginning with the Marco Polo Bridge incident in 1932.
And now any reader interested only in modern times must forgive me a long excursion into the dim past.

The theory of Shan migration is well known, but no one has been able to put his finger on the exact manner how this happened. The earlier and better known theory places the movement as from north to south and the "cradle of the Tai race" variously from western Central Asia to the water sheds of the Yangtse. The Shans were the "elder brothers" of the Chinese who later either absorbed them or drove them southward, according to this theory.

A later theory places the original home of the Tais in the west - northern India or Tibet, and says the Tai peoples migrated east via the Brahmaputra river, the Hukawng valleys, north Burma and thence via the Shweli and the Taping into the Chinese provinces of Yunnan, Szechuan, Kwei-chow and Kwangsi. The Tai-Chinese affiliation is repudiated by this theory which groups the Tais with the Kadais and the Indonesians, and says that it was the subsequent migration of the Mon-Khmer peoples (sent out of India by the Aryans) which drove a wedge between the Tais and the Kadais on the left and the Indonesians on the right. The Indonesians were of course sent to their present homes by the Mon-Khmers, while the Tais were later ousted by the Chinese from their homes in various parts of southwest China and came down to their present habitats to drive out the very Mon-Khmer peoples who had earlier pushed them north.1

But we are concerned here not with the Tai migration but with the historical Tais, especially the Shans.

The Shans form only one section of the Tai race which is at present divided over an area stretching from Assam in India (where the Ahoms are), through northern and eastern Burma (where are our own Shan States), into China of the Chinese Shan states, and then southwards into Laos till the Kingdom of Siam where Siamese or Thais are found till Malaya is reached. Together all these Tai peoples number about 27 - 30 million - enough to establish an average-sized nation of southeast Asia, and though this work cannot hope to trace adequately how they came to be spread over their large area owning allegiance

1. Seidenfaden, E., The Thai Peoples, pp. 1-8. N. B. The theory that the Mon-Khmer peoples immigrated into Southeast Asia from India is quite untenable. (D.G.E.H.)

2. Ibid., p. 11.
to five different countries, at least some aspects of their early movements can be touched upon.

When I reached London I spent some time, perhaps too long, in trying to look up what was known to western writers about the old Shan kingdoms. Here one reads about the usual southward migration of the Tai race, the Pong Kingdom which has puzzled many people as to its true identity, the Mao Kingdom, Kawampa, Kobanpyi and various other kingdoms found in Burmese, Shan and Siamese Chronicles.

These chronicles are dear to the Shan heart and they cannot be dismissed lightly by an average Shan. Although I am not qualified to lay down theories about these, I feel that a brief discussion of the subject is called for. If some of the points raised hereinafter are well known to many readers, I may be forgiven for repeating them as they are unknown to many Shans to whom any work on any aspect of the Shan State is interesting.

Some scholars are of the opinion that the chronicles can be used to a certain extent and that at the height of Nanchao's power in Yunnan, in about the 8th century, valley kingdoms of various Tai tribes were already in existence all over Southeast Asia. In other words, these scholars do not believe the theory that the southward exodus of the Shans began only with the conquest of Yunnan and Burma by Kublai Khan. Long before Kublai Khan's exploits the Tais had already settled in their valley kingdoms. The exploits of the Shan general, Samlongpha, took place before the conquest in 1253 of Yunnan (Nanchao) by the forces of Kublai Khan. Some scholars in Thailand are working on the theory that the first Thai king who liberated Sukhotai from the Khmer yoke, Pra Ruang I (King Sri Indaraditya), was a scion of Samlongpha.

The date of the end of the Pagan Dynasty founded by Anawrahta is generally placed at 1287, the year its last king Narathihapate, the Tarokpyemin, was murdered by one of his sons, and this was 10 years after the Burmese retreat from Ngasaunggyan; Mangral of Chiengsen, Pra Ruang of Sukhotai and Ngammuang of Phayao swore eternal friendship also in 1275. Samlongpha's conquering hordes were active long before 1250. The defeat of the Khmers by the Thais in the Upper Menam valley around the middle of the 13th century also shows that the Tais were active before Nanchao was overrun by the Mongols.

To come back to the assumption that the Tais were in parts of Burma and Northern Siam long before the Mongol armies overran Nanchao, Professor Coedes tells us that the Tais appeared in the history of Further India in the 11th century when Cham inscriptions mentioned "Syam" slaves or prisoners of war, by the side of the Chinese, Annamites, Cambodians and Burmese. A group of warriors, dressed differently from the Khmers and called "Syam" in two short inscriptions, also figured in the bas reliefs of the Angkor Wat in the twelfth century. Although these "Syams" of Angkor were referred to as

1. Jinakalamalini, p. 163.
"savages," they had a closely knit social organization, due to their living for centuries in close contact with Chinese civilization. As they were good assimilators they were not slow in absorbing the civilization of their neighbours and masters.

In histories, the despised savages often became the masters. And so it was that the Tais, having lived as subject people for some three hundred years in parts of Northern Burma and Northern and Central Siam, themselves became the masters when the Pagan Dynasty came to an end and when the Khmers became weak.

Although this seems to prove the contention that the Tai ascendency was the result of the Mongol invasion of Yunnan (Nan-chao) and Pagan, it can still be said that such a rise would not have been possible if the Tais had not already been there for some centuries.

It seems, therefore, that when the 13th Century opened the Tai "beach-heads" had already been firmly established among the Burmese and Mon-Khmer peoples, and it was from these "beach-heads" that the various Tai tribes began to assert themselves over their neighbours resulting in what Professor Coedès calls "a large effervescence" from the direction of the southern frontier of Yunnan. During this period the Pagan Dynasty of Burma was on its last legs, while in the lower Menam valley the Khmer administrative hands were weakened by the death of Jayavarman II in 1220. Coedès suggests that the Tai effervescence was inspired by the successes of the Mongol arms in the North, in China proper. Another factor which contributed in no small degree to the rise of the Tais was the earlier rise of the Pagan Dynasty. It was the founder of the Dynasty, King Anawrahta, and his immediate successors who weakened the Mon-Khmer powers in the Lower Burma and the Lower Menam Valley. Prince Damrong advanced the theory that when the chronicles stated that Anawrahta conquered Thaton, Nakorn Pathom, a few miles southwest of Bangkok, was actually meant. When Pagan fell, the Tais were ready to step in.

The situation in Southeast Asia at the close of the thirteenth century showed the following dispositions of Tai powers:

In Central Burma, the three Shan brothers began their reign in Ava (1287); in Lower Burma, the Shan Haraoh (a title given to him by his old Lord and father-in-law, Ramakhamheng, the Thai King of Sukhotoai) made himself master of Martaban and eventually became the King of Pegu; in Northern Siam, Mangrai's expansion of his dominion from Chiangsaen-Chiangrai area culminated in the sack of the Mon (?) Kingdom of Haripunjai (1261) and the founding of Lannathai (Chiangmai); in Sukhotoai Ramakhamheng (Pra Ruang II) consolidated his Kingdom and erected his famous stone inscription (1292); in Mongmao, Sokhampha's successors appeared to be consolidating what Sunlongpha had won for


them during the second quarter of the century, and nothing of note was recorded except for the move of the capital to the present Mongman during the reign of Sowakpha who died in 1315; in Hsenwi nothing of note was recorded throughout the century; in Kengtung scions of Mangrai were ruling.¹

How these "beach-head States" were established can be seen from the way the Shans from Mongnai, Hawnkai and Mongpan settled in Mehawngsawm, Mongman, Massaum, Mongton, Monghang, etc., in the middle of the last century.² If a more warlike example of such trusts is needed, we may cite the Shan Rising in the rainy season of 1902³ in Lao Provinces of North Siam. Either through discontent with local Siamese officials (British and Shan version) or through a desire for loot (Siamese version), or, what was more likely, both, the Shans who had settled in the Lampang-Pre-Phayao area suddenly rose against the local Siamese authorities. It was said that they only went after the Bangkok Thais, as distinct from the Laos, and that about 20 heads were collected. Most of the rebels were Shan petty traders and precious stone miners, and it all started at Phayao and spread southward rapidly. At that time the Lao Provinces were also dissatisfied with the Central Government at Bangkok. The rebels numbered several hundred and soon captured Pre and made its chaoluang (sawbwa) agree to support their cause while the Siamese Governor there was summarily executed. The Chaoluang of Lampang refused to give in and ordered his police to fight it out and a reward of Tics 500 was offered for each Shan or Ngio head brought in. Fighting was widespread but the rising soon petered out partly because the British vice counsellor at Nan, Mr. T. H. Lyle, came to Pre and ordered the Shans there to lay down their arms before a junction was affected with another ban coming from the Lampang area; and partly because a force of modern troops was sent up from Bangkok in time. The rebels no doubt took advantage of the fact that British subjects in Siam could not be touched by Siamese laws without knowledge of the British consulates representatives. When the rising had been put down,² British subjects, a Burman, an employee of the Bombay Burma Trading Company, and a Shan called Pu Phiu were given a summary trial and shot by the Siamese. The British protested violently and this resulted in a Siamese officer, Phya Daskornpalat, being tried and sentenced to 12 years imprisonment, though he was released after 2 years in jail.

When the Sawbwa of Kengtung, Saomom Kawn Kiao Intaleng, was passing through Bangkok in 1903 on his way from the Delhi Durbar to his own State, he had an audience with King Chulalongkorn, and after this audience he called on the Minister of Interior, Prince Damrong. On both occasions he was accompanied by Mr. W. A. R. Wood, the British Consul. The Sawbwa expressed the hope to the prince that the recent

¹ Wood and Yonok History suggest that Kengtung, then known as Khemarat, was part of Lannathai.
² See Chapter IX.
³ Le May, R., An Asian Arcady, p. 57.
rising would not cause the Siamese Government to bar the Shans from trading and settling in the country, and that the Shans would not give trouble again. The prince replied that all would be well if only Mr. Wood would not register them as British subjects. 1

If there had been no British vice consul at Nan, and if it had succeeded, the Shan rising in North Siam in 1902 would probably have repeated what the ancestors of the Laos had done a thousand years earlier. For, as Professor Hall says, what happened in those dim days "was not a mass displacement of population in the areas affected but the seizure of power by a Tai governing class." 2 In our own times, in the past decade in fact, there has been an influx of Chinese Shans from China into north and northeastern Burma; as well as movements by the Shans of Burma across the southeastern borders of the Shan States into Thailand. In both cases the cause of the move has been the unsettled conditions in their own homeland.

So much for Tai migrations.

A reference has already been made to the Nanchao kingdom of Yunnan. This has, up to very recently, been regarded as a great Shan kingdom, the greatest that the Tai race had set up in southeast Asia. Now a theory is being advanced that the rulers of Nanchao were in fact not Shans but Lolos, a people of the same Tibeto-Burman stock as the Burmese are believed to have stemmed from. This is a theory which I see reasons to favour, but as the reputation of Nanchao as a great and powerful Shan kingdom is still so widespread I offer some information about it to those of my country-men who are bound to be interested in its civilisation and its standing vis-a-vis China.

The first person to circulate the story of the Nanchao Kingdom seems to have been E. H. Parker, who came in 1891 from the British Consulate at Kiumchow to act as Adviser on Chinese Affairs to the Government of Burma. Parker stated that this history of Nanchao was extracted from the Annals of the Chinese Dynasty of Ti'ang. To him, the words Ailao and Shan were synonymous.

A hundred years before the Christian era, Emperor Wu Ti of the Han Dynasty sent an expedition against the Ailao country in the present-day Yunnan. This country was called Tien with its capital Peh-ngai. The king of Tien became an ally of the Chinese and together they suppressed the Kunming tribes.

About 50 A.D., Hienlih, King of the Ailaos, had a clash with the Chinese but was worsted and made to pay tribute. After this, numerous other Ailao tribes submitted, and all the Ailaos

1. Main trend of the story told to the writer by Mr. Wood and Princess Phoon, Prince Damrong's daughter.

numbering over half a million, were placed under the prefecture of Yungchang.

The Ailaos used to pierce their noses and distend their ears - the higher the rank the greater the distension, in some cases the ear touching the shoulder.

Later governors of Yungchang were less successful in treating with the Ailaos and frontier clashes with the Chinese occurred from time to time. During this period the Pyus of Burma came under the influence of the Ailaos.

In 220 A.D. China was split into three empires and the Ailaos seem to have dropped out of the picture for some centuries. By 650 A.D. the kingdom had come to be known as Nanchao, meaning 'Southern Prince' if we take Nan in Chinese meaning 'south' and Chao in Tai meaning 'prince.' As early as 70 A.D. in fact, six Chaos were listed, of whom the most powerful was the Chao of Mengshe in the south from whom all the Nanchao kings descended. This Nanchao Kingdom was very extensive, touching Magadha in the West, Tibet in the North-west, China in the North, "Female Prince State" (a term then applied to Cambodia whose queen married an Indian adventurer) in the South, Annam in the South-east and the Pyu Kingdom in the South-west. There seems to have been two capitals - one not far from modern Talifu and the other near Yungchang.

The Nan-chao Empire seems to have been highly organized. There were ministers of State, censors or examiners, generals, record officers, chamberlains, judges, treasurers, aediles, ministers of commerce, &c., and the native word for each department is given as shwang. It is for Shan scholars to exercise their wits upon this word. Minor officers managed the granaries, stables, taxes, &c., and the military organisation was by tens, centurions, chiliarchs, decachiliarchs, and so on. Military service was compulsory for all able-bodied men, who drew lots for each levy. Each soldier was supplied with a leather coat and pair of trousers. There were four distinct army corps or divisions, each having its own standard. The King's body-guard was called chu-nu katsa, and we are told that katsa or katsu meant "leather belt," — perhaps the Siamese khat-eu or the Burmese khatsi. The men wore chuti helmets and carried shields of rhinoceros hide. The centurions were called lo-tsa-tsé. All these words are deserving of the attention of Shan scholars. Land was apportioned out to each family according to rank; superior officials received forty shwang or acres (the tone of this word being unlike the tone of the first-mentioned word shwang). Some of the best cavalry soldiers were of the Wang-tsa tribe, west of the Mekong, — possibly the modern Wa. The women of this tribe fought too, and the helmets of the Wang-tsa were studded with cowries. There were six metropolitan departments and six provincial Viceroy's in
Nan-chao. The barbarian word for "department" was Kien, undoubtedly the Keng of modern Keng-ma, and the Kiang of modern Kiang-tung. The King of Ching-mai, Tzimne, or Zimne is perhaps the same word locally pronounced.

It is unnecessary to enumerate all the Nan-chao departments: but it is interesting to note:— Peh-ngai, once the capital of the King of Tien; Yunnan; Meng-she, the ancient seat of the Meng family of Nan-chao rulers; Ta-li; and Taiho (Tali Fu).

The people were acquainted with the arts of weaving cotton and rearing silkworms: in some parts— the west—of the country there was considerable malaria, and the salt wells of K'un-ming or modern Yunnan Fu were free to the people. West of Yung-ch'ang a mulberry grew, the wood of which was suitable for making bows, and gold was found in many parts, both in the sands and in the mountains. West of modern Momein the race of horses was particularly good.

When the King sallied forth, eight white-scalloped standards of greyish purple were carried before him; two feather fans, a chowry, an ax, and a parasol of king-fishers' feather having a red bag. The queen-mother's standards were scalloped with brown instead of white. She was called sin-mo (sheng-ma) or kiu-mo, and the queen-wife was called tsin-wu.

As a special mark of honour, the chief dignitaries wore a kimpolo or tiger-skin, — an article still worn by the northern Burmese in winter. The women's hair was gathered into two locks and plaited into a chignon: their ears were ornamented with pearls, green-stone, and amber. Female morals were easy previous to marriage, but after marriage death was the penalty for adultery. If I am not mistaken, the same thing may now be said of some of the Shan States, according to recent official reports.

One peculiar article of food called ngo-k'uch is mentioned. This was fish, hashed up with gherkins, pepper, and ginger. The first syllable suggests the word nga, and k'uch may be misprint for a very similar character p'ihn, the Burmese ngapi.

It took three Nan-chao men to drive an ox-plough: one led it, another drove it, and the third poked up the animal: all ranks, even the nobles, engaged in this leisurely agricultural work. There were no corvees, but each man paid a tax of two measures of rice a year.

As stated the line of Nanchao Kings belonged to the Meng Dynasty and there was a complete list of them after about 600 A.D.
As a rule, the last syllable of a King's name became the first of that of his son. Thus among the first Nanchao Kings we have the following names:

1. She-lung
2. Ka-tuh-mang
3. Tuh-lo (alias Sinulo)
4. Lo-sheng-yen
5. Yen-koh
6. Sheng-lo-p'î) brothers

We may now trace some important happenings in the Nanchao or Meng Empire in chronological order.

In 746 A.D. Kohlofeng succeeded his father and made T'âiho (Talifu) his capital. He threw in his lot with the Tibetans and made war on China on account of the imprudent behaviour of a neighbouring Chinese Governor, and named his Kingdoms the Great Meng Empire. China was in difficulties with the Turks at this period. Kohlofeng set up a stone inscription telling the world why he severed relations with the Chinese, and this stone was said by the author of the History of Yunnan, M. Emik Rocher, to be still in existence in the suburb of Ta-li-fu.

Kohlofeng's son, Feng Ka-i, having died before his father, Imousun (son of Feng Ka-i) succeeded to the throne after the former's death. The Ailaos and the Tibetans combined to attack China during Imousun's reign, but were worsted. Imousun later broke away from the Tibetans who became oppressive to his people because they established garrisons at all important points, levied men to fight their wars and collected taxes ruthlessly. Due to the machinations of a Chinese mandarin, Imousun made peace with the Chinese.

794 A.D., April, Imousun fought against the Tibetans in a great and bloody battle at the "Iron Bridge" on the upper Yangtse in west Yunnan) and defeated them. The Chinese Emperor recognised Imousun as the King of Nanchao and Chinese envoys were received with great pomp. "Soldiers lined the roads, and the horses' harness was ablaze with gold and cowries. Imousun wore a coat of gold mail and tiger skin, and had twelve elephants drawn in front of him." From now on, the Nanchao King entered upon a career of conquests, welded the six Shan principalities into one, and annexed a number of neighbouring tribes. Imousun sent his sons to be educated in China and maintained good relations with that country. To break the Tibetans, Imousun made war upon them again, and was again victorious.

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1. T'âiho means "great peace" in Chinese and it is said that the Shan word for peace is "Shan-po-t'î'o" and that the name was adopted after a successful war. "Shan-po-t'î'o" conveys no meaning in the present-day Shan.

2. At the time Mr. Parker submitted his story in June 1892.
808 A.D. Imousun died and was succeeded by his son, Sunkohkuan, alias Meng Tsou, 1 who styled himself Piausin, 1 but he ruled only for one year and was succeeded by his son, Kuanlungsheng, who was in turn murdered by one of his generals. Another son, K'uanli succeeded and was followed by his brother, Fengyu, who out of modesty declined to take a syllable from his father's name. The general who murdered Kuanlungsheng, in a raid on Changtu, kidnapped a number of Chinese boys and girls and skilled artisans. This exploit was said to have resulted in Nanchao being placed on a par with China in costs, literature and weaving.

In 859 A.D., one "Shan grandee" named Tsiulung, not of the direct line but thought to be a grandson of Imousun, became king, and taking offence at certain Chinese diplomatic omissions broke off relations with China and declared himself Emperor of Nanchao. Still retaining the title of piausin, he made war on China and occupied the capital of Annam, Tongkin, but he was driven off by the celebrated Chinese general Kaopien; and after years of fighting he was obliged to submit. The Chinese then allied themselves with Nanchao's old enemy the Tibetans. Meanwhile Tsiulung died in 874 of a carbuncle "brought on by excessive mental worry."

Mengfah 2 succeeded Tsiulung and adopted a hostile policy towards the Chinese but his ambitions were thwarted by the latter's strategem. Mengfah was followed by his son, Shunhwa, in 885. The Chinese ignored friendly overtures from Nanchao throughout Shunhwa's reign, but soon the Chinese Empire itself was engulfed by civil wars, and relations with Nanchao ceased entirely. In any case, Shunhwa had no sons and when he died in 889 the Meng Ruling House, which had its beginning at Mengshe and had been ruling for over 800 years, came to an end.

After the death of Shunhwa, complete anarchy reigned in Nanchao and adventurous generals tried to outmanoeuvre one another.

In 916 A.D., an adventurous Chinese satrap named Twan Sz-ping established himself as the King of Tali. 3 The Twans continued to rule from this date until the advent of the Mongols in the middle of the 13th century. They sometimes styled themselves as Emperors. During the rule of the Twans, Central Burma and the Shan States often had contacts with the "Chinese Emperor" variously called U Di Bwa, Sao Wong, Fa Wong, Phya Wong, Sao Wongti, Wongtfang, etc. Probably the appellation did not refer to any one higher than one of the Twans of Tali.

1. of. Burmese "Minsaw" and "Pyushin."
2. Mongpha (Muangfa) ?
3. According to J. G. Scott's Burma, p. 46, Twan accomplished this by massacring 800 members of the Ruling House.
It was during the reign of one Twan Shianghing in 1236 that the Mongols, who had by now conquered the Kitans, Nuchens and parts of China, came down the Tali-way threatening war. Tali by then was only one of the numerous principalities or States into which Yunnan had been divided. Emperor Mangu Khan sent Kublai himself to subdue Yunnan. Two of Twan's ministers were foolish enough to murder his envoys; but the Mongol conqueror was satisfied with executing the culprits without putting the whole populace to the sword as he had done elsewhere. Kublai Khan appointed one of the King's ministers as suanfushi, or "pacificator," whose duty it was to advise and help the King in State affairs. "This seems to have been the origin of the kindred appellations now bestowed upon the Shan tsawbas."

When Kublai became Emperor, the aged Tali King, Twan Shianghing, set out on a journey to China to tender the submission of his Kingdom, but he died on the way and was succeeded by his son, Twan Sinchajih. Kublai recognised this person only as a Governor instead of King. He later became a general and then a suanfushi. It was Twan Sinchajih who helped the Mongols to invade Burma towards the close of the century.

In 1298 Kublai's son, the Prince of Liang, was appointed Viceroy of Yunnan, but, according to this source, the Mongols never thoroughly subdued the Twans.

In 1367 another Prince of Liang named Timur Baekha established himself as an independent Governor of Tali after a war; by this time the Mongols had been driven out of China by the Mings.

In 1381 a large Ming army effected the conquest of Yunnan, but the native chiefs were allowed to govern their own people.

Mr. Parker concluded:

This brings us to the period whence the history of the border tsawbas begins. Even now, the southern portions of Yunnan are in part administered by Shan tsawbas, or by Chinese adventurers, who have become Shans in character. As the Chinese find they can absorb this or that tsawbaship, it falls under direct Chinese rule, and the centre of Shan power is slowly but surely driven south. As Captain Forbes very judiciously suggests, "previously to the destruction of the Pagan monarchy in A.D. 1282, the Tai race, of which the Shans form a branch, had been gradually forced out of their original seat in Yunnan by the advance of the Chinese power under the great Emperor Kublai Khan. It was about this time that a portion of the race formed the kingdom of Siam." Dieu Van-tri, the Chief of the Muong Shans, is not a Shan, but a Canton Chinaman named Lo, who still holds the Ming seal, and has always rejected the overtures of the Manchus. The name Dieu is simply the surname Tao given by the Chinese. His colleagues of Ch'ei-li, or the Sib-song-panna, seems to be
still in a wavering state, and it is high time that China put her foot down. After fighting against the French, Dieu has come to the conclusion that they are better allies than China, and, in order to protect himself against Chinese revenge, he has admitted 300 Tonquinese soldiers, under French officers, into his capital at Lai-chau, or perhaps Dien-pien-phu. His children have gone to Paris to be educated.

In speaking four years ago to Siamese of high rank at Bangkok, I found that they were totally ignorant of the history of the Shan Empire. Doubtless the Siamese migrated or were driven south when the Shan Empire broke up. The Chinese are also ignorant that the Nanchao were Shans. In fact, in submitting the above sketch, I can cite no better authority for the due concatenation of events than myself, for nearly the whole information is taken from translations published by me a year or two ago in China, or from information gathered on the spot in Tonquin, Siam, or Burma. 1

Such is the story of the Kingdom of Nanchao. Regarding the race of its rulers I am inclined more towards the theory that it was Lolo rather than Shan (though I know nothing of Lolos) if only because of one or two aspects in the story just narrated, which do not appear Shan to me.

The custom of adopting the last syllable (or even one of the syllables) of the father's name in that of the son is not a Shan usage, and like the Burmese, the Shans do not have family names which seem to have been the practice among the Nanchao kings. Moreover, except for "Mengfah" none of the kings' names suggests a Shan origin. "Chao" and "kien" might be Shan words, but they seem to be the exception rather than the rule, and if the Tais intermingled with other peoples in Yunnan in those days there must have been some words which were common to all. The words "piau-sin" and "meng-tso" suggest, rather, an affinity with the Burmese language, and Lolo and Burmese belong to the same stock — that of Tibeto-Burman.

It might be asked what traces remain of this great 'Shan' or other Tai settlements of those days. There is a sad lack of ruins and inscriptions to begin with. The earliest Thai inscription is that of Ramakhamheng of Sukhotoi in 1292. As far as the Western Shans and Chinese Shans (who claim the past glories of Hsenwi and Mongmao) are concerned, no such things have yet been found. It is not known when the present Shan Script came into being, but no stone inscription of any antiquity written in this script has been found. A Shan book which is over 100 years old is still to be discovered.

This shows either that the script is of very recent origin or that the
Shans were not in the habit of erecting inscriptions. In the present
Shan State nothing short of granite should have survived the incessant
warfare within and between the states. Nevertheless, traces of old
cities can still be seen in many places in the Shan State. A well-
organized excavation will certainly add to our knowledge of the old
Shan states. East of the Salween, in Kengtung city a stone inscription
bears a date; if my memory serves me, in the sixteenth century and the
script is Khun but the letters are rectangular instead of rounded as
used at present. There are many inscriptions in the north of Kengtung
awaiting rubbing and reading.¹

Many pagodas (cediya) in the Shan State claim to be hundreds of
years old, but the original shapes of the more celebrated ones have not
survived the zeal of the devotees who insist on building grander but
more modern shells over the old forms. It is these same devotees who
allow beautiful monasteries, adorned with rare wood carvings and
splendidly gilded, to go to rack and ruin, and, instead of maintaining
and repairing them, insist on building new ones.

Ancient sites and ruins and inscriptions have failed us, we next
turn to the chronicles. The modern practice is to regard the chronicles
only as the barest outline of history, unless events mentioned are
collaborated by other writings and/or chronicles. As far as the Shan
chronicles are concerned, if the events mentioned in them are also
spoken of in the annals of Chinese Dynasties, so much the better. The
chronicles of all the major Shan States can be found in the Gazetteer
of Upper Burma and the Shan States, but they are always prefaced with
words of caution as to their historical worthiness. I have before me
three versions of the Chronicles of Hsenwi, and some of the important
dates do not agree. The two versions of Hsipaw State Chronicle
suffer from the same shortcoming. A Chronicle of Mongnai has over
100 pages of parabaik, but it contains not a single date. The dates
in the four versions of the Kengtung Chronicles, however, agree sub-
stantially. This was most probably due to the fact that they were
copied from the same original source. I also find that the English
translation of these Chronicles in the Gazetteer of Upper Burma and
the Shan States contain some errors, either in the names of rulers, or
in certain facts; but it is not an easy matter for any translation to
be entirely accurate if it has to go through another medium. Most
Shan chronicles must have been translated first into Burmese, orally
or otherwise, and then into English in the offices of British Admin-
istrators. But until better translations are available those who work
in English must rely upon the work of those Administrators, to whom our
grateful thanks are indeed due.

It will take time to sort out the dates in the chronicles of the
Shan States. Mongnai, Hsipaw, Hsenwi, Mongnai and Yawnghwe seem
closely connected at one time or another and some cohesion and accuracy
should emerge from comparing dates and names. The Kengtung chronicle

¹. See page 1 above.
would need to be checked with those of Kenghung, Monglem and Chiengmai. It will be interesting to see how much of these chronicles is mentioned in the Chinese dynastic annals. Sooner or later such verification and comparison should be done and it certainly can be done, given sufficient time and facilities. Once that is done there is no reason why a modest history of the Shan State cannot be compiled.

For the time being the chronicles of the major Shan States make a sad reading as they tell of little else except moving of capitals, palace intrigues, rebellions, fighting for succession and interstate warfare. Very often fraternal love among princes was only skin deep. Nevertheless, posterity is grateful for some dates of succession which give us something to start with.

The most famous so far, of such chronicles is not that of any of our own Shan States, but that of the Kingdom of Pong. It is famous because it was the earliest to be read by European scholars who, however, not being at all certain which of the Shan kingdoms 'Pong' could be identified with, there being no Pong state discernible in the geography of these regions, variously located it in Mongmao (Yunnan), Mogaung (northern Burma) and Nanchao. Sir George Scott whose own belief was that it was Nanchao declared at one point that in the absence of any really satisfying solution, the frivolous might say that "it was Mrs. Harris."

The Pong chronicle was discovered by Captain R. D. Pemberton of the Indian Army who was sent to Manipur on intelligence work in the early 1830's, and I reproduce his translation verbatim, because, having compared it carefully with the stories of Mongmao and Mogaung (which are attached at the end of the book), I offer my own theory as to the location of the mysterious "Pong." To general readers who are not interested in the unravelling of such clues in the tracing of old Shan kingdoms I offer the story as an example of the state chronicles such as every major Shan State in Burma also possesses.

Captain R. B. Pemberton has written:

1st. The country, of which it is now proposed to give a general description, extends from the foot of the mountains forming the south-eastern boundary of the Assam valley, in latitude 27° north, down to the 22nd parallel of latitude, and from the mountains which separate the Muneepoor and Kobo valleys on the west, to the Chinese province of Yunnan on the east.

2nd. These, as far as our information now extends, formed the boundaries of an extensive empire, of which scarcely even the name has hitherto been known; though the Siamese and the people of Iowia Shan, who speak the same language, unite in representing themselves as descended from the Taee-ion or great Shans, by whom it was occupied. Dr. Buchanan, who accompanied Colonel Symes in his embassy to Ava, in 1798, was the first European who obtained any
certain information upon the subject; but even he appears to
have been wholly uninformed of the earlier history of the
country, and to have known its chiefs only in their present
degraded situation, as tributaries to the King of Ava.

3rd. During my residence in Muneepoor, I ascertained
the existence of an ancient Shan manuscript chronicle, which
proved of very material assistance in some discussions upon
questions of boundary with the Court of Ava; and though un­
able to procure the document itself from the old Shan to
whom it belonged, he allowed me to have it translated into
the Muneeporee language under his immediate superintendance,
and from this translation I have obtained the information of
the past political relations of this kingdom, of which it is
now proposed to give an abstract.

4th. The names by which this territory was known to
Dr. Buchanan, were those of Mrelap Shan, or Shan tributary to
the Burmahs, and Kasi Shan, or the western portion of it,
tributary to the Kasis, Kathees, or Cassayers, by all of which
names the people of Muneepoor, who call themselves Moitay or
Miethliee, were designated. To the Muneeporees, the whole
country under its ancient limits was, and is still, known as
the kingdom of Pong, of which the city called by the Burmahs
Mogaung, and by the Shans Mongmaorong, was the capital. The
people, they generally called Kubo, and distinguished them,
as they were dependant on Muneepoor or Ava, by the terms
Miethliee Kubo, or Awa Kubo, which expressions are synonymous
with the names Kasi Shan and Mrelap Shan, applied by the
Burmahs to the same people and country.

5th. From Khooliee, the first king, whose name is
recorded in the chronicle, and whose reign is dated as far
back as the 80th year of the Christian era, to the time of
Murgnow, in the year 667 A.D., the names of twelve kings are
given, who are described as having gradually extended their
conquests from north to south, and the names of no less than
twenty-seven tributary cities are mentioned, which acknowledged
the supremacy of Murgnow. To this period, the Pong kings
appear to have been so fully engaged in attempts to consoli­
date their power at home as to have had but little leisure,
and probably less ability, to extend their conquests to coun­
tries more remotely situated. In the year 777 A.D., Murgnow
died, leaving two sons, called Sookampha and Samlongpha, of
whom the eldest Sookampha succeeded to the throne of Pong,
and in his reign we find the first traces of a connexion
with the more western countries, many of which he appears to
have succeeded in bringing under subjection to his authority.

6th. Samlong, the second brother, was dispatched by
Sookampha at the head of a powerful force, to subdue first
the countries to the eastward, including probably the
principality of Bhume, which extends from the left bank of the Irawattee river to the frontier of Yunan: this expedition was successful, and Samlongpha again leaving Mongmaorong, is described as having arrived in the western country of the Basa king, which probably means Banga, the ancient capital of the Kachar country; he overcame the opposition there made to him, and having received his submission, proceeded to Tripurah, where he was equally successful. From Tripurah, he marched back across the hills, and descended into the Munseeoor valley near Moeerang, a village on the western bank of the Logtak lake.

7th. The fact of this visit is also recorded in the ancient chronicles of Munseeoor, though the period assigned to it is earlier by sixty years than that given in the Shan chronicle—a discrepancy in dates, which it were equally vain and useless to attempt to reconcile. Samlongpha, in consideration of the extreme poverty of the Munseeoor territory, remitted all tribute, and appears to have directed the adoption of certain observances in dress and diet, calculated to improve the habits and manners of the people, who were evidently in the lowest stage of civilization.

8th. From Munseeoor, Samlongpha, according to the Shan chronicle, proceeded into Assam, where he also succeeded in establishing his brother’s authority. He dispatched messengers to Mongmaorong, to communicate the intelligence of his success to his brother Sookampa, and to announce his intended return to Pong. The messengers, however, instilled the most serious suspicions into the mind of Sookampa, of the designs of his brother, and represented him as determined to assume the sovereignty of the country on his return from Assam. A conspiracy was entered into for the purpose of poisoning Samlongpha, who was saved by his mother’s having accidentally overheard the plot, of which she gave him timely warning by letter. Samlongpha’s wife and son were permitted to join him in Assam, and from this son, who was called Chownakhum, the subsequent princes of the Assam dynasty are said to be descended.

9th. If we compare this tradition with the accounts given by the Assamese themselves, to Dr. Buchanan, in 1808 and 1809, we shall find them tracing their descent from two brothers, Khunlaee and Khunteee, whose names sufficiently prove their Shan origin; the one brother is said to have remained in Nora, by which term the Simphos, or tribes occupying the mountains south-east of Assam, to this day designate the Tsobwa or tributary prince of Mogaung, whom they call the Nora Rajah; and the other brother, Khunteee, remained near the hill Chorai Khorong, in the vicinity of Geergaong, the ancient capital of Assam, which, as it is on
the eastern borders of the valley, was probably the site chosen for a residence by Samlongpha.

10th. This account is the only one I am aware of, that proves with any degree of certainty the fact of intercourse having taken place at so remote a period between the Indo-Chinese nations and the inhabitants of the eastern frontier of Bengal. That the supremacy which was then obtained by the brother of the Pong king over Cachar and Tripurah, was exercised but for a short period, may be fairly assumed from the nature of the country and the distance which separated the paramount authority from the subjected state. But the proof, that such an intercourse did take place, satisfactorily establishes the source from whence the Tartar peculiarities by which these tribes are distinguished have been derived, and we know that with Muneepoor, communication continued to be held to a comparatively recent period.

11th. From the death of Sookampha, in the year 808, to the accession of Soognampha, in 1315, the names of ten kings only are given, whose reigns appear to have been unmarked by any event of importance; but about the year 1332, A.D. some disagreements originating in the misconduct of four pampered favourites of the Pong king, led to collision between the frontier villages of his territory, and those of Yunnan. An interview was appointed between the kings of Pong and China, to take place at the town of Mongsee, which is said to have been five days distant from Mongmaorong, the capital of Pong. The Chinese sovereign, with whom this interview took place, is named in the chronicle Chowongtee, and Shun-tee, the last prince of the twentieth imperial dynasty, is in the best chronological tables described as having ascended the throne of China in the year 1333; the coincidence of dates and striking similarity of name leave no doubt of the identity of the emperor in whose reign the conference took place, and the misunderstanding was removed by the execution of the Pong men.

12th. The Chinese, however, probably, now conscious of their superior power, determined on subjugating the Pong dominions, and after a protracted struggle of two years' duration, the capital of Mogaung or Mongmaorong was captured by a Chinese army, under the command of a general called Yangchangsoo, and the King Soognampha, with his eldest son, Sookeeph, fled to the king of Pugan or Ava, for protection. They were demanded by the Chinese general, to whom the Burmese surrendered them, and were carried into China, from whence they never returned.

13th. The Queen of Pong, who, with her two remaining sons, and a third born after her flight from the capital, had sought a refuge among the Khumptis on the north, returned at the expiration of two years, and established a town on the
banks of the Numkong river, to which the name of Moong-kong was given. The second and third sons of the exiled king Soognam reigned, the one three, and the other, twenty eight, years, and were succeeded by their younger brother, Soo-ooop-pha, who, as has been before mentioned, was born after the destruction of the capital Mongmaorong by the Chinese.

14th. This prince ascended the throne in the year A.D. 1363, and anxious to avenge the treachery of the Burmahs, who had surrendered his father and brother to the Chinese general Yangchangsoo, he invaded their territory three years afterwards, at the head of a large army, and laid siege to the capital of Zukaing, on the northern bank of the Irawatee river, which he succeeded in capturing and destroying. A very unexpected confirmation of this event is found in the Appendix of Mr. Crawfurd's Embassy to Ava, where in the Burmese chronological table, obtained during his residence in that country, the destruction of Chitkaing or Zakaing and Penya is mentioned as having been effected in the year 1364, and Major Burney also discovered the same circumstance recorded in the 6th vol. of the Maha Yazwen, or great history of Ava, where the destruction of both cities is said to have been effected by the Shan king Thokyenbwa.

15th. Soo-ooop-pha was succeeded by his nephew Soo-hoongpha, who, after a prosperous reign, died in the year 1405, A.D., leaving four sons, whose names, and the districts assigned for their support, it will be useful to record. The eldest son, who was called Sooheppha, was also known by the cognomens of Soohoongkhum and Chow-hoo-mo, and to him the districts of Manpha and Moonjeet were assigned. The second son was called Chow-hoong-sang and Satabal, and he possessed Moongyang and the surrounding territory. The third, Chow-swee-nok, subsisted on Kaksa; and to the fourth, Sow-rum-khum, the district of Khumbat, was assigned. The names of two princesses, daughters of Soohoongpha, are also mentioned in the chronicle, one of whom was given in marriage to the tributary chieftain of Moongyang, and the other was affianced to the dependant Rajah of Khumbat; but on reaching Moongyang, on her way to Khumbat, the anticipated separation caused the two sisters so much distress, that they solicited and obtained their father's permission to dissolve the engagement with the Khumbat chieftain, who requested that the dowry he was to have received with the princess should be still paid, and a remission of tribute be granted to him for three years. The latter request only was complied with, and the Khumbat Rajah, indignant at the treatment he had received, built a strong fort, under a pretended apprehension of the tribes of the adjacent hills, and prepared to throw off his allegiance to the king of Pong.
16th. In this state of affairs, Soohoongkhum, in the year 1474 A.D., sent an embassy, headed by a Shan nobleman called Chowlanghiee, to Kyamba, the reigning prince of Muneepoor, requesting a daughter in marriage, which was acceded to; and in the following year, the princess left Muneepoor, for Pong, escorted by Chowlanghiee. On reaching the Sekmoo hill, which is close upon the western frontier of the Sumjok territory, the cavalcade was attacked, and the princess carried off by the Rajah of Khumbat, who had been lying in wait at the foot of the hill for this purpose, with a chosen band of followers. The Pong nobleman Chowlanghiee effected his escape, and reaching Mongmaorong, related the disaster and capture of the princess.

17th. Measures were immediately taken to avenge so gross an insult; the king of Pong crossed the Ningthee or Kyendwen river, at the head of a considerable force, and entering the Kubo valley, was there joined by the Muneepoor chieftain, with all his men; they besieged Khumbat, which, after an obstinate defence, was carried by assault, and the Rajah made his escape to the southward, on a spotted elephant, by a pass which still bears his name, and commemorates the event.

18th. A tract of country was then made over to the Rajah of Muneepoor by the king of Pong, extending east to the Noajeeree, a range of hills running between the Moo and Kyendwen rivers, which was then established as the boundary between the two countries. South, the limit extended to the Meeyatoung or Meeya hills, and north, to a very celebrated mangoe tree near Moongkhum, between the Noajeeree hills and the Kyendwen river, where, the two princes separated, and returned to their respective capitals.

19th. The Pong king Soohoongkhum, or Kingkhomba, with whom these arrangements were made, died about the year 1512-1513, and was succeeded by his son Soopengpha, in whose reign, according to this ancient chronicle, the Burmahs first attacked and conquered Pong, though they affirm their subjugation of this kingdom to have been effected so early as at the commencement of the 11th century.

20th. In the 9th and 10th volumes of the Burmese History, before alluded to, Major Burney found, that in 1526 A.D., the Niliyen and Mogaung Shans again invaded Ava in considerable forces, and destroyed the capital, killed the king, and overran the whole country as far south as Toungnoo and Prome; for nineteen years afterwards, according to the same authority, two Shan princes reigned in Ava, and Soopengpha, whose career had been marked by such vicissitudes of conquest and defeat, died, according to the Shan chronicle, in the year 1568, A.D.
21st. Under his son and successor, Sookopha, two successful invasions of Siam are recorded in the chronicle, and the capture of four white elephants gave a degree of importance to the conquest, which none but an Indo-Chinese can fully appreciate: his territories were subsequently invaded by the Burmahs, his capital taken, and himself compelled to fly to Khumpti, where he was discovered and betrayed to the Burmese by two of his slaves, Tooyang and Sieerang: his subsequent fate is unnoticed in the chronicles, where his reign terminates in 1587 A.D., with his capture, and his son Chow-kalkhum is said to have succeeded him. In an attack upon Meetoor or Myedoo, not more than four or five marches north of Ava, he was cut off by a Chinese force, which appears to have invaded this portion of the Burmese territories at the same time, and was killed about the year 1592.

22nd. Chowoongkhun, called also Soohoongpha, who had fled to Ava on the death of his father Chowkalkhum, was raised to the vacant throne by the Burmeh king, but was again dispossessed four years afterwards, in consequence apparently of having attempted to throw off his allegiance, and raising the standard of rebellion in Moongyang, which he had been sent to destroy. His reign lasted but four years, and is only remarkable for the general adoption by the Shans, about the year 1596, of the Burmese style of tying the hair and dressing; two circumstances which clearly prove their subjugation at that period to have been effectually accomplished. An Interregnum of ten years followed the expulsion of Chowoongkhun, and from 1617 to 1662 A.D. four rulers are mentioned whose brief sway was unmarked by any event worth recording. In the ten years between 1662 and 1672, a son of the king of Ava reigned in Pong, after whom, the succession again reverted to the lineal descendants of their ancient race of kings, and five are mentioned whose united reigns bring the history of that country down to the year 1734.

23rd. About this time, two princes of Pong, called Mongpo and Kyathon, fled to Rajah Gureeb Nuwaz of Munepoor, whose career of conquest has been noticed in the second section of this report, and solicited his protection against the Burmahs: he attacked and destroyed the town of Meetoor, and establishing the two princes at Moongkhong, in the month of May, bestowed his daughter Yenjeejoyaae in marriage on the eldest. From Moongkhong, they returned in August to Mongmaorong, the ancient capital of Pong, where the elder brother reigned for a short and uncertain period; Chowmokhum (Mongpo) was succeeded by the younger of two sons named Chowkholeseng, in whose time arose the Burmese dynasty of Mooksoo, with its founder Alompra, about the year 1752, A.D., from which period, even a nominal independence has ceased to exist, and this once extensive empire, stretching to Assam, Tripurah, Tunan,
and Siam, has been thoroughly dismembered, its princes are no longer known, and its capital is ruled by a delegate from Ava. 1

On comparison of the above story with those of Mongmao and Mogaung 2, I came to the conclusion that "Pong" was neither Nanchao; nor Mongmao nor Mogaung alone; nor need it be "Mrs. Harris." I think, rather, that the first part of the story up to the surrender of Songanpha by Ava to the Chinese was the story of Mongmao or the Mao Kingdom; and that from there onwards, from the time that the Pong Queen, Songanpha's wife, established her court at 'Moongkong', the story is that of Mogaung.

Before enumerating some points in support of this theory, I should point out that both Pemberton's report of Pong and Elias' sketches of Mongmao and Mogaung reached the compilers in English after having passed through two or three hands and as many languages. It is natural, therefore, that there should be mistakes in Shan sounds and dates after such treatment. I suspect that the original Shan source of both works was Mao Shan. In this dialect of the Tai language group, the consonant "nw" is often pronounced as "lw" and vice versa, also, certain individual Shans would pronounce "lw" as "nw", although this is very rare. The fact that both Elias and Pemberton did not know any dialect of the Tai language made it difficult for them to render every Shan word or name wholly intelligible. The capital of the Mao Kingdom, Ma-Kao-Mung-Lung or Ka-Kao-Mung-Lung, for example, provoked the following comment from its compiler, Mr. Ney Elias. "I have been unable to obtain a meaning for the name as given, and indeed cannot be sure that I have written it correctly, reaching me as it did, through two foreign languages." 3

The considerations which lead me to identify Pong first with Mongmao, and later with Mogaung are the following:

1) The capital of Pong was called Mongmarong in Shan, but Mogaung in Burmese, according to Pemberton's account. Actually, in the first part the capital was "Mongmarong" (Mongmaolong in Shan, Maingmawgyi in Burmese); in the second part, it was Mogaung (Mongkawng in Shan). Henry Yule, following Pemberton also says

2. See Appendices I & II.
"Mogoung" and "Moung Maulong" are one and the same city. No Shan or Burmese could make the mistake of identifying those two cities. The mistake clearly arises from the successive translations of the account in Pemberton's report.

Elias observed:

... This Munipuri history of Pong is simply that of the Mao Shans, ante dated by nearly five hundred years at the commencement, while as it proceeds, dates and events are made gradually to agree more closely by assigning unreasonable periods to the length of the reigns of the kings. The error doubtless arose in the first instance from the absence of an intelligible chronology in the original Shan record, and for want of fixed points in the contemporary annals of neighbouring countries by which to set up landmarks; but however this may be, we see that on arriving at the death of Chau-Ngan-pha, Major Pemberton's date is only about one hundred years in arrear of the correct date, and that some four hundred years had to be distributed in the reigns of the intervening kings. Thus it is that twelve kings are made to reign for 587 years, or an average of nearly 149 years each; the 13th Murgnow (a name impossible to recognise), reigns for the astounding period of 110 years; the 11th for 31 years, and the remaining 10 for 507 years; giving an average for the whole of twenty four of very nearly 51½ years, or more than double the usual period, and sufficient, in itself, to show the erroneous nature of the story from a chronological point of view.

2) The first Pong King, "Khool-liee", was definitely the first Mao King, "Kun-lai"; and perhaps the name Elias found it impossible to recognise, viz. "Murgnow" has an affinity with the 30th Mao King, "Mo-Kang-Neng"?

3) Samlongpha's conquests and the surrender of Songanpha to the Chinese are identical in both the Mongmao and Pong stories, except in the dating.

4) It was from the time the Pong Queen, Songanpha's wife, established her court at "Moongkong" that the story of Pong became the history of Mogoung (= Moongkong = Mongkawng in Shan). It is quite possible that the Mogoung descendents of Samlongpha were also ruling in "Chei-En" or "Tsei-En" at the same time since they were very closely related - the scions of one Ruling House were sometimes asked to become kings of the other.

5) The gift of a tract of territory by "Soohoongkhun" of Pong to Manipur has some bearing on the division of his territory around the Chindwin by "Chau-Kaa-phu" of Mogoung to his relatives.

1. Yule, H., A Narrative of the Mission sent by the Governor-General of India to the Court of Ava in 1855, p. 270.
6) Wars with Pegu which occurred at about the same time in both Pong and Mogaung stories, took place in the reign of "Soopengpha" in Pong and of "Chau-Peng" in Mogaung, the two kings being one and the same.

7) "Sookophaw" of Pong and "Chau-Kaa-pha" of Mogaung invaded Siam. This was plainly at the behest of Pegu, and the two names belonged to one and the same person.

8) Pong was finally subjugated in 1752 by the "Burmese dynasty of Mooksoo" in the reign of "Chow Khoolseng". This was undoubtedly the same king as "Haw Seing" of Mogaung who had to submit to Alaungpaya in the fifties of the eighteenth century.

What about the name "Pong"? It was the Manipuri term for "Shan". Mr. Harvey is right in saying it meant "Haw Shan". Mr. Wood admits "Pong" is one of the mysteries of history. Elias tries to attribute to the word the Burmese "Pong" meaning "glory" in the sense of the Chinese "Celestial Kingdom". But we are still left with the question, why the Manipuris, who had had no dealings with the Shans beyond Ava and Mogaung, should call the Shans "Pong"?

My own theory is as follows: In the story of Mogaung, a tribe of Pwons were subjects to that state during the height of its power. The Pwons are still to be found along Irrawaddy defiles above Bhamo. It was more than probable that these people were known to the Shans of Mogaung and Mongmau as "Pong". If Samlongpha's army that invaded Manipur contained some contingents of the Pong and if these contingents were the first to come into contact with the Manipuris and said they were Pong, it would be quite natural for this name to stick to all men under Samlongpha's standard in the eyes of the Manipuris. Hence all Shans were known to the Manipuris as Pong. After all the Burmese word Taruk came from Turkic tribes who formed the bulk of the Mongol army which invaded Burma in 1277.

Here is another plausible explanation of how the Shans were called Pong. In the entry for the 25th February 1837 of his Journal, McLeod observed that the Kengtung Shans called the Northern Shans Phong or Tai Nik. But the origin of the word Phong is as elusive as ever.

Tables of Kings and Rulers in the three narratives will be found at the end of this work, and I hope they will help to confirm my observations.

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3. Luce, G. H., The Early Syam in Burma's History; JSS, XLVI, 2, November 1958, p. 136.
There are still other words from the past which tease the imagination of Shans. These are the words Kawampi or Kosambi, and Koshanpyi, which figure in local chronicles as well as in Burmese annals.

Kawampi was the classical name of the Mao Kingdom. The Hsenwi Kingdom of the northern Shan States of Burma also had Kawampi as its classical name. Both claimed a founder of the same name - Khun Lai. It is quite clear that the Hsenwi Kingdom was intimately related, as an off-shoot descendant perhaps, to the Mao Kingdom. In the Hsenwi chronicle, not only is the country called Kawampi, but the name Mongmao is also used for one tract of territory and is explained in the following story.

In Mong Kawampi there lived a queen named Ekka Mahesi Dewi, who was great with child, and one day feeling unwell she lay wrapped in a shawl of red velvet basking in the sun on the terrace of the palace. There a Tilanka bird, while flying through the air, saw her, and taking her for a piece of raw meat, swooped down and carried her off beyond the reach of mortals into the depths of Hema Wunta, the centre of the 3000 forests. There he settled on a great Mai Nyiu tree and would have devoured her, but the Dewi cried aloud and the Tilanka was frightened away. The queen was then delivered of a male child on the tree and the cries of the infant attracted the attention of a hermit named Alakapa who was living in the neighbourhood. He came to the tree and the queen related how she had been carried off by the bird from Kawampi. The hermit then made a ladder for her and her son to descend from the Mai Nyiu tree. After a while, being far away from other human beings and lonely, the hermit and the queen lived together as husband and wife.

When the boy attained the age of fourteen or fifteen years, the Thagya came down and presented him with a harp, whose strains charmed and subdued all the elephants of the forests, and the boy was thus known by the name of Khun Hseng U Ting, from the word Ting, a harp.

Khun Hseng U Ting at an appropriate time gathered together all the elephants of the forests with the music of his harp and marched to the country of Kawampi. There he found that the King, his father, was dead, and he succeeded him on the throne. Later he went back to the forests where his mother lived, and there built a city called U Ting, afterwards known as Mong Ting, on the spot where the Thagya gave him the harp.

The forests in which the queen lived came to be known as Kawampi.

1. The words merely mean "chief queen."
While the Tilanka bird was carrying the queen through the air she felt so dizzy that the country over which the bird flew was named Mongmao - from the Shan word mao meaning dizzy or giddy.

Many Shans believe this story to be the explanation of the Hsenwi kingdom's own origins, and some Europeans working on the Hsenwi chronicle treat it as a Shan fairy tale. But in fact the story can be traced back to the Dhammapada's celebrated 'Story-cycle of King Udena', and I recount his story at some length, not only to give my compatriots the pleasure of reading a Dhammapada story unexpectedly, but also to convince them of the true origin of the Hsenwi legend. King Udena was reigning in the classical Kosambi during the life time of Lord Buddha, and this is the story of the birth and youthful career of Udena:

Once upon a time, two kings, Allakappa and Vethadipaka, renounced their kingdoms and went to live as hermits in the depths of the Himalaya. In due course, one of them, Vethadipaka, died and became a nat. Wishing to see his old friend, the nat disguised himself as a wayfarer and visited him, and eventually revealed his identity. Before parting from the nat, Vethadipaka asked his friend if he was disturbed by anything and if he could help in any way. Allakappa replied that he had been much disturbed by wild elephants in the forest and had much trouble in cleansing their foul dung from the ground of his hermitage. Vethadipaka then gave Allakappa a three-stringed lute and three gathas (spells) with this instruction "Strike this string and utter this gatha, and the elephants will turn and run away without so much as daring to look at you; strike this string and utter this gatha, and they will turn and run away, eyeing you at every step; strike this string and utter this gatha, and the leader of the herd will come up and offer you his back. Now do as you please." Thereafter the ascetic Allakappa lived in peace.

\[\text{From this point until the end of the story, it is direct transcription}\]

At this time Parantapa was king of Kosambi. One day he was sitting out in the open air basking himself in the rays of the newly risen sun, and beside him sat his queen, great with child. The queen was wearing the King's cloak, a crimson blanket worth a hundred thousand pieces of money; and as she sat there conversing with the king, she removed from the king's finger the royal signet, worth a hundred thousand pieces of money, and slipped it on her own.

Just at that moment a monster bird with a bill as big as an elephant's trunk came soaring through the air. Seeing the queen and mistaking her for a piece of meat, he spread his wings and swooped

1. Compiled from GUBSS, I.1.227 and a chronicle of Hsenwi in my possession.
down. When the king heard the bird swoop down, he sprang to his feet and entered the royal palace. But the queen, because she was great with child and because she was of a timid nature, was unable to make haste. The bird pounced upon her, caught her up in the cage of his talons, and soared away with her into the air. (These birds are said to possess the strength of five elephants; they are therefore able to convey their victims through the air, settle wherever they wish and devoured their flesh.)

As the queen was being carried away by the bird, terrified though she was with the fear of death, she preserved her presence of mind and thought to herself, "Animals stand in great fear of the human voice. Therefore if I cry out, this bird will drop me the instant he hears the sound of my voice. But in that case I should accomplish only my own destruction and that of my unborn child. If, however, I wait until he settles me somewhere and begins to eat, then I can make a noise and frighten him away." Through her own wisdom, therefore, she kept patience and endured.

Now there stood at that time in the Himalaya country a banyan tree which, although of brief growth, had attained great size and was like a pavilion in form; and to this tree that bird was accustomed to convey the carcasses of wild animals and eat them. To this very tree, therefore, the bird conveyed the queen, lodged her in a fork of the tree, and watched the path leading to the tree. (It is the nature of these birds, we are told, to watch the path leading to their tree.) At that moment, the queen, thinking to herself, "Now is the time to frighten him away," raised both her hands, clapped them together and shouted, and frightened the bird away.

At sunset the pain of travail came upon her, and at the same time from all the four quarters of heaven arose a great storm. The delicate queen, half dead with suffering, with no one beside her to say to her, "Fear not, lady," slept not at all throughout the night. As the night grew bright, the clouds scattered, the dawn came, and her child was born at one and the same moment. Because her son was born at the time (utu) of a storm, at the time when she was upon a mountain, and at the time when the sun rose, she named her son Udena.

Not far from that tree was the place of residence of the ascetic Allakappa. Now on rainy days it was the custom of the ascetic not to go into the forest for fruits and berries, for fear of the cold. Instead he used to go to the foot of the tree and gather up the bones from which the bird had picked the flesh; then he would pound the bones, make broth of them and drink the broth. On that very day, therefore, he went there to get bones. As he was picking up bones at the foot of the tree, he heard the voice of a child in the branches above.

Looking up, he saw the queen. "Who are you?" said he. "I am a woman." "How did you get there?" "A monster bird brought me here." "Come down," said he. "Your honour, I am afraid to come down on account of difference of caste." "Of what caste are you?" "Of the
warrior caste." "I am also of the warrior caste." "Well, then, give me the pass word of the warrior caste." He did so. "Well then, climb up and set down my boy." Finding a way to climb the tree on one side, he climbed up and took the boy in his arms, obeying the queen's behest not to touch her with his hands; he set the boy down; then the queen herself came down.

The ascetic conducted the queen along the path to his hermitage and cared for her tenderly without in any way violating his vow of chastity. He brought honey from flies and gave it to her; he brought rice grown in his own field and prepared broth and gave it to her. Thus did he minister to her needs.

After a time she thought to herself, "For my part I know neither the way to come nor the way to, nor can I repose absolute confidence even in this ascetic. Now if he were to leave us to go elsewhere, we should both perish right here. I must by some means seduce him to violate his chastity, so that he will not abandon us." Accordingly she displayed herself before him with her under and upper garments in disarray, and thus seduced him to violate his vow of chastity; thenceforth the two lived together.

One day as the ascetic was observing a conjunction of a constellation with one of the lunar mansions, he saw the occultation of Parantapa's star. "My lady," said he, "Parantapa, king of Kosambi, is dead." "Noble sir, why do you speak thus? Why do you bear ill-will against him?" "I bear him no ill-will, my lady, I say this because I have just seen the occultation of his star." She burst into tears. "Why do you weep?" he asked. Then she told him that Parantapa was her own husband. The ascetic replied, "Weep not, my lady; whoever is born is certain to die," "I know that, noble sir." "Then why do you weep?" "I weep, noble sir, because it pains me to think, To my son belongs the sovereignty by right of succession; had he been there he would have raised the white parasol; now he has become one of the common herd." "Never mind, my lady; be not disturbed. If you desire that he shall receive the sovereignty, I will devise some means by which he shall receive it." Accordingly the ascetic gave the boy the lute to charm elephants with and likewise taught him the spells for charming elephants.

Now at that time many thousands of elephants came and sat at the foot of the banyan-tree. So the ascetic said to the boy, "Climb the tree before the elephants come, and when they come, utter this spell and strike this string, and they will all turn and run away, without even so much as daring to look at you, then descend and come to me." The boy did as he was told, and then went and told the ascetic. On the second day the ascetic said to him, "Today utter this spell and strike this string, if you please, and they will turn and run away eyeing you at every step." On that day also the boy did as he was told, and then went and told the ascetic.
Then the ascetic addressed the mother, saying, "My lady, give your son his message and he will go hence and become king." So she addressed her son, saying, "You must say, 'I am the son of King Parantapa of Kosambi; a monster bird carried me off! Then you must utter the names of the Commander-in-chief and the other generals. If they still refuse to believe you, you must show them this blanket which was your father's cloak and this signet ring which he wore on his finger." With these words she dismissed him.

The boy said to the ascetic, "Now what shall I do?" The ascetic replied, "Seat yourself on the lowest branch of the tree, utter this spell and strike this string, and the leader of the elephants will approach and offer you his back. Seat yourself on his back, go to your Kingdom, and take the Sovereignty." The boy did reverence to his parents, and following the instructions of the ascetic, seated himself on the back of the elephant and whispered in his ear, "I am the son of King Parantapa of Kosambi. Get me and give me the sovereignty which I have inherited from my father." When the elephant heard that, he trumpeted, "Let many thousands of elephants assemble;" and many thousands of elephants assembled. Again a second time he trumpeted, "Let the old, weak elephants retire;" and the old, weak elephants retired. The third time he trumpeted, "Let those that are very young retire;" and they also retired.

So the boy went forth surrounded by many thousands of warrior-elephants, and reaching a village on the frontier, proclaimed, "I am the son of the king; let those who desire worldly prosperity come with me." Levying forces as he proceeded, he invested the city and sent the following message to the citizens, "Give me the battle or the kingdom." The citizens answered, "We will give neither. Our queen was carried off by a monster bird when she was great with child, and we know not whether she is alive or dead. So long as we hear no news of her, we will give neither battle nor kingdom." (At that time, we are told, the kingdom was handed down from father to son.) Thereupon the boy said, "I am her son." So saying, he uttered the names of the Commander-in-chief and the other generals, and when they still refused to believe him, showed the blanket and the ring. They recognised the blanket and the ring, opened the gate, and sprinkled (annointed) him king.

There is no doubt where the origin of "Sao U Tain" came from, and how the classical name Kosambi or Kawsampi for Mongmao and Hsenwi came about.

The Shan theory that the early rulers of Hsenwi took turn to rule for a period of three year each and hence the name (Kaw = each,


2. There is no consonant "d" or "b" in the Western Shan script or speech.
Sam = three, Pi = year), can hardly be taken seriously, though it makes better sense than the story of "Sao U Ting" or "Um Ting" (= Harp carrier).

Again, the term Kawsampi is often confused with Koshanpyi, a term from Burmese annals. Sometimes these two names are made synonymous with Nanchao, Pong, Mongmao and Hsenwi. Sometimes it is said that Koshanpyi is derived from Kawsampi. Scott suggests so, adding, "the Burma official, with the ear of a hippopotamus and the arrogance of a self-made man, could not bring himself to admit that a Shan Kingdom had any right to a classical title, if indeed he knew that Kawsampi was classical. He therefore, transformed Kawsampi into Koshanpyi." ("Koshanpyi means, in Burmese, nine Shan countries.")

Some Burman might be cussed but certainly not in this respect, and Scott seems to have missed the whole point of Burmese culture which recognised royalty, foreign as much as its own. There was no reason why Ava should grudge the Shan States the classical names of which every important Shan State had one. Every Shan State had its place in the Burmese hierarchy and the whole set-up was full of high-sounding classical terms. A sawbwa or myosa was given so many white or gold umbrellas or entitled to so many tiers of pyat that or such and such royal regalia or dresses. The adoption of classical terms for cities and states was the custom throughout Buddhist Southeast Asia. Shan States' classical names had been used and respected by the Court at Ava.

Whether through the poetic touch of the phrase Ko maing ko kyaing or the playful fancy for the favourite number "9", the term Koshanpyi seems to have had a definite geographical application. If the term is synonymous with anything, it is so only with the phrase Kopyidaung (nine states) and this latter term makes it even less possible for Koshanpyi to be confused with Kawsampi. In Burmese, Kawsampi is written to read as Kaw-tham-bi and is never mistaken for Koshanpyi, because both existed side by side. In their reference to Hsenwi, the Burmese chroniclers wrote Kawthambi whereas the Chinese Shan States would be referred to as Koshanpyi. These nine Shan countries or states were situated along the present border of Burma from Bhamo area down through Namkham, Muse, the Wa States and to Manglon. The following extracts from the Burmese chronicle will establish the distinction made by the Burmese between the two terms:

In the reign of Pyu-zo-di, the third King of Pagan, who reigned between A.D. 166 and 211, the Chinese are said to have invaded his Kingdom with an immense army, over which the king obtained a great victory at a place called Ko-tham-bi, but neither the date nor the cause of this war was given.

1. GUESS, I.1.190.
2. GUESS, I.1.189.
3. See Appendix IV.
In the year 1562, Tshen-byu-nya-yen (Lord of many white elephants), the great King of Pegu, after conquering Ava, Mogaung, Zemay, Theinni, etc., sent a large army to the frontiers of China, and took possession of the nine Shan towns (Ko-shan-pyi, or Ko-shan-daung), Maing-mo, Tsi-guen, Ho-tha, La-tha, Mo-na, Tsanda, Mo-wun, Kaing-ma, and Maing-lyin or Maing-lyi, all of which, with the exception of Kaingma, are now, and apparently were at the time, under the dominion of China.  

Many European writers, including Yule and Sladen, subsequently quoted the nine Chinese Shan States as the Koshanpyi, and I am convinced they were right.

While Hsenwi-Mongma's classical name was Kawsampi, the whole of the Shan States was known as Kambawsa, and this is still the practice. Kambawsa is the Burmese pronunciation of the Pali Kamboja from which Cambodia is derived, but why the whole of the Shan States has been given that classical title is not easily explained. Many Shan Sawbwas of old had that word included in their titles, normally given by Ava.

The most satisfactory explanation, for want of a better one, seems to be that given by Phya Praja-Kichkornchakr. He says that around Northern-India in the Maha Kosala Ayudhya and Indra Bharat (Delhi) regions most of the people there belonged to the Kamboja clan. These people were the descendants of Prince Boja, a scion of King Jajati and because these people worshipped the cow and the planet Saturn, the word Boja was prefixed with Kam. Wherever the Kambojans settled they called their country Kamboja, and when they came to Siam, at the time under the Khmer power, they also named their new colony "Kamboja." Phya Praja adds that the classical name was applied not only to the Khmers but also to the ancient Thais as well, and hence the Shan adoption.

Is it possible then that the Taifs of the Shan States had connections with the original Kamboja or Kambawsa as early as those days when the "Taifs" were mentioned as slaves and prisoners of war in the Cham inscriptions in the eleventh century?


2. For an eye witness account of Koshanpyi, in the 1860s, Mandalay to Momeik by Colonel E. B. Sladen and Colonel H. Browne (London, 1876) is recommended.

3. See Chapter III.

It must be noted that the State of Kengtung does not come into these classical terms. Its own classical name is Khemaratatungaburi, and in its chronicle there was no mention of affairs in the west until the beginning of the sixteenth century. Before this, Khemarat had close relations only with the Luy, the Lams, and the Laos of fancatifai (Chiangmai) and Lanchang (Laos), and this tends to confirm the theory that these peoples, including the Thais, belonged to the same Eastern wave of the southward migration of the Tais during the first millennium A.D. The first date mentioned in the Kengtung Chronicle is 1229 when the country was full of the Was. By 1253 Mangrai had sent up his son and people up from Chiangsen-Chiangrai area to rule and populate the Kengtung valley. There was no mention of Samlongpha. If the latter's forces had really gone into Siam they must have bypassed Kengtung. A glance at a map of Burma will clearly show that the land lying between Hsenwi-Mongmao area and the border of Chiangmai, via the rolling downs of the Central Shan State, Mongnai and Mongpan, is devoid of really formidable mountains excepting those bordering both banks of the Salween between Mongpan and Mongton-Mongbang area.

A word about the terms Shan and Tai.

We know that the word Shan came from the same root as Siam, Syam, Sajam, Sien, Hsien, etc., but so far no satisfactory explanation has been offered how it came about or what it means. As stated earlier, the word Syam was mentioned in the Cham inscriptions of the eleventh century. This seems to have been the first mention of the word. In the twelfth century, it again occurred on the bas-reliefs of Angkor Wat. Professor Luce further tells us that the word occurs over twenty times in the Pagan inscriptions, the earliest being dated 1120 A.D., which is one of the earliest in Burmese, and that it occurs usually in the lists of pagoda slaves, male and female. But the Thais never call themselves Syam, nor do the Tais in the Shan States call themselves Shan. Syam or Shan seems to be a term used by other people in calling certain members of the Tai race.

The word Tai is the same as Thai. Many scholars prefer to use the spelling Dai to represent the name of the language and the people as a race; but some prefer to use Tai, and when this is aspirated it becomes Thai, which means the Siamese or inhabitants, and official language of the present-day Thailand. The present work adopts this latter usage.

Many Thais and Shans will tell one that the word Tai means free – free from bondage as well as from debt. But in Siam, the word also denotes pleasant, beautiful and not dark, with its noun form meaning light or illumination. In the Shan dialects (including

1. See p. 16 above.

2. Luce, G. H., op. cit., p. 124.
Khun) the word Tai also means people or inhabitants. Thus Tai Loi or Tai Noi means hill people, Tai Weng - city dwellers as opposed to Tai Nawk or outside villagers or simply "jungle wallahs". Tai Mandalay - Mandalay denizens. The Khun of Kengtung are called Tai Kengtung.

What about the terms Khun, Lu, Lem and Lao? These people do not call themselves Tai or Thai, but Khun, Lu, Lem and Lao. Their languages or dialects fall between the Shan and the Thai tongues; that is, speakers of these dialects will understand either Shan or Thai better than the Shan or Thais would understand each other.

Some people say the word Tai or Thai is the same word as the Chinese Tai meaning great or big, in the celestial sense. I doubt very much if this interpretation can be taken seriously.

Beyond this I fear I cannot throw any light on the origin or meaning of the two words, Tai and Shan.
CHAPTER III
Past Shan-Burmese Relations

Of all the races in Burma, the Shans, the Mons, the Burmese (Arakanese included here) are the most closely associated from the earliest historical times. Chronicles of Burma mention the Shans quite early. Both the Shan and Burmese chronicles claim the founding of Tagaung. From the reign of Anawrahta (1044-1077 A.D.) onwards there is no doubt about the close association between the two peoples. Anawrahta is said to have received homage from several Shan sawbwas. On his return from his holy tooth mission in Tali (Nanchao), Anawrahta was presented with a princess by the Mau king. This incident is often taken to mean that the kingdom of Mangmao was tributary to Pagan. This is doubtful. Giving away one's daughter in the old days did not always mean homage; it often meant intimate alliance. Was Queen Victoria tributary to Russia or Germany when she gave her daughters to their emperors?

Of the Shan homage, it is most likely that Anawrahta received it only from the princelings of statelets along the eastern foothills. Even then the homage was only nominal and the Pagan King had to establish the well known forty three outposts along his eastern frontier adjoining those hills.

We read of Alaungsithu's extensive travels in his domains, and he was credited with visits to some of the nearer Shan States. Yawnghwe and Tawngpeng still have legends to prove that this king visited them. The site where his barge stopped is always pointed out to one on a visit to the placid Inle - it is a whole valley shaped like a boat. In Tawngpeng, legends connected the king's name with the seed of the first tea trees from which all the present tea bushes are supposed to have sprung.

The Shans were credited with having been instrumental in the Mongol invasion of Pagan, and when Narathihapate's reign came to an end, it was not the Chinese who completed the ruin of that kingdom. The Chinese were all for the continuation of law and order, so long as Pagan acknowledged their overlordship. They gave Kyawswa an appointment order, but did not reckon with the three Shan Brothers, Asankhya, Rajasankram and Sihasura (Athinkhaya, Yazathinkyan and Thihathura). The two younger brothers absented themselves from the ceremony at which the great Khan's edict concerning his recognition of Kyawswa was read out. The three later put Kyawswa to death. These Brothers by
secret intrigues and "cat-and-mouse tactics" succeeded in convincing the Chinese that they had nothing to do with the death of Kyawsaw. When the Emperor learned the truth about Kyawsaw's death from the lips of his youngest son, Kumarakassappa, he ordered a small army to restore this son to the throne. The Chinese reached Myinzaing on the 25th January, 1301. The three Brothers put up a stiff resistance. This, together with their secret negotiations and bribes, plus the hot weather, caused the Chinese to retreat. Thereafter the Brothers made haste to stave off further invasion by sending submissive envoys and presents to Peking. The Chinese found it convenient, eventually, to accept tribute and recognise Sihasu, the surviving youngest brother, as "the King of Mien."

The Mongols alleged that the Shans at Kyaukse were in league with those in Northern Siam against the Emperor's authority. If this be true, as seems more than likely, then the swearing of friendship between Mangrai of Chiengsen and Ngammuang of Phayao and Phra Ruang of Sukhothai in 1287, must have been an alliance pact, as suggested by Professor Luce, against the Chinese who at this period were bent on aggression in Southeast Asia generally. Ramakhamheng's journey to Peking 1292 was to buy time and Mangrai was the leader in the resistance to the Chinese in North Siam, says Professor Luce. The Chinese campaigns against Chiengmai, which began in 1292-93, ended in the latter raiding Kenghung in 1297. Kenghung was under Chinese protection then. In their subsequent attempts at again invading Chiengmai in the early part of the fourteenth century the Chinese were as unsuccessful as they were with the Shans in Central Burma at the same time, but eventually recorded in their annals that "the southern barbarians of Yunnan came to submit" in February 1347.2

Were these "tributes" received at Peking actually sent as homage from a vassal to an overlord, or as gifts from a friendly but smaller monarch to a more powerful one and recorded by Peking officials as homage from a feud? After the unsuccessful Chinese invasions of 1265-69, the Burmese reopened relations with China and sent presents to Peking, but these were represented by the courtiers to the Emperor as homage from a people who had just routed his armies.

One of the chief reasons for the successes of the three Shan Brothers was their control of the rice areas of Kyaukse, which was regarded as the granary of Upper Burma. To reinforce their authority after having got rid of the last of Pagan kings, they intermarried with the remaining members of the royal family, and their descendants held Upper Burma for the next two and a half centuries. This period in the history of Burma is often known as the Shan Dominion or Shan Period.

The youngest of the Shan Brothers, Sihasu, survived the other two. When he became king it became necessary to move the capital from

1. Wood, W. A. R., op. cit., p. 55 has the date as 1294.
2. Luce, G. H., op. cit., pp. 130, 146, 150, 164, 172.
Myinsaing to a more centrally-situated place. Pagan was no longer suitable now. Ava, at the confluence of the Myitnge and the Irrawaddy, was proposed in 1312, but the astrologers were against it. So Sihasu moved to Pinya, a little south of Ava. Thadominbya, noted as the king who ate a meal on the chest of the corpse of a brigand he had just killed, is remembered for founding Ava in 1355 which was to remain the capital of Burma generally for the next five centuries; hence the term "the Court of Ava" or "the Kingdom of Ava", even after the capital had moved to Amarapura and Mandalay in the nineteenth century.

The Shans at Kyaukse were as good Buddhists as the Burmese, and they regarded the northern Shans\(^1\) as ditthi (heretics). The former left behind dozens of inscription, written not in Shan but in Burmese, while the latter left nothing.\(^2\) This would lead one to conclude that the present Shan script, which is regarded by some as the Lord Buddha's own writing, had not yet been invented during the Shan Period in Burma.

The most unproductive period of Ava was between 1385 and 1122, when there was more or less annual warfare between Ava, headed by Mingyiwasuwe (1368-1121) and later his son Minkhaung (1121-1122), and Pegu headed by Rajadarit (1385-1123), a descendent of Wareru, the Shan founder of Pegu. Year after year Shan and Burmese levies would swarm southward sacking and burning any town or village that opposed them. The Mon records often referred to the invaders simply as "the Shans". Rajadarit had to ward off some of the invasions by instigating other Shan States to fight Ava, which, in turn, invoked the help of Arakan and caused the Siamese states of Chiangmai, Kampengpet and Ayudhya to keep Rajadarit occupied. At one point the Mong king was so successful that he came up the Irrawaddy, as far as Sagaing. Sometimes, Ava was able to control Prome and some of the Delta areas. But while princes of both sides gloriety in the virtues of war, the peasants often had to starve because there was no one to cultivate the paddy fields. Prome and Toungoo paid tribute now to the one, now to the other, but later they grew into sizeable independent states and acted as a buffer between Ava and Pegu.

Towards the middle of the fifteenth century, the Mao Kingdom made war with the Chinese and its king, Songanpha, took asylum with his royal cousin at Ava in 1144. The Chinese followed up and demanded the surrender of the Mao prince. Ava refused at first to give up its political prisoner, but capitulated when the Chinese brought up reinforcement from Yunnan. On learning about his fate, Songanpha killed himself and the Chinese could take away only his dead body, dried in the sun, it is said.

The kings of Ava were often ousted by the neighbouring Shan sawbwas. In 1527 the Sawbwa of Mohnyin occupied Ava and placed on the throne his son Thohanbwa or Sohompha. The only notable event in this

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1. Anything north of Kyaukse or the Koshampyi in China?
2. Luce, G. H., op. cit., p. 151.
Prince's reign was his massacring of some 360 Buddhist monks because he said they led an idle life and could rebel if they wanted to. He then made bonfires of all the manuscripts he could collect from monasteries. This was considered a most barbarous act of vandalism equalled only by that of Alaungpaya when he sacked Pagan in 1757. Such burning of cities has been responsible for the paucity of reliable historical material; it was the practice that no victory was complete unless the conquered city had been fired. No conquering race seems to have escaped this weakness, even in the recent war waged by highly industrialised peoples who considered themselves more civilised.

One bright aspect of this period of incessant fighting was the rise of Burmese literature. This leads one to ask: Was this rise a subtle expression of Burmese nationalism under Shan domination? How Shan was the Shan period? There seems to be little doubt about the answer to the first question. Concerning the second, evidence seems to show that the ruling circles and the fighting men were Shan. At Ava itself sentiments were clearly more Burmese than Shan, but elsewhere the states seemed more Shan in character. Inscriptions of this period were all written in beautiful Burmese, the Shan script having not yet been devised. While the indigenous population was mainly Burmese, it would be natural for the ruling princes to depend on their own Shans for fighting. The number of the fighting men must have been reduced by the endless warfare, and although unending migrating waves of the Shans must have made up for the human losses, a time must come when no replenishment was possible. It seems that this point was reached by the end of the fifteenth century, but the senseless slaughter continued for nearly two generations and at the end of it the virility and energy of the Shans were at their lowest. Warfare, jealousies and lack of organisational ability rendered the various sawbwas incapable of consolidating into one powerful kingdom which might have changed the course of Burma's history. Thus we read of the sawbwas of Kale, Monyin, Mogaung, Yawnghwe, Nomeik, Hhamo, Mongnai, Hsipaw and Mongpai continuing to play at war with each other, a pastime so dear to their heart, even when a new Burmese power was looming large on the southern horizon - viz. Tabinshwehti (1531-50).

Ava, as capital of an independent kingdom, fell to Bayinnaung in 1555 without much fighting. Sawbwas who called each other royal brothers and uncles or nephews failed to answer Ava's call for help, and it was too late when they realised what was happening.

Here is one version of how Ava fell:

"The Shan records agree with the Burman that their loss of Ava was due to mutual jealousies and lack of co-operation. Hso-hom-pha (Tho-han-bwa) incurred the hatred of the Burmans by his cruelties. He may not, however, have been so impious as the Burmans make him out to have been. There may have been occasion for his hostility in dealing with the Buddhist monks, if Burman monks took part in insurrections and their monasteries were the favourite haunts of conspirators, as was sometimes the case at the time of British occupation. This
could not justify his expulsion and massacre of so many of that religious fraternity, but it does suggest what may have been the occasion of his enmity. The Shans seem to have supported Hso-hom-hpa's immediate successor, but when his son, a prince from the comparatively unimportant state of Mongpai, with the title of Mongpai-Narabadi (Mobyemin), ascended the throne of Ava, the northern Shans refused tribute or to help him in any way. The end might have been foreseen. Surrounded by Burmans already aggrieved and bursting with race-pride, and who had never taken kindly to the rule of the Shan invaders, he soon found his position untenable. He fled to Bayin Naung who, according to Shan accounts, promised to re-establish him upon his throne. Bayin Naung marched northward, conquered Ava (1555), and sat on the throne himself for a short time. Putting his brother on the throne of Ava, he returned to his capital in Pegu before the rainy season.1

Within three years from 1556 to 1559, the Shan states of Hsipaw, Mongmit, Monzin, Mogaung, Mongpai, Sanka, Yawngwe, Lawksawk, Nawngwaem, Mongkung, Mongnai and Chiangmai became tributary to Pegu. In 1562 Bayinnaung set out with a huge army, consisting of divisions from all the vassal states, to conquer the Koshanpyi - the Chinese Shan States of Mongmau, Hsikwan, Mongma, Sanda, Hosa, Lasa, Mongwan, Kungma and Monglem. The first four were the first to be reduced, followed by submission of the remaining. In November 1562, Kengtung sent tributary presents and a daughter, and the Peguan king reciprocated with white umbrellas, a crown and the five articles of royal regalia. Haenwi submitted later.

In all his conquests, Bayinnaung's tactics had been the same. There had been no serious fighting and no town or city seemed to have been fired. The king of kings would appear before a walled city with a mighty host commanded by various vassal princes, including his son, the crown prince, and his brothers, and the besieged would submit without offering any resistance. Then the relatives of the ruling prince who had submitted would be sent down to Pegu and housed in quarters appropriate to their ranks. Some of the ladies would be taken into the royal harem. The oath of allegiance was administered to every prince who became a vassal. A large number of people were also deported, partly to populate the Lower Burma and partly to serve the royal hostages of the vassal states.

Bayinnaung claimed to have reformed Buddhism in many of the Shan States. It is also said that he put an end to the funeral sacrifice in which the favourite elephant, horse and slaves of the dead sawbwa were slaughtered and buried with him.2

Concerning the number of animals and human beings sacrificed at the dead ruler's grave, Mr. Harvey says that at the funeral of a big sawbwa, as many as 10 elephants, 100 horses, 100 men and 100 women might be sacrificed. It is doubtful whether a Shan state, however large, could have afforded so many precious animals, even if 200 slaves could have been expended.

The Shan levies, not available to Tabinshwehti, swelled Bayinnaung's army and enabled him to conquer Siam with comparative ease. In both his campaigns against Ayudhya in 1563-64 and 1568-69, each division of the king's army had some Shan contingents. We learn from the (Burmese) Hmannan Yazawin that during the 1563-64 invasion, the army under the Prince of Ava had Shan contingents commanded by the Sawbwas of Mongmit and Hsipaw; the Prince of Toungoo had his Shan levies commanded by the Sawbwas of Mohnyin and Mogauung; the Prince of Prome's army had the Mongnai and Onbaung Sawbwas and their men; the Crown Prince's army was served with Shan contingents commanded by the Sawbwas of Yawngwe and Hsenwi. Similarly in the second invasion of Siam, Shan contingents served in Bayinnaung's armies under the Sawbwas of Mogauung, Mongmit, Momyin, Bhamo, Onbaung, Yawngwe, Mongnai and Kengtung, together with the Lao levies from Lannathai (Chiengmai).

The Shan chronicles also speak of their States' participation in the Burmese invasions of Ayudhya.

The Hmannan and other Chronicles are full of instances of co-operation between the Shans and the Burmese both in peace and in war. Of course the Shans were very much the junior partner, but everybody was junior except the king and the point is that the Shans were loyal to their suzerains in Pegu and Ava, and whenever a recalcitrant Sawbwa gave trouble, other Sawbwas would answer the royal summons and put down the wicked member. No less than during the Burmese invasions of Ayudhya in the sixteenth century, the great invasion of 1764-67 was also greatly helped by the Shan armies. Thus we learned that an army of 20,000 started from Kengtung to invade Siam in 1764. The Chinese invasions of Burma in 1765-69 could not have been successfully driven back, without the Shan participation on the defender's side.

During the first Anglo-Burmese war of 1824-26, in the battle before Prome (November 1825), we have the following contemporary account of some of the Shan participation:

Eight thousand men of his corps d'armee were Shans, who had not yet come in contact with our troops, and were expected to fight with more spirit and resolution than those

2. For those preferring to read the English translation, see Relationship with Burma, Pt. I, being selected articles from the JSS, Vol. V, pp. 24, 55-56.
who had a more intimate acquaintance with their enemy. In addition to a numerous list of Chobwas and petty princes, these levies were accompanied by three young and handsome women of high rank, who were believed, by their superstitious countrymen, to be endowed not only with the gift of prophecy and foreknowledge, but to possess the miraculous power of turning aside the balls of the English, rendering them wholly innocent and harmless. These Amazons, dressed in warlike costume, rode constantly among the troops, inspiring them with courage and ardent wishes for an early meeting with their foe, as yet only known to them by the deceitful accounts of their Burmese masters.

In the ensuing battle between human courage and modern armament, the Burmese and the Shans died side by side for their sovereign at Ava, some 400 miles away.

The gray-headed Chobwas of the Shans, in particular, showed a noble example to their men, sword in hand, singly maintaining the unequal contest, nor could signs or gestures of good treatment induce them to forbearance — attacking all who offered to approach them with humane or friendly feelings, they only sought the death which too many of them found. Maha Nemiow himself fell while bravely urging his men to stand their ground, and his faithful attendants being likewise killed by the promiscuous fire while in the act of carrying him off, his body, with his sword, Wonghee's chain, and other insignia of office, were found among the dead. One of the fair Amazons also received a fatal bullet in the breast, but the moment she was seen, and her sex was recognized, the soldiers bore her from the scene of death to a cottage in the rear, where she soon expired.

While this was passing in the interior of the stockades, Sir Archibald Campbell's column, pushing rapidly forward to their rear, met the defeated and panic-struck fugitives in the act of emerging from the jungle, and crossing the Nawine river: the horse-artillery was instantly unlimbered, and opened a heavy fire upon the crowded ford. Another of the Shan ladies was here observed flying on horseback with the defeated remnant of her people; but before she could gain the opposite bank of the river, where a friendly forest promised safety and protection, a shrapnel exploded above her head, and she fell from her horse into the water; but whether killed, or only frightened, could not be ascertained, as she was immediately borne off by her attendants. 1

The Shans did not encounter the British before this battle at the Prome. The three Shan ladies were from Laikha and the two killed

1. Snodgrass, Major, Narrative of the Burmese War, pp. 231-235.
were the wives of the Sawbwa. From enquiries made, the present-day Laikha seems ignorant of these remarkable deeds of its courageous daughters.

No Mons or Shans seem to have participated in the Second Anglo-Burmese War of 1852. By the time the third war of 1885 came, misrule by King Thibaw had caused the whole of the Shan States to revolt openly. Active Shan participation of affairs in Mandalay seems to have ceased with the death of King Mindon, upon which nearly a hundred royal children were put to death in the customary succession blood bath. The Shans then fell to fighting among themselves. True, the royal annals continued to mention events in the Shan States or to record tributes received, but the relationship between the court and the Shan Sawbwas was neither as close or cordial as before.

Before this rift, the Shan sawbwas had a definite place in the order of things at the palace. Most sawbwas and some of the more important myosas have their titles suffixed with the word raja or yaza, while the king suffixed his with rajadhiraja (king of kings). Very often the Shan sawbwas were referred to as newin bayin (sun-set king) while the king was nedwet bayin (sun-rise king), for obvious reasons. Sawbwas would be summoned to attend the coronation of a new king and the annual kadaw pwe at the capital.

The King wore a salwe of 26 strands; the Crown Prince, 21 strands; Princes of the Blood and Shan sawbwaygis, 18 strands; other members of the royal family and Shan myozas, 15 strands; ministers, 12 strands. When the Kinwun Mingyi visited England in 1872, he took with him as Burmese Orders from Mindon a salwe of 21 strands for the Prince of Wales and one of 12 strands for Mr. Gladstone the then Prime Minister.

At home in their own states, the sawbwas and myosas had their royal paraphernalia prescribed for them by the court of Ava as to how many tiers or roofs their haws should have, how many white or gold umbrellas, what types of dress or crowns or hats, how many articles of royal regalia, etc. Royal words and phrases used at the court were addressed to them by their subjects and other Shans and non-official Burmans. In his own State, a sawbwa had the power of life and death over his subjects and in this Ava seldom interfered. A sawbwa might refer or cause to be referred to himself the Pali title of raja or maharaja or any other high sounding terms, but the supreme Burmese title Bawashin mintaragy (Lord of life, the great and just king) was always reserved for the king at Ava, as was the term cherang daw or cheyin daw (literally, royal feet; figuratively, the royal presence). In Burmese language the sawbwas refer to their sons and daughters and

1. See extracts from Dr. Richardson's Journal of the 22nd Feb.; also Yule, H., Mission to the Court of Ava, p. 300.
2. See titles of King Thibaw and those of various Shan Chiefs in Appendix III.
3. GUBSS, I.2.134.
relatives in royal terms, such as thadaw, thamidaw, nyidaw, naungdaw, amadaw, nyimadaw, swedaw-myodaw (meaning respectively, royal-son, -daughter, -elder-brother, -younger-brother, -elder-sister, -younger-sister, -relatives). In Shan the words are prefixed with sao, e.g. saolook (son or daughter), saolan (nephew, niece or grandson and granddaughter), saopi (elder brother or sister), saonawng (younger brother or sister). For relatives the Western Shans use the Burmese swedaw-myodaw. The Khun Shans use direct Pali words, rajaputta, -putti, rajanatta, -natti, khattiya rajawongsa, etc. Several royal words in Western Shan have been borrowed from the Burmese, while Kengtung from the Siamese.

It has been stated earlier that although the Burmese kings claimed suzerainty over the Shan States definitely from the time of Bayinnaung, Burmese control, and then only of cis-Salween States, became effective only during the second half of the eighteenth century - from the time of Alarmpaya or Hsinbyushin. How it was brought about and the exact dates could form a good research project for diligent Shan scholars; but we have a pretty good idea of what the set-up was like during the early part of the nineteenth century.

However that may be, it is quite indisputable that the Kings of Burma received tribute and controlled successions in the Southern Shan States long before they had any permanent control in Hsen Wi, where their first exercise of authority was no earlier than A.D. 1604 or 1605, when the Mao Shan Kingdom came to an end. From that time the Tai were never free from Burman interference, however little the suzerainty may have been acknowledged in the remoter States to be of practical effect. In the Southern States it very soon became an active and oppressive reality, dwindling gradually to the eastward and to the north-east, but for many years constantly creeping on, notwithstanding the enterprise of the Chinese from the other side. In these three centuries at any rate, the power and prosperity of the Tai principalities steadily declined. They were worn down not only by the aggression and rapacity of the Burmese and Chinese, and by the intestine wars, in which there is abundant proof that they always indulged, but by the advances of the Kachins. Whether these hillmen were crushed out by the Chinese, or whether over-population forced them to migrate, it is certain that for the last two centuries they also have passed south-eastwards and have driven the Tai from much territory between China Proper and Burma, until Shan names of mountains, streams, and villages are the only remaining witnesses of former occupation. The once powerful States west of the Irrawaddy now only possess a meagre and much Burmanized population, while the border principalities to the east from Hsum Hsai to Yawng Hwe, and in a lesser degree even to Mong Nai, have suffered almost as much from the deliberate policy of the Burmese Kings and have only survived because they had the mass of their fellow-countrymen behind them.
No connected history of these two, or two and a half centuries can be written because there was no cohesion or connection. What details have survived must be picked out under the heads of the various States. The Burmese policy was not by any means directed to maintain peace and quietness. The sons or brothers of the ruling Sawbwas were always kept at the Avan Court, not only as hostages for the good behaviour of the Chief of the State, but that they might be reared under Burman influence and withdrawn from sympathy with those of their own race, so that when they in time came to rule, their loyalty to the suzerain might be ensured; moreover, the policy was to foster feuds between the different Sawbwas, and rival aspirants were left to settle their claims to the succession in a State by force of arms. The victorious claimant might be confirmed as Sawbwa by Royal patent, but he would not be, unless he was able to pay for it, and when the civil war was over, his forces were too exhausted to permit him to resist Burman demands. If a Chief seemed so prosperous that he might become impatient of Burman control, conspiracies were fostered against him. Such troubles were easily managed among a hot-tempered people, such as most hillmen are. There was probably never a time when the gates of the temple of Janus were closed, when there was peace in all the Shan States. Consequently there were permanent bands of marauders or dacoits, collected from all parts, who were always ready to take the opportunity for indiscriminate plunder which the disturbed condition of some State might offer. In this way it was not uncommon for a prosperous and populous district to be utterly deserted for a time owing to these internal troubles, and the State of Hsen Wi, which till the middle of the century was the most powerful of the States, is the most notable example. Besides all this, or rather in consequence of all this, there were frequent, more or less extensive, rebellions against the royal authority. Some of these were soon put down. Some, like that in Hsen Wi, dragged on for years. The extraordinary thing was, and it was pointed to as the justification of the Burman policy, that other States always willingly supplied armed contingents to suppress the rebel for the time being. Such risings were always put down in the same way. Towns and villages were ruthlessly burnt and everything portable was carried off. It is little wonder therefore that the greatest of the modern Shan capitals would hardly form a bazaar suburb to one of the old walled cities.1

These conclusions of Sir George Scott must be taken with a sense of perspective. Neither the Shans nor the Burmans reading this need get alarmed. They are quoted not to degrade the Shans or to rouse feelings against the Burmans. Nor can we dismiss them as a fabrication

1. GUBSS, I.1.280-282.
of a die-hard foreign imperialist. It is good to see ourselves in other people's eyes. The Shans in North Burma spread out too thinly in an area too large for them to control effectively. Interstate warfare, disease and disunity have combined to reduce them to the present straits. A Shan normally does not concern himself with others' danger and when the danger reaches his own home he finds his neighbour looking on unconcerned and he is forced to move to the next village.

For a king to bring up his tributary chiefs' children was considered magnanimous; it was a good insurance against rebellion and lawlessness; a Shan sawbwa would have done the same thing in the king's place — in fact some sawbwas are still bringing up children of their favourites. If the king favoured a claimant who had his ear first, he was just playing favouritism which was the fashion all over the world. The Shans treated each other in the same way in cases of risings by subordinate chiefs. The various Burmese princes and chiefs of provinces and states in Burma Proper also behaved in much the same way, for it was considered better by far to be sovereigns with their own States, no matter how small, than to submit to their neighbours, and at the same time acknowledge only Ava as centre of the universe. Burmese kings put down risings in Burma Proper just as ruthlessly. So did kings of Shan within their own domains. The Siamese complained of Burmese barbarity when Ayudhya was sacked in 1767. The Laos complained of the same thing against the Siamese when the latter sacked Vientiane in 1827. The Laos of Luangprabang and those of Wiengchan behaved towards one another as the Siamese did towards both. These things were taken for granted. The Burmese or Shan chronicles describe without jeering or bitterness the ups and downs of the two peoples.

From the foregoing one is tempted to assume that the general conditions in the Shan States, or in Burma Proper for that matter, from the seventeenth to the nineteenth centuries must have remained unchanged, and that description of the Shan States as given by eye-witnesses Captain McLeod and Doctor Richardson in 1837 must be fairly close to what they were in the seventeenth century, as well as to what the British saw on their annexation.

At this time, 1837, the Burmese centre of administration in the Shan States was at Mongnai. The head of the Burmese setup, supported by three to four hundred soldiers or levies from Burma, was the bohmu mintha, who resided mostly in Mandalay but who would come up to see his charge occasionally. The bohmu mintha's deputy was the sitkedawgyi or, as normally called, sitke. Other sitkes were stationed in the more important States and had to report to the most senior sitke residing permanently at Mongnai. From here the Burmese controlled all the Shan States from their boundary with Burma in the west to the trans-Salween States of Kengtung, Kenghung and Monglem in the east, from Mongmit and Hsenwi in the north to Mongpai and Mawkmai in the south, i.e. up to the Karenni border. Whether Chiengmai and Chiangsen were controlled from Mongnai when they were within the Burmese dominion is open to
doubt, but it is known that Chiengsen had been a Burmese stronghold until the Siamese finally expelled the Burmese from there in 1802.

It is not known when the Burmese headquarters were first established in Mongnai, but a complete list of bohmus and sitkes of Mongnai from 1802 to 1882 will be found in the Appendix. ¹

The effectiveness of the Burmese administration depended on how far away a state was from Mongnai and from Ava. In the trans-Salween States the control was nominal, although the sitkes were there, while in the cis-Salween States it was quite firm. How the Burmese garrison and the resident and his followers supported themselves in Mongnai will be found under Chapter IV. ² During the time of Mindon, the chief activity of the Burmese political agents was to collect the Thathameda tax for the treasury at Mandalay. Earlier, it may be assumed, the sitkes saw to it generally that orders from the Central Government were carried out and the annual tributes paid in regularly. Apart from these and the demands made by the sitke and his entourage, including the garrison, the sawbwas were given an entirely free hand to deal with their own subjects. Oppressive measures by a sawbwa on his own people were rare because they often had the effect of causing the people to migrate to neighbouring States, and this the sawbwa dreaded.

Succession of sawbwaship was usually hereditary, but appointment orders came from Ava which were normally in accord with the wishes of the people and of the previous ruler, unless some of his relatives managed to collect a sizeable following and make himself heard at the court. On receiving the orders the sawbwa would have a coronation ceremony. A mahadevi was also appointed by Ava and she took her place at the side of her husband at the coronation ceremony, or a separate ceremony would take place proclaiming her the mahadevi.

There seems to have been no authentic system of precedence in the Burmese times beyond the principle that the sawbwas of bigger states were respected more than those of the smaller ones, sawbwas taking precedence over myosas and the latter over ngwegunhmus. Some of the ngwegunhmus were not as well off as the Burmese thugyis. The rulers of the undivided Hsenwi used to take precedence over other sawbwas, followed by Mongnai, in the seating priority before the audience at Ava. Kenghung and Kengtung seem to have taken the lead after Hsenwi had been plunged into chaotic embroilment by various claimants. Age and favouritism sometimes counted in the seniority of sawbwas' places. At the time when the Mongnai Queen was one of King Mindon's favourite wives, the Sawbwa of Mongnai not only sat above all other sawbwas, but also had his territory much enlarged.

¹ Appendix IV.
² Pp.
Durbars were held at Mong Nai only very irregularly and most often when the ruler of some State had died, though it does not appear that this was enforced by any customary law, or that the opinion of the assembled Chiefs as to the succession was asked, or had any weight if given. The assemblages were held in the Lum, the building referred to by Dr. Richardson. In this there was a long raised platform running east and west in the centre of the audience hall. At the western extremity of this the Bo-hmu Min sat on a dais facing the east. In front of him sat the Wundauk, who appears to have accompanied the Bo-hmu when he paid his visits from the capital. Behind the Wundauk sat the Sikke-gyi, then the Nakhans and other subordinate officials, and at the eastern end were ranged the body-guard. To the left of the Bo-hmu Min, below the platform, was a square enclosure fenced with red cords. In this the Sawbwas arranged themselves at their pleasure, or according to mutual agreement, the Mong Nai Sawbwa occupying the post of honour, that nearest to the Bo-hmu. The Sawbwas were nearly in a line with the Wundauk, that is to say, a little to the left front of the Bo-hmu. Beyond them and facing the Nakhans were the Myosas, also in a red-fenced enclosure, like that of the Sawbwas. Behind these enclosures were others, in which were gathered the Amats, and Myosayes - the officials of the Sawbwas behind the Sawbwas and those of the Myosas behind their masters. The Ngwekunhmus, if any were present, took rank with the Amatyis of a Sawbwa.

At the Palace in Mandalay the Shan chiefs sat straight in front of the throne behind the Princes of the blood and the Ministers of State, who took station left and right of the throne, otherwise the arrangement seems to have corresponded with that in the Mong Nai assemblages. It is stated that the Sawbwa of Mong Nai in King Mindon's time (father of Hkun Kyi, the first Sawbwa under British rule) in right of being one of His Majesty's Fathers-in-law, sat occasionally with the Princes of the blood, but only by special orders and not as of right.¹

Conditions of the Shan States and the Burmese influence therein in 1837 were vividly described by McLeod and Richardson, whose writings will now be quoted at considerable length, and readers not interested in these details may turn to the next chapter straight away.

Captain W. C. McLeod and Dr. D. Richardson were sent in December 1836 by Mr. E. A. Blundell, the Commissioner of the British Tenasserim, to open "the gold and silver road of trade" between Moulmein and the Shan States through Chiengmai. Richardson had made three trips previously to Chiengmai and Karenni. On this occasion McLeod and Richardson set out together on the 13th December, 1836 from Moulmein. They parted company near Mainglongyi on the 26th December. McLeod reached Chiengmai on the 12th January, 1837 but was

¹ GUBSS, I.1.289-90.
considerably delayed there because the authorities were most reluctant to let him proceed to Kengtung, as relations between the two States were at their worst, culminating in the Siamese invasions of Kengtung in 1852-54. McLeod persevered and managed to leave Chiangmai on the 29th January and arrived at Kengtung on the 20th February. The following extracts are from his journal:

20th February .......... As I was anxious to be introduced to the Tsobua with as little delay as possible, I requested that some officer might be sent to settle this point. In the evening the Minister, Puniah (or Paya as it was pronounced) Wang, called on me, attended by a train of officers and other followers, and brought several trays of fruit, &c., as presents. He is the factotum here. His wife was a sister of the Tsobua's late wife, and his daughter is married to the Tsobua's eldest son; so he may be supposed to have considerable influence. He tried to impress on me the honour done me by his visit; that he had come at the Tsobua's express order, who had long been most anxious to establish a friendly connection with the English, and had endeavoured to open a communication with them; that he had never before called on any other officer, however high his rank. He was very angry and sore about the reply from Zimme to their propositions about the road, which was not even couched in civil terms, as well as the detention of the officer there. This person had been set on to Ava with the presents (four elephants), all given by the Tsobua's own relations at that place, none by the Government.

The Tsobua's eldest son, Chou Maha Phom, has been appointed from Ava Aing She Meng (Lord of the Eastern House) or Crown Prince, a title or appointment which confers on him certain privileges and power only little short of those enjoyed by the Tsobua himself.

The Tsobua has three sons, the eldest about 25 years of age, the second, Chow Patta Wun, about 18 years of age, and a younger one, at present in a monastery, of 12. He has two or three daughters, one of whom is married to his nephew, and one engaged to the late Kiang Hung Tsobua's son. Unlike most chiefs the Tsobua is content with one wife; all his children are by this one ....

22nd February .......... Agreeably to the arrangement made yesterday, I was introduced to Tsobua to-day. At about 12 o'clock some officers came to escort me. On arriving at the gate of the palace inclosure, the officer with me asked me whether I would dismount, as no person ever entered it on horseback; knowing their customs, I immediately complied with his request.

On entering the gate I could not help observing the total absence of care and neatness in the compound. It was overgrown
with grass, and the out-houses in a dilapidated state, and
the whole surrounded by a brick and mud wall of 8 feet high.
The Palace itself, a shabby-looking pile of wood, raised
about 15 feet from the ground, on high pillars. After
ascending the steps, and on reaching the door of the hall,
the Tsobua's two sons came forward and led me to a seat in
front of the Tsobua, where carpets had been spread for me and
my followers. The interior of the building was very richly
gilt, forming a strong contrast with its exterior. The
throne stood at one end within a railing, very elegantly
curved and gilt, with two white umbrellas on each side of
it, and folding doors leading to it from the back, as in the
palace at Ava.

The Tsobua, however, was seated on a handsome low gilt
couch in front of the throne, surrounded by a number of men
holding swords in gold scabbards at a respectful distance.
His two eldest sons and nephew were seated on the ground on
his right, and the officers ranged in lines on each side in
front.

I was much struck with the grandeur of everything com­
pared with what I had seen at Zimme. Though many Tsobuas
are permitted to have thrones, white umbrellas, and other
emblems of royalty, yet they cannot make use of them per­
sonally. The Tsobua when he goes out has eight gold chuttas
carried round him (the number allowed to the Tsekia Meng
King's eldest son at Ava), but he dare not use a white one.
The hall was crowded, the officers well dressed after the
Burmese fashion, but the rest of the people with Shan jackets
and blue trousers.

The Tsobua is a remarkably fine tall man of about 55,
but blind, which I did not know till afterwards, for when
speaking to me he looked directly at me. He evidently thinks
and acts for himself. He spoke in Shan, but understands
Burmese perfectly. He addressed me immediately when I was
seated, saying that he was truly glad to find the English were
willing to establish a friendly intercourse with him; that
he had long wished it, and had been disappointed that no
officer had ever before visited him, as we had been in the
habit of going to Zimme for a long time; that he had attempted
to communicate with us, as I might have heard, but the jealousy
of the Zimme people would not permit it; that they did not
wish us at all to have any communication with them; that fear
alone had induced them to permit me to pass through their
country at present. He asked about the Dakhong road, as he
had understood it was intended that I should travel by it.
The officer from Zimme who was with me, related the whole
affair perfectly correctly. The Tsobua said that he had
sent to Ava, and with the King's permission intended to make
another effort to have the road thrown open; that matters of
commerce and of war were distinct, the merchants passing through could do no harm. I made an excuse for the conduct of the Zimme people, and told him I hoped the Chou Hona, on his return from Bangkok, would comply with our wishes and permit all merchants a free passage.

The Commissioner's letter was then read by a Burman writer, and the Tsobua listened attentively to its contents. He said his wishes were precisely the same as those conveyed in the letter; he was an advocate for a free communication with all the surrounding countries, and would joyfully render every assistance in his power to bring about so desirable an object.

He prayed for a continuation of that peace he had so long enjoyed with the Siamese through our means, though he now regretted to see symptoms of a breach on their part. That he had repopulated many of the deserted towns, and would continue to do so, but he feared the Siamese would not long remain quiet, except we interfered.

23rd February .......... In the evening I paid Paya Wang a visit; he resides immediately at the back of the Tsobua's palace in a good large wooden house, built like those of the chiefs of Zimme, but not kept particularly clean. He said it was necessary, that I should attend their consultation about my proceeding to China, or if I would visit the Tsobua the next day, he had no doubt the point would be then decided. He informed me, that the Burmese Tseitke, who has been withdrawn lately, is at Mone, or Monae, as the Shans call it; that the Meng myat bo, or Bo wun meng tha, as he is also called, a half brother of the King of Ava, who has the government of all the Shan States tributary to Ava, has his Turn dau or royal court at that place, where a Burmese Tseitke is stationed; that all the Shan States are obliged to report to and receive orders from him, and that intelligence of my arrival and the object of my mission has already been sent to him.

25th February .......... I should think that the town contains about 600 houses. The palace stands in the centre of the town; to the southward and westward of it are low hills and swamps; this portion is totally uninhabited. The roads to the north are narrow, and the houses, which are very poor, are widely separated from each other. In some places near the fort and some new monasteries, as if the road were not narrow enough, people were digging pits in it, and with the mud making bricks. It is a miserable place, and I could never have fancied an inhabited place, the residence of a Tsobua, in such a wretched state. The pomegranate and the custard apple are the only fruit trees in the place. Peas, beans, &c. grow here in abundance.

There are some good kyoungs or monasteries, and places of worship, decorated with gilt ornaments, and the walls painted;
they are in every way superior to similar buildings at Zimme. This is partly accounted for by the work having been done by Chinamen. The priests, too, are stricter in the discharge of their religious duties, and do not parade the streets for amusement; the only point in which they are said to be rather lax is eating after mid-day.

The fort stands on high ground at the foot of the range of hills passed by us on the march, and which run to the north and north-east. On the north-western side are fields extending from three to eight miles, bounded by high mountains; on the other sides are swamps and low hills. The wall on the southern face has been lately extended, in consequence of an order from Ava, directing that all Tsobuas shall surround their capitals with walls 6,000 cubits in circumference. The wall, which is about 15 feet high including the parapet, consists of a double wall of brick and mud of about two feet thick, with the space between them filled up with earth. In many places the weight of the earth during the rains has brought down portions of the wall, and parties of Chinamen are at work repairing these breaches, the inhabitants paying them for their labour. This industrious race furnishes the only artisans in the place. Many of them come in search of work, be it what it may, during the dry season, and after collecting a little money together they return to their homes. But to return to the fort; it has 12 gates, four or five of which are on the eastern face, but it has no bastions or embrasures for cannon. The wall, following the conformation of the ground, presents a most irregular fortification. I did not see a single piece of ordnance in the place. Swamps supply the place of a ditch, and where these do not exist, a cutting has been made in some places to the depth of 30 feet from the foot of the wall through the hilly ground to a level with the swamps, but no water enters it. Finally, its position is not strong, having the hills to the southward equally high, if not higher.

The extent of the Kiang Tung territory is at present considerable, reaching from the Salween to the Combodia river, and embracing many states formerly governed by different Tsobuas, many of whom with their followers are now at Zimme and other Siamese places. Of these, the principal are the Tsobuas of Muang Niong, Kiang Then or Tsen, Muang Lem, Muang Lap, &c. To the eastward it is bounded by the Me Khong and the territory of the Kiang Khieng Tsobua; to the north-east, by the Kiang Hung territories; to the northward, by Muang Lem; to the westward, by the Salween; to the south-west, by some towns belonging to Mone; and to the southward, by Zimme, &c. The town stands in 21° 17' 45" north latitude, and about 99° 40' east longitude. Water boiled here at 208½ Fahrenheit.
The average range of the thermometer during my stay here, was at -

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>In the House</th>
<th>In the Sun</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6 A.M.</td>
<td>42°</td>
<td>80°</td>
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<tr>
<td>9 &quot;</td>
<td>64°</td>
<td>98°</td>
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<td>12 &quot;</td>
<td>72°</td>
<td>110°</td>
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<tr>
<td>3 P.M.</td>
<td>82°</td>
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<td>6 &quot;</td>
<td>76°</td>
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I always find a fire at night necessary.

Kiang Tung is a great thoroughfare for the Chinese, who pass through it and spread themselves over its territories, or proceed to Mone and other Shan states on the western bank of the Salween.

They import the same articles as they do to Zimme, with the addition of woollen cloths, carpets, thick cotton cloth, warm and fur jackets, and salt. For this last article, the inhabitants are entirely dependent on them.

Their exports consist chiefly of cotton and some tea from this and other districts to the north. Many of the traders who do not proceed further than this, are well known here, and have agents to prepare cotton for them before they arrive; this is sent off, the head merchant remaining behind to make his arrangements for a second supply, and his mules return from China bringing nothing but salt. Even some of those who go to Mone make two trips in the season. Those, however, who only come from the towns on the border of China, make three or four trips.

The merchants, during the first or second journey, frequently sell their cotton on the road, but never during the last trip; some must be taken home to be worked up during the monsoon, when all communication with these states cut off. They likewise export to the frontier towns of China coarse cloth, which they purchase from the Ka Kuis and other hill tribes; this is entirely carried by coolies.

It is stated here that the last war between China and Ava originated in a quarrel amongst some boys, which ended in an affray, in which a Chinaman lost his life; the Chinese would have life for life, the Burmans or Shans declined to satisfy them in that manner, but offered the price of blood, which was refused by the Chinese, and an army was in consequence sent towards Ava by them. The peace was brought about by the intrigues of the commanders on both sides, by which the kings of each nation considered either that he had conquered the other, or that the other acknowledged his superiority, and in submission sent tributary offerings.
The men here are not tall, generally rather dark, with broad faces, and small noses, though not flat; the chiefs, however, are fine tall men, fair and appear a distinct race altogether, one might almost say Chinese. They dress in the glazed dark blue Shan jackets, and wide blue trousers; the Chinese jacket, both of cloth and fur, is common amongst them. They preserve their hair long, and wear a turban like the Burmans, and in the day-time when going about, a Chinese hat. The only ornament worn by the Chiefs is a gold bangle. The betel utensils are here of gold or silver, according to the person’s rank, carried in a Shan box as in Burmah. They do not chew the betel leaf and areca nut to the same excess as the Siamese, perhaps because it is not a produce of the country; they have, nevertheless, succeeded pretty well in getting black teeth. There is not an areca nut tree in the whole territory, and they are entirely dependent upon the Zimme and labong people for it. The price is here four ticals for a bundle of nuts, which contains 288 nuts cut up, and strung on strips of the bark of a certain jungle tree. A cocoa-nut sells for half a tical; it is also brought from the lower provinces.

The women are looked upon here in an inferior light to what they are in Burmah. Many of those who brought trays on their heads to me were the daughters of the first officers of the place, and were hardly noticed by the men. They are rather a short race, not fair, and broad featured; they wear a petty coat like the Siamese Shans, both in texture and make; a jacket is a part of their dress, and on their heads the young women carry a loosely-folded cotton handkerchief, having the appearance of a turban; and the elder women, when moving about in the sun, a small neat hat, made of bamboo delicately cut, which they place on the knot of hair at the back of their head. Amongst those who travel leggings are common.

There are a good many Burmans here; those belonging to the Ava Government at present consist but of six men. The others are traders from Mone and Ava, whence they bring English piece-goods, which are in demand here.

28th February. He regretted that the deprivation of sight prevented his looking at an English officer. He told me that his blindness first commenced in the beginning of 1824, at Ava. He had been under the treatment of many Chinese doctors; one had couched one eye, and he saw distinctly with it for 20 days, when he consented to have the other eye operated upon; but, instead of finding the same relief as on the former occasion, he was seized with a violent pain in his head, became sick, and totally blind. He entreated me to inquire if he could be cured, and, if so, to ask the Commissioner to send a doctor up, whom he would reward handsomely.
McLeod left Kengtung on the 1st March for Kenghung, much against the sawbwa's inclination. He reached his destination on the 9th to find that the state had just had a civil war to determine who should succeed the late Sawbwa Maha Wang. He had intended to proceed to Yunnan but the Chinese were suspicious and told him to return whence he came, stating that the proper trade route to China was via Canton "where British ships were constantly arriving." Also, messages arrived from Kengtung requiring his return there, as ordered by the Sitke at Mongnai. He therefore left Kenghung on the 26th and reached Kengtung on the 31st March.

31st March ......... In the evening an old Burmese woman, who is a favourite in the place, came to tell me that Dr. Richardson was detained at Mone for orders from Ava, and appeared mysterious respecting some communication received concerning myself, which she said I would hear in due time. This old woman, when I was here before, appeared to take great interest in the success of my mission, and in the impression made by me on the people here; she frequently brought me the news from the palace, and was anxious I should not call on any officers of Government. Hearing that I had paid the minister a visit, she came and entreated that I would not demean myself by calling on any of the others; that I must keep up my dignity; that I was only to go to the Tsobua, for though Puniah Wang never called on any officers deputed here by other states, that he had on me, to show how highly they thought of me; that by making myself too common the Tsobua's son would not visit me.

A criminal was sentenced to be executed, having committed numerous thefts and cruelties; the priests, headed by Tsobua's youngest son, rescued him at the gate, though not without giving many hard blows; the young prince's presence prevented the jailors and their gang exerting themselves: the culprit was taken to a monastery, his head shaved, and he himself admitted into the priesthood, so that he is now exempt from all punishment.

2nd April .......... Received a letter from Dr. Richardson at Mone, dated 6th of March; it was brought by some of the Tseitke's people. At about nine o'clock at night the Puniah, who had recognised me on my arrival, came to me with a message from the Tsobua, saying he wished to see me that night privately, as he had something particular to communicate; I accordingly proceeded to the palace accompanied by my writer and interpreter. We were taken to the back of the building, where all was still; after passing through many dark passages and rooms, we found ourselves at the back of the hall of audience.

Here were the Tsobua, his eldest son, and Puniah Wang. The apartment was only lighted up by one wretched oil light.
The object of this secret interview was to renew the propositions of the morning in more distinct terms, he being fearful then of being too explicit. He was anxious to form an alliance, both offensive and defensive, that we should assist him when called upon, and we were to consider his country as ours, and he would bind himself faithfully to obey us in all matters. What I have mentioned will suffice to show the drift of the conference, which lasted a considerable time. He was quite prepared to place himself under our protection, but I did not countenance the proposal, and was cautious not to give him any encouragement or to commit myself in any way. He spoke in the warmest terms of gratitude of the King, but he has a strong dislike to Mengthagy and others at Ava. Before my departure the Tsobua called Puniah Wang, and whispered something to him, and then walked to a large chest, and taking from it a sword with a golden scabbard, gave it into his son's hands to present to me. The Tsobua, addressing me, said that it was a Shan custom, when a friendship, such as had been formed between us existed, to exchange arms in testimony of the sincerity of each party; he hoped, therefore, that I would accept the sword and keep secret what had passed between us. The only thing I could offer in return was a double-barrel pistol of curious workmanship, and which I knew he was anxious to obtain; I accordingly told him that I would deliver it to Puniah Wang. On my way home I observed to the Puniah that the Tsobua appeared to be greatly attached to the Burmans; he replied that he was much so to the King, but that his Majesty is now considered as not taking any interest in the Shan States, and the consequence is, that the Burmese Tseitkes lord it over them.

McLeod left Kengtung on the 4th April, arrived in Chiangmai 15 days later, on the 18th, and started on the 11th May his return journey to Moulmein which was reached in 17 days on the 27th.

Meanwhile, on parting company with Captain McLeod, Dr. Richardson had headed north and reached Mainglongyi on New Year's day of 1837. The route was familiar to him, as he had been through it in 1835 on a mission to see Papawgyi at the latter's request. On this trip Richardson's passage through Karenni was uneventful; he stopped at "Dwam Tulwee" for a few days to see his old friend, the Karenni Chief, Papawgyi, with some presents which he thoughtfully brought with him. He left the Karenni territory on the 13th February and after a halt of one day at Kandu reached Mawkmai via Banhat on the 17th. From here on we will quote his journal liberally:

20th February (Monday) Mok-mai ........ Went into the town to wait on the Tsoboa this morning, and was requested to dismount at the gate; I was not asked to take off my shoes. The Tsoboa is a man about 26 years of age; he succeeded his father (who was killed during the late war) about five years ago, but has only within the last few months received the royal order for his investiture, and authorising him to assume the ensigns of royalty. The father of one of his wives (the thoogyee of Ban-hoat) told me that the debts he incurred in making presents to people of influence about the court to procure it prevent his taking advantage of it, and the only mark of royalty about his house, which is rather a good one of wood and mats, is the frame of a window, which opens behind where he sits into an inner room, being gilt; there were two small chairs and a small cotton Bengal sitringlee in his room. He was married to the daughter of Monay Tsoboa about four months ago, and has eight other wives and four children, the eldest about 10 years of age. He spoke very little, and nearly all the conversation that passed in a visit of an hour was with the tsetkey. His jurisdiction is bounded west by Thataung (which pays a tax in silver to the king of Ava, and has also for some years paid to the Kareans), the Salween to the east, the Karean-nee south, and Monay to the northward, and is said to contain 30,000 houses, which must be very much above the number; judging from the size of the three valleys of Kundoo, Ban hoat and this, which are the only level parts of his territory we have seen, there may, perhaps, be 2,000; his contingent is 500 men. Many of his people have gone to live altogether amongst the Kareans for safety and quiet, and a majority of those left pay them tribute. I learned here for the first time that the tsoboas are quite independent of each other; but as the town of Monay is the largest and most central of the Shan towns in this direction altogether under the control of Ava, the Burmans have fixed the head quarters of the force they have in the Shan countries at that town. The Bohmoo meng tha Meng myat boo (General Prince Meng myat boo, a half brother of the king's son of a Shan princess), the general who commanded at Melaun during the late war, is, and has been since the peace, governor of all the Shan countries from Mok-mai south, to the Chinese frontier, north, and from Nat tike, the top of the pass from the valley of the Irrawaddee up to the Shan country, west, to three days beyond the May Koong (Broad River), or Great Cambodia River, east. He himself generally resides in Ava, but visits his government occasionally, in one of which visits he rode from Monay to Ava in three days. His deputy, who constantly resides in Monay, leaving, as usual, his family as pledges in Ava, is the Tsetkay daughee, who has several officers under him; and there are at the court of each of the other tsoboas two tsetkays, also appointed from Ava. These tsetkays, particularly the chief one, lords it over the tsoboas; to him the chief authority belongs, and all the
external relation of the country is committed; and the royal orders are sent to Monay, from whence they are forwarded by the tsetkay; but the Monay Tsoba has no authority to call any of the others. The lesser tsoboas have no tsetkays, and are looked upon as merely myo tsas ...

Richardson reached Mongnai on the 22nd.

22nd February (Wednesday) Monay ............ In the evening a seray, or secretary, came out to my tent; he mentioned to the people outside, though not to me, that he had been sent by the Tsetkay. He was dressed in a handsome and heavy fur jacket, with the hairy side in, though the thermometer in the tent was about 86°. I discovered afterwards that this was a sort of official dress with all the Government officers here, though I should think anything but pleasant in these latitudes. He questioned me as to what I wanted here, and wished to know why I had not brought letters to the Tsetkay, &c. I told him my visit was a disinterested one, for I wanted nothing but to open the gold and silver road, that the people here might exchange what they did not at present want with our people for what they did, to get the protection of the Government here for our people, who might hereafter come on the same errand, to assure them of the good feeling towards them at Maulmain, and to promise protection and facilities for traders to their people visiting it, &c. I explained again the reason of my coming unprovided with letters to the Tsetkay by the fact of the Commissioner at Maulmain not being aware of the existence of such an officer, &c. My visitor had served in the late war; he had been a sort of aide-de-camp to the old general of the Shans, Maha nay myo, &c.; had taken part in the affair at Wattigam, and bore a part at Zimbike, when the old general was killed, with several of the Shan Tsoboas and two of the three wives of the Laygea Tsoba who, dressed in male attire, were, for some superstitious cause, expected to have done good service against our troops at the seven stockades near Rangoon. The Burmans suffered most severely here; the Shans, who had not engaged us before, were not prepared to run away soon enough. He gave a sad description of their sufferings from cholera and starvation for many days after the storming of their stockades. His visit lasted about an hour and a half. We parted great friends, and he continued during my stay most attentive and friendly. I explained to him before leaving that it would be inconvenient to wait on the tsoba to-morrow.

25th February (Saturday) Monay ............. On arriving at the yeum, I proceeded upstairs without any notice being taken of my shoes, but was stopped outside the plank about a foot high (coon-ts'en) which surrounds the centre pillars of the yeum, and requested to seat myself there. Close to me were all my own people and the people of the town; inside the plank before mentioned were the Tsetkay daughee, Meng myat
boo's representative (and governor in his absence of all the Shan States); the royal Tsikay, an old man whom I took for the tsoboa, two Naksans, and two Bo-dha-ghees. Meng-nay-myoo, seated himself by me. I beg now personally to explain to the assembled chiefs that my bringing a letter directly to the tsoboa must be attributed entirely to the chief at Maulmain not being aware that any authority higher than the tsoboa was resident in the country, though perfectly aware that he was a vassal of the King of Ava, and hope that a mistake so trivial as the mere wrong address would have no weight against our good intention, that of increasing and strengthening the friendship which has existed between the English and the King of Ava for so many years, by joining with the ruler in the Shan countries, whoever he might be, to open the gold and silver road by the nearest route, between this place and our possession on the coast. I then expressed a wish to deliver the letter to its address, and held it out towards the second tsikay, a little fat old man I had mistaken for the tsoboa, when the Tsikay daughee took it from my hand, told me the tsoboa was not present, and commenced conversation in a most insulting and overbearing strain, which he kept up during the whole interview. He told me I had trespassed in coming here without an order from Meng myat boo; and the king, through Barney (the Resident), asked sneeringly and incredulously if the Maulmain Woonghee did not know the constitution of the force here; told me I know nothing of Burman customs, or I would have not come here without authority. I told him he had deceived me with the promise of the tsoboa being at the yeum, otherwise I should not have come there. As for my right to come here, I referred to the treaties of Yandaboo and Ava, the latter particularly stipulating that traders, on whose behalf I was come here, should be allowed to enter the Burman dominions at any part, and proceed in any direction without let or hindrance. I explained to him that it was always a custom with us to send an officer with traders opening a new route, to ensure them protection, and as a surety to the people of the countries passed through or traded with, that they were fair traders and responsible people, coming with the knowledge and sanction of the British Government, not to mention the long friendship of the two countries, and the kind reception of their people on visiting Maulmain. He said he had never promised that I should see the tsoboa today; pretended he knew nothing of the Ava treaty, and said that of Yandaboo made no provision for my coming here. After a good deal more in this strain, I asked him, as he had received the tsoboa's letter, whether I should be allowed, and when to proceed, as therein requested. He denied the Commissioner's letter contained such a request; when I begged him to show me the letter, and pointed out the paragraph, he said, "Oh, you may go; you may go." I said I was sorry that my reception had led me to think they did not wish to see me, and that the sooner I started for Ava the better. The senior
nakan, who was seated opposite, now addressed me with much
civility, and asked me whether I did not wish to see the
Tsoboa. I said, most certainly, but that it depended on the
Tssetkay daughee, to whom the king had given the chief author-
ity here, and he did not appear to wish me to do so; this
he seemed to take as flattery, for he said, "Ah, these are
proper words." The nakan again said, "Why, you have just
come here, and are already talking of leaving us; you must
stay a little amongst us; it will be proper to get permission
from Ava before you proceed." I replied, "It was my wish,
and the intention of the Commissioner, that I should cultivate
the friendship of the chiefs here; that, had there appeared
any wish to make my reception more pleasant, I should have had
no wish to leave so soon, but I had as yet no reason to
suppose I was welcome, though it was impossible for me to
wait for permission from Ava, which, considering the friend-
ship of the two countries, I could not see the necessity. I
was, besides, afraid my people might suffer at the setting in
of the rains, as they had no cover at night." The Tssetkay,
laughing insultingly, said, "Oh, he calls himself Tsia woon
(physician), and yet he is afraid of dying."

27th February (Monday) Monday ......... I have sent the
Shan interpreter to-day to the tssetkay to say I object to
being seated outside the coon-tsen, with my own coolies and
the people of the town within half a foot of me, convinced
that with the disposition evinced by him, nothing is to be
gained by concessions, indeed no Burman can have an idea even
of a perfectly independent gentlemanly compliment. I desired
him in the first instance to go to Meng-nay-myo, as he has
been the channel of communication hitherto, to say I was
sure he was anxious to promote the objects of my mission as
I was; but as in the matter of the tsoba's presence at the
yeum, and bringing the presents there at once, the Tssetkay
denied that such a promise and request had been made with
his knowledge, I thought it better that I should communicate
direct with himself. His reception was civil, both by the
Meng-nay-myo and the tssetkay, who paid me some compliments,
and told him that as they were situated here, a very few
Burmans amongst a conquered and distinct people, the customs
were necessarily different from what they were in Ava; that
the tsoba, whom I should meet to-day, was never allowed to
come inside the coon-tsen; he told the man to say that he
would send to let me know when they were ready; as the
tsoba was to sit outside, of course I could make no further
objections. At half-past nine the person came to intimate
that the military officers were assembled, and I started.
Meng-Nay-Nyo joined me on the road, and we rode together to
the yeum, where I found the same chiefs I had met on my
former visit, and seated myself as before after about half
an hour's conversation, during which the tssetkay told me they
heard of my intended visit here, a month ago, through some
Shans who had seen me at Mein-lun-ghee. The Tsoboa came with
four gold chattahs, and about 50 or 60 men armed with muskets,
dhas, and spears, and a number carrying thanleats. When the
old gentleman came in I bowed to him, which he returned, and
seated himself close beside me. The morning was cold, and,
either from that cause or agitation, he trembled considerably.
I again explained the mistake of the letter (which had been
returned to me by the tsetkay), and delivered it to him. The
list of the presents was read over, and they were laid before
him. He said the contents of the letter were already known to
him, that they were good, and he was glad to see me here; but
it would be best, he thought, for all parties that the presents
and a copy of the letter should be sent to Ava, with a request
for instructions from the king to allow me to proceed, to
which an answer would be returned in about 20 days; in the
meantime I must remain here. He was the king of Ava's slave,
and afraid of rendering himself liable to punishment (yazawot)
if he allowed me to proceed. I remonstrated, with all the
arguments I could think of, against such delay, but in vain;
there was a good deal of conversation on general subjects,
particularly on geography (on which subject they are the most
curious, and as ignorant as it is possible to be on any subject,
believing in the Mee Mho Hill (Mount Mercoo), and four large
islands, &c.), in which the Tsoboa took a part. The whole
conversation to-day was conducted in a mild and gentlemanly
style, and so indeed were all the remarks of the tsetkay,
whom it was difficult to believe the same person whom I had
conversed with here only two days before. The Tsoboa is a
man of; perhaps, 68 years of age, of the common height of
Burmans, fair even for a Shan, though those on this side of
the Salween are much darker than to the eastward, notwith-
standing they are a few degrees further north; his manners are
mild and gentlemanly; his son and son-in-law, the son of the
Laygea Tsoboa, both fair and rather stout young men, were
seated behind him; neither of them took any part in the con-
versation. I was requested to furnish a list of the people
with me, to be sent to Ava tomorrow, before I left. The
tsetkay had the letter to Ava, which was to accompany the
Commissioner's letter and presents, read to me; near the end
of it the tsoboa's name and mine occurred in juxtaposition,
and the term "the slave of the King of Ava" followed, so that
there was some doubt as to which it applied. I stopped the
person reading, and had the passage read again, much to the
amusement of the tsetkay, who at once saw the ambiguity, and
laughed heartily at my suspicion. By the message who took
the Government letters I wrote also to the Resident at Ava.

From now on the relations between Richardson and the sitke were
very friendly. While waiting for orders from Ava, he spent some of
his time visiting the sitke and various members of his staff, all on
a friendly basis. The objection of the sawbwa and the sitke to
Richardson proceeding to Ava without instructions from the capital
was understandable. Government was absolute and highly centralized in these matters, and little responsibility and initiative were left to local officers. Some of Richardson's entries tell us about conditions in Mongnai in those days.

5th March (Sunday) Monday ............ Called to-day on Meng-nay-myo, and met at his house the Kien-taung Tsetkay, a Burman of course, Panya Pan, and another Shan chief, who went from Kien-taung last year to Zimmay, with an intention, it is said, of coming to Maulmain; they did not, however, to-day allude to such an intention, and as the authorities here are said to disapprove of his having gone to Zimmay, I did not mention the report. Captain McLeod arrived at Kien-taung on the 18th ultimo, and saw the tsoba on the 20th. It does not clearly appear whether he has been detained there or not, but letters were dispatched by the tsoba early this morning, with orders to detain him till the return of the messenger who is sent to Ava to report his arrival, and to furnish him with everything that he may want in the meantime. The messenger to Kien-taung was ordered to travel night and day. The distance of Kien-hun-ghee from Kien-taung is only nine days for an unencumbered man, and about 15 for elephants. The officers I met to-day expressed themselves in the most friendly terms, rejoiced in the prospect of a free and friendly intercourse, and spoke in the warmest terms of approval of the spirit that prompted the mission of Captain McLeod and myself to this part of the country. The house of the officer I visited to-day, which is just rebuilt after a very extensive fire which consumed most of the town last April, is the largest in the town, consisting of five different roofs, three parallel to each other, and two across these ends, with an open platform between the end and centre ranges, and also between the northernmost centre range and the other two; these ranges are all on the same floor, which cannot be less than 100 feet square; the materials and the workmanship as good as the Burman carpenters' work generally is. The houses in general are small, low, and mean; and the whole town, which is long and narrow, and so crowded with bamboos that only a very small portion of the houses can be seen at one time, may contain about 8,000 or 10,000 inhabitants; about 2,000 of these are Burmans. The tsoba sent out people to-day to build tays (temporary houses) for myself and the people, but as there is little chance of rain for the month I am likely to be here, and delightful shade from the magnificent large bamboos, I preferred remaining in my tent, and the people have been comfortably halted in three houses, at each side and behind it. I have tied my chattah to the corner of my tent, and though I have made a considerable advance in the estimation of the people since my arrival, this has much increased my consequence; they are not yet accustomed to consider themselves at all an inferior people to us, either in power or civilisation. Before the war they
considered themselves as infinitely superior to all the world; they have not lately sought to engage the Chinese, but they are all aware that they have always come off conquerors when they did engage them.

8th March (Wednesday) ........ Called on the first nakan today; he is a man of about 50 years of age; he went to Ava with his father, who was of the royal family of Chandaporee or Wintian, the zenzen of the Burmans, when he was a child, and remained about the palace till six or seven years ago, when he got his present appointment. Nearly the whole of his family was destroyed by the Siamese when they took the town of Wintian, eight or nine years ago. He expressed himself as much pleased with my mission here, well disposed towards us, and anxious to facilitate the intercourse between Moulmain and this place. He congratulated himself on not having been employed during the war, which he says was of little advantage to anyone. From his house I went to that of the second nakan; he had just come from the yeum, where a royal order for the instalment of the Loye Lung Tsooba, or myotsa, had been read; he was engaged at chess with some of his children and people. His house is small and mean, little better than a thooghee’s of one of our small villages, and himself and everything in it in the same style, and miserably dirty. He had very little to say for himself; my visit was therefore short; he, however, told me the force of Burmans in the Shan states is about 10,000 men. In my way home I called on Meng-nay-wyo; and in the evening he returned my visit, bringing two of his little children with him. He mentioned that on the day before our attack on Wet-yea-kan (or Wattigam) a large reinforcement of Shans were sent to it, who lost their way, and at nightfall bivouacked in the jungle close to the stockade, without being aware of its vicinity, and came up in the morning as unexpectedly to their own as our people. A report is current here to-day that a messenger arrived last night in six days from Ava, with a royal order telling the tsekay not to be alarmed, but keep the country quiet; and intimating at the same time that the Sarawattee Prince had quarrelled with the Queen, and left Ava for Mauktsobo with 500 or 600 men.

10th March (Friday) .......... Passed the day at home, but was visited by some people from the tsoobas, the only Shans I have yet been able to communicate with; they all spoke Burmese, as do most of the Shans in large towns here; they complain much of the oppression and insolence of their Burman rulers; the members of the tsoobas’ family are frequently insulted in the streets if they go out without their gold chattahs or attendants.

The Burmans, who are very numerous here, live entirely on the natives, contribute nothing to the expenses of the country, or to the occasional royal exactions of money, the
levying of which is the province of the tsobo; many of them, styled keun-dau-myo, not even called soldiers, have no means of subsistence but preying on the natives, and many acts are committed with impunity by them, which are severely punished by the Shans, who complain they are looked on as little better than dogs. Much alarm is said to have been excited by the Prince of Sarawattee having left Ava, of which there is no doubt amongst the people, though the chiefs still endeavour to conceal the fact from me.

11th March (Tuesday) .......... The tsetkay's son came out again to-day, and mentioned the fact of the disturbances at Ava, which are now talked of with less reserve. Report says that the Bohnoo meng had taken a part with the Prince. A report also had been brought by some merchants that the tsobo of Thienee had been beaten to death with clubs by his Shan subjects at a poe, to which he had gone with a few followers. He was the son of the last tsobo (a perfect savage) by a Burman woman he saw only for a few days at Neaung Eue. After his birth the woman married a Rangoon man, where the boy followed her, and was loose in the country for some years; he then came to Ava, and entered himself amongst the young Prince's followers; his father dying without other known children, he was raised to the tsoboaship about six years ago. He was a confirmed bad character, and living about the Palace in Ava had learned, with the vices of the capital, drinking and opium-smoking, to consider himself more as a Burman than a Shan, and had imbibed the Burman contempt for the latter, by his oppression of whom he had succeeded in making himself so detested that his death as related was the consequence. It is not at all known here who will succeed him. One of the family is said to be amongst the Kakhens (the wild tribes between the Shan country, Ava, and China, so called), of whom many are subject to Thienee.

27th March 1837 (Monday), Monay ........... Waited on the tsobo to-day, my reception was most friendly; his hoa or palace has a gilded roof of five stories, the pyathat or royal spire, surmounted by a tree (chattah), or gilded iron ornament so called; the hall, in which I was received, about 140 feet square exclusive of a large verandah, which surrounds it; the centre portion, a square of 30 feet, is raised about 18 inches, with four rows of pillars, which support the high roof, three in each row, and 10 feet apart; the innermost four of the two centre rows are gilded, and the yazabolen (throne), which is a very handsome one, is lower and better proportions than those of the Siamese Shan tsoboas, I have seen; the gold appears burnished at the distance at which I sat, though the art of burnishing is not known to the Burmans; at each side of the throne stood a large white muslin umbrella, furled, with two rows of gold plates attached to
fringes near the outer edge; on it were a small gold crown sceptre, a chowree, an ottar daun, and the royal red velvet slippers, forming the five ensigns of royalty (meng-hmeau tasa gna ba); the only other furniture in the room was a gilded chair, and a common clumsy Burman bedstead; there might be about 100 muskets ranged in different parts of the hall. The tsoboa sat on the raised part of the floor, on a common China carpet; his son Chow Kin Mouang (lord eater of the town, pronounced by the Burmans Keamyne) on his left, and his son-in-law, the son of the Laygea Tsobo, on his right below, and I had a mat immediately in the front on the same level; his tsetakys, two officers placed here by the Burman Government, his own officers and people, a little behind me; he expressed himself glad to see me here, and hoped I was pleased with my visit, but evidently wished to avoid all conversation on my mission to himself; he introduced me to his sons, and soon changed the conversation to subjects entirely unconnected with Burmah; natural history and geography of Europe, and that part of Bengal mentioned in their sacred books, the 16 countries of Thela. On taking leave he gave me a pair of grey ponies, one of which is a fine large handsome animal; he agrees with everyone else in advising me to wait a day or two for the tribute party from Mien-lan-ghee, which is said to have crossed the Salween seven days from this, some days ago. The poverty here is very great and general; theft, common robbery, and murder not unfrequent in this town; the tsoboa alone takes what he wants from the market people, in the bazar in Mok mai; there are five who have that privilege, for in the next seat in the bazar there was one of our people; a poor devil sat down with five eggs to sell; he had no customers for some time, when the tsoboa's people or servant came and took one of his eggs, the four others followed in the same way, and the poor creature rose up without having spoken a word and went away.

No order concerning Richardson could now come from Ava which had been plunged into confusion by the coup d'etat of Prince Tharawadi. Mongnai had been ordered to send to the capital a contingent of 1000 men. The son of the Ye-wun of Rangoon arrived to hasten the despatch of the Mongnai levies. The sitke advised that Richardson should accompany the contingent which the sawbwa now decided to command in person. The whole party started off on the 6th April. Everywhere were signs of insecurity and impending disaster. Robbers and brigands roamed the countryside and preyed on helpless villages. When the party arrived at Mongpawn on the 10th April, the sawbwa there had just been stabbed to death while fishing, by his own brother. Mongpawn village itself contained about 80 to 100 houses and Richardson stated it was under the Sawbwa of Mongnai who proceeded to appoint a myook to look after the place. Contingents from Mongeit, Mongpawn and Laiikha joined the party en route. Before they reached Yawnghwe, orders were received on the 14th April at "Say-lay" countermanding the sawbwa's move. Ava had fallen to Tharawadi. The sawbwa however insisted on going forward
a little more to ascertain the situation himself. But on the 16th it
was certain that the sawbwa was returning to Mongnai and he tried to
persuade Richardson to return with him saying that the unsafe condi­
tions of the country made it unwise for him to proceed. Richardson
insisted on going forward and said goodbye to the sawbwa in the
latter's camp in the evening. The next day, the 17th April,
Richardson and his own party arrived at Yawnghwe. The monsoon had
already started - it rained heavily that night.

19th April (Wednesday) .......... Shifted our berth last
night into the town, or more properly village, for there are
not above 150 or 200 houses of the same miserable appearance
as those of Monay, or perhaps a little more so. There is not
one good house in the town, and the country villages are
worse; they are all very low, and from the walls of many of
them being made of thatch, much of it old and discoloured,
have a said ruinous appearance. Many here, and indeed
throughout the country, have the same low end as the houses
of the Red Kareans. The site of the town is a dead level,
and, as conjectured, was formerly the bed of the lake, which
extended several miles up the valley to the northward of
this; it has now shrunk away about three miles to the south­
ward, and fills the end of the valley about 12 or 14 miles
north and south, and reaching to the foot of the hills east
and west, perhaps, an average of 2½ or 3½ miles; it is fed by
the Bora-that, which falls into its northern end, and a few
small rivulets from the hills; the only stream it gives rise
to is the Mobie River, from its northern end, and a few
small rivulets from the hills; the only stream it gives rise
into the sea by the Setaung River, the waters east of this
all falling into the Salween. Our encamping ground is a
vacant space to N.W. of the ban; between that and the houses
of the tsoba's lesser wives, of whom there are about 20 or
30 living in the houses of their parents, distinguished by the
privilege of attaching planks in the shape of buffaloes' horns,
to the end of the ridge pool. He is said to add two to the
number annually, but unless they have children they receive
absolutely nothing from him, and then only a bare subsistence.
Even some who live in his house are said to have their food
carried to them by their friends. About 11 o'clock I visited
the tsoba, and remained about an hour; his house, enclosed in
an old wooden fence, is mere bamboo; the floor, which is also
of bamboos, covered in part with mis-shapen boards. Though
of the same rank as the Monay Tsoba, he has none of the
insignia of royalty, except the gilded frame to the window
behind his couch; even his betel apparatus is the same as the
commonalty; he is about 45 years of age, very stout with rather
a want of intelligence in his countenance. His three brothers
were present, and three or four of his sons, of whom he told
me he had 20 about 11 years of age and under. I explained
the friendly nature of my visit to Monay, and begged him to
consider the same sentiments towards himself existed with the
Commissioner at Maulmain as I had been commissioned to communicate to the Monay Tsoboa, I solicited his protection and countenance to our traders who might come here, and promising the same to his people at Maulmain, gave him a musket, carpet, and three or four finger-glasses; apologised for the smallness of my present, as I had not anticipated seeing him, &c. &c. &c.; he has little to say, but was as friendly as I had reason to expect from the strong recommendation of the kind and gentlemanly old Tsoboa of Monay.

20th April (Thursday): 21st (Friday). Neaung Eue ..........
Visited the tsoboa's brother to-day, who seems a man of more intelligence and energy than the tsoboa. He was formerly exceedingly dissipated, a drunkard and opium smoker, but has for some years quite reformed. He gave some account of the feud between the Tsoboa and his uncle, who seized the throne on his father's death about 14 or 15 years ago. The war (for there were some pitched battles) lasted about two years, in which contest this brother was the principal supporter of the present tsoboa, but the principality has never recovered the waste and destruction, and though it was one of the four at one time embracing the whole of Cambosa-tyne, it is now said only to contain in all 500 houses in the district. They are so weak that the Kareans infest their marches all the dry weather, and carry off all unprotected persons into slavery, unless ransomed by their friends. This year they have been freer from their inroads than usual, which they attributed to my having passed through the Karean country. A more legitimate cause may be found in the vicinity of the British possessions on the coast, where runaway slaves from the Shan countries are of course free, and finding their way thence, or remaining in Maulmain, are lost to their masters, this having gone on for seven or eight years. The Zimmay Shans, who are the chief purchasers, will only buy children, and that at a reduced rate, as cattle, when I first penetrated to Zimmay, which sold at two rupees and a-half, are now selling for 10 or 12; this rendering the slave trade much less certainly profitable, will probably ultimately put an end to it, though it is said there are still nearly 300 persons annually sold into the Siamese territory. Many of the people of this district have voluntarily gone to reside in the Karean territory, which at its nearest point is not more than 30 miles from this, to avoid the grinding oppression of the Burman Government. Since the troubles at the capital they have had a short respite, but there are generally from 80 to 100 Burmans here living on the natives.

22nd April (Saturday): 23rd (Sunday). Neaung Eue ........
Called to-day on Chow Shoe-nee (Lord Red Gold), the second brother of the tsoboa, and remained about an hour, being the market day here, which is held as at Monay once in five days; a crowd of 100 or 200 people followed me to this house,
which was fortunately, however, at no great distance. My re-
ception was friendly; his whole family were present. Saw a
good many of the Tavoyers to-day, who form the principal part
of the inhabitants of En-lay, Emma, four villages of the lake
(though they are not now confined to four); their dialect is
so similar to that spoken at Tavoy at this day, that I could
immediately detect a Tavoyer, though they must have been
here about 662 years, if the tradition be correct that they
accompanied Narapadi Say Thoo, or Shoo, King of Pagan, as he
reigned there about the year 536 of the Burman, era (1175 A.D.)
Many of the traditions of this town are connected with him, in
Burman history he is said to have defeated an immense Chinese
army which attacked the old city of Kau-tham-bee, formerly the
capital of this valley, the extensive ruins of whose walls are
still visible two or three miles north of this. It must at
that time have stood just on the borders of the lake, and the
wooden pillars of his palace are said still to be visible in a
calm day at the bottom of the lake, with the chains and posts
for fastening his elephants. Five days south-east of this is
another considerable town, Thataung, inhabited by people from
the old town of Thataung, one of the first capitals of the
Pegu kingdom, situated about one day north-east of Martaban,
and brought here by Norata meng tsoe, King of Pagan, at a
still earlier period, viz., 379 of the Burman era. It is
close on the borders of the Karenni country, to the chief
of which people they are now tributary, as well as to Ava.
A messenger from Ava yesterday states the town still to be
surrounded by the Prince's army, the country dreadfully dis-
turbed, all the Burman chiefs of the Shan country turned out,
a new Bohmoo and Tsetkays appointed.

While at Yawnghee Richardson gathered much information about
the Inle Lake and country to the south of it, including Karenni. On
the 16th May, after one month's enforced stay, he received the order to
proceed to Ava. He did not find Yawnghee as friendly as Mongnai, but
there was nothing that he could really complain about. He left
Yawnghee on the 18th May for Ava via "Nay gea", (Negga ?), Pwehla,
Yengan, and reached his destination on the 21st May.¹

¹. Parliamentary Accounts and Papers, C, volume 50, 1867, pp. 104-
114 - Journal of Dr. Richardson.
CHAPTER IV
Preparations

In the open season of 1835-36 Captain S. F. Hannay, of the 40th Regiment, Native Infantry, was deputed by the British Resident of Ava to accompany the Burmese Wun of Mogaung from Ava to the Hukawng Valley in order to settle some dispute between two factions of Kachins on the border between Assam and Burma. Hannay kept a journal of the mission, an extract of which was later published by Captain Boilean Pemberton of the 46th Regiment, Native Infantry, and of Kingdom of Pong Fame. In a preface to the extract, Pemberton writes:

From the termination of the Burmese War to the present period the spirit of enquiry never slept, and the most strenuous exertion has been made by the officers employed on the Eastern Frontier to extend our geographical knowledge to countries scarcely known but by name, and to acquire some accurate information regarding the manners, customs and languages of the various races of men by whom they are inhabited.

These exertions were not too fruitful of results, for Pemberton later states that every attempt prompted by that spirit of enquiry to enter "the great valley of the Irawadi", either from Assam or Manipur, "was defeated by the jealous vigilance of the Burmese authorities".

Behind the spirit of enquiry was trade. The epithet "a nation of shopkeepers" was not applied to the British without reason. Trade was the order of the day, and south-west China and south-east Asia glittered as a vast and ever hungry hinterland capable of swallowing up without saturation all British manufactured goods from pots and pans to textiles and machineries. It was trade and commerce that prompted the British to send out their officers in all directions to look for market, and in the process a whole Empire became British territory. It was also in this process that the British came across the Shans in Northern Burma, South-western Yunnan, the Shan Plateau and Northern Siam.

About the same time that Hannay went to the Hukawng valley, the Commissioner of British Tenasserim, sent in the open season of

1. JASB, No. 64, April 1837.
1836-37 two officers, Captain W. C. MacLeod and Dr. D. Richardson, whose writings we have just read, to explore what was termed the Burmese Shan States. In present-day terminology the visits of these officers would be called goodwill missions to open the golden and silver roads of trade. Captain MacLeod’s journey took him, as we have seen, to Chiangmai and thence to Kengtung and Kenghung, while that of Dr. Richardson took him through Karen to Mongani and thence to Yawngwhe and Mandalay. Each left behind a very valuable journal, from which we have quoted. Captain MacLeod prefaced his journal with a memorandum to authorities concerned in which he said, among other things:

Having received from all the States an assurance of goodwill and their wish to carry on a free communication and trade with us, it now remains with Government to decide what steps ought to be taken to establish a permanent intercourse with them ........... Though the demand for British goods is at present limited, yet a desire to obtain them exists, which will undoubtedly increase as the facilities of procuring them becomes more certain; and we may in return obtain large supplies of tea, the produce of the Shan Districts, beside China goods.

It was largely upon the journals of these two travellers that Colonel Henry Yule based his account of the Shan States of Burma in the thirteenth chapter of his famous “Mission to Ava”. In his writing, Yule enumerates 13 major States of the Shan States, viz.:—

1. Moby (Mongpai)
2. Mokme (Mawkmai)
3. Mone (Mongnai)
4. Mungyue (Yawngwhe)
5. Legya (Laikha)
6. Thibaw (Haipaw)
7. Theinni (Hsenwi)
8. Kaingma (Kungma)
9. Maingmaing (Mongmung)
10. Mainglengyi (Monglem)
11. Kiangtung (Kengtung) or Burmese Kyaington
12. Kianghung, Burmese Kyainyungyi (Kenghung)
13. Kiangkhen, Burmese Kyainkhyang (Kengcheng)

Yule’s number is actually 12 as he couples Kaingma and Mainmaing together. Mung Tein (Mongting) is also mentioned of which the author is not certain if “it is considered tributary to Burma”.

2. Those in brackets are modern spelling and closest to the Shan pronunciation.
On the British occupation of Upper Burma, one Mr. R. H. Pilcher, who had studied some Shan language and was regarded by the British as an expert on Shan affairs, submitted a "compilation" of "information then (December 1885) available concerning the Shan States". In this compilation, Pilcher, after consultation with a monk and some elders of the Shan town of Kemmendine", gives a list of the following States as constituting separate Shan States:

Northern States

Momeit & Mohlaing
Kume or Hume & Maingkun
Toungbaing
Maington
Thonse
Thibaw
Legya
Maingkaing
Youksouk
Maingkin
Maington
Theimm, including 49 States

Southern States

Tigiyit
Moby
Nyaumgywe
Naungwun
Helon
Maingpan
Maingseik
Mokme
NONE
Maingpan
Kyein-taung
Kyein-khen

Towns & townships under direct Burmese Administration:

Tazet-Te-U
Ye-ngan
Pwehla
Pindaya
Kyauktat
Pansein
Kamakhan
Pin-hmi
Tounj-la
Hiwe-man

Lon-bo
Myin-ma-ti
Inleywa
Pon-mu
Nan-tok
Thabet-Mainglin
Ban-yin
Tha-ton
Nan-khop
Ho-bon

Young-pok

As will be seen, the list is not complete and concerns itself only with the cis-Salween States. However, this compilation by Pilcher, faulty though it inevitably must be in the light of subsequent knowledge, reveals much diligent effort on the part of the author, and deserves closer attention as some of the statements made by him are still true today. Apart from the help given by the Shan monk and elders of Kemmendine, Pilcher acknowledges that his effort is the result of a compilation from Yule's "Mission to Ava" and from a few other books and official papers, and makes these observations on the Shans:

The Shans, or Tai, as they call themselves, are the most extensively diffused and, probably, the most numerous of the Indo-Chinese races. Lapping the Burmese round from northwest by north and east to south-east, they are found from the
borders of Manipur (if the people of that valley have not been, indeed, themselves modified by Shan blood) to the heart of Yunnan, and from the valleys of Assam to Bangkok and Camboja; everywhere Buddhist, everywhere to some considerable extent civilised, and everywhere speaking the same language with little variation; a circumstance very remarkable amidst the infinite variety of tongues that we find among the tribes in the closest proximity of location and probable kindred throughout those regions. This substantial identity of language appears to indicate that the Shans had attained at least their present degree of civilization, and a probability of their having been united in one polity, before their so wide dispersion and segregation. The traditions of the Siamese, as well as the Northern Shans, speak of an ancient and great kingdom held by this race in the north of the present Burmese Empire, and of the traditions the name of "Great Tai" applied to the people of that quarter appears to be a slight confirmation. Some fatal want of coherence has split the race into a great number of unconnected principalities, and the kingdom of Siam is now, perhaps, the only independent Shan State in existence. All others are subject or tributary to Ava, China or Siam.

Pilcher divides the Shans into four main sections: the north-western, the Chinese or north-eastern, the eastern and the southern Shans, corresponding respectively to the Khamti Shans, the Mao or Chinese Shans, the Shan States Shans and the Siamese Shans. He refers to the Chinese Shan States as the "Koshampri", a terminology I have attempted to clarify elsewhere. Of the southern or Siamese Shans, he writes:

Their identity as a race with the others is undoubted, though they differ more from others than the latter do from each other. Considering their distance and other circumstances, this was only to be expected. There seems to be a pretty well defined boundary line between the States tributary to Burma and those belonging to Siam, and transfers of suzerainty are rare. There can thus seldom if ever be any such doubt how far Siamese authority extends as there is regarding that of China and Burma.

When Karenni is described, Pilcher regards that State as falling naturally within the zone of influence of the Shan States and Burma, maintaining that in spite of the forays and slave hunting expeditions made by the Red Karens into adjoining territories, the relations between the Karennis, and the Shans and the Burmese are very close, and that the country is inseparably bound up with the Shan States and must take an important part in their political affairs.

1. See Chapter II above.
The Shan States proper are described in some detail: dialect, indigenous administration, Burmese suzerainty, and characteristics of the individual States. In this description he follows Yule's list closely against the Shan States. Some materials are available.

Another source of information on the Shan States available to the British was their Vice-Consul at Chiangmai who opened his office there early in 1884. Apart from protecting the interests of British subjects in Northern Siam, keeping in order the subjects themselves who were not slow to take advantage of British protection, and promoting unrestricted trade, the Consul was instructed to report on conditions in the "Shan Chiefships of the highland between upper waters of the Sittang and the Red River", and on the "success or failure of the Ava Court in maintaining its authority in those chiefships". The Vice-Consul was even told "that the Government of India were desirous that he should undertake a Gazetteer of the Shan and Lao States, and that in return for a satisfactory Gazetteer an honorarium of £200 or £250 would be granted to him, and he was asked whether he was willing to undertake the work".

Now let us examine British intentions towards the Shan States after the fall of Mandalay. These are clear from the telegram which the Chief Commissioner despatched to the Viceroy on November 20, 1885:

Your Excellency's telegram about the Shan States. I asked General Prendergast not to send his notice among the Shan States and told him we had no idea of governing them or converting them into British districts even in the event of annexation. I gave him a first rate Shan interpreter who has travelled in the Shan States, and suggested that, if he had opportunity of communicating with Shan Chiefs, he should tell them that the British would not interfere in internal autonomy of the larger States so long as they govern well, promoted trade, and paid a moderate tribute. As soon as position opens I would send with small escort Mr. Pilcher, who knows Shan language well, to visit the principal Shan Chiefstains, explain to them the Viceroy's views, and perhaps the way for making agreements with them. Even in case of a Feudatory Prince being retained on Mandalay throne, I would

1. Pilcher, R. H., The Shan States Tributary to Burma; in Burma Foreign Dept. No. 139, dated 13-12-1886.

2. Memorandum dated 31-3-84 by Mr. Charles Bernard, Chief Commissioner, British Burma.

3. Foreign Department Proceedings No. 11 Part B, dated 23-9-85. Events in Burma apparently moved too rapidly for the Gazetteer to be completed.
propose to this course and regulate the relations of Shan Chiefs and their suzerain. When Ningyan is occupied, I propose to send Mr. Pilcher thither in order to begin establishment of relations with the Shan States. But I should like to take definite instructions from Foreign Secretary and submit for approval draft of instructions to Mr. Pilcher before he actually starts through States.

In all their correspondence on or about the Shan States, the British stressed again and again these points: there must be peace, i.e., the States must stop fighting with one another; trade must not be restricted; the Shan Chiefs must administer their states with justice and efficiency; nominal annual tribute must be paid, and foreign relations must be in British hands. So long as the spirit of these conditions was kept up, the British proclaimed they would not interfere in the internal affairs of the Shan States.

It seems that the British had every intention of going into the Shan States during the open season of 1885-86 for by December of 1885 they had already formulated a plan, hinted in the above telegram, how this should be done. A mission "to begin the establishment of relations with the Chiefs" was to be despatched to the Shan States, headed by R. H. Pilcher, to preach British ideas of peace and law and order. A surveyor, a medical officer, an escort of some 50 chosen sepoys with an English Officer in charge of them were to accompany this British ambassador-at-large. It was to have been a goodwill and fact-finding mission. What Pilcher was to do in the Shan States was precisely laid down:-

Mr. Pilcher must of course travel simply as a Political Officer. He will be duly accredited by the Chief Commissioner to the Chiefs and will travel under their protection, they being held responsible for the general safety of the party, and the supply of provisions, means of carriage, and so forth as required. Should the Chief of any State refuse to receive his mission, he would not be visited, but the fact would be reported to the Government.

Mr. Pilcher will at first confine himself to explaining to the Chiefs the views of the Government of India and recommending them to accept without delay the position offered. He should make it clearly understood that we desire mainly to preserve order and to encourage trade; that we wish neither to interfere with the Chiefs' rights, nor to raise large revenues out of their tribute; but, as far as may be, to leave them their autonomy and to exact only such sums as they may fairly be expected to pay, regard being had both to present circumstances and to ancient customs.

Mr. Pilcher will collect all the information he can on matters of politics and history. The Medical Officer will
be requested to study so far as he can the geological features of the country, the fauna and flora, and the physical character, and the habits of the inhabitants, the Officer commanding the escort will be requested to give special attention to routes, distances and altitudes, to the natural products of the country, and indeed to all matters interesting from a military point of view. These Officers as well as the Survey Officer and Mr. Pilcher himself should keep diaries and record all the information they obtain as they go, submitting copies at intervals. Mr. Pilcher will be directed to submit reports of his proceedings weekly in the form of a copy of his diary.

The British were most unwilling at this time to offend the Chinese Empire, and careful instructions were given on this point.

The most careful enquiries possible should be made about the relations of all States bordering on China with the Government of that country. States subject to China should not be visited, and where there is any doubt as to the suzerainty, care would be taken to avoid arousing jealousy on the part of Chinese officials or subjects.

In the event of annexation, a suitable term will have to be chosen for the residence of the Superintendent of the Shan States.

And Inleywa and Mongnai, formerly seat of the Burmese Political Officer, were tentatively chosen as possibilities.

Mr. Pilcher's staff must be carefully chosen.

The Shan dislike and distrust the Burmese; and therefore as few Burmese as possible should be employed, Shans being engaged whenever it is possible to use them.

And a little bribery would not be out of place, if discretion was used to distinguish between receivers.

It will be well for Mr. Pilcher to have with him a few articles of small value to give as presents to heads of villages or Chiefs of wild tribes or others who may render him special service. These gifts will not be of any public character, nor is it intended to make presents to Chiefs or persons of importance. A sum of, say, Rs.200 should suffice for this purpose.

However, it was not possible in the open season of 1885-86 to send a British mission or expedition into the Shan States. There was too much to occupy the British in Mandalay. It was not until almost a year later that another plan was evolved in which was envisaged the British move into the Shan States. This, "Plans for Establishing British-Influence in the Shan States during the Open Season of 1887", 
was written on the S. S. "Mindoan" in September 1886 by Mr. Charles Bellard, the Chief Commissioner. It will be noticed that the paper speaks not of "annexation" but of "establishing British Influence in the Shan States. One passage in this note gives a very clear picture of what was happening in the Shan States during the period between the first plan and this one, and it is given in full below:

Though we intended to send last year a mission with an escort into the Shan States, we have been unable to do so because our hands were so very full of the work of pacifying the plains of Burma Proper. Thus the Shan States have been left wholly without such support as the presence of a British Officer escorting by a small force of troops would assuredly lend to such Chiefs as might be well disposed and desirous of maintaining peace. During the past nine months the Shan States have for the most part declined to give asylum or help to pretenders, who were trying to set up their standards, and claim the throne of Mandalay. Small parties of Shan marauders may have joined pretenders, or may have raided on their account; but such people did not represent any Chief or any large section of the Shan people; they merely represent the bad characters who are always to be found in loosely ordered communities like the Shan States. But though the Shan States have not harmed us in any way, parts of them have been subjected to serious internal disorders. In the first place, Chiefships, where the late Government had established Burman rulers after ousting the hereditary Sawbwas, have risen against the Burmese Governors and ejected them. In other Chiefships, notably Mone and Thibaw, the Sawbwas who had fled across the Salween in Burman times, have returned and claimed their old thrones. Elsewhere, notably in Nyawngwe, the Chiefship has been wrested from the recent holder, first by an uncle and then by an elder brother. Lastly in one small State, Taungan, a Sawbwa has been killed by the followers of the Kyinsaing Prince, who had found asylum there. All these operations have been attended with a good deal of disorder, with loss of life and property, and with burning of villages. Lastly, the Limbin Prince, a fugitive of Alompra's house, who for some years enjoyed British hospitality, and was at one time a paid magistrate in Lower Burma, has made his way into the Shan States, where he found followers and attempted to set himself up as head of a Shan federation. He has attacked some of the Chiefships which refuse to side with him; and he has been fighting more or less since April last. The last accounts are that this prince and his supporters were defeated and driven back towards the Salween. But at one time he had the possession of Mobye, the fugitive Chief of which he had prayed for the intervention of British troops; and the Limbin Prince also had with him the fugitive Sawbwa of Mone, who had returned from exile in Kiangtung in order to regain his rightful throne, from which the Burmans drove him some six years ago.

1. This does not seem to be correct since the Limbin League was still fighting the Yawnghwe Sawbwa when the British entered in January, 1887.
At intervals during the past six months we have received invitations from Motye, Nyaungye, and other minor Chiefships to send British troops or help of other kinds into the Shan States, so that the Limin Prince may be put down, order may be restored, and peace kept in the Shan country. These invitations seem to be given in a sincere and friendly spirit; and it seems to be the general opinion that order will not be restored among the Cis-Salween States until we send an Officer up to the Shan Plateau with a suitable escort whose duty shall be to support the status quo in the States he visits and assist the de facto Sawbwas in ejecting Burmese or other pretenders. To such requests we have replied that we intend to send a mission, with suitable force, into the Shan State next year, provided the Chiefs really want our help; that we do not intend to interfere with the autonomy of the Shan States; and that we hope that they (the friendly Chiefs) will keep the peace and successfully repel attack till we come there to help in restoring order ...........

It was during this period, very early in May 1886, that Pilcher, by this time strategically posted as Deputy Commissioner, Kyaukse, the district nearest to the Myelat of the Shan States received "a very carefully worded letter" from Sao On, the usurping Sawbwa of Yawngwe asking for help and protection. The bearer of the letter, an amathtauk of the Sawbwa, who had been with the Kinwun Mingyi; and whose father was Setsaya Dun (Mg Tun), stated that the letter was meant for the British authorities in Mandalay and that he had brought several copies with him in case one should go astray. Deputy Commissioner Pilcher was justifiably excited and reported to his superiors in Mandalay: "it is a very carefully worded letter, and is addressed to no one, so it looks to the Wun as if meant for the Hlut. But the bearer says the Sawbwa knew that the Hlut was abolished. Any way, no one can tell who the letter was meant for on the face of it. And it would answer equally well, as it stands, as a letter to, say, the Kinwun Mingyi or to a brother Chief, say of Theinni". Pilcher suggested that time was ripe to advance into the Shan States. "It will be inexpedient", he went on, "to encourage friendly Chiefs to place much reliance on us or to enter into relations with us before we are prepared to support our friends by force. The Chiefs who first made advance to us will be objects of suspicion and jealousy to the rest, and may become martyrs in our cause, as many Burmese villages have. Inleywa is evidently the place for garrison. It is said to be in a good military position. It is central; supplies are plentiful. And the best road is by the Natteik Pass".

Pilcher's letter to Mandalay was dated May 3, 1886. The exciting letter from the Yawngwe Sawbwa was without a date and is reproduced in full in the next chapter.

1. Plans for Establishing Influence in the Shan States during the Open Season of 1887; in Burma Foreign Dept. No. 139, dated 13-12-1886.
On May 10, 1886, the Secretary to the Chief Commissioner at Mandalay, answered Saw On's letter:

The Chief Commissioner has received a letter written by the Nyaung-Ywe Sawbwa Saw On. The Chief Commissioner is glad to learn that the Sawbwa is anxious to be friendly with the British Government, to keep order in his territory and to live peaceably. It is the intention of the Chief Commissioner to send up a British Officer to confer with the Shan Sawbwas and to assure them of the desire of the British Government that the hereditary rights of the Sawbwas shall be respected and maintained. But this will not be done until the rains are at an end. In the meantime each Sawbwa should keep order in his territories, and should decline to harbour dacoits and rebel princes. When the British Officer comes, he will be accompanied by a sufficient force, and he will protect and support those Sawbwas who have lived at peace. The British Government do not in the least wish to make war upon the Shan States or to subjugate them; they wish the Shan Sawbwas to govern their countries and people peaceably under the protection of the British Queen. The Chief Commissioner hopes that in two or three years time a railway will be made from Toungoo to Mandalay through Yamethin and Kyaukse. This railway will greatly facilitate trade in salt, ngapi, cotton and other goods between the Shan States and Rangoon.

This first letter from the premier representative of the British power in Burma was to be the basis of the British policy towards the Shan States throughout, with modifications as time went on. That during 1886 the British hands were full with affairs on the plains of Central Burma, was fully described in a paper called "Measures adopted for the Pacification of the territories recently acquired in Burma", which was a Despatch from Lord Dufferin the Viceroy and his assistants in India to Viscount Cross, the Secretary of State for India in London. The last paragraph of this Despatch concerns the Shan States and is quoted in full:

As soon as we have obtained by these (military and civil) a sufficiently firm hold on the territory formerly under the direct rule of King Thibaw, we must direct attention to the tributary Shan States, as well as to the Kachens and other wild tribes in the northern districts, who owed allegiance to the Sovereign of Mandalay. Amongst them the work to be done is very different from that on which we are at present engaged. The Shans, Kachens, and other mountain tribes live under the rule of hereditary Chiefs, whose authority is generally sufficient to preserve order amongst them. Here, then, we have to deal not with disintegrated masses as in Burma Proper, but with large organised units, each under the moral and administrative control of an individual ruler. If we secure the

1. Burma Foreign Department Proceedings No. 1, May 1886.
allegiance of these rulers, we obtain as far as can be now foreseen most of what we require, and all the premonitory symptoms give us reason to hope that this will not be a difficult task. The Chiefs, or Sawbwas, as they are called, appear willing to accept our supremacy, and preserve order amongst their people in accordance with our wishes, provided we recognise their rights and dignity of Chieftainship, and abstain from quartering troops upon them, and we on our part, are very glad to accept these conditions, for we have no desire to extend unnecessarily the sphere of our administrative responsibilities. What we mainly want from the Chiefs is that they should prevent their people from raiding in the territory under our administration, that they should abstain from fighting among themselves, that they should not enter into relations with any foreign Power, and that they should gradually proximate to our standard of civic discipline. These we hope to secure by the amicable intervention of a few expert political officers, if possible, without recourse to military operations. As soon as it is clearly understood that we desire to maintain the native rulers in the enjoyment of their legitimate possessions and privileges, that there is no intention of interference so long as the administration on lines prescribed by us does not become conspicuously oppressive, and that we shall always be reluctant to interfere otherwise than in the form of moral pressure exerted alike in the interests of the people and of the rulers themselves, the Shan Chiefs and other Sawbwas will, we trust, like the Native Princes of India, be found willing to recognise British supremacy, and to regard it as the best guardian of their dynastic interests and of their administrative autonomy.¹

Since the Chief Commissioner's note written on S. S. "Mindoon" in September 1886, changes in the Shan States were reported by the Chief Commissioner to the Government of India as follows:

(a) The Limbin Prince and his allies have gathered strength, have attacked Nyaungywe, and were, by last accounts, on the outskirts of that State, about three days journey from the Capital. The invading and the defending troops have had encounters with varying results. Latterly the invaders under the Limbin Prince seem to have got the best of it.

(b) The Nyaungywe Chief has sent further urgent messengers begging that a British force may come up at once to help him, as he is the chief (he says the only) well-wisher of the British on the Shan plateau. The last messenger from Nyaungywe only went back last week; he was one of the Sawbwa's chief ministers. He was told that a British force would come up without fail in January; but that we

¹. Government of India, Home's Department No. 54, October 1886.
could not come now. He agreed to come back and pilot our troops up, and he undertook to send forward letters from us to the petty Chiefs on the road, telling them our officer was coming on a peaceful mission, that our people would pay for everything they got, and that the villagers should stay quietly in their houses.

(c) The Mobye Chief has also written twice during the past two months saying that the Shans are fighting together, that order cannot be restored until a British force comes up, and praying that the force and promised Political Officers may be sent soon.

(d) The Thibaw Chief on the north has written in most friendly style and professed much readiness to receive any agent we may send; there seems little doubt but that this Chief knows our power and that his professions are sincere.

(e) A British Officer with a small force of Native troops has been sent to the nearer Shan State of Thonze; he met with no opposition either at Thonze or on the way thither; but he found the Thonze country utterly laid waste by marauders from Thibaw and adjoining States.

(f) The Nyinzaing Prince’s death has made a difference in the attitude of the lesser States at the head of Natteik Pass, for they had to some extent made cause with him; still they have not made friendly overtures to us.

The Chief Commissioner listed the following States as being in favour of the British and ready to welcome the visit of a British Political Officer: "Thibaw, Nyaungwe-Inleywa, Maingkaing, Kyithi-Bansan, Maington, Mobye"; while "Yatsauk, Maingpon, Naungmun, Maingpyin, Legya, Banyin, Thaton, Tabet, Namkok, and Hopon", were thought to be against the British in that they had been followers of the Limbin Prince. "Mone" was reported as not having taken any decision but that he had given some ground for belief that he would not oppose the British.

There was no information about what was happening in the trans-Salween states, beyond the report sent in by the British Vice-Consul at Chiangmai to the effect that the five small States of Mongton, Monghang, Mongpu, Monghsat and Mongkyawt had tendered their allegiance to Siam, and that the Siamese authorities had ordered troops towards their frontier to prevent aggression into their territory. It was of no help to turn to some of the late Burmese Ministers of Thibaw’s Government because it had not exercised any authority over the trans-Salween Shan States since the revolt of Kengtung. 1

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1. Burma Foreign Department No. 139, dated 13-12-86.
The British accurately assessed the weight of the influence of the Sawbwa of Mongnai in their effort to win over other Chiefs, and expected little trouble from the Limbin League, which aimed to put the Limbin Prince on the Burmese throne; now that there was no Burmese king to fight and that the Shan rulers could be detached from their alliance with the Limbin Prince without much difficulty. Special letters had been despatched to the Sawbwas of Lawksawk and Mongnai telling them that if they acknowledged British supremacy, governed well and paid a moderate tribute, they would be confirmed in their position. Letters had also been sent to other rulers heralding the coming of the British Political Officer with peaceful and non-interfering intentions.

Such then was the picture of the Shan States as seen in the British administrative headquarters in Mandalay in December 1886. Preparations were now being made in earnest for the advance into the Shan States, whether it was for complete annexation or establishment of British influence will appear as the advance penetrated deeper into the heart of the Shan land. To the legalistic British what constituted the Shan States must first be publicly declared. This was done in a public Notification, General Department No. 458, dated Mandalay the 30th October 1886, and the following states were declared to constitute the Shan States:

"(1) On the west of the Irrawaddy River

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<tr>
<th>The State of Wuntho</th>
<th>The State of Kale</th>
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<td>On the west of the Irrawaddy River</td>
<td>On the east of the Irrawaddy River</td>
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<tr>
<td>&quot; &quot; &quot; Thaungthut</td>
<td>&quot; &quot; &quot; Kanti</td>
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(2) On the east of the Irrawaddy River

(a) West of the Salween River

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<tr>
<th>The State of Momeik</th>
<th>The State of Latmaing</th>
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<td>&quot; &quot; &quot; Mohlaing</td>
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<td>&quot; &quot; &quot; Mainglon</td>
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Kyi-thi Bansan
(b) East of the Salween River

The State of Maingpu
  Maingthat
  Kyaingchaing

The State of Kyaingchaing
  Kyaingyongyi
  Mainglingyi

The British next considered the strength of the military force that was to proclaim the annexation of these States, and the following was decided upon:

1. Companies, 2nd Battalion Hampshire Regiment
2. A whole regiment of the 3rd Gurkhas
3. 2 Mountain guns 1-IE D.R.A. } with mules and European gunners
4. 2 Gardner machine guns
5. 50 Bombay sappers and miners
6. 20 Mounted infantry.

The original idea of entering the Shan States through the Natteik Pass, nearest to Kyaukse, was given up. In their earlier plans, it was suggested that one of the Shan Chiefs should be appointed as "Captain of the Pass" who, the British thought, in exchange for this imposing title and a small annual allowance, would see to it that the Pass was kept open and protected. But this Natteik Pass, although the shortest way to the Shan States, would require more pack animals for the Expedition than were available at Mandalay, and so a longer route through the alternative Pyindet Pass had to be traversed before Yawnghwe could be reached. This Pyindet Pass not only was some 2000 feet lower than the Natteik at its highest point; in this section from Hlaingdet to Yawnghwe it offered a shorter and less mountainous route, and it would take only 5 days for the troops to march this stretch. Bullock carts carrying supplies could go right up to Hlaingdet and even a few miles beyond, where pack animals would begin. Yawnghwe loomed large in the British planning, for it was most desirable that it should be reached before Sao On, their principal ally in the South, was overwhelmed by his adversaries of the Limbin League.

Next to be considered was the directive to be given to the political and military officers of the Expedition. This was clearly and definitely set out as follows:

Heads of instructions to be given to the Political Officer and to the Military Officer Commanding.

I. The object of the expedition to the Shan country is, not to fight the Shans, but to make friends with the Shan Chiefs and get them to be friendly to us. We wish to promote a great trade between the Shan States and the Irrawaddy plain;

1. Military Report on the Shan States, Intelligence Branch, Q.M.G. Department, Simla, 1905.
and to this end we have abolished all the duties, imports and monopolies that used to fetter the Shan trade. Military and Political Officers and troops will take all possible care to cause no avoidable offence or inconvenience to the Shans or their Chiefs; to gain the goodwill of the Chiefs, priests and people; and to interfere with their prejudices, their religious houses and their private arrangements as little as possible.

II. The first thing will be for the force to make its way to Inleywa as quickly as may be, and, if possible, without fighting. Every aid and protection should be given to engineers and labourers who may be working for the improvement of the road and on the erection of block-houses. Arrived at Inleywa the Political Officer will communicate at once with, or will visit the Nyaungywe Sawbwa, will explain again to him our friendly intentions, and will relieve him of any anxiety lest we should intend to displace him in favour of the late Sawbwa, his (the present Chief's) brother. Arrangements should be made with the Sawbwa for his consent to our erecting a Residency and fort at Inleywa and to our taking up a certain quantity of ground. At the same time the Sawbwa should be asked to procure trustworthy information concerning the Limbin Prince and his followers, and concerning the attitude and intentions of the Mone and other neighbouring Shan Chiefs.

III. The Officer Commanding, in concert with the Political Officer, the Engineer Officers, and the Senior Medical Officer, will choose the best site for the fort, Residency and barracks. Probably it would be best to be a little distant from the town of Inle and from the margin of the lake. As soon as the Chief's assent has been gained by the Political Officer, the construction of the fort and quarters for a garrison of (say) 100 European and 200 Natives should be begun.

IV. Meanwhile information should be obtained concerning the routes and distances to Mone, to Mobye, and to the place where the Limbin Prince's following may be assembled. And letters should be sent, through messengers to be obtained from Nyaungywe, to all the neighbouring Chiefs, telling them of the arrival of the Political Officer, apprising them that his headquarters will be at Inleywa, and inviting them either to come themselves or to send trusted Ministers thither to discuss matters with the Political Officer. The letters would carefully explain that we do not want to interfere with the autonomy of any State, that we do not wish to displace any de facto ruler, but that we desire to help the Chiefs in maintaining peace and quiet and in restoring trade. We wish them to acknowledge the supremacy of the British Empress who has succeeded to the Burman King's rights; we wish to settle amicably what tribute, if any, is to be paid by each State
yearly during the next 10 years, and we demand no payment on account of arrears of tribute.

V. With Nyaungywe and with any other State that may submit the Political Officer should enter into an agreement in somewhat the appended shape (Appendix A), confirming the Sawbwa, declaring his position and duties towards his people and towards the British Government, and settling the tribute he is to pay. The tribute should not ordinarily be less than three quarters of what was nominally paid in King Thibaw's time. But a special remission of moderate amount should be given to Nyaungywe in consideration of his giving us a good site for the Residency and fort. And if any State has been specially harried during recent disturbances, its tribute can be partially remitted by a year. No arrears of tribute should be demanded.

VI. When the Residency and fort are to some extent forward, the Officer Commanding, in consultation with the Political Officer, will decide whether to go or to send a part of his force to Mone or against the Limbin Prince, and will plan his march to Mobye so as to get there not later than the 15th March, and to reach Toungoo not later than the 10th April. A field wire will meanwhile have been carried to Hlaingdet and to Inleywa, so that communications with Mandalay will be fairly easy. All the time supplies will have been going forward to Inleywa. And another convoy of supplies will be sent from Ningyan to reach the foot of the Mobye pass descent by the 12th March.

VII. Though it is desirable to visit Mongnai and to come to friendly terms with the Mone Chief, who is the biggest man in those parts, yet no risks must be run of disaster either from failure of supplies, or from sickness, or from armed opposition, on the march to and from Mone. If the Officer Commanding thinks the march imprudent, or in any way likely to compromise the safety or health of his force, he should not attempt the journey to Mone, and that part of the programme must be put off for another season.

The British were fully alive to the practice during the regimes of successive Burmese Kings of parcelling out territories as marks of royal favour to persons who managed to get the ear of the Court. This was also discussed with the Government of India and the British intention in this respect were set out in the following paragraph:

There is one question that is sure to arise, and that is whether the disintegration of individual States should, as in Burmese times, be promoted. The Burmese Kings used to cut off slices from one State or another, and erect such slices into separate little chiefships under officials.
called Myozas or Shwegunmuus. Or sometimes they would cut off
a whole territory and erect it into a Burmese province under
a Wun or Burmese Official. This was apparently done with
Myelat, a submontane tract, which was taken away from Nyaungyuwe
and which is at present in a condition of complete anarchy.
No doubt the bigger Chiefs will want to get back these pieces
of their dominions. The petty Chieftains recently created
may demur to reabsorption into the parent State. But for the
people it will perhaps be better that they should belong to a
fairly strong State that can protect them. And the Chief
Commissioner's view is that our policy should be in favour of
the reabsorption of these outlying tracts provided the people
of such tracts do not object. In the case of a large tract
like the Myelat; if we allowed it to go back to Nyaungyuwe,
we should require some moderate addition to the tribute on
that account. It will on many grounds be better and cheaper
for us to get such tracts which may be clearly Shan territory
managed by responsible Shan States, than for us to incur the
cost of direct management through our own agency.

It was not considered that the Expedition would come into
collision with hostile Shan forces until Yawnghe was reached or until
it proceeded beyond to where Limbin League forces might give trouble.
This the British hoped to avoid by offering a full pardon to the
Limbin prince and promise of a pension of Rs. 250 and a house at either
Moulmein or Rangoon if he would live quietly. The Prince's former
pension was Rs. 100 per mensem and the Chief Commissioner thought it
would be worthwhile to give him an increment of Rs. 150 "in order to
get him out of the Shan States". Another factor in favour of avoiding
unnecessary collision was that the force as prescribed was considered
strong enough to convince possible opponents that it was irresistible.
There would also be strong points where blockhouses would be set up
along the route from Hlaingdet to Yawnghe, to be manned by the
garrison from Hlaingdet. The Political Officer and Medical Officer
were further advised to avoid hurry and to abstain from pressing Chiefs
or people too much, or from committing offences against religious and
other feelings or "prejudices" of the Shan. Freebooters and bandits
there would certainly be, but it was thought that the number of such
attacks on the Expedition would be few and far between, and the
military Commanders would be able to take complete care of such
eventualities. It appears therefore that all possible human pre-
cautions had been taken to avoid fighting in the Shan States, and
the unforeseen would be left to the discretion and good sense of the
Political and Military Officers.

What about the appointment of political officers themselves?

R. H. Pilcher, the only British Officer in Burma who knew some
Shan language, had been ear-marked for the post of the Chief British
Political Officer to the Shan States, but unfortunately he died of
fever in October 1886. Mr. Thirkell White was next considered. Being
in the office of the Secretary to the Chief Commissioner, White knew
what had been going on in the Shan States, and a recent foray to Hsumhsai had given him an experience of dealing with Shans. But in his report on Hsumhsai he had made recommendations which were against the Sawbwa of Haipaw, the chief ally of the British in the North, and which the Chief Commissioner considered "unnecessarily pessimistic", and subsequent events had proved that the Chief Commissioner was right. Moreover, his presence was considered to be so essential to the bureaucratic machinery of the Secretariat at Mandalay that he could not be spared for any length of time. He seemed to have belonged to the "headquarters" or secretariat type of civil servant, as opposed to the district or touring type.

In his book White does not give the impression that he was over-anxious to head the mission. The official choice finally fell upon Mr. A. H. Hildebrand, at the time serving as the Deputy Commissioner of that turbulent district, Tharawadi, and these were his chief qualifications: he knew the Burmese language well and most people in the Shan States with whom the Political Officer was likely to meet would know Burmese; in 1877 he had headed a successful political mission into Karenni; as a district officer, first of the Salween Hill Tracts and afterwards of the Arakan Hill Tracts, he had "had much experience in dealing with half savage border people". These factors caused the Chief Commissioner to have much confidence in Mr. Hildebrand's "experience, sagacity and courage" and to select him as the political head of the British expedition to demand submission of the Shan States. The proper designation of the appointment was "Superintendent and Political Officer of the Shan States".

As the Political Officer would have to do a great deal of touring, or he would sometimes have to depute some one to tour the country on his behalf, it was very desirable that he should have an assistant. The choice fell upon one J. G. Scott who happened at the time to be the Assistant Commissioner at Hlaingdet. Although barely a year had elapsed since Mr. Scott joined the Burma Commission, he was not a young man and had a good knowledge of the Burmese language and, in the light of the available sources of those days, of the races in south-east Asia. His book, The Burman - His Life and Notion, written under the pen name of "Shway Yoe", was an added recommendation. Scott was not only to be assistant to the Superintendent and Political Officer, but also to learn "the Shan work and the Shan country" - he was to be an expert on the Shans and all things Shan.

The Chief of the mission was to receive an additional allowance of Rs. 300 and his assistant Rs. 150 a month in recognition of the strenuous work ahead.

With military and political plans thus definitely and precisely laid down for the major British Expedition into the Shan States, the Chief Commissioner of Burma in a letter dated December 13, 1886, asked for the sanction of the Government of India to advance from Hlaingdet.

1. White, H. T., A Civil Servant in Burma.
on or about the 15th January 1887\textsuperscript{1}. Even while the sanction was being sought, troops had been ordered to concentrate and supplies sent to the assembly point at Hlaingdet, and work had already begun on the Pyindet Pass Road.

\textsuperscript{1} Burma Foreign Department No. 139, dated 13-12-1886.
CHAPTER V

Chaos and Revolts

Before the British Annexation of Upper Burma, the Shan States had been in turmoil for some time and practically all the States were free from Mandalay control. Several factors were responsible for this chaotic state. Maladministration at the centre and the state of lawlessness in Upper Burma itself were not conducive to peaceful living in the autonomous Shan States, which found it easy to revolt against local Burmese political agents and their garrisons. The States themselves were never at peace with each other, and when the Burmese garrisons were withdrawn after the fall of Mandalay, they were free to settle their differences by force of arms. To add to the confusion, marauding bands of adventurers would collect themselves round local leaders for their shares of loot.

Writing in the early eighteen eighties about his survey of a railway project from the British Moulmein to Chiengmai and thence to Kengtung, aiming eventually to reach the Chinese border beyond Kenghung, Archibald Ross Colquhoun observes: "Within the last few years, the Burmese Shan States have succeeded in throwing off the yoke of Burma, and, it is believed, will shortly put themselves under the protection of Siam. As the Burmese rule no longer exists in the Shan States, the King of Siam has withdrawn all opposition to the resumption of traffic. Under these circumstances trade will rapidly revive, and the road to China will once more deserve its old title of the 'Golden Road'".1

The Shan States were free from Burmese control, but, as we shall see, they had no idea of putting themselves under the protection of the Siamese king. The 'Golden Road' to China glittered before the trade-conscious Britishers, but even in the best of times during the British supremacy in the East the road never carried more than a few thousand mule packs a year - its significance was more local than international. Only chaos in the Shan States was a reality. Both in the Northern and Southern Shan States, practically the whole countryside was in the state of turmoil. Even in Kengtung in the east, where there was comparative peace, trouble broke out among some of its dependencies.

But before coming to the upheaval itself the terms "Northern" and "Southern" Shan States should be clarified. These terms, with

definite political boundaries, seem to have come into being only with the
British annexation. Sir Charles Crossthwaite explains how it came about:

The grouping of the Shan States for administration purposes
into North and South, which was not inherited from the Burman
Government, and was not founded on any distinction recognised
by the Shans, had its origin in these events. The States, the
history of which is of most importance in this connection, are
Hsenwi and Hsipaw, to the north of Mandalay; Yawngwe and
Mongnai further south; and, on the east of the Salween, the
large State of Kengtung.¹

"These events" refer to the turmoil in the Shan States which led
the British to send three separate military-cum-political expeditions to
deal with them as we shall see later. The first was the foremost
British force sent to the South in the cold weather of 1887 which
heralded the British conquest of the Shanland; the second took place
to the North in the next cold weather; and the third, a handful of
Indian sepoys headed by three British Officers, one political, one mili­
tary and the third medical, practically conquered the whole of 12,000
square-miles of Kengtung State. This division of the Shan States into
North and South is most convenient and natural in many ways. The main
road from Mandalay and Magmyo leads to Hsipaw and Hsenwi and opens up
routes to all parts of the Northern Shan States. Another main road
from Meiktila - Thazi area goes to Yawngwe, Mongnai and further east
to Kengtung, with roads from other Southern States joining this
arterial road. Roads exist which connect the North and South at vari­
ous points. The whole Central Plain of Burma is thus well connected
with all parts of the Shan States.²

Of the chaos and revolts in the Northern and Southern Shan
States prior to the British annexation, we may begin with the revolt
in Kengtung, which had been considered part of the Southern Shan
States.

Kengtung and Kenghung had been very close to each other in
friendly relations from ancient times, as is borne out by the Chronicle
of Kengtung. Kenghung had not had a stable government for some time
prior to 1880 when ruling princes came and went, the ease and rapidity
of these comings and goings depending upon the success or otherwise of
the palace intrigues. Kengtung, on the other hand, had been stable
since Sawbwa Maha Khanan admitted Ava's suzerainty in 1814. In the late
eighteen seventies relations between these two States seem to have been
strained, and to heighten these differences, the Sawbwa of Kenghung,
Sao Seng, received royal appointment or recognition from King Mindon,
without reference to the Sawbwa of Kengtung and to the exclusion of the
latter's nominee. This royal order was confirmed by King Thibaw and

¹. Grossthwaite, Sir C., The Pacification of Burma, p. 137.
². A list of the States in the North and South will be found in the
Appendix at the end of the book.
the Kenghung Sawbwa went to Mandalay to receive the honour personally. The shortest route from Kenghung to Mandalay passed through the Kengtung valley, and Sao Seng did not pay a courtesy call on its prince, but sent word that he would do so on return. On his way back from Mandalay and while passing through Kengtung for the second time, not only did Sao Seng not pay a visit to the Sawbwa of Kengtung, but he let it be known that as his appointment was senior to that of Kengtung in the Mandalay warrant of precedence he had no intention of making any call on a junior prince, who should have been the first to call. The Sawbwa of Kengtung, by this time Sao Kawntai, never liked the idea of Kenghung taking precedence over Kengtung, and when he was informed of Sao Seng's remarks, thought the time had come to rid himself of the Burmese rule and to have Sao Seng's head. He began by putting to death the Burmese political agent in Kengtung and his body-guard numbering 30, and raising a force of several thousands to attack Kenghung. In due course, Kengtung forces overran Kenghung and installed their nominee on the throne of the principality, while Sao Seng's head was embalmed in honey and brought to Kengtung. This was in 1881 and King Thibaw and the Court at Mandalay, beset as they were with their own troubles and disorders, were unable to do anything about this revolt. The Burmese garrison in Kengtung was never large and the Burmese control and authority there were only nominal, quite different from those in the cis-Salween States which were nearer to the centre. It is doubtful if even a stronger king would have thought it worth-while to send an expedition to Kengtung on an occasion such as this, if his own representative on the spot had been in the wrong.

Soon after this event in Kengtung another revolt broke out in Mongnai, headquarters of the Burmese Resident and garrison in the Southern Shan States. This was caused by a string of events which had their beginning during King Mindon's time when the Thathameda tax which the Shans never liked was introduced. Before proceeding, however, it would be appropriate here to say a word about the tax itself.

It would seem that the Thathameda tax was levied for the first time in the Shan States in 1868 in Mongnai. It was originally fixed at Rs. 5/- per house to be levied on the basis of one thousand seven hundred houses, the same number of houses as was fixed for Kengtawng, a sub-state of Mongnai. From this it is clear that the number of assessable houses was not fixed on a scientific basis, for the number of houses in Mongnai must have been far greater than that of Kengtawng.

This is how the thathameda was collected: The Hluttaw Mingyis, and not the local political agents, issued the orders for collection. On receipt of this order the Sawbwa would summon his

1. GUBSS, I.1.291. The story of Sao Seng and his head was told to the writer by Sao Kawntiao Intaleng, Sawbwa of Kengtung 1896-1935.
council of ministers and officials and lay before them the Mandalay demand, and a discussion would then take place as to the amount each Circle in the State was liable for. When a decision had been reached, the Sawbwa's Office would issue letters to all circles showing the exact amount each was to pay. This letter would be the authority shown to the village headmen who would then collect the appropriate amount from his villagers.

At one time subsequently, on account of the increased expenditure at the Burmese capital, orders were issued for the tribute to be paid in kind, e.g. thitsi, oils - wood or sesamum, lac, cutch and similar products. Districts that did not produce these had to buy them from those that did; and the penalty for failure to produce them was increased revenue. The products were despatched from various States by bullock carts to Ava where they would be weighed by the Akunwun and accepted if correct. This system which was introduced in 1861 proved unsatisfactory and last only for some 2 or 3 years, and the former system of cash payment was resorted to.²

This Thathameda tax would have made for good government if the matter had ended with the payment of it without the States having to feed members of the Burmese garrison quartered there. At Mongnai, where the normal strength of the Burmese garrison (also called "Ko-Yan" or body guard or personal retinue of the Burmese political agent) was about four or five hundred strong, the State around there took turns in feeding the garrison. Big States, such as Mongnai, would feed the soldiers for about fifteen days at a time, and smaller States would be allotted fewer feeding days according to their sizes, each taking its allotted turn until a full cycle was reached and a beginning made again. Such a system, feudal and irksome though it was, would constitute a tolerable hardship on the feeders if the soldiers obeyed their commanders and behaved themselves; but soldiers of those days were not soldiers in the modern sense - they were only levies and if they were not satisfied with the feeding and pay they received, they would infest the countryside and obtain by fair or foul means what they could from the villagers, who naturally were afraid to lay any complaint against the soldiers unless they could be sure of redress and immunity from victimisation. During Sitke U Shwe Kyu's time, each of his four hundred soldiers in Mongnai received Rs. 10/- per month from Mandalay.³

To come back to the Thathameda tax, each State had an allotted amount to pay to the King at Mandalay. Failure or tardiness in payment was frowned upon by the Court as a serious omission. One year, early in Thibaw's reign, the Sawbwas of Mongnai, Lawksawk and Yawngwwe were restricted to Mandalay owing to their inability to pay the tribute

1. This is the date quoted in the GUBSS. Was it meant to be 1871?
2. GUBSS, II.2.h20.
3. GUBSS, II.2.h18-h19.
as ordered; but were soon released after their people in their States had collected sufficient money and paid up in full, and the Sawbwas returned to their States with some feeling of bitterness and shame at having been "restricted" to Mandalay.

It was about this time that an unfrocked monk of Kengtawng by the name of Twet Nga Lu attacked Mongnai, but he was easily repulsed and driven off by the Sawbwa. With this attack began the bitter animosity between the Sawbwa of Mongnai and Twet Nga Lu, and the latter tried his best to obtain favours from the Court at Mandalay to get the better of the former. Soon after the attack, and most probably as a result of manipulation at the Court by Twet Nga Lu, a nephew of the Sawbwa of Mongnai was appointed by Mandalay as the Myosa of Kengtawng, without any reference to the uncle. Kengtawng was (and still is) a sub-State of Mongnai. What made the appointment more palatable to the Sawbwa, Khun Kyi, was the fact that Twet Nga Lu, was by now a stepfather to the young Myosa, Sao Maung, whose widowed mother had married the unfrocked monk. Accordingly the Sawbwa made very strong representations against the appointment through his sister, known as the Mongnai Queen. The Sawbwa himself was summoned to Mandalay by the King, but having had a taste of confinement there previously he declined to go and after some conference with the Magwe Wundauk, the Burmese political agent at Mongnai at the time, decided to send his sister, Nang U, the Mongnai Queen, instead. Nang U went and stayed at Mandalay for about six months, but as no notice was taken of her at the palace, she left Mandalay to return to Mongnai. She was pursued, caught up and arrested at Kaukse and taken back to Mandalay to be confined there. This event caused no little resentment on the part of the Sawbwa who regarded the ignoring and subsequent arrest of his sister as a grave insult to her honour and to himself personally.

More summons came from Mandalay for the Sawbwa. At the same time the Bohmu, Magwe Wundauk, had been recalled to Mandalay, leaving the Sitke in charge of the Burmese post at Mongnai. The Sitke urged the Sawbwa to obey the summons, but the latter asked for forty to fifty days delay. Anticipating that the Sawbwa would take flight during this period of delay, the Sitke wrote to the Sawbwas of Kengtung and Mawkmai asking them to arrest Mongnai Sawbwa should he attempt to enter their territories. At the same time, the Sitke alerted his men to be in readiness to seize the Sawbwa.

The Shans led by the Sawbwa struck first. The Sitke and his guards were invited by the Sawbwa to the Haw to partake of a feast. Suddenly all the gates and entrances of the Haw were closed and the Sitke himself and nearly all the soldiers were put to death. This was in 1882.1

1. GUESS, II.2,421.
On the news of this massacre reaching Mandalay a large force was at once despatched as a punitive expedition. Besides this force from Central Burma, contingents from the Shan States of Myelat, Samka, Yawnghee, Hopong, Mongpawn, Laikha and Kesi were ordered to proceed to Mongnai. Unable to oppose such a large force, Khun Kyi, the Sawbwa of Mongnai, fled across the Salween and took refuge in Kengtung. With Mongnai Sawbwa were his brother-in-law, Mongnaung Myosa, and Sao Weng, the Sawbwa of Lawksawk. Mongnaung Myosa's sister was the Mahadevi of Mongnai and the Myosa had every right to fear the wrath of the punitive force. It is not clear how Lawksawk Sawbwa came to be involved. He must have nursed some thoughts of rebellion when he was confined together with Mongnai Sawbwa in Mandalay for failure to pay up the Thathameda in time. With Sao Weng, also went the Myosa of Mongping, a small State close to Lawksawk.

The Annual Register of Events of the Hluttaw at Mandalay has the following entry about this rising in Mongnai:

Also in the same month (Tabaung 1244 - March 1882) the Myowun Shwalanbo Kawlin Myosa Mingyi, Maha Mingaung Nawratha, who was placed in Mone on account of disloyalty of Nga Kyi Nga, ex-Sawbwa of Mongnai (Mone), and of Nga Htun, ex-Myosa of Mongnaung (Maingnaung); Nga Waing, ex-Sawbwa of Lawksawk (Yatsauk); and Nga Pe, ex-Myosa of Mongping (Maingpyin), having returned to the capital, his place was taken by the Wundauk Kutywa Myosa, Mingyi Mingaung Sithu Kyaw, who received the command of a force of 1000 men, and went to take charge of Mongnai and to restore peace in the Shan States.1

It may be assumed that the fugitive princes were received with open arms by the Sawbwa of Kengtung, who had already successfully thrown off allegiance to Thibaw as described, and his State was virtually independent.

Mr. Gould, the British Vice-Consul at Chiangmai in his letter No. 50, dated 22nd December 1882 to the Chief Commissioner of Burma at Rangoon, writes: "Chiangtung for the moment practically an independent State, is daily taking advantage of the present weakness of Mandalay to strengthen her own position". The Vice-Consul was of the opinion that the British Government in Lower Burma should take steps to negotiate with Mandalay to settle the boundary line between Kengtung and Chiangmai, as the fluid and uncertain frontier created much friction and distrust,2 resulting in insecurity for smooth flow of trade. The Chief Commissioner of British Burma replied that it was not possible to take up the question with Mandalay at this time as "Local Government cannot hope to send an Embassy as far as Chiangtung for another year", and suggested that the delimitation of the boundary be settled between Chiangmai and Kengtung authorities.

1. GUBSS, I.1.94.

2. See also Colquhoun, A. R., Amongst the Shans, pp. 305-306.
At Kengtung, the fugitive princes and their chief ally, the Sawbwa of Kengtung (Sao Kaung-tai), naturally plotted ways and means of regaining their States and lost dignities, and as a result they conceived a plan whereby Thibaw would be dethroned and their own candidate, who would be more favourably disposed towards them and the Shan States generally, crowned king. The thought of declaring the Shan States independent with one of them as king was far from their minds. Nor did they ever think of placing themselves and their States under the protection of the Chinese, or the Siamese.

Most probably the Chinese grip on the Koshanpyi (Chinese Shan States) was too businesslike, too firm and too near for the exiled princes and their host to think seriously of turning towards the North; while the three Siamese attacks on Kengtung in the fifties were too recent to permit any illusion of brotherliness from the South. And they did not think of anyone else except a Burmese prince of the blood of the House of Alaungpaya as their candidate for the Burmese throne. What they needed was a candidate that would be acceptable to the Burmans of the Central Plains as well as to other Shan Rulers; this ruled out the possibility of any Shan prince as a candidate even if he were to be acceptable to his fellow Sawbwas. A Burmese prince with all the prestige and glories usually associated with him would command blind obedience among the normal Burmese populace and be accepted as suzerain by them and all Shan alike. By choosing a Burmese prince, half the battle would be won, and with the misrule of Thibaw and disorder in the country, the king's own soldiers could be expected to desert or fight only half-heartedly. The sentiments of the Sawbwas regarding the choice of a Burmese prince, were clearly expressed in a letter from the Sawbwa of Kengtung to the Sawbwa of Hsipaw, Hkun Seng: "Without a suzerain there will be continual struggle among the Sawbwas .... if there be a suzerain, the interests of the country, of the religion, of all of us, will be protected .... if the Limbin prince becomes king, the Thathameda tax (an unprecedented thing in history) will be remitted, and the Sawbwas will be required to do obeisance to the King only once in three years". The last sentence was all or practically all the conditions laid down by the allies in Kengtung in return for their submission to a king in Mandalay. The Sawbwas did not plan to abolish the monarchy - on the contrary they supported it; nor did they dream of an independent Shan States. All that they wanted was to be left alone, each independent in his own State, without any interference from the Court or its representatives and soldiers. And their choice fell on the Limbin prince.

The Limbin prince had escaped into British Burma on the accession of Thibaw. This prince, on whom had fallen the shadow of the Burmese crown, was a son of the Einshemin, the Crown Prince, who had been murdered by his own nephews during the 1866 rebellion. It

1. Burma Foreign Department No. 206, dated 14-10-1886.
2. GUBSS, I.1.292.
will not be out of place to give here an account of that rising. The Einshemin was the Khamaung Mintha, a loyal and devoted younger brother of Mindon, who had been largely responsible for placing the latter on the throne, following a plot fabricated by some palace ladies to implicate them (the two brothers) in a treason against the reigning king, Pagan Min. Two of Mindon's sons, the Myingun and Myingundaing Princes conceived the idea that they had been unjustly treated by their uncle, the Einshemin, and resolved to kill him, and their father and to seize the throne. They consulted an astrologer in the person of the famous U Ponnya who determined that August 2, 1866 was an auspicious day for their crime. On that day the King, his queens and Court were having some religious celebration at the Maha Lawkamarazin Pagoda in a temporary Summer Palace outside the safety of Mandalay walls. The Einshemin, who had been informed of the conspiracy some time before, was deliberating with a number of ministers in an open building near the Hlutaw about this very plot, and they were debating whether the two principal conspirators should be arrested or not. At noon the fire signal was kindled in the Hawgon quarter and the Myingun and Myingundaing Princes with their followers, all armed with guns and drawn swords, rushed into the palace towards the Hlutaw. The younger brother, Myingundaing was shouting, 'Save me! Save me!' with Myingun hot on his heels. This was part of the plot to disarm any suspicion, so that their uncle the Einshemin might not take flight at the first sign of alarm. The party was met at the Hlut entrance by the Myadaung Wungyi who was alarmed at the sight of so many men with naked swords within the precincts of the palace - an unprecedented and treasonable act. He had advanced to enquire the cause of the uproar. His alarm was short-lived; for he was immediately cut down. The Einshemin saw this and made for safety, but he was killed by one of the Princes' followers named Hpadi. Myingundaing who was behind Hpadi, cut off his uncle's head and rushed with it to his elder brother, screaming "Aungdawmupyi". Mad with excitement and reeking of drinks, the rebels killed almost all ministers present at the Hlut meeting, including Laungshe Wungyi, the War Minister. King Mindon's eldest son, the Malon prince (a lad of "much promise"), and his brothers the Pyinsi and Sagu princes, had already been murdered at the Southern Gate of the palace. Myingun gave orders that everyone in wungyi garb was to be cut down on sight and the suddenness and ferocity of the attack took everybody by surprise.

The rebels then made for the temporary palace where King Mindon was having his religious festival. At that moment he was actually giving an audience to Major E. B. Sladen, the British Resident in Mandalay. They were met and resisted by the King's guards, who however were outnumbered and soon overpowered. But the short and violent struggle gave the King enough time to escape with his Queens, some princes and attendants, about 50 in all. Outside the Western Gate of the Summer Palace, the party came across the sword bearer, Shwedalwe Bo called Maung Paik Ku who was posted there specially by the rebels.

1. In his trial subsequently U Ponnya stated he had given the wrong date and moment so that the plot would not be successful; but he was executed.
with orders to kill the King. On seeing him, the King ignorant of Paik Ku's errand, commanded; "Nga Paik Ku, carry me to the palace". The man came forward bending. Was Paik Ku spell bound by the King's command and by the sight of so many members of the royal family, or did he mean to kill the King when the latter was within his sword's reach? As he came forward the Mekkara and Chinbin Princes saw a naked sword in his hand and took it away. A man of Paik Ku's station in those days must have been mesmerised by the sight of the King and the royal party; at the same time, Paik Ku himself must have been aware that failure in his mission would cost him his life (which was precisely what happened as the simple man later made his way to his masters' camp and reported what had happened). King Mindon rode on Paik Ku's back, and the Chief Queen was carried by another man. Half way to the palace they came upon a pony which was commandeered for the King to mount and the whole party soon reached the safety of the palace walls.

The rising was eventually put down, but the two chief rebels escaped into British Lower Burma where they were interned in Rangoon. After some time there, Myingun made his way to the Karenni States from whence he made constant raids on Mindon's territories until a force of 3600 men were sent and dislodged him. He escaped again and again into the British territory where the authorities put him "under restraint" and subsequently sent him to India. From British India the Myingun prince escaped into French Pondicherry and later made his way to Saigon. He tried to return to Burma through some of the Shan princes but the British annexation of Upper Burma put an end to his intrigues.

Back in Mandalay, the Einshemin's own son, the Padeing Prince fled with his men from Mandalay to Shwebo, the usual rendezvous for princes aspiring the Burmese throne. Despite assurances and appeals from Mindon, he refused to return, collected more men and marched on the Capital. They were successful at first, and Mindon was already thinking of surrendering his throne to save further bloodshed, but his Chief Queens and Ministers prevailed upon him to stand firm and resist. Eventually the Padeing Prince was captured and put to death by the Hlutaw without, it is said, the knowledge of the King - an ironical and sad ending for the eldest son of the man who had done so much to make Mindon King.¹

So much for the violent background of the Limbin Prince, the man chosen by the Shan League in Kengtung for the Burmese throne at Mandalay.

The Limbin Prince was educated in Rangoon and later appointed for some time as a myo-ok or subordinate magistrate. He was

subsequently removed from his appointment for incompetence and because he took advantage of his liberty to attempt to raise a rebellion in Upper Burma. During the year 1885, he was living in Moulmein under nominal surveillance of the British authorities, and it was here that the agents of the Allies in Kengtung found him and offered him the Burmese crown if he would only head their cause. He accepted the invitation, with, we may assume, some alacrity, and left Moulmein in October 1885, arriving in Kengtung on December 10, 1885.

Here we may be allowed to wonder whether the prince, having seen British power and organization in Lower Burma, was really convinced of the success of his cause, or whether he felt he was gambling with a lucky dip. To be fetched from obscurity and suddenly raised by a few Shan princes, each of whom had far more real power and reserves than he could himself muster, to a position in which those princes prostrated themselves before him, must have been a sensational and exciting experience. Such a thing was possible when parties believed in the divine right of the monarchy.

In a letter dated 7th Waning Tabaung 1247 (26th March 1886) from the Sawbwa of Kengtung to the Sawbwa of Hsipaw (a passage of which was quoted above), we see clearly the aims and objects of the Limbin League and the troops at their disposal. The letter is reproduced in full as it contains many important facts and dates, and sentiments prevailing at the time:

As King Thibaw did not rule his Empire justly, the Sawbwas of Kyaington, Kyaintchaing, Mingpyin, Yatsauk, Mone, Kyaintyon, Mainglin, Maingnaung and Maingseik invited Prince Limbin, then residing in the British territory to come and wrest the crown from King Thibaw. Prince Limbin reached Kyaington on the 4th waxing Nattaw 1247 (10th December 1885), and it was resolved to draw the chief portion of the royal troops from Kyaington and Kyaintchaing. Accordingly 20,000 or 30,000 men were collected at Kyaington. Meanwhile the Western Sawbwas informed the Prince of the British occupation of Mandalay, and the deportation of the King, Queen, their daughters and the Queen Dowager. The informants further reported that quarrels and struggles were going on in the States, west of the Salween. Military aid also came in from Maingshu, Maingsi, Kye-thi, Bansan, and Maington, and royal banners were distributed among the new allies.

Of the 20,000 or 30,000 troops collected 10,000 were selected, and the rest quartered, as a reserve, in Kyaington, Maingpyin and Maingpu, and along the banks of the Salween River.

As an advance guard, three detachments under the Sawbwas of Maingnaung, Mone and Yatsauk were sent forward. The Maingnaung and Mone Sawbwas entered their principalities on the 5th waxing Tabaung (9th March 1886) and 12th waxing
Tabaung (16th March 1886) respectively; and the Yatsauk Sawbwa reached Mone on the 2nd waning Tabaung (21st March 1886).

The royal army reached Mone on the 15th waxing Tabaung (3rd April 1886). When it was at Ban-Lawkunlin a letter from you (Thibaw Sawbwa) was received. You stated in your letter that it would be beneficial to the Shans to have their country welded into a congeries of independent States like Germany, and that you desired to know what were our wishes on the subject, and what steps we contemplated to take for securing the preservation of the religion. You also sent us an account of the deliberations you and your royal elder sister came to in the presence of the Ngwegunhmus; and you desired us to communicate to you our future intentions. These are the resolutions come to by the various Sawbwas and Myozas:

(i) that without a suzerain there will be continual struggles among the Sawbwas;
(ii) that if there be a suzerain, the interest of the country, of the religion, and of all of us, will be protected and promoted;
(iii) that if Prince Limbin becomes King, the thathameda tax (an unprecedented thing in history) will be remitted, and the Sawbwas will be required to do obeisance to the King only once in three years;
(iv) that under the proposed circumstances general peace and security will be ensured to all;
(v) that if there be no suzerain, the religion will be injured by the people of other creeds;
(vi) that if there be a suzerain, a combination can be effected between him and the Sawbwas to withdraw any attempt to injure the religion.

We hope that the love hitherto existing between us still lasts, and would request that, as the rains are coming on, you will be good enough to come up to Mone to do your obeisance to our Prince.

This letter tells us much, but it leaves one question unanswered. Having learned that the British had occupied Mandalay, the League did not disband their forces but pushed on to various cis-Salween States in accordance with their original plan. Did the Allies mean to fight the British in Central Burma to regain the Burmese throne for the Limbin Prince, or did they mean to weld the Shan States "into a congeries of independent States like Germany" with "their prince" as suzerain? Subsequent official records and correspondence do not clarify these points.

Meanwhile what had been happening in Mongnai during the absence of its rightful Sawbwa?

1. Burma Foreign Department No. 208, dated 14-10-1886.
The combined Shan and Burmese punitive forces sent by the order of the King at Mandalay restored some order at Mongnai, and Twet Nga Lu received a royal seal to administer the States with the Burmese officials, the Myowun and the Shwealanbo. But when Mandalay fell to the British, Twet Nga Lu was left to his own resources as all the Burmese troops were recalled to Burma. Having heard of the formation of the Limbin League in Kengtung and as a manoeuvre to maintain himself at Mongnai and his step-son at Kengtawng, he formed a League of his own, and his allies in this formation were those who had reason to fear for the security of their positions in various States, such as those who had taken part in the punitive expedition against Mongnai by orders from Mandalay or who had usurped the places of the Chief exiled in Kengtung. But this anti-Limbin League did not appear to have won much support, for the Limbin League, apart from the States mentioned in the Kengtung Sawbwa's letter, had also got these supporters: Mongpawn, Mawkmai, Mongsit, Hsahntung, Wanyin, Nawngwawn, Namkhok, Hopong, and many from the Myelat. By comparison, Twet Nga Lu's League was so much smaller. Nevertheless, it was active and at once set about attacking its enemies.

Mongsit, whose Myosa, Khun Kyaw Zan, was a nephew of the Mongnai Sawbwa, was the nearest to the Anti-Limbin League and therefore the first to be attacked and burnt. Even before the main forces of the Limbin League crossed the Salween in March 1886, fighting had already broken out between the Anti-Limbin League and some cis-Salween members of the Limbin League. In February and March 1886, forces under the warrior Sawbwa Khun Ti of Mongpawn, took possession of Mongnai and handed it back to the followers of the rightful Sawbwa. In April, Laikha and Lawksawk staged a counter-attack on Mongnai but were repulsed by Mongpawn. Finally in May, Twet Nga Lu, Laikha, Mongkung and Mongpan were defeated by forces under the leadership of Mongpawn. Thus, everywhere the Limbin League was victorious and the exiled rulers found no difficulty in re-establishing themselves in their own States. Having settled with the Anti-Limbin League in the southeastern States, the allies of the Limbin League began to move west and avenge themselves on Laikha, Mongkung and Kesi-Bansan, whose rulers, it will be recalled, had furnished contingents, by order from Mandalay, to help in the fight against the Mongnai rising in 1882. The Sawbwa of Laikha was obliged to flee to Mongkung. The State of Laikha itself was ravaged from end to end, and a considerable portion of Mongkung and Kesi-Bansan received the same treatment. Scott comments on the fight: "probably it was as much to give the Kengtung troops payment and employment in the way of looting, as to enable the returned exiles to recover their plough cattle or to take those of other people".

1. Scott, J. G., Burma & Beyond, p. 245.
2. GUBSS, II.2.422.
3. GUBSS, I.1.293. See also letter from Sao On p. 114.
4. GUBSS, I.1.293.
so thoroughly mauld that the population of the State was, it is said, reduced to a hundred souls. When the British forces passed the State capital in 1887 only some half-dozen houses were seen standing in it, and majority of the town's population was still in hiding in the jungles.

In Mongnaung, during its Myosa's exile in Kengtung, one Maung Gan was appointed by Mandalay to administer the State. This Mandalay appointee was easily expelled and its old ruler, Khun Htun, installed.

The Limbin League forces then proceeded further west and installed without difficulty Sao Weng of Lawksawk and U Pe of Mongping in their respective States. But in order to understand the situation at Yawnghwe at this time, it is necessary to pause for a brief moment to describe the background of the two main personages there.

At the time of the British occupation of Mandalay, the Sawbwa of Yawnghwe, Sao Maung, was there. He returned to the Shan States soon after the fall of Mandalay, with the Laihka Queen and her son, Kodawgyi. He was attacked almost immediately on his return to Yawnghwe by the Limbin League supporters from the east, namely forces from Hahtung, Banyin, Namkhok, Nawngwawn, Hopong, Ponmu and In. In an engagement near Loi Htam, east of Yawnghwe town, Sao Maung was wounded in both legs, which forced him to retire to Yawnghwe and later on the same day to Kyawktap (Kyauktap). From here he sent for his elder half-brother, Sao On, who was the Myosa of Ang Teng (Indein) at the time, and gave him the task of recovering his State from the Limbin League, while he himself retired to Taw Gin, in Hlaingdet area, and later to Mandalay, to recover from his wounds. Sao On took this to mean voluntary abdication by Sao Maung in his favour, and refused to move out when the rightful ruler, having recovered from his wounds, demanded back the State. Yawnghwe was spared a minor civil war between the two brothers only because the British annexed the Shan States before that civil war had started, and it was the British policy to recognise and confirm all de facto rulers in order to save confusion and complications which would have ensued, if claims and counter-claims were entertained.

1. It is said by several people, including U Nu, some time Prime Minister, that when King Thibaw was being led away by the British troops towards the Irrawaddy, Sao Maung, with a band of some three or four hundred armed men, was laying in wait in one of the streets of Mandalay to ambush the British and rescue the King. It seems that Sao Maung and his followers were waiting in a wrong by-alley and the royal prisoners did not come by their way. This story is unlikely. A whole brigade of British troops were guarding the King on the way from the palace to the jetty, and a rescue would have been an impossibility. There could have been no mistake about the route along which the King was taken. And, as Mr. G. E. Harvey told the writer, the people were too stunned to realise what was happening until the King was safely on the launch.
The Limbin League had already installed Sao Chit Su as Sawbwa of Yawngwe when Sao Maung retreated. Sao On found allies in Samka and some of the Myatlat States and had no difficulty in expelling Sao Chit Su, who was his own uncle. Sao On was thus thrown by fate into the opposite camp to that of the Limbin League. This was the position when the main forces of the Limbin League arrived on the scene with the Sawbwa of Lawksawk, Sao Weng at their head, and began attacking Yawngwe from the north.

When Sao Weng was exiled to Kengtung in 1882, the administration of Lawksawk was given to Sao Maung, the Sawbwa of Yawngwe. On receipt of orders from Mandalay, Sao Maung sent his uncle Le Bwin with the title of Myosa. Le Bwin remained in Lawksawk only for one year, after which the administration was carried on by two Amats appointed from Yawngwe named Maung Po and Maung Nit. In 1884 (B.E. 1246), the Heng of Nawngtong, "Nga Laing"/Shan: Khun Leng attacked Lawksawk and drove out the two Amats and took charge of the administration himself with the title of Myook. It was this "Nga Laing" who was one of the very active supporters of Anti-Limbin League and he was overthrown when Sao Weng the rightful ruler returned.

It would appear that the monsoon had already set in by the time Sao Weng was established in Lawksawk and began his attack on Yawngwe, and since nothing much could be done during the monsoon, both sides maintained a sort of armed truce. Both sides spent their time in consolidating their positions, and Sao Weng established a strong stockade position at Kugyo, a few miles north-east of Bawrithat Pagoda, with every intention of attacking and capturing Yawngwe as soon as he was able to do so. On the Yawngwe side, Sao On was able to hold his own against his attackers, proclaimed himself Sawbwa of Yawngwe and told his brother, Sao Maung, to forget about his claims to that State. But he knew that sooner or later he would be defeated by the Limbin League which had behind it an overwhelming force, supported as it was at the time by the majority of the States in the South. To save the situation, however, Sao On immediately tendered allegiance to the British and set urgent calls for help to them at Mandalay. His first letter to the British reached the Deputy Commissioner of Kyauktat by about the end of April. The letter itself bore no date but the Deputy Commissioner of Kyauktat reported to his superiors at Mandalay on May 3, 1886. It is reproduced in full below:

Sao Maung, formerly Sawbwa of Nyaung-ywe, brought up from Mandalay the Legya Queen and her son Kodawgyi, and began to issue orders and requisitions to all myosa, and Shwe Guns and Ngwe Guns, saying that he would fight the English and take Mandalay. Meanwhile he was attacked by forces from

Thaton  Nankok
Banyin    Hopon
Nawngmun  Pompau and In.

He was wounded and had to flee to Kyauktat. While he was there these forces, having set Saw Chit Su up as Chief of
Nyaung-ywe, again plotted against Saw Maung. I got to know this, and saved his life by taking him away to Hlaingdet district. The Ngwe Gun Min of In and other States mentioned above then invited the Lego Queen and her son Kodawgyi and again planned to fight the English and take Mandalay.

Meantime the Nyaung-ywe Sawbwa, Sao Maung, handed over Nyaung-ywe to me, bidding me take possession of it as best I could. Relying on your favour and by your goodwill I did so and I am now in possession of Nyaung-ywe and Inle Ywa (In). Various princes have tried to persuade me to join them, but I have declined and have obeyed no such summons, replying that we cannot fight the British. I now beg for a reply to say what you wish me to do, and so that the hereditary rights of the Chiefs may be upheld.

As for the present state of affairs in the Shan States, the Thibaw Chief has returned to Thibaw. The old Sawbwa of Mone has retaken his State, and with the old Myoza of Maingnaung, old Sawbwa of Yatsauk, old Myoza of Maingpyin, and the Limbin Prince has established himself in Mone. Thence he is sending letters to all Sawbwas and Myozas to say that he intends to conquer the English and take Mandalay and is demanding men and arms. He has demanded 100 muskets and Rs.20,000 of Lego, to guard the Prince, as he says. The Sawbwa of Mone-Kyaingtaung has left his own territory and taken refuge in Lego, and Mone demands his extradition also. So the old Sawbwa of Yatsauk and the old Myoza of Maingpyin are not received back by their people. Maung Shwe Gan, the old Sawbwa of Maingnaung, has left his State and taken refuge in Kyethi Bansan, and he too is demanded.

The Chiefs of
Mone
Maingnaung
Maingseik
Maingpun
Maukme
Yatsauk
Maingpyin

have made a firm resolve to oppress the rest of us, and seeing that we could not endure it,

Legya
Yatsauk
Maingkaing
Kyethe
Bansan and I

consulted together and joined forces and are now attacking the former, A.
The Twangan Myoza and the Bawzaing Ngwegunhmu are the only people who are on the side of the Kyinzaing Prince. The supporters of the Legya Queen's son are dispersed and the Prince himself, with the Yewun Sayadaw, has taken refuge and is living in Thamaing-gan.

Of the other States none dares to join in any other's plan. Each is severally keeping his own territory in order as well as he can.

Although there are many hereditary claimants to States, yet, unless the people consent and unless the hereditary Chiefs can agree with their neighbours, even they at the present time cannot keep their footing and hold possession of their States.

In consequence of the Mayangyaung pongyi's assembling of dacoits and raising disturbances in Toungoo, Shwegyin and Martaban districts, on one bad man's account the whole of the clergy, we hear, are in straits and are disturbed. The clergy in the Shan States are disturbed and alarmed in consequence.

How to come under the British flag and obtain British protection so that our hereditary claims may be respected? What policy we ought to adopt? Whether we ought to join the Chiefs of the 57 States of Siam and so obtain British protection? All these questions I have never faced before and cannot solve.

I look to no quarter for aid and protection but you, and I therefore beg for your instructions and guidance as to the course I am to adopt. 1

The letter speaks for itself and reveals much of what was happening in the Shan States at the time and what was going on in Sao On's mind. Everybody was tainted with some pro-minlaung or anti-English leanings, and the only person worthy of unstinted British support and sympathy was the writer himself who had enough political acumen to recognise before other Shan princes the might of British power and to seek aid and protection from that quarter. And having ousted Sao Maung, Sao On asked the British to respect the hereditary rights of the Shan rulers.

Such then was the situation in the Southern Shan States before the British entry. Started by Kengtung and followed by Mongnai, almost all the States had successfully repudiated allegiance to King Thibaw. Even if the Burmese garrison in the Shan States had not been recalled as a result of the British invasion of Upper Burma, it would have been impossible for it to enforce its former control over the Shan States again, for the Shans had not repudiated the monarchy, but had put up

1. Burma Foreign Department Proceeding No. 1, May 1886.
their own candidate as King in the person of the Limbin Prince, who was bound by his supporters not to oppress or interfere in the internal affairs of the Shan States. The ease with which the British almost literally walked into Mandalay shows that few were willing to risk their lives to uphold a court under which life had become oppressive and not worth living. The same opportunity might have been offered to the Limbin League forces marching with a Burmese prince at their head on Mandalay. Districts in the Central Plains of Burma, tired of misrule and disorders under Thibaw, might well have thought a new king would be a welcome change. How long that change would have survived is a different question. Within the Shan States there is no doubt that if the British had not intervened the Limbin League would have defeated all opposition. Even Sao On would have joined the winning side if he had not been aware of the existence of a stronger power. Once the Southern Shan States were united, a delegation from them would be all that was necessary to bring to their side the powerful and influential Khun Seng of Hsipaw and Khun Sang Ton Hung of Hsenwi, both of whom had already repudiated their allegiance to Thibaw. Letters from the Sawbwa of Kengtung to the Sawbwa of Hsipaw and from Sao On to the British, show unmistakably that the Shan princes were united in spirit and desire. What they could not agree upon was the means whereby that unity could be made into a reality. This is a crucial point and it has plagued the Shans throughout their history.

From Sao On's letter, Sao Maung was mustering forces to fight the British in Mandalay. This lends some credence to the story that Khun Seng, the Sawbwa of Hsipaw, and Sao Maung, the Sawbwa of Yawnghwe, had had an understanding with each other to resist the British entering the Shan States, which would be proclaimed independent. This story goes on to say that when Khun Seng learned that Sao Maung had only a few thousand men at his disposal he thought that his friend could not have been serious in his purpose; and when Sao Maung went to Mandalay to heal his wounds received from the Limbin forces, Khun Seng was certain that his friend had betrayed him and had gone there to tender allegiance to the British, and therefore decided to receive the British with open arms so as not to be outmanoeuvred by Yawnghwe.

Sao On's letter mentioned that the Limbin League meant to fight the British and recover Mandalay. This is the only source which gives a hint at such a course of action by the Shan League. If the League had any such intention it must have evaporated by the time the British captured Sao Weng the Lawksawk Sawbwa's stockade at Kugyo. But, before we proceed with the British entry, it is necessary to see what was happening in the Northern Shan States on the eve of the British conquest.

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1. Told to writer by U Swe of Kyaukme, who heard it from his father, Khun Kiu, who served under Hseng Nawpha of Hsenwi and who was a son of the Myosa of Mongyal. At the time of the British annexation Khun Kiu was about 40 years old. To my mind, the story is not impossible.
The most important States in the Northern Shan States are Hsipaw and Hsenwi, and what happens there affects the whole of the North. We shall begin with Hsipaw.

When Mongnai and allied States defected in 1882, the Sawbwa of Hsipaw Khun Seng, was suspected by the Court to have connections with the revolt, but before anything could be done to him, he fled from his State, wandered through Bangkok and Chantabun and found his way into British territory in Lower Burma in the capacity of a jewel merchant. Eventually he reached Rangoon, worshipped at the Shwedagon and settled down in Kemmendine with his family and retainers. While there in 1883, he suspected that some of his servants had received money from Thibaw's agents and were plotting to poison him. He shot two of them. Being in British territory he was arrested, tried for murder by the Recorder of Rangoon and sentenced to death. In consideration of the fact that in his own State the Sawbwa held the power of life and death over his subjects, the death sentence was reduced to one of imprisonment for life. In Rangoon jail he was treated like other convicts; his head was shaved and he had to wear the coarse canvas prison garb stamped with the black broad arrow, and he had to do his daily task of hard labour in husking rice with a mill worked by hand. A few days after his imprisonment, the then acting Chief Commissioner Mr. (later Sir) Charles Crossthwaite, saw Khun Seng during his jail inspection and found him taking his punishment like a man, uttering no complaint and working with a mill at the task imposed on him. The jail authorities were then instructed to treat him as a political prisoner. "After a sufficient time had elapsed to make it plain to the independent Chiefs that if they sought refuge in British territory they must submit themselves to British law", and also as the result of entreaties by the Sawbwa's faithful Mahadevi, the Chief Commissioner, using Government prerogative, released Khun Seng from jail on condition that he left the British jurisdiction.

Khun Seng made his way to Karenni and lived there under the protection of that war-like Karenni Chief, Sawlapaw, Myosa of Kantarawadi. This was in 1884. When the news of the fall of Mandalay reached him, Khun Seng, with aid in men and material from Sawlapaw, left Karenni and made his way to his own State. He met with some opposition but soon made himself master of all Hsipaw, only to find the place in ruins, the only structure standing intact being his own Haw, which had been spared, it is said, through fear of its guardian nats. That was in March 1886. The following letter, from Khun Seng to the Chief Commissioner, gives some details of how the Sawbwa regained his State.

The Burmese Government was unjust and tried to bring coercion to bear upon me, and in 1213 (1881) I had to flee to British territory to save my life. In 1216 (1884) I was permitted by the Deputy Commissioner and his officials to go to Kantarawady (Eastern Karenni).

In 1217 war broke out between the English and the Burmese. After the war, Nawmaing, the son of the Theinny
Sawbwa, with men from the central division of Maington came and attacked Thibaw, which he represented to the Myinzaing Prince as a rebel State on the side of the English, and the eastern division of the Thibaw principality was burnt down.

On the 10th waxing Tabaung 1247 (14th March 1886) I reached Thibaw. I defeated my enemy and fixed my camp at the central division of Maington. I had about 5000 men under me. The rains having fully set in, I thought that the work in the field should commence. So, on the 5th waxing Wazo 1248 (5th July 1886), I returned to Thibaw, where I am trying to establish peace and order.

In the Southern tracts the Sawbwas of Mone and Yatsauk, and the Myosas of Maingbyin and Mainghaung, returned to their respective principalities from Kyainton on the eastern side of the Salween; but they were resisted by the de facto Sawbwas and Myosas.

Intelligence reached me that the Chiefs of Maington, Thonzeleyachaukywa, Ywangan, Pwehla, and Pindaya are preparing to make a combined attack on Thibaw. I have therefore deemed it prudent to have the confines of my State guarded by 6000 armed men.

I regret that the trade route to Mandalay is not open as yet. This is perhaps owing to the existence of organised rebel bands headed by the several Princes, for whom no provision was made by the British Government on the capture of Mandalay and its King.

I am under great obligations to the British Government. I feel very thankful on this account, and I hope the British Government will continue to bestow its favours on me.  

Before we go on to Hsenwi, the involvement of the Myinzaing Prince in the chaotic conditions of the Northern Shan States may be mentioned.

This Myinzaing Prince was in prison in Mandalay, and along with other political prisoners, was released by the British on the fall of that city. Encouraged probably by the Nawmoeng of Hsenwi, his jail mate, who was also released by the British at the same time, Myinzaing found his way to the Northern Shan States and raised his own standard against the British. One of his earliest supporters apart from Hsengnawpha of Hsenwi, was Hein Sai of Thzone or Hsumhsl, in whose State he had made his headquarters. The plan of campaign was to seize possession of the Northern Shan States as his base from which he would set out to reconquer Upper Burma; Hsipaw State, whose Sawbwa

1. Burma Foreign Department No. 208 dated 11-10-1886.
was friendly with the British, was to have been given to Nawmong, while Hsenwi, now largely under the effective control of Khungsang Tonhung, was to have been retaken and given to the old Sawbwa, Hsengnawpha, of the original House of Hsenwi.

To many of us living under modern conditions it may be puzzling how men and materials were mobilised to fight a war in those days. What happened was not as difficult as might be imagined. Every able-bodied man was liable to be called up to serve as a soldier some time or other. All that was needed was an order from the Sawbwa calling upon certain villages or circles to furnish so many men according to their size, and men would come flocking under their own commanders who usually were the heads of the villages or circles. The following letters showed how the Myinzaing Prince tried to mobilise:

(1) Letter received on the 5th waning of Nattaw 1247 (26th December 1885) from Mogyo Mintha to Thibaw Sawbwagyi:

Prince Thadominye Yanshein (Myinzaing) son of Mindon Min (full titles) thus addressed the Thibaw Sawbwagyi.

About 5000 British troops and 20 steamers, under Colonel Sladen, came up to fight the Burmese.

As there was no agreement between the King, Queens, and the Ministers, the Burmese troops were withdrawn, and the Burmese Government was going to resort to diplomacy, when the English broke their word and captured the Capital, and they have deported to a foreign country my aunt (Sinbyumashin), elder sister (Queen Supayalat), elder brother (Thibaw) and niece (Thibaw's daughter). In consequences of this downfall the people are as a child bereft of its mother, or a fish taken out of its watery home.

In former times, a Ceylonese monarch, Dutthagamani crushed the Tamil invaders to prevent the downfall of the religion. Taking this as my precedent, I too shall wage a ruthless war against the heretic English Kalas, so that I may be able to serve the Religion, preserve the integrity of the royal dynasty, and secure the happiness of the people.

For the above purpose, therefore, the Sawbwagyi is directed to bring his contingent of men and arms to the place where I am now encamping.

(2) Translation of a Royal Order of the Myinzaing Prince (without date) found in the house of Hein Nga Se when he ran away on the 2nd waxing Thadingyut (29th September 1886).

1. See also Wales, Q., *Ancient South-east Asian Warfare.*
Royal Order by his Most Gracious Majesty King Myinzaing (titles):

I am the son and heir to his Most Glorious Majesty the first Founder of Mandalay and the Convenor of the Fifth Buddhist Synod (Mindy) in his dual capacity of Patron of the People. Being a Scion of the House of Alompra and the Representative of the Solar Race, I am wise, sagacious and powerful.

The heretic, savage, and lawless Kalas have now entered Burma, and are destroying religious edifices, such as pagodas, monasteries etc., held sacred by the people, the Buddhist Scriptures, and the Priesthood. They have destroyed the accounts and records of royal ceremonies which were generally referred to by the Kings of old. And these Kalas are using in the profane way the white umbrellas and the other insignia which belong only to royalty.

Under these circumstances certain wise priests and wise lay men have represented to me that the present time is opportune for me to capture and wipe off the rebel Kalas and to assume the reigns of sovereignty. In compliance, therefore, with this representation I have resolved to take the field with my fourfold army, consisting of Burmese, Shan, Karen and Palaung contingents.

Priests and lay men residing in Lower Burma which was part and parcel of the Burman Empire during the time of my forefathers, have come to me and promised that they will reconquer in my name the towns of Toungoo, Rangoon, and Bassein. I have accordingly given them my command and ordered them to plant my royal flag on the very sea shore.

I have likewise resolved to conquer Mandalay and regain the Burmese throne. For this purpose the following armies have been organised:

On the northern side, 10,000 men armed with dahs, 15,000 men armed with muskets, and a reserve force of 20,000 men under the command of the Wuntho Sawbwa, the Kanti Sawbwa, the Momeik Myoza, the Kachin Chiefs, and a number of Bos, Wuns and Sitkes.

On the western side, in the districts of Alon and Sagaing, 10,500 men armed with dahs, 20,000 men armed with muskets, and a reserve force of 20,000 men under the command of Ohmu Mingyi Minhla Mahamingaunggyaw, and 35 captains.

On the southern side, 1,000 men armed with dahs, 1,500 men armed with muskets, and a reserve force of
6,000 men, under the command of the Anauk Windawhmu, the Taungdwinggyi Myowun, the Pindaletinbo, the Tazaungdaiktial-aing Bo, the Pindaletin Myowun, and 31 captains.

On the eastern side, 20,000 men armed with dahs, 3,000 men armed with muskets, and a reserve force of 20,000 men commanded by my royal self, my royal uncle (titles), and 45 captains.

These forces will march simultaneously when a canon is fired as a signal.

When my royal army arrives to secure the safety of those people who are loyal to me, I would direct them to use a piece of white thread as a badge. Those people who have sided with the heretic Kalas will receive a free pardon though it may be politic to kill them so as to produce a deterrent effect on their descendants.1

Hsumhsai where Myinzaing established his headquarters had been administered since 1846 by direct appointments from Mandalay. The cause of the dispossession of the last Sawbwa of Hsumhsai by the Court cannot now be ascertained, but most probably the Sawbwa had done some wrong and the hangers-on at the Court thought this was a chance for them to get rid of him so that they themselves could enjoy the revenues and tributes from Thonze. The appointment of heins was kept on and the last Burmese Wun of Hsumhsai was Maung Pwe. Hein Sai, mentioned above, and Hein Sa were two powerful Heins of Hsumhsai who were called down to Mandalay by Taingda Mingyi with their levies on the eve of the last Anglo-Burmese War. After the fall of Mandalay, while returning home with their men, the two Heins met Khun Meik, brother of the Sawbwa of Hsipaw, who was also returning home from the Capital. In their first flush of joy at seeing a Shan prince, the two Heins invited Khun Meik to come and "eat" Hsumhsai. Khun Meik accepted the invitation and went off to collect his men. In his absence, one Maung Gale, a representative of the former Hsumhsai lineage, appeared on the scene. Hein Sai joined Maung Gale, while Hein Sa sided with Khun Meik. In the fight that ensued, Khun Meik had to retreat and Maung Gale remained master of Hsumhsai. Later Hein Sai and Maung Gale fell out as they went down to join the Myinzaing force to fight the British at Ongyaw. After this Maung Gale was unable to return to Hsumhsai, and Khun Meik returned with more men and drove out Hein Sai in late August or early September 1886. Hein Sai returned again and this time drove out Khun Meik who had to retire to Gokteik. Myinzaing was believed to have appointed Hein Sai as Sitke of Hsumhsai. These see-saw skirmishes reduced that part of the country into a terrible state of desolation and effectively sealed the main trade route between the Northern Shan States and Mandalay, along which under normal conditions as many as 10,000 mules and ponies and 50,000 pack bullocks passed through annually. At this critical juncture, the Myinzaing Prince died in October 1886.

1. Foreign and Political Proceedings, December 1886.
In Hsenwi the biggest State of the North and site of the former Kingdom of Kawsampi, trouble began even before King Mindon's reign. It is necessary here to provide a summary of the events which had contributed to the chaotic conditions verging on complete anarchy. The last Sawbwa of Hsenwi who wielded undisputed authority over the whole State with its 49 "mongs" seems to have been Sao Khamleng Sokhanpha. The breakup of Hsenwi began when Hsengnawpha came to the throne in 1845 and put to death the influential Minister, Tao Sung Tunkham, and his family including his seven sons.1 The murder roused another Minister, Tao Sung Khammawn, to rise against Hsengnawpha who was driven out of Hsenwi to Mandalay. This rising was put down with the help of Burmese troops from Mandalay and the chief perpetrator executed. But the trouble did not end there. Tao Hsanghai, who had successfully led the Hsenwi contingent to the aid of Kengtung when it was invaded by the Siamese in 1854, was the next man to rise against and drive out Hsengnawpha who was obliged to flee to Mandalay again. It must have been about this period that one of Hsengnawpha's daughters became one of the minor queens of Mindon. Hsengnawpha also gave a younger daughter in marriage to the Mekkhara Prince. In spite of this, and in spite of the fact that the King sent troops and officials, including Maung Po, Hsengnawpha's half brother, to help him recover his State, Hsengnawpha was unable to do so. And he always took refuge in Mandalay after each failure. According to Hsenwi's Chronicle, he was sent up from Mandalay five times to rule and was sent back every time to Mandalay by Hsang Hai. According to British sources, each time he returned to Mandalay he was put in jail for his failure. This is how Sir Charles Crossthwaite describes it: "Naw Hpa was summoned to Mandalay, and condemned to imprisonment for having failed to maintain his authority, while a cadet of Hsenwi House was appointed in his stead. This cadet, U Po by name, was driven away ignominiously by Hsang Hai, and was recalled to Mandalay and sent to join Naw Hpa in jail. Numerous Burmese officials of high rank with imposing titles were sent up one after another, and one after another was expelled by Hsang Hai, and they came back in order of their going, to join the company of failures in Mandalay prison."2

At last Mindon ordered eight States from Yawnghwe to Monglong to make a combined attack on Hsang Hai. This was too much for the usurper, and he was compelled to retreat to Kunlong. But before Hsang Hai retired from fighting he had nominated at Weng Khampaen an heir and successor in the person of his chief lieutenant and son-in-law, Khunsang Tonhung; and the unfortunate Hsengnawpha was driven out once more, but on this occasion, instead of going to Mandalay as was ordered, he sent his son Naw Mong to represent him, while he himself took refuge with the Kachins in Mongsi.

1. The nats of the 12 members of the family are still being worshipped in Hsenwi.

2. Crossthwaite, C., op. cit., p. 139.
When King Thibaw came to the throne in 1879, Hsengnawpha's daughter, who had been one of his father's wives and known as the Hsenwi queen, was imprisoned, and her son killed along with other princes in the general massacre of the time. Nawmong himself was sent to prison too. Thus, Khunsang Tonhung was left undisputed master of the Northern and Eastern Divisions of Hsenwi. The Southern Division or Taunglet had been broken up about this time into the myosaships of Mongnawng, Mongsing, Monghsu, Kesi-Bansam and Kengton, as the myosas of these small States managed to get the good ear of the Burmese Resident at Mongnai and of the Court at Mandalay. It was common in those days to award a person a piece of territory for him to "eat" in recognition of some distinguished service, or simply because the person managed to get the hearing of the Court. The Middle Division of Hsenwi, Alelet in Burmese, or Kawkang in Shan, was governed by one Sang Aw, commonly called by the term Pa-Ok-Chok, who had his headquarters at Mongyai. A small garrison of Burmese troops was also kept at Lashio to back the authority of the Burmese officials stationed there. But these were unable to support themselves against Khunsang Tonhung and withdrew as soon as they heard of the fall of Mandalay.

On the British occupation of Mandalay, the son of Hsengnawpha, Nawmong, who had been imprisoned apparently since 1879 by King Thibaw, was set free along with other political prisoners, including the Myinzaing prince, as stated. It has also been stated how the Myinzaing faction was planning to annex Hsipaw and Hsenwi whose Sawbwas either by fate or their own sagacity were placed together in opposition to the faction, and were thus driven to find in each other natural allies and comrades in arms. The two States, Hsipaw and Hsenwi, had the physical means to resist their enemies successfully. With the British firmly installed in Mandalay, Myinzaing, however valiant his personality might have been, could never have raised enough supporters in the Shan States to crush an influential Shan Sawbwa like Khun Seng, while the representatives of the original House of Hsenwi, Hsengnawpha and his son, had proved themselves, before this, quite incapable of maintaining themselves in Hsenwi without outside aid.

It seems to have been the plan of the Myinzaing faction that while Myinzaing himself was to attack Hsipaw from his headquarters in Hsumhsai, Nawmong was to oust Khunsang Tonhung in Hsenwi. The faction took time to gather strength. This is hardly surprising considering that the new masters of Burma, the British, took a whole year to prepare their first major expedition into the Shan States. By December 1886, however, the pressure on Hsipaw had slackened through the death of Myinzaing. Actually Hsipaw was never at any time seriously threatened; the British knew about this and although they sent a quantity of fire arms to the Sawbwa to keep his enemies at bay they never felt the need to send a force to his rescue as they did in the South to Yawngwe.

1. See letter from the Sawbwa of Hsipaw to the British, pp. 118-119 above.
If the Sawbwa of Hsipaw was able to keep order within his State with 6000 armed men, the real trial of strength between the old and new representatives of the Hsenwi House was just beginning. From the fall of Mandalay to the cold season of 1886-87, Khunsang Tonhung was able to maintain himself as the new ruler of Hsenwi around Northern and Eastern Divisions; but to the extreme North, the Namkham Myosa did not recognize him, in the north-east, at Mongsi, Hsengnawpha was collecting followers to drive out his implacable opponent, while at Mongyal the Paokchoke, Sang Aw, also did not acknowledge Tonhung’s supremacy. Nawmong made his way from Mandalay by slow degrees to the Kawn-Kang (Alelet) where he was recognised by the Tamong of Mongsang and began to collect his force, and as the British expedition was penetrating into the Southern Shan States and settling fights and political affairs there, Nawmong occupied Lashio with 1000 men. Khunsang Tonhung accepted the challenge and marched down from Myoma (by which name the capital of Hsenwi was then known), or Weng Hsenwi, with a force composed of 250 Shans, 200 Kachins and 50 Palaungs. Nawmong was defeated and forced to retire to Manse. In this action Nawmong lost 24 men killed with trifling loss to Tonhung. This was about the middle of February.

Khunsang Tonhung then left 200 men to hold Lashio and returned with 300 men to oppose the aged Hsengnawpha who was coming down from Mongsi and heading for Myoma with a levy of Shans and Kachins in what appears to have been a badly concerted anvil-and-hammer attack designed to synchronise with his son’s earlier move at Lashio. The two opposing forces met at Taungsaw, 12 miles east of Myoma, where Hsengnawpha was worsted and forced to retire to Mongsi, pursued by Tonhung, who proceeded as far as Mongsi itself and there received the submission of its Chief. In this fight, Tonhung lost five men killed, and Hsengnawpha 37.

By this time Saw Yannaing or the Chaunggwa Prince, a son of the Mekkara Prince, who was fighting the British on the Irrawaddy plains, was driven not only from the Ava neighbourhood, but also from the Pyinulwin subdivision, and he found his way to Manse and joined Nawmong 1 who had been driven there by Tonhung.

A lull of four months followed during which both sides were busy collecting men and arms. Khunsang Tonhung ended the lull by marching down with 8000 men on Manse, where on the 6th waxing of the 7th month (about 7th June) he defeated Nawmong and Chaunggwa, killing 70 of their 7000 men with little loss to himself, and dispersing the rest. By the following month Tonhung’s force had swollen to 15,000, and on the 2nd waxing of the 8th month (about 1st July), he fell upon his opponents at Mongkaeng, whose numbers by now were reduced to 3,000 and they were easily scattered with a loss of 30 killed. After this battle, Khunsang Tonhung was joined by 200 Las from Somu who came uninvited to his aid. Also with him were the

1. The Mekkara Prince married one of Nawmong’s sisters.
300 Hsipaw troops who were sent to his support by his ally, Sawbwa Khun Seng, Tonhung then pushed on with his men towards Mongyai which was occupied after a last action at Loi Pangpara on the 6th waxing of the 9th month (about 9th August), and thus brought hostilities to an end. The Paokchoke Sang Aw and Nawmong fled to Mongnai and, promptly placed themselves under British protection by correspondence with them at Fort Stedman in Yawnghwe.

Khunsang Tonhung's successive and rapid victories which would have been attained in any case by sheer weight of numbers, were helped not a little by "predatory raids of bands" from Hsipaw at the instigation or orders of his ally. These guerrillas burnt out the whole of the Central Division (Kawnkang), and ruined the greater part of that tract. This was the type of warfare most familiar to and understood by the people at the time - the kind that had caused so much loss of life and property not only in the Shan States and Burma but throughout the whole of South East Asia.

Khunsang Tonhung was in effect master of all Hsenwi with the occupation of Mongyai, whereupon, with magnanimity reminiscent of the classical Princes or Kings of old, he issued proclamations pardoning all who had taken part against him and inviting all officials to return to their posts. The majority accepted the invitation and the promise was faithfully kept. Only in four Circles, where the runaway officials did not or dared not return, were new appointments made, and these were Mongyai, Monkseng, Nanang Lantau and Manpyaen. Nanang was restored to Mongyaw, of which it had formed a subdivision for 20 years and from which it had been separated only in 1247 (1895). Monkseng was placed under Khun Ton of the original family which had ruled that circle for generations, but which had been supplanted by a Royal Order from Mandalay 40 years previously.

Upon hearing from Nawmong at Mongnai, the British Superintendent and Political Officer at Fort Stedman, under whom all Shan States, both North and South, had now been placed, started corresponding with Khunsang Tonhung at Mongyai. The Hsipaw bands were withdrawn, and for the first time for over a generation there was peace in Hsenwi. The incessant fighting which had been going on had prevented the sufficient sowing of crops, and everywhere the spectre of famine was staring people in the face. In Laikha conditions were so bad that a considerable number of people died from actual starvation.

Such was the state of insecurity that people of those days always slept with their belongings packed into pairs of baskets ready to be carried away (with carrying poles) at the slightest sign of trouble. Many eye witnesses of that period or their children are still alive today to tell the gruesome tales of the unsettled conditions of the time.

Of the two remaining but smaller States in the North, Mongmit and Tawngpeng, the former was much torn asunder by the usual jealousies
of rival claimants, while the latter was comparatively quiet, on the eve of British occupation.

Mongmit and Mongleng (Momeik and Mohlaing) formerly constituted a single State until 1840 when on the death of the Sawbwa Maung Hlaing it was divided between his two sons, Maung Pu taking Mongmit and Kya U, taking Mongleng. From now there was not much security in the two States and a succession of Wuns were sent up from Mandalay including a Kengtung prince called Shwe-nanshin (1840-43), son of Maha Khanan, to either administer or put down disorders. Details of this period will be found under its proper heading.

Just before the British conquest, a sawbwauna (pretender) appeared in Mongmit in the person of Kan Hlaing, a scion of the Mongleng branch of the ruling family. But the rightful heir of Mongmit, Kin Maung, at the time a minor 3 years of age, found loyal protectors in the four State Amats, Maung Chu, Maung Kan, Maung Saung and Maung U, who successfully resisted and drove off Kan Hlaing. It was also reported that the opposing forces were informed by some of the Shan States lying further East that if the warfare continued during the rains and cultivation was thus hindered, those States would join against whichever side persisted in the warfare.

In the fastness of his tea mountains, the Sawbwa of Tawngpeng, Khun Khammong, had been living peacefully since his appointment by King Mindon in 1877, and was little affected by internecine strife around his State. King Mindon gave him as advisers a Burmese joint-administrator named Sitke Nga Hpe, and a Palaung Pongyi who was related to the Sawbwa's family. These two men were reported to be the real rulers of Tawngpeng, though the Sawbwa's own subjects merely said that their Sawbwa was a very pious man. On the fall of Mandalay he managed to maintain order and peace in his own State, and although factions in the North tried to involve him, the Sawbwa seems to have been diplomatic enough to ward off any real commitments, as illustrated by the following letter which he wrote to Hein Sai of Hsumhsai on the 13th waning Nayon 1248 (29th June 1886):

In the waning part of Nayon 1248 (June 1886) I was glad to hear that as the Prince (Myinzaing) would really become King, the Sawbwas, Myozas, Shwegunhmu and Ngwegunhmu on the Southern side (Southern Shan States) had taken the oath of allegiance to His Royal Highness. I too have been summoned with my contingent of troops to drink the oath-water of allegiance like others, but I cannot obey this order just at present because the rains have set in and the people need my protection while working in the fields, and also because it appears to me that the plan is not yet ripe for execution.

I am trying to maintain peace and order in my State, and I hope Hein Sai would kindly lend me his co-operation. This

1. Burma Foreign and Political Department Proceeding No. 7, August 1886.
letter is sent by the hand of the Thangedawbo, Nga Baw Paung, who has been ordered to make a note of the political affairs not going on.

The State of Thibaw has sided with the English and its Sawbwa has sent me many letters, but as the Sawbwa is not a man to be trusted, I have not allowed myself to be talked over by him; and I hope Hein Sai would also follow my example.

In order that we two may be able to secure peace and happiness in such evil times as we are now living in, I shall feel much obliged if the orders of His Royal Highness the Prince are communicated to me.  

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1. GUBSS, II:3.254. Burma Foreign Department Proceeding No. 313, December 1886.
CHAPTER VI

Annexation by Marching Columns

We have seen in the previous chapter how conditions in the Shan States had become chaotic even before Mandalay fell to the forces of General Prendegast and how the situation deteriorated as the result of the abolition of central authority from Mandalay. The Limbin League had not yet made its authority felt even in the whole of the South when Sao On, the usurper Sawbwa of Yaungwe, sent a letter of appeal for help to the British in Mandalay. In the North, the rivalries between the Myinsaing Prince and the descendants of the ancient House of Hsenwi on the one hand; and between Khun Seng, the influential Sawbwa of Hsipaw, and Khungsang Tonhung, the new master of Hsenwi, on the other, had created similar unsettled conditions as in the South. The proximity of the region to Mandalay, however, made the urgency of the situation felt at headquarters more readily. It was also reported that a caravan of some 1000 loaded pack cattle had been prevented from coming down from the Shan hills to Mandalay by dacoits and unsettled conditions in Hsumhsai. This stoppage of the free flow of trade had touched the nerve centre of British policy. There must be unrestricted trade and communications to help stabilise conditions in the newly-conquered Upper Burma. Only when the shops, pweyons and bazaars were full of merchandise would faith and confidence be created in the new and foreign government.

Thus, occupied though the Chief Commissioner and his military commanders were with affairs and risings in the newly-conquered territory of the plains, it was found imperative that a military column should be sent to Hsumhsai, equally to make a show of British power and to open up the trade route between Mandalay and the Northern Shan States. The columns consisted of 200 men of the 3rd Gurkhas under the command of Colonel E. Stedman, with Mr. H. Thirkell White as its political head. The small force assembled at Pyinulwin and reached Hsumhsai via Nawngsakaw on November 18, 1886. In the Political Officer's staff were two representatives of the Shan ruling families of Tampak and Mawkmai - one of the two men was actually the ex-myosa of Tampak, named Khun Nu, of whom we shall hear more later. These two men were formerly kept as hostages and attached to the Court at Mandalay and, after the British occupation of that city, were employed by the British Commissioner of the Northern Division to take British "Letters of friendship" to various Shan States. White found them
at Zibingale and kept them with him until his return to Mandalay as he found them working well and loyally.

White found the country-side in a state of desolation and this is how he describes the scene at Hsumhsai at the time:

The country was to a great extent deserted, villages had been abandoned, and many inhabitants had fled to the neighbouring States of Mainglon, Thibaw and Yatsauk, but chiefly to Mainglon. Much of the land had been left uncultivated, the road was neglected and overgrown with long grass. These evidences of disorder we saw as we passed through Thonze; and I learned from the people that the rest of the country was the same as that of the part which we saw.

Part of White's task was to install at Hsumhsai a ruler who would be confirmed in his position by the British in return for a pledge to keep law and order among his people. We have seen how Hein Sai of Hsumhsai was an adherent of the Myinzaing faction and how he was fighting with the brother of Hsipaw Sawbwa, Khun Meik, who had claimed the State at the invitation of Hein Sai himself and Hein Sa. On arrival of the British at Hsumhsai Hein Sai would have nothing to do with them; in fact, he took White's advance messengers to task for serving the British after having been in the service of the Burmese King. All attempts of the British agent to bring together Hein Sai and Khun Meik in order to come to some amicable settlement failed. At one point Khun Nu, ex-myosa of Tampak, was sent as messenger, and to assure Hein Sai of his sincerity and good faith White told him to keep Khun Nu as a hostage until his safe return from the British camp to his own headquarters. Hein Sai refused to come out to meet White, while Khun Meik and his brother, the Sawbwa, sent Amats to see him with friendly messages couched in a conciliatory tone. If only Hein Sai could have known how White favoured him (even without seeing him) as a ruler of Hsumhsai as against Khun Meik, he might have put in a personal appearance which would have immediately secured his confirmation as ruler of Hsumhsai. For some reason White was not in favour of adding Hsumhsai to Hsipaw territory, and he recommended that the Hsipaw troops should be made to withdraw as soon as a British political agent could be appointed to Hsipaw with the support of some British troops. White considered his mission a complete failure in as much as he "was unable to place in power in Hsumhsai a ruler acceptable to the people, able to maintain himself there, and willing to accept his appointment from the British, and to pay a reasonable tribute". Sir Charles Crossthwaite, writing in 1912 on this mission remarked that Mr. White's "view was unnecessarily despondent". The Expedition left Nawngsakaw and Hsumhsai territory on November 25th.

1. Near Maymyo.
2. Burma Foreign Department Proceeding No. 57, December 1886.
One month later, the Chief Commissioner was able to report to India:

Since the return of the force from Thonze Caravans of Shans and Panthays have come down from Thibaw by Thonze route; and replies have now been received from the Sawbwa of Thibaw to letters previously sent by the Chief Commissioner, and to the letters sent to him by the Political Officer from Thonze. The substance of the letter is satisfactory. In more than one of them the Sawbwa recites his obligations to the British Government for the treatment which he received in Rangoon. By one of the messengers who came down from Thibaw, the Sawbwa is reported to have said that he is under great obligations to the British Government because, when his life was forfeited according to their laws, they did not kill him but permitted him to go in peace to his own country. This statement of his sentiments did not contain in so many words in the Sawbwa's letters, but it is in accordance with several passages in them. In the Chief Commissioner's judgment, it is a mark of enlightenment and credible to a man of the Sawbwa's race, position and training that he should recognise that the treatment he received in Rangoon was really magnanimous. It would have seemed not unnatural if the Sawbwa had cherished resentment against the people whose Government had punished him, even mildly, for an act which he himself could not regard as a crime.

In the same letter, the Chief Commissioner also reported that the presence of the Sawbwa's troops in Hsumhsai had the effect of securing peaceful passage of traders, while at the same time the Sawbwa expressed his willingness to withdraw his troops as soon as a permanent arrangement could be made. The evident desire of the Sawbwa to cultivate the goodwill of the British made the Chief Commissioner reluctant to call upon the Sawbwa to evacuate Hsumhsai. The Chief Commissioner even stated that if the situation improved by the time a second expedition was sent to Hsumhsai "there would be no objection to the grant of permission to the Sawbwa to continue to administer Thonze." White's recommendations would be carried out only if conditions deteriorated.

Hsumhsai eventually became part of Hsipaw. Diplomacy and a conciliatory attitude on the part of Khun Seng, the Sawbwa of Hsipaw State, certainly defeated the recommendations of a British Officer "on the spot", who in this case seemed unduly prejudiced against Hsipaw from the beginning. And looking back years later when British rule had become an established fact, there could be no doubt as to which was the more sensible course of action, the Chief Commissioner's action in befriending the Sawbwa and adding Hsumhsai to

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1. Sic.

2. Burma Foreign Department Proceeding No. 313, December 1886.
Hsipaw, or Mr. White's recommendation of finding an independent ruler for Hsumhsai.

But Mr. Thirkell White’s expedition to Hsumhsai was only in the nature of a foray to remove a barrier to free trade; it was not a major undertaking to establish British rule - not yet. After the Myinzaing Prince's death activities by his faction seemed to have petered out in Hsipaw and the neighbouring state where Sawbwa Khun Seng and his troops were in complete control, and no more was to be heard of Hein Sai. In the State of Hsenwi Sao Nawmong, son of the old Sawbwa Sao Hsengnawhpa, and his friend Saw Yanmaing, the Chaunggwa Prince, did not come to grips with their implacable foe, Khunsang Tonhung, until a few months later. The situation in the North at the end of White's mission then seemed tolerably stable for the British not to attempt to station a permanent garrison or a political agent for the time being. Their main attention was directed to the South where the forces of the Limbin League were closing in upon Sao On, the usurper Sawbwa of Yawmghwe, who had sent many appeals of help to the British at Mandalay and the latter had not been slow to take full advantage of the situation. With their promise to help Sao On, the British were fully committed to entering the Shan States; whether as conquerors or merely as suzerain will be unfolded as they advanced. As soon as the monsoon of 1886 came to an end, therefore, the British commenced collecting men and equipment at Hlaingdet in preparation for the major advance into the Shan States, and it is here that we must now turn our attention.

Though the Pyindet Pass had been chosen by the British as the best route to reach Yawmghwe from the central plains of Burma, the roads themselves had not been in use for many months - practically since the fall of Mandalay when the breakdown in the state of law and order seemed complete. All roads traversable for bullocks and carts were blocked on purpose by the Burmese and Shan villagers to prevent cattle raiders from driving away their animals. In many places towards the Pass, the routes were blocked by special orders of Sao Weng, the Sawbwa of Lawksawk on behalf of the Limbin League, to delay the progress of the British forces. Work on the roads was slow because it was not easy to procure labourers to clear and repair the roads so as to make them passable for transport animals and the main body of the force. Even when labourers had been procured, the strenuous nature of the work was such that on December 26th they went on a strike. Entry for that day in Mr. J. G. Scott’s diary: "Coolies struck. Had the leaders up and threatened to do heaps of illegal things. Got the fear of death on them and extorted promises never to do any more." On top of these difficulties, the commissariat supplies of the Expedition did not arrive regularly or promptly as planned.

In spite of these delays, however, the Expedition was able to advance earlier than the target date of the 15th January. On the
3rd January 1887, Colonel E. Stedman with 200 Gurkhas left Hlaingdet and proceeded to occupy Pyinnyaung in two marches. The column found the road blocked in many places with fallen trees, some of which having been felled on the very morning of the day of its passage.

On the political side, Mr. Hildebrand had not yet arrived at Hlaingdet, but Scott, his assistant and deputy, accompanied the military and spent his time in distributing copies of the Chief Commissioner's proclamation explaining the aims and objects of the Expedition to the Chiefs of the Myelat States and in writing letters in his own name to headmen and prominent persons en-route. Scott also had time to explore the road and get labourers to improve them. Of the military head of the column, Scott writes: "Colonel Stedman of the Gurkhas very energetic. Likely to hurry the expedition up".1

From Pyinnyaung the column pushed on to Kyatsakan and crossing the Pyindeik Pass occupied Singu on the 20th January. It was harassed ineffectually at many places by men sent by the Sawbwa of Lawksawk. From one of the wounded men captured by the Gurkhas in the scuffle, the British learned that 200 men has been sent down from Pwehla to delay their passage, and that there were 4,000 men awaiting to give battle. But the men who gave trouble to the column were ill-armed and undisciplined and their resistance was more in the nature of pin pricks than anything else. Besides these levies sent down to delay their progress, the British also had to deal with ordinary dacoits who looted the villages through which they passed. When the villagers appealed to them, the troops had to go after the dacoits and in many cases recovered the stolen property or animals. The dacoits were so bold one night as to drive off one of the Expedition's elephants, which however was retrieved soon after.

Parts of the road were spiked with bamboo stakes.

On the 21st January, Hildebrand with the rest of the force at Hlaingdet caught up and joined the advance party at Singu. Before seeing him, Scott wrote in his diary of Hildebrand: "2 January 1887: I am likely to be Assistant Political Officer in Shan States - Hildebrand coming up to be Commissioner. Doosed hard luck. He'll grab all the credit". Later, after Hildebrand's arrival, Scott wrote on the 21st: "Hildebrand bossing. Don't see what I shall do if things go on like this".

On the 27th of January the main body of the British forces advanced as far as Namkham. Here another feeble attempt was made by the Limbin men to delay them. They fired a few rounds from a distance of 700 yards, and hurled abuse and defiance to reinforce the bullets, but broke up and melted away when a shell was fired at them. This shell killed a nonbelligerent villager whose wife later received as

1. Ibid., p. 77.
compensation Rs.100/- from Stedman, on advice given by his political colleagues. That seemed to have been the last shots fired by both sides before the British reached Yawnghwe. On the following day, elders and headmen from nearby villages came in to the British camp bringing, as is customary, oranges, bananas, cane sugar slabs and other tokens of friendliness, including charcoal which is still an article to be greatly welcomed on winter nights on the Shan Plateau, especially in the open and windy downs of the Myelat, where the British were then camping.

The British entered Pwehla on the 29th and they were met by the Chief and people including the prominent pongyis outside the town, augering well for their entry. It was here, at Pwehla, that the British discovered that the news of their ally the usurper Sawbwa of Yawnghwe, Sao On, being hard pressed by the Limbin League forces, had been greatly exaggerated and that he was in no immediate danger. With the cause for their haste towards Yawnghwe thus removed, the British decided to take their own time to proceed to Yawnghwe. The halt at Pwehla gave them the excellent opportunity of contacting the Myelat Chiefs who showed willingness to submit. Moreover, they were eager that Sao Weng, the Sawbwa of Lawksawk, should see the futility of resistance and that he should thereby submit peacefully, whereupon they would confirm him in his State. The British offered to settle his differences with the Sawbwa of Yawnghwe, but they insisted that he must first withdraw his forces from his stockade at Kugyo. Messengers were despatched from Pwehla with Hildebrand's letter explaining the situation to the Sawbwa. A reply from Sao Weng was received on the 3rd February to the effect that he did not know the British were coming up, that Sao On was not the rightful Sawbwa but a dacoit and usurper, and that he saw no reason for coming and visiting the British camp. To this reply, the Political Officer despatched on the same day another letter inviting the Sawbwa to meet him at Hehoa. To this letter, no answer was received.\footnote{Of the Sawbwa's warlike activities, the British learned from the people of Pindaya that he was levying one man from every house to fight them and that he intended to flee to Mongnai if defeated.}

During this halt at Pwehla some amusing incidents occurred which had much bearing on the prestige and precedence of the new rulers and the ruled. One day when a Chief came to see the Political Officer, Hildebrand, he was given a chair because "he called himself a Sawbwa". This apparently annoyed the others. On another day, the Chiefs of Pangmi and Loimaw came in with gold umbrellas, but the Political Officers, because of embarrassing experience of the previous occasion, made them sit on the ground. The chair, a common and sensible seat all over Europe, and sat on by every ordinary citizen there, thus became the symbol of "face" and superiority and had contributed in no small degree to some of the bitterness in the rise of nationalism in Burma.

\begin{enumerate}
\item Military Report on the Shan States, Intelligence Branch, Q. M. G. Department, Simla, 1905, p. 33.
\item Mitton, G. E., \textit{op. cit.}, p. 79.
\end{enumerate}
The work of the Political Officer was by no means smooth or easy, as can be seen from the following "unofficial view" of his assistant: "The column ... lumbered along in a very slow and stately way, and the Political Officer, who had instructions to avoid fighting if it was in any way possible, sent off numerous letters to the nearest and most powerful of the Chiefs, full of arguments, promises and veiled threats". All these proved of no effect. He got few replies, couched in very lofty language, but most of the letters remained unanswered.

Some of the answers stated that the Chief whom the column had gone to relieve, had no business to be a Chief at all, and that was why he was being attacked. He had got himself appointed Chief by a dirty trick played on his own brother. He was a man no one liked and his people were cattle-thieves.

The column marched east, and the country was a series of ranges and valleys running north and south and it was practically unmapped, so that it was a good deal longer than had been expected before the expedition arrived at its destination. The beleaguered Chief came out on an elephant with a double row of retainers. They were armed with comic opera weapons, tridents and pikes and spears fastened with horse-hair dyed red.

The column pitched camp four miles from the Capital, near some dry rice beds and a mountain stream. To further complicate the situation, it seemed that the people from the Capital had mostly gone over to a village behind the enemy's lines, as it was bazaar day there. It was difficult to know how to fit all this in.

The place where the column pitched camp was Bawrithat, named after a pagoda built there, according to legends, by King Anawrahta, founder of the Pagan Dynasty. It is half way between Yawngwe town and Kugyo where Sao Weng the Sawbwa of Lawksaw had fortified positions. The column arrived there on the 7th February, after having spent the 5th and 6th at Heho in the vain hope of treating with Sao Weng. Sao Ong, the usurper Sawbwa of Yawngwe, came out to meet the British at Bawrithat, riding on an elephant with five gold umbrellas - one actually shading him while the remaining four merely surrounded the elephant to enhance pomp and glory; and his son rode on another with four gold umbrellas. The Sawbwa was described as a thick-set man with a freckled face and small, half-closed bright eyes, but unpleasant looking. He represented Sao Weng (actually a distant cousin of his) as anti-British and was against the idea of communicating with him. He himself must have been thankful and delighted to see the arrival of the British; for almost a year he had been surrounded by the Limbin forces, and, having usurped his brother's place, he must have felt insecure all the time. With the arrival of the British, his throne was secure and his state would soon be free from any external armed attack.
At Bawrithat, another attempt was made by the Political Officer to communicate with the Sawbwa of Lawksawk asking him to disperse his men at Kugyo. No one could be found as a messenger - even the pongyi who had volunteered on the 7th declined on the next day. The official excuse was that Sao Weng had many "wild" Kachins and Panthays in his camp and it was through fear of these men that none dared to approach Kugyo. It is difficult to say how far Sao On himself had been responsible for instilling this or other fear, since he himself was against the idea of communicating with Sao Weng from the beginning, and from subsequent events his capacity for intrigue seemed enormous. Nor was it likely that Sao Weng would retire peacefully, ignorant as he was of the fire power and discipline of a modern army such as that arrayed against him. So it was decided by the British to take Kugyo by frontal assault on the 9th February.

The day before the attack was spent in reconnoitering the geographical position of Kugyo and its fortifications. While on this "spying" work, some British Officers came upon a cultivator who, on being questioned, seemed to know Kugyo inside out. The man was at once taken to their camp and asked to make a mud model of the fortifications, which he did to perfection, showing all the ravines, paths and places where spikes had been embedded. This the Officers proclaimed as a work of art which gave them the greatest satisfaction and extracted from them the greatest admiration for the artist.

British forces began to move against Kugyo before dawn on the 9th. It was taken without any difficulty and all was over in 15 hours from start to finish.

For the Lawksawk Sawbwa and the Limbin League generally the capture of Kugyo seemed a great defeat and disaster; for the British, it was a cheap victory for it was won without loss of a man on their side. Some details of this operation were recorded by Scott in his diary: "I went ahead with guides, and after a list made a variety of excursions, a quarter of a mile ahead of the troops to warn the friendly posts not to be alarmed, or to make a noise when we passed. Found most of them more wide awake than I had expected. At one place nearly fired on. Awful third class funeral business; animals so slow not withstanding the moonlight. Got on to ridge leading south-west towards Kugyo about dawn. Then some d-d humbug, skirmishing through a pagoda enclosure where there could not possibly be anybody. Result, rising of sun and firing of a warning gun to our left front. Got guns into position, and wasted a lot of time blazing away shells at different ranges. Lot of men from the fort left, but the rest cheered defiantly and fired guns. Then advanced infantry. Went along with right flank. Stream fourteen feet deep, sheer, nine foot wide channel. Hard to jump it. Up beastly hill slope and into stockade. Beggars bolted. Volleys after them down the hill. Signs of a boss pongyi, said to be the Sawbwa's step-father, but more possibly Sawbwa himself. Had some sandwiches and then went on. Got in at 3 p.m., 15 hours of it".
The British made a triumphant entry into Yawnghwe on the following day. The Sawbwa sent two elephants for their Chiefs to ride in on - Hildebrand on one, and Stedman and Scott on the other. Sao On himself came out one mile beyond the gates of Yawnghwe town to welcome his saviours with Shan drums, gongs, trumpets and all the emblems of pomp and glory that a year ago belonged to his brother Sao Maung by right. On the British side, the Gurkhas band struck up and at once caused the two state elephants so much consternation that they nearly stampeded.

The British arrival in Yawnghwe and their capture of Kugyo produced the effect desired and expected by them. The Myosa of Samka and ex-Myosa of Sikip (Thigyit) came in personally at once to acknowledge British supremacy. Representatives of Laikha, Mongkung and Kesi-Bensan arrived with letters for the Secretary of Upper Burma asking for assistance against Mongpan and Mongnai who had overrun their States. These three States also showed signs of coming to terms. Not having sufficient troops to commit themselves to anything positive and still lacking definite plans, the British sent back the emissaries with a promise that their States would be visited. By the middle of February all the Myelat Chiefs had come in, most of them in person. Mongpai acknowledged the British rule by letter. Letters were despatched by the Political Officer to the Sawbwas and Myosas of Mongnai, Mongpawn, Mongsit, Hopong, Namkhok, Nawngwawn, Banyin and Hsahtung telling them to carefully consider the proclamation of the Chief Commissioner; while these letters to Shan Chiefs demanded "loyalty" and "submission", letters to the Karenni Chiefs, in deference to their "independent" identity during the Burmese regime "offered friendship" and "suggested a meeting". These Karenni Chiefs were Sawlapaw of Kantarawadi, Pobya of Nammekon and the Myosas of Bawlake, Kyebogyi, Ngwedaung and Naungpale.

With the fall of Kugyo, all the Limbin forces retired to their own territories or States, and the prince himself moved his headquarters to a place near Hopong, but there was no sign of the principal Limbin partners in the East giving in - it was even announced the leaders had taken a fresh oath to stand or fall together. This item of news must have dismayed the British somewhat, for while they knew no one could really withstand them, the forces at their disposal at Yawnghwe then were insufficient to deal effectively with scattered resistance and chaos on a large scale. Knowing their superiority, they wanted to avoid fighting, if possible, even against people whom they did not consider their civilised equals. Moreover, the orders from the Viceroy were not to shed avoidable blood.

In spite of this news, however, Limbin Prince wrote a letter to the Political Officer announcing his willingness to surrender if granted a pardon. Better than any of his supporters who had taken the "last ditch" oath to defend him or his cause, the prince knew the British might. But did he write the letter in secret or with the full knowledge of the Leaguers? Either way, the British could not have wished for any better solution than this offer to surrender. A
reply was at once despatched promising full immunity if he would surrender, an allowance of Rs. 250/- a month (an increment of Rs. 150/- over his last pension of Rs. 100/-) and a free house for him to live either in Rangoon or Moulmein. More letters were also sent to the Limbin League States in the east, including one to Sao Weng, the Sawbwa of Lawksawk, who was told that in spite of Kugyo he had nothing to fear if he surrendered. To this last letter, an unfavourable reply came two days later.

In the south, in spite of his letter to the British welcoming them, the Sawbwa of Mongpai was still fighting desultory village warfare against Pobya of Nammekon. Both the contestants wrote to the British at Yawnghwe "praying" that troops be sent to their aid. Their "prayers" were promptly answered. On the 26th February, the Assistant Political Officer, J. G. Scott, with 100 Gurkhas under the command of Captain Pulley and Lieutenant Battye with Surgeon Fuller in medical charge, started by boats down the Nam Pilu (Bilu Chaung). On both sides of the river were scenes of desolation bearing witness to the anarchy of the last few years. Burnt-out villages, deserted kyaungs, neglected fields and plantations were to be seen everywhere. Only kingfishers, egrets and paddy birds flapped their wings or lazed about unconcerned with the troop movements. Within ten days of the passage of the British troops, a good many families had returned and erected temporary huts - families of people who had no share in the avarice and ambitions of their rulers and who, beyond the necessities of life, wanted nothing but peace.

The British party arrived at Pekon (Peyakon), the Sawbwa's headquarters, on the 1st of March. The Sawbwa, Khun Yon, came out to meet them and was most "profuse in his expressions of delight at the settlement of the Shan States by British Agency". He said he had hoped for it and had been urging it for the last thirty years and that now that they had come there would be peace, likening their coming to the descent from heaven of the Thagyamin. He asked the British to establish a military outpost at Pekon as in the Burmese days, to preserve the peace that had thus come. He undertook to persuade the Sawbwas of Mongnai and Mongpawn to share his views on the coming of the British, and wrote letters to them accordingly. Some British Officers thought these letters influenced the Sawbwas concerned in their eventual decision to recognise the British supremacy.

Pobya, who had also "prayed" for the British troops' arrival, received the following ominous letter from the warrior Chief of Kantarawadi, Sawlapaw.

Order from Sawlapaw to Pobya and Bawlake.

I have not interfered in the struggles that have been going on between the Mobye Sawbwa and Bawlake, aided by Pobya. I hear that Bawlake and Pobya have invited the English Kalas to come, and I now send down messengers to inquire whether this report is true. If the Kalas are invited to
the Karenni country, all the Karennis will become slaves to the Kalas. If it is desired that the government of Karenni should be hereditary, the Kalas should not be asked to come. But if the invitation has been sent, the Kalas should be written to return.

The Kalas are not an ordinary race. They captured the Burmese King and annexed his empire. This is known to Pobya and Bawlake. By all means the Kalas should be asked to turn back.

An early reply as to whether the present order will be obeyed is requested.

Although Sawlapaw, the first frontier Chief in the East to offer serious resistance, later on, to the British, knew the "English Kalas" to be of no ordinary race, little did he realise the effectiveness of their fire power or that in world politics, particularly towards the end of the 19th century, small tracts like Karenni, however wild and independent, could not be left alone. Sawlapaw had no thoughts of yielding and he maintained this attitude to the very last, but his Karenni brother Chief, Pobya, held different views, and his answer to the former's request as to whether his order would be obeyed or not, was to forward the order to the Assistant Political Officer.

With both Mongpai and Pobya professing such friendliness it looked as if peace had at last come to the warring villages. But it was not to be. This was due to a sudden change of plans in the British troop movements. Originally a good part of the British column was to have returned to Burma at Toungoo via Mongpai, and it had been intended that the Assistant Political Officer's escort of Gurkhas should wait at Mongpai until the main body joined them. This period of waiting would give the Assistant Political Officer time to settle Mongpai-Pobya affairs. Owing to some military exigencies, the original plan of troops returning to Toungoo were changed and the expedition was ordered to return to Burma by the route it came through, namely, the Pyindet Pass. The Gurkhas under Captain Pulley received orders to leave Mongpai and return to Yawnghwe immediately. Consequently the Assistant Political Officer was compelled to retire with the troops, leaving Mongpai-Pobya quarrels to be settled finally only in the cold weather of 1889. The whole party left Mongpai on the 5th of March. Whether their departure was taken by the Sawbwa of Mongpai as the earth itself opening up or as the ascent of the Thagyamin back to his heavenly abode, has not been recorded.

The Assistant Political Officer and his hundred Gurkhas returned by land and reached Fort Stedman on the 7th. This site was chosen to be the headquarters of the British, civil as well as military, and named after the military commander of the Expedition. When the Expedition first arrived they billeted in thatch-and-bamboo
huts, or tawmaws, built for them by the people of Yawngewe, near the town itself. The camp was too close to the town and the whole area was low lying and unhealthy, and also liable to be submerged under water during the rains. Indian and British troops and their officers, having been used to the segregated cantonment life in India, would never be happy in such a place. They therefore asked for a piece of land from the Sawbwa, as originally planned, and the most suitable spot was found on a high ground above the village of Mongsauk (Maingthauk), on the eastern shore of Inle Lake and about 7 miles from Yawngewe by road. The place remained the British Residency and cantonment for quite a number of years until the administrative headquarters moved to Taunggyi on the 15th September 1894.

After the Limbin Prince had retired to Hopong following the fall of Kugyo, the Political Officer sent letters to him and to the Sawbwas of Mongnai and Mongpawm inviting them to meet him at Hopong on the 17th of March so that some political settlement could be arrived at. Preparations were accordingly made for the march from Yawngewe to Hopong; pack bullocks were procured and carriers were collected. When everything was ready, the Sawbwa of Mongpawm, Khun Hti, wrote in to say that he could not meet the Political Officer on the appointed day because the principal Sawbwa of Mongnai, Khun Kyi, was away in Kantarawadi attending the marriage ceremony of his nephew to a daughter of Sawlapaw. At the same time, Mongnai's own mother-in-law had died and could not be buried until the Sawbwa returned; and until the funeral was over the Sawbwa himself could not attend to any business, political or otherwise. And without Mongnai's participation, others could not or would not do anything.

This unexpected delay, natural to the Sawbwa in the circumstances, must have appeared to the Political Officer as Shan or Oriental unpredictability and it at once placed him in a dilemma. To insist on a meeting on the date fixed was clearly impossible. To halt the intended march was not easy either as everything had been geared for it. On the other hand, delay might be interpreted as weakness which must be avoided at all costs. The Political Officer also feared that Sawlapaw, who was hostile from the beginning might take advantage of the delay to persuade the wavering Karenni Chiefs and Shan Sawbwas to refuse to treat with the British. States in the neighbourhood of Yawngewe which had recently acknowledged British rule were watching the situation. In the north, Sao Weng was still at large in his State. When the mail runners were attacked and robbed for the first time since the British establishment at Fort Stedman, it was suspected that the Sawbwa of Lawksawk was behind the deed. To get out of the dilemma, therefore, the British decided to move against Lawksawk, and a letter was accordingly sent to its Sawbwa to the effect that the Political Officer was coming to his capital and that opposition or flight on his part would result in someone else being appointed as Sawbwa of Lawksawk, but that submission would confirm him in his throne.

For reasons of his own, Sao On, who was not in favour of postponing the march to Hopong, was now reluctant to assist in the
expedition against his erstwhile enemy, Sao Weng. The British accused him of making the most money out of the expedition by demanding at every opportunity very exorbitant rates for hiring of transport and animals. But he could not stop the march to Lawksawk, and the Political Officer with a contingent of troops set out on the 14th of April and moved by easy stages towards Lawksawk via Pwehla and Pangtara, partly to allow Sao Weng time to "see the light" and partly to clear the country side of bands of dacoits and men posted to harass their progress. These bands were working in cooperation with gangs in the districts below the hills. The Political Officer's flag march had the effect of forcing the latter to surrender to the British outpost at Wundwin. Men posted to harass the British en-route disappeared as their troops advanced.

On April 10th the British party arrived at Magyipin, 3 miles from Lawksawk, and a letter was about to be sent to the Sawbwa asking him to meet the Political Officer outside the capital on the next day when a deputation from the same town arrived and announced that the Sawbwa had fled. Lawksawk town was entered on the 11th and one Bo Saing who had held office under the former government was placed in temporary charge of the administration. The column then continued its march and reached Mongping on the 15th, and a myook was appointed to act under Bo Saing. It was here, at Mongping, that another letter was received from Mongpawn finally postponing the meeting at Hopong. The column, nevertheless, continued its march towards Hopong which was reached on the 17th. The whole village was in ruins and was all but deserted. The Limbin Prince had not come in and Khun Hti was occupied in defending himself against forces from Laikha, Mongkung and Kesi-Bansam.

On learning that Mongpawn and his attackers were actually engaged in firing on each other only a few miles away, the Political Officer and his assistant with an escort of 10 mounted infantry and 50 Punjabis under Major Swetenham, went to the scene of the fight. The firing continued for some time after the arrival of the British party. When the Sawbwa of Mongpawn had been prevailed upon to cease firing, Assistant Political Officer Scott was told by his superior to go up to the stockade on a hill from which the attackers were firing and to persuade them to stop fighting. Scott was accompanied by Khun Nu, the ex-Myosa of Tampak (Tabet) who had been on a previous mission with Thirkell White to Hsumhsai in the North, and who had now come all the way with the British from Mandalay. Scott and Khun Nu, the former with a pipe in his mouth to demonstrate cool British courage in any emergency (so says Lady Scott),1 walked up the hill, went inside the stockade and between them managed to persuade about a dozen leaders to return with them to Mongpawn camp. Among these men Scott recognised one or two who had gone to Mandalay in a mission to acknowledge British rule. Asked why they were now breaking the precious peace they were specially told to preserve, the men answered that they were doing precisely what they had been

told to do, namely, to assist the new regime in every way possible, and that as Mongpawn was one of the chief supporters of the Limbin League he must be attacked. Their conviction however did not appear deep, for the Sawbwa of Mongpawn and his attackers soon came to terms of amicable settlement, so much so that by the time the British party returned to Mongpawn in the evening, leaders of both sides were mingling together as long lost friends and talking about deeds of valour each side had performed before they had become friends. The Sawbwa of Mongpawn himself promised to give his erstwhile enemies enough rice to see them home.

Khun Hti, Sawbwa of Mongpawn, was described as a man of strong character and the moving spirit in the Limbin League. He readily acknowledged British supremacy and advised strongly that a party should be sent to Mongnai to negotiate with its Sawbwa for recognition of British rule, and that the Limbin Prince, who had by now removed himself to Mongnai, should be brought in. The British then and there decided to act upon his advice, but as the monsoon had now begun in earnest, making roads difficult, it was thought sufficient to send the Assistant Political Officer with an escort of 50 rifles to Mongnai, while the Political Officer himself returned to Fort Stedman with the main body of the column.

The Assistant Political Officer was delayed in Mongpawn for some days waiting for the arrival of rations. While there, two minor Chiefs, Nawngwawn (a brother of Mongpawn) and Mongsit (Mongpawn's son-in-law and half-brother of Mawkmai) came in to submit. Other smaller Chiefs sent messengers or promise to meet the British Representative in Mongnai. British soldiers fraternised with the people, local chiefs came in for rifle shooting practice and people generally were entertained by military parades and manoeuvres. In spite of these signs of friendliness, no one could guarantee the surrender of the Limbin Prince. It must depend on his own decision, the Shans said. The Political Officer, Hildebrand, wrote: "This was an instance of the way in which the Shan Chiefs cling together, and of the sanctity they attached to an oath. They did not know that Limbin had written to the British: his last letter accepting British terms was received at Fort Stedman on April 1st.1 They knew that his cause and the main object of the League had been lost, but they would not coerce him to surrender.

Leaving Mongpawn on the 2nd the Assistant Political Officer and his escort arrived at Mongnai, 70 miles distant, on the 5th of May. The party passed through a sad countryside - it had been ravaged both by Laikha men and by Twet Nga Lu, and in the last seventeen miles before Mongnai all the villages had been burnt. Of the town, Mongnai itself, official reports describe it as follows: "From the north there is a long avenue-like approach to Mongnai. The walls of the ancient city still exist in a very dilapidated state. They are

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1. Military Report on the Shan States, Intelligence Branch, Q. M. G. Department, Simla 1905, p. 34.
about 20 feet high and machicolated. The city was about 1000 yards square, and there remain signs of extensive suburbs. Everything, however, had been destroyed. Of ten thousand houses only three hundred (mostly recently built) remain; out of one hundred and twenty monasteries only three are left standing. The Sawbwa himself lived in a bamboo house, instead of the former teak-wood haw (palace). The interior of the city walls is all jungle grown."

After quoting the above from the Political Officer's official report (of June 22, 1887, paragraph 97) Sir Charles Crossthwaite writes: "It is as well to put on record some description of the condition in which the British found the Shan States. A few years hence we shall be denounced as the ruthless destroyers of a country which we had found wealthy and prosperous. Did he already foresee, at the time of writing (1912), the rise of nationalism in Burma?

To continue with Crossthwaite's description of the British entry into Mongnai:

The Sawbwa of Mongnai came in an unpretentious fashion to see Mr. Scott the day after his arrival. His superiority in breeding and character to most of the Chiefs was marked. He made no difficulty about accepting British supremacy, and proffered all his influence to induce the other Chiefs to follow his example. The typical character of the Shans as a race of traders came out in his request that his submission to British authority should be made known in Moulmein. In former times there was a good trade in timber with the Moulmein merchants. When they were informed of the establishment of peace, this trade he anticipated would revive.

It remained to induce the Limbin Prince to submit and to accompany Mr. Scott to Fort Stedman. This was not a question of very high diplomacy, but it required some skill, tact, and patience to induce the Prince to make a voluntary surrender. It would have been very easy to have arrested and removed him by force. Such action, however, would have been distasteful to the Shan Chiefs and might have rendered it more difficult to dispose of other pretenders still remaining in the Northern States. The Prince showed himself to be a poor creature, whose chief characteristic was an immeasurable conceit. He was, after all, only the illegitimate son of the Einshemin, or War Prince, who was the brother of King Mindon. But Burmans and Shans, like some other people, if a man is a prince, do not ask too curiously what sort of a prince he may be. When he left Mongnai, mounted on an elephant, with his gong beating, great numbers of people knelt down by the road side as he passed, and similar respect was shown to him at other places. Notwithstanding his conceit, he did not put a very high price on his submission. This descendent of Kings, who had left his refuge in British Burma to become the head of a great Shan Confederacy to be formed on the model of the German Empire, was glad to
barter his lofty ambition for a stipend of £16 sterling a month and a house at Rangoon or Moulmein or elsewhere.1

While waiting for the Limbin Prince to be ready for his journey, the Assistant Political Officer spent the time in dashing off to Mawkmai, 25 miles further south. Mawkmai town was situated in a beautiful and fertile valley and it was the only town in the Cis-Salween Shan States that up to this time had escaped the inter-State warfare. The Capital town had some substantial houses in it.

On arrival the British party was told that the Sawbwa had just died that morning. This was Nai Noi, the best known of all the Mawkmai Sawbwas, designated as "Kolan Sawbwa" because he was reported to have been able to jump across a length of nine lan (5½ feet) with the help of his long spear which, it is said, he always carried about, together with his musket. Kolan seems to have been a man of exceptional strength and extraordinary height for a Shan. It is said that when he sat on his haunches with his knees up, his two knee-caps would be on the same level as his head, and the three points were likened to the three cooking-pot stones of a Shan kitchen. As far as territories south of Mawkmai were concerned, Kolan was no peaceful neighbour for he carried on raiding forays into Karenni and the now Siamese territory of Mahawngswan, and it is said that nothing could stand in his way once he made up his mind to go for certain objectives - these were generally elephants and timber - and that the only man he would not go near was one Phnya Pharb, a high ranking officer of the Chaoluang (Sawbwa) of Chiangmai. Legends about Kolan's exploits can still be heard from old people of Mawkmai.

The new Sawbwa, Khun Hmon by name, was Kolan's son and a young man of about 25 years of age and he came to see the Assistant Political Officer the next morning to acknowledge British supremacy. He came in great state, riding in a gilt carriage drawn by men and surrounded by 10 gold umbrellas, bodyguards and all items of royal regalia. Mawkmai was eager for British protection partly because of its timber trade connections with Moulmein and partly because its border villages had been victims of attacks by slave raiding parties from Karenni.2

On their return to Mongnai on the 11th of May, the party found the Sawbwa of Mongnai in even a better mood for co-operation. He gave assurances that he would be able to promise the acceptance of British rule by the powerful Sawbwas of the trans-Salween States who, he claimed, looked to him as their leader, and to Mongnai as their place of assemblage. The Sawbwa also asked that as a special favour to himself and as a confirmation of his authority, he might be allowed to fly the Union Jack. This request for an emblem that cost the giver nothing, but carried a great deal of prestige to the receiver, was immediately granted. On the evening of the 12th, the flag was ceremoniously hoisted in the ground of the Haw by the Assistant

2. More about Kolan and Mawkmai in chapter on Karenni.
Political Officer to the bugle sound of a general salute, while the small contingent of troops solemnly presented arms. Practically the whole town and countryside were there to witness the ceremony, and the ordinary people saluted the flag in their customary attitude of respect. As the 50 Punjabis marched back to their billet, Shan drums and gongs struck up. Such is the story behind the Union Jack flown by successive Sawbwas of Mongnai until the 4th January 1948.

The Limbin Prince had by now completed his preparations, and on the 13th started on his journey escorted by the British party. The prince was immensely pleased at being escorted by the small contingent of British sepoys who received instructions to see that he did not attempt to escape. The prince's own camp followers were also in the train, of whom 17 ran away the night before they reached Fort Stedman. The monsoon was now on in full force, making the roads slippery and travelling generally difficult, especially when the warring States during the past year had tried to make them impassable with spikes and fallen trees. Four soldiers and many of the camp followers were spiked in their feet. These seem to have been the only casualties since the British party left Mongpawn. Fort Stedman was reached on the 20th. The party was met by the regimental band two miles from the station and was "piped in", much to the satisfaction of the prisoner prince. After five days' rest, Limbin was sent under escort to Rangoon. At his own request he was later sent to India where he lived harmlessly for the rest of his life, first in Calcutta and then in Allahabad, with his family of eight.

The acceptance of the British authority by the influential Sawbwa of Mongnai and the surrender of the Limbin Prince relieved the British of much anxiety and represented a great diplomatic victory in their first major thrust into the Shan States. Practically the whole of the Southern Shan States west of the Salween had been annexed almost by stealth without a single casualty in actual combat, so far.
CHAPTER VII

Southern and Northern Shan Columns

With the despatch of the Limbin prince into obscurity, the British had completed one phase of the process of adding the Shan country to the mighty Indian Empire. By this penetration, the British had learned a number of lessons which were to guide them in their future dealings with the Shans and their rulers. They learned that there could be no organised resistance to their disciplined troops, and that a small number of such troops went a long way towards keeping law and order in the Shan hills. They discovered that the Shans were ready and willing to accept a powerful arbitrator from outside, but would perish rather than submit to their own kind even for the sake of unity, and that it was this fatal weakness of the Shans that had been responsible for the devastating inter-State warfare that laid waste practically the whole of the Shan plateau from end to end during the years preceding their annexation. The people themselves were tired of fighting and the state of anarchy that had been going on even before the Sawbwa of Mongnai revolted against King Thibaw in 1882, especially after the withdrawal of the Burmese garrison following the fall of Mandalay to the forces of General Prendergast. Some old people are still alive who remember the chaotic state of those days, and they say there had been so much fighting that the paddy field bunds disappeared. Prior to the penetration into the Shan States of this Expedition at the beginning of 1887, the British had but a sketchy, though more or less accurate, knowledge of the Shan States. Now they were sure of their ground, and from having "no idea of governing them or converting them into British districts even in the event of annexation" in November 1885, the British by mid 1887 felt confident of dealing with the Shan States and their problems. Kogyo stockade was taken in 15 hours without loss of a single man (on either side); the Limbin League was disbanded and their opponents dispersed without a single British casualty; the Limbin prince himself accepted the British surrender terms with readiness and some alacrity - all these gave the British their confidence, verging on contemptuous arrogance, as could be seen from the writings of one of their officers who had taken a prominent part in the process.

Although a small contingent of the British column penetrated as far as Mawkmai, many States in the South had not been touched. Except for the Thirkell White expedition to Hsumhsai in November 1886, none of the big Northern States had seen any sign or
representative of the new Power. It was felt that all the States should be visited so that problems could be solved on the spot and also that the symbol of the British power in the person of their troops could be exhibited en route. No communications had yet been established with the large trans-Salween States of Kengtung, Kenghung and Monglem. Meanwhile the five smaller trans-Salween sub-States of Mongton, Monghang, Mongkyawt, Monghta and Monghsat had placed themselves under the protection of the Siamese flag, and had drunk the oath water of allegiance to the King of Siam. Then there was the question of Karenni States whose status had not yet been determined. It will be remembered that the Assistant Political Officer's tour to Mongpai soon after the British had arrived at Yawngwe had settled nothing, as the whole party was immediately recalled, and the powerful Sawlapaw of Kantarawadi was as hostile as ever to any friendly gesture towards the British. And then there was the question of the succession in Lawksawk whose Sawbwa had refused to submit to the British, saying he could not serve two masters at the same time. How to administer the small States in the Myelat was another problem. As has been related before, the Myelat was once part of Yawngwe State, but had been parcelled out into petty, independent chiefships as a result of court intrigues and "farming out" of royal favours. The British were not quite decided whether to restore the Myelat to Yawngwe or to allow the status quo. To settle these and other problems in the Shan States, the Political Officer was summoned to meet the Chief Commissioner at Mandalay during the rainy season of 1887.

At Mandalay the main lines of British policy towards the Shan States were defined. First, it was decided that each Chief would be required to acknowledge the supremacy of the new Power in person, and that where there were rival claimants, weight would be given to the fait accompli, and to consideration of expediency rather than those of abstract right or justice. It was maintained that the British Government was under no obligation to find out how a man came to be in possession of the State, "provided he appeared to be a person capable of maintaining order", or to put it bluntly "this was a resolution prompted more by a weak minded effort to escape much trouble and endless enquiries than an honest attempt to see justice done. Having laid down the rule for accepting or rejecting a ruler, the British then laid down a policy which they would adopt towards the Shan States and their rulers. This policy was really the contents of the sanad for the more important rulers, and letters of appointment for the lesser Chiefs. By the sanad the recipient was recognized as a feudatory Chief and empowered to govern his territories in all matters whether criminal, civil, or revenue, and was authorised to nominate for the approval of the Government a fit person, according to Shan usage, to be his successor. These privileges were made subject to certain conditions, one of which was the payment of a tribute, settled for five years at the amount previously paid to the King, and

2. See form of various sanads, etc. in Appendix.
liable to revision thereafter. The forests and royalties on all minerals and previous stones were reserved to the Government. Order was to be maintained by the Chief, the rights and customs of the people were to be respected, and trade protected. All disputes arising between one State and another were to be referred to the Superintendent, at whose headquarters the Chief was to maintain an agent or representative. The order of appointment given to the lesser men bound them to pay the revenue assessed by the Superintendent, and in all matters connected with the administration of their districts to conform to the instructions and orders issued by the Chief Commissioner or the Superintendent. In short, the British merely replaced the former central authority from Mandalay, in an organised and modern way.

The Superintendent and Political Officer, to quote his full title, came away from Mandalay with definite orders. Lawksaw was to be given to Khun Nu of Tampak. Kengtawng, which had been given to Twet Nga Lu by King Thibaw was to revert to Mongnai. The officer himself was to tour the Shan States from the south northward at the head of a military column, while another column was to tour the Northern States, and the two columns were to have Mongyai as their rendezvous. During the tour, the Southern column was to attempt to settle the dispute between Mongpai and Pobya, to induce Sawlapaw to "see the light" and the futility of armed resistance, and to have a durbar of all available Chiefs at Mongnai. At Mongpan, before reaching Mongnai, the British were to settle the status of the five trans-Salween States with the Siamese whose Government had been informed to send representatives there. From Mongnai the column was to march north through as many States as possible with Mongyai as the final objective where it was expected a general settlement of the important State of Hsenwi could be worked out.

The Northern Column, under one Lieutenant H. Daly, now seconded to the civil from the army, was to start from Maymyo and to go through Hsipaw, Taungpeng (to bring the Sawbwa to acknowledge British rule), Hsenwi (to take the de facto Sawbwa to Mongyai) and eventually to meet the Southern Column at Mongyai.

Experience had shown the British that the Shan States covered too big an area to be effectively dealt with by one column. If there had been two from the beginning, in the cold month of 1887, one to the South and a second to the North, much fighting and misery in Hsenwi State would have been spared. The appearance of two columns simultaneously in a "pincer" movement from North and South would make a greater impression psychologically than a single force of much larger strength moving only from one direction. The possibility of armed opposition was not entirely ruled out, but they trusted "rumours would magnify the numbers of each (column), and if opposition

was contemplated by any of the Chiefs, he would not know where to
direct his attack*1.

Forces and rations were therefore assembled at the two start­
ing points, Fort Stedman and Maymyo. The one assembled at the former
was the bigger of the two consisting of:

- 2 guns 1-1 Eastern Division, R.A.
- 50 Rifles - West Survey Regiment
- 150 Rifles - 27th P.I.
- 25 British Mounted Infantry
- 25 Native " "
- 20 lances - 1st Bombay Lancers.

The force was known as the Southern Shan Column under the
command of Major Swetenham, 27th P.I., under the political control
of Mr. Hildebrand, the Superintendent and Political Officer of the
Shan States.

The second, smaller force, assembled at Maymyo, and called
the Northern Shan Column, consisted of:

- 2 guns 1-1 Eastern Division, R.A.
- 50 Rifles - Royal Mounted Fusiliers
- 100 " " - 43 G.L.A. (Bombay Army)
- 50 " " - Native Mounted Infantry
- 25 " " - British Mounted Infantry

This force was under the command of Major Yates, 1-1 Eastern
Division, R.A. Although Lieutenant Daly was the Political Head of the
Northern Column, he was to act only under the instructions from
Hildebrand who was appointed the Chief Political head of both columns.
Mr. J. G. Scott was to accompany Hildebrand.

The relations between the civil and military authorities were
clearly defined. As the aim of the two columns was almost entirely
political in character, the military was to interfere as little as
possible, their business being to help the civil officers in their
task. Only when fighting could not be avoided were the civilian
officers to step aside. Troops were told that they were passing
through friendly districts, and that they must pay for everything
that they took. Strictest discipline among the troops was to be
maintained so that there would be no cause for the civil populations
to complain about their behaviour. The populace of any country will
judge a foreign government by the behaviour of its troops, especially
the first contingent. The British seemed to have appreciated this
important point from the moment an Expedition into the Shan States
was contemplated.

Let us now deal with each of the two columns in turn. Before
the Southern Shan Column started, Sawbwas, Myosas and Ngwegunhmus of
the neighbouring States were called in. They were told about the
amount of revenue each would have to pay - the exact amounts having been fixed according to what had been paid to Mandalay before, with modifications in some cases to suit local conditions prevailing at the time. Sanads and letters of appointment were issued to them.

Before starting from Fort Stedman, the Southern Shan Column encountered some difficulties from Sao Ong whose position as the Sawbwa of Yawnghwe rested entirely on British bayonets. He objected to paying the tribute, having learned that Hsipaw State had been exempted from such exaction. He feigned illness to avoid meeting the Political Officer. He also made it difficult for the troops to obtain coolies and pack bullocks except directly through him, and then at exorbitent rates. The British suspected that Sao Ong was under the impression that they were withdrawing from the Shan States and Burma, and they later found out that he actually spread the story to Karenni and other Shan States.

The Column finally started on the 22nd of November 1887, on its five-month tour. Its first major halt was at Mongpai where attempts were again made to settle the disputes between that State and Pobya of Nammekon. All that the Political Officer was able to do was to obtain agreement of both sides to submit their cases to the Chief Commissioner and to abide by his decisions.

Efforts were also made to open friendly relations with Sawlapaw of Kantarawadi, but this warrior chief remained aloof and hostile to the British throughout and it was not until early in 1889 that the British by armed intervention were able to make the whole of Karenni, recognise their supremacy.

The Column passed through Mawkmai where people were found to be afraid of Sawlapaw, and timber extracting work in the forests had stopped for some time. As stated elsewhere, Mawkmai was the only State in the whole of the Shan States not ravaged by the inter-State warfare of the past few years. The British found it to be the most prosperous at the time.

The next major stop was Mongpan, a rendezvous with Siamese Commissioners for a conference to determine the status of the five trans-Salween sub-States which had drunk oath-water of allegiance to the King of Siam. A short account of these States is called for.

It would seem that these five small States, Mongton, Monghang, Mongkyawt, Monghta and Monghsat had been a jungle waste until Shans from Mongpan and Mongnai began to settle in them early in the 19th century. In 1830, a sort of Chief was appointed by Ava to Mongton, but after a while this chieftainship became part of Mongpan and from about 1867 Mongton, Monghang, Mongkyawt and Monghta had been administered by Pawmongs appointed by the Sawbwa of Mongpan.
When the Limbin forces crossed the Salween from Kengtung and recaptured Mongnawng and Mongnai, a contingent and monetary contribution were demanded of Mongpan which was rashly refused, and negotiations having failed, Mawkmai was ordered to attack it. This was done successfully and as was the custom, Mongpan was fired and its Sawbwa, Khun Leng, fled across the Salween to his dependencies where he collected men, counter-attacked and expelled Mawkmai invaders. This was early in 1887. Mongpan had peace until July of that year when the Sawbwa's younger brother was assassinated in the Haw. Thinking that a rebellion had started, the Sawbwa fled to Mongnai, but no disturbances followed and two months later he returned to his capital. Khun Leng's flight to Mongnai was somewhat unaccountable, for he was not sympathetic towards the Limbin cause and refused to have anything to do with it, for which he was driven out of his State by the Limbin League forces and yet when he thought his life was in danger the Sawbwa took refuge in Mongnai, one of the principal pillars of the League.

It was during these uncertain days when these small States could not look to any central authority that they went and swore allegiance to Siam. At this time the Siamese had sent some troops to guard their frontier adjoining the Shan States, and these troops were stationed in Mongfang. To receive Siamese protection the Pawmongs of the 4 States had to go to Mongfang and drink the oath water of allegiance to the Siamese King. Apparently Monghsat had done the same thing. It was on the basis of this oath of allegiance that the Siamese claimed these five sub-States, which themselves looked upon the act as a measure to protect their villages against devastation.

When the British column arrived at Mongpan, its trans-Salween districts were still under the Siamese flag. The Siamese Commissioners came as arranged and also the British vice Consul at Chiengmai. By this time Monghsat had dropped out of the picture, its Pawmong having submitted to Kengtung and received the title of Hpya from the Sawbwa who also sent a small force to levies to protect his new dependency. At the conference table at Mongpan, the Superintendent and Political Officer could not settle anything with the representatives of the Siamese King and battle of correspondence was still raging between the Government of India and the British Foreign Office on the one hand, and between the latter and the Bangkok Government of Rama V on the other. All that the Political Officer could do was to obtain agreement from the Siamese not to work the forests until the final status of the territories concerned had been settled by higher authorities.1

From Mongpan the Southern Shan Column marched West and reached Mongnai on the 7th of January 1888 and made a halt of fifteen days. Mongnai had been the traditional headquarters of the Burmese Resident

1. See chapter on Boundary Commissions for final settlement of these sub-States.
for the Shan States and his garrison. To this place all the available Sawbwas and Myosas had been summoned in advance to assemble. All the important Chiefs of what was then called Eastern States\(^1\) came, except the Sawbwa of Laikha and the Myosas of Mongkung and Kesi-Bansam. Those who came were the Sawbwas of Mongpawn, Mongpan and Mawkmai, and the Myosas of Nankhok, Banyin, Nawngwawn, Hsahtung, Mongsit, Mongnawng, Hopong and Kengkham. The influential Sawbwa of Mongnai was host to all - he and his people had to build bamboo and thatch huts or tawmaws for both the British and Shan contingents alike. A large Mandat or Durbar Hall was also constructed out of bamboo and thatch. The exiles from Hsemwi, namely Nawmong, son and heir of Sengnawpha, and San Aw, the Pa-ok-chok of Mongyai, were also there to wait upon the pleasure of the Superintendent and Political Officer regarding the fate of their State, or rather, their own fate. None of the large trans-Salween States of Kengtung, Kenghung and Monglem showed up.

At Mongnai the important question of tribute from the States to the British was discussed. All admitted the right of a conqueror or suzerain to demand tribute from the conquered or from fiefs, but the manner in which it was to be paid was discussed at length. Was it to be in the form of gold and silver flowers together with other valuables like gold and silver bars, horses and elephants, precious stones and bales of rare silk and brocade? Or was it to be in the form of money to be collected from the people who were to benefit from peace and prosperity the new regime would bring? The latter method was adopted and the usual formula applied: each State was to pay the exact amount paid to the King at Mandalay. On the 20th a Durbar was held at which sanads were given to the rulers, and the Superintendent and Political Officer pointed out in his formal durbar speech the advantages of the peace which would follow the establishment of British rule. A solemn march-past and a mock battle performed by the British soldiers pleased the crowds immensely. Sports were held to allow the soldiers to rub shoulders with the populace.

Leaving Mongnai on the 22nd of January, the column headed for the North. It had intended to go through Mongnawng, the shorter route, but as the Chiefs of Laikha, Mongkung and Kesi-Bansam had not put in an appearance at the durbar, it was decided to go through their States instead - this would also take the column through more States than the former one. Two marches out of Mongnai, the Sawbwa of Laikha and Myosa of Mongkung met the column and turned back to accompany it to their States. They explained that difficulties in procuring supplies had delayed them. As the column marched on, the truth of their words became obvious. Everywhere there were signs of desolation; what used to be the main thoroughfare now narrowed down to a mere path; even marks of tigers and other wild beasts were seen here and there on such paths which were

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1. Now divided into North-eastern and South-eastern subdivisions.
devoid of human travellers; mountain streams might trickle or roar and wild birds call unconcerned from tree tops, but the people themselves when seen out of their jungle hide-outs looked gaunt and hungry and had not enough energy to pull out the spikes embedded in the paths during their fighting. Laihka town itself, once "one of the finest and wealthiest places in the State" with many splendid monasteries and pagodas, and a Shan capital of some two or three thousand houses, was now almost overgrown with jungle.

Mongkung which escaped ravages by the Limbin forces, did not escape ruins caused by its own internal dissension and court intrigues. When the British passed through it, a minor civil war had just been fought over the succession, in which Mongnawng and Kesi-Bansam took a hand. Here at Mongkung, the minor Chiefs of Monghsu and Mong sang came in person to acknowledge British supremacy. News was also received that the Northern Shan Column had reached Hsenwi and had obtained promise from the redoubtable Khungsang Tonhung that he would attend the conference at Mongyai. The Superintendent and Political Officer who had been uncertain of Khunsang Tonhung's move, was much relieved by the news and at once issued a proclamation in Shan to all monks, headmen and elders of Hsenwi ordering them to attend the conference at Mongyai where their affairs would be settled.

Four marches further brought the Column to Kesi-Bansam where the Myosa, described as "an undersized, insignificant-looking creature, addicted to the use of opium", came 15 miles out to meet the British and played them into his capital with Shan musicians and dancers. The road between Mongkung and Kesi-Bansam was also marked with scars of civil war. Here reports came that the man Khunsang Tonhung had placed in charge of Mongyai had been driven out by Sang Aw's adherents, who also gave out that they were acting for him and with the approval of the British. Fearing this incident might cause Khunsang Tonhung to change his mind about coming to Mongyai, the Political Officer hurriedly sent him a letter reassuring him that the British were not behind the move, and that the expulsion of his men from Mongyai would in no way influence his final decisions.

The Southern Shan Column reached Mongyai on February 15th 1888.

The Northern Shan Column was to march through Hsipaw, Namhsan, Hsenwi and thence to meet the Southern Column at Mongyai. At Namhsan it was to make the Sawbwa recognise the new Government of Burma. At Hsenwi it was to take Khunsang Tonhung to the conference. In all political matters Lieutenant Daly was to seek orders from Hildebrand, but he was empowered to stop in any inter-State fighting and to use force in maintaining peace.

The Column reached Hsipaw on the 24th of December 1887. There was not much to do at Hsipaw, whose Sawbwa, Khun Seng had been and was still in high favour. Peace had been established in areas between Hsipaw and Mandalay and traders had been travelling on the road with some security. At the end of 1886, while forces were being assembled
at Hlaingdet for the first major British Expedition to the Shan States, Khun Seng had made his way to Mandalay to meet the Chief Commissioner, Sir Charles Bernard, in order to make personal acknowledgement of the new regime. He was given a cavalry escort into Mandalay and was received with much ceremony by the Chief Commissioner. At that time Hsipaw stood prominently alone as the only friend of the British. The Sawbwa remembered kindly the lenient treatment he received when he was in Rangoon jail on a murder charge in 1884. The British must have congratulated themselves on what appeared now to be foresight in according him that lenient treatment, now that he was the only Sawbwa who appreciated their power and magnanimity. This mutual respect and admiration resulted in the small States of Hsumhsai, Mongtong and Mongung being made dependencies of Hsipaw; and Haipaw State itself was exempted for ten years from paying any tribute to the British. The last favour caused much jealousy among other Sawbwas who claimed the same treatment on grounds which seemed to them reasonable enough. On his return from Mandalay, Khun Seng was accompanied by a British Officer, Mr. Bridges, who came to stay in Hsipaw for twenty-five days collecting much information about the Shan States and their politics generally. General improvement of the State and opening of communications with other States were also discussed.

The only trouble that bothered Daly on his arrival at Hsipaw was the restiveness among the three States of Hsumhsai, Monglong and Mongtung, against their new suzerain, but it was not serious and could be dealt with later. The Column therefore left Hsipaw on the 28th December for Namhsan. Long before leaving Hsipaw Daly had written to the Sawbwa of Tawngpeng several friendly letters, but there was no reply. On the 29th December the road was blocked in one place by newly felled trees. On the next day, 30th, immediately after leaving the camp, the Column's advance and rear guards were fired upon, resulting in 2 mules being killed and a mule driver wounded; but the attack was a half hearted affair and the attackers fled when a few volleys were fired by the British troops into the bushes. Namhsan was reached on the new year day of 1888 and the Column made a halt of 8 days. The villages through which the Column passed were practically deserted, and so was the capital Namhsan. The Sawbwa could not be induced to come in to meet Daly, though many officials were sent by him. Ordinary people, however, trickled back into their villages on discovering that the troops did not misbehave themselves in any way. Shortage of rations and their work in the all-important Hsenwi did not allow Daly and his Column to linger, so they left Namhsan on the 10th January and came down via Lilu.

At Mansam it was discovered that 1 miles away at Pangkhem were 400 of Khunsang Tonhung's men to attack the village in retaliation for its part in the raid on Renai previously. Daly was able to stop the Hsenwi party from advancing further, and as the men were in great straits for provisions - they had been hoping to satisfy all that they wanted in Mansam - they welcomed his order and returned home in haste.
At Lashio, a first letter from Khunsang Tonhung asked Daly to delay his march as he had some Chinese soldiers with him, that there were some 10,000 Chinese troops at Mongmao, and that as he was under great obligations to the Chinese for past assistance he might have to resist the British if ordered to do so by them. This caused Daly to delay his departure for a few days. A second letter, brought in by 3 officials and accompanied by the head of Hsenwi's party at Pangkhem, was more conciliatory, and Khunsang Tonhung offered to meet Daly anywhere. With his confidence thus restored, Daly moved towards Hsenwi. During the week's stay in Lashio, "exploring parties" of the Column had not been idle and had collected much information about routes into Lashio. Hsenwi old town was reached on the 25th. The old town and Hsenwi Myoma as seen in 1888 was described by Daly thus: 

The old capital is reported to have contained nearly 3000 houses, many of them brick buildings, and although it is now entirely destroyed, the ruins tend to show that it must have been a large and regularly laid-out town, while in places, there are traces of what appears to have been a substantial city wall. The Namli and Myitnge are both unbridged and would be impassable when in flood. The latter even at the ford was in places 3 feet deep and about 30 yards broad, the banks sheer and 15 to 20 feet high, and the current rapid. About half an hour after we had camped, Kun San Ton Hon came over to visit me, walking by the footpath across the intervening marsh. He was attended by Amats and by 50 or 60 followers, but was very simply dressed, had no gold umbrellas or show of state of any sort, and was excessively shy and nervous on first meeting me. He expressed himself much pleased at our arrival and repeatedly declared his anxiety to abide by the orders of Government. It was decided to move over next morning to a camp close to his palace, and after an hour's miscellaneous conversation the Chief took leave.

On the 26th Major Yates and myself with other officers paid a return visit to Kun San Ton Hon. His "palace" is a simple house, little if at all better than those of the ordinary well-to-do villagers. The roof projected over the doorway within a couple of feet of the outer platform, and the room in which we were received was unlighted by any window or aperture. Here, again, there was no attempt at display, no chairs, raised seats or dias, and nothing but a strip of carpet for visitors and Chief to sit on. Major Yates was anxious to send out exploring parties during our halt at Theinni Myoma, and on the subject being moved, Kun San Ton Hon evinced the greatest readiness to assist; it was arranged to despatch parties west and north. While this visit was being paid, the Column had marched round the marsh and a camp was established on the slope of the knoll below the palace; the bullock convoy with rations which had missed the right road from Lashio arrived at the same time all correct. It was bazaar-day and the market was thronged
with Shans and Kachins including a sprinkling of Chinese Shans. Of vegetables and local produce there was a great show inter-mixed with Manchester cloth and haberdashery, and Chinese shoes, straw hats. Excellent salt was selling at four annas the viss, rice at Rs.3 the basket (or about 2½ lbs. the rupee), and paddy at Rs.5 the lang (4 baskets equivalent to about 170 lbs.). The Kachins seemed to conduct their transactions chiefly by barter. Here, as in every Shan bazaar, gambling was freely indulged in, but in this the Kachins appeared to take little or no part.

Kun San Ton Hon’s capital can scarcely be dignified by the name of town. It consists rather of a collection of some half-a-dozen hamlets crowning a succession of little knolls and eminences on a length of about 1½ miles fronting south. The situation is picturesque in the extreme. The valley of the Myitnge, 3 or 4 miles in breadth, runs almost due west and, except at the mouth of the conjoint valley of the Namli, is enclosed on both sides by lofty but irregular hill ranges. Immediately to the north of Theinni Myoma the hills, at a distance of about 2 miles from the river, start sharp and sheer from the plain, and rise to a height of at least 4000 feet, at which elevation there is an extensive upland plateau. The cliff side which here and there affords glimpses of the road to China, climbing at a forbidding gradient, is diversified by occasional narrow ledges covered with tree growth, and numerous streams pouring down from above form a long line of sparkling cascades. To the extreme east the view is bounded by a low "col" connecting the ranges on the north and south of the valley; to the west the Taungbaing mountains can be faintly perceived in far distance. Small tributaries seek the Myitnge from the numerous clefts and valleys in the hills, thus affording great facilities for cultivation. It is evident that the whole valley had at one time or another been tilled and the cultivated area is even now large.

During the British Column’s halt in Hsenwi from the 27th to the 31st of January, Daly had long interviews with Khunsang Tonhung everyday. It was agreed that he should meet Daly at Manse and from there accompany him to Mongyai, the exact date would be communicated to him later when the movements of the Superintendent with the Southern Shan Column were known. The Northern Column then struck camp on February the 1st and marched towards Kunlong on the Salween. From Kunlong the Column marched south-west towards Kangmong, and from there to Mongkyet, and thence Mongyaw following Namkyet valley. From Mongyaw the Column by slow stages made a loop eastwards around to Mongma and worked their way westwards towards Manse where Khunsang Tonhung was to meet Daly on the 26th of February. Khunsang Tonhung was punctual and arrived at Manse on the date fixed, in two marches from Hsenwi. The whole party then started for Mongyai on the 28th reaching their destination on March the 1st.
The 3rd of March was fixed for the beginning of the Conference which was to decide once and for all the three main issues affecting the large State of Hsenwi. These issues were the claims of Khunsang Tonhung and of the original heir to the old Hsenwi's House to the Sawbwaship of Hsenwi; whether Hsenwi was to be retained as one large State or to be partitioned into two; and the question of tribute to be paid to the new suzerain. The principal participants had been summoned to Mongyai; they were Khunsang Tonhung, who came with Daly; Nawmong and Sang Aw, the Pa-Ok-Chok, who accompanied the Southern Shan Column all the way from Mongnai. Sao Sengnawpha the old Sawbwa was absent in his hide-out in Mongsi - at any rate he was pronounced by all to be too old and infirm to participate usefully in the Conference and that his son Nawmong could do all that was necessary on his behalf.

We have seen how Khunsang Tonhung had fought his way, over a number of years, to his present position, and also how the heirs to the original ruling house of Hsenwi had lost all the virility and initiative of leadership and had been ousted at every turn by their enemy, and had finally been driven to seek protection from the British at Mongnai. A word remains to be said about Sang Aw, the Pa-Ok-Chok. He was said to have been a younger son of the grandfather of the then (1888) Htamone of Mongkyet, and though originally holding no official position he subsequently rose to a position of reputation and influence. Some rumours said he owed his name and fame solely to his success as a dacoit leader. Around the mid eighteen-seventies, the hereditary myosaship (or heinship) of Mongyai was filled by one Khunsang Saun. This myosa exercised some form of control over the whole of Kawnkang (Alelet) circles and made himself very unpopular by his connection with Sitke Shwe Bo, a Burmese official sent up from Mandalay to supervise the collection of tribute from Kawnkang circles. At this time, Kawnkang subscribed to the King's purse a sum of Rs.15,000, paid in half yearly instalments, but the sitke supplemented this by a variety of irregular imports locally called "dark money" which the connivance of Saun enabled him to exact. When the burden became unbearable, the subordinate officials of Kawnkang under the leadership of Sang Aw rose against their oppressors and drove out both the sitke and the myosa. The latter fled to Monghseng where he later died, and Sang Aw succeeded to his position. Sang Aw married a lady from Mongma who was reported to have La blood in her veins, and the title of Pa-Ok-Chok was first given to him by the Las. Four years after the deposition of Khunsang Saun, a new Burmese Sitke came to Mongyai and gave Sang Aw an ameindaw confirming his myosaship over Mongyai and general control over Kawnkang.

In addition to the three principal participants at the Conference there were also present the Chiefs of Kesi-Bansam,1 Monghsu

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1. Daly mentioned in his report that the Myosa of Kesi-Bansam was on terms of friendship with Khunsang Tonhung and that while he was at Hsenwi he saw letters from the Myosa to him addressed as from a dependent chief to his suzerain.
and Mongtsing, representatives from Hsipaw and many other States from the South, and a large gathering of Hsenwi officials, sayadaws, pongsis, elders and headmen. Of the gathering, Crossthwaite writes:

It was not a mere show; the people had not assembled themselves to register a foregone decision. The Superintendent was making an honest attempt to ascertain the wishes of all classes. The machinery was rude. But it was quite as likely to succeed in its object as the elaborate devices of advanced democracies which give free play to the arts of false-tongued demagogues and afford them every opportunity of bamboozling electors, most of whom were more ignorant of the issues than the Shans who assembled at Mongyai.  

Of the three chief claimants, Nawamong and Sang Aw owed their survival entirely to the coming of the British and they were more than willing to abide by the decision of the Superintendent and Political Officer. And as Sang Aw had already declared he would be quite happy to be re-instated in his former myosaship of Mongyai, under his suzerain Nawamong, the real contest was between Nawamong and Khunsang Tonhung. In any case, Sang Aw was already an old man and his only claim to any consideration in the Superintendent's eye was the fact that he had preserved the peace in the Central Division (Kawnkang) at a critical time when the rest of Hsenwi was in turmoil. Khunsang Tonhung, having swept away the heirs of the old Hsenwi House, not unnaturally laid claims to all the State known by the name of Hsenwi. To settle these various claims the arbitrator, Hildebrand, received the following instructions from the Chief Commissioner:

You should then, pending a full reference to the Chief Commissioner, make such arrangements for the administration of Theinni (Hsenwi) as you deem most fitting, bearing in mind that the great object to be attained is peace in the country. You must not be guided either in your provisional arrangements or in your recommendations solely by considerations of abstract right or justice. You must give great weight to considerations of expediency and keep prominently before your mind that Theinni (Hsenwi) must have strong permanent Government in order to ensure peace and prosperity; and that the Chief or Chiefs must be both friendly to the British Government and ready and able to give proof of friendship by prompt and powerful action, should such be necessary.

The Chief Commissioner although favouring one large State, left the final decision to Hildebrand as to whether Hsenwi should be divided up between the two rival claimants. 

2. Ibid., p. 174.
At the Conference on the 3rd of March 1888, opinion was 
"manifested unmistakably" that the former Kingdom of Hsenwi should 
be divided into North and South, and that North Hsenwi should go to 
Khunsang Tonhung and South to Nawmong. The Sawbwas of the two 
Hsenwis having been elected, the boundary between them was then 
fixed - this naturally gave a much larger area to the North. It was 
declared at the Conference that the small States of Kesi-Bansam, 
Mongnawng, Monghsu and Mongseing were to be confirmed as independent 
myosaships. On the next day, the 4th, the question of the amount of 
tribute to be paid to the new Power was discussed. Nawmong un- 
hesitatingly offered the former tribute to Kawnkang to Mandalay of 
Rs.15,000, Tonhung protested that he could not possibly pay more than 
Rs.500, claiming poverty of his part of Hsenwi as the reason. It was 
only after much discussion and persuasion that he agreed to pay the 
sum of Rs.2,000. This was seen by the Shans of the two Hsenwis as 
proof of their respective Sawbwas' ability to protect their interests 
since a large tribute meant heavy taxation, and it was this heavy 
taxation that was partly responsible for the rising one month later 
against Nawmong in Mongyai. It is true that on the whole North Hsenwi 
was poorer than South Hsenwi in productivity, but its area was so much 
bigger and population so much larger that the difference between Rs. 
2,000 and Rs.15,000 became even more marked by comparison. But the 
prestige of Tonhung at the time was such that the Superintendent and 
Political Officer "thought it wiser to accept it than to risk rupture 
with" him.

On the 5th of March a formal Durbar was held at which Sanads 
and letters of appointment were ceremoniously given away, followed 
by solemn drilling and mock battle and sports, as usual. On the 6th 
the new Sawbwa of North Hsenwi started on his journey home. On the 
following day the British left Mongyai for Lashio via Mansang and 
Manse.

From Mongyai letters had already been despatched by the 
Superintendent and Political Officer to the Sawbwa of Tawngpeng asking 
him to meet the former at Panglong in order that British rule 
might be acknowledged, and Hildebrand deliberately took the longer 
route via Manse and Lashio in order to give the Palaung Sawbwa time 
to make up his mind. But when the Column reached Panglong there was 
no sign of the Sawbwa of Tawngpeng; but the Letwe Amat, Khunsang Siin, 
and other Tawngpeng notables were there to receive the British and 
to inform them that the Sawbwa's son and heir, Khun Kyan, also known 
as the Nawmong, would be coming to meet the Political Officer, but 
that the sawbwa, due to old age and infirmity, was unable to put in an 
appearance in person. On the 20th Khun Kyan arrived with a letter 
from his father announcing that he wished to abdicate in favour of his 
son. As the Sawbwa was nearly 80, this was accepted by the British 
represented and the amount of tribute was fixed. The Tawngpeng 
delegation explained with apologies that the attack made on the 
Northern Shan Column when it passed through Tawngpeng in January was 
due to the belief that Hsipaw troops were with the Column and that it 
was the intention of the British to place Tawngpeng under Hsipaw, in
the same way as the three dependencies of Monglong, Mongtung and Hsumhsai. It was explained to the Tawngpeng delegates that their belief was not founded on facts. Having thus settled the affair of Tawngpeng, the British left Panglong on the 22nd and reached Hsipaw on the following day.

At Hsipaw, Hildebrand made a halt of four days to discuss State matters with the Sawbwa Khun Seng. These concerned the affairs in the new dependencies of Monglong, Mongtung and Hsumhsai, where some of the leaders did not want to submit to their new suzerain. The Sawbwa was also busy building a new capital on the right bank of the Namtee, about a mile south of the old Hsipaw town, and it was to be called "Sebaing" "Se" is a Chinese word and is said to convey the idea of a union of Chiefs. When Hildebrand took leave of the Sawbwa on the 28th, Daly was left behind with an escort of 100 soldiers, with instructions to implement a scheme to tour the northern part of North Hsenwi and to settle affairs in Namkham whose Myosa had refused to acknowledge the North Hsenwi Sawbwa. Other matters to settle during the proposed tour were repatriation of old Hseng Nawpha from Mongsi to his son's domain in South Hsenwi, and to observe generally how people took the recent political settlement at Mongyai. As sanction for the tour was being awaited from the Chief Commissioner's Office, Daly was instructed not to leave Hsipaw without special orders.

The British Column reached Mandalay on the 9th of April, 1888, after a tour of four months and nineteen days.

On the same day, the 9th April, Daly received reports from the Sawbwa of South Hsenwi saying that the Pa-Ok-Chok, Sang Aw, was fermenting trouble against him. There was no indication how serious the trouble was, but Daly thought the Sawbwa would be able to maintain his authority without his interference, and a letter was dispatched to the Pa-Ok-Chok ordering him to desist from intriguing against his own Sawbwa. Later reports, however, revealed that the Sawbwa Nawmong was unable to maintain himself in Mongyai and was obliged to leave his own State and take refuge in Hsipaw territory. Daly called the Sawbwa into Hsipaw town where he arrived on the 19th. Having received orders from Rangoon, and accompanied by the Sawbwa of Mongyai, Daly proceeded to Mongyai, arriving there on the 11th of May. Sang Aw the Pa-Ok-Chok had just died two days previously. It was ironical that even his erstwhile co-exile, Sang Aw, must rise against the Nawmong of the old Hsenwi House. But the British would not have peace broken so flagrantly, and fourteen ring leaders were arrested and handed over to the Sawbwa who, after a trial, sentenced them to various terms of imprisonment. Absconding leaders were proclaimed rebels, three of the arrested men were deported, and new appointments made in places of leaders so involved. Daly was able to return to Hsipaw at the end of May.

1. Except where specified, the progress of the Northern Shan Column was compiled mostly from Lieutenant Daly's official report.
With the settlement of Mongyai practically the whole of the cis-
Salween Shan States became part of the British Empire, thanks to the
various marching columns and 3 Political Officers, but before we can
end this chapter, the end of Twet Nga Lu must be told.

When the Southern Shan Column left Fort Stedman in November
1887 to begin its march to the North, only a small detachment of 40 men
were left behind to hold the fort, and when the same Column left
Mongnai after the Durbar no garrison remained behind. At Mongyai
after the Conference and Durbar, not only was no garrison left behind
anywhere in the Northern Shan States but the British forces marched
straight to Mandalay instead of returning to Yawnghwe in the South.
All this was according to plan, but to the ordinary people in the Shan
States who had not known peace or security for almost a generation, the
rumours of British withdrawal from the Shan States and Burma seemed
confirmed. These rumours were given credence not only by the ordinary
villagers, but also by the ruling Chiefs themselves, and the British
found out that the chief of these rumour-believers was none other
than Sao Ong of Yawnghwe, the man whose position as a usurping Sawbwa
was confirmed and maintained by them. We have described how Sao Ong
made difficulties for the British by not co-operating wholeheartedly
with their preparations for the Southern Shan Column. He was later
found to be writing letters to various Chiefs of the Shan States to
the effect that Fort Stedman was left with only 40 sepoys and that the
British were withdrawing from Burma because war was about to break out
in Europe. Sao Ong even sent copies of these letters to the British
"for information". Apparently what gave him these ideas was the fact
he received regularly newspapers from Rangoon which at the time were
reporting routine reliefs and transfers of troops between India and
Burma, and the imperfect grasp of the news items led him to assume that
the new regime was about to come to an end.

"In dealing with semi-savages and ignorant races, the power of
rumour and misinterpretation can hardly be over-estimated", wrote Sir
Charles Crossthwaite, the Chief Commissioner of Burma of that period,
and he attributed the cause of two major events, which now followed,
to the rumour of British evacuation from Burma. The first of these
major events was the sack of Mawkmai on the 2nd March by Sawlapaw of
Kantarawadi who drove out Sawbwa Khun Hmon, and installed as his
feudatory Sawbwa his own candidate, Khun Noikyu, a cousin of the
rightful Sawbwa. The second event was the re-emergence of Twet Nga
Lu from his trans-Salween hide-out and his capture of Mongpan on
March the 14th, 1888.

The account of the sack of Mawkmai will be found in the
chapter on Karenni; only the story of Twet Nga Lu will be told here.

The origin of this man by the name of Ai Lu seems obscure.
He was a Shan and from recorded sources we come to know him only as
an unfrocked monk (hence the prefix "Twet") who became the arch enemy
of the Mongnai Sawbwa, Khun Kyi, through his attack on the latter's
state, and his court intrigues which resulted in his having been made
the yin-gun-baik of Kengtung as his step-son, Myosa Sao Maung, was

apparently still a minor. The story is still being told how Sao Maung, infuriated at Nga Lu's attention to his mother, one day took a gun and shot him from behind, and how the shot did no harm to Nga Lu. Whatever the cause of this escape, Nga Lu appeared to Sao Maung and many others to have possessed some charms against the gun shot and sword blade, hence this apparent invulnerability. From then on, so ends the story, Sao Maung sat at Nga Lu's feet and submitted to his becoming his step-father. 1 When we last heard of him in our present narrative, Twet Nga Lu had been driven out of Mongnai and Kengtung by the Limbin League forces. 2

Before the Southern Shan Column started on its march in November 1887, Twet Nga Lu had the temerity to present himself at Fort Stedman to the British and exhibited the Royal Patent - made out on a thin sheet of gold - which appointed him as ruler of Kengtung and Mongnai. Besides this Amoindaw Nga Lu also had an ivory seal of conical shape and about 8 inches high, at the base of which was engraved a hare - the hare in the moon - and round it ran the titles proclaiming him Chief of Kengtung and Mongnai. 3

Twet Nga Lu represented to the Superintendent and Political Officer that he wished to be re-instated as the Myosa of Kengtung. He was told that the British Government had already recognised and confirmed Khun Kyi as the rightful Sawbwa of Mongnai and that Kengtung had been amalgamated with that State as in King Mindon's time. Nga Lu protested but nothing could be done at Fort Stedman. He therefore returned to the East, looted and burnt Kengtung for the second time and, having been driven out from it by the Sawbwa's men, disappeared across the Salween. He was proclaimed a rebel and outlaw and every Shan State was to seize him accordingly. The British had also requested the Siamese Government to capture him. 4 British writings at the time hinted that the Siamese failure to capture Nga Lu was due to deliberate non-cooperation from political motives or otherwise. Perhaps the Siamese were dissatisfied with the way in which the British conducted themselves in regard to the disputed trans-Salween territories. But to arrest an outlaw in the jungle of South East Asia even in the present days is easier said than done, and Twet Nga Lu in 1887 was able to move about with complete freedom in the trans-Salween areas of the Shan States to collect followers and new recruits.

1. Another present day local belief is that Nga Lu was unfrocked in Mandalay and sent up by the King to rule Mongnai. This seems to be the period when Khun Kyi had revolted and had been obliged to flee to Kengtung; it was during this period that Nga Lu received an Amoindaw from Mandalay to rule both Mongnai and Kengtung.

2. Chapter IV.

3. Scott, J. C., Burma and Beyond, p. 245. According to this book, p. 240, the place meeting was at Fort Stedman; but according to Scott of the Shan Hills (Mitton), p. 110, it was at Mandalay.

4. The 1887 Political and Secret Home Correspondence is full of letters on this subject between Siam and the British Government.
There have been suggestions that Nga Lu might have been made of the same stuff as Sao Weng of Lawksawk and Sawlapaw of Kantarawadi both of whom refused to submit to the British to the end. It is true that Nga Lu had sometimes been referred to as "Saopha Tak" (meaning unfrocked monk Sawbwa) by some Shans, but since the days of his myosaship of Kengtung during the early eighties he had never really been accepted by the people, hence the ease with which he was driven out of Mongnai and Kengtung. Moreover, he had attempted to treat with the British at Fort Stedman, and when his wishes were not acceded to, he looted and burnt places he passed through.

Twet Nga'Lu had never had real following in any of the Shan States he had ruled or passed through. During those confused days of grand disorder when "the paddy field bunds disappeared" there seem to have been bands of reckless adventurers and "bad hats" willing to hire themselves to anyone who aspired to any form of leadership. These men were more numerous where there was no established authority, such as in the trans-Salween territories, and the price for hiring them was the opportunity given them to loot and plunder freely, towns and villages which they attacked and burned. It was such type of men that Nga Lu recruited as his followers, and having collected a sufficient number of them after his rebuff at Fort Stedman, he recrossed the Salween in December 1887 and made a descent upon Mongpan, whose Sawbwa, Khunleng, was obliged to fly, as his State had been depopulated and devastated so much that he was unable to raise enough men to oppose the raiders. It was not certain whether it was the combined forces of Mongnai and Mongpan, or the news of the approach of the British Southern Shan Column that caused Nga Lu and his men to retire beyond the Salween once more.

When the Southern Shan Column had marched North without leaving any garrison in the traditional headquarters of the central government, Mongnai, Nga Lu again crossed the Salween with his band and attacked Mongpan. Khun Leng the Sawbwa put up some resistance at the capital, but he was overpowered and fled, first to Mongnai and later to Mongpawn. Mongpan fell to Twet Nga Lu on the 4th of March 1888, two days after Mawkmai had fallen to the forces of Sawlapaw.

The news of the sack of Mongpan by Nga Lu and of Mawkmai by Sawlapaw reached the Superintendent and Political Officer Mr. Hildebrand, while he was at Hsipaw on his way from the Mongyai Conference to Mandalay. He knew that such an outbreak of lawlessness would be a blow to British prestige if allowed to go on unchecked, and it must be assumed that other Shan States were watching British reaction to it. In Kengtung, which had heard the rumour of British withdrawal from Burma as well as the news of the reappearance of "Chowfa Tak", the reception of the British vice Consul from Chiangmai was cool and almost hostile, as good as saying: "If you cannot maintain order in the Western Shan States, there is no point in trying to teach us how to maintain peace which we have been enjoying even before your arrival". Hildebrand therefore wrote at once to the Sawbwa of

1. Political & Secret Home Correspondence 1888, Vol. 104, p. 1257 - "Extracts from Mr. W. J. Archer's Journal of a visit to Chiangtung in May and June 1888".
Mongnai asking him to expel Twet Nga Lu from Mongpan and to reinstate Khun Hmon in Mawkmai. 1

The Sawbwa of Mongnai, in response to the Superintendent's letter, collected a force of levies and attacked Twet Nga Lu in Mongpan, but with an unfortunate result, for the attack failed and Nga Lu pursued his attackers into Mongnai where fighting took place for two days on the paddy land east of the town. As the fighting was going on a large party of men were seen approaching from the direction of Mawkmai and the Mongnai men ceased fighting and abandoned the place with the Sawbwa himself evacuating north to Haiphak to regroup his men. Thus fell Mongnai on May 3rd 1888 2 to Twet Nga Lu and his chief Lieutenant Khunsang Mongcheng and their 200 men. For years Mongcheng had been a terror in that region for his cruelty, and he and Nga Lu were reputed for their powers of tattooing against sword blades and bullets.

In the chapter on Karenni it is related how the Assistant Superintendent Mr. Scott was sent post haste from Mandalay and left Fort Stedman on May 2nd with 100 Baluchis and 50 men of the Rifles Brigade under the command of Colonel Sartorius and Lieutenant Fowler, for Mawkmai to expel the Karennis from there. They were ignorant of the fall of Mongnai on the 3rd. On the 6th they came upon a group of fugitives from Mongnai who reported that the town had fallen to Twet Nga Lu. The British Column at once changed the direction of their march and headed for Mongnai. On the 9th, a halt was made at Kanglu, 9 miles west of Mongnai. Kanglu and the neighbouring Koni had been looted by Nga Lu's men and were deserted - the former was devoid of living beings except for an old woman and a pig. The tommy's killed and ate the pig.3 Whether the old lady thought Nga Lu's men had returned was not recorded. Nor was it recorded if the column met the Sawbwa at Haiphak; for if it had, the situation would not be dissimilar to moments in silent films when the audience clapped at the sight of the hero meeting his rescuers.

The British planned to capture Nga Lu the next day. As a large body of troops would be cumbersome and give advance warning to the enemy, it was decided that a small party should do the job with the rest of the troops immediately following up. The rainy season was then on and the 10th morning was a particularly wet one - an ideal situation for a surprise attack for most people would remain indoors. The whole column started moving from Kanglu towards Mongnai soon after 6 o'clock in the morning. When it was within 2 miles of the city, a small party headed by Scott and Fowler left

2. GUESS, II.2.423.
the main column on horseback. There being no mounted infantry with
the column, all officers' horses had to be requisitioned for the party
which, besides the two officers, consisted of 6 Rifles Brigade men and
1 Baluchi.

Scott knew the ground well as he had studied it on his two
previous trips to Mongnai, and he led his small party through bypaths
and over the hills to escape notice. They entered the town from the
south and galloped towards the Haw. Practically the whole town was
still asleep. Twet Nga Lu himself was awakened by the sound of the
galloping hoofs and he looked over the balustrated verandah of the Haw
to see what was happening. Scott caught a glimpse of him and recognised
him at once, and, dashing up the wooden stairs, seized the bandit chief
before he was fully awake. By this time the noise had also woken up
some of Nga Lu's men who came out, only to be seized and disarmed. So
complete was the element of surprise that about forty men had their
arms taken away from them before they knew what was happening. Not on
the heels of this surprise was heard the sound of rifle shots in the
distance which signified that Colonel Sartorius and the rest of the
column had arrived. The shots were occasioned by some of Nga Lu's men
firing at the column which returned the fire. Townspeople, women and
children began streaming out of the town to seek safety in the open
fields.

Even in that short space of time looters were already out to
plunder the property of their own kind within the city walls. Such an
account makes a sad reading. Gone were the Panca Sila, the Five
Precepts - the first of Buddhist rules to guide human conduct in
society - which these people had taken a vow to observe, in monasteries
during preachings by their pongoys. Retribution, however, overtook
the looters quickly for a few were killed by the British soldiers who
fired at anyone running away with a gun. And the towns-people soon
returned to their homes when they realised it was all over.

A number of well known dacoit leaders were among the prisoners
who were handed over to the Sawbwa as soon as he returned to his
capital. The Sawbwa was all for disposing of them en bloc, but after
discussion with Assistant Superintendent Scott the number to be
crucified was reduced to eight. The condemned were each tied to a
bamboo cross and the executions by firing squad were carried out by
the Baluchis under the supervision of their British Officers. The
eight skeletons remained on exhibition for a long time by the side of
the main road leading to the bazaar. Such a method may not be consid­
ered modern, but it was the practice of those days and had the desired
effect.

Twet Nga Lu himself was not among the eight; he was considered
too important to be dealt with by a Sawbwa and was therefore taken to
Fort Stedman. On arrival at the Fort, however, it was found that even

1. A detailed account of this episode can be read in all writings by
J. G. Scott who comments on it; "It was melo-drama and bluff,
succeeding the comic efforts which had gone before".
the Superintendent himself was powerless to try him because of some technical difficulties presented by the British civilised law codes, now that Upper Burma had become part of India where such codes operated. Mr. Hildebrand was therefore instructed to send Nga Lu back to Mongnai to be tried by the Sawbwa now considered to be above such laws. The prisoner never reached Mongnai. The Baluchi guard escorting him returned to Fort Stedman a few days later and reported that their man attempted to escape and that they had shot him dead and buried him in a shallow grave on the spot in the wooded hills bordering Mongpawn.

There were some doubts at first at Fort Stedman as to whether Twet Nga Lu was really dead, but subsequent reports confirmed that he was. Assistant Superintendent Scott himself went to inspect the place of his burial. The day after Nga Lu's death, a party of Shans from Mongpawn disinterred his corpse from its shallow grave, and cut off its head to be sent to Mongnai for public exhibition. Pieces of gold and silver embedded under the dead man's skin were removed to be used as charms and talismans. Although one would have thought that such pieces from such a luckless man would bring misfortune rather than prosperity, the local belief was that they could be "reconditioned" by boiling them in sacred waters and having mantra said to them. Maha Si, or princely oil, was made from his body: pieces of the dead man's flesh were cut and fried in a big cauldron and the oil or fat so obtained became Maha Si and phials of it were sent to the Chief Commissioner in Rangoon and to Scott and Sartorius at Fort Stedman. The oil or fat from the flesh of such a notorious or famous bo as Nga Lu used to fetch high prices, for it was believed that a taste of it gave the taster all the courage and fearlessness in fighting, and a person tattooed with it became invulnerable and bold in speech and action. This belief and practice was extant not only in the Shan States but also in Burma Proper and Siam.

Scott wrote in his diary about this adventure in Mongnai:

Sartorius showed me his letter to the General. He mentions me of course, but writes as if it were his show, which, I suppose, is natural. I'll slightly astonish him with the Civil report, which I also will show him.

In her "Scott of the Shan Hills" Lady Scott wrote:

Here it may be mentioned as showing the usual trend of Government action, that Hildebrand got the C.I.E. at once, though he was miles away, and knew nothing of the matter until it was all over. Fowler got a well deserved D.S.O. Sartorius got the C.B. The men were suitably rewarded. Writing to Symes in 1891, three years later, Scott casually mentions at the end of his letter that out of the whole eight who took part in the raid, he was the only one who did not receive recognition. They took a year to think about it, and in 1892 gave him the C.I.E.
When Scott got down to Fort Stedman later he congratulated Hildebrand and observed with amusement, 'Like everyone else who gets the C.I.E. he professes to be indignant over it and not to want it. It is the fashion'...
Karenni was the name by which the present Kayah State had been known until the official change in 1950, and it is by this name that this land of the Red Karens will be referred to throughout this book. Although Karenni is not part of the Shan States, its story during the period of the British annexation and after, is so intermingled with that of the Shans that it is unavoidable to refer to it rather fully. Also, as stated elsewhere, culturally, commercially and politically, Karenni has been so closely connected with the Shan States, even from the times of the Burmese Kings, that it is desirable to include happenings there in the present work.

Not much was known about Karenni prior to the British annexation of the land in 1888, and no known annals in Shan or Burmese could be traced, for the simple reason that the Red Karens have no writing.

The States were formerly divided into Eastern and Western Karenni; the former consisting of one State, Kantarawadi, with an area of approximately 2500 square miles; the latter of four States, namely, Bawlake (300 square miles), Kyetbogyi (950 square miles), Nammekon (50 square miles) and Nawngpale (30 square miles). The small States of Western Karenni were formerly subject to Bawlake, but this subordination had for a long time been becoming less and less defined so that by 1888 it had ceased altogether. Even then, for some time after the British rule had been established, the Chief of Bawlake continued to exercise his right of demanding a measure of rice from every house in all four States. There was one small State, however, which was independent of both the Eastern and Western Karenni, called Saophayun, which had six villages and its own Chief. But in 1890, the Chief of Saophayun, an aged man, made over the State to his son-in-law, Myosa of Kantarawadi, Sawlawi.

The generally accepted story of the original Karenni was that Bawlake was the Chief of both the East and West until the fifth Chief called Po Byu Hla became ruler. A Mon named Mg Pon, said to be of royal blood came up from the plains of Lower Burma and settled in Bawlake, and soon acquired great influence there. This alarmed Po Byu Hla who, recalling the old saying that two buffaloes could not wallow in the same pool, made Mg Pon go and take charge of the country east of the Nampawn. The Mon prince did as he was told and assumed the title of Papawgyi; his part of territory came to be known as Eastern Karenni and has been separated from the rest ever since.
The small State of Ngwedaung, now part of Kantarawadi, was founded soon after this, i.e. during the reign of Po Byu Hla. According to local tradition this was how the line of ruling Chiefs of Ngwedaung began: To the south-west of Ngwedaung are four hills called Loi Ngun (Silver Hill), Loi Kham (Gold Hill), Loi Tawng (Copper Hill) and Loi Nang Manaw (Manora Hill). West of Loi Ngun lived a single woman, called Nya Mya, who like an Amazon had only one breast. One day, when she returned home from the jungle where she went to look for food and firewood and went to bed she dreamed that the moon had descended into her womb. Shortly afterward Nya Mya became great with child, to the scandal of the whole village whose inhabitants refused to believe her story and said that the child would one day find his father. In due course Nya Mya gave birth to a small child. A few years later the child was taken by his mother to the village of Bawlake. There when the infant saw the Chief Po Byu Hla, he immediately ran up to him and clung to him round the neck. Everyone then said that Po Byu Hla was the father of the boy. While the reaction of the Chief's opinion was not recorded, the mother strenuously denied the implications and named her son Pla-pu-kra (son of no father). The two continued to live near Loi Ngun, and when Pla-pu-kra grew up he was chosen by the people to be their Chief, apparently with the blessings of the Po Byu Hla.

In Eastern Karenni the reign of Papawgyi, erstwhile Mg Pong, seems to have been uneventful but peaceful. Papawgyi was succeeded by his son Papaw-gale who, unsure of the position handed down to him by his father, went to the Burmese Court at Ava and obtained an Ameindaw confirming him in his territory west of the Salween. It is also said that he made a journey to the Siamese Court at Bangkok to obtain recognition of the territories which he had colonised east of the Salween.

About this time the Red Karens, probably both of the Eastern and Western States, became aggressive and raided the neighbouring Shan States in pursuit of slaves. Villages were burnt as far as Ywangan and women and children carried off. At length Ava was roused to issue orders raising a force of Shan troops, estimated at ten thousand strong, from Mongpai, Samka, Mongnai, Laikha, Hsenwi, Hsipaw and other States, to invade Karenni. This force passed Nawngpale without opposition, but received a set-back when it was ambushed by the Red Karens in a narrow pass at a place called Mongsong. One thousand horses were sent up as reinforcement from Burma and the whole force advanced as far as Tilyin, a Kyebogyi village, and burnt it. Most probably the whole country-side enroute was thoroughly ravaged as was the custom of the time, until Kyebogyi and Nawngpale sent a deputation to Ava and made submission and were in turn granted titles. From this time the Chiefs of Kyebogyi and Nawngpale became permanently independent of Bawlake. The Shan and Burmese forces then retired.

No record of any sort exists about Papawgale's share in this fight and he died soon afterwards and was succeeded by Saohpyatin whose rule was similarly uneventful. Saohpyatin was succeeded by the most
famous and colourful of all Karenni Chiefs, Sawlapaw in 1866, the year the Myingun Prince tried unsuccessfully to kill his father, Mindon, and went to Karenni to collect followers. Myingun's force could not have been numerous and consisted mainly of local Shans and Karens, with headquarters at Nammekon, near Mongpai border. The rebels made constant attacks on Mongpai and penetrated as far as Sakoi and laid siege to that village. It was at this juncture that a thousand Shan troops from Hsipaw arrived at Sawlon, Sawlapaw's capital, with orders from Ava to drive out the rebel prince. Hsipaw men must have reached Karenni via the Tampak valley and they were joined by a number of Sawlapaw's Red Karens. At the same time another force, also a thousand strong, under the Lamaing Wundauk, was marching south to crush the rebels. Caught between the Hsipaw and Sawlapaw's forces coming from Sawlon in the south and the Lamaing Wundauk's men from the north, Myingun lost heart and fled into British territory while his men dispersed without a fight.

Proud of having given this assistance, Sawlapaw went down to Mandalay in 1868 and was received in audience by King Mindon. It is said that he asked the King for a force of a thousand men to enable him to annex all Karenni, but he was refused. However, Sawlapaw returned home satisfied with the title of the Myosa of Kantarawadi.

In 1875, as a result of a quarrel with Bawlake, which ended in a defeat for the latter, Sawlapaw annexed all Bawlake territory north of Nampawn, besides Pazaung and country east of the Salween. At about the same time, a petty quarrel between Ngwedaung and Loikaw villages resulted in the former having to acknowledge Sawlapaw's supremacy. In 1880, Sawlapaw sent his grand-nephew Sawlawi to Mandalay to explain the annexation at the Court and to counteract any influences which might have been set in motion by the representatives of Ngwedaung who had shortly before gone down with presents for the King. Sawlawi was successful in his mission and returned with the title of Kemmong granted to him by the King.

Since 1872 two Burmese posts had been established at Loikaw and Nammekon, but the one at Nammekon was afterwards withdrawn as a result of representation by the British who, in a treaty with King Mindon in 1875 in conjunction with the Burmese Government, guaranteed the independence of Western Karenni States. The Loikaw post did not seem to have exerted itself much in the maintenance of law and order, otherwise the Loikaw-Ngwedaung affair would not have occurred. It must also have been difficult for any Burmese post to do anything, cut off as it was from its nearest neighbour in the Shan States by war-like Red Karens. But the Ngwedaung deputation produced another post there which did not prove a success and was later abolished. The Loikaw post, however, was maintained until the British conquest of Upper Burma when it was disbanded or fell back on Mongnai and marched away with the garrison there.

The preceding account concerns mostly Eastern Karenni and its colourful ruler Sawlapaw, of whom we shall hear more later. Let us
turn for a moment to Western Karenni. It seems that soon after Papawgyi was given the Eastern Karenni by Po Byu Hla, Kyebogyi and Naungpale became independent of Bawlake about 1845. The petty State of Nammekon came into existence after that when the Chiefs of Bawlake and Ngwedaung between them gave a piece of territory, Nammekon, to a Red Karen, a revered ascetic called Po Efe.

After the second Anglo-Burmese war in 1852, the British thought that Karenni was subject to the Burmese King and insisted that the demarcation of the boundary should be extended to the Salween; but when it was ascertained later that the Red Karen country was independent, the British decided not to extend the right of conquest over them and the demarcation of the boundary was not carried further east of the Sittang than the Kunang ridge of the Paunglaung mountain range. Since then the Western Karenni Chiefs seem to have manifested an anxious desire for closer relations with the British. As early as 1855, an agent of the British Government was stationed in Kyebogyi as a general look-out post to observe and report on events in the neighbouring States, and to use his good offices to check petty wars and slave forays.

In 1857, Mr. E. O'Riley, the Deputy Commissioner of Toungoo, went on a tour to Karenni and made friends with the "ancient Chieftain of Kyebogyi". From this period the Chief considered himself under British protection and though no public promise of any kind was made by the British in this direction, the mere presence of their agent and the manifestations of friendship combined to have the good effect of preserving the Chief from serious attack from any quarter.

In 1863 O'Riley was again deputed to Karenni to settle some differences with the Eastern Karenni Chief, and to provide for the safe transit of caravans through all parts of the country. O'Riley found the Chiefs of Western Karenni still firm in their attachment to British friendship, which was publicly manifested and renewed. When the Chief of Kyebogyi died in 1868, his two sons, Khun Ti and Khun Sha, repeated their father's former request that the British should take over the administration of Western Karenni. This the British were not prepared to do. When Sawlapaw asked Mindon in 1868-69 for a force to annex all Karenni, the British came to know about it and urged the Burmese Government to abstain from any such venture. Again, towards the end of 1873, the British had reports of another move against the Western Karenni and reminded the Burmese Government of its former assurances of not interfering in Western Karenni affairs. Mandalay repudiated these assurances and claimed suzerainty over Western Karenni. The British were determined not to allow Burmese influence south of the prolongation of the British Lower Burma boundary line and sent Sir Douglas Forsyth to negotiate in Mandalay. King Mindon, for some unknown reasons, cut short the discussion by voluntarily agreeing to guarantee the independence of Western Karenni and the following agreement was signed on the 21st June 1875.
"AGREEMENT regarding the independence of Western Karenni 1875.

In accordance with the request of His Excellency the Viceroy of India that Western Karenni should be allowed to remain separate and independent, his Majesty the King of Burma, taking into consideration the great friendship existing between the two great Countries and the desire that the friendship may be lasting and permanent, agrees that no sovereignty or governing authority of any description shall be exercised or claimed in Western Karenni, and his Excellency the Kimwoon Mengyee, Minister for Foreign Affairs, on the part of His Majesty the King of Burma, and the Hon'ble Sir Douglas Forsyth, C.B., K.C.S.I., Envoy on the part of His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor General of India, execute the following agreement:

AGREEMENT - It is hereby agreed between the British and Burmese Governments that the State of Western Karenni shall remain separate and independent, and that no sovereignty or governing authority of any description shall be claimed or exercised over that State.

Whereunto we have on this day, the 21st day of June 1875 corresponding with the 3rd day of the waning moon of Nayoung 1237 B.E. affixed our seals and signatures.

/Seal/ (Sd) T. D. Forsyth. /Seal/ (Sd) Kinwoon Mengyee."

At the time of the signing of the Agreement, the Burmese Government was informed that the boundary between the Western Karenni and Burmese territory would be demarcated by a British Officer "who might, should the King desire it, be accompanied by a Burmese Official". The boundary was accordingly demarcated by Mr. A. H. Hildebrand early in 1876 and the Burmese outposts at Namkekcon and Lawdawku were withdrawn in 1877. The Western Karennis were thus left to themselves till the British sent an Expedition, heralding British annexation, into the Shan States in the open season of 1887.

At this point we may pause and look at contemporary accounts of Karenni recorded by Dr. R. Richardson (the same whose journal has been quoted earlier) who was sent in 1835 on a mission to Papaawyi and who passed through Karenni en route to Mongnai in 1837. The following is from his 1837 mission report:

2nd Feb. (Thursday). - Pha-pho arrived last night in two days from the Salween; the fowl bones being unfavourable to return by land, he came the first day up the Pon to Bantooe in small boats, which they were several times obliged to unload and drag up the falls. From thence he came yesterday on horse back, and arrived here about 9 p.m.; he pleads
fatigue as an excuse for not seeing me today, but I am to be introduced to him to-morrow, and from what I have heard from his son and the old Taung-thoo interpreter. I almost anticipate a refusal to my request to be allowed to pass through his territory. He has already ordered that traders from the up country north-west of this should not come further than Gnoe-daun, and from the southward and eastward than the Salween, in consequence of some trouble he and the old interpreter’s son had last year with three men from Moulmein.

3rd Feb. (Friday). - Waited on the old Chief this morning with the Commissioner’s letter and presents. He is evidently anxious to oblige us, but naturally afraid of opening a way into his country for the Burman. After a good deal of discussion, I obtained his promise of transit through his country, and protection to traders as far as his power and influence on the people prevailed. Traders are to pay no duty, but to make a small present to the Chief on receiving his pass; and as the old man has not the character of being avaricious, I do not suppose much will be expected. He distinctly stated that his authority was supreme throughout the country; that there are three other Chiefs of his appointment, and that there is no necessity for my visiting them. He spoke of the value of the presents, and regretted his inability to make a suitable return. My visit lasted for nearly three hours; and soon after my return the old Shan interpreter came out to the tent, I begged him, as we had already lost so much time, to get the letter to the Commissioner ready to-morrow, as I wish to take leave the day after, and to start on the subsequent day. He had come to borrow a writer, as their only one was from home, whom I promised to send this morning.

4th Feb. (Sat.), Dwom Tulwee. - Sent the writer with paper, &c., into the village this morning, and the letter was ready by noon. The old Chief regretted he could not visit me, as my tent was pitched on the spot where the cattle are sacrificed; and as he neither eats meat nor drinks spirits, which they do to excess here, it would be improper for him to come here. His son and all the heads of the village, however, came without scruple. The place was of my own choice, as the place we occupied last year was under water; and there was no other spot, except in the centre of the village, level enough to pitch a tent.

5th Feb. (Sunday). - This morning I called on the old Chief for the letter. He was most anxious to detain us till the return of Phabhang’s marauding party, which he told me amounted to 300 or 400 men; their attack is on some part of the Monay frontier, and he appeared very apprehensive of our falling in with them on their way home. .................. I remained upwards of an hour, to my discomfort, sitting on
a Tartar carpet on the hard floor, and left the Chief fast asleep, with his head against a post, and his pipe in his mouth, in which state he must have been for a quarter of an hour, as he had not joined in the conversation for some time, and the house was too dark to see, till the people moved out of the door way, to let me out.

Under date line the "11th Feb., Kundoo (Thursday),"
Richardson writes of the country:

The Kareans themselves say their country, without including the slip of territory to the eastward of the Salween, extends four days march from east to west, and six from north to south; but this must not be supposed one of our short marches, as a Karean marches all day long. Gnoe-daun is the largest town, and is said to contain 500 houses. Most of its inhabitants, however, are Shans from the northward, who have fled there to escape from the Burman oppression. Their country is divided into three States by the three Chiefs who rule it, viz., Pha-pho, Pha-bhang, and Key-pho; of these Pha-pho is nominally, and, under ordinary circumstances, really the head, and his people the most numerous; those of the Key-pho and Pha-bhang, the most restless and daring in their in roads into the Burman territory. There are some other fanciful divisions, such as Lay-may (black necks) so called by the Burmans from a black crescent-shaped mark tattooed from the angles of the jaw to the pomum Adami. They are called by the Shans Tsurein, or Taleine; they wear their hair short, contrary to the usual custom, and ornament their head with a string of teeth round it, just above the ears. They are reckoned the greatest savages, and are said to be more muscular than the other; they inhabit the country north-east of Saga. Besides these are the En-bue (white chests) and Potaiingo, near Shoe-gheen and Toung-ngo, the Tamai, north of Mobie, and some others. Their own term for the nation collectively is Kaya, the meaning of which I did not learn. To the eastward the Salween may be reckoned their boundary; for though they have a few miles of territory, and some common Kareans subject to them, I believe there are no Red Kareans who live to the east of that river; north they have the Burman Shan States, west the Burmans, and south, a somewhat extensive track, inhabited by the common Kareans, who under their own Chiefs, pay tribute to both the Burmans and Shans.

The town of Gnoe-daun, before mentioned, is the only walled town in the country, as far as I am aware, though there are some large villages in the neighbourhood of it, situated almost in contact with each other, having the general name Nong Palay, containing in all some 300 houses,
under Key-pho. The inhabitants are said to be some of the most desperate robbers of the whole tribe.

The leopard is common in all the jungles; in the northern part of the country the royal tiger, elephant, and rhinoceros are found. Near the Salween all the domestic animals are scarce; horses are stolen and brought in small numbers from the Burman Shans; and black cattle and buffaloes are received in barter for slaves and stick-lack from the Siamese Shans. Pigs and poultry are also scarce. Fruits they scarcely cultivate, except the plantain; and even that, though so easily raised, is by no means plentiful. Pha-pho, to whom I spoke on the subject of their origin, seems, in common with the rest of the people, to know little about, though, like almost all nations, they believe themselves to have migrated to their present location at a very remote period; he says they came from the north-west. He gave a long and somewhat confused account of the origin of the human race generally, the founder of which, Pha Bee, a sort of demi-god, had three sons, from the eldest of whom, the Chinese, from the second, the Kullas; and from the youngest, the Kareans are descended. This little story did not agree with that of many of the southern Kareans I have spoken to on the subject, who call themselves the elder brothers of the white Kullas, and Paya Kaneo "Men" par excellence. Though there are many Shans from the Burmese territory farming small villages throughout the country, there is probably not one to 100 Kareans, to whose number it is scarcely possible to speak, from the way in which I crossed their country, and little information can be obtained from themselves on the subject. The factotum of Pha-pho, an up-country Shan, told me, when urging on me an alliance with them, on my last visit, for the purpose of making war on the Burmans, that they could bring 4000 men into the field; and though doubtless on such an occasion he would make the most of their numbers, I do not believe the number exaggerated. I passed in one day's march, when our route lay through an inhabited country, eight or ten large villages of, perhaps on average, 30 or 50 houses. In person they are generally small made, and low in stature, often small legs and projecting abdomens; of no appearance of muscularity, but they plume themselves on swiftness, and in the race no nation in the little world they know of can compete with them; they challenged my people on every opportunity, and generally beat them. Their colour is fair, and exposure to the sun and weather gives them a red appearance, hence their name. In their habits they are perfect savages, in their persons filthy; in sacrificing a bullock or buffalo to the Natts they often smear themselves with the blood, which is allowed to remain till it wears off. Their habitations are of the rudest and most primitive description, of the same form and materials as those of the poorer order of Burmans, except that one end is always in form of a bow, where the entrance generally is, and they are darker and more filthy in the
interior. The house of the principal chief, Pha-pho, was about 10 feet by 30, and perfectly dark, the only opening in it, except the crevices between the planks, being the door, and the roof (a sort of projecting verandah) coming so low outside that little light was admitted by it, and that little was intercepted during my visits by the people crowding round it; in the middle of the room was a fireplace, a small square wooden frame, a few inches deep, filled with earth, let up through the floor and supported from below, having a few inches of space between it and the floor; the roof was splendidly varnished; the half of the room was filled with the yam, some growing some decayed, the smell from which was most disgusting. The dress of the men is a short pair of breeches, generally red, drawn by a string tight above the hips, and reaching one third of the way down the thigh; in warm weather this, and a handkerchief (most of them managed to get a Madras or English one) round the head forms the whole of their dress; in cold weather, they wrap themselves in coarse cotton sheets of their own manufacture. The women wear a cloth about the same length as the men's breeches, which is their only dress in warm weather; in cold they have an oblong piece of coarse cloth, intended to be white, but seldom or never washed, the two corners tied in a knot over the right shoulder; the rest of it hanging free reaches to the knee, the left arm being covered up, the right naked, and at liberty; sometimes two are worn with a knot on each shoulder; they also wrap themselves in sheets like the men, in the cool of the morning and evening. Those who can afford it are loaded absolutely with paltry and small white, red and green beads, wearing an immense roll round the ankle, round about the calf, the waist, the neck, and the head. Of domestic utensils they are destitute, except the common chatties for cooking, and coarse knives of different sizes; a trough, made of the half of a split bamboo, serves with most of them all the purposes of plates and dishes; rice, cholum, yams, and other esculent roots are their chief food, but they also consume a large quantity of animal food; all the cattle sacrificed to the Natts are eaten by them, and three or four days seldom pass without a sacrifice, at which times they also consume large quantities of vile arrack of their own manufacture, which they drink habitually, and always carry with them if they leave their homes for a day; fortunately, opium has not found its way amongst them, nor do I know that gaming is amongst the catalogue of their vices; their general condition is on a par with that of other savages in the same grade of civilization, where the brute propensities and passions of men are unrepressed by education, and reason is weak in the infancy of nations as of individuals. They have of course no trades, nor any manufacture except of the clothes they wear; and of gongs and a particular kind of brass drum peculiar to themselves, one of which was transmitted by the Commissioner of the Tennaserim Provinces to Calcutta two years ago. Their
language is peculiar to themselves, differing altogether from that of the natives by whom they are surrounded, appears to be a dialect of the same language as that spoken by the common Kareans, who inhabit the hills south of them, but now so much altered that a conversation cannot be carried on between them as with the other Kareans; they have no letters, or symbols of any kind by which to represent their ideas; their religion, if it may be so called, consists entirely in attempts to propitiate by sacrifice the malignant Natts, by whom they suppose all sickness and misfortune is inflicted with no other view than to obtain the sacrifice of some animals or other; they endeavour to find out what, by a peculiar method of divination, with the leg or wing, bones of fowls, holding two parallel between the fore finger and thumb, with the holes for the transmission of blood-vessels upwards; they choose one for the person and one for the diseased, or business to be undertaken, and introducing a small piece of bamboo into the holes, they judge by signs known to the initiated what is proper to be done; they have neither priests, lawyers, nor physicians, and use no medicine in illness; but a sacrifice is made to the Natts of a buffalo, bullock, pig, or fowls, as indicated by the bones; if the patient gets worse it may have been from a wrong sacrifice, and another of a different animal is made, and when he dies it may be either from the sacrifice being the wrong animal, or made to the wrong Natt. Marriages are early among them, and are not binding unless the female has been given away by her parents, when a pig or a bullock or two is killed, according to the wealth of the parties, and a feast given in the village, in which arrack is always an attractive part; divorce is easily obtained if there are no children, but should there be one child they are not permitted to separate. Before marriage great license is allowed. Their funerals are more simple than those of the white Kareans; the body is merely interred, and money, valuables, paddy, yams, pumpkins, in short everything used by them in life is interred with it, in greater or smaller quantities, in proportion to the wealth of the individual; a horse is often let loose (if the person possessed one) on the occasion, with some distinguishing mark; he is never reclaimed; if the deceased was a person of substance sometimes as many as five or six bullocks are slain near his grave, the heads, feet, and tails left for the Natt, and the rest consumed by his friends and relations; with the poorer individuals a pig or a fowl or two is sacrificed in a more humble way.

On the subject of slave traffic, of which some of the Shan States bordering Karenni used to speak with some horror, Dr. Richardson also left some account of what he himself saw and what was told to him at the time. Before reaching Papawgyi's Capital, he made the following entry in his diary for the 26th January 1837:
We met on the march today an old man with his family, taken at Mobie, being driven to the ferry for sale; their captor an old Karen thooghee of about 50 years of age, was riding behind, spear in hand. I asked him if thoughts of his own children did not make him feel some compassion for these poor people, he coolly answered 'Khan' (fortune), and pushed on his prisoners.

We have already referred to Papawgyi's anxiety for Dr. Richardson's party not to run into his marauding party of 300-400 men returning from their attack on some part of Mongnai frontier which did not pay the black mail money. Having crossed the boundary into the Shan State of Mawkmai, Richardson recorded on the 16th February 1837:

At one o'clock we came to a sort of outpost of about 10 or 12 men, within a bamboo fence, looking out for the Kareans within sight of the town. Though the town contains many inhabitants, they are in perpetual dread of their attack, and are, in fact, carried off daily (during the last month they have unmolested) from the road we came today, between this and Banboat. They make no secret of their fear and weakness, and told many tales of the Kareans' skill in kidnapping; among others, of the Kareans who came on a party of six of their people, and seeing they were the weaker party waited till night, when they made bundles of bamboos, interwoven with thorns, which they threw over them when asleep, and standing over them, with their spears picked them out one by one, tied their hands and marched them off. As Mok-mai is the only town on the frontier that does not pay the black mail, they have to stand the principal brunt of their inroads. A night or two ago, a village to the northward of this was attacked; I have not heard with what success ....

Not only were Shan women and children captured and sold as slaves, Karennis themselves met with the same fate in the feuds between different villages. Also, occasionally Karenni debtors liquidated their debts by giving themselves up as slaves. Many of the Shan themselves were slave merchants who made a living by enticing their own kind to the Karenni border where they could easily be captured by the Red Karens.

Mr. O'Riley, Deputy Commissioner of Toungoo, who visited Karenni in 1856 and 1864, recorded on the subject of slavery there:

In estimating the amount of population of the country, I have stated that about one-third of the inhabitants are

slaves, on which subject I deem it necessary to offer the following explanation:

The chief cause of this amount of slavery, a term by the way, only partially expressing the conditions of the subject, lies in the prevalence of indebtedness throughout the community. Incurred originally by the heads of families to meet some casual expenditure attending their superstitions ceremonies, the debt, increased by an enormous interest, has been unliquidated at the period of the death of the borrower, and in all such cases, where no effects are available for repayment, in accordance with the terms of agreement, one or two members of the family become bond-slaves, and subsequently from incapacity to liquidate the original debt with its large amount of accumulation for interest, have become permanently the property of the lender; and although bound to assist in the cultivation of their master's lands, they are debarred from other pursuits from which to derive a means of eventual emancipation; but this is of rare occurrence, and this state of indebtedness has become an integral portion of their social system.

The other far more iniquitous and remorseless state of slavery in the worst feature which prevails with this race has its existence in their kidnapping propensities; no one single individual among them but is ready on all occasions to avail himself of the opportunity to seize the person of any of the Shan and Karen tribes which occupy the country in their vicinity. Thus, in most of the Karenni villages are to be found the Shan-Yangs of the Karen tribe, Yondalines, Padungs, and Let-htas of the mountain ranges to the north-west, all doomed to a hopeless state of slavery, into which, priced like beasts of burden, they are sold to the Yons (Chiangmai Shan), by whom they are resold to the Siamese, and eventually end their career — slaves of a nation of slaves: no worse or more pitiable condition can possibly be imagined.

In the lowest stage of degraded barbarism themselves the Karennis regard themselves as the dominant race amongst the less numerous tribes of Karens which inhabit the hill-tracts of their country, especially so with reference to the Karen Pyus. This unfortunate race they consider that they have a prescriptive right to seize as slaves, whenever their inclination or want of money prompts them to plunder and carry them into slavery the more depraved of the Shans and Taung—thus of the neighbouring States. Their country affords a means of selling into slavery any member of their own community who may have incurred their enmity, and acts of the most inhuman kind are constantly enacted. An instance of this I may note to show the absence of that quality of humanity which the relation between man and wife dictates, but which finds no place in their savage nature. While at Nyong Belai, a poor woman with two children came to me with a pitiful story. She said
that her husband, a Taungthu, residing at Yawng Hwe, had fallen into difficulties and had induced her to accompany him to Karenni, where he had sold herself and children to one of the Chiefs there present for a sum of Rs.60. She appealed to me to liberate her, which I endeavoured to effect by the offer of Rs.100 to the man, but he declined the offer, and, in reply to my remonstrances on the heartless cruelty of the transaction on the part of both the husband and himself, he replied that these were considerations he had nothing to do with, that he had purchased the family on speculation, and unless he got Rs.250 for the woman, and separate prices for the children, he would not part with them. I had not the money to spare and the poor creature with her children are now in all probability in the possession of the Yons and on their way to the maritime provinces of Siam.

From the source above noted about one thousand two hundred souls are annually captured and purchased by the Karennis, at least one-third of whom are taken from the Burmese protected Shan States.

The wildest anarchy and lawlessness has prevailed so that it may be said literally that each man's hand is against his neighbour. Security of life or property does not exist. The right of plunder of each other's villages would appear to have become an institution of their social relations, and causes the most trifling and puerile to give occasion for the sacrifice of life. A single instance will suffice. Shortly before my arrival a youth of a village about two miles distant from Ngwedaung was detected in stealing a common chatty from a house in that place. He endeavoured to escape with it to his village, but was pursued by a party of men and deliberately speared to death. Since this barbarous act was committed, a series of attacks and plunder of each other's property followed; many lives will be sacrificed ere the affair is finally settled. One of their attacks occurred while I was at Ngwedaung. Hearing a great noise with firing proceeding from the place opposite my tent I proceeded to ascertain the cause and found that a number of people of the village to which the murdered youth belonged, watching their opportunity, had sallied out and were endeavouring to drive off a herd of cattle belonging to the people of Ngwedaung. The alarm being given a strong party of Karens, mounted and armed with match-lock and spear, proceeded to the spot and, after a good deal of firing and noisy bravado, effected the recovery of the cattle, not however before several of the aggressive party had been wounded, whom I saw fall from their ponies in the heat of the scuffle; and these scenes, I was told, were of constant occurrence.
To my enquiries on the subject of the existence of any dominant authority in the country, and especially as regarded the position of the Chief of Papaw's village, Sawlapaw, I was informed that this young man, although recognised as the head of the Eastern Karenni, was in reality only nominally so.

Having sketched such background as is available from contemporary writings of Karenni as a whole, we now resume our narrative, and we shall soon see whether Sawlapaw's authority was real or nominal in Eastern Karenni.

Before the British Southern Shan Column started from Fort Stedman, the Superintendent and Political Officer had begun writing to Sawlapaw of Kantarawadi inviting him to meet the former at some point on the Karenni border along which the Column had intended to march, in order that British supremacy might be acknowledged. To these overtures, the descendant of Papawgyi did not respond; he had come to believe that his territory was impregnable and his warriors invincible. "He was confirmed in this confounded belief by the extraordinary timidity and cowardice of the Shans who habitually submitted to be raided and robbed, and to seeing their people carried away into slavery by this over-bearing savage and his men". He had given protection to such better known Shan lords as the Sawbwas of Hsipaw and Mongnai. He was at this juncture preparing an expedition against the Shan State of Mawkmai for grievances of some 20 years standing when the then Sawbwa of that State allegedly seized a number of elephants and quantities of timber from the forests of Karenni. He had endeavoured to obtain redress from the Court at Mandalay, but without success. The day of reckoning had now come; the move of the British Southern Shan Column away from Fort Stedman on its annexation tour of the Shan States had been interpreted as a permanent departure of British forces.

The Sawbwa of Mawkmai at this moment was Khun Mung, son of the famous Sawbwa Kolan, who had been alleged by Sawlapaw to have seized the Karenni elephants and timber. Khun Mung had succeeded to Kolan on the latter's death just one day before the arrival of a small British Column to demand Mawkmai's submission in May 1887. Since then the remains of his father had been lying in state. The burial seems to have been deliberately delayed because Khun Mung for some reason did not want to face the unpleasant task of dividing up his father's estate, for the custom dictated that the division could be done only when the remains of a former ruler had been laid to rest. It also happened that some of the principal recipients of Kolan's estate were in Mongnai, relatives of the Sawbwa of that State whom Sawlapaw regarded as an ally.

1. GUBSS, II.1.314-316.
While Kolan was alive there was little that Sawlapaw could do but nurse his grievances, for Kolan himself was aggressive and made himself feared not only in Karenni but also in what is now a district of Chiengmai, Mehawngsawn. Kolan went so far as to successfully attack Mehawngsawn, drive out the Shan administrator placed there by Chiengmai authorities, and make a present of the district to his niece Nang Mya. Now that Kolan was dead, Sawlapaw was able to call Khun Mung to account, by advancing with his warriors on Mawkmai.

When Khun Mung received the news of the approach of Sawlapaw, his guilty conscience made him imagine that Mongnai was also marching against him from the north, and he "fled without raising a finger to defend himself". Sawlapaw's men entered Mawkmai without any opposition on the 3rd March 1888, and, as was the custom, they proceeded to burn the town and ravage the country side, destroying bridges and monasteries. Mawkmai valley, which up to that time had been the only part of the cis-Salween States to have escaped the general devastation caused by inter-State civil wars, was completely ruined. Sawlapaw declared Mawkmai annexed to his territory and appointed Khun Noikyu as his feudatory Sawbwa in charge of administration. The main body of Karenni then withdrew leaving a garrison of 150 men to uphold Noikyu's authority.1

This Khun Noikyu was a cousin of Khun Mung, the Sawbwa, and the latter's subordinate Myook of Mesakun, a trans-Salween Circle of Mawkmai State. Noikyu seems to have nursed dissatisfaction against his cousin - a probable reason was Khun Mung's failure to settle Kolan's property in which Noikyu must have coveted a share. Normally he lived in the prosperous town of Mawkmai in preference to his petty administrative headquarters at Mesakun, but in January 1888 he suddenly disappeared from the State capital, only to appear again as Sawlapaw's appointee, as described.

Mawkmai State had already submitted to the British suzerainty and to maintain their own authority they must maintain the Sawbwa thus ousted by Sawlapaw, but when the news of the sack of Mawkmai reached Fort Stedman there was nobody to act at once, as both the Superintendent and his assistant were away with the Southern Shan Column. The news soon caught up with the Column and when it reached Mandalay, Assistant Superintendent J. G. Scott was sent post haste from there via the Natteik Pass with orders to restore order and to reinstate the Sawbwa at Mawkmai. Scott left Fort Stedman on the 2nd May with a force of 100 Baluchis and 50 men of the Rifle Brigade under the command of Colonel Sartorius of the Baluchis and Lieutenant Fowler. This small force was delayed at Mongnai where Twet Nga Lu was captured, as narrated elsewhere, but it reached Mawkmai on the 16th May to find that the Red Karens had already left the town. Mawkmai was formally occupied and Khun Mung reinstated. Scott and

Sartorius returned to Fort Stedman, leaving behind the hundred and fifty rifles at Mawkmai under Lieutenant Fowler, who in turn thought that the need for a strong force at Mawkmai was past and moved his headquarters to Mongnai, leaving 25 men to protect Mawkmai. Sawlapaw, who had been watching these movements closely, saw his opportunity at Fowler’s withdrawal and ordered his men to attack Mawkmai on the 3rd July, but the attack was repulsed by the Baluchis and the Sawbwa’s men. Lieutenant Fowler then moved his main force back to Mawkmai.

On the 12th July, on learning that the Karens were camping within a day’s march from Mawkmai town, Fowler and his men went straight for them, carried their fortifications at the point of the bayonet and drove them in confusion beyond the border, with a loss to the Red Karens of about 60 to 100 men, including their leader, the Heng of Banmau (Ywathit).

This reverse by no means discouraged the warrior Sawlapaw. Any anxiety on his part must have been softened by the full force of the monsoon during which he knew he could not be attacked. He wrote letters to the Superintendent at Mawkmai in the tone of an Ameindaw to the British ordering them to evacuate their troops from Mawkmai. His letter to the Superintendent is reproduced below:

(From Sawlapaw to the Superintendent, Fort Stedman, dated 13th July 1888)

Minwe the Sawbwa of Mawkme with his sons, during the years 1228, 1229 and 1233 (1866-67, 1867-68 and 1870-71) repeatedly committed raids into Kantarawadi; with armed men and carried off from the forests 182 elephants and 5200 logs of timber. Redress was sought at the hands of King Mindon. When King Mindon died and Theebaw ascended the throne, I sent again to demand the return of my property. Mauk-me refused to give satisfaction and I have ever since been at war with Mauk-me .... Subsequently I applied to Khun Hmon for satisfaction of my claims. A reply was sent me saying that my property would not be restored but that I should get cannon shot instead. I have been fighting since the time of King Mindon. The British Government and my State of Kantarawadi; have been at peace and on friendly terms with each other ever since the time of our grand parents.

I shall be obliged if you will kindly remove the troops which you have stationed at Mauk-me in case that when our troops are engaged in fighting Khun Hmon they may not accidentally harm your troops.

At Fort Stedman the representatives of the foremost imperial power in the 19th century could not be expected to accept such letters from Sawlapaw which, after their contents had been noted, were technically rejected, and returned unanswered. Nevertheless, they were not a little tantalised, if not actually dismayed, by Sawlapaw’s sublime
refusal to acknowledge their superior power. In their playing fields British Officers were taught never to take advantage of the weak, at the same time in the service of their sovereign and country outside Europe they were taught to acknowledge no superior being to themselves. They did not want to use force against Sawlapaw, but he must be made to realise how small his world was. By September 1888, therefore, an ultimatum was placed in the hands of the Superintendent, ready for delivery to Sawlapaw, as a last resort for peaceful settlement. This ultimatum stipulated that the Karenni warrior Chief was required firstly to come in person to Fort Stedman to acknowledge the sovereignty of the British Queen; secondly, to pay an indemnity of two hundred thousand rupees to cover the cost of damage done to Mawkmai and the cost of the British 150-man expedition to relieve that State; thirdly, to surrender 500 serviceable muskets; and lastly, to pay an annual tribute of five thousand rupees to the British Government.

But Sawlapaw had already decided on war and as soon as the rainy season came to an end he started making earnest preparations for it.

In October Fort Stedman was somewhat surprised to receive a letter couched in a more friendly tone from Sawlapaw, which led Superintendent Hildebrand to hope for a peaceful settlement and to propose that Sawlapaw should submit to him at Mawkmai instead of Fort Stedman. In another letter dated the 5th November, which reached Fort Stedman only on the 17th, the Karenni Chief professed a desire to renew the "old friendship" between his State and the British, and proposed Loikaw as their meeting place on the 11th December. He added: "The reason why I propose Loikaw is that at present I am like a mother with a baby in her arms; she has to be with it always in order to stop it crying; my people will feel my absence if I go to Fort Stedman."

But that was only a tactical ruse - Sawlapaw was playing for time. Did he perhaps mean to ambush and massacre the British when they went to Loikaw?) The bearers of the letters were instructed to observe military preparations at Fort Stedman. These amateur intelligence men had no idea of the might and efficiency of the Power that had just conquered Upper Burma. They saw no warlike preparations at Fort Stedman and reported back accordingly. They were also ignorant of the existence of another force which had been ordered to come up to Karenni from Moulmein via Papun. Furthermore, to block Sawlapaw's escape to the east, the British Government had requested the Siamese Government to send troops to their border adjoining Karenni in the east. All this was unknown to Sawlapaw who thought nothing of the British strength at Fort Stedman. He ordered trees to be felled across all the main routes towards his capital, and the paths themselves were spiked. All his warriors were summoned - even some of the Shan Sawbwas of the neighbouring States were persuaded to join him. Another factor which seems to have influenced Sawlapaw on the path of war was his belief that the British tommies, being white in their
complexion with grey or blue eyes, were more or less blind when the sun was high, in the manner of albinos, and that the best way of attacking them was to go for them when the sun was high but behind his own soldiers.

The main British force, commanded by Brigadier H. Collett, was assembled in Samka and consisted of:

2 guns, No. 1 Mountain Battery, Bengal
100 rifles, 1st Battalion the Rifle Brigade
250 rifles, 1st Baluchi Light Infantry
4 signallers
40 Mounted Infantry, Rifle Brigade
70 Mounted Infantry, 1st Baluchi Light Infantry
25 Queen's Own sappers and miners
Medical commissariat and staff

The force from Moulmein was under the command of Colonel Harvey and consisted of 100 British and 150 Indian soldiers. All the British Burma outposts adjoining Karenni were reinforced, and a complete blockade of food and exports into Karenni was also affected.

The British ultimatum was despatched on the 16th November, one day before Sawlapaw's last letter.

Sawlapaw was the first to strike. On the 5th December 1888, two villages on the British Burma frontier, including Kyaukhnyat, on the Salween and north-east of Papun, were attacked and burned. Two days later Superintendent Hildebrand reported that the Sawbwa of Mawkmai had received letters from Sawlapaw announcing his intention to fight.

The British force amassed at Samka received orders to march on the 29th December. The Superintendent was instructed to obtain personal submission of Sawlapaw "in an unmistakable fashion", after which he was to be confirmed as Chief. The instruction went on "The object is to keep him in a friendly, subordinate alliance. You have liberty, if he submits, to mitigate the terms to such extent as you may think necessary to secure his future friendship, and to let him see that we have no desire to harm him. If he does not submit, it will be necessary to punish him". In the case of non-submission, Sawlapaw, a descendent of Papawgyi, was to be replaced, but by his own kin, if possible.

The British Expedition met with no opposition until it reached Nga Kaing one march from Loikaw on the New Year day of 1889. On that day "while the camp was being pitched, the Baluchi scouts, who were exploring some wooded ground near the village, were fired upon. They were immediately joined by the Baluchi Mounted Infantry, under Lieutenant Tighe. The enemy driven through the wood and compelled

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1. This was told to the writer by the late Sawbwa of Kengtung, Sao Kawntai.
to break cover, attempted to make for the high ground; but our men
getting between them and the hills, forced them into the plain.
They numbered two or three hundred, most of them Shans under two of
Sawlapaw's officials, and were not without courage. Several times
they turned to face the pursuers; but ill-armed and without dis­
cipline, they had not a chance. The three score of the Mounted
Infantry broke them up, rode them down and drove them almost up to
Loikaw, eight miles distant, inflicting heavy loss. Some of them
seeing their escape to be hopeless, turned fiercely on their enemies,
and the Baluchis lost four killed and seven wounded in the pursuit".
Brigadier Collett and Hildebrand pressed on to Loikaw in the same
evening, leaving the bulk of their troops and baggage at Nga Kain.

From Loikaw the British pressed on to Sawlon (Saolong), then
Capital of Eastern Karenni, crossing Nampawn without much opposition.
Sawlon was totally deserted, and with its occupation the military
side of the operation was an end; but the political side of it had
just begun. Sawlapaw left Sawlon with whatever belongings and
treasure he could load on two elephants, leaving the rest to be
"divided and carried off by his officials and the chief townspeople".
That was how the great wealth stored up at the Haw was reported to
have been disposed of before the entry of the British troops.
People began to return to their homes after a few days, but there was
no one in authority that the British could treat with. The fact that
Sawlapaw went away with only 2 or 3 of his most trusted followers
made it more difficult to locate him. In vain did Hildebrand pro­
claim that unless Sawlapaw appeared before the 18th January he would
be deposed and another man appointed in his place. The final day
was extended to the 28th January, when Sawlawi the Kemmong, so
appointed since King Thibaw's time
came in at an early hour from
the jungle.

On that very day, in the presence of the British
Political Officer and 29 electors consisting of headmen, elders and
merchants, not only from Eastern Karenni, but also from Ngweaung,
Bawlake, Kyebogyi and Saophayun, Sawlawi was unanimously elected
Myosa to succeed Sawlapaw. The new Myosa then took a
document acknowledging submission to the British Queen Empress,
agreeing to pay an indemnity and annual tribute of Rs.5000, and
promising to obey all orders of the Superintendent, Shan States.
Fourteen of the electors, who were wealthy men, signed a joint bond
with Sawlawi to pay the indemnity of two lakhs of rupees and 500
muskets, as set out in the ultimatum, and a further one lakh as
cost of the expedition. All the timber of the sureties was
hypothesized to the British Government in Burma as a security for the
payment of the fine on the dates fixed as follows.

Rs.100,000 and 500 muskets on or before the 30th March 1889.
Rs.100,000 on or before the 28th July 1889.
Rs.100,000 on or before the 20th December 1889.
On the following day the 29th January, a formal Durbar, a ceremony most fashionable at the time, was held and the Superintendent handed Sawlawi an order of appointment which reads:-

I, the Superintendent of the Shan States, hereby appoint you, Sawlawi, Kya Maing, to be Chief of the State of Eastern Karenni, on the following conditions:-

1. That you shall govern your State in accordance with established custom, and as a tributary to the British Queen whom you acknowledge to be your suzerain.

2. That you shall enter into no negotiations or agreements with any other State than that of England.

3. That you shall pay a tribute the sum of Rs. 5000 yearly.

4. That you will in all matters obey the order of the Superintendent of the Shan States.

5. That in case of dispute with Siam about territory east of the Salween you will refer the matter to the Superintendent of the Shan States for arbitration.

6. That no Shan, or Burman, or British subjects of any race shall be detained in any part of Eastern Karenni against their will, but that they shall have free liberty to go where they please.

Given under my hand and seal this 29th day of January 1889.

A. H. Hildebrand
Superintendent of the Shan States

The last clause was meant to pave the way for the abolition of slavery and it will be noted that Karenni was not claimed as part of British India.

On the 30th January the whole of the British Expedition began to march back to Fort Stedman, and Sawlawi was left to his own resources. This early withdrawal of the British troops due to insufficient rations, rather bound the hands of the Superintendent and Political Officer who was thus obliged to rush through in two days the whole process of treating with the Karennis and appointing a new Myosa. It is quite possible that, given time, Sawlapaw might have been induced to come in and be confirmed after submission. It was reported that he did in fact see the futility of resistance after the disaster suffered by his men at Nga Kaing where over 150 men were estimated killed in a single action, but a war party in his State insisted on carrying on the fight. On the 5th January, when Tilaunya village on the eastern bank of
Nampawn received two British shells from the opposite bank and went up in flame and its smoke was seen from Sawlon, Sawlapaw told the war party to do as they pleased, packed up and departed with his two elephants and a few faithful retainers forbidding anyone to follow him. He later obtained British permission to come out of his jungle hide-out and live in a settled community, devoting himself till the end of his days to his favourite agricultural pursuit. He refused Sawlawi's offer of a house in Sawlon, gave his private haw in Banmau to the monks and built himself a house in Nyaungkhan village, and in spite of forebodings he never attempted to disturb the British settlement in Kantarawadi.

Sawlawi was the son of Sawlami whose mother was a sister of Sawlapaw. Sawlami was actually the heir to his famous uncle, but as he did not go to Mandalay in 1880, his son, Sawlawi, who went in his place, was proclaimed Kemmong by the Court. Sawlami died not long after this. Having been proclaimed Myosa by the British in 1889, Sawlawi proved himself to be a capable administrator. He was supported by a strong body of hard-headed merchants and traders in the three chief towns of Sawlon, Sataw and Banmau, who had close connections with Moulmein and who knew that business could thrive only with law and order. With the help of these merchants Sawlawi found little difficulty in settling the indemnities imposed by the British. To help him in the administration, the British appointed a myook with headquarters at Samka. The appointee was Khun Hnya, formerly Myosa of Thigyit which he lost during the disturbances prior to the Annexation. Khun Hnya was a man of natural intelligence and energy and had been to Burma several times.

From Sawlon the British forces and political officers returned through Ngwedaung and Nammekon, at which latter place they arrived on the 14th February 1889. Brigadier Collett marched on to Fort Stedman leaving 100 rifles as escort for Mr. Hildebrand who set up his temporary headquarters at Sondaw on the boundary between Mongpai and Western Karenni. This stop was to demarcate the boundary line between Mongpai and Nammekon.

The country here is a wide open space drained by the Baluchaung and it was not easy in those days for petty States to respect each other's territory at such a point where natural features for a boundary were lacking. A number of Red Karens came to settle on this plain, so that the headquarters of Mongpai State, seat of the sawbwa, had to be shifted from the village of Mongpai to Kaung-i, not far from the old Burmese outpost of Pekon (Peyakon) in the north. This encroachment had been going on for a long time and was still continuing when the British entered the Shan States. It is not clear whether these Red Karen settlements before 1889 acknowledged the authority of

the Sawbwa of Mongpai, or continued to pay tribute to their former Red Karen Chiefs of the areas they had left, or both. In due course friction naturally arose, not between the immigrants to whom the original ownership mattered little, but between the taxing authorities, namely the Sawbwa of Mongpai and Pobya of Nammekon. This led to cattle lifting, looting and arson by both sides. In 1867, when a combined Burmese and Shan force was ordered to dislodge the Myingun prince from Nammekon as narrated, much of the country on the plain was ravaged. Pobya often allowed raiding parties from other Red Karen States to pass through his territory into Mongpai. In 1886, when pressure from the Limbin League forces on Yawnghwe was great, the Sawbwa Sao On, encouraged Pobya to attack Mongpai so that Yawnghwe need not feel any anxiety on its southern flank. In these inter-State quarrels Naungpale and Ngwedaung were also involved, as can be seen from the following incident, which was typical of the conditions of those days and had been responsible for so much suffering.

About the time that the British Column was penetrating into the Southern Shan States, a quarrel broke out in Naungpale State through a demand made by one Le Po for a toll of one rupee per bullock from some Ngwedaung traders who were caravanning down to Toungoo and had been granted a safe passage through Naungpale by Le Kyi, son-in-law of Naungpale Chief. Actual fighting between Le Po and Le Kyi was prevented by the timely intervention of Lu Saw Aw, father-in-law of Le Po and an official of Kyebogale, subject of the Chief of Naungpale. At a meeting of headmen of Naungpale, Lu Saw Aw undertook to prevent Le Po from starting the quarrel again and the headmen in turn gave the same undertaking in respect of Le Kyi. Not long afterwards, however, Le Po, taking advantage of the prevailing disorder, resumed the hostilities with an attack on the Chief of Naungpale whom he cut down with his own hands.

Supported by his own followers, Le Po aimed at becoming the Naungpale Chief. Le Kyi collected his men and counter-attacked at Naungpale, killing Le Po and driving out his followers, and then proceeded to attack and burn several villages friendly to Lu Saw Aw who had gone to live quietly for a time in Mongpai where he had considerable power and influence as a result of his marriage to a sister of Khun Lon, Myook of Mongpai Circle. In October 1888 Lu Saw Aw, who by this time had collected some two or three hundred men, attacked Naungpale and burnt the villages of Dawweku and Latataw. Le Kyi and the new Chief of Naungpale again rallied their men together and drove out Lu Saw Aw who once more sought refuge in the Shan State of Mongpai. It was not until the settlement of Mongpai-Nammekon boundary that a formal enquiry was made into this case by the British, and Lu Saw Aw was sentenced to pay a fine of one thousand rupees for his attack on Naungpale.

It will be remembered that soon after their arrival in Yawnghwe early in 1887 the British sent a small party to Mongpai with the object of receiving submission from local Chiefs as well as to settle Mongpai-Pobya differences, but the party was suddenly recalled with the result that hostilities between Mongpai and Nammekon
which had stopped for a while, were resumed. At the beginning of
the march of the Southern Shan Column in December 1887, the political
chief of the Column, A. H. Hildebrand, met the two protagonists,
Mongpai and Pobya, for a while, but could not attempt to do more than
to hear the charges and counter charges of cattle lifting, robbery and
dacoity brought forward by both sides. The two Chiefs later visited
Rangoon and met the Chief Commissioner and were persuaded to write off
these mutual claims. Even then the peace did not last for long and the
village warfare began all over again. In December 1888, just before
the expedition against Kantarawadi started, Hildebrand went on a tour
to Mongpai but failed to bring the two opponents together. Now on his
return from the Kantarawadi expedition, the Superintendent had
definite orders to settle the Mongpai-Nammekon boundary and other
questions.

The demarcation of Mongpai-Nammekon boundary itself was not
so difficult as Hildebrand himself with the assistance of Captain
Lloyd, R. E., had settled it in 1876 and all he had to do now was to
put up boundary posts in place of the original cairns, most of which
had been destroyed by the Sawbwa of Yawngwe at the behest, it is
said, of the Court at Mandalay. But this demarcation of the boundary
was not as satisfactory as it might seem, for Mongpai and Nammekon
men were left on both sides of the line and Pobya asked if he would
still be allowed to collect taxes from his men north of the line, and
trouble would certainly result if he insisted on this right in what
was Mongpai territory.

It is precisely this point which was the cause of the
entanglement in the plain south of Mobye. The people on
either side paid little attention to the original ownership
of the soil. Probably all would have admitted that it
originally belonged, as it certainly would naturally belong,
to Mobye. But the inhabitants have become gradually more
and more Karen until at last the only remnants of the Shan
population remain in the village of Ngakaing. If
ethnological arguments were to prevail, practically the
whole plain would have gone to the Karen Chief. But
this argument, if pressed, would have extended much
further, for it is questionable whether there are not
more people of Karen than of Shan race in the Mobye
Sawbwa's territories. On the other hand, according to
physical geography, the whole plain no less clearly belongs
to the Mobye Chief. History proves no assistance for
records are loosely kept, if kept at all, in the Shan
States and among the Karens; and general public opinion
is no less untrustworthy than it is divergent. Mr. Hilde-
brand, therefore, with the assistance of Captain Jackson,
Royal Engineer, of the Survey of India, and of the local
headmen, constructed an artificial channel and various
streams as definite a boundary as the nature of an open
plain allowed. This demarcation seems to have met with
general approval, and boundary post to the number of 17,
covering a distance from 9 to 10 miles were planted in the ground under the supervision of the people chiefly concerned in the delimitation. It is hoped therefore that the settlement may prove permanent, and that this fine paddy plain may become as productive as it ought to be, instead of being a simple cockpit as it has been for some years. Kebo Gale, Bawlake, with accredited representatives of the Chiefs of Ngwedaung and Eastern Karenni, besides all the local headmen, took part in the demarcation and expressed their general satisfaction, as also did the Mobye Sawbwa and Pobya. Here the collection of revenue is to follow the border line altogether irrespective of the nationality of the population. Attempts may be made as heretofore to make one village pay dues to two Chiefs, but if this should be attempted, it will be the fault of the villagers themselves if they do not secure redress. Mr. Hildebrand having fixed the boundary then proceeded to the settlement of the many claims which had arisen from its previous non-existence. Lu Saw Aw was fined a thousand rupees and was allowed to live at Mobye, the Sawbwa standing security for his future good behaviour. Cattle were restored or paid for; kidnapped people were released and ransom paid for previous release were paid back; smart money, according to hill custom, made such reparation as was possible for dacoity and murder; and, so far as could be ascertained, everything was put into fair trial ....

This boundary line, as far as is known, still stands. Hildebrand struck camp at Sondaw and left for Fort Stedman on the 19th February 1889.

When the British left Sawlon, Sawlawi had in his hands the appointment order which the Superintendent and Political Officer gave him at his election. The rest of the Karenni Chiefs did not receive anything until the 21th January 1892 when a formal Durbar was held at Loikaw and the Superintendent and Political Officer, Shan States, gave away the sanads to all Karenni Chiefs including Kanatarawadi, in whose case the original appointment was thereby replaced. By this time, however, the old ascetic Pobya of Nammekon had died, and his son-in-law, Khun Pya, was provisionally appointed to the general acceptance not only of Nammekon elders and people but also of all Western Karenni Chiefs. (This appointment was confirmed at another Durbar held in the following May at Fort Stedman.) By the terms of the sanad each of the Western Karenni States was required to pay an annual tribute of Rs.100, and the Superintendent reported that "each Chief paid his tribute for the year at once".

A touching incident occurred at the Loikaw Durbar when two female Shan slaves ran into the British camp and asked for protection

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1. RASS, 1888-89, Sections 6-8. For full report of boundary demarcation, see Burma Foreign Proceedings Nos. 1-4, April 1889.
and help to regain their freedom. They were well received and later rejoined their relatives in the Shan States from whom they had been kidnapped some years previously. 1

Of all Karenni problems facing the British on their assuming suzerainty over the country the most international in character was the occupation of Kantarawadi's trans-Salween tracts by the Siamese troops and Shan levies who had come there at the British request to seal Sawlapaw's escape route to the east. These occupation troops were under the impression that they had come to stay. All elephants and timber in the area were seized and stockades were constructed at ferries and river mouths capable of floating logs. White Elephant flags flew over all stockades and district headquarters. In vain did the Superintendent write to the military commander of the Siamese occupation force requesting him to withdraw his men now that the purpose for which they had come had been accomplished. The commander merely replied that he was only obeying orders and therefore could not evacuate.

It was not until November 1892, when agreement had been reached between the British and Siamese Governments regarding the boundary line between the trans-Salween Karenni and Siam, that the Siamese troops were withdrawn from the 38 Pilu villages - as the area was called. A full account on this point will be found in the chapter on the Boundary Commission. Before the Siamese evacuation, however, much damage had been done to the timber there. Sawlawi, the Kantarawadi Myosa and his traders protested to the British against the Siamese doings, but there was nothing that the Chief Commissioner in Rangoon could do except report to India, which had to report to London, which again had dealt with the Siamese Government only through either the Siamese Legation in London or the British Resident in Bangkok. Constant protests from Karenni did cause Rangoon authorities to place an embargo against the disposal of all Karenni logs in Moulmein until they had been seen and claimed by Sawlawi's agents. This does not seem to have helped much as Sawlawi's men were late in starting and on arrival at Moulmein they were not energetic enough to be business-like and the date of the embargo expired on the 30th July 1891.

When the Siamese withdrew in November 1892, a British Assistant Political Officer, Mr. Leveson, was sent to see to the transfer of authority, and Sawlawi resumed the administration of all his former trans-Salween territory, except for a small area in Me Te and Me Nge which was ceded to the Siamese. Sawlawi was very unhappy that this area should have been presented to Siam after three years occupation of his territory by the Siamese who, he quite rightly claimed, had made a great deal of money during the period and despoiled so much of his valuable forests. A forest officer was sent to the trans-Salween Karenni that had thus been returned to make a

1. RASS, 1891-92, Sections 9-10.
thorough check of the forests and he spent the whole of the open 1892-93 open season there. This forest officer reported that the damage done by the unlawful floating out and sale of timber and by jungle fire, accidental and intentional, was as great as Sawlawi had always represented.

Nevertheless, although the Karennis chafed against the Siamese excesses in extracting the timber, the Karennis themselves paid little attention to the long term effect of their own exploitation. In 1888-89 the Superintendent, Shan States reported to the Chief Commissioner:

"The Myoza of Kantarawadi appears to have at last awakened to the fact of the wasteful damage being done to his forests, for under the advice of the Assistant Political Officer, he fined a lessee on the Tu Chaung Rs.1000 for felling under-sized logs. The conservancy generally, however, of the forests throughout Karenni is quite nominal and the utmost waste and destruction is still going on".

To those words may be added the earlier report of Assistant Political Officer, Loikaw for 1896-97: "The same waste and destruction of the forests continues in Karenni; green teak is felled, unsaleable teak is girdled, and generally the forest administration, if it can be called such, is in as rotten a state as it can be. There will be no teak left in Bawlake in a few more years and, if wanton destruction continues this year, the Tu Chaung forests will not last long".

The inter-State boundaries within the Karenni themselves were also fixed in 1895-96 and completed during the following year. In order to make both the Chiefs and peoples of various States realise the importance of fixed boundaries which must be scrupulously respected for all time to come, responsible officials from States concerned accompanied the surveyor and travelled along the lines and had maps of the boundaries shown to them.

A notable event soon after the British settlement in Karenni was a minlaung Rising at the end of June 1892. About 1000 men from the independent tribes of Bre, Padaung, Manen and Yinbaw collected in the hills and mountain tops between Western Karenni and Toungoo, marched across Western Karenni States to Ngwedaung and attempted an attack on the British post at Loikaw. The attack was repulsed and the attackers broke up and disappeared. The British claimed by evidence that the plot was hatched in Burma and the object of the rising was to re-establish Karenni as an independent nation. That Karenni was not independent was made clear to these tribes in several ways, namely, the deposition of their redoubtable warrior chief Sawlapaw, the loss of the trans-Salween tracts, the payment of fines and indemnities, collection of taxes for the payment of tribute, stoppage of cattle raid, elephant theft and slave trade. They preferred the complete
freedom of the pre-British period to any form of settled government however civilized. There was little doubt that if the rising had succeeded in overrunning even temporarily the British post at Loikaw, the whole country side from Karenni right up to the Myelat in the Shan States would have been ravaged as in former days. After it had "fizzled out" the British authorities in the following year were able to trace the origin of the rising to Toungoo, dispelling their former suspicions of Karenni Chiefs. In Toungoo a few Karenni patriots organised themselves, subscribed to the necessary funds and found willing fighters among the tribes. Four of the original leaders were arrested including Share, brother of the minlaung who himself was killed in action at Loikaw. They were handed over to Sawlawi for trial, in which two were acquitted, one released on security, and only Share sentenced to death and executed by firing squad. Villages that had given support or taken part were fined in money and muskets, of which latter some 700 were collected.

The British took the opportunity offered by the rising to tour thoroughly the hill tracts inhabited by these independent tribes and to bring them under some form of control. The Chief Commissioner remarks:

After suitable fines had been inflicted on the raiding villages, which made no attempt at resistance, Mr. Carter (Deputy Commissioner, Toungoo) and Mr. Leveson (Assistant Political Officer, Loikaw) together proceeded to make a tour through the country of the Padaungs, and Bres. It was found that nearly all the villages were dependent upon one or other of the Shan or Karenni Chiefs, that most of them, particularly the Bres, were in a very lawless state owing to the inability of the Chiefs to control them, and that if the Chiefs were supported by a Civil Officer at Loikaw they would probably be able to maintain the peace throughout the tracts subordinate to them. The Civil Officer at Loikaw has accordingly been placed in general charge of the country of the Bres and Padaungs with instructions to interfere as little as possible except for the purpose of maintaining peace and order in the adjoining country and keeping open the trade routes.

In the following year, the Superintendent was able to write of the tour:

The whole of the villages in the Bre-Padaung tract have been divided among the Chiefs of Mongpai, Kyeboyi and Bawlake for the purpose of general control and administration. The tracts so delivered over have been defined by metes and bounds; all criminal or other claims brought forward have been decided and finally settled up to date,

and an understanding come to that next year and in succeeding years claims made upon acts anterior to this general settle-
ment will be dismissed as barred by limitation, and that all feuds must now be considered as having brought to a termina-
tion ....... Thus 19 villages were made over to the Sawbwa of Mong Pai, 51 villages to the Myoza of Kyebogyi, and eight to
the Myoza of Bawlake ....... The Myoza of Kyebogyi and the Kemmong of Mong Pai collected a considerable sum of revenue
from the villages allotted to them and apparently the payment was in no way resisted.

Sometimes mistakes were inevitable when villages were placed under wrong Chiefs but the British could not retrace their steps.
Therefore the new allegiance must be enforced for it was held that to give way in this would undermine the whole work done in the previous two years. Year after year British Officers toured the Bre and Padaung tracts, particularly the latter whose inhabitants seem more unmanage-
able, and it was not until towards the close of the century that some semblance of law and order was established.
CHAPTER IX

The Third Annexation Tour: Kengtung

Though not as big or as well known to the Court at Ava as undivided Hsenwi in her hey-day, Kengtung State annals date back to the early twelfth century. By the time Hsenwi was showing signs of disintegration in the middle of last century, Kengtung was one of the biggest trans-Salween States and as such was recognized by Ava as one of the premier Shan States. Lying between the eastern drainage system of the Salween and the western one of the Mekong, she falls within the sphere of influence of that part of Tai racial territory which constitutes the home of the Lus, Lems, Khuns and Laos: this territory stretches from Sipsawngpanna in the north to a point in the Menan valley where the Thais and the Laos call it the boundary between them, and it is bounded in the west by the Salween and in the east by the eastern water-shed of the Mekong. Kengtung's Khun language, religion and culture point to influence from the South. Her political connection with Burma which is in the opposite direction can be explained by the fact that while the Tai States in the south for several centuries were divided into three almost equal kingdoms, namely Lao, Chiengmai and Ayudhya, Burma had already been united and strong under energetic sovereigns.

Unlike the rest of the Shan States during the period under review, Kengtung had been enjoying internal peace ever since the middle of the century when the three Siamese invasions had successfully been repulsed; and except for attacks on Kenghung and Monglem, in 1872 and again in 1881 by Kengtung forces, external peace was also maintained. In 1867, in an attempt to obtain permission to proceed to Kenghung, the commander of the French exploring expedition, M. Doudart de Lagree, was obliged to visit Kengtung. No notable event occurred until Sao Kawngtai became Sawbwa when he declared himself independent of allegiance to King Thibaw and gave shelter to the exiled princes of Mongnai, Lawksawk and Mongnawng. This Sao Kawngtai (Joti Kawngtai was his full name) was also known as Saomom Kengchung partly because his mother was a lady from Kengcheng and partly because he was appointed Myoza of Kengchung before he became the Sawbwa of Kengtung. He was the principal architect of the Limbin League as most of the initial forces of the League were drawn from his State, but he did not live to see the disbanding of the League and the removal of the Limbin prince, for as the first
British major expedition was moving towards Yawngwe in January 1887, he died.\(^1\)

Sao Kawngtai was succeeded by his son, Kawng Khamfu, better known as the Tiger Sawbwa, a youth of 12 or 13. The epithet "Tiger Sawbwa" seems to have come from either his heavily pox-marked face, or ferocity of his temper, or his full name: Maha Byagghajoti Kawng Khamfu (Pali: Byaggha = Tiger). Soon after his accession, Lieutenant G. J. Younghusband, of the Queen's Own Corps of Guides, was despatched by the Indian Army to do intelligence work in Siam, Kengtung and Kenghung. His mission to Kengtung was to find out "the feasibility of a flank attack delivered on that State through Siam". His reception there was none too friendly. He was given to understand that the late Sawbwa, Sao Kawngtai, being "strenuously opposed to the entrance of Europeans into his country", would have made "short shrift" of him. Younghusband was, ominously, shown the execution tree and had a sword drawn on him by a Shan who was asked by him to hold his horse. He came to no harm, however.

Of Kengtung affairs at the time, he reported:

Kengtung .... is, or rather was, nominally tributary to the King of Burma; and tribute in the shape of ivory, gold, and ponies was yearly sent, until the massacre of the Kiang Tung Prince's sister a few years ago (1879 most probably) by King Thibaw. In retaliation for this outrage, the whole of the Burmese Embassy, then resident at Kiang Tung, the capital, were murdered and diplomatic relations with the Court at Mandalay were broken off.\(^2\)

Although at the time King Thibaw vowed vengeance, and threatened an invasion, with the double intent of punishing the Kian Tung Shans for their treachery, and of re-instating a Burmese Embassy and Burmese influence in that State; yet his threats were never executed, and, as far as Burma was concerned, Kian Tung became practically an independent State.

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1. It is not easy to determine the exact year of Sao Kawngtai's death. The Kengtung Chronicle in my possession has it as 1246=1884. CURSS, II.1.10, apparently a translation of another Chronicle of Kengtung, 1247=1885. Another Kengtung Chronicle yet, translated into Siamese, 1248=1886. Lieutenant G. J. Younghusband who visited Kengtung in March 1887 on a spying mission, stated in his report that Sawbwa Sao Kawngtai had died only two months before his arrival - unless he mistook, through bad interpretation, two years for two months. Also, the letter from the Sawbwa of Kengtung to the Sawbwa of Hsipaw in Chapter V pp.110-111, seems from its tone to have been written by Sao Kawngtai, who by March 1886 appears to have seen his allies safely across the Salween.

2. I have not been able to find a record of this incident anywhere else. Most probably the author mixed up the Mongnai revolt with that of Kengtung.
Years of apathy or timidity have considerably reduced the size of the province, the Siamese from the South, and the Chinese from the North, have both encroached to a considerable extent and have taken possession, undisturbed, and almost without protest, of large and valuable tracts of country.

On the status of Kengtung and the policy which he thought the British Government should adopt towards it, Younghusband wrote:

If we intend to maintain our inherited suzerainty over Kiang Tung, it would be both wise and politic, in conjunction with the French, to definitely settle her boundaries in this direction (towards Tongkin), at an early a date as possible.

If, on the contrary, it is the intention of the British Government to sanction the continuance of the practical state of independence in which this province has existed during the last eight years - and I cannot help thinking that this would be the most far sighted policy - it would be well to declare so at once.

The arguments in favour of this latter step are many and cogent, both from a military and political point of view.

The arguments in favour of the retention of this province are few and unimportant.

Our new kingdom of Burma Proper, bound, as it is, on the east by the Salwin river, flowing through high and almost impassable mountains is, on that face, a compact and defensible kingdom, offering serious natural obstacles to invasion, and having a clear and definite boundary between our possessions and those of our neighbours.

Add to it the State of Kiang Tung, and an element of weakness is at once introduced to the safety of our Burmese possessions, to wit, a long, straggling, ill-defined, tongue of country, which runs between two foreign nations, and ends on the borders of a third. A province open to invasion to all three of them - to China from the North, to Siam from the South, and to the French from the East, and separated from the actual possessors of the country by lofty and impassable ranges of mountains, and approachable only to an English Army by passing through Siam or China.

The Kiang Tung province in the hands of the British can never be anything but a source of weakness to the integrity of the Burmese kingdom. It will, like the Irishman's coat tails, be dragging along the ground - a constant challenge to outsiders to tread upon it.
The soundest policy would appear to be to hand over the province to the Chinese; not as a possession, but as a tributary State, making certain stipulations, for trade and defence against aggressions, favourable to British interests.

On the government of Kengtung, Younghusband writes as follows:

The government of the province of Kiang Tung is carried on by an Hereditary Prince, assisted by four councillors, or magistrates.

The present Prince is only a child of 12 years old, who succeeded his father at the beginning of the present year (1887). When I was in Kiang Tung in March, he had not yet been crowned; that ceremony being postponed till after the cremation of his father, which does not take place till six months after his death.

Of course the child is a mere puppet in the hands of the four councillors, though they prostrate themselves before him in public and never approach him, except in that grovelling position peculiar to Indo-Chinese nations.

He is a thin, pale, and rather idiotic-looking youth, with a face that may turn into a very cruel one. His father was an implacable enemy to all foreigners, and would not allow them to enter his domains. The American missionaries had made several attempts to obtain permission to visit Kiang Tung, but without success. The chief councillor informed me candidly that I should not have lived a day if I had been unlucky enough to arrive two months earlier, during the lifetime of the old Prince.

The whole legislative and magisterial government is carried on by the four councillors, all of whom must be blood relations of the Prince. The Chief councillor, who is lord of chief justice, is the most influential man in the province; he is a brother of the old Prince and uncle of the present ruler. One of the four councillors would command the army in case of war, but would probably direct their movements from his own house in Kiang Tung.

Regarding Kengtung's armed forces, Younghusband estimated that the whole of the Kengtung valley, inclusive of the town, could put into the field 3000 men, while its dependencies between the Salween and Mekong rivers could rally 7000 men, making a total of 10,000.

Younghusband regarded the martial qualities of the Kengtung Shans to be superior to those of the Laos, and gave the following incident to prove his point.
I had dismounted at a small hamlet outside Kiang Tung to make a sketch of a hut, and finding my pony troublesome, held out the reins to a Shan amongst a group of people standing by, and asked him to hold my pony a minute. Instead of immediately complying, as a Laos would have done, he drew his knife on me, and poured forth a volley of abuse, which I was not sufficiently a master of the language to understand. Being entirely alone, I thought it wiser to laugh the matter off, and producing my revolver quite quickly, pointed out to him with the utmost good humour that I was six to one too good for him, whereupon he put up his knife and joined in the general laugh at his own expense; we parted good friends.

Younghusband was quite impressed by the walls surrounding the city of Kengtung and struck by the industry and wealth of the Chinese Shans outside the eastern wall. He arrived in Kengtung via Chiengrai and Mongpak, on the 8th March 1887 and stayed on for 10 days, during which he had tried to penetrate north into Kenghung which was disallowed by the State authorities. Kengtung's attack on Kenghung a few years previously was mentioned, as was the Limbin League. His reference to the latter was a question by the Sawbwa's uncle whom he went to see on the 9th having been conducted there by a Burman from Moulmein, named Maung Kin.

He was making copius notes about me, my name, occupation, &c., when he suddenly asked, 'Did I belong to the lot who were fighting the Shans between this and Mandalay?'

The Burman answered, "Oh, dear no; this is a gentleman who is travelling all over the world. He came in a ship to Moulmein, and when he gets to Bangkok, he gets into another ship and goes to some other country." The old gentleman, who did not look at all a nice old gentleman when he asked the questions, became all smiles and good humour, and gave me a house to live in: a rather imposing-looking brick and plaster building, viewed from without. Within, it is like a rather inferior Indian stable.

The Tiger Sawbwa gave an audience to Younghusband, and the latter's impression of him and his court should be reproduced in full:

At 3 o'clock Moungkin came to say the Prince would see me. First we went to the court-house, a large wooden house on very high poles. At the end of the hall of justice was a large gilded thing that looked like a horse trough with an over-mantle behind it: in front of this and a little lower were two or three little stools which the Shans use for resting their elbows on whilst sitting on the ground. The gilded trough was therefore, I take it, merely a local emblem of justice, and the judges sat in front of it. My friend, the Prince's uncle, was Lord Chief Justice, and there were three other Judges or Magistrates. He asked my age,
and would not believe I was a day under forty, which apparently
is the age at which a Shan begins to get a moustache that many
an English old lady would put to shame. Next, "My business?"
Answer as before. "Had any 'Magistrate' sent me?" "How long
did it take to get from London (very small print to Kiang Tung
(largest type)?" He then came down and felt me all over, and
unearthing my revolver from my pocket, insisted it should be
unloaded at once, and not be taken at all into the presence of
the Prince. Having a good stout stick and another weapon handy,
I unloaded it, but, under pretence of going home with the re-
volver, reloaded it and hid it in my cummerband.

One cannot be too careful when it is one man against a
thousand. On my return the Kashmir chogah was handed round
and much admired, and then we went across to the Prince's
palace, a wretched shanty, in no way to be compared to the
Zimme Prince's palace. After passing a broad outer verandah,
we came to the audience chamber, which was about 30 feet
square, and matted. We all squatted round the edges and waited
for His Royal Highness to appear through a curtain door. The
furniture and ornaments were a mixed collection of very valuable
and very trumpery things. Large vessels of solid gold and
silver stood about amongst the rubbish of a Moulmein cheap
jack; a few spears and guns hung on the walls, and an English
naval officer's sword on one side of the door, and an Infantry
Field officer's on the other. A gilt couch, with room for two,
and a curtain, which could be dropped from the ceiling to hide
it, stood in the corner by the door; and in front of it a
mattress and some carpets were spread on which the Prince was
to sit. He kept us waiting about 15 minutes, during which time
both my legs went to sleep. On his entrance the whole crown
prostrated themselves. The Prince is a boy of about 12, a
thin-faced, long-nosed, foolish-looking youth. My chogah was
presented to him, and then they all began to jaw. I asked if
they would like a railway. They said, "No, certainly not".
In this conversation the youth took no part, and was busily
engaged in trying to get a peep at the chogah through a hole
in the paper cover, as apparently it was not etiquette to open
it before the donor. Nothing important was said or done.
After I arrived home, a man came to say His Royal Highness
wanted to see my gun and pistol. I took them to the palace,
but, as H. R. H. was much to exalted a personage to see the
weapons in my hands, and as I stoutly refused to let them out
of them, the young man had to do without them, and I went
away. At Zimme the Prince stood up, shook hands, and was
most affable. Here no one approaches within ten paces of the
Prince, and only then in the grovelling position peculiar to
these nations. To-morrow I am to get a decided answer
whether it is to be Kiang Hung or not. I don't much care
really, for I can get pretty full details about that bit, and
the French, too, have been over it. Unfortunately Kiang Tung
hates China and fears it; whereas Kiang Hung is very friendly
with China. Consequently they have got it into their silly old heads that China, and not Bangkok, is my destination, and that I am going to expose the nakedness of their land to the Chinese, or do some other profound devilment. As things stand, I don't think it would be fair on my orderly and servant to go, except with a caravan. It would not be a matter of taking a considerable risk; it would be going to almost certain destruction, and that won't help anybody.

News of the arrival in Mongnai of the British Annexation Column reached Kengtung on the 17th of March, and thinking that the local populace did not favour the news which might cause them to be actively hostile to him, Younghusband quietly slipped away from Kengtung town on the 18th evening.¹

Actually, the British Column did not get to Mongnai till May and the fears on the part of the British Intelligence officer in Kengtung seemed premature, for when the Assistant Superintendent, Mr. J. G. Scott, on reaching Mongnai to receive the surrender of the Limbin Prince and acknowledgment of British supremacy from the Sawbwas of Mongnai and other States, sent on the advise of the Sawbwa of Mongnai, circulars to all trans-Salween Sawbwas demanding submission, he received a friendly reply from Kengtung in August.² But nothing happened till the Mongyai Conference in March 1888 when the British received a letter from the Kengtung Sawbwa stating that he had intended to meet the Superintendent at Mongyai but had waited for the Sawbwas of Kenghun, Monglem and the Myosa of Kengcheng until it was too late, and that a later visit was envisaged. A party of high officials from Kengtung did start for Mongnai in May 1888 with the intention of visiting Fort Stedman but when they reached the Salween they were turned back by the news of Twet Nga Lu's antics and by the news circulated by the Yawnghwe Sawbwa, Sao On, that the British were withdrawing from the Shan States altogether.

In the same month of May 1888, the British vice-Consul at Chiangmai, Mr. Archer, was instructed to visit Kengtung on another "fact-finding" mission. With the news of Nga Lu's capture of Mongnai and rumours of the permanent withdrawal of the British from the Shan States still fresh in their minds the Kengtung officials gave but a cool reception verging on hostility to Archer. It also appears that Kengtung was under the impression that Archer asked them to submit to Chiangmai which they stated in a letter to the Sawbwa of Mongnai they would never do. What bothered the Kengtung State government was the question of the permanence of the British occupation. After pointing to the troubles in Mongnai and Mawkmai (which had just been sacked by Sawlapaw), the Kengtung officials in effect told Archer: "Such is the state of the country under British protection to the West of the Salween. Here we enjoy peace and quiet. Now you come to us in this manner from Chiangmai and would wish us to place ourselves

¹. Younghusband, G. J., The Trans-Salween State of Kiang Tung, pp. 1, 3-5, 8, 39-42.
². RASS, 1887-88, p. 4.
under the British. It is very well that you have come, but what can you expect us to say?" What could he expect them to say indeed! A lion without its claws and fangs is not too impressive. The officials told vice-Consul Archer that when the West had been definitely settled and they (Kengtung) had had time to consult Kenghung and Monglem (which according to Youngusband's report was subject to Kengtung at the time), "they would be able to decide on a matter that was properly represented to them from Mandalay".

The British in Burma were under the impression that the Kengtung's tardiness in acknowledging their supremacy was due partly to the influence of Sao Weng, the exiled Sawbwa of Lawksawk who had taken refuge in Kengtung and partly to fear of British vengeance for past events. It had been known that before the Limbin Prince was invited to lead the alliance against King Thibaw, Sao Kawngtai, the then Sawbwa of Kengtung and chief prop of the alliance, had first approached the rebel Prince, Myingun, who was regarded by the resistance party to the British in Burma as their natural leader. Hence Kengtung's fear of British vengeance. That Sao Weng managed to influence Kengtung to some extent was confirmed by Archer in his report.

In August 1888, the young Sawbwa of Kengtung wrote a letter to the Sawbwa of Mongmai, protesting against what he mistook for Archer's attempts to make him submit to Chiangmai and saying that he and his younger brother, Sao Kawn Kiao Intaleng, would pay Mongnai a visit at the end of the rains, and that representatives would be sent to Fort Stedman.

The British on their side toyed with idea of visiting Kengtung after the 1888 rainy season, hoping their mere presence would secure the submission of the Sawbwa. Once Kengtung had been annexed, they reasoned, Kenghung, Monglem and Kengcheng would follow Kengtung's lead as these trans-Salween States were related to one another in the following manner. Saonang Wentip, an elder sister of the Kengtung Sawbwa was married to the Hsenwifa of Kenghung, while the Sawbwa of Monglem had recently married the mother of young Kengtung. The Myosa of Kengcheng was a cousin of Kengtung's father, Kawngtai.

No visit by either side took place, however. At the Durbar which was held at Mongnai in January 1888 during the march of the Southern Shan Column, most of the Chiefs in the cis-Salween States

2. Crossthwaite, op. cit.
3. Title by which the Sawbwa of Kenghung is called.
4. RASS, 1887-88.
were present, but Kengtung was not there. Nevertheless, he had written several letters to the Sawbwas of Mongnai and Mong Pawn admitting the advantages of a British protectorate and saying that he would welcome them as soon as a good moment arrived.

In January, 1889, the Superintendent received the following from the Tiger Sawbwa of Kengtung and his brother the Kemmong:

From the Sawbwagyi of Kyaington and his younger brother the Kyaington Kyemmong (Heir-apparent) to the Superintendent, Shan States, - dated waxing Natdaw 1250 (December 1888)

By the favour of the Chief Commissioner and the Superintendent of the Shan States we are enjoying good health and our State is at peace. On a former occasion we wrote that when the representatives of Kyaingyongyi and Mainglingyi had reached Kyaington we would, in accordance with the agreement entered into by us with these States, send down our Amats in the company of these representatives. While we were preparing for their arrival letters addressed to the Chiefs of Mainglingyi and Kyaingyongyi were received by us from the Superintendent, Shan States. These letters were duly forwarded. Replies were received from these States saying that they owed dual allegiance (to China and Burma), that they place reliance on the Chinese authorities, and that Chinese military officers were coming down. We have written to the Kyaingyongyi Sawbwa asking him not to let these officers come down.

Kyaington is a remote and insignificant State situated on the border land, and if a large force advances on it from both sides, it will be unable to withstand and must suffer itself to be destroyed. The time is not yet ripe for the despatch of the representatives from Kyaington, and we have asked the Chief of Kyaingyongyi to stay the advance of the Chinese Officers. We are obliged therefore to ask the Superintendent, Shan States, to postpone his visit to Kyaington with an armed force.1

It is plain that Kengtung was still unsure that the British were really and permanently supreme. If the British had gone into the Shan States with an overwhelming force, instead of columns of two or three hundred men as they did, and had been able to establish law and order everywhere all at once, there would have been no question of any part of the Shan States not recognising their supremacy immediately, and that would have saved much bluff and threats used by the few British Civil Officers to convince the local populace that real forces existed to support their words. And as far as Kengtung was

1. See Chapter X.
concerned, the British policy makers at this time had not yet decided to cross the Salween.

To return to the letter from Kengtung, Scott, as Acting Superintendent, replied on the 15th June 1889 to the effect that if the Sawbwa of Kengtung had attended the durbar at Mongnai he would have seen how all the Western Chiefs had acknowledged the British protection and how peace, prosperity and security had returned to all the Western States as the result. He pointed out all the advantages to be derived from Kengtung accepting British protection, in return for almost "nothing but offerings such as were formerly sent to the Burmese King" minus all forms of presents to local British Officers who were forbidden to accept them. The Acting Superintendent advised the Sawbwa not to listen to Sao Weng, but "to the advice of the old and experienced ministers of his father", and to follow the example of the Sawbwas of Mongpaw and Mongnai.1

When it was finally decided to send an expedition to Kengtung, Scott was chosen to head it. At this time he was with Ney Elias's Boundary Commission to settle the frontier to Mongnai before starting in order to collect some mule transport of Panthays. To go with him were two other white men; Captain F. J. Pink and Surgeon Darwin. Their escort consisted of "eighteen old soldiers, Sikhs of the Shan Levy which had lately been taken over by the army, and as many untrained recruits of the same corps". To this not too impressive array of uniformed men were added their camp followers, servants, some Burmese clerks, Panthay muleteers and their pack mules.

After some delay in procuring mules and elephants, the party started from Mongnai late in February and made for Takaw on the Salween via Nawngwawp, Kengtawng, Kengkham and Kenglom. In Kengtawng evidence of ravages by Twet Nga Lu was to be seen. Scott wrote in his report: "West of the Nam Teng, in the Mone State proper, the country showed signs everywhere of the ravages of Twet Nga Lu. East of the river, where the sub-State of Keing Tawng is entered, the state of affairs is very much worse. Except for a few houses recently built at Mak Lang the country for nearly 20 miles on a stretch is practically a desert. Yet all along the road old wells, ruinous monasteries, and the grass-grown skeletons of former paddy fields, to say nothing of the hill clearings, showed that formerly there must have been a large population here. There does not seem to be much prospect that the land will be soon reclaimed. The handful of people who have so far returned to Keing Tawng have settled 20 miles further south, round the side of the old capital. There is a magnificent banyan tree, known far and wide as Mai Hung Kon, at Mak Lang. The adjoining monastery was burnt by Twet Nga Lu's brigands, and not even the sanctity of the tree, which 20 men could not span and under whose branches a fair-sized village might be built, has been able

1. RASS, 1888-89, pp. iii-iv of Appendices.
to persuade the monks to return. There are in fact not enough of the pious in the neighbourhood to support them. 1

At Keng Kham the party was enlarged by the Myosa of the place and his retinue who accompanied Scott to Kengtung. Scott reported: "He gave me to understand that his object was to improve his mind by travel and to learn English modes of procedure. It afterwards, however, appeared that he was attracted by the fame of the charms of a sister of the Kengtung Kemmong. He was successful in his wooing, and it may be hoped that his bride will put an end to the habit which he is developing of making inconsequent marches. Otherwise he is in great danger of becoming an intolerable young prig".

From Takaw the party went on to Hsenmawng where the road branched off to Mongpeng and Mongpu-awn, both routes leading eventually to Kengtung. The Mongpeng route was the shorter of the two and had been known as the "Lammadaw" as it was the main route from Takaw to Kengtung much used during the former regime. At the time of the little column's passage in March 1890, however, it was blocked in several places by landslips due to neglect and disuse. The neglect had followed disorders at Mongpeng on account of rival claims to the Phyaship of the district which resulted in a minor civil war that had made the road unsafe for the past three years, and Scott reported at the time that the end of the strife was not yet in sight. So the party took the Mongpu-awn route. The capital village of Mongpu-awn was found to be a thriving little place - the houses were large and substantial, rice was grown far beyond the requirements of the inhabitants of the valley, and the cultivation of opium in the hills to the east brought in a good deal of money. The Hpaya in charge was Hpaya Hsai, whose family had been in control of the place for three generations, receiving direct appointment from the Sawbwa in Kengtung.

The small British Column reached Kengtung on the 11th of March 1890. The following account by J. G. Scott was his first impression of the city of Kengtung, and it is worthwhile reproducing it in full before we proceed to describe his business in Kengtung:

It lies in a plain about 20 miles long and perhaps 15 broad. [Actually about 5 miles broad]. To the west and north this is perfectly flat and under paddy cultivation. The town is built on the western edge of this rolling country and overlooks the paddy lands. It is surrounded by a wall about 15 feet high and machicolated at the top. The bricks are insufficiently burnt, the wall is old and has therefore crumbled away in many places, so that it is picturesque rather than formidable; moreover, some hills to the southwest would enable field guns to drop shells wherever they please all over the enceinte. The wall follows the line of the rolling ground, and to the north and south towers high above

1. RASS, 1889-90, pp. 10-11.
the plain. To the west, it has not this advantage, and jungle affords admirable cover up to the dry ditch which protects it on this side. To the north, east and south swampy ground covers the approach. The walls measure 4 3/4 miles round and have 10 gates, which used to be covered by semi-circular arches. Only two of these arches, however, now remain, both on the eastern face. There is very little level ground within the walls and only the northern half of the walled wall is inhabited. Even this portion is so overrun with trees as to be almost jungly, and there are several large swamps among the houses. These supply people with water to drink and small mud fish to eat. There are probably 700 or 800 houses within the walls and many of these are substantial. Some are entirely built of bricks, some have brick basement and plank walling, and the number of bamboo houses is very small. All the better class houses are roofed with small tiles made locally. To judge from the Sawbwa's audience hall these tiles are not very satisfactory against the rain, but they at any rate prevent the fires which do much frequent mischief in other Shan towns. The monasteries are numerous and some of them are adorned with elaborate carving and wall-paintings. These are very much like the ordinary Burmese or Shan Kyaungs in general architecture, but there is an undefinable suggestion of Tartar influence about them. This is particularly noticeable in the massive gate ways which immediately suggest the pai-fang of China. The resemblance is no doubt due to the fact that the brick work was run up by Chinese or Shan-Chinese handi-craftsmen. There is no similarity whatever to the steep-roofed, parti-coloured, tiled gables of the Bangkok wats. Outside the walls the villages are very numerous and populous. Affairs at Keing Tung was for a time so critical that it was inadvisable to send out the military surveyors to map out the plain, so that the number of villages can only be guessed at. I should, however, be inclined to estimate the population of the whole plain at from 15,000 to 20,000. To the east of the town is a very large colony of Shan Chinese, Tai Mee or Tai Neu as they are commonly called. These people have been resident for many years. They have large gardens and keep goats, pigs, duck and fowls in great numbers. Their houses are all built of bamboo, and their villages, like those of China, are inconceivably dirty, though in person the inhabitants are clean enough. They do a good deal of trade. It is they who introduced the manufacture of tiles into Keing Tung, and I believe that the pottery-work, the plates, cups, bowls, jugs, tea-pots, spittoons, pagoda ornaments, and so forth, which are so varied in kind and so cheap in Keing Tung, are mainly their handiwork. They are peaceful enough, but they have a shrewed idea of their own strength and are said on several occasions to have regulated the imposition of taxes according to their own ideas, and to have over-awed the Sawbwa into accepting their views. These Tai Che visit all parts of the Shan States during the dry season in search of work, but, so
far as I know, Keing Tung and Keing Hong, where also there is a large colony of them, are the only places where they have formed permanent settlements.1

The small British Column was described by Sir Charles Crossthwaite thus: "Not a very imposing embassage, certainly, to represent the majesty of England, and to require the allegiance of a chief who ruled over twenty thousand square miles of country. But the leaders had the right spirit .... The elephants, although they marched slowly, and may have been execrated at times on that account, undoubtedly added pomp to the somewhat insignificant procession which entered the city".2

The party was met at the edge of the plain, about 1½ miles from the city walls, by a deputation of officials headed by the Chief Minister.3 A great part of the road was lined by spectators, who in many places stood three or four deep to see them pass.4

They camped on the site of the old Burmese post, and were visited almost at once by the Sawbwa and his brother, the heir apparent. The visit is best described in Scott's own words:

We had barely got our tents pitched when the Sawbwa and the heir apparent came in state to pay us a formal visit. They came in separate parties, riding on gorgeously caprisoned ponies and shaded by numerous gold umbrellas. Each had his own body-guard of several hundred men. Most of these were armed, but they drew off and did not come up to my tent. Half the town followed, and we were surrounded by a half moon

1. RASS, 1889-90, pp. 16-7.
3. This is from J. G. Scott's Official Report on the Administration of the Shan States, 1889-90, para. 11, p. 17. From "Scott of the Shan Hills", p. 111 we have this account: "Messengers had been sent from Kengtung to meet the British party, but missed them by going out on the northern road; they hurried back and reached the camp late at night". And from Scott, J. G., Burma & Beyond, p. 251: "Mr. Scott sent a letter on ahead to say he was arriving on such a date. He expected to be met, and was rather piqued that he wasn't, nor was there any one to point out a place to camp, even when he actually arrived at Kengtung".
4. Incidentally my mother was among those who went to see "the entry of the Kalas".
of 2,000 or 3,000 people. The Sawbwa was obviously very nervous. He is sixteen and well grown for that age, but his appearance is far from prepossessing. The ordinary Shan type of face is not handsome and it requires a pleasant expression to make it even passably engaging, rather than brilliant-hued satin coats, gold-bespangled trousers, with a dado pattern round the bottom, gorgeous slippers with the toes turned up mediaeval style, and diamond rings and ear cylinders. The Sawbwa has the usual heavy jaw, the extremely prominent cheekbones, lips more than usually protruding, nose more than usually sketchy, eyes set nearly flat with the forehead, and with an expression which is instantly repellent. Very deep traces of an attack of small-pox add, altogether unnecessarily, to those ill looks. On this face the struggle between conceit, which had never before met any one not an inferior, a desire to presume, yet a fear of consequences, and a natural dullness of brain, which rendered ideas scarce, produce an unpleasing effect. He hardly said a word except yes or no. The heir-apparent is a bright little boy. He looks two or three years younger than his brother. He has a rather pleasant face.

The Chief knew no Burmese, and acknowledged what Shan remarks were addressed to him only by grunts over his shoulder, but he fingered books and papers lying on the camp table, and roused the doctor to fury by taking up his briar pipe and putting it in his mouth.

Conversation was desperately jerky, and as soon as he could with propriety, Scott said that he would return the Sawbwa's call next morning, if that would be convenient. The Chief was understood to say that he didn't mind, but some of his attendant ministers, who were elderly, well-mannered, and obviously well acquainted with Burmese courtly forms, said for him that it was very condescending of the Wundauk; any time would be suitable.

Then there was silence, which was rather embarrassing, but was abruptly put an end to by the Chief's getting up and saying: "I'm going now", and off he went without any of the most ordinary form of Oriental civility in leave-taking.

And now we turn to the Official Report:

A formal visit was paid to the Sawbwa next day. He is building himself a new brick haw, and the old palace, which is a dingy wooden erection, is said to be so rickety that it would have infallibly collapsed with the number of people who

were to be present at the reception. We were therefore received in the court-house, which looks rather like a railway goods shed outside, but has been rather highly decorated inside. The gilding is now, however, worn and tawdry. There is a large gold throne at the further end enclosed within a railing and reached by folding doors from behind, like the Mandalay Yaza-palin, which it otherwise resembles in construction. The Sawbwa and his brother sat on chairs in front of this, outside the railing, and we were placed between them. There was an enormous gathering of officials both of the town and the neighbourhood, and of the prominent merchants of the town, and the conversation was kept up by these and by the Kyem Meung, for the Sawbwa had never a word to say beyond yes or no. The merchants all talked of the opening up of communications with the west, and particularly of the construction of a railway. Trade at present is entirely with China. The old Chiengmai trade is greatly interfered with, and almost put an end to by vexations, restrictions and imports levied at the Siamese frontier posts. The general impression received was that the merchant class and the bulk of the ministers were delighted with the establishment of British authority in Keing Tung. There is a huge drum near the door of the audience hall. It is made of hide stretched on a wooden frame, and is about the size of a puncheon. This is said to have been made by the "hill people", but by what hill people and where nobody knew. One stroke on this sigyi announces that the Sawbwa has ascended the throne, two that he has left the palace to go through the town, and three strokes summon all officials and armed men within hearing to the palace without an instant's delay. We heard three strokes on this drum a good many times during the next few days.  

1. The drum can still be seen in Kengtung at the Kemarat Club which occupies the building of the Old "Court House" where Scott was received by the Sawbwa. It is one of a set of three made from the same tree trunk - the other two being at Wat Hokong and the present Hawgyi. The size of each is bigger than a puncheon (= "Large cask for liquid &c. holding from 72 to 120 gallons" - The concise Oxford Dictionary, 1966 Edition) - probably each will hold about 300 to 400 gallons. Certain "hill people" from certain areas in Kengtung are known for their ability to make such large drums. The one-two-three strokes signals seem over dramatising. The drum at the Hawgyi is played during certain State ceremonies in conjunction with the Frog Drum. It is also used to summon people - normally the Sawbwa's own officers and pages - to the palace, and then more than three strokes are required, beginning with slow, measured beats and ending in continuous, fast ones thus X X X X x x x x x x .... with the intensity of last beats dying away, and this is repeated three times when there will be a pause of ten to fifteen minutes, and then the beating begins again, and after another pause, the beating of the drum is made for the third time - this constitutes the summoning of the Sawbwa's men by the big drum.
The "delight" noted by Scott at prospects of British rule was marred by an incident which placed the Sawbwa at a disadvantage and showed up the gun-boat pluck and bluff of empire builder Scott. On the night of the 6th of March, some eight Panthay muleteers of the British party wandered into the pwe which was being held in the precincts of the haw, and were attacked "by the Sawbwa's men", in which attack one of them was killed and one wounded, while the rest dispersed. The wounded men limped back to the British camp and reported to his masters what had happened. According to this man the muleteers were innocently buying some cheroots in the pwe when they were "set on by the Sawbwa's men" and while most of them escaped, one by the name of Lao Pan, "was seized, held with his face to the ground, and shot in the back by the Sawbwa himself". Scott's report on the incident and his writings about it, were based on the report given by the Panthays, who maintained they had touched no drinks nor had misbehaved themselves in any way at the pwe.

Scott wrote in his official report:

... I demanded, next morning, an explanation from the Sawbwa and production of the man who had fired the revolver. I got no explanation except that the Sawbwa had issued an order that none of our followers were to be allowed to go about in the town wearing arms. In a country where every male above six years wears a dagger this was an absurdity. The order had, moreover, not been communicated to our people. I therefore demanded the surrender of the offender and had issued this order before the Panthe's managed to summon up courage enough to denounce the Sawbwa himself as the murderer. It was impossible to recede. It was necessary for British prestige and for our own personal safety to settle the case. Our followers expected to be massacred in their beds; the Sawbwa feared that he would be seized in his palace and filled it with armed men. For two days the suspense was trying. I then announced that if my orders were not complied with, I would march down to the haw the next day. This brought up the Tawpaya and several other ministers with a petition that I would decide the case as it stood. They produced no witnesses and did not deny that the Sawbwa as the offender. I therefore sentenced him to pay Rs.500 compensation to the wounded man and Rs.1,500 if the missing man were not produced within five days alive and well. This sentence I informed them was a concession to the low state of their civilization and the ignorance of the Sawbwa. The Rs.500 were paid a couple of hours afterwards and the Rs.1,500 a few days before we left.

Scott himself must have felt a slight sense of guilt at his own behaviour, for the next paragraph of his official report begins with the sentence: "The incident was all the more embarrassing because none of the details of the Sawbwa's relations with the British Government had been settled".1

1. **RASS, 1889-90, pp. 17-18.**
The money was paid to the chief muleteer, who received it "with a wide grin". The grin suggested little sorrow for poor Lao Pan and one wonders how much of the compensation reached his relatives.

Actually it was not as simple as reported officially - this is revealed in Scott's other writings. Having been told that the Sawbwa was the offender it was not easy for Scott to broach the subject to the Sawbwa directly. To impress the latter, and the local populace with the might of the Empire, before dispensing justice, Scott arranged for his twenty odd uniformed personnel to have a parade, arms drills and exercises and a mock battle. This went off well and it was wound up with a general salute, before which Captain Pink was reported to have said: "We'll salute you and not that savage, so mind you take it'.

During the display, Scott could not bring himself to mention the Lao Pan affair, but wrote about it immediately upon reaching his camp and sent the letter to the Sawbwa, asking him to come and discuss the terms of his sanad.

The sawbwa went to see Scott the next day, and Pink posted his men about their camp in such a way as to prevent any surprise attack, with men pretending to clean their rifles.

The Chief came with a smaller escort than the first time. He treated the question of British suzerainty with imperturbable nonchalance. He had nothing to say against it, and saw no particular advantages in it. I had to argue in every way I knew, until at last, out of sheer boredom, he agreed that a covenant should be drawn up. Then I asked about the mule-driver. The Chief said that the Nats had not yet answered, but there would probably be an answer on the day of 'preparation before the full moon'. That was four days ahead. Then he flung himself off.

There is no record to show the Sawbwa's version of the story. There is no reason to discredit the main happenings, only, it is not necessarily true that the mule drivers were such angels as Scott would have us believe. The incident, nevertheless, was a great help to the ease with which Scott "conquered", single handed, the largest of the Shan States.

A durbar was held on the 29th March, three days before our departure from Keing Tung, for the purpose of formally presenting the Sawbwa with his sanad. Except for the

1. Scott, J. G., Burma and Beyond.

presence of the Keing Kham Myoza and the Naw Kham Meung Tein, brother-in-law of the Mone Sawbwa, those who attended were all connected with the Keing Tung State. This, however, is so large that the area represented is quite as great as would have been the case at either a Mone or Fort Stedman durbar. Besides the Sawbwa, his brother, and his ministers, there were many men of position from places considerably over 100 miles from the capital. I therefore took advantage of the opportunity to address them at some length on the advantages which must follow to the State from the acceptance of British suzerainty. I especially impressed upon them that the British supremacy meant peace and trade, and urged them to maintain the one and develop the other. As is usual with a speech in the Shan States a running comment was kept up in different parts of the audience on the various points enumerated, and on the whole it seemed that their comprehension was satisfactory and their resolution praiseworthy. The ministers promised for the Sawbwa complete obedience to the Chief Commissioner in all matters connected with his State, and the Sawbwa himself was divided between admiration of the repeating carbine which he received as a present and a laudable desire to be amiable. The gold and silver flowers, and other tributary offerings, of which a list is given in Enclosure No. IV, were made up to the full amount, a portion having been already presented before we reached Keing Tung, and on the whole the settlement had every appearance of being satisfactory, certainly much more so than had seemed at all possible when the Panthe muleteers were shot. We left Keing Tung on the 1st April and in the 2¼ months which have elapsed since then the Sawbwa has asked for advice under the terms of his sanad, complete peace has been maintained throughout his State, and everything points to the observance of the terms of his sanad by Soa Keing Tung as carefully and loyally as by the more civilized Chiefs west of the Salween river.

The British party left Kengtung on the 1st of April via Monghsat and Mongpu. This route was reported to be so much more difficult than the Takaw route. The Salween was crossed at Ta Peu, and after a delay of about one week at Mongpan, Fort Stedman was reached on the 6th of June.

Years later Sir George Scott mentioned that at a Government garden party at Maymyo the Sawbwa of Kengtung told him "casually that it was only because of the intercession of his wives that he had not massacred the whole party", and that he now thought they had been right.

Lady Scott added: "Though Scott was not to be allowed any special recognition on account of what he had done, yet in a private

1. RASS, 1889-90, pp. 24-25.
letter to him, Sir Charles Crossthwaite, the Chief Commissioner, acknowledges his value handsomely.¹

The chapter can be closed with the list of tribute given to the British party as below:

"Tribute paid by the Sawbwa of Kyaington".

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Article</th>
<th>To The King</th>
<th>To the Crown</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>:Value:</td>
<td>Prince.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>:Number: in rupees.</td>
<td>:pees.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>By the Sawbwa.</th>
<th>Rs.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Small gold flowers</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot; silver &quot;</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gold ornaments for pony trappings</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Silver &quot; &quot;</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rolls of satin</td>
<td>2 : 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rolls of bayaw satin</td>
<td>2 : 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pieces of black cotton cloth</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pieces of Turkey cloth</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gilt candles</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Silver &quot;</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ponies</td>
<td>2 : 10.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trousers</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spear-handles</td>
<td>7</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>By the Mahadeur.</th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Large gold flowers</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large silver &quot;</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>By the four Amats.</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Large gold flowers</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large silver &quot;</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹ Mitton, G. E., op. cit., p. 152.
CHAPTER X

Boundary with Siam

Anyone reading accounts of the British conquest of Upper Burma and the Shan States cannot help being struck by their hesitancy, one could even call it timidity, in crossing the Salween at any point into what used to constitute territories that had paid annual or triennial tribute to the Court of Ava. In their proclamations the British declared that as they were heirs to the Kingdom of his Burmese majesty all territories that had paid tribute to the latter became British, but when it came to actual penetration into the trans-Salween Shan States they stopped short.

British officers on the spot were ready and eager to cross the Salween, for they knew there was nothing to oppose their troops, but at the same time they could not advance one step without orders from India. Nearly two years elapsed from the time of the Mongyai settlement before the first British crossed the Salween to plant the Union Jack.

Official reasons for the British delay in physically annexing the trans-Salween Shan States were military, administrative and political.

The Army in India was most reluctant to extend its commitments. It is well known that the military's first reaction to the suggestion of annexation of Upper Burma was not favourable. As far as the Shan States were concerned, they argued that the Salween was a natural boundary where their commitments should end. An enemy from the east of that river, they maintained, could not advance without extreme difficulty due to rugged and mountainous terrain, while the rolling Shan tableland immediately to the west of the river would form an ideal position for defence with easy communications open to the Irrawaddy valley. The Salween itself was one of the world's most turbulent rivers, infested with swift currents and innumerable rapids, and running through a deep and rocky gorge. In spite of its vast volume of water and impressive length, it is not navigable except for a distance of some 100 miles from its mouth which was already safe in British hands since 1826.

With the conquest of Upper Burma, an area of over 120,000 square miles had been added to the Indian Empire, and of these nearly 20,000 square miles lay across the Salween, excluding
Monglem and Kenghung. One of the reasons for the British conquest of Burma was to protect the eastern frontier of India. Before 1885, a military authority maintained that if India was seriously threatened it would be necessary to recall the British garrison from British Burma letting that province "go for the time". That being the case, the addition of 20,000 square miles of administrative load to the existing burden would be no small strain, especially when there was no hope of any revenue apart from the annual tribute which would not be sufficient even to defray the cost of garrisoning a battalion of regular soldiers. And unless effective administration could be insisted upon there was no point in the British taking over those territories to the east of the Salween. Administratively speaking therefore there was not the slightest need for the British to cross the river.

Politically, the British wished to avoid at all costs a common frontier with the French who were fast expanding from the east in Indo-China. They would like to have a friendly and what they considered strong, power like China come in between the extreme eastern frontier of the Indian Empire and that of the Indo-Chinese empire of their rival expansionists. If "bad hats" were to collect in these regions let them be the headache of Imperial China who had no watertight legal mind and whose summary trials and executions were famous then, at least among the frontier regions. At one point, through panic over the bogey of a common frontier with France, the British seriously played with the idea of renouncing in favour of China all rights over all the trans-Salween territories tributary to Ava.1

To avoid a common boundary with France became an obsession with the British policy makers - an obsession which led to many decisions detrimental to the interests of several hundred thousand souls whose rulers had always looked to Ava for protection, and which finally brought them the very thing they wished to avoid.

British eagerness to please Imperial China stemmed from two or three sources. One was the impression abroad that China was a great power. This made the British very cautious about infringing her territorial rights. The British of course were entirely in the dark as to the exact limits of Burma's frontier with China; nor did they know exactly the relationship between Ava and Peking. Another important factor in the favourable dealings China had with Britain was the appointment by China of Sir Robert Hart as Advisor to her Customs and of Sir Halladay McCartney as Advisor to her Minister to the Court of St. James.

When news of the British preparations (by the British) for the Third Anglo-Burmese War reached Peking, Hart cabled from there on the 1st of November 1885 to Mr. J. D. Campbell of the British Foreign Office in London:

1. Political & Secret Home Correspondence, 1887, Vols. 91 & 92.
Tsungli Yamen Prince yesterday said to me: What is this about Burma? We hear England has sent an ultimatum and is preparing an expedition. Burma is our tributary State, and sovereignty will compel China to interfere; but England is a friendly Power, we desire friendly arrangements. Therefore we want to be before hand; better prevent complication than wait for complication to be adjusted. We do not like to enquire through either Marquis or Peking (British) Legation, fearing one way might cause a difficulty and the other create official coldness. Please ascertain privately what offense Burma gave and what reparation England requires. We can treat matter officially later on, if necessary.

The sentiments were friendly, correct and according to protocol, but since the Chinese invasions of Burma had been successfully driven off in 1769, Burma had never felt she was tributary to China. As Colonel Henry Yule remarked in a note dated the 30th November 1885 to the Foreign Office, the agreement between the Burmese and Chinese generals after the latter's defeat in 1769 to exchange presents as between two equal and friendly Powers, was represented in Peking as Ava's paying tribute to the Emperor. Yule added: "It certainly was the case that until lately our presents were regarded (at the Court of China) as tribute".

Two months earlier, late in September 1885, Sir Robert Hart wrote to Lord Salisbury that his knowledge of China had convinced him of two things: China would very soon be a powerful State; and "the safety of England's Indian Empire hinged upon England's relations with China". Hart went on to suggest that Chinese troops be trained in India and their naval cadets with the British navy, and that China would be willing to join in an alliance against Russia.  

Englishmen in the loyal services of foreign nations appear to have been the gentlemanly type. In any case, in those days few people thought the Manchu Dynasty would fall so easily to progressive forces 25 years later.

No wonder then that British officers in Burma in 1885-86 received strict instructions not to offend any Chinese Officer or subject beyond Burma's boundary, the limits of which nobody knew exactly.

But the British official reasons for not crossing the Salween did not bear close examination. No river, however great, has yet proved to be an effective barrier to the advance of a determined army. The Burmese certainly did not find either the Salween or the Mekong a hindrance to the extension of their suzerainty eastwards. Nor did the Mekong prevent the Siamese from invading Laos, Cambodia

1. Tseng, at the time Chinese Minister in London.
and Vietnam. The cost of administering 20,000 square miles and of garrisoning troops therein would be a mere drop in the high budget of the mighty Indian Empire, especially when it involved only indirect rule through "native rulers". Experiences with Twet Nga Lu had taught the British what could happen in these areas if bad characters were allowed to collect beyond the writ of their strict laws. Not to cross the Salween would also damage British prestige in the newly-conquered territories. And to give the trans-Salween States gratis and outright to China and Siam would be inviting the very trouble they wished to avoid, for who could say that these Powers under pressure subsequently might not hand them over to France, in which eventuality the French would be next-door neighbours to the British on the Salween, instead of on the Mekong nearly 200 miles further east. Certainly Siam was expected to be annexed by France any time. Furthermore, the Salween which was used for floating teak logs down to its mouth at Moulmein in British territory, might prove a source of international friction if both its banks in the Shan States, where teak forests abound, were not under British control.

These arguments were put forward by the British authorities in Burma who took a more realistic view of both the Chinese and French bogeys, and they are forcefully put as below:

In the Chief Commissioner's opinion, the only course which can be pursued with any reasonable prospect of success is to assert the undoubted rights of the Government over these States and to repeat the invitation already sent to them to acknowledge themselves to be British subjects. The longer the adoption of this course is delayed the more risk there is that the invitation will not be responded to. If the opportunity afforded by the holding of a durbar of Chiefs at Mone in April next is not taken to secure the submission of these States, the Government must be prepared to face the probability that when Kyaing to n and the other Trans-Salween States are called upon to submit they will decline to do so. The position would then be a very serious one. Either it would be necessary to compel submission by force, or the claim to supremacy would have to be withdrawn. Neither of these alternatives can be contemplated without misgiving. In the meantime, as the Government of India is aware, the Sawbwa of Yatsauk, an avowed enemy of the British Government, is at Kyaing to n. He is in correspondence with the Myingun Prince, and he is doing his utmost to undermine British power and influence in the Shan States on both sides of the Salween .......

It will be seen from the papers submitted with my letter No. 66C., dated the 2nd February 1889, that the emissaries of the Prince went to Tonquin through Kyaing to prepare the way for the Prince's journey to that State, and that they must have received assistance and encouragement from the French, who, it may be supposed without unfairness, have been well aware of the object of the mission. It is probably true that
between the Mekhaung and the nearest French stations in Tonquin a large belt of mountainous country intervenes. It will take the French a considerable time to bring this country under their administration. There is, however, nothing to prevent them from accepting a protectorate over Kyaington if the offer was made. That they may very likely look to extending their boundary to the Mekhaung is evident from the provisions of the secret Burmo-French treaty of 1884, which provided the cession of Kianghung to France. Our present hesitation may therefore lead to the advancement of the French boundary to the Salween instead of to the Mekhaung.....

The relations of these countries to the kingdom of Burma, their connections with each other, the ties that bind them to the Cis-Salween States, the effect which our withdrawal or holding back would have on our prestige, the favourable position which they afford to malcontents as a refuge and a basis for an attack on British territory, and lastly, the course which their rulers and people would pursue if cast off by the power to which they have been accustomed to look, all these matters were found to be factors in the problem.

That these States, as enumerated in the appendix to Mr. Smeaton's letter No. 256, dated the 10th of September, 1887, were dependencies of Burma is a matter of fact which admits of no doubt whatsoever. If we cast them off, it will be a deliberate departure from the principles so clearly laid down in the last paragraph of the Secretary of State's despatch. It will appear that the burden of the Government of Burma which we have taken up is too heavy for our strength. The effect of this action will be, in the opinion of the local officers, to diminish estimation in which the British power is held in the Shan States. Sir Charles Crossthwaite concurs in that opinion. Our influence in those States is supported by little more than an appearance of force, and rests on the belief of the people that we are able and at all times ready to enforce our orders. A confession of weakness will shake that belief. If the British cannot hold the States across the Salween, how are they able to hold the neighbouring and connected States lying on this side of the river?

One or two States east of the Mekong paid tribute to both China and Burma, but most of the cis-Mekong States used to pay tribute to Ava alone.

Of these Kyaington is by far the largest and most powerful. Whatever she does will probably decide the action taken by the others. Now it is very improbable that Kyaington will gravitate towards Siam or Chiangmai. The Chiangmai Governors have been encroaching on Kyaington on the south and the
feeling towards Chiengmai is not very friendly. On the occasion of Mr. Archer's visit the fact that he came from Chiengmai stood in his way. They were prepared to receive messages and orders from Mone but not from Chiengmai. It is extremely unlikely that any of the States will place themselves under Chiengmai of whose principles and method of governing they are not without knowledge. It is almost equally unlikely that Kyaington will place herself in the hands of China. The influence and power of China in those parts is weak, and it is doubtful whether an accession of territory between the Salween and Mekhaung would tempt her to undertake the responsibility which it would bring with it. It is, the Chief Commissioner considers, a mistake to suppose that a council can be called of China, Siam, and England to partition the territory which we desire to discard without reference to the Chiefs of that territory. At any rate there is no ground at present for such a supposition. The probability is that when the Chief of Kyaington discovers that notwithstanding the friendliness of his attitude, the British Government is ready to discard him and to make him the subject of an arrangement with China or Siam, he will not be inclined to acquiesce in the measure, or feel grateful to us for our intentions. He will look about for other protection. The communications already established with the Myingun Prince in Pondicherry will not fail to come to his mind, and it will not be surprising if he asks for French protection, or invites the Myingun Prince, who will come with the assistance and countenance of the French. With Kyaington will go all the other minor Trans-Salween States which are left to their own devices.

The Burman emissaries of the Myingun Prince have shown the road from Tonquin to Kyaington. There is no difficulty in the way of sending a French agent to Kyaington. With Kyaington as a centre of hostile influence, the disturbances which already result from Trans-Salween intrigues may be expected to increase and the necessity of maintaining a considerable force in the Shan States may be regarded as a possible and probable contingency.

Such are the considerations which have induced or rather compelled Sir Charles Crossthwaite to put aside the idea of the Salween boundary, attractive as that idea from some points of view undoubtedly is, and to record his opinion that the rights enjoyed by Burma over the Trans-Salween States should be taken up as a matter of sound policy and expediency.

1. PCTSS, V, pp. 620–623. Letter No. 640 Foreign Department, dated the 2nd February 1889 from the Chief Commissioner to the Government of India.
Most probably it was the last portion of the letter that frightened the British Government into deciding to cross the Salween.

It must have been trying for the Chief Commissioner and his staff to have to obtain orders from India for every move they wished to make towards the Salween. At one point, Burma was told to invite the trans-Salween Kengtung, Kenghung, Monglem and Kengcheng to attend some durbar of submission; and then, orders would come withdrawing the invitation. (It took a good part of a month for messages to reach Kenghung in those days.) Little initiative was left for officers on the spot whose words went unheeded in India and Whitehall. See the following telegrams, for example:

From J. G. Scott, Esq., Officiating Superintendent, Shan States to the Chief Secretary to the Chief Commissioner, Burma, No. 3L dated the 10th April 1889:

I leave 12th for Mone to hold durbar on 1st May. Orders are requested as to what I am to say in durbar speech and in conversation with Chiefs regarding Mongpu, the trans-Salween Mongpan and Maukme States, and the greater trans-Salween States.

Reply, confidential, No. 3 F. P. dated 11th April 1889:

Your 3L. Say as little as possible about the trans-Salween States. If you say anything, say that the decision of the Government of India about these States is not yet known.

By the beginning of the year following this telegram, however, the British Government had accepted Crossthwaite's recommendations and decided to brace itself and plunge across the turbulent Salween. Once this decision had been arrived at, their military and administrative machinery was set in (slow) motion accordingly. Boundary Commissions must be appointed to demarcate frontiers with Siam, France and China, and an expedition must be sent to Kengtung to receive from its Ruler the recognition of British supremacy. These activities kept the British occupied almost till the close of the century.

The mission to Kengtung has been described in the preceding chapter. We shall now begin with the various Boundary Commissions in chronological order, beginning from the South in the trans-Salween Karenni.

Here the whole stretch along the Salween was populated by about 3000 to 4,000 Karennis with other peoples such as Shans and White Karens numbering about another thousand. Settlements in the North were under Heng Long, a man described as "a Shan by birth, but a Red Karen in everything else", who controlled about 21 villages, while the southern settlements constituting about the same number of villages were under a Karen named La Pe. The tract seems to have
been colonised some 30 or 40 years previously. A Karenni called Pilu organised the colonisation with advances of cash, cattle, seed grain and tools from the chief of Kantarawadi and settled in the north. At the same time the southern portion as far as Me Te was colonised by Yang Saral (or Yindale, i.e. Metis Shans born in Eastern Karenni) and others. Previous to these settlements the country seems to have been uninhabited except by nomadic taungya-cultivating villagers. The settlers lived at distances from the Salween varying from 15 to 25 miles because the hills along the river are very stony with barely enough soil to grow even ingzin and bamboo; but the tract was very rich in teak which was subsequently worked almost exclusively by Shans and Burmese foresters from Moulmein.¹

The connection which the tract had with Siam was described in September 1884 by Mr. E. B. Gould the British Consul at Chiengmai in the following terms:

The territory occupied by the Red Karens on this side of the Salween was some years ago the scene of a struggle between the Chiengmai Chief and Tsalapaw (Sawlapaw). For a succession of years Chiengmai sent a force to drive out the Karens. When the Laos were in force the Karens retired to their strongholds in the hills on the other side of the river, and as soon as the Laos returned the Karens resumed their former position on the Chiengmai side. Meanwhile Tsalapaw (Sawlapaw) harried the country far beyond Muang Yuom with bands of dacoits and elephant-stealers. This entirely stopped all trade, and ultimately so worried the Chiengmai people that they became willing to make a treaty. It was then agreed that the country should be considered Chiengmai territory, but that Sawlapaw's Karens should be allowed to live and work unmolested therein (they were chiefly teak foresters). Sawlapaw on his side agreed to withdraw his robber-bands. Fugitives from either country were to be surrendered. A solemn treaty was made, and by the terms thereof, is to endure "as long as there is water in the Salween or until the horns of the buffalo grow straight". It has hitherto been faithfully observed by both parties and the country has been quiet enough.

This "solemn treaty" was read out in Chiengmai to Mr. Archer in June 1889 when Siam actually claimed Eastern Karenni after Sawlapaw had been defeated, and he interpreted it as a treaty of extradition with Chiengmai undertaking to arrest fugitive criminals on the east of the Salween while Sawlapaw was to arrest fugitives on the west side of that river. This was a recognition by the Karennis of the territorial claims to the east of the Salween by Chiengmai.

The Siamese claimed the authenticity of the treaty but the British were inclined to doubt its genuine existence. The Siamese maintained the agreement was signed on the 30th April 1882.

¹. RASSS, 1889-90, p. 6.
When the British Government asked for Siamese cooperation against Sawlapaw, did they recognise the Siamese claims over trans-Salween Kantarawadi? Prince Devawongse, the Siamese Foreign Minister, maintained that Mr. Gould made a verbal promise to allow the Siamese to retain possession of the Karenni territory east of the Sawlein. Gould certainly informed the Chief Commissioner of Burma on November 10, 1888 that in return for their cooperation the Siamese would probably wish to establish territorial rights over the trans-Salween Karenni. He further recommended that the Siamese rights over the territory might be admitted. Gould's intimation to the Chief Commissioner arrived too late in Rangoon to be included in the British ultimatum to Sawlapaw, but Hildebrand was instructed to keep Siam's claim in mind in his settlement with the Karenni Chief and to tell him that as Siam was a friend of England he must not molest her. On second thoughts, however, the Chief Commissioner was against having the Siamese on the Salween "in view of the probable absorption of Siam at some future date by a European power".1

After the defeat of Sawlapaw, the Siamese were asked to evacuate the trans-Salween territory of Karenni but the Officer Commanding the Siamese troops replied that the Salween was the boundary between Siam and Karenni; and two hundred soldiers were then distributed in some eight posts throughout the trans-Salween Karenni. Pilu villagers were prevented from returning to their homes.

In the Siamese capital Gould, now British Minister, endeavoured to persuade the Siamese Government to withdraw their troops. At the same time he told the British Foreign Office that the Siamese could prove their right on the ground they had occupied and as they had already had their frontier on the Salween south of Karenni he did not consider there would be any political complications if that frontier were extended a little to the north. To the Chief Commissioner of Burma, he recommended that the Siamese suzerainty should be recognised on the Salween up to the valley of the Me Pai river.

When Gould approached the Siamese Government in Bangkok, the Foreign Minister, Prince Devawongse, maintained that he had made a bargain with Gould that in return for their cooperation the Siamese were to be allowed to have the whole of the territory occupied by their troops. Gould denied that he had ever made any such bargain.

It looks as if Gould had definitely made some off-the-record verbal promise to give the prince that understanding. And it must have been this understanding or misunderstanding that gave rise to the rumour in Mehawngsawn that the Salween had been adopted as the boundary between Siam and the Shan States. The British said Siam had promised to cooperate unconditionally.

1. CSTK, pp. 1, 37, 20, 35, 7, 8. (This is interesting: it anticipated the 'Paknam Incident' by nearly 5 years and illustrates the awareness on the part of British frontier officers of French ambitions. D.G.E.H.)
The triangular discussions between Bangkok, London and Calcutta proved of no avail. What seems to have happened was that before the British annexation the Karennis were content with their 1882 treaty with Chiengmai but when they saw they had the British power behind them they claimed the territory outright. Siam would in all probability have been allowed to retain the areas they had occupied had the British not had second thought about France swallowing up Siam. Siam on her part probably genuinely believed in the validity of her claims.

However that may be, unless the frontiers were adjusted and definitely defined, trade, law and order would be adversely affected. Already the Karennis had put up claims amounting to some 3 lakhs of rupees1 against Siam for what they considered had been lost due to Siamese occupation of the trans-Salween districts.

In June 1889 the Government of India agreed to the Siamese proposal to hold a boundary commission provided it had the power to examine all territories under dispute between the British Shan States and Karenni and Siam.2 After mutual agreement to have the commission, however, the two parties could not agree on the place of preliminary meeting - the British wanted it at either Shwegyin or Rangoon, while the Siamese, although they originally had agreed to go to Rangoon, insisted on either Chiengmai or Bangkok, and each threatened an independent mission. The British, the more powerful of the two, were convinced the Siamese case was weak and their proposal of Chiengmai was unpractical as the place had no telegraphic communication, while Bangkok would entail several weeks' delay. The Siamese protested against a British independent commission.3

In pursuance of their determination to appoint an independent Boundary Commission, the British went ahead with their plans and appointed Mr. Ney Elias, a renowned explorer in the Indian Government service, to head their mission. Other members of the Commission were Mr. J. G. Scott, Assistant Superintendent of the Shan States, Mr. W. J. Archer, British Vice-Consul at Chiengmai, Major E. G. Barrow, Intelligence Officer, and Captain F. J. Pink. Dr. J. K. Close was the medical officer, and Captain H. M. Jackson, with Messrs. Ogle and Doran, constituted the survey party. The Commission left Fort Stedman on December 15, 1889, marched through Loikaw and Sawlon, and pitched camp at Tahsangle, which was the Banmau (Ywathit) ferry on the Salween. From Tahsangle the party split into three, headed respectively by Elias, Archer and Scott, each accompanied by a surveyor. Elias was to examine the south; the middle portion and into the Me Pai valley was Archer's responsibility, while Scott took on the northern tract known as Wan Hpa Leun.

1. CSTK, p. 29.
2. CSTK, p. 32.
3. CSTK, p. li0.
Having taken the decision to have an independent commission, the Siamese did not send their commissioners to meet the British party.

The British commissioners found a series of Siamese posts all along the Salween, beginning at Me Te in the south and succeeded by Hsaya, Tahsangle, Hsuppai, Tahsa, Tapakeut-ta, Melayu, Mehsate, Jatawma and Hwelang. All these posts were stockaded, flew the white elephant flag of Siam, and each had a garrison of from 50 to 100 men, half Laos and half Mehawngsawn Shans with a few Siamese here and there. At the beginning a Siamese Sub-Lieutenant made an attempt to prevent Archer from moving up the Me Pai. **This gentleman, Nai Champa, drew up his men across the path and said he had orders to prevent the Commission from entering the country. A few men of the Oxfordshire hustled them off with the butts of their guns, and arrested and disarmed a non-commissioned officer. Nai Champa then declared that he was satisfied with this exercise of superior force, and that he would report the matter to his Government. The non-commissioned officer was released and had his arms restored to him, and Mr. Archer was not further molested. Another Siamese Officer followed Mr. Elias into the interior, but did nothing more than follow up with much pain and trouble the long marches which the Commission made**. The third party headed by Scott was not molested in any way; in fact one officer commanding a post gave much information regarding various jungle routes.2

In view of the impressive array of Siamese posts along the Salween, the Boundary Commission made no attempt to plant the Union Jack in the trans-Salween districts of Kantarawadi. The Commissioners merely made enquiries about local history, trade, people and villages and completed the survey of the area. The whole Commission then struck camp and moved to Mawkmai through Ta Tawmaw and Kantulong, in order to survey the trans-Salween districts of Mawkmai, viz. Mongmau and Mehsakun.

It is proper here to give a short account of history of these two places. During the reign of Shwebo Min, the famous Kolan Sawbwa of Mawkmai had done much to help the King in his campaign against Karenni. It was due to Kolan's assistance that the Karenni forces were worsted. Much honour was showered upon the Sawbwa who was then formally recognised as Sawbwa. But due to the latter's repeated quarrels with local Burmese residents he soon fell from royal favour and was cast into prison, from which he escaped and went east of the Salween and founded the two districts of Mongmau and Mehsakun with people from his own State. The place soon became prosperous as it

1. These Shans were usually Mongnai or Mawkmai men who had fled from civil wars on the west of the Salween and had taken refuge in Mehawngsawn.

2. RASS, 1889-90, pp. 5-6.
was rich in teak. After some 20 years in exile, Kolan was pardoned by Ava and returned to live in Mawkmai, leaving the newly founded colonies to his nephew, Khun Noi Kyu. Kolan was by no means a peaceful neighbour. In the south he made himself feared by the Karennis; in the south-east he attacked the Siamese town of Mehawngsawn (which was peopled largely by Shans from Mawkmai and Mongmai), drove out the Shan headman, Taiktaga Sa, who had been placed there by Chiengmai authorities, and gave it to his niece, a lady of some character called Nang Mya. On becoming the chief of Mehawngsawn, Nang Mya dismissed her first husband and recalled Taiktaga Sa from exile and raised him to her bed, probably to gain the much-needed local knowledge and influence. When Kolan Sawbwa transferred his residence from his trans-Salween possessions to Mawkmai, Nang Mya transferred Mehawngsawn's allegiance from Mawkmai to Chiengmai, Mehawngsawn being nearer to the latter.

When Mawkmai was attacked by Sawlapaw in March 1888 Khun Noi Kyu was appointed by the Karenni Chief to be the Sawbwa of Mawkmai. It is difficult to say whether Noi Kyu's disloyal act was prompted by his jealousy of his cousin, Khun Hmon, the ruling Sawbwa, or by the latter's failure to divide the personal property of the deceased Sawbwa, Kolan (alias Nai Noi), thereby causing discontent in Noi Kyu and other relatives. When the Karennis had been driven out, Noi Kyu also fled to his myo-okship in the trans-Salween Kehsakun. At this time the Myoo of Mongmai was Tage (Taga?) Hon, who seemed to have reason to fear deposition by Khun Hmon, the Sawbwa of Mawkmai. It also appeared that Tage Hon was also aspiring to the bed of Nang Mya who at the time was without a husband. Both the heads of Mongmai and Mehsakun therefore refused to obey orders from Mawkmai. At the same time Nang Mya wrote to her cousin, the Mawkmai Sawbwa, to say that as it had been decided in Bangkok that all territories east of the Salween belonged to Siam, he (the Sawbwa) should not interfere in the future administration of Mongmai and Mehsakun. Shortly after this the whole district was overrun by Mehawngsawn Shans and a party of some 20 or 30 Laos established themselves at Ta Hwepon hoisting the white elephant flag. This Hwepon ferry was the chief place of transit over the Salween by Shan traders proceeding to Chiengmai and was known to have been one of the chief customs posts on the Salween during the Burmese regime. Nang Mya gave orders to seize the elephants and timber belonging to her cousin the Sawbwa and other trans-Salween Shans and sold them.

This overrunning of Mongmai and Kehsakun, coming as it did soon after the Siamese had claimed suzerainty over the four sub-States of Mongpan, caused not a little excitement and astonishment among the nearby Shan Sawbwas.

When the British Boundary Commission crossed the Salween from Mawkmai into the disputed area they were met at a point where the road

1. This must have been the result of verbal promise made by Gould to Devawongse - see above.
left the river towards Mongmau by a Major of the Siamese Army, Luang Ran Ron, who described himself as a member of the Siamese Commission and "welcomed Mr. Ney Elias into Siamese territory". After an enquiry which had established facts as narrated above, the Sawbwa of Mawkmai was told to resume the administration of the area. The Sawbwa gathered a force of 300 men and when he appeared before Hwepon ferry the Siamese garrison withdrew.

From Mongmau and Mesakon, the Elias Commission marched north to settle the status of the four dependencies of Mongpan, namely Mongton, Monghang, Mongkyawt, Monghta, whose background history can be summarised as follows:

During the disturbances prior to the British annexation of Upper Burma and during the Limbin League inter-State warfare, the Sawbwa of Mongpan, Khunleng, refused to aid the League with either money or men. For this refusal to cooperate, Mawkmai, a League member, was ordered to attack Mongpan whose Sawbwa was obliged to flee across the Salween. On the news of these disturbances reaching Siam, the Siamese mobilised seven thousand men, of whom only one thousand were actually called to the colours. The Siamese Chief Commissioner, Phya Montri Suriyawongse (or Marquis de Montri, as he was styled by his Government in their correspondence with the British) was the supreme commander and he made Muangngai near the border his headquarters. It was here that the headmen of Monghsat, Mongton, Monghang, Mongkyawt and Mongta came to drink the water of allegiance to Siam as related above.

The British attitude was that Siamese suzerainty began only with this submission of the five Pawmongs. The Siamese took the view that the five provinces had been Siamese territory and the Western Shans who came to settle in it felt grateful for the Siamese protection and therefore had done only what was right and customary in formally submitting to the representative of the King of Siam. The Siamese further claimed that Monghsat was conquered by the Chiengmai Warrior Chief Kavila in 1802 and a rebellion in that province in 1838 was successfully put down by another Chiengmai Sawbwa, and since then Monghsat had been regarded as part of Chiengmai on the same footing as the four remaining provinces in the Mekkyawt-Mehang basin which the Siamese claimed to have annexed in 1790.

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1. MBSUB, p. 9.
2. Some Siamese nobilities were sometimes personified as "Barons" or "Counts".
4. MBSUB, pp. 2 and 14.
During the march of the Southern Shan Column in the dry months of 1887-88, British and Siamese Commissioners had met at Mongpan, but nothing could be agreed upon. The Siamese, in the manner of light-hearted Orientals, did not bring documentary evidence of their suzerainty, and maintained their position as stated in the preceding paragraph. The Sawbwa of Mongpan, certain of British support, showed that he had had uninterrupted suzerainty for the past twenty years. Siamese Commissioners refused to accept this stand by the British side, but said they had no power to come to any final settlement. The two parties then agreed that Monghsat was to remain under Kengtung and the four pawmongs to continue under Siamese occupation, while the Siamese promised to maintain law and order and to capture Twet Nga Lu who was still then at large. The British had captured documents at one of Nga Lu's camp near the Salween which showed that the bandit was given encouragement by the Pawmong of Mongton and minor officials of Chiengmai.

In August, 1888 the British finally decided that they could not accept the Siamese case and ordered the Superintendent, Shan States, to take over the administration of the four trans-Salween Pawmongs and place them under Mongpan. A proclamation was issued by the Superintendent, Shan States declaring that from the 15th November 1888 the Sawbwa of Mongpan would "resume possession" of the four Statelets. The Siamese Government was also informed of the British intention and requested to recall their troops. The Siamese protested strongly but tactfully withdrew their troops, thus paving the way for Scott and the Mongpan Sawbwa to take possession smoothly. At the approach of the British party, one of the four Pawmongs, that of Monghang, fled into Siam because he had arrested foresters sent by Archer, the British Vice-Consul at Chiengmai, to attach the timber extracted during the Siamese occupation by Kya Nyun, a protégé of Monghang. Khun Pan, a younger brother of the absconding Pawmong, was appointed Panya of Monghang. The four trans-Salween sub-States were declared Mongpan territory and the working of the teak reverted to its original leasee, Mg Ba Thaw. Their mission accomplished, the Sawbwa and Scott returned to the west bank.

All was quiet for about five weeks. It must be assumed, however, that the refugee Panya of Monghang did not stay idle in the Siamese territory, where a "large" Siamese garrison was posted to Muangfang, three marches away from Monghang. All of a sudden the four Pawmongs or Panias, either through pressure (British claim) or of their own free will (Siamese version), went to Muangfang to renew their allegiance to Siam. No Siamese troops were posted to the four sub-States. It was about this time that rumours were rife in Mehawngsawn

1. See also Chapter VI
2. PCTS, p. 474. Letter No. 1-4 dated Mone the 8th January 1888 from the Superintendent, Shan States to Chief Commissioner, Burma.
to the effect that the British and Siamese Governments had agreed to make the Salween a boundary between them.

There the matter rested until the Elias Commission appeared on the scene. Monghta with its 30 houses was found unmolested. Mongkyawt and Monghang had been harried by the ex-Pawmong, Ai Nan Pon. At Mongton, the British found a Siamese garrison of 150 men under the command of Luang Praja Kidikich camping on the outskirts of the village.

The Pawmong, Noi Ta, refused to have any communication with Elias except through the Siamese Commander who also represented himself as a judge of the Civil Court in Bangkok. Probably Luang Praja, like Luang Ran Ron at Muangmau, belonged to the Siamese Independent Boundary Commission. Pawmong Noi Ta, it will be recalled, had already sworn allegiance to both the Sawbwa of Mongpan and the King of Siam. "He had accepted money from Chiangmai and had sent presents to the Sawbwa." Elias considered that such sitting-on-the-fence was incompatible with the security of the frontier and had him arrested early one morning at dawn.

The Siamese Commissioner was then informed that the four Mongpan sub-States had been formally declared British territory and that his presence there had a disturbing influence on the authority of the Mongpan Sawbwa's officials. He was therefore requested to leave. He had ample time given him to do so at his convenience, but he chose to do so in three hours. The four districts were then placed under the general administrative supervision of Khun Pon, son of the last Sawbwa of Mongpan and therefore nephew of Khun Leng.

The Siamese protested to the Foreign Office in London and alleged that Luang Praja was threatened by Elias with expulsion by force. In his report to his Government the Luang attributed to Elias the following violent outburst: "You must leave at noon tomorrow. I will give you an order in my name; you must leave in limit time, or I shall, if necessary, have to expel, shall shoot, and burn your camp." Noon of March 13th was reported to be the "limit time".

British surveyors, under Captain Jackson, managed to determine during that open season the course of the Salween over a distance of 200 miles and fix the positions of many towns not previously marked. The survey party also made a flying visit to Monghsat where a good start had been made "towards the surveying of the huge mass of the greater trans-Salween States".

1. RASS, 1889-90, p. 9. Lady Scott, in Scott of the Shan Hills, p. 137, stated that the Siamese were given 28 hours to leave.

From Mongton the main body of the British Commission marched back through Mongpan and Mongnai and reached Burma early in April, 1890.

So much for the preliminary survey of the trans-Salween territories. We next deal with the Kengtung's southern frontier with Siam.

In his report "The Trans-Salween State of Kiangtung", Lieutenant G. J. Younghusband stated that the former frontiers of Kengtung adjoining China and Siam had been encroached upon by the Chinese in the North and Siamese in the South, and that the British Government as successor to the Kingdom of Burma would be within their right to claim the old boundary lines.

In December 1890, Scott was sent on a mission to survey the frontiers between Kengtung and Siam. Archer, at Chiangmai, was already waiting for him when Scott arrived at Mongton. A representative of the Sawbwa of Kengtung joined them at Monghsat. He was Phya Sin, a man of considerable age, but well-versed in State matters, had been employed in many State missions and had met Siamese officials before. The party had an escort under Captain Fulton, of the Gurkha Light Infantry. Siamese officials met them at the border and the whole mission started work in earnest on New Year's Day 1891.

During the survey of the territory the party came across many burnt and deserted villages, evidence of local feuds and general unsettled conditions at the time. Owing to secret instructions from the Viceroy of India, Archer was found to be favouring the Siamese claims which included some two to three hundred square miles of cleared and settled territory belonging to Kengtung. The difficulty was that a large tract of country claimed by both sides was dead flat, lacking in prominent natural features to form a definite boundary line, while villages overflowed the lines claimed by both sides. The Kengtung party reinforced their claims with the assertion that they had received orders from the King of Burma during the reign in Kengtung of Sao Hseng "Momeik Sawbwa" 1876-1881 to populate the area. The Siamese claimed the water-shed of Nam Lin and Me Hok, also reinforced with historical facts.

1. See Chapter VIII, p. 252.
2. With him was Lord Lamington who was exploring the country on his own and kept up with the mission until Mongsing, where he branched off to Tonking.
3. Burma Foreign Progs., No. 3, June 1891, p. 20 (Scott's report, p. 1)
From Chiengsen area the mission went to Mongsing at the express wish of the Sawbwa of Kengtung who had insisted at the time of his submission to the British that that small State should also come under the British flag as its Ruler was closely related to the Ruling House of Kengtung, and that the Siamese were trying to win over the State. Here, at Mongsing, the Siamese spent three days in making up their case which the British party regarded as weak. The Chief of Mongsing, Mom Siri, expressed the desire of coming under British suzerainty and, declaring that Siam had nothing to do with his State, proffered gold and silver flowers to Scott as token of submission to the British, but one of the Siamese objected and Scott stayed his hand. Nothing definite was achieved on the spot by the mission and the parties concerned submitted reports to their respective Governments.

In 1892 the British Government managed to persuade Siam to accept Mongsing in exchange for the trans-Salween districts of Karenni. Then the Siamese proposed a new Boundary Commission to demarcate the entire length of the new frontier.

The final delimitation of the boundary between the Shan States and Siam was done by a Joint Anglo-Siamese Commission during the cold weather of 1892-93. The British party was composed of Mr. A. H. Hildebrand with Mr. H. G. A. Leverson as his assistant, surveyors headed by Colonel R. G. Woodthorpe, 2 medical officers, and Intelligence Officers to represent the Indian Army which never quite trusted civilian reports. Baya Law (Phya Raw) represented the Sawbwa of Kengtung. Their escort consisted of 100 Rifles of the 22nd Madras Infantry, including 12 mounted men. The transport consisted of 5 elephants, ponies, mules and a few Khasia coolies. The Siamese party was composed of Luang Kamchat Phairind, Luang Sarasiddhi Yanukar, 3 survey officers and an escort of 100 Siamese Infantry. The Siamese transport consisted of some 60 elephants and coolies.

The two parties met at Monghang on the new year day of 1893 and started their work on the 7th in two directions from Loi Un: Hildebrand and Luang Sarasiddhi were to demarcate from the starting point eastward towards the Mekong, Leverson and Luang Kamchat westward in the direction of the Salween. Their escorts were halved, each to go with one of the parties.

In their westward move the Commission more or less covered the ground surveyed by Archer-Scott mission in the cold weather of 1890-91. The Siamese and British Commissioners worked in perfect accord and the actual boundary line is described as follows:

From Loi Un to Loi Pahampup, the hill range which forms the water-parting of the Me Chai to the north, which empties itself into the Me Tun in the Mong Pan State, and of another Me Chai to the south which runs through the town of Mong Fang. From Loi Pahampup to the Me Kok the water-parting between the Namha on the
north and the tributaries of the Me Fang on the south. It then crosses the Me Kok in a northeast direction to the water-parting of the Me Yon with the Me San and Me Hkam, as far as Loi Sam Saw; thence following it in a northerly direction to Loi Tun; and thence eastward along the water-parting of the Me Hkam and the Me Sai to the highest peak on that ridge Loi Taw Hkam, and from thence northeast along the spur which terminates at the Me Sai, about 1 mile west of the so-called Siamese fort on that stream; thence along the course of the Me Sai to its junction with Me Huok and thence to the south and east along the Me Huok to its junction with the Me Kong.

At Mongngam and Kengsen, however, the boundary line, in order to be definite, had to leave out certain villages paying tribute to Kengtung, but arrangements were made by the Commissioners whereby no tax would be levied in the area by the Siamese authorities before the 1st April 1894, and the inhabitants were given the option of moving into Kengtung territory before the expiry of that date. The loss was keenly felt by Kengtung.

The Commission completed its work when the boundary line reached the Mekhong at the mouth of the Mehok in latitude 20° 20'. Before the British and Siamese Commissioners parted company at Hawngluk on the 11th February, Hildebrand had asked Luang Sarasidhi to accompany him to Kengcheng which had by this time been handed over to Siam and whose boundary with Kengtung he had been instructed to define. Sarasidhi could not oblige Hildebrand through lack of instructions from higher Siamese authorities. The British Commissioner proceeded to Kenglap alone, to await the arrival of the representative from Mongsing, capital of Kengcheng.

When the Kengcheng representatives arrived on the 20th February, they pressed for two points. They urged that their State should not be made over to Siam as they wished to come under British protection; secondly they wanted Hildebrand to give orders that, whatever happened, the small village circle of Kenglap, situated within the loop and on the west bank of the Mekhong, should pay tribute to Kengcheng instead of to Kengtung as it had been doing for the past decade.

To their first request, it was impossible for Hildebrand to accede as part of his mission was to proclaim at Kenglap that Kengcheng was now Siamese territory. This was done in an open durbar on the 23rd in the presence of the representatives from Kengtung, Kengcheng and local inhabitants.

To grant their second request was also impossible. Hildebrand had received no instruction on the subject and he was against the idea. For ten years previously Kenglap had been paying revenue to Kengtung and its Phaya had received appointment orders from the Sawbwa, and all
the local inhabitants declared that they had been Kengtung subjects "all their lives" and meant to die as such.

Kengtung boundary, as had just been demarcated, started from the mouth of the Mehok stream along the Mekhong in a north northeasterly direction all the way to the Namyawng except for this small interruption by the Kenglap tract. Hildebrand reported:

If this small patch is to be given to Kengcheng, the frontier will have to leave the Mekhong for a hill range and follow the hill ranges from one to the other which form a semi-circle round the three Kenglap villages till it reaches the Mekhong again about 12 miles north of where it departed.... Thus to give cis-Mekhong Kenglap to Kengcheng is to break what would otherwise be a continuous run of the Mekhong as a frontier for some 86 miles by this little excresence in the midst of the line. At the mouth of the Namyawng, some 20 miles north of the Kenglap ferry, the Kengcheng boundary proper crosses the Mekhong and does not again return to it.

When Hildebrand entered the Shan State in 1887 his instructions were that he was to rigidly enforce the rule that all the de facto Chiefs were to be confirmed and supported, ignoring all de jure claims. This had saved much headache to the new administration. In the case of Kenglap, Hildebrand now recommended the application of the same principle, i.e. the tract should remain Kengtung soil as the British found it. Moreover, by allowing Kenglap to go to Kengcheng and thus become Siamese territory, the British ran the risk of entanglement with the Siamese due to "the endless bickering and disputes" that were bound to arise in the area as the people of Kenglap, having gone there from Kengtung would always look to the latter for support. Hildebrand confidently predicted that cession of Kenglap to Kengcheng would result in "breaches of present peace" as feelings in Kengtung, which had already been inflamed by the cession to Siam of villages around Mongngam and Kongsen, would not tolerate it.

As a last, and apparently most important, reason against letting Kenglap go to Kengcheng, Hildebrand wrote:

It is quite hopeless to expect that the weak government or misgovernment of Siam will exercise any real control over Kengcheng ....

The crux of the matter was that neither the Kengcheng nor Kenglap inhabitants wanted to be under the Siamese suzerainty. This was not because they hated the Siamese more than the British but because the latter was the more powerful of the two and if anyone had to be under anyone it made sense to prefer the more powerful.

Much against their will, therefore, the Kengcheng representatives had to return home with neither of their requests having been
granted. Hildebrand also wrote a letter to the Myosa informing him that he was now a Siamese subject and his State Siamese territory.

Without Siamese participation the British Commissioner could only make "as good a preliminary survey as was practicable" of the area. In any case it was too late in the season to make a thorough survey or demarcation. The whole boundary problem between Kengtung and Kengcheng was settled only with the settlement, in 1896, of Mongsing with France in which all cis-Mekhong Kengcheng became part of Kengtung.

By the time Hildebrand's party got back to Kengtung on the 20th March 1893 a week's continuous "mango shower" rain had already started.

In the West, Leverson and Luang Kamchat also successfully demarcated the frontier between Siam on the one hand, and the southeastern part of the Shan States and the Trans-Salween Karenni on the other. The line is what it is today, and covered from Loi Un westward a distance of roughly 250 miles marked with 16 boundary pillars at prominent places or where definite natural features were absent. As they moved from one small State to the next they were helped by local officials and there was no hitch in the relations between the British and Siamese parties. This westward branch of the Anglo-Siamese Commission broke up on the 25th March 1893 at the last boundary pillar near the Salween - the Siamese returning to Chiangmai via Mong Yom, the British to Fort Stedman via Ywathit and Loikaw.

On 17th October, 1894, King Chulalongkorn of Siam and the British Minister at Bangkok formally exchanged maps showing the boundary line as it appears today between Siam and Burma from the Salween, southern most point of Karenni, in the west to the Mekhong in the east.

Soon after this settlement of the frontier, the British Government presented Siam with a bill for compensation for losses said to have been incurred in the Trans-Salween Kantarawadi. This bill had been presented by Sawlawi to the British and it amounted to some Rs.50,000. When the Siamese Foreign Minister, Prince Davawongse, was informed of this claim, he burst out: "If Lion wants White Elephant, let him take it by all means, but not allow the Elephant to be bullied and bitten by Jackal and Wolf, nor was it dignified to bite off Elephant flesh to give charity to smaller animals such as foxes and reptiles, etc.," and asked his European Advisor, M. Rolin Jacqumyns to talk to the British Charge d'Affaires "in a more proper language than I would do under the circumstances" so that pressure against Siam might be mitigated.

1. Government of India, Foreign Department, Secret No. 24, dated the 14th February 1894; Enclosures Nos. 1 & 2.
At this time there were other matters outstanding between Great Britain and Siam, and it was to facilitate easy settlement of these that the British Government waived the Karenni claims.  

CHAPTER XI
Boundary with France

The boundary settlement in 1894 between Britain and Siam did not settle the question of Mongsing, a term which henceforth will be taken to mean the trans-Mekhong Kengcheng. Of all the Shan States frontier problems the settlement of Mongsing was the thorniest for the British as it involved another European power, France, the frontier bogey.

We have mentioned how Mongsing was formally declared Siamese territory in 1893, in exchange for the Siamese acquiescence in withdrawal from the trans-Salween Kantarawadi. This British accommodation lends credence to the Siamese allegation that a promise had been made by the British to recognise their rights over the ground occupied by them in return for their cooperation in the war against Sawlapaw. But the British had to step in again into Mongsing affairs after 1891, to the extent of virtual occupation of the place for one whole year in 1895-96. To understand this fully it is necessary to know the background of Mongsing and what was happening in Siam at the time.

The State of Kengcheng lay astride the Mekhong river between latitude 20° and 21½° N. with an area of about 21,000 square miles. The cis-Mekhong feudatory districts of Kengcheng consisted of Mongkhan, Monghe (written -re), Mongloe, Mongyu and Mongwa while its trans-Mekhong territory consisted of Mongsing and its 39 village tracts.

The old city of Kengcheng was situated on the banks of the Mekhong and had been deserted at least a hundred years previously. When the Siamese raided the area in 1893-94 and when the Lagree-Garnier Expedition made its way from Saigon by the Mekhong to Yunnanfu in 1866-68, the capital of the State was at Mongyu. This was subsequently moved to the ancient site of Kengcheng on the left bank of the Mekhong. Owing to the unproductiveness of this place, the capital was again moved by Sao Kawmtai of Kengcheng (Saomon Kengcheng) on the 2nd waning of the 4th month 1239¹ (or 1887) to Mongsing. Over one thousand families took part in this mass move, leaving only some 10

1. This date is from Scott's No. 22-B to Salisbury Further Report respecting the Mekhong Commission dated London the 22nd August, 1895. Curiously enough, Scott had identified the date as "about March 1884". At this date 1884, Saomon Joti Kawmtai had already succeeded to Kengtung, but Scott went to say that the migration was ordered by him as Sawbwa of Kengtung. According to the copy
households to carry on in the old capital. This illustrates well the process of migration of a small Tai tribe within one generation.

Kengcheng suffered much in the process of inter-tribal wars between various Tai peoples, as it lay directly on the route from the Lao States to Kenghung and Kengtung. During the reign of Rama I of Siam, Lao armies in 1803-04 invaded Kengtung and Kenghung. Little States en-route such as Mongyawng, Kengcheng, Mongmang, Mongpong, Mongnoon, Mongram, Mongtong, and Phukha were all ravaged and plundered. The Burmese garrison at Kengcheng was put to death. Contingents from Muangnan alone claimed to have conquered eleven or twelve States and deported between forty and fifty thousand souls. Other Siamese contingents claimed to have brought down some sixty to seventy thousand people. All the princes and their families were taken to Bangkok to submit to the King in person. Rama I later released these princes in consideration of the fact that they had not done Siam any harm and that the proximity of their States to Burma and China would render the King's protection ineffective.1 All the rulers returned to their States except the Kengtung Sawbwa whose State was now in the hands of the Burmese who later recognised his brother, Maha Khanan, as Sawbwa. The original Sawbwa, also Kawngtai by name, was obliged to settle in Chiangmai and later moved to Chiangsaen.2

In 1813, Chao Chang Phoak (Lord of White Elephants), Sawbwa of Nan (a state in northern Siam), again conquered Kengcheng and drove out the Burmese troops. During the unsuccessful Siamese invasions of Kengtung in 1852-54, unhappy Kengcheng, lying in the path of invading Lao hosts, suffered another devastation. In fact, the Sawbwa of Nan who was commanding his contingent, marched up by way of Mongpukha, Mongsing, Mong Loe and fixed his headquarters at Mongyu until the Siamese retreat. This was the same Chief who was still ruling in 1891.

That seems to have been the last big-scale devastation suffered by Kengcheng.

of Kengtung Chronicle in my possession Sao Kawngtai ordered the move in 1239, which agrees with the Burmese era of Scott's No. 22-8. But in his 1890-91 Report on a visit to Kengtung-Chiangmai Boundary and to Mongsing and Kenghung, in Burma Foreign Department Proceedings Nos. 1-3, June, 1891, the move to Mongsing was done in about 1884 by Mom Siri. According to Prachum Phongsawadan, Vol. IX, p. 114, the move was also led by Siri in 1245 about 1883-84.

2. Chronicle of Kengtung.
The Siamese, however, never attempted to establish their authority over Kengcheng which continued to pay its tribute to Ava twice every three years, the last being in the spring of 1885. True, Kengcheng Chiefs occasionally sent presents to Nan, but these were in the nature of friendly gifts from poor relatives to wealthy and powerful cousins, for Kengcheng and Nan were closely related, the mother of the then (1852-91) Nan Sawbwa being a Kengcheng Lady. This question of tribute to Bangkok came up only in 1888 after the fall of Mandalay, when a Siamese Commissioner together with some Nan princes and a force of 1000 levies came to Mongsing and demanded tribute. Gold and silver flowers were then sent to Bangkok. The receipt of these tributes was recorded in the royal annals of Bangkok, having the date of February 1891.1 When Messrs. Archer and Scott, after their survey of Kengtung-Chiangmai boundary went to Mongsing early in 1891, the Myosa insisted that the submission to Siam was forced upon him, and as his State had always paid tribute to Ava he was anxious to accept the British suzerainty. He had known of the fall of Mandalay but had been ignorant of the British intentions, as the letters sent by Scott and the Sawbwa of Mongnai in May 1887 failed to reach him.

The Siamese took three days to make out their claims which centered around their over running of Kengcheng in 1803-04, 1813 and 1852-54 and on presents sent to Nan which they regarded as tribute. The Myosa offered to present gold and silver flowers to Scott as tribute to his Government. Scott regarded the Siamese case as weak, but as no orders had been passed regarding British commitments beyond the Mekhong, he was obliged to refuse the Myosa's offer to submit. As we shall see, this refusal had seriously undermined British credit in their subsequent dealings with Mongsing, a Mongsing supported by France.

Prior to the fall of the Burmese Kingdom in 1885 the relations between Kengtung and Kengcheng were very intimate. Apart from connections by marriages, the latter, junior partner of the two, had always looked to the former for advice and guidance in dealings with other parts of the Shan States and with Mandalay. The old Myosa of Kengcheng, Nai Noi Einta, father of Mom Siri, had given his youngest sister, Nang Khan Kham, in marriage to Saomom Maha Khanan of Kengtung, out of which two sons were born, Tippanikham and Joti Kawngtai. Noi Einta also had two younger brothers, Semmong and Famoso of whom the former was recognised as his heir but died before his father, and the latter through a family quarrel went to live in Nan and died there. When Noi Einta died, his eldest son, Mom Siri, was too young, and the Taophyas and people of Kengcheng approached Maha Khanan in 1220 (1858) with the request that his eldest son by Nang Khan Kham, namely Saomom Tippanikham, be made their Chief. Tippanikham after ruling Kengcheng for two years went to receive a royal patent from Mandalay but on his return he died at Mongnai. The people of Kengcheng again requested Maha Khanan for Joti Kawngtai to be their ruler. Their request having

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been granted, Saomom Kawngtai became the Myosa of Kengcheng in 1222 (1860) and Mom Siri was made the Kemmong. When Kawngtai succeeded to Kengtung, Siri was recognised by Ava as Myosa with the title of Mahathiri Thabbezinkura Buddhhabrahmawuntha, at the age of 19.

The above dates and events were recorded in the royal annals of Bangkok as submitted by Kengcheng officials who took gold and silver flowers to the Siamese King in 1891. From having been the Myosa of Kengcheng before he succeeded in Kengtung Joti Kawngtai was styled Saomom or Sawbwa Kengcheng; this title was applied to him till his death. When Kawngtai died in 1887 he was naturally succeeded by his son the Tiger Sawbwa, a boy of about 13. British reports of the period often quoted Siri as a dissatisfied man because, it was said, he considered that he should have succeeded Kawngtai in Kengtung instead of the Tiger prince. This assumption was wrong. Siri was never in the line of succession in Kengtung which could hardly have been expected to submit to a Myosa from Kengcheng as long as their own Ruling House was not barren of scions.

It was during the rule of this unfortunate Mom Siri that the suzerainty over Kengcheng changed hands several times. When Scott met him for the first time in 1891 he gave the following description:

The Myosa came out to meet us in the usual Shan fashion, riding at the base of a sort of pitch fork formed by two lines of men, carrying guns, spears, green, white and red, and white and brown pennants. The display was rather paltry compared with that of most of the cis-Salween Chiefs, who have not been so completely ruined as to be unable to make any display at all, but it was marked by an array of processional weapons, tridents, half moons, halberds, and buffalo-horn like forks. These properties were very ancient and vastly inferior to the same things which one sees in Tongking or China, the only countries so far as I am aware where they are used. The Myosa had only three golden umbrellas, which showed that he had not the rank of a first-grade Myosa in Burmese times. On one side of him was his son and on the other rode a Chinaman - a Yunnanese - who acts as a species of Maire du palais, and apparently has much greater influence with his Chief than the Nan people, who had asked for but had not received permission from the Myosa to accompany him. The Chief wore a Chinese bamboo hat and one of the sleeveless jerkins, plastered with gold so suggestive of the Middle Kingdom. The whole turn out was in fact much more suggestive of China than of Siam. The Myosa himself conducted us to a large assortment of barracks and shelter huts which he had run up for us, and then after the usual compliments, returned to the Haw, where we paid him a formal visit the following day. He is a stout burly man of five and forty and, after his first nervousness had worn off was very pleasant and frank in his manner. He combines the shrewdness of the Mongpawn Sawbwa with the savoir-fair of
Mongnai, and is altogether as favourable of specimen of the Shan Chief as any I have seen .... 1

In the last chapter we have already related how the Siamese Government had agreed to take this unproductive Kengcheng in exchange for the teak-rich trans-Salween Karenni, how Mr. A. H. Hildebrand publicly promulgated the British recognition of Siamese suzerainty over Kengcheng, and how a letter was also sent by the Kengcheng delegates to their Myosoa informing him that he was now a vassal of the Siamese King. In giving Kengcheng to Siam, the British Government stipulated that the State must not be ceded to any foreign power without their consent. To this Bangkok agreed. The British also informed the French Government in Paris that they reserved the right to reassert their claims over Kengcheng should Siam be forced to surrender that State to any third party. The French raised no objection then. That was in April 1893.

On receipt of Hildebrand's letter, and after two years of British silence over the fate of his State, Mom Siri sent tributes to Nan, and affably received in Mongsing a Siamese Commissioner who was sent to organise the administration in the new territory. The good news scarcely had time to reach Bangkok when France began her aggression in Siam. 2

We must now turn our attention to what is happening in Siam during the same period.

Here France was fast expanding in the East. In the general European scramble for colonies, France (having been out-manoeuvred from India by the British) was determined not to be outwitted again in Indo-China but to acquire as much territory as possible. By 1863 she had annexed Cochin-China and established protectorate rights over Cambodia. In 1866-68 the Mekong Expedition was undertaken, in which Doudart de Lagree and Francis Garnier made their name. The Expedition started from Saigon in June 1866 and, following the course of the Mekong by steamboats and country dugouts, reached Kenghung, and proceeded thence overland to Yunnanfu. The leader de Lagree died at Ting-Chuan in March 1868 on the return journey, but the expedition under Garnier reached Saigon on the 15th June 1868, after 2 years and 10 days, with "a wealth of information". Although the expedition proved that the Mekong could never be a water highway from Saigon to the heart of Yunnan, the French for some sentimental reason insisted on dreaming about opening up commerce with Yunnan and south-western China via "le fleuve" which they affectionately regarded as theirs.

1. Memorandum by J. G. Scott, Offg. Superintendent, Shan States on a visit to the Kengtung-Chiangmai Boundary and to Mongsing and Kenghung dated Mandalay the 21st May 1891, in Burma Foreign Proceeding No. 1, June 1891.

Colonial activities of France stopped for a while in the early seventies when she was recovering from her ignominious defeat by Prussia in the Franco-Prussian war of 1870-1. But after the Berlin Congress in 1878 she was encouraged by Germany and Britain to go ahead with her colonial expansion in North Africa and Indo-China, which she did with such resolute determination and methodical thoroughness that she nearly clashed with Britain in a war. By 1883, she had annexed or acquired protectorate rights over Cochin-China, Cambodia, Annam and Tongkin.

It was then that she came into contact with the Kingdom of Siam which had been expanding north and east over the countries of the Laos and the Khmers. In Paris the colonial party whipped up "public opinion" through the press which clamoured for outright annexation of Siam. In London, the French Ambassador made several proposals to partition Siam between the two countries, and in 1891 suggested that the Mekong river should mark the extreme limit of the spheres of influence between Great Britain and France.

Like a man well satisfied after a very heavy meal, Britain was slow to move with events in Indo-China and Siam which were rapidly coming to a head by 1893. By "incidents", diplomatic manoeuvres and military pressure, France in Indo-China was extending her territory westward, at the expense of Siam. Suddenly in March 1893, the French representative in Bangkok, M. Auguste Pavie, informed the Siamese Government that France claimed the Mekong as the western limit of Annamite territory and insisted upon the withdrawal of all Siamese posts east of the river. Ignoring Siamese proposals for arbitration or peaceful discussion to settle their differences, the French organised military columns which drove out three major Siamese outposts east of the Mekong. In addition to this aggression against Siam, the French also claimed that all damages caused to them by the Siamese in the defence of their own land must be made good by the latter. To reinforce these claims the French in June 1893 sent three gunboats to Bangkok. The Siamese Government refused to give permission for the French warships to proceed beyond Paknam, mouth of the river Menam Chaopaya. In defiance of orders from Paris to station his boats at Paknam, the French commander forced entry into the river which caused the Siamese Government at Paknam to open fire, grounding one of the gunboats. Two of the gunboats reached Bangkok, and Pavie presented an ultimatum to the Siamese Government on the 20th July 1893.

By the terms of the French ultimatum Siam in effect must

1. Cede to France all territory on the left bank of the Mekong (about 100,000 square miles or one third of Siam).

(2) Evacuate all troops from the area.

(3) Pay for losses and damages incurred by France during her aggression against Siam.

(4) Pay two million francs in cash for losses caused to French subjects and ships during French aggression.

Because the Siamese, not unnaturally, were hesitating to accept entirely the French demands, Pavié left Bangkok with his gunboats on the 25th July and blockaded the Gulf of Siam. The Belgian Adviser to the Siamese Government, M. Rolin Jacquemyns, wrote to his English friend in the Siamese Legation in London: "The frog-eaters seem to like to treat Siam as if she had been utterly knocked down in war, when she is nothing of the kind".

All this time the Siamese turned to the British Government and appealed for help. Lord Rosebury, British Foreign Secretary at the time as he said of the the French action, "They proceed as a man who has unprovokedly knocked down some one else, and exacts compensation from his victim because he has bruised his knuckle in doing so", advised the Siamese Government to accept French terms unconditionally.

To save their precious independence the Siamese did so. The French did not accept at once the total capitulation by Siam, but exacted further humiliating terms before lifting their blockade of the Gulf of Siam on August 3, 1893. Among these were stipulations that the Siamese must not station any security post, be it police or military, within 25 kilometers of the western bank of the Mekhong and that the French must occupy Chantabun, a coastal town near the Cambodian border, until Siam had fulfilled all the other conditions imposed by France.

Commenting on the French behaviour towards Siam after the latter's surrender in August but before the signing of the Treaty and Convention of October 3, 1893, Lord Dufferin British Ambassador to Paris told the French Foreign Minister, Delville: "to use the language of the grammarians the Siamese Government are now in possession of an ultimatum, a penultimatum and an ante-penultimatum. In fact the word 'ultimatum' had completely lost its meaning, for each new one seemed to procreate a successor". The terms of the Treaty and Convention were not unlike those imposed by a victor on the vanquished in a war.

There was little that Britain could do to help the Siamese in spite of the right sentiments her officials expressed. In 12 years between 1881 and 1896 the British Government had added to its Empire in the shape of direct annexation or spheres of influence two million and six hundred thousand square miles of territory. This British achievement excited the envy of other colonising powers to an intolerable degree. As far as the Indian Empire was concerned she was bordered on the west by Russia and on the north and east by China, France and Siam. The French aggression in Siam
hurt the British more than any other Power, as their commerce in that country amounted to tenfold the combined trade of all other nations. British commercial interests in Bangkok were advocating a firmer British stand against France, and the British representative in Bangkok was advising the Siamese Government privately to resist French demands, but they did not receive support or encouragement from London. Britain was not ready for a show-down in a war with France over her commercial interests in Siam. Nevertheless, it was British commercial interests in Siam that prompted the British Government in London to advise the Siamese Government to surrender to France so as not to give the latter any excuse for direct annexation and at the same time to strive by diplomatic pressure on France to respect the independence and integrity of Siam, thereby preserving British commerce there. Not a very heroic way out, perhaps, in the context of the present day, but European powers in those days could do no wrong in Asia and Africa. And it was this policy of limited self-interest in Siam that prompted Lord Rosebury to propose a buffer state between the French Indo-Chinese frontier in the extreme West and that of the extreme Eastern boundary of the Indian Empire, a buffer state touching China (Kenghung) in the North and Siam (Mekhong) in the South and separating the two frontiers by a few dozen miles. A common frontier with France was unthinkable.

This brings us back to the main trend of the story of Mongsing.

In surrendering all the left bank of the Mekong to France in accordance with the Treaty of 1893, Siam reminded Great Britain that Mongsing which she had promised not to surrender to any foreign power was included in the surrendered area. The British Government somewhat coldly replied that it would be for them to take up the matter directly with France. It was then that the British Government proposed the creation of a small buffer state between their territory in Burma and French Indo-China, and Mongsing was suggested as the British contribution with the trans-Mekong territory of Muang Nan, south of Mongsing, as French contribution. This part of Indo-China was very barren and unproductive and difficult of access, and if the idea of a buffer state was that of an unwanted territory where no colonising Power would normally step in, then the area proposed was ideal.

But the French passion for territorial expansion was not normal. It has been said that "Britain annexed areas where she had interests to protect, whereas France annexed areas where she wished to have interests to protect, and so had to shut out competition


3. (We must not assume that war would have resulted from a firmer stand; that was Rosebury's defence, but I refuse to accept it. D. G. E. H.)
from the start. The ease with which France managed to annex the trans-Mekong territory of Siam was helped by the fact the Laos and the Khmers resented Siamese domination for, as remarked by Professor Hall, Siam "had certainly not shown her best qualities in exercising dominion over other peoples".

At all events, the British wanted to show that Mongsing was as much their territory as its cis-Mekhong dependencies, and Mr. G. C. B. Stirling, an Assistant Superintendent in the Shan States, was despatched from Fort Stedman late in December 1893 to ascertain and demarcate the boundary between Kengtung and Kengcheng States. The man who was to do the actual mapping was the experienced Colonel R. G. Woodthorpe. The escort for the party was 150 strong under the command of Lieutenant E. W. Carrick of the 5th Burma Regiment. Maung Nyo, who had just been appointed Assistant Political Officer at Kengtung, also accompanied the Mission.

In the survey of the boundary, the Mission found Kengcheng East and West occupied roughly the same amount of ground. A small sub-State, Kengkhang, was found to be a dependency of Kengtung but surrounded on all sides by Kengcheng, except in the north which was Kenghung. To draw a good boundary line, Mongwa, in the south and adjoining Kengtung, was recommended to be detached from Kengcheng and given to Kengtung as compensation for the loss of Kengkhang, which was to be incorporated in Kengcheng. At Kenglap, the Mission discovered that the Myosa of Kengcheng at Mongsing had been demanding revenue from the people there who had continually paid it to Kengtung. Stirling was also against the idea of having the Kengtung boundary broken by giving Kenglap to Kengcheng. Nor did his Mission make any survey of the area as such a step would be tantamount to acknowledging Kengcheng claim over it. The villagers themselves were anxious to learn about their future and Stirling, like Scott in 1891 and Hildebrand in 1893, was unable to allay their anxiety, through lack of instructions as before, and advised status quo "until further orders".

While at Mongyawng, Stirling received a courtesy call by the Kemmong of Kengtung who had come all the way from Mongsing. The Kemmong, Saomom Ratana Kawn Kiao Intaleng had gone to Mongsing to marry Nang Padumma, eldest daughter of Mom Siri. He refused to return to Kengtung on the ground that his brother, the "Tiger" Sawbwa, had not sent him a suitable escort to welcome home his bride and himself. This was the time when the two brothers were on hostile terms due largely to court intrigues by different factions. Intaleng was also "ill-supplied" with money; the Sawbwa had given him none; his wedding was an expensive affair and he was now heavily in debt; he wanted an appropriate amount of money as well as a suitable escort to enter Kengtung with any face. The

Assistant Superintendent invited the Kemmong to accompany his party from Mongsing back to Kengtung. He said he would consider the matter but Stirling did not see him again.

While surveying Western Kengcheng on the 15th March 1894, Stirling received orders to proceed to Mongsing to inform the Myosa that Kengcheng was still British after all, the transfer to Siam having been cancelled, and to exact a nominal tribute from him. On arrival at Mongsing, Stirling failed to get any token submission from the Myosa, whom he described as a man of about 65 years of age, well mannered, intelligent and honest. The British Officer thought Mom Siri was a mere figurehead entirely in the hands of his advisers. This statement seems unjustified, to judge from subsequent dealings Stirling had with him.

From the very beginning, the Myosa refused to accede to the British demands and he took his stand as below:

1. Kengcheng had been tributary to Burma and therefore became tributary to the British after November 1885.

2. Fully admitting this, the Myosa was willing and anxious to submit to British suzerainty in 1891, but his offer was refused and nothing had happened for two years.

3. In 1893 the British declared Kengcheng to be a vassal State to Siam and accordingly the Myosa drank the water of allegiance to Siam and sent tributes to King Chulalongkorn.

4. Now he was told that the transfer was cancelled and he was still in British territory.

5. He refused to accept this story as no one had informed him officially of the re-transfer and Siam had accepted his tributary presents, Siamese officials having left Mongsing only a month before.

6. Should there be a mistake again, acceptance of Stirling’s demands would be a treasonable act against the King of Siam.

No. He could not bring himself to accommodate Mr. Stirling without orders from Bangkok releasing him from his oath of allegiance to the King there.

In due course, however, the British Government requested the Siamese Government to absolve the Myosa from his allegiance to them. A number of Proclamations written in Western Shan Script were then sent

by the Superintendent, Shan States, to the Myosa for distribution to
all his domain. As the population of Mongsing was composed largely
of Lu who had a script of their own and could not understand or read
the Western Shan Script, the Proclamation sheets served no useful
purpose. The Myosa, however, acknowledged receipt of the Superin-
tendent's letter and stoically accepted his new status.

At the same time he also wrote a reply to the Government of
Siam acknowledging receipt of the intimation that he was no longer a
Siamese subject, and sent this letter with an official of Muangnan,
Nai Nan Pichawong. The letter carrier was intercepted at Chiengkhong
by the French who sent their "commercial agent", M. Macey, back with
Nai Nan to Mongsing to inform the Myosa that as Mongsing had been
ceded to France by Siam he must have no contact with Siamese officials
and that Kengcheng East was now a French territory and the Myosa a
French subject. The Chief wrote to the Frenchman and said "that he
had been told that he was a British subject, and piteously asked what
he was to do pending the settlement of the question between the two
Great Powers". Reiterating that Mongsing was French territory, Macey
replied "that the Myosa was to continue to rule as before, leaving
disputes of importance to be settled by French Officers who would be
appointed for the purpose". This French reply was accompanied by a
Tricolour.

"It is certain", reported Scott, "that from this time on the
State of Kengcheng became much more French than British in feeling
and tendencies".

This pro-French attitude was created by French propaganda
and presents, while the British awaited orders from above. Scott
somewhat naively expressed a surprise that the French had an un-
limited supply of secret money and said that coins were liberally
"distributed with both hands to all comers".

These French activities were unknown in London at the time
when preliminaries to the Buffer State Commission were discussed
between London and Paris. As stated, this proposed Buffer State
was the result of the Siamese intimation to the British Government
that Kengcheng East, i.e. Mongsing, had been included in the terri-

tory east of the Mekhong forcibly taken from Siam by France. Should
their idea of a Buffer State prove unworkable the British said they
would retain suzerainty over Mongsing. England and France agreed
to have the Commission on the Buffer State in the cold weather of
1894-95.

It seems that the British Government had been anticipating
the creation of the Buffer State even while the French were blockad-
ing the Gulf of Siam, for in August 1893, J. G. Scott was ordered to
proceed from Lashio to Bangkok to advise the British Legation there
"on Siamese affairs". He arrived in Bangkok on the 15th September
and on the 2nd November, Captain Jones, the then British Resident
Minister, at a private dinner party read out a telegram from Lord
Rosebury instructing him to hand over the charge to Scott. His appointment was acclaimed by Siam Free Press "as a very satisfactory one" "in view of the delicate negotiations now proceeding between France and England on Siamese Affairs". But it was only in August 1894 that Scott received the appointment order to be the British Commissioner in the Buffer State Commission.

The British Commission then composed of the following, besides Commissioner Scott:

Mr. W. Warry, Chinese Political Adviser to the Government of Burma
Mr. G. C. B. Stirling, Political Officer in charge of Mongnai
Colonel R. G. Woodthorpe, C. B. R. E. Survey officers
Lieutenant C. H. D. Ryder, R. E.
Captain H. S. Walker, D. S. O., D. C. L. I., Intelligence Officer
Surgeon-Major O. E. P. Lloyd, V. C., A. M. D., Medical Officer
Sub-Surveyor Abdul Rahim, Ramsabad Indian Survey Department
Jamadar Ranjit Garung, Escort Commander
Escort of 30 rifles of the 1st Burma Regiment

Captain G. Caulfield, D. S. O., stood by in Kengtung with 100 men of the same battalion, with Subadar-Major Imam Singh Garung and Jemadar Jasabab Thappa.

Phya Raw (or Law, as erroneously recorded), representative of Kengtung State, who had won high praise for himself from Mr. Hildebrand in the 1892-93 Anglo-Siam Boundary Commission, was also on hand to advise. Apparently this Phya Raw was one and the same person as Phya Sim, who had accompanied Scott on his 1890-91 Kengtung-Chiangmai Boundary survey mission. He seemed to have been promoted by his Sawbwa to the rank of Raw as a reward for good work done with the British. The previous holder of the title, Raw, had been done to death in 1890 by the order of the Tiger Sawbwa who accused the officer of plotting against his life. This person, the new Phya Raw, seems to have been a man of initiative and high intelligence. For a native to win a word of praise and esteem from Europeans, especially in those days, he must have worked unusually hard to conform or come up to their standard. In all his three missions with British Officers, Raw had won their unstimted praise. While these British Officers received suitable awards and acclaims from their imperial Governments, he was rewarded with the upgrading in rank by his tempestuous and youthful overlord the Tiger Sawbwa. In the present Buffer State Commission, Phya Raw had already ordered repairs of roads and bridges to Mongsing before the arrival of Commissioner Scott.

Scott left Bangkok on the 23rd October, and travelling through Korat, Paknampho, Utharadit, Pre, Nan and Chiangrai, reached Hawngluk on the 13th December to find the rest of the British Commission waiting for him there. The Commissioner had high praise for the Siamese
Government's help in his journey all the way from Bangkok. The commander of his Siamese escort was a "Major Count Ranron* who together with his men had earned a gallant praise from Scott. "As far as mere marching was concerned, they were the superiors of the slow-footed Gurkhas, and, therefore, better light infantry*. This, from a Scotsman, to Siamese troops of those days was no mean tribute. Was this Ranron one and the same person as that who "welcomed Mr. Ney Elias into Siamese territory" on the bank of the Salween on the road to Mongmau in 1890? 1

Scott arrived in Mongsing on the 24th December, 1894, after 63 days journey from Bangkok ahead of his opposite number, the idea being that Scott should be there, "to welcome the French into British territory", à la Ranron.

The French Commission was no less impressive than the British. It consisted of:

M. Auguste Pavie, Commissaire-General au Laos
M. Lefèvre-Pontalis, Secrétaire d'Ambassade, Commissaire-Adjoint
Capitaine A. Rivière)
Lieutenant Thomassin ) Survey Officers
" Seauve ")
Dr. Lefèvre, Surgeon to the Mission
M. Caillat, Private Secretary to M. Pavie
Two interpreters from the Cambodian College in Paris, one of whom a Chevalier de la Légion d'Honneur.
Escort of 30 Tongkinese Miliciens.
12 Shan-Chinese Body guards of M. Pavie from Lai Chao.

When the British Contingent arrived at Mongsing, the Tricolour was flying over the Haw, but the Myosa and his son, thinking that armies were converging on his capital, had fled.

The hoisting of the French flag had no sort of significance to him. He considered it a mere concession to the eccentricities of foreigners, and attached not the slightest importance to it. The same explanation may be offered for his more recent flight in May of this year, on the occupation by Mr. Stirling of Mong Hsing. It is unfortunately true that the Chief has completely lost his nerve, and is entirely in the hands of one or two of his officials who exercise anything but a good influence over him. He is not by any means an old man, and he does not appear to have any particular vices. It is very possible that his undeniably harassing position during the last five years is responsible for his entire lack of backbone.

1. See Chapter IX.
At any rate we were eight days in Mong Hsing before he could be persuaded to return. None of his people would betray his hiding-place, and during the whole week I had constant interviews with the officials of the State, and even went the length of writing a formal letter guaranteeing to the Chief his personal safety and immunity from any kind of punishment for his failure to obey the orders of Mr. Stirling.

The officials were extremely eager to learn whether the British Government intended to establish a military post in Keng Tung. I could give them no direct answer. Had I been able to answer in the affirmative I am confident that I should have obtained the tributary offerings. That question had to be dropped entirely after the arrival of M. Pavie.

This sizing up of the situation seems unwarranted. The flying of the French flag undoubtedly conveyed its full meaning to the Myosa who knew he was closer to the French fort opposite Chiengkhong, and it did hurt Scott. Subsequent events showed up the Myosa as by no means back-boneless and his own people obeyed and supported him loyally until superior forces were used. And Scott's evasive answer at once lowered British prestige on the spot.

Scott, of course, hauled down the French flag, but, instead of keeping it as the French would probably have done to a Union Jack, courteously returned it to Pavie who secretly gave it back to the Myosa.

Of the French Commissioners, Scott said that Pavie was "a very crafty man" but weak, and that he (Scott) would have had no trouble in dealing with him, alone. In fact, Pavie was very courteous and accommodating before the arrival of his Deputy, Pontalis. He even admitted privately to Scott that Kengcheng was undoubtedly tributary to Burma, but said that "it would have been 'more generous' if Great Britain had recognised the sentimental feeling of the French for 'le fleuve' and had agreed to the Mekhong forming the boundary line of French Indo-China as far North as the Chinese frontier".

Pontalis was less compromising, and asserted "that the British had no right to anything east of the Salween, if so far as that; that our progress to the Salween-Mekhong watershed was due to French supineness; that our claim up to the Mekhong is unblushing effrontery, and to anything beyond a blatant insult". Much time was spent by Pavie in restraining the violence of his deputy who claimed he was in an ante-room when the Buffer State Commissioners, British and French, met in Paris in 1893.

Pavie was the man who dictated the humiliating treaty terms of 1893 to Siam, and the 25-Km zone was Pontalis' idea, "devised with no other object than the keeping open a raw spot for future operation on Siam" - Siamese authority in the zone was being sabotaged methodically.
In a survey of the territories involved, trans-Mekhong Kengcheng, i.e. Mongsing, had an area of 1250 square miles; cis-Mekhong Kengcheng 1150 square miles; trans-Mekhong Nan, 2700 square miles. Kengtung had an area of about 736 square miles east of the Mekhong with villages founded by the orders of its Sawbwa and paying revenue to him. The largeness of this area surprised both the British and the French, and because of the prospect of revenue the latter bitterly contested British or Kengtung rights in it. Pavie said he regarded this enclave as French territory and threatened to arrest any Kengtung officials from Monglin or Paleao. Scott hotly replied that he would regard that as a French unfriendly act and "would take measures for the protection of British subjects".

The British proposed that as the trans-Mekhong Kengtung enclave and Mongsing were part of their Indian Empire, they would contribute this piece of territory, amounting to some 2050 square miles, as their share of the Buffer State, and that the French were to contribute trans-Mekhong Nan (consisting of trans-Mekhong Chiengkhong, Phtha and Muang Luang) with its area of 2700 square miles as their share. The British share was smaller but richer and had a population of about 6000 while the French area was barren with about a tenth of the British population.

The French, refusing to admit any British rights east of the Mekhong, said that Mongsing and the Kengtung enclave, having been "ceded" to them by the Siamese in 1893, would form their share of the Buffer State, while the British share would have to be cis-Mekhong Kengcheng to which must be added Mongko, Hopong, Monglin and Paleao in order that Siam might have access to it.

Scott, of course, could never have agreed to the French stand, and he reported:

If to Keng Cheng East and trans-Mekong Keng Tung is added Keng Cheng West, the value of the British contribution is out of all proportion beyond that of the French in area, population, prosperity, and orderliness. At the same time, it must be remembered that the whole tract is worth very little. From a European point of view it is worth little more than nothing. From a Shan States point of view Keng Cheng is a comfortable little possession, which grows so much more than it wants that the people are able to cover themselves with finery, to own pack cattle, hold periodical feasts, and build occasional pagodas, while the Chief has a revenue sufficient to enable him to keep up elephants, maintain a private band, and to buy Dutch clocks, fearsome glass ware, and Chinese eccentricities such as the Shan delights in.

1. It is not understood how this figure was arrived at as Mongsing and the Kengtung enclave together make 1986 square miles. All the figures are from Scott's report of the 25th July and the 22nd August, 1895.
Trans-Mekong Keng Tung is peaceful and well in hand. It pays for the officials told off to look after it, and if a sale is found for the Mong Hi timber it might even be a profitable possession. It is, moreover, a convenient settling-place for migratory La Hu and other hill tribes. The Keng Tung Sawbwa would undoubtedly resent being deprived of it without compensation elsewhere.

In all their formal meetings and to the very last the two parties would not depart from the above stand each had taken. A tour of some of the areas along existing routes was undertaken by the Commissions. This tour revealed the unproductiveness of the area, especially the French portion. This worthlessness of the whole area was about the only thing of which the two parties were in complete agreement.

At their last meeting at Chiengkhong at the end of March the British and the French Commissioners realised that agreement was impossible, argument waste of time and joint recommendations out of the question. They therefore on the 2nd April signed a procès-verbal whereby the question of ownership of the portions of territory which were to form the Buffer State was left to the two Metropolitan Powers and in the meanwhile no orders were to be issued to the Kyosa of Mongsing by either side.

The Commissions broke up at Chiengkhong on the 3rd April. Pavie and Pontalis returned to Hanoi via Luang Prabang, Dien Bien Phu, and Lai Chao. Scott returned to Burma via Kengtung, reaching Mandalay on the 4th June 1895, 225 days after leaving Bangkok and some 1880 miles wearier in the legs. He then left Burma on the 22nd and submitted his first report on the 25th July, 1895

It will have been seen that Scott was no match for the crafty Pavie. He did not succeed in convincing the French of the British suzerainty over Mongsing and the trans-Mekhong Kengtung enclave, although it was indisputable that the ground belonged to the British as successors to the Kingdom of Ava. London, Calcutta and Rangoon never had a clear-cut policy in the Buffer State which was the creation of Lord Rosebury who dreaded a joint frontier with France.

Scott was criticised by the Foreign Office in London for his agreement of the 2nd April 1895 with Pavie. It was difficult to see how he could have done otherwise. Officials of Mongsing were pro-French (through British fickleness, in their eyes) and he was so far away from London which had no firm policy. Scott himself must have been too apprehensive of involving his Government to have taken any other course, though as far as the military situation in Mongsing was concerned he boasted that with the force at his command he could

1. Scott to Salisbury, No. 21-B dated the 25th July and No. 22-B dated the 22nd August 1895; Report, and Further Report, on the Mekhong Commission.
Again when Scott tried to maintain his Government's rights in the Kengtung enclave east of the Mekhong, he was criticised by the India Office in London for "having taken too high ground in regard to Kengtung villages, east of the Mekhong", which, London "felt it would be a useful card to throw away", as the Government of India abhorred any commitment beyond the Mekhong. In the same letter to the Foreign Office, and referring to Mongsing where the British Government had decided to exercise authority should the Buffer State fail, the India Office in London declared, "We should not pose as grasping at any disputable territory beyond the Mekong". To which the Foreign Office added a note: "We don't want that beastly place, but we can't let Pavie go on flourishing about treading on our toes with hot headed boots". The Chief Commissioner of Burma was of the opinion that to surrender Mongsing to France "would damage prestige, stultify recent action, render useless work of past season and give us river frontier with France, the military objections to which have been pointed out". The Viceroy on the other hand expressed "his unpreparedness to advise definitely until he knew what general arrangement of Siamese affairs was considered". But the India Office was pressing the Foreign Office to relieve the Indian Government of the burden of maintaining troops in the trans-Mekong Shan States.

It was all very confusing and not easy for honest Scott to please London, thousands of miles from "that beastly place". The situation was further confounded when (in spite of London's abhorrence of the place) Lord Kimberly, Foreign Secretary in Rosebury's Government, ordered Mr. Stirling and 100 rifles of the 1st Burma Regiment at Kengtung under Captain G. Caulfield to proceed to Mongsing to reassert British suzerainty there. Stirling reached his destination on May 2, 1895. The French had already established a fortified post garrisoned by militiamen at Fort Carnot, opposite Chiangkhong on the left bank and in the territory which the British proposed to be their (French) contribution to the Buffer State.1

Confused British policy on Mongsing also resulted in the propaganda victory for the French. It was not surprising therefore that an honest man like Scott could not get the upper hand of Pavie in what may be called the Buffer State cold war. Nor could the Mongsing populace be blamed for feeling more favourably disposed towards the French, who, besides their presents, also showed firm intentions of "staying put" in all places acquired by them. The local populace certainly thought that the French were the more powerful of the two. These were also the feelings of the British Commissioners as they came away from the fruitless mission.

Such was Scott's disgust that in his report to Salisbury of the 25th July 1895, he wrote: "Except as a means of mapping and gathering miscellaneous information about a little known country, the Commission over which I had the honour to preside has not been very productive of results".

The map which Scott submitted was "entirely the work of Colonel Woodthorpe and Lieutenant Ryder. The French mapping work consisted of mere route traverses-pacing, combined with compass work, frequently done from pony-back. Latitudes were fixed occasionally by astronomical observation, but apparently the observations were always taken from the inconsistent moon, and not from a more trustworthy star. The French work, could not therefore, claim to be more than an indication of the general line of the roads, and this was admitted by the French Officers themselves".

The occupation of Mongsing itself was frustrating for the British. The Myosa, whom both Messrs. Stirling and Scott described as clay in his ministers' hands, refused to meet the British representative, and took refuge with the French at Phukha. Persuasion, cajolery and threat by Stirling produced no result. He forbade his ministers to obey the British, on pain of death. The British, on stupid principle rather than expediency, decided to raise revenue to assert their suzerainty. They received no cooperation from the people until all the ministers were arrested and threatened with deportation to Taunggyi. Even after this, a mere Rs. 3000 was collected. It is surprising that Rangoon authorised this unnecessary blunder. The following letter from the Myosa more or less sums up Stirling's activities during the year:

I have heard that you have been out to examine the limits and boundaries of my State, and that you have told the Ministers you will, on your return, order house-posts five spans in circumference and will build a large and substantial house. I do not at all relish this news. The State of Kengcheng is not your State. Do you think you will stay in it for ever? The arrangement between the two great powers and the letter given to me are facts which cannot be controverted. Your coming to my State (as you did) is equivalent to having attacked and seized it forcibly. You acted with violence and drove me out. I was obliged to leave my State and fly on account of your violence. I took refuge in French territory because the French have observed the arrangement made by the two great powers and have done no harm to, nor seized upon, my State, nor have any cause of complaint against it. At the time I fled from my State and came (here) you received and intimidated the Ministers, saying I had abandoned both them and my State and that I should never return to it. You told them not to imagine that I would ever come back and recover my State. When the Ministers heard this deceitful and threatening language of yours, they still refused to obey you. Then you seized eight of the chief Ministers and placed them in confinement. You declared you would send them to
Taunggyi and would bring troops and rule the State. Then the Ministers and people were afraid, because they were but feeble people, and they collected the revenue and drew up a document declaring themselves British subjects. It is the same therefore as if they had never collected the revenue and had never signed such a document. As to the Ministers collecting the revenue and drawing up a document declaring themselves British subjects, what could they say, or what could they write? If you had not used violence to them, the Ministers would neither have collected the revenue nor have written such a document and this you well know.

The State is mine and I rule it. When the French and English Governments have decided to which it shall belong, they will inform me. Your coming to Monghsing was an offence against the two powers, and contrary to the written agreement made, notwithstanding which you came and seized upon my possessions. Now I never gave you leave to live in my State, and I protest against your conduct under five heads -

1. I protest against your living at Monghsing at present.
2. I protest against the evil (violence) you are now doing.
3. I protest against everything you may do in the future.
4. I do not authorize or approve what the State Ministers have done in the past, or what they may do in the future, or their obedience to your orders.
5. I now call upon you to observe the agreement between the two powers. I wish to return and govern my State, and I demand from you the same recognitions of that agreement as the French have accorded. When I know to which power the two Governments have decided to allot the State I shall not disobey their orders.

Written the 15th waxing of the 3rd month 1267 (31st December 1895).

If the Myosa had been a European he probably would have been exalted for his steadfastness and courage to the last. True, he had the French behind him, and later years were to prove that British colonial policy was more liberal than that of the French. But in 1895-96, May to May in Mongsing, it definitely looked as if the French were the champions of the under dog, if one had not remembered what

they had just done to Siam and the rest of Indo-China. Even now, many Europeans behave in a most unaccountable manner outside their own country. The excuse is always that the other people are not as civilised as they are.

However that may be, the British occupation of Mongsing in 1895-96 would have won the support of the local inhabitants if they could have proved in a gentler way that their ruling methods were superior to those of the French.

In his report to London Scott stated that it would be impracticable - even dangerous - to have the Buffer State under its own independent Chief. Nor was it politic to hand over Mongsing to China whose existence in the area the French refused to recognise, especially after she had been defeated in the war against Japan in March 1895. Scott's third alternative was to hand over Mongsing back to Siam if only that meant a revision of the unjust France-Siamese Treaty of 1893 and if it was also followed by an Anglo-French guarantee of Siam as a buffer and independent country. His final recommendation was that there was really no valid objection in having the Mekhong as the boundary line.

A Siamese special envoy, Prince Swasti, and his Belgian Adviser, M. Rolin Jacquemyns, who came to London during their tour of the European capitals at this time, were told by Lord Salisbury who succeeded Lord Kimberly, at the Foreign Office that while he would do everything to maintain the integrity of Siam he did not think that the interests of Siam were important enough for Britain to defend them in a war.

That being the case Scott's last recommendation was the only acceptable one. In fact, it pleased London to find a way out of the impasse created by British policy makers.

The French, of course, were loud in their protests against Stirling's occupation of what they had considered their territory. At the same time they proposed also that the Mekhong boundary would be the most favourable solution to both the Powers. Yet the French delayed coming to any agreement with Great Britain about their proposal, in an effort, it would appear, to find a pretext for annexing the whole of Siam.

Months passed without anything happening until one day, November 12, 1895, Salisbury bluntly told the French Ambassador in London, Baron de Courcel, that it was in Britain's interest to maintain the independence and integrity of Siam, and that unless France could agree on some reciprocal arrangement he would be forced to make a unilateral formal declaration that "the maintenance of Siam within her present limits as an independent Kingdom was a matter of serious interest to Great Britain". Salisbury added quietly that perhaps such a British action would serve the interest of France better than a joint guarantee.
For the first time over these years of negotiation on the question of Siam, Britain was able to put France on the defensive. France had to accept the cession of Mongsing by Britain to her, thereby acknowledging British rights in that State, in exchange for a joint Declaration signed in London between Salisbury and de Courel on January 15, 1896. By the Declaration, the safety of the "Menam Valley" was guaranteed jointly by the two Powers, which further engaged not to acquire special privileges or advantages in the region not commonly enjoyed. It is true the Valley of the Menam was by far the richest part of Siam, but the fact that the "safety zone" was bounded on the west by the British Burma frontier and on the east not by the Mekong, but by the watershed of that river and of the Menam, shows up two features of the then cold war; namely, the adroitness of the French in securing as their sphere of influence the whole of the western watershed of the Mekong within Siam, and the unwillingness of the British to guarantee anything outside their commercial interests which were mainly in the Menam Valley. This latter feature, however, was somewhat mitigated by a letter dated January 15, 1896 from Salisbury to Lord Dufferin, British Ambassador in Paris, in which the former declared: "We fully recognise the rights of Siam to the full and undisturbed enjoyment, in accordance with long usage or with existing treaties, of the entire territory comprised within her dominions; and nothing in our present action would detract in any degree from the validity of the rights of the King of Siam to those portions of his territory which are not affected by the Treaty". This virtually ruled out any French annexation of the area in Siam which France claimed as her sphere of influence.

To come back to Mongsing, Mr. Stirling the British Administrator there reported:

On the 15th January 1896 the declaration fixing the Mekhong as the boundary between British and French possessions in Indo-China was signed. Intimation of the settlement was received on the 31st January, and from this date till our evacuation of the district nothing of importance occurred. By the terms of the Convention Mong Hsing was ceded to France. It only remained to hand over the territory to the officer appointed to receive it. M. Vacle, Commandant Supérieur of the Upper Laos, was nominated for this duty, and (after considerable delay) reached Mong Hsing on the 9th May.1

M. Vacle was accompanied by two other French Officers and escorted by 10 Europeans of the Infanterie de Marine and 22 Annamese tirailleurs. The handing over ceremony took place on the 10th. The British asked for a French assurance that none of the Mongsing officials who had obeyed British orders would be punished.

Stirling received the assurance and reported further:

In view of the feeling which our occupation of Mong Hsing excited in French Indo-China, it is pleasing to record the courtesy shown by M. Vacle and his companions to Major Caulfield and myself on the occasion of its handing over. The party marched in without the usual tricolour, and none was hoisted while we remained there. The visit which we paid to the French officers on their arrival was returned within two hours.

Our private relations were of the most cordial kind, and we parted with many expressions of mutual regard. It is impossible that the most ignorant villagers could have failed to see that the cession of the territory was made without reluctance on our part, and received without triumph by the French officers. On the 11th May we left Mong Hsing, and four days later recrossed the Mekhong into British territory.1

This show of good will over the cession was part of "playing the game" but it only confirmed the belief of the Myosa and his ministers that they had acted in the right direction from the beginning by passive and active resistance to Mr. Stirling.

Thus it was that the frontier between the Shan States of Burma and the French Indo-China was formed by the Mekhong river all the way from the mouth of the Mehok until the former river entered the territory of Kenghung at the sub-State of Mongla. All the cis-Mekhong Kengcheng became part of Kengtung State.

As far as our study is concerned it ends with the handing over ceremony of Mongsing by Mr. Stirling to M. Vacle on the 10th May 1896, but it will not be improper to relate briefly how Siam fared from this cold war.

The French reaction to the treaty of the 15th January 1896 was violent and uncompromising; the colonial party blatantly claimed that the opportunity for annexation of the whole of Siam had been allowed to slip; the Indo-Chinese and Paris press called the treaty "a betrayal of the rights of France over Siam". The Government of India greeted the treaty with great relief as they had always considered "this small excrescence on the other side of the Mekong could be of no advantage or profit to us". In Siam it was felt that the joint guarantee should have been extended to the whole Kingdom; but then the British concern was with her commercial interests in the Menam Valley and not in Siam's difficulties with France. In England the press was very critical and Lord Rosebury who was now in the opposition called the treaty "the surrender of Siam".2

1. Ibid.

Scott, who himself suggested the Mekong as the boundary after several impracticable alternatives, wrote years later:

Lord Rosebury, who was Foreign Secretary at the time, had the extraordinary idea of forming a buffer state. Lord Kimberly, who followed him, courted a snub by ordering the immediate occupation of Mongsing, and then came Lord Salisbury, who was, without exception, the worst Foreign Secretary we ever had for matters east of Suez, and he gave the whole question up.¹

 Truly, States in South East Asia, big or small, were but pawns in the imperial chess board of the 19th century.

The treaty was by no means a satisfactory one even in those colonial days, but it gave Siam that very much needed respite to recover from the state of despair and despondency into which she had fallen as a result of the 1893 treaty dictated to her by France, and to put her house in order. Thanks to her enlightened king and other leaders, she was able to modernise rapidly, and opened up her country to other European Powers thereby obtaining a balance of their vying interests. For example, previous to 1900, about 80% of shipping in Siam was British. In 1900, the German Norddeutscher Lloyd bought up two of the chief steamship lines from the British firms. The Danish and other shipping firms came into the field later. When there was only Britain as the chief commercial power in Siam, France did not hesitate to twist the Lion's tail to her advantage, but now that there were other European powers in the Menam Valley she would have to ponder long and deep before she could act rashly. Germany, with her vast army ever ready for war in Europe, was now in Siam, and a combined protest of this Power and Britain would be more than sufficient to stop any French aggressive action.²

From the very beginning, Britain need not have feared having a common frontier with France on the Mekhong.

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CHAPTER XII
The Wa States

In our narrative so far two trans-Salween areas have been omitted, namely Manglon and the Wa States proper, the first being the home of the "tame" Was and the second that of the "wild" ones. They will now be dealt with in turn before we come to a brief description of the boundary with China.

The origin of Manglon is wrapped in such legends and incoherent accounts as to make it impossible to trace its growth and consolidation as a state. Under this state are a number of feudatory states: Mothai, Manghseng and Ngoekhting in the north and Mawpha in the south. In the middle of the twentieth century the whole tract was still very wild and there are reasons to believe that the Was of Manglon until recently were much in the same condition as their brethren in the north, the so-called wild or untamed Was, in that ideas of government did not exist beyond village groups, and that in spite of legends in its chronicle the state as a separate entity has been a comparatively modern growth.

The chronicle of Manglon gives a coherent account from the founder of the present ruling family, Tawang, a Wa who ousted the original hereditary sawbwa, Mawng San, with the help of levies from Hsenwi. In all probability Manglon was tributary to the undivided ancient Hsenwi off and on, but by the time Tawang had established himself as sawbwa, his state was bound to supplying Hsenwi with 500 levies or Rs.2500 when no levies were not needed, and this amount was increased to Rs.5000. Tawang took the title of Hsokham and Htamo was his capital.

Tawang died in 1822 and having no issue of his own, was succeeded by Khun Sing, the son of his wife's younger sister. Khun Sing had six wives, the chief and first a Wa and the rest Shans, and he ruled without serious interruption for 30 years and made Pangyang the capital. The tribute to Hsenwi was paid regularly at first but this was reduced to one sixth of any tribute paid by Hsenwi to Ava - Manglon's portion was usually about Rs.500. From about 1849, in the confusion of Sengnawpha's rule in Hsenwi, the tribute from Manglon ceased altogether.

Intrigues and fighting for succession followed Khun Sing's death in 1852. Upayaza, son of the Wa wife succeeded at first but was ousted a year later by his younger brother Nawpha who had
obtained help from Kengtung. Upayaza fled to Mothai where he died in the following year. The third brother, Tunsang, contended for a share and the result was that Nawpha ruled in the trans-Salween portion south of Pangyang and the cis-Salween tract, while Tunsang was lord of the remaining area in the north. Many petty chiefs in Manglon east broke away during this period of brotherly discord and confusion and have since become independent - they were Ngekhting, Sunglong, Kawngpha, Hatet, Tawng Tarawng, Loilon, etc.

When Nawpha died in 1859, Tunsang succeeded and divided the cis-Salween tract equally between his three brothers, Sengkyaw, Maha and Ratana. When the latter died his portion went to Sengkyaw. Having had a taste of rule over larger territory Sengkyaw wanted more and attempted a rebellion, but was driven out and Tunsang gave the whole cis-Salween district to Maha. Sengkyaw retired to Hsenwi in 1877.1

Thus on the eve of the British annexation of the Shan States, Manglon was being ruled by the two brothers: Manglon East, the larger territory by far, by Tunsang with capital at Takut; Manglon West on the right bank of the Salween, known as Nalau after the name of its capital, by Maha, usually known as Maha Nalau. The population of the former was predominantly Was and Las, while that of the Nalau was almost entirely Shans.

In the Shan upheaval of 1882-86, Manglon's tributary state, Mawpha, in the south and largely populated by Las, had not been idle. It annexed Hoklap from Mongnawng. Mawpha lies mostly east of the Salween, while Hoklap is on that river's right bank and its inhabitants are entirely Shans. Mawpha was later allowed by the British to retain Hoklap.2

When the British had established themselves in the Shan States, invitations were sent to both Mawpha and Manglon asking their chiefs to attend the durbar which was held in January 1886 by the Superintendent, Shan States, A. H. Hildebrand, during the march of the Southern Annexation Column. Mawpha did not bother to reply. Tunsang, styling himself as "Khun Hawkham" (king), replied distainfully but verbally through the messengers who were men of the Mongnawng Myosa, that as his state had never been tributary to either Burma or China he proposed to remain independent. This stirred up the image of another Sao Weng in the mind of the British, but they received reports that Tunsang's brother, Maha Nalau, was on friendly terms with the myosas of Monghsu and Mongsong who had already submitted and the Superintendent expected that he (Maha) would submit without difficulty and through him he hoped to approach the hostile Tunsang.

1. Shan States and Karenni, pp. 70-71, and GUBSS, II.2.173-175.

2. RANSS, 1892-93, p. 21.
This report of Maha Nalau's friendliness proved incorrect, and the Superintendent's optimism premature. In 1889-90 Maha promised to go to Lashio in order to submit to the Superintendent, Northern Shan States which by now had been separated from the control of Fort Stedman in September 1888, much to the annoyance of Mr. Hildebrand. But he failed to show up. During his mission to Kenghung in January 1891, the Superintendent, Mr. H. Daly, visited Nalau, in the manner of Mohammed going to his mountain, but its chief Maha, had fled on hearing his approach. His elder brother and technical overlord, Tunsang of Manglon East, on the other hand, showed signs of wishing to be on friendly terms with the British. In April 1892, the Superintendent, Mr. J. G. Scott (who had taken over from Daly), was touring Manglon again. By this time, Maha had shifted his capital from Nalau to Manpeng. At Mongheng, two marches from Manpeng, Scott was met by Maha's brother-in-law who stated that the chief had fled across the Salween and taken refuge in Motele. The Superintendent refused to treat with the brother-in-law.

Tunsang, meanwhile, came in from Takut to submit. He met the Superintendent at Manpeng and was immediately proclaimed sawbwa of all Manglon. All his tributary headmen were made to swear the oath of allegiance to him; all obeyed except three who had fled with Maha. Tunsang assured Scott that he would stay on at Manpeng as advised, but soon after the Superintendent's back was turned moved back to Takut in June. On hearing of this move, Maha collected some Was from Motele and Ngekhting, attacked and captured Manpeng at the end of June. Several villages were burnt and looted, and most of the dogs in Manglon West were eaten by the Was during their occupation. The Superintendent reported confidently that Tunsang would be able to capture Manpeng after the monsoon.

When the rains were over the Superintendent wrote and told Maha that he would be pardoned if he submitted before the 20th December 1892. Starting from Lashio on the 4th December the Superintendent began his tour, but as he approached Manpeng Maha fled again, and this time he headed south to Mongpeng in Kengtung territory together with his two chief supporters, the ramangs (headmen) of Ngekhting and Loilon, defiantly proclaiming he would return again when the British troops had gone. Early in 1894 Maha again raided Manglon and burnt the village of Loingon, but the approach of a relief force from Lashio caused him to retire to Loilon.

Gradually, however, Maha's influence declined as he failed to show his followers any victory and to give them any loot and reward. By 1896-97, the Superintendent was able to write in his annual report: "Saw Maha is apparently a thing of the past". He retired to Ngeklet and lived there until 1904 when permission was given to him to live in South Hsenwi where he died in 1911.

It seems that Maha's persistent refusal to meet the British Officers was due not so much to the same spirit and motive that

1. Burma Foreign Proceedings, Nos. 1-3, September 1888.
moved Sao Weng of Lawksawk and Sawlapaw of Kantarawadi to resist the British advances, but to some well founded fear that he would be arrested the moment he was within reach of British troops. He seemed to have been complicated with the upheaval in Hsenwi which culminated in the division of that ancient state into North and South. He failed to show up at the Mongyai Conference which partitioned Hsenwi. Later in the year two of his cousins were arrested at a meeting in Mongyai and sentenced to two years imprisonment. By the time the British occupation had become an established fact and the two cousins been released, Maha was persuaded (by his cousins) that any meeting with a representative of the new power would result in his arrest and deportation. From Kengtung and later from Sipsawng Panna, Sao Weng of Lawksawk also urged him not to submit to the British. At about this time, he also got himself involved in the fighting which broke out between Manglon and Monglem over the question of the ownership of some border circles beyond Namkha in the neighbourhood of Mongnga. 1 To Maha, these activities constituted a treason to the new regime. His fears were therefore well founded, and of course he could not believe or understand that they were pardonable in the name of peace and politics by the new rulers of the Shan States.

Maha's elder brother, Sawbwa Tunsang, who submitted in 1892, prospered under Pax Britannica. He claimed to have converted all his Was into Buddhists and was very proud of it. These Buddhists had here and there stuck up skulls in the head-posts outside their villages; but the British Superintendent was told in 1892 that they were those of thieves and they did look old.

The Manglon Was belong to five different clans, the Sinlam, Sinleng, Sinlai, Tamo and Motno. The distinction is in the waist cloth which is either striped or chequered variously for the different clans. "They all wear clothes", runs the 1892-93 report, "that is to say, at least a quarter of their personal superficies is covered". Most of these Was live in the sub-states of Mothai, Ngekhting and Loilon which form an intermediary belt between the "tame" and the "wild" Was who live further north. 2

This belt between the two categories of Was was first crossed by representatives of the new regime in April 1891 when Daly returned from his Kenghung expedition. A more thorough tour of the area was done two years later in January 1893 by J. G. Scott who passed Manglong West and East, and then headed north and plunged into the real wild Wa country. Ngekhting, Loilon, Mongkha, Sungramang, Sanhtung were visited. He returned to Lashio via Mongmau, Panglong and Kunlong.

Mr. Warry who accompanied Daly to Kengtung also left a report on the Was, but it was Daly and Scott who gave more detailed accounts

1. GUBSS, II.2.175.
which form the basic reference on the Wa States and are still fundamentally accurate.

It is well known that the Was were the original inhabitants of parts of the Shan States and northern Siam. They belong to the Palaung-Wa groups of the Mon-Khmer race. Outside the Wa States, these people are to be found nowadays in isolated settlements dotted all over the Shan States in the midst of the Shans. The Riangs of the central Shan States; the Tai Lois (or Tai Dois), the Maens, the Sam-taos and the Sensum of Kengtung and the various Kha tribes in Laos belong to the same race.

The chronicle of Kengtung speaks of the original inhabitants of the states as having been the Was who came from the seeds of a prolific and legendary gourd. These Was were conquered by the descendants of Mangrai, who himself conquered the Mon-Khmer state of Haripunjai (Lampoon) in 1281. At the coronation ceremony of a Sawbwa of Kengtung, 2 elderly Wa men from the villages of Ban Kham and Ban Kang (founded by Mangrai it is said) would be brought in and told to feast on the throne; but just as they opened their food packets and were about to eat, an official called Phya Lai (= to drive) would appear on the scene and would ceremoniously chaff at them and drive them away. Such a ceremony was last performed towards the close of the last century during the coronation of Saomom Kawn Kiao Intaleng.

Another pointer to the Wa origin of the founding of Kengtung State seems to be ceremony of "sending off" the "old year" before the "new year" is ushered in. On the 13th April every year, a procession with a big drum, headed by flag bearers and accompanied by youths of the town, goes through the town, from the house of a certain official (with the hereditary duty of performing this ceremony) near the old bazaar, to the Namkhun stream half a mile outside the northern city Gate. The drum carriers, standard bearers and many of the official processionists wear red cloth uniforms and are Tai Lois (of Wa race) from a certain village, also with the hereditary duty of making the ceremony a success. In the old days an indecent figure was carried publicly in the procession but this was modified by the order of Sawbwa Kawn Kiao who said that such a custom was barbaric and incompatible with Buddhism, and now the indecent figure is made small and carried hidden in the pocket of one of the processionists. The whole procession marches through the town at a merry making pace with the drum being beaten by the mystic looking Tai Lois and followed by the hereditary official who is the phya, or chief of the ceremony, on horse back. Along the route people gather to water the drum, the phya and the processionists, especially the former, and a wish, verging on prayer, for a prosperous new year goes with every cup or bucket of water thrown. On the bank of the Namkhun a frog has been made ready of earth and sand. When the procession arrives a short ceremony is performed and the figure plunged into the frog. The

1. See also p.
procession then returns through the same route to receive more water and blessings until the hereditary official's house is reached.

How is the frog connected with the Was?

The Was in the Wa States themselves say their primeval ancestors descended from tadpoles which lived in Nawngkheo, a lake half a mile long and 200 yards wide situated on the top of a 7000 foot mountain not far from Mongkha to the north north-west. It was fabled that half of the rivers in this part of the world had their sources in Nawngkheo and that it was so deep and so cold that no fish could live in it. The tadpoles became frogs and found their way to a place called Namtao and there the frogs (by biological processes?) developed into phiphas or ogres and two of them called Yahtawm and Yahtai lived together in a cave near Pakkate, about thirty miles south of Nawngkheo. As long as Yahtawm and Yahtai lived on wild beasts they had no off spring, but one day they went far from their usual haunts and came upon a human settlement where they captured a man, ate his flesh and took his head back with them to their cave. Soon after this they started to produce young ogrelings who all had human form, and they were so happy that they placed the original human skull on a stake and worshipped it.

Yahtawm and Yahtai produced a family of nine sons and ten daughters all of whom were prolific and futile, especially the latter and they produced a race of arduous hunters of men's heads and their language was that of the croaking of the frog - krek-krek-croak-croak - and some people say the sound is still traceable in the dialects of the Was.

When Yahtawm and Yahtai felt their end was near they summoned all their children together and told them of their origin. After their death, they said, they were to be worshipped as father and mother of all spirits, and the best offering to them was a "snow-white gleaming skull". They enjoined their children always to have human skulls in their settlements. While fowls, pigs and buffaloes would do for ordinary sacrificial offerings, special occasions such as marriages, declaration of war or death demanded human male skulls. Diseases which claimed many victims or drought which threatened crop failure also required human skulls. But skulls could either be bought, bartered or hunted.

A Burmese inscription at Pagan in 1190 mentions the Was (Lawa) and another in 1198 a Wa village in Kyaukse.¹ The first European traveller to mention the Was was reputed to have been Vasgo da Gama at the end of the fifteenth century. The Was were called the "Gueos" in Camoens's "Lusiads" which described da Gama's wanderings. During the "Burmese times"² an army of 3000 was reported to have been sent

2. No date is given in RANSS, 1892-93, p. 23.
into the Wa country to look for gold in the legendary Shwethamin Chaung. They found no gold and were cut pieces to a man.

All Was speak the same language with varied dialects. They call themselves Vu, the Shans Hsem, and the Burman Yong. The Burmese call the head-hunting Was gaungbyat Wa ("head-cutting Was") and the Shans call them Wa Hai ("ferocious Wa") or Wa Long ("savage" or "uncivilised" Wa).

The head-hunters' territory is bounded in the west by the Namma and Nampang, in the east by the Loimaw Range (Kungmingshan) beyond the Namkha, in the north by Mongturn and in the south by Manglon. The most confirmed head-hunters live on the ridges which divided the Namhse, Namkhakhau, Namkhalan, Namyangleng and Namyanglam. Each ridge is about 4000 feet from the stream bed, and the centre of the area is about 40 miles east of Nafan, a large Shan settlement.

Gold dust found in some of the streams, like streams in parts of the trans-Salween Shan States, gave rise to the fable of the gold cave or gold tract (Mawkham). In the spring of 1897 when Scott, contrary to his instructions, carried fire and sword into some of the Wa villages, he had the opportunity to visit the Cave of the Golden Deer on the Shwethamin Chaung, a branch of the Namkha and formed by the junction of the Namyanglam and Namyangleng and in the territory of the friendly Petken Was. The cave was at an elbow bend of the stream, on a knoll amidst bubbling hot springs. The cave itself was not entered in deference to the Was' request, but everyone in Scott's party dug the sand "in dogged silence" on the bank and among the boulders of the stream. They found no gold and specimens of sand and quartz sent to government analysts in Rangoon revealed no trace of gold.

These wild Was are divided into Wa Pwi and Wa Lon or Lawn, with the former regarding the latter as very uncivilised. They live in large villages situated prominently on well-chosen ridges which can be seen miles away. Each village has a large number of houses - few have less than 100 - each of which is substantial and big with plank flooring and often with plank walling too. No vegetable is grown in the village but spaces unoccupied by house are guano islands made up of pig- and buffalo dung. Each village is surrounded by defensive breastwork riveted by bamboo and thorny bushes; and it lies astride a road or path from and to neighbouring villages. There is only one entrance and one exit made through a deep but narrow ditch with its top covered by earth work, so that these entrances are virtual tunnels between 50-100 yards long with the path studded with pegs to prevent a rush. The passages are not wide enough for loaded animals to go through and the ends of the

1. In 1786 Hsenwi attacked West Manglon and the people of Mampeng migrated in a body and settled in Nafan - RANSS, 1892-93, Appendix F.
tunnels are blacked with slabs of wood thick enough to stop a Martini rifle bullet. And each village is practically independent of its neighbours.

The inside of a Wa house is very dark as there are no outlets except for one exit door. The fire-place indoor makes the house even darker by discolouring (or rather colouring) the walls, beams, purlins and roof. Hundreds of chickens' shank and wing bones are tied together in pairs and stuck to the roof. These are for occult consultations. The opium is kept in a bamboo indoor for easy access. The Was eat a large amount of raw opium, which, the official report says, paradoxically enough, makes them powerful, energetic and prolific and enables them to escape fever and to be hardy and work in fields miles away from their villages. For their stable diet the Was eat peas and maize. Rice is grown only for making liquor which they consume in great quantities.

In front of every Wa house stands a forked post resembling a giant catapult to denote the slaughter of a buffalo to the spirits of the house - apparently the original Yahtawn and Yah Tai. Some houses have a forest of these, and the buffalo skulls are stored at the back of the house. It was estimated in 1893 that there must have been at least one lakh rupees worth of buffalo horns in the Wa States.

The pigs live in underground huches made for them and the chickens have nest baskets. Dogs are bred for the table.

The villages are populous and their inhabitants hard working. Contrary to belief before the British entry, the wild Was are not cannibals; they are not even ferocious except during the head hunting season in March and April; but they are seldom sober. They are excellent engineers of bamboo-and-rattan bridges and bamboo aqueducts, "but water inside the village seems only to be wanted for making liquor with, and the bridges appear to be intended to avoid an involuntary washing of their persons", for "the state of dirt of both men and women is absolutely beyond belief, and is only limited by the point beyond which extraneous matter refuses to adhere to human flesh".

In Winter men wear a strip of cloth; a few of the older ones wear coats and trousers of Shan pattern, on festive and ceremonial occasions. The women have a skirt which begins at the hips and stops short above the knees and is "extremely open" in front. In the warm weather everybody goes naked.

Outside the village, but not necessarily at any point of compass, is the skull avenue situated in a grove which is a strip of primeval jungle where huge forest trees and thick undergrowth are left standing when the rest of the country is cleared for cultivation. Each village will have at least a dozen skulls, some have as many as 100 stuck up on posts. To these, new skulls are added every year if crops are not to fail and evil spirits are to be propitiated, and the height of the head hunting season is in March - April, although there
is no close season. "Heads can be bought by indolent villages; the prices run from two rupees weight of silver for the head of a Llem, who is as easily killed as a puppy dog, to a couple of hundred for unusual or fashional heads", such as those of Europeans. Between the two extremes and in order of preference and sacrificial value are those of the Lahus, Chinese and Shan (on equal footing) and Burmans.

As far as is known, there are only two European heads in the Wa States lost during 1899-1900 Sino Burma Boundary Commission. The heads proved very costly to the Was, for several of their villages were burnt as a punishment.

It was hoped that the two European heads perished in the fire, but twenty-five years later, it was reported from several sources that the valuable trophies had been carried away and hidden long before the allied assault began, and that they were still being cherished with affection and reverence.

But even more coveted than European heads seems to be that of a Sikh.

During the Wa States tour of a British Officer in 1939, a Sikh doctor had to be rushed out of the head hunting area under an escort of a platoon of troops when it was learned that the Was came and offered Rs.300/- to some of the camp followers for his head which, with its magnificent beard and moustach, they said would bring enduring prosperity to their village.

The Chinese classify the degree of civilization of the Was by the way in which they collect heads. The most primitive is he who cuts any heads, preferably those of strangers. The next comes the Wa who cuts heads with some pretense at justification, e.g. heads of thieves. Above this is the Wa who buys heads without questioning. And finally there is the least uncivilised Wa who is satisfied with heads of big games.

When a head is secured, it is put in a basket or a thatched cover, and is then hung up in a tree, or perched on the top of bamboo, or, in business-like villages, slung in a shed prepared for this special purpose. There it ripens and blanches until it is ready to be set up in the avenue, and this is done with great ceremony and banging of gongs.

These gongs are better called drums and are made of hollowed logs and beaten with wooden mallets which produce a weird and sinister sound carried to an extraordinary distance. These drums are also used for such special occasions as installations of new chiefs, summons to arms and marriage.

1. Told to the writer by U Swe of Kyaukme who was one of the camp followers.
Spirit worship is the only religion, and except for dedications of heads there are no special religious feasts and therefore no regularly recurring festive days. The village spirit is not held in any special esteem, though heads are offered to him. The most feared and powerful is the spirit of the house to whom buffaloes, pigs and fowls are regularly sacrificed, but even for him there are no special worship days. Human sacrifice, to say nothing of cannibalism, is unknown in the skull grove. Human heads are hunted not for the sheer pleasure of hunting or collecting them, as one collect curious or art objects, but because they are so very necessary to protect the whole community from evil spirits and to improve crops and general well-being of the village.

Such, then, is a brief account of the romantic head-hunting Was. What has been gathered about the Was from official papers of the last decade of the nineteenth century is still true today, including the head-hunting habits. The British in those years had not much peace to boast about in the Wa States. 1

Warry in 1891 wrote ominously in his report:

I think it likely that the Was will give trouble to the Delimitation Commission, and they will probably object to be taken under any sort of protection, British or Chinese.2

The "wild" Was resisted British protection as much as the Kachins and Chins and suffered almost as much, though the number of British troops involved was small when compared to that employed in the Kachin and Chin Hills. Clashes in the Was States could have been avoided if British Officers had not gone beyond instructions given them.

In March 1896, Captain Elliot, the Superintendent, Northern Shan States, thought he had discovered an "anti-British coalition", and decided to march through the hostile Wa circles. The Matet Was offered fierce resistance, but were finally defeated, several of their villages having been burnt.

The most serious clashes occurred in the cold months of 1896-97 when Scott (again), after his buffer state mission in Kengcheng and a spell of "home leave", was posted back to Lashio as Superintendent and ordered to obtain "as precise information as possible regarding the

1. Except where stated the account has been compiled from the following source. (1) Reports of M/s H. Daly & W. Warry in the Despatch No. 182 of 1891, dated Simla the 14th October, 1891 from the Government of India, Foreign Department, to the Secretary of State for India. (2) RANS, 1892-93, Sections 36-36. (3) GUBSS, I.L. (4) Scott, J. G., Burma & Beyond.

2. Warry, W., Letter No. 9 dated Bhamo the 15th June 1891 in Despatch No. 182 of 1891 dated Simla the 14th October 1891, from the Government of India, Foreign Department, to the Secretary of State for India.
locality in which Chinese posts, whether permanent or temporary, have been recently established", and to ask them to withdraw if found within the British frontier as laid down by the 1894 Convention. He was definitely told to confine his tour to the trans-Salween petty state under Tunsang and that there would be no objection to his entering into "friendly communication with any of the Chieftains of the outlying Wa Circles".

Scott found no Chinese posts on the British side and he went as far as Monglem where he was feted by the Chinese. It was on his return that the trouble began. Extracts from the Government of Burma's letter No. 63-4-S/9 dated the 2nd July 1897 to the Government of India forwarding Scott's report, give a clear idea of what had happened:

While at Loinung Mr. Scott had entered into correspondence with the Nawkham-U of Loilon (Hitherto called Lunlong) and had obtained from that chief a promise that if he visited Loilon he would be given a fitting reception. Mr. Scott therefore now decided to return to the Salween via Loilon and Naphan. The decision, as Mr. Scott explains in para 22 of his report, was based on the friendly letter of Nawkham-U, Enclosure D of the report, which led Mr. Scott to hope that he might be able to enter into friendly communication with the Chieftains of the outlying Wa Circles. The Lieutenant-Governor regrets that Mr. Scott decided as he did. His decision was contrary to the instructions conveyed to him, and led to much fighting and destruction of the villages, results which it was particularly desirable to avoid. Mr. Scott's reception at Loilon was very different from what he had been promised. The Nawkham-U fled on his approach, and admission to the village, which was found stockaded and full of armed men, was refused. Further armed parties arrived from neighbouring villages and the road back to Loinung was blocked. Mr. Scott's postal runners were ambuscaded and fired on. All endeavours to persuade the Nawkham-U to return having failed, Mr. Scott seized and destroyed his citadel and, having found there a mass of correspondence clearly proving that Nawkham-U was a party to a Wa coalition against British authority, and that he had been in regular correspondence with the Chinese, Mr. Scott decided to depose him and to again appoint Nawhseng in his place. Nawhseng was sent for and duly established, several villages being destroyed in the process, and three sepoys being killed and one wounded by Wa ambuscades. As soon as Mr. Scott's back was turned, the Nawkham-U returned and Nawhseng fled.

From Loilon Mr. Scott decided to visit the so-called gold tract or Wa Petken.\(^1\) The Chiefs of this neighbourhood had

\(^1\) Also called Wa Mawkham.
specially invited him and gave him a most cordial reception. They are bitterly hostile to the Chinese and to the people of Monglem, and are most anxious for recognition as British subjects. From the "gold mine" Mr. Scott brought specimens of sand and quartz in which no trace of gold has been found.

From Loilon Mr. Scott wrote a friendly letter to the Chief of Ngkelek expressing his intention of returning to the Salween via Naphan. Ngkelek replied begging him not to come, but Mr. Scott considered it of importance to examine the route, if possible, to come to an understanding with Ngkelek, and for these, and other reasons explained at length in paragraph 18 of his report, determined to adhere to his intention. He was received in a friendly manner at Naphan, where several of the neighbouring chiefs made formal submission. From Naphan he was practically forced, owing to certain difficulties of transport, to continue his journey by Sunglong to Matet. There was no active opposition at Sunglong, but at Matet he was attacked and compelled to take the village by assault, losing two men in the process and suffering a further loss of one man killed and one wounded in the march thence to Manphang.

Loyal Tunsang of Manglon met Mr. Scott at Manphang.

Of Scott's report itself Government of India, in reply, remarked:

Mr. Scott's report has been read with interest. It is much to be regretted that he should have become involved in the hostilities with the Was and no trouble of this sort need apparently have arisen had the orders of the Government of India been closely observed.1

No wonder the K. C. I. E. was withheld, much to Lady Scott's annoyance.

1. Despatch No. 131 dated Simla the 16th September, 1897 from the Viceroy (Government of India, Foreign Department) to the Secretary of State for India. For detailed description of the British attack and for military opinion of the Was, their country and fighting tactics generally, see Couchman, G. H. H., Report of the I. O. accompanying the Superintendent, N. S. S., on his tour in 1896-97.
CHAPTER XIII

Boundary With China

As narrated, one of the first things the British did on occupation of Mandalay was to ascertain the extent of the territories and states that paid tribute to the Burmese King. The former Burmese ministers and Hlutdaw officials supplied the necessary information. From these the British learned about the extreme eastern limits of Burma's tributary states, and for convenience this was called the Hlutdaw Line.

It must not be supposed that in those days national boundaries in Asia, particularly South-east Asia were anything as well defined or well known as in Europe which had already learned the art of map-making. Frontiers in South-east Asia then were determined by states or districts bordering them. For instance, it would be perfectly satisfactory to say: "Kengtung is bounded in the north by Monglem and Kenghung, in the east by Kengcheng, in the south by Chiengrai ...." Officials at headquarters were confident that local officials or villagers on the spot knew exactly where the actual boundaries were.

Thus the Hlutdaw Line claimed the following eastern tributary states as falling within Ava's domains and having paid tribute to her: Hsenwi, Kokang, Kungma, Monglem, Kenghung and the Lahu hills between the last two. These states would somewhat cover probably a quarter the present day Shan State in area, and they were bordered on China side by Mongting, Mongmung and Menglich. East of Kenghung was Annam. South of Kenghung were Kengtung and Kengcheng, well-known tributary to Ava. To the east of Kengcheng was the kingdom of Laos which then owed allegiance to the King of Siam and was therefore considered part of the Siamese domain. And "the four boundaries between Ava, China, Annam and Siam all meet at a point marked with four flags near the P'ohei-Poteng-salt wells". All seemed satisfactory and convenient, except when it came to actually mapping out what was where.

Our story so far concerns British activities in territories regarding which there could be no doubt about past connection with Ava. It will be remembered how British officers coming into the Shan States were instructed not to do anything that might be taken as intruding on Chinese territory, and nowhere in the Shan State did they

come across any sign of Chinese influence or suggestion of their suzerainty. But beyond Hsenwi, Kengtung and Kengcheng they knew of Chinese influence in Monglem and Sipsawng Panna or Kenghung.

From the Journal of Captain McLeod on his "trade mission" to Kengtung and Kenghung we learn of the dual allegiance Monglem and Kenghung owed to both Ava and Peking. In the entry for the 27th February 1837, McLeod noted in Kengtung that a group of Burmese officials had just returned from a revenue or tribute collection mission in Monglem. In Kenghung, a Burmese sittke was stationed there and that state regarded China as father and Burma as mother - the former being nearer home than the latter. The ministers of Kenghung stated that the Chinese were just and upright as a nation, would insist on being paid every fraction of what they regarded as their due, but would not take what did not belong to them. They (the Kenghung ministers) quoted the example of Kengcheng which at the time wished to throw off its allegiance to Ava and submit to China, but the latter would not hear of it. On the other hand, the Chinese were jealous of anyone entering their actual territory so that even officials from Kengtung, traditional ally of Kenghung, were never allowed beyond Puerh. The ministers were impressed by a force of "2000 Chinese soldiers" who passed through Kenghung recently and paid for everything they took.

Of internal affairs of Kenghung, McLeod reported that strife for succession had been going on since the beginning of the century. He arrived soon after the latest series of clashes which followed the death of sawbwa Mahawang who had ruled unpeacefully for 24 years. The upheaval caused Mahawang's son and the rightful heir, Sao Phung, to flee to China, many of the partisans on both sides having been killed. Conditions were unstable. The Burmese sittke himself lived in constant fear of his life because he had taken part in the intrigue by withholding his sovereign's despatch recognising Phung as the Hsenwifa (sawbwa), and because of his connexion by marriage to the opposing party. The Chinese also approved of Phung and McLeod learned that they had intended to keep him with them for another year so "that he might be initiated in Chinese literature, etc."

McLeod was therefore unable to see the young sawbwa, a youth reported to be 13 years old; but he was well received by his mother, the mahadevi and state ministers. These personages were courteous and hospitable to him, but they were positively adamant in not allowing him to proceed beyond Kenghung without permission from Yunnan, with whom the state authorities were in communication on the subject.

While Kenghung's military commitment towards "mother" Ava was said to be 5000 men, no such obligation towards "father" China was reported. Kenghung's connection with China (by which Yunnan was really meant) appeared to have been economic rather than well defined suzerainty, and the famous Puerh tea, produced in the eastern pannas principally, formed the chief export. On the other hand, the hsenwifa's court was much influenced by Chinese customs and manners, and Chinese clerks were employed.
Of the twelve pannas, McLeod listed 9 as situated on the eastern bank of the Mekhong with the remaining 3 on its western bank.

After a fortnight’s stay orders arrived on the 24th March from the Chinese authorities at Puerh forbidding McLeod and the merchants who accompanied him to enter China through its back door. He was advised to go through Canton, where English ships called regularly. This was hardly surprising. Unorthodox entry into many countries in the middle of the twentieth century is still forbidden, frowned upon or regarded as madness.

His request to go to Ava via Monglem or to return via the eastern bank of the Mekhong having been refused by Kenghung authorities, McLeod left on the 26th March and returned to Kengtung by the same route.

Thirty years later, in 1867, the Lagree-Garnier expedition passed through Kenghung on its way to Yunnan; but it was not till 1891 that the British learned anything about Kenghung from their own men, and these were Messrs. Scott, Daly and Warry. We shall first deal with the former.

When Scott had completed his mission with Archer in surveying the frontiers of Kengtung, Chiangmai and Kengcheng, and had arrived at Mongsing, he decided on his own initiative and responsibility, to return to Kengtung via Kenghung. He stated in his official report that the marching stages between Mongsing and Kengtung via Monglen on the one hand, and those between Mongsing, Kenghung and Kengtung on the other, were the same. This of course is not true, but that was not going to stop Scott. He also said he wished to obtain "information generally" about Kenghung which at this time was again engulfed in another civil war. And on arrival at Kenghung he intended to arrest Sao Weng of Lawksawk who was living under the protection of the Mongse Myosa, to break up his "robber band" and seize his correspondence with the Myingun Prince who had by then escaped from India and had been living in French Indo-China.

On his arrival at Kenghung Scott found the town disappointingly small – smaller than any of the Panna headquarters so far seen by him. It was not the town visited by McLeod and Garnier; that earlier town had been abandoned and was some three miles to the north.

The Hsenwifa or sawbwa was not in his capital; he and most of his officials were supervising the civil war at the "front". The Madadevi, a sister of the Kengtung Sawbwa, received Scott with delight and much hospitality, and she immediately took the date of Scott's arrival as the commencement of British suzerainty. She complained that the Chinese were of no help in time of trouble. When Sao Weng attacked Kenghung before the formation of the Limbin

1. Chapter XI, supra.
League, the Chinese Resident ran away to Puerh and the town was given to looting and burning, and Sao Weng was able to march back to Kengtung unmolested. When Sao Weng came to Kenghung for the second time as a political fugitive the state was much alarmed, especially when he came to settle in Mongse, whose myosa was about to rebel. The Mahadevi was convinced that Sao Weng "was the inspiring spirit" behind the present rebellion which aimed at the removal of the Sao Khamom, her husband. She was therefore very keen for Scott to arrest Sao Weng.

After two days stay in Kenghung Scott left for Monghai where he met the sawbwa and Messrs. Daly and Warry. The latter had already stopped the fighting at Kengaong, and would have arranged a settlement between the sawbwa and his rebellious myosa and brother-in-law but for the sudden arrival of a party of "Chinese in uniform". The Chinese major in charge was willing to let Daly be the mediator but Warry advised against it. Scott thus found himself unable to mediate as requested by the sawbwa and as he would have loved so much to have done.

The picture of Chinese uprightness and justice as painted in McLeod's journal had lost much of its glamour. The sawbwa, discovering that Scott would not help, "launched out into a tirade against the Chinese who, he said, took no interest in the state, except to prevent disturbances which interfere with the cultivation of tea. The settlement of all disputes was left in the former days to the Burmese, and although they always took money from both sides they were satisfied with less than Chinese majors. The sawbwa said that for the past twenty years or more Kenghung had been using the seal granted by the King of Ava. Two years ago a Chinese official with a large party came ... and invested him with Chinese official garment and gave him a Chinese seal. Previous to this there had been no Chinese seal in the state for many years, the old one having been lost. The sawbwa maintained positively that at this investiture nothing was said or implied about his being subject to the Chinese alone, the ceremony and the garments being the same as when there was a Burmese sitke resident in Kenghung. In short, the sawbwa was extremely keen to submit to the British.

The sawbwa was an excessive opium addict and, though reported to be 20 years old, looked much older. The control of the 12 pannas was slipping from him, and none of them helped him effectively when Mongse revolted. It was the Myosa of Mongse who had been responsible for installing the sawbwa on the Kenghung throne, but he felt he had not been sufficiently rewarded and accused this protege of ingratitude. When the sawbwa questioned his entitlement to some valuable tea estates east of the Mekhong the myosa rebelled. It was rumoured that the myosa had a younger brother of the sawbwa in readiness for succession.

Scott did not, however, seize Sao Weng as he had said he would do because, he stated, it might upset the people of Mongse and "torpedo" the attempts of the Chinese major at mediation. The real reason seems to have been that he had received no orders to seize
Sao Weng and that he was travelling through Kenghung on his own initiative. Moreover, Daly did not credit Sao Weng with being "the inspiring spirit" behind the rebellion.

Finally Scott reported that Chinese interests in Kenghung were "undeniable and continuous", but that their concern was mainly over the production of tea and they took no interest whatever in the politics or well-being of the state. He thought Kenghung was capable of development, and therefore recommended that it be controlled jointly by the British and Chinese Governments as during the Burmese regime. As the state had well-defined frontiers he said the joint control would strengthen British hold on the Shan State and stop French intrigues in Siam and Laos.¹

The twelve pannas were listed as equally divided by the Mekhong, six in the east and six in the west, although in the previous year, 1890, in his report on his annexation of Kengtung, Scott showed five pannas west and seven east of that river.²

These pannas seem elusive, Lieutenant Daly who was in Kenghung at the same time as Scott, reported the opposite of Scott’s 1890 reckoning, i.e. seven west and five east of the Mekhong.

The word panna means one thousand (pan) paddy fields (na). According to Daly, a panna paid 1000 baskets in revenue. Most people in Kengtung nowadays seem to take it at its face value, namely, one thousand plots of paddy fields, with the size of each "plot" quite vague and undetermined, as is the fashion with other measures in these parts.

As to the name of the twelve pannas, the four lists (McLeod, Scott (2 lists) and Daly) so far given never agree completely except for Mongse and Monglong which were big enough to form a panna each. Mr. Harvey in his Wa Precis 1932 gives the following which I take to be the latest and most accurate, if that is possible:-

(1) Liushun @ Mongla, formerly owned Ssumao
(2) Puteng @ Mong Hing
(3) Mengwang @ Mongwawng
(4) Chengtung @ Kengtawng
(5) Yipang @ I-bang
(6) Yiwu @ I-ngu
(7) Menghai @ Kenghsung (capital now Mengah @ M Ngat)
(8) Mengche @ Mongse
(9) Menglung @ M. Long
(10) Mengla @ Mongna

¹ Burma Foreign Department Proceedings No. 1, June 1891.
² Secret Despatch No. 97 of 1890 dated Simla the 4th August 1890 from the Government of India, Foreign Department, to the Secretary of State for India. Enclosure 6, section 22 of Scott's No. 001 dated the 19th May, 1890 to the Chief Commissioner of Burma.
And from the Precis' "Treaty Localities Map" except for pannas Nos. 7, 8 and 9, all are on the east of the Mekhong. ¹

With this I will dispose of the names of the 12 pannas of Kenghung and the riddle of their location east or west of the Mekhong. The other 4 lists of the pannas are given in the Appendices.²

The first official expedition to Kengtung after the British annexation of Upper Burma was that headed by Lieutenant H. Daly, Superintendent, Northern Shan States. He was accompanied by Mr. W. Warry, Government Adviser on Chinese affairs, Captain T. F. Renny-Tailyour of the Survey Department and Captain G. V. Burrows of the Intelligence branch of the Indian Army. The expedition's duties were to find out:

1. The extent and limits of Shan states owing allegiance to China directly or indirectly, and
2. What states, owing allegiance to China or not, it would be advisable and worthwhile to keep in British possession.

The strength of the expedition was four British officers, 56 military police, 50 followers (which included medical and survey personnel, clerks and servants), and 25 to 35 muleteers who looked after 122 mules (which was soon reduced to 100). Starting from Lashio on the 21st December 1890, the British were joined early in January by the South Hsenwi's amatgyi, Khamsoi, and his dozen followers.

Daly's first major halt was at Nalau in West Manglon where he had hoped to come to a settlement with Sao Maha; but the latter declined to meet him as described in the preceding chapter. En route to Nalau he had to pass through Tonhung, the place that gave the title to the North Hsenwi's sawbwa. At the time Tonhung was under a headman who was the son of the sawbwa's elder brother.

From Manglon the expedition headed straight for Monglem via Mongnga and Mongma. On the 15th February, Monglem officials met the party at Mongnga; and a mile from Monglem town the sawbwa greeted them.

Monglem city itself was described by Daly as a small Shan town of about 100 houses. A number of Chinese were seen but all of them would return to Yunnan before the monsoon set in. The sawbwa himself dressed in Chinese when he greeted the British party, and looked Chinese, but could speak only Shan.

The origin of Monglem had connections with the Was and their tadpoles until the present state was founded in 1278 A.D. by Khampakpha of Mongmau. Monglem was reported to have first sent tribute to Yunnan in 1404. Fifty years later, 1454, a Burmese crown prince fled to Sumu-Kangso and this caused some international concern and led to a series of conferences between Burma and China which resulted in the boundaries of Monglem being fixed as follows: East, the Namlamb (distant 260 li); South, Loihai (140 li); West, the Namkha (140 li) and North, the Namsong (1420 li). It was from this date, 1454, that Monglem began to regard China (Yunnan) as father and Burma as mother.

Tan Saikwi was ruling when the Burmese prince fled to Sumu-Kangso. At Saikwi’s death Monglem was overrun by Hsenwi which ruled it for 15 years when Kenghung in turn ousted Hsenwi and ruled it for 10 years, at the end of which a scion of Monglem ruling house Tau Phaipha, regained his state in 1549 and ruled for 35 years. Then the succession passed on to

- Tau Phaikhang (1584-1612)
- Tau Phaiyen (1612-1664)
- Tau Phaisong (1664-1688)
- Tau Phaikhyen (1688-1721)
- Tau Phaitin (1721-1748)
- Tau Phaisun (1748-1758)

After a period of civil war and confusion Tau Phaimyin became the ruler for 15 years (1795-1810). Previous to this the Chinese worked the gold and silver mines to the north-west of Monglem, but the mortality among the miners was so heavy that they abandoned the services which were made over to Phaimyin who worked them for four years. Phaimyin’s death was followed by fifteen years anarchy from which Sao Khamsom rose as sawbwa. In 1825 Khamsom went to Ava to receive an ameindaw from the Burmese king (Bagyidaw ?). Khamsom died in 1848 and was succeeded by his nephew, Sao Hongkhama who ruled for thirty-one years.

Hongkham was Phaimyin’s son but was a minor when his father died and Khamsom, Phaimyin’s younger brother, took the state. Hongkham made several attempts to regain the state, but was unsuccessful and he was a refugee in Mongyang of Kengtung for a while. Finally

1. In the Kengtung chronicle, one of the earliest founders of Monglem was a scion of Mangrai.

2. "The 'li' is a very elastic Chinese measure of length: the equivalent of an English mile is from 2 to 15 li according to the nature of the country, but Mr. Baber says that 'except in very steep places 5 li may be assumed as being one mile.'"
Hongkham drove his uncle into China where he was put to death by the Chinese. Hongkham was succeeded in 1880 by his son, Sao Mainkham, the sawbwa who greeted Daly.

It was during this period of anarchy that the Las, Was and Musos obtained a footing in Monglem and Hongkham was helped chiefly by the Musos when he fought with his uncle, Khamsom, for the state.

Daly found that the people did not like the Chinese owing to oppression by local Chinese officials. When a contingent of Chinese who had previously helped to put down a rising among the Musos against the sawbwa's authority, the officer in command demanded 17 viss of pure silver as payment, and the tardiness with which the silver was collected resulted in the state treasurer being flogged to death in the very presence of the sawbwa who seemed powerless to do anything to help his officer.

Daly was told that a party of Frenchmen visited Monglem during the Lagree-Garnier expedition whose report gave the exact latitude and longitude of the place.

It was here in Monglem that Daly, with the help of Amatgyi Kahmosi of Mongyai, unravelled some of the confusing frontier politics in which Maha of Nalau was involved. Due to Maha's intrigue, Daly and the sawbwa of Monglem had the worst suspicion of each other: the former thought the latter was in an anti-British coalition while the latter thought the British the reincarnation of the devil himself. On arrival at Monglem, however, the Lems discovered that the British wanted nothing more than token submission in exchange for their protection, while the British found that the Lems wanted to be left alone and in peace but within the British empire. This suited both parties and the Lems showed much eagerness to come under British suzerainty.

On the 20th February the British column left Monglem capital for Kenghung. Khamawm Mahawang, the kemmong, was deputed by the sawbwa to accompany them. This Mahawang was a man of remarkable personality. He was energetic and enterprising and had great influence not only in Monglem and Kenghung but also in Kengtung, for he married the mother of the Tiger Sawbwa. In Kenghung he proved to be of great assistance to Daly.

Mongse, whose myosa was fighting against his overlord the Kenghung sawbwa, was reached on the 1st of March; and Kengsong, the scene of the battle lines, on the 5th. Daly had no difficulty in dispersing the forces of both sides and in destroying the stockades and breastworks that faced each other. The men, numbering about six to seven hundred on each side, were relieved to return to their homes after some two months of sporadic fighting in a fashion described by Daly thus:

Shan warfare is very rarely attended by any noticeable loss of life among the 'troops' actually engaged, but
during the continuance of the 'operations' all country in
the neighbourhood in the theatre of war is continually
harried by bands of freebooters.

From Kengsong, Daly moved on the 6th of March to Monghai, where
Khamawm Khamlu, the Hsenwifa of Alawi, alias Sipsawngpanna, in short
Kenghung, had his forward headquarters camp. The sawbwa was "un-
feignedly glad" to see the British representatives and relieved to
learn that fighting had ceased.

Daly estimated that Khamawm Khamlu was about 29 years of age
(Scott had placed him at 20 but said he looked older). Daly agreed
with Scott that he was of a weak character, complete wax in the hands
of his wife and ministers. That he was an excessive opium addict was
there for all to see, as was the fact that the various pannas were
slipping away from his effective control.

Khamlu was one of the four sons of Mom Seng or Sao Seng who
went to Ava to receive the ameindaw and on return passed some insult­
ing remarks to Sao Kawngtai of Kengtung for which he had to pay with
his head as related. 1 Seng himself succeeded by murdering his elder
brother Mom Saw in 1874. The two brothers were the sons of the
Uparaja, second son of Mahawang and brother of Sao Phung referred to
in McLeod's journal.

Incidentally it may be mentioned here that of the remaining
three younger brothers of Khamlu one named Sawmmong fled to Kenghung
during a subsequent upheaval and took refuge in Kengtung where Sawbwa
Kawn Kiao Intalang made him myosa of Mongsat in the twenties of this
century.

One of the five sisters of the Hsenwifa married the rebel
myosa of Mongse.

While Daly and his party were at Monghai a Chinese major, Tao,*
with 40 uniformed escort arrived from Puerh to settle the Mongse-
Kenghung dispute. Daly would have liked to mediate between the dis­
putants, who requested him to do so, but Warry dissuaded him. From
then on Daly declined to take any direct action in the dispute, though
he felt certain that both sides would have abided by his decision
which would have established a kind of modus vivendi they genuinely
desired. Of the Chinese influence in Kenghung at the time Daly
remarked:

It is evident that, owing to the weakness of King
Thibaw's rule and to our non-intervention, the Chinese and
the Chinese alone for the past 10 or 15 years exercised con­
trol over Kenghung politics, and as Major Tao had been

1. See page
directly commissioned to settle the questions now at issue, interference on the part of a mission such as ours might not unreasonably have been taken exception of.

(Tao's intervention was not successful for Daly learned while on his return, at Kenglaw, that fighting had broken out again and that Mongse's men were advancing towards the capital. How the public regarded the quarrel was also illustrated by the report that the headman of Kenglaw had sent 15 men to help the sawbwa and 15 to the myosa).

The British party left Monghai on the 10th and reached Kenghung on the 12th.

Attempts by Daly to find records of any historical value proved unsatisfactory owing to incessant civil wars which had been raging for the past century and which destroyed most of the written records. From one book, however, he obtained information about the chaotic ruling family described above. Even Kenghung's connections with China had nothing on paper to show; there was nobody who was acquainted with the Chinese language; and the last Chinese clerk had returned to Ss'umao on sick leave taking with him, it was said, all Chinese papers and there was no one to succeed him so far.

From his own enquiries Daly learned that Kenghung regarded China as father and Burma as mother and that 22 viss of pwe silver was sent annually as tribute to father Peking, while mother Ava received customary tributes once in every three years. During Mindon's reign, there were Burmese toll posts as Talaw, Monglong, Mongmang and Monghai - the first two staffed with a myook and 30 men each while the last two had 10 - 15 men and all were under the sitke at Kengtung. These posts were withdrawn after Thibaw's accession, and some of the men were killed on their way home.

Besides Major Tao and his escort the only evidence of any Chinese attempt at establishing their influence in the region was the recent creation of the border district or sub-prefecture of Chenpien, far to the north of Monglem. It was said that the Yunnan authorities at the request of the Lem Shans of Mongngim in that year, despatched a military expedition against the Musos. Since then both the Musos and the Mongngim Lem Shans formerly under Monglem had been placed under the direct administration of the Chinese. As a result, intercourse between Monglem and the Chinese had become more direct and frequent. Chenpien's area was not large and it represented a southward Chinese move of only some 40 straight miles from the original border of the sub-prefecture of Shunning. The new district could not penetrate the Wa and Muso opposition in the west.¹

Within 30-40 years previous to 1891, both Monglem and Kenghung had shrunk greatly from their ancient sizes on account of encroachment of the Musos and other hill tribes. The states gradually lost ground

¹ I have a strong feeling that the creation of Chenpien was decided upon by the Chinese to counter the British annexation of Upper Burma.
to these hardy hill people simply because their strength had been 
fatally sapped by disunity and internecine strife. Most of what was 
lost to the Lera and Lu Shans came under direct administration of the 
new district of Chenpien.

While at Kenghung Daly heard nothing of the French bogeyman, 
Pavie, and the French expansion from Tonkin.

The Daly-Warry expedition left Kenghung on its homeward journey 
on the 15th March 1891 via Talaw and Mongma (Kengtung). Scott joined 
the column from Monghum to Mongma. Daly and his party then struck 
north to rejoin his outward route at Mongma (Monglem) which at 5200 
feet was about the water-divide between the Salween and the Mekhong. 
From here the column marched through Loilon, Nafan, Pangkhawn, 
Panglong, Kunlong and, via Hsemyi Myoma, reached Lashio on the 7th 
May 1891, after an absence of just under 20 weeks during which it had 
covered 850 miles.1

Messrs Daly and Warry submitted separate reports to the 
Government of Burma. Although these covered much the same ground and 
their recommendations on the objectives of their mission were almost 
identical, Warry gave an insight to some other Shan States not men­
tioned by Daly. For instance, Kungma was another State that used to 
pay tribute concurrently to Ava and China, and it was mentioned by 
Yule as a tributary state to Ava. How this state was faring during 
the years immediately after 1885 was described by Warry thus:

For many years Kengma has been distracted by disputes 
regarding the succession to the sawbwaship, and matters 
have been much aggravated by the intervention of corrupt 
Chinese officials. The Peking Gazettes have from time to 
time published accounts of troubles in the State, but no 
notice has yet appeared of the latest high-handed action 
of Chinese officials. I learnt at Meunglem that last year 
there was a quarrel between Wei, the Kengma Sawbwa, and 
his brother, and that the former secretly invited Pao, 
Chinese colonel commander on the Shunming border, to help 
him. Pao having received a large bribe gave out that he 
was starting to inspect the border, and made a rapid march 
to Kengma, where he caught and executed the sawbwa's 
brother without trial or inquiry of any sort. The matter, 
however, came to the notice of the civil authorities at 
Shunming, and Pao was put under arrest and sent to Yunnanfu 
for trial. The issue of the trial has not yet transpired 
..... Constant disturbances have checked the development 
of Kengma, but the state is still described as rich and 
prosperous. It produces in abundance every kind of crop,

1. Secret Despatch No. 182 of 1891 dated Simla the 11th October, 
1891 from the Government of India, Foreign Department to the 
Secretary of State for India - Daly's report dated Maymyo the 
30th May 1891.
and it transacts a considerable trade with Yunnan and the Shan States. It is also the highway for a good deal of through trade between Yunnan and the Shan country. Lastly it enjoys a delightful climate on which the Chinese or Panthays whom I have met are never tired of expatiating.¹

In their recommendations both Daly and Warry deprecated continuing the dual allegiance of Monglem and Kenghung, as hastily recommended by Scott. Daly said if Monglem was to be retained it would not be because the Lem Shans wished to elect British protection, as no political weight could be given to such human sentiments, but because it might have valuable mineral wealth. If the British wished to cede Monglem they should do so only as an exchange for concessions elsewhere by China. As for Kenghung, the recommendations agreed that advantage should be taken of disunity in the State and the weakness of the sawbwa to carve it up at the Mekhong; it was undesirable to absorb Kenghung East as that would place the British frontier next door to that of the French and, moreover, the Chinese would never give up their "Puerh tea" plantations in the eastern pannas. From the British viewpoint, cession of West Kenghung would leave China too close to Kengtung and Siam. As for the Wa States, they must be within the British boundary in their entirety.²

Warry suggested "negotiation for the extensive control of cis-Mekong Kainghung" and handing over Monglem and trans-Mekong Kenghung to China. He said the Chinese admitted that the Wa States "belonged to Burma". In any case, the British, as successors to the Burmese Crown which had exercised tangible sovereignty over these In and Lem States during the century, should not renounce their rights "without some substantial equivalent".³

The Government of Burma, forwarding the Daly-Warry reports in their letter No. 468-277c-D dated Rangoon the 24th July 1891, endorsed their recommendations in the following terms:

Both reports are full of interest and throw much light on a country hitherto unexplored. It is satisfactory to find that the Chinese frontier from the Salween to the Mekong is already fairly well known and should give rise to no great difficulty when the matter of the formal recognition of the boundary comes under discussion. It is apparently only with regard to the States of Meunglem and Kainghung that any question of importance is likely to arise. The reports of both Mr. Warry and Mr. Daly show that to these two States the Chinese have stronger claims than we. Both States have for hundreds of years paid annual tribute to China.

¹ Ibid. - Warry's Report, No. 9 dated the 15th June 1891.
² Ibid. - Daly's Report, Appendix 20, and his letter No. 6F dated Bombay the 12th June 1891.
³ Ibid. - Warry's Report; No. 9 dated the 15th June 1891, paras. 54-55.
Sawbwas receive appointment orders from China; they use Chinese titles and Chinese insignia of office; they have Chinese Secretaries, and they are in regular communication, as dependent tributaries, with the Chinese officials across the border; with Burma their connection is less ancient and less close, and since the year 1878 it has ceased altogether. Under these circumstances it will not be possible or desirable to set aside the Chinese claims.

As regards Meunglem there need be no question raised. It may be recognized without demur as Chinese territory.

In his despatch to London, the Viceroy of India was moralistic and upright. Ignoring the fact that Monglem-Kenghung relations with both Burma and China had been equally loose and ill-defined throughout the centuries, he submitted the following recommendations:

The Chief Commissioner of Burma, acting partly on the advice of the officers who composed of the exploring party, recommends that Kaing Hung and Meung Lem should be made the subject of a treaty with China, in which the rights of both England and China should be set forth. In this recommendation we are not disposed to agree. We believe that it is of extreme importance that our attitude towards China should be generous and conciliatory, and with this object in view we would readily acknowledge the Chinese ownership of Meung Lem and Kaing Hung. Their connection with Burma seems to have been of a very slender and intermittent description. China would probably resent, and possibly resist, any attempt on our part to assert possessory rights over either of these States, and it would certainly not be worth while to risk a quarrel with her in order to keep alive these rights, whatever they are worth, or any portion of them. Extension of territory is, in this direction, undesirable for its own sake, and still more so because of the offence it would give to China. Seeing, however, that the hold of China over Kaing Hung is reported to be extremely loose, and that French Emissaries are taking much interest in the State, we would recommend that Her Majesty's Government should intimate to that of China that, though we have no intention of pressing against them rights which we inherited from Burma, it would be satisfactory to us to find that China had accepted full responsibility for these two States. This offer of Kaing Hung and Meung Lem should, however, in our opinion, be made to China, only as part of our proposal for a general settlement of the whole frontier question, as far as she is concerned.

1. Ibid. - Confidential letter No. 66-227C-D dated Rangoon the 21st July 1891 from Chief Commissioner of Burma to Government of India, Foreign Department.

2. Ibid. Italics are mine.
Did the Viceroy base his recommendations on genuinely moralistic
grounds or was it simply that he and his Government could not be bother­
ed with more territories? Anyway it was convenient not to have Monglem
and Kenghung within the Indian Empire. I am inclined to agree with
Mr. Harvey in the following remarks:

The whole proceedings disclose an anxiety not to penetrate,
let alone claim, territory which could be regarded as Chinese
(at one time the expedition was nearly forbidden to visit
Kenghung) and they carefully state the weak points in our very
considerable lien, as heirs to the Burmese crown, on the States
of Monglem and Kenghung which the expedition traversed and
which we ceded to China for consideration elsewhere.¹

In the conference rooms of London from September 1892 to
February 1894, the main interest on the eastern frontiers of Burma
centered around that of Bhamo and Myitkyina, "indeed the India Office
dелегates had orders to treat Kenghung, Monglem, Kokang and Sonn
(Pangkhawn) as make weights".² And having settled the Bhamo-Myitkyina
frontier in a preliminary draft, the India Office telegraphed to India
for a draft frontier between Namkham and the Mekhong River. The
Government of India naturally replied that such a matter could not be
dealt with in telegrams, and said they were sending a note by Daly
(now an Assistant Secretary to the Government of India) and another
from Burma. When this latter note eventually reached London it was
a quarter of the length of the note on Bhamo-Myitkyina frontier and
accompanied by a single map instead of eighteen.³

The Foreign Office in London did not wait for the arrival of
those notes, but using Daly-Warry 1891 expedition reports and Scott's
1893 expedition diaries, made the draft themselves and it was
"virtually the text as signed". This extraordinary draft was passed
without being sent to the Government of Burma's Advisor on Chinese
affairs, Wary, or to the areas concerned. It was "examined" in the
Rangoon Secretariat during the visit to Burma, 18th November to 10th
December 1893, of Lord Landsdowne, the Viceroy, who telegraphed to
London passing it as it stood except for "minor suggestions, e.g. it
should invariably state latitude and longitude to be appropriate only,
as we cannot depend on our maps either as to the natural features or
as to latitude and longitude (but at least they were maps, not the
sort of thing the Chinese produced at the Foreign Office conferences -
sheets with no mark for hills, rivers in the shape of deformed fingers,
names sprawling over half a countryside without anything to denote
the spot, and so forth)".

2. Ibid., p. 21.
3. Ibid., p. 27.
Lord Landsdowne visited Bhamo, the centre of main interest, and, in his note, recorded after a conference on the spot, mentioned the Shan frontier only at the end:

I have purposely in this note avoided any reference to the portions of the frontier and to the large concessions which have already been offered to China in Kokang, Wanting, Kenghung and Monglem ... liberal almost to the point of extravagance. I may, however, be allowed to express my earnest hope that the proposal now made will be treated as a whole, and that the Chinese may be given to understand that it is to be refused or accepted as it stands. It has been much the custom, when a 'give and take' boundary has been proposed by the Government of India, to regard that Government as irrevocably committed to any concessions which it may have offered, and to lose sight of the quid pro quo, which it was sought to obtain by offering them.

Such was the origin of the 1894 Convention which was signed in London on the 1st March 1894. The boundary between China and the Shan State was described in detail in clauses II & III. It will be seen that Kokang was given to China. The two Governments agreed to demarcate the frontier on solid grounds, as against demarcating it on papers based on various reports, within twelve months of the ratifications of the Convention and that the Joint Boundary Commission must "terminate its labours in not more than three years from the date of its first meeting".

It is understood that any alterations in the alignment which the Joint Commission may find it necessary to make shall be based on the principle of equivalent compensations having regard not only to the extent, but also to the value, of the territory involved. Further, should the members of the Commission be unable to agree on any point, the matter of disagreement shall at once be referred to their respective Government.

Article V sets out the territories each ceded to the other. Here the British relinquished claims over some parts of "Northern Theinni" including the sub-state of Kokang, Monglem and Kenghung, on condition that "China shall not, without previously coming to an agreement with Her Britannic Majesty, cede either Munglem or Kaing Hung, or any portion thereof, to any other nation". China relinquished her claims over territories "lying outside and abutting on the frontier of the Prefecture of Yung Chang and Sub-Prefecture of Teng Yueh".

1. Ibid., p. 21.
2. Appendix IX
3. 1894 Convention, Article VI, paras. 1 & 2.
4. Ibid., Article V, para. 1.
Before the ratification of the Convention, however, clashes between aggressive European interests in China resulted in the Franco-China Convention of the 20th June 1895, in which China had to surrender two eastern pannas to France. What was happening to the adjustment of the Shan States was insignificant when compared with crowding and momentous events in Africa and China; European Powers were carving up the former and were imposing territorial rights and privileges on the latter. For our study in this boundary question between the Shan States and Yunnan, Mr. Harvey's caustic remarks in his Wa Precis 1932 are relevant.

Kengcheng ... the largest of our surrenders was relinquished to China - to avert the supposed calamity of having a common border with France in Tongking, just as, France moving towards Laos, East Kengcheng and Tang-aw were relinquished to Siam - only to find, as we imagined, France on the border of West Kengcheng through China ceding to her what we thought were pannas 10 and 10a (Mongla and Mongpung). West Kengcheng must therefore go the way of East Kengcheng and Tangaw, only, as there was evidently no security in cession to a third party, we contemplated making them into an independent buffer state. Meanwhile, however, France did what Lord Rosebery described to Queen Victoria as 'base, cruel and treacherous ... nothing so cynically vile is on record ... it makes his blood boil.' she annexed a third of Siam, including the above trans-Mekong gifts. (We were just in time to bewilder the ruler of East Kengcheng by telling him the annexation had neither left him Siamese nor made him French) so that we were again face to face. To stave this off, we would relinquish our trans-Mekong and West Kengcheng claims and France would contribute Houessai (freshly annexed from Siam) to the neutral buffer state; but as France's conception of a buffer state turned out to be a No Man's Land which her nationals could permeate, the buffer state idea had to be discarded, and we ended by waiving all our trans-Mekong claims in order to secure at least the river between us and France. And meanwhile we discovered that the ceded pannas were only 11 and 12 (Wuteh or Hutaq and Mengwu of Hunao), so that we need never have yielded East Kengcheng on that score - all the same the transaction cost China Kokang and the rest of the shaded area (part of present Hsenwi), completing the vicious circle ...

It is wonderful how Britain managed to steer through all the confusion created by her refusal to accept the views of officers on the spot.

The Convention was "modified" and this resulted in the Agreement signed at Peking on the 14th February 1897. The very opening paragraph tells why the Agreement was necessary:

2. Appendix I
In consideration of the Government of Great Britain consenting to waive its objections to the alienation by China, by the Convention with France of the 20th June 1895, of territory forming a portion of Kaing Hung, in derogation of the provisions of the Convention between Great Britain and China of the 1st March 1894, it has been agreed between the Governments of Great Britain and China that the following additions and alterations shall be made in the last-named Convention, hereinafter referred to as the original Convention ....

In this Agreement the Shan State boundary with China from the Shweli (Nam Mao) to the Mekhong was dealt with in Article III, and Articles V and VI were modified as follows:

**Article V**

It is agreed that China will not cede to any other nation either Mung Lem or any part of Kiang Hung on the right bank of the Mekong, or any part of Kiang Hung now in her possession on the left bank of that river, without previously coming to an arrangement with Great Britain.

**Article VI**

Article VI of the original Convention shall be held to be modified as follows:-

It is agreed that, in order to avoid any local contention, the alignments of the frontier described in the present Agreement shall be verified and demarcated, and, in the event of their being found defective at any point, rectified by a Joint Commission appointed by the Governments of Great Britain and China, and that the said Commission shall meet, at a place hereafter to be determined by the two Governments not later than twelve months from the date of the signature of the present Agreement, and shall terminate its labours in not more than three years from the date of its first meeting.

If a strict adherence to the line described would intersect any districts, tribal territories, towns, or villages, the Boundary Commission shall be empowered to modify the line on the basis of mutual concessions. If the members of the Commission are unable to agree on any point, the matter of disagreement shall at once be referred to their respective Governments.

In accordance with Article VI, the Sino-British Boundary Commission set out to demarcate the actual frontier in three cold seasons beginning with that of 1897-98.
The whole demarcation was divided into three sections: I, from the northern-most extremity to the Taping; II, from the Taping to the junction of the Namwan and the Shweli which marched with the Chinese Shan States of Lasa, Hosa, Mong Wan and Mongmao; and III, from the Shweli to the Mekhong.

During the first season, the British party was led by H. T. White and the Chinese by General Liu, and the Commission had its first meeting at Bhamo on the unlucky day of the 13th December 1897. Commission was divided into two, the northern and the southern sections to deal respectively with I and II above.

The British and the Chinese members of the northern group worked in perfect accord, "with energy and judgement", and completed the boundary line from the confluence of the Nampaung and the Taping to the northernmost extremity, which was "the high peak" in the latitude $25°33'20"$ and longitude $98°13'25"$.

In the south, however, things did not work out according to plan. Although private relations between Mr. White and General Liu and their opposing subordinate was most cordial, when it came to work on the ground there was little that the two parties could agree upon, so much as that from beginning to end the site of the Commission's camp never moved from Lwelon. White accused the general of an obstructive attitude and over-fondness for seizing any opportunity to quibble over vague terms and geographical features. All that was accomplished by the southern party was the survey of the Shweli up to its junction with Nan yang, knowledge of local conditions and "Chinese methods of business". Sometimes the Chinese Shan saw was threatened to invite the Kachins to attack the Commission. One would like to see what the Chinese records, if available, have to say on these points.

White withdrew from the Commission on the 2nd April 1898 and recommended, among other things, that he be deputed to London and Peking to explain matters to avoid delays and pinpricks, citing J. G. Scott's example when he presented his reports on the Buffer State in London in person. To this Rangoon did not agree. But the Government of India were moved to obtain official recognition of the map bound with the Agreement in the blue book called Treaty Series No. 7 of 1897, and to warn the Chinese Government that in the event of unreasonable obstruction by their Commissioner, the British Commissioner would demarcate the frontier single-hand.

Actually this first season of the work of the Joint Sino-British Boundary Commission did not concern the Shan States, and

1. Burma Foreign & Political Proceedings (Confidential), June & December, 1898. Reports of Messrs. White and George (for Northern section) are given in full.

2. Secret Despatch No. 105 of 1900 dated Simla the 2nd August 1900 from the Government of India to the Secretary of State for India, Enclosure 21.
although British authorities in the Shan States made preparations to receive the Commission at Namkham no one showed up.1

During the second season, the cold months of 1898-99, J. G. Scott was appointed British Commissioner while the Chinese retained the services of their old Commissioner, General Liu.

This season's work was most fruitful. The Commission again decided to delimit the frontier line in two sections: the Northern and Southern, the former under J. G. Scott and General Liu, the latter under Messrs. E. C. S. George and Chen Tajen. The Northern party demarcated the line from the confluence of the Mampaung and the Taping to the confluence of the Mampha (alias Namseng) and the Namting which covered, as far as the Shan States were concerned, practically the whole of the North Hsenwi's frontier with the adjoining Chinese Shan States from the Skweil eastwards to the Salween and beyond (with Kokang within the British line) and then southwards down to the Namting, near Hopang. The southern party started its work in January from Nalawt on the Namkha near Pangasang, and demarcated successfully some 22k miles stretch of frontier between Kengtung on the British side and Konglam and Kenghung on the Chinese side up to the Mekhong. The sawbwa of Kengtung and his British agent, Mr. Stirling were asked to accompany the Commission, the sawbwa accepting its decision "with good will".2

The British Commissioner, Scott, had definite ideas of how the work of the Joint Boundary Commission should be conducted. By his own account, he had been aggressive and unyielding in the last season's (1898-99) negotiations, and his opinions on the opposite numbers of the British members in the Joint Commission were unflattering. The Commission ended its season's work on the 23rd April 1899 with a mutual exchange of maps and notes.3

Thus after two seasons of hard work by the Joint Sino-British Boundary Commission, the only boundary line remained undemarcated between the Shan States of Burma and China was the stretch between the Namting and Namkha, within which lay the turbulent, unadministered Wa States. It was to discuss this wild territory with the Governor of Yunnan that Scott was commissioned to go to Yunnanfu and he received permission to proceed on his new assignment on the 21st April afternoon. General Liu expressed pleasure at the news and asked Scott to go in his party,4 and the two marched northwards on the 26th.

1. RANSS 1897-98, section 4.
2. RANSS 1898-99, section 2 and 4; RANSS 1898-99, section 7. I regret my failure to trace the original report of the Commission by Scott on the season's work.
3. Mitton, G. E., op. cit., Chapter XIII.
4. Ibid., p. 272.
Scott's business in Yunnan was to secure Chinese agreement on four points; namely, that the wild Wa country must not be intersected and the control of the tribes should be left to the British; that as the watershed between the Salween and the Mekhong as far as longitude 92°40' and latitude 23°N is inhabited by the wild Was, the binding portion of the Agreement text should be held to be "leaving to China the Tsawbwaships of Kengma, Mengting and Mengko", the line of Chinese effective control to be pointed out by local officials concerned and accepted by the British; that the Kungmingshan of the Agreement is the Salween-Mekhong watershed; that the point where the Namkh commences to join the frontier line for ten minutes of latitude is at Hsuphse, Kawghso.

The Chinese seemed to have agreed on the first two points in principle, but produced what was known as the "Hsueh map", supposedly drawn up over the signatures of Lord Rosebury and Marquess Sueh (or Sieh), Chinese Minister in London, and refused to accept anything put forward by Scott without orders from Peking. The negotiations naturally came to a dead-lock. The only agreement Scott was able to come to with the Chinese was his proposal that the next boundary commission during the 1899-1900 season should be worked from the Chinese side and up to the limit of "Chinese effective administration". Even then, the Governor of Yunnan, Sung Tajen (whom Scott described as "a man of the most polished (Chinese) manners, silken speech, determination to assume no responsibility and absolute want of moral principle") would commit nothing in writing.

Scott left Yunnanfu on the 14th July 1899 after 24 days stay - having reached there on the 10th June, and started to retrace his steps over some 500 miles back to the border of Burma. At Tengyueh, he met General Liu and they agreed to meet at Hopang on the 20th December to begin the 1899-1900 work.1

Difficulties had been foreseen by the British regarding points one and two of Scott's mission to Yunnanfu, namely that the boundary line must not intersect the Wa States and that the British would accept the "line of Chinese effective control" to be pointed out by local officials so that the binding portion of the Agreement should be held to be "leaving to China the Tsawbwaship of Kengma, Mengting and Mengko" (Mongkaw). In fact these two points were irreconcilable because the sawbwas concerned "were found to have thrown out feelers into the Wa country". And trouble began soon after the erection of the first three cairns of boundary. The first cairn was erected on the Namting at a point where a spur struck the river, the second at a point where the road from Hopang to Mongting crossed the spur, and the third on the summit of Loiseng (alias Manhkashan). The trouble concerned the loss to the Was of the heads of two British Officers of the Commission, Major W. Kiddle, R.A.M.E., and Mr. A. B. Sutherland, a junior British political officer from Tangyan, Northern Shan States.

1. Burma Foreign & Political Proceedings (Confidential), December 1899.
The Commission had reached and been camping at Mongkaw, and its opposite members had been arguing their cases on the ground, when the Was complained to General Liu that some of his soldiers had misbehaved in their villages. The General held an identification parade and had the two men pointed out by the Was beheaded; and had their heads stuck up on posts at the gate of the bazaar at Mongtum, a few miles away. It was a bazaar day and the date was the 9th February 1900.

Three British officers, Major Kiddle, Messrs. Sutherland and J. G. L. Litton, acting British Consul at Ssumac, decided to go to the bazaar, one of the "must" institutions to all foreigners. As they walked past the Chinese camp they called out to 10 Chinese soldiers of the signals section under an N. C. O. to follow them and the Chinese did so in a casual manner for they considered the area quite safe and only the N. C. O. kept within sight. The three Europeans had barely been to the Mongtum bazaar for ten minutes when from the bazaar crowd of about 1,000 people, 50 Was, who had been drinking, and had seen the two Chinese heads at the bazaar gate, set upon them. The Was stoned the British officers and, shooting at them with cross bows and guns, chased them. Half a mile out of the village, Kiddle and Sutherland were killed and their heads immediately removed. As Litton fell wounded, he killed a Wa with the dead Kiddle's gun, the only weapon among them, and one which its owner had refused to use in retaliation. The Chinese N. C. O. behaved in a gallant manner and saved Litton's life by helping him back to the Commission's camp. The rest of the N. C. O.'s men disappeared from the scene of struggle and headless bodies of four of them were found later. The two white men's heads were carried off to Saohin.

The Was, far from dreading the consequences of the murder, then proceeded to burn the Shan villages round Mongtum, and besieged the 600 Chinese soldiers there.

Seventeen days elapsed before the British and Chinese reinforcements arrived, and then the allies at once began attacking the Was both to relieve the besieged Chinese soldiers and to avenge the murder. In two days fighting (on the 26th and 27th February) at Mongtum and to the Saohin villages in the south, the British with 4 white officers, 40 British infantry and 151 Gurka and Kachin Military Police, and the Chinese with a much larger force, carried five enemy stockades, burnt 12 fortified villages, containing nearly 2,000 houses, "down to the last pig-sty", killing over 60 Was and wounding over 150; the British lost 1 man killed and 8 wounded, the Chinese 8 killed and 40 wounded.

Although the murder had thus been avenged, the Was descended on the two villages Mongtum and Mongkaw as soon as the Commission moved south. The Shan inhabitants had many of their villages burnt and had to buy peace from the Was with cattle, salt and rice.

It was hoped that the heads of Kiddle and Sutherland had perished in the fire that destroyed the twelve villages, but in
February 1921, when a British column under Captain French made a tour of the Wa States, the Was asked after the health of the two dead men's relatives, for the family of a man whose head had been taken was supposed to decline both in wealth and number. Ordinarily a head was good for ten years, but those of Kiddle and Sutherland were reported by the Was to be unique and still retained their virtue. Where the heads were the Was would not reveal. 1

After the erection of the first three cairns and this joint effort at "suppressing" the Was, the cooperation between the British and Chinese in the Joint Boundary Commission seemed to have ended for the rest of the season. It was plain that where there were Was, nothing could be done. There seems to have been some evidence that the Wa hostility had been instigated, but it was not clear whether the instigation was done by the local Shan chiefs or some Chinese from the district of Chenpien. Scott's orders were to abandon demarcation rather than risk serious conflicts with the Was. General Liu was all for a showdown with the Was and for demarcation, but Scott obeyed his instructions.

South of the Wa areas the two sides could not agree on the interpretation of the Agreement on the ground. This was largely because Liu had not been supplied by his Government with the map attached to the Agreement; instead the so-called "Hsueh map" was produced by the Chinese and they insisted that this was the map signed by Lord Rosebury and Marquess Sieh. The mountain range Kungmingshan was the bone of contention. The map attached to the Agreement placed the range in longitude 99°10' and it was supposed to be the watershed between the Salween and the Mekhong, while the Chinese placed it on longitude 99°. Moreover, in many areas the Chinese were found to have pushed their posts forward into the territory assigned to Burma by the Agreement.

An impasse was thus reached and the whole of March and the first half of April were spent in fruitless argument. Scott and party took leave of the Chinese on the 20th April and invited Liu to see the fourth cairn he erected on the bank of the Namkha, at the mouth of the Namhse, in latitude 22°20' and longitude 90°17'. Liu refused to see the cairn which was later destroyed by the Chinese. From this fourth cairn the frontier followed the Namkha for about ten minutes of latitude before the first cairn of the southern section of 1898-99 season was reached.

Scott left Pangsang on the 2nd May and reached Maymyo on the 27th of the same month. In his report he recommended, concerning the Shan States, that persons responsible for the fabrication of the "Hsueh map" and for the non-appearance of the Agreement map be traced

and punished by the Chinese, and that the map of the frontier and its
description as determined by the British party should be declared to be
the boundary up to and including the Kungmingshan as defined by the
Agreement. These recommendations were endorsed by the Lieutenant
Governor of Burma, Sir Frederic Fryer, who further recommended that,
in order to ensure that the truculent Wa country would be an unad-
ministered unit entirely surrounded by Shan administrable areas, a
new frontier should be drawn up to the Mekhong north of Kenghung,
which would include Mongmung, Kengma, Mongting and Monglem within
British territory, leaving Chenkang, Shunning and Kenghung to China.
This recommendation would also help in the extension of the Mandalay-
Kunlong railway project, the Lieutenant Governor said. This was a
reversal of the 1896 policy, but Burma was satisfied that the Chinese
district of Chempian was created only after the British annexation of
Upper Burma (with the object, as I said earlier, of claiming as much
territory as possible under the Dragon flag to counter the British
conquest of Upper Burma).

The Government of India demurred. In its reply to Rangoon,
it considered that the question of tracing and punishment of persons
responsible for the disappearance of the Agreement map and appearance
of the "Hsueh map" should be dropped. It accepted Scott's version
of the frontier between the Wa States and Chinese Shan areas. This
subsequently became known as the "Scott line". As for Sir Frederic
Fryer's idea of a new frontier line up to the Mekhong, the viceroy
remarked that it "could scarcely be pursued unless very sweeping
changes in China were in progress", in which case "the whole position
would need review, and the matter would be primarily one for Her
Majesty's Government". Burma was also told to forget about the
Mandalay-Kunlong railway, for the time being. In any case India
considered it inopportune at the moment to broach the whole subject
to China which at this time was engulfed in the Boxer Rebellion and
its aftermath. On the death of the two officers India commented
that they went to Mongtum without the knowledge even of their chief,
J. G. Scott, and that therefore no blame could be attached to the
Chinese.1

Lady Scott was able at last to report that J. G. Scott was
awarded the long expected K.C.I.E. after this 1899-1900 Boundary
Commission.2

This brings us really to the end of our present study, but
it will not be out of place to follow up in a few lines what sub-
sequently happened to the frontier line between the Wa States on
Burma side and the Shan States on China side.

1. Secret Despatch No. 105 of 1900 dated the 2nd August 1900 from
the Government of India, Foreign Department, to the Secretary
of State for India. Enclosures 21 to 25 should be scrutinised.

There had been no firm British policy on this Scott line for the first 30 years of this century, and China refused to discuss both the "Hueh map" and the line. For example, in 1905 the Government of India wanted to enforce the Scott line and worked out the cost of enforcement; in 1906 the Government of India wished to exchange the Scott line for Hpimaw, while the British Government in London said it would not give up the Wa States; then nothing happened till 1929 when Sir Charles Innes suggested that Hpimaw should be exchanged for the Scott line, while India whispered that "we had little claim to either".

It was the Chinese who first suggested in 1929 that a Boundary Commission go over the Scott line properly and demarcate a workable frontier. Nothing happened until late 1930s when the British and Chinese resumed their boundary demarcation work through the good offices of the League of Nations which appointed the Swiss Colonel Iselin to be the Chairman of the Commission. What was accomplished in the two seasons' work belongs to another research undertaking. The tentative boundary was known as the 1941 or Iselin line but nothing definite was settled until Burma's post-independence period.

Late in July 1956 local newspapers in Burma began giving alarming reports on infiltrations by Chinese soldiers into various sections of Burma's eastern frontiers. The Government of Burma, quoting the 5 co-existence principles of Panch Shila, tried to soothe the justifiable anxiety of the public and started to negotiate with the Government of the Peoples' Republic of China on the settlement of the whole stretch of Burma's eastern frontier with China. These negotiations culminated in the signing in Peking on the 1st October 1960 by U Nu, Burmese Prime Minister, on behalf of Burma, and Mr. Chou-En-lai, Chinese Prime Minister, on behalf of China, of The Sino-Burmese Boundary Treaty. Burmese sources are optimistic and confident that all the boundary pillars from the "high conical peak" to the Mekong will have been erected before the 1961 monsoon sets in.

2. Ibid., pp. 110-111.
3. Appendix XI.
CHAPTER XIV

Epilogue

In terms of history 70 years may be short, but 1887 is a dim past for those living in 1960. It is appropriate to end this work with a brief, however inadequate, description of the period that followed the British annexation of the Shan States.

The British proclaimed before their entry that they would bring peace and prosperity with them and that they would not interfere in the internal affairs of the Shan States. Peace came as never before and prosperity naturally followed. As far as could be seen the Shans were left almost severely alone in their old ways, habits and customs. With the British also came people of other races who technically were loyal subjects of the Queen, but who nevertheless were aliens to the Shans. Being more sophisticated the other subjects of the British sovereign soon were in control of the main commerce, and the trading instinct of the Shans which had won the praise of the British before their entry became almost extinct. If Shans were still traders they were second-grade ones, very much depending on the favours of the big alien merchants who had connections in all capitals of South-east Asia. Even the final disposal of the native produce of the Shan States was not in the hands of the natives. But this was happening throughout the East. There were always bigger and better traders than the native ones. For the Shan States the pattern was the same all over. The alien merchants sold their goods to the native town traders who sold it to the villages, which in turn sold with profit what they obtained from towns to the jungle and hill folks. Conversely produce from the jungles and hills had to go through brokers in the villages and towns.

The non-interference policy of the British worked so well that they have been accused of a deliberate "divide and rule" policy. Actually nothing could be easier than to leave a people alone. There is no need to exert one's energy to prod the natives to work harder than necessary. Everybody was his or her Majesty's subject and was given the same rights and privileges. In such a world of equality the non-aggressive Shans did not show up their best. There was enough rice in the granary, enough vegetables in the gardens and fish in the ponds and streams, and when all else failed there were t'o-naa1,

1. Soya bean fermented cake.
salt and chilies in the pantry to go with rice. This will be found to be the principal philosophy of the Tai race all over South-east Asia.

Law and order were perfect. When the present writer travelled to Bangkok from Kengtung in 1925 he had to go by pony with a train of some 20 odd pack mules which carried, apart from bedding and other luggage, some twenty thousand pieces of the French Indo-Chinese piastre coinage. This enormous amount of almost pure silver coins was sent by his father to be exchanged for gold in Bangkok. Trade was literally free then. These coins were tied to the mule-packs in their gunny bags; and wherever the caravan put up for the night, be it in the villages or in the jungles, the muleteers would line the packs together and slept on them. Four state policemen spaced out between road bends to guard over the treasure of their sawbwa, and at night they slept under trees or in thatch-and-bamboo bivouacks built for them. No one thought that the policemen's casual vigilance would ever be challenged. From the border at Mesai - eight night stages from Kengtung - the silver was transferred to bullock carts which travelled as far as Chiangrai before a bus could be obtained to carry both the silver coins and the two saos and their dozen guardians and followers to the railhead at Lampang. One longs now for such law and order.

It was the heyday of the "empire on which the sun never set". Peace and security were perfect; the administration was humane, if unimaginative. To elaborate what could and should have been done to improve the lot of the Shans in order to keep them abreast of time would be outside the scope of the present work, though one could not help feeling that if the British had insisted on higher academic accomplishments by the Shan leadership, the Shan States would have been less under-developed than they were when independence found them in union with Burma proper.

The laws that enforced such a peaceful condition in the Shan States were epitomised in the ten sections of the "Shan States Customary Law". The gist of this law is that anything that was not specified in the first nine sections could be charged under Section X. Lawlessness among the natives was dealt with by the sawbwa's courts, while offences by other British subjects were dealt with by courts presided over by British administrative officers, and any undesirables could be expelled from the Shan States under the "frontier cross" regulations - any sawbwa could also "frontier cross" any Shan from his state. "There is fish wherever there is water", so goes a Shan saying, and of course there were crimes in the Shan States, sometimes very violent ones, but there was nothing really that could disturb the sleep of the British administrators.

For the first twenty odd years of the British administration, the various sawbwas, myosas and ngwegunhmus continued to pay tribute as set out in their sanads and appointment orders. The states were under the supervision of British political agents called Assistant Superintendents whose chiefs were the Superintendents of the Northern and Southern Shan States. A big state would be in the charge of one
Assistant Superintendent, or a group of smaller ones placed under one. These officers advised the chiefs in their administration, and their advice was expected to be taken literally and seriously. The administration of each state was channelled into various branches to conform with the Government's own system. Accounts and files were kept and inspected regularly by the Assistant Superintendents. The chiefs' personal prerogatives were left very much to themselves as long as they did not affect justice and good government. A Shan chief was seldom deposed and when he was, it was only because he had committed one of the three following crimes: disloyalty verging on rebellion or rebellion against the government; murder; and very serious misappropriation of state or government money.

But the tributes paid by the Shan States could not pay for the cost of the British administration and a system had to be devised to make the administration pay for itself. This was the introduction of the Federation, which was one of the most important steps brought about during the British regime to make the states have some sense of togetherness and some sort of loyalty to the centre, and this took place at a time when political changes were taking place all over India and Burma. The following official description puts the British administrative system in the Shan States in a biggish nutshell.

Twenty-six Shan and three Karenni States are included in the Southern Shan States charge. Three ranks of Chief are recognized by Government, SAWBWA, MYOSA and NOWBOUNHU. There are eleven SAWBWAS, eleven MYOSAS and four NOWGUNHUMUS in the Southern Shan States, and one SAWBWA and two MYOSAS in the Karenni States. The Northern Shan States charge comprises six States, and all the Chiefs are SAWBWAS.

There have been some changes in the area of States by amalgamation and otherwise since the British occupation. Certain Chiefs also have been promoted to higher ranks. But, generally speaking, the ruling families are relatively in much the same position as they were at the time of the annexation. That event was preceded by a long period of unrest, rebellion and internecine fighting, and consequently by much change. Several small States were absorbed, old States were dismembered and new States arose. The ruling families shared in these vicissitudes. Some of the oldest have disappeared, or have declined in importance. New families have been established, whose ancestors were subordinate local officials. Having regard to the conditions through which they have passed, however, the old families have survived to a remarkable extent. The habit of polygamy and the absence of the law of primogeniture have contributed to this result. A Shan Chief has many wives, and although the position of a son by the chief wife was, and is, regarded as superior to that of a son by any other wife, he did not always succeed to the State. In the troublous times before the annexation, a brother of mature
years was preferred to an infant son. The right of the latter was sometimes recognized by declaring him to be KYEMMONG or heir-apparent, and in several States the succession has been (1) elder brother, (2) younger brother, (3) elder brother's son. More rarely a son by a minor wife has succeeded and has been followed by a son of the chief wife. Shan public opinion sets great store on the Chief being of ruling family, but concerns itself little with rules of succession. The son of the chief wife, if competent, was the natural successor, and if he was excluded it was through force or fraud. But the time did not admit of infant rulers, and there was no hesitation in setting aside a young boy provided there was an eligible scion of the family to take his place. The old practice of nominating a KYEMMONG, or heir-apparent, and a NAWMONG, or heir-presumptive was probably prompted by the idea of avoiding an infant successor. Adoption has never been looked upon as conferring any title to the succession, if the child adopted is the son of a commoner. If he is connected by blood with the ruling family, adoption may be resorted to with a view to declaring the Chief's choice and strengthening a future claim.

In former years the position of chief wife was more important and assured than it is now. If her recognition by the Burmese Court was desired it could be obtained. A patent was issued to her, and she was given the title of MAHADEVI. No lady who holds this patent is now living. No chief wife now has a right to the title of MAHADEVI, though it is often used in addressing others as a matter of courtesy.

The nearest approach to a class of hereditary nobles is found in the officials of certain regions whose families have held office for generations. Some of these officials are descended from families who ruled the regions when these were independent States; others trace to ancestors who received lands as grants from the Chief for services rendered, or for other reasons. In either case the family was held by a sort of feudal tenure, and they regarded the region as theirs by hereditary right, subject only to defined, or well-understood, obligations. The rules of succession were much the same as those to the Chiefship. A duly qualified man, who was prepared to render the customary loyalty and services, could not justly be passed over. The dispossession of the family was an act of spoliation. The number of these hereditary charges is now small, but their special character is still recognized.

There is no class of hereditary officials in the strict sense of the term - that is, no one can claim a particular office by right of succession. But in practice great weight is attached to hereditary claims. Probably the majority of officials are the sons of men who held office before them. Where the success of an appointment depends largely on its
being favourably received by the people (as in the case of a circle official) hereditary claims cannot be, and are not, ignored. With the above exceptions, which are well recognized, and usually observed, the position of the Chief as regards his people is absolute; rank and consideration depend on his favour. In the majority of States a list of the leading men is practically a statement of the principal officials for the time being, supplemented perhaps by the names of a few private persons who are held in esteem for their wealth and benevolence.

The tract known as the Myelat now comprises only four small States the status of which differs from that of the Shan States proper. The original law in force is practically the same as the law in force in Upper Burma, and the Chiefs are Magistrates under the Criminal Procedure Code. As regards rules of succession, however, and the power of old custom, the position is much the same as in the Shan States proper.

The three States of Karenni differ from the Shan States in that they are not part of British India. They were brought under British control in 1889, and their Chiefs hold SANADS of appointment from Government. For many years previous to this even they were constantly engaged in a border warfare with the adjacent Shan States. The decline in population which they have suffered may be ascribed partly to this, and partly to economic causes. In theory the Karenni Chiefs are elected by popular vote, but in practice connection with certain families is held to be desirable, if not indispensable. Blood relationship is not demanded and marriage into a ruling family has been accepted as sufficient qualification. As in the Shan States, however, the tendency now-a-days is to regard a son as the natural successor, and to prefer a son by the chief wife. But in any case it is considered essential that the Chief should be a pure-blooded red Karen.

The State of Mong Mit was transferred to the charge of the Superintendent, Northern Shan States, with effect from the 15th November 1920. Hkambi Long, which comprises eight small principalities, is in charge of the Deputy Commissioner, MIITKYINA DISTRICT. The small States of Hsawngsup and Singkaling Hkambi lie on the Chindwin River, and are in the Sagaing Commissionership.

**FORM OF ADMINISTRATION.**

2. Backward Tracts.- The Federated Shan States, the Shan States of Hsawngsup and Singkaling Hkambi, Hkambi Long, the Chin Hills (including the Kampetlet Sub-division, formerly the Pakokku Hill Tracts), the Naga Hills District, the Arakan Hill Tracts, the Hill Tracts of the Myitkyina, Bhamo and Katha districts, have been declared "Scheduled Areas" under the Legislative Council in respect of legislation on the voting of expenditure and (except with the Governor’s sanction)
of interpellation or discussion. The authority of the Ministers does not extend to these areas which are wholly in the charge, in the case of the Federated Shan States, of the Governor, and in the case of partially excluded areas of the Governor in Council. A special personnel for the administration of the Excluded Areas is provided by the Burma Frontier Service.

3. Shan States.— In the case of the Shan States, the civil, criminal and revenue administration of every State is vested, by the Burma Laws Act, 1898, in the Chief of the State subject to any restrictions specified in the SANAD or order of appointment granted to him. Under the same Act enactments in force in Upper Burma can be extended to the Shan States and a large number have been so extended. In matters not covered by enactments, the law to be administered in each State is the customary law of the State, so far as it is in accordance with justice, equity and good conscience, and is not opposed to the powers of the Chiefs are exercised under the supervision, in the case of the Federated Shan States, of two Superintendents appointed from the Burma Commission or the Burma Frontier Service, and in the case of the other States, of the Deputy Commissioner of the district within which each falls. The Superintendents are assisted by Assistant Superintendents from the Burma Frontier Service. The powers of the Local Government extend to the appointment of officers to take part in the administration of any State, to the regulation of their powers and procedure, to the modifying of the customary law where necessary to bring it within the conditions of application, and to the regulation of the assessment and collection of revenue. The main block of the Shan States, grouped into the Northern and Southern Shan States, was formed into a federation with effect from the 1st October 1922. The main features of this arrangement are a centralized budget, covering expenditure on public works, medical administration, forest, education and agriculture, and to a small extent on police, towards which the several States contribute a definite proportion of their revenue and to which is credited the revenue from forests and minerals, which previously went to provincial funds; and an advisory council of Chiefs which, though without legislative powers, is consulted in connection with the extension of Acts to the Shan States by the Local Government and discusses the budget. The Federated Shan States thus form a sort of sub-province with finances distinct from those of Burma proper and under a distinct form of administration. The agent of the Governor in respect of its administration is the Commissioner of the Federated Shan States who is president of the advisory council of Chiefs. Formerly he was Commissioner of the North-East Frontier Division, a division which existed till 1922-25, but in 1925 it was abolished and the Federated Shan States were given a Commissioner of their own; he is also Superintendent of the Southern Shan States, a post which is temporarily in abeyance. The Commissioner is the official superior of the Superintendents, whose primary functions remain, as before the
federation, the supervision of administration in the individual states. The powers of a High Court for the Shan States, except in reference to proceedings against European British subjects or persons jointly charged with European British subjects formerly exercised exclusively by the Lieutenant-Governor, have also been transferred in part to the Commissioner. Departmental officers of Government employed in the Shan States are removed from ordinary departmental control and are the technical advisers of the Superintendents and the Commissioner in their respective subjects. The States of Karenni, not being part of British India, remain outside the federation.1

Actual political upheavals did not touch the Shan States and the restless elements were kept at bay by the "cross frontier" regulations. The sawbwas' courts, particularly those of the first five or six large states, were small replicas of the Mandalay one. The main haw of Hsipaw which was burnt down during the last war had an audience hall, glittering with gold, that would have passed for a small palace of the Burmese kings. Nor did the British interfere with the polygamous custom of the ruling families.

One important institution set up by the British was the opening of the "School for the Sons of the Shan Chiefs" in 1902 with a handful of pupils during its first years. Some of the pupils were married men while most of the chiefs' sons had their retainers and servants in town. It was not easy for the British headmasters to enforce the idea of English public school discipline. Nevertheless, emphasis was placed on discipline and "character training" rather than academic accomplishment. As its name implied, none but sons and relatives of chiefs was admitted; the effect of this was that the young lords at the school had small idea of what was happening outside and there was little or no incentive for competition. An heir to a state would consider himself naive indeed to work harder than was necessary to avoid the headmaster's cane, when he knew that after leaving school he would eventually succeed his father, so long as he did not commit the three main crimes mentioned above. Scholastic attainment was not high, but some of the boys did set up many records in games and sports, and a limited amount of esprit de corps was created. In spite of its defects however this school did produce many men of sturdy character and honest principles, and most of the administrators and executive officers of the present-day Shan States were its products.

Through the initiative of a handful of hard-working friends, some of them old boys, this unique institution was converted in 1951 into a public school under the name of "Kambawsa College".

Three major departments were set up in the Federation, and these were Public Works, responsible for the construction of roads

and buildings; Forest, for the administration of the extraction of exportable timbers; Education, to administer Government schools directly and to advise schools set up by the various States. Other branches of modern administration such as agriculture, medical and health, veterinary, etc., were placed under the all-powerful General Administration. There seems to have been enough funds to run them adequately. Most of the junior officers and clerical hands in these departments were non-Shans, especially in the Public Works where a certain clique of Indian clerks were not keen to recommend to their superiors outsiders to any post that might fall vacant. The Shans themselves worked in the States and these were always regarded as far below their equivalents in the Government offices. A good example of British non-interference policy can be seen from the fact that up to 1946 only two Shans had been recruited into the Burma Frontier Service, and a few into junior posts of other branches of administration. In Burma proper the new spirit of nationalism was beginning to make both the officers and their non-Burmese staff feel uneasy, but in the Shan States, all felt safe and insulated against such a phenomenon. The climate in the Shan States on the whole was good and there was practically nothing that could be taken as a sign of political restlessness. It was easy to regard all the political happenings in the Burma proper as wickedness, alien to the spirit and nature of the Shans.

Then, all of a sudden, this paradise was shaken to the core by the Japanese Greater Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere war. British officers were obliged to leave the country without much ceremony. Gone was the peace and sanads and non-interference. It seemed that the period of uncertainties and chaos had returned. During this Japanese period, Kengtung and Mongpan were given to Siam, while the rest of the Shan States was placed under a Chief Commissioner appointed from Rangoon. In the Siamese section, the civil and military officers sent up from Bangkok and from some of Siam's northern provinces did not exhibit their best qualities; in the rest of the Shan States, attempts were made to integrate the administration with Burma proper.

This period of uncertainties and scarcities passed away like a very bad dream, and the old administration returned in the summer of 1945 with the populace welcoming its officers and representatives as real liberators, hardly realising that independence for the whole country was barely two years away. There was no respite for the rulers or the ruled. The nightmare of Japanese occupation seemed to have wrought drastic changes in the people's attitude toward life. The administration had hardly planted its feet firmly on the ground when the "wind of change" swept through Burma. The Shan States which had hitherto shunned all political connections with the Burmese in the plains suddenly held a conference to which all the political leaders of Burma and of the Chins and Kachins were invited. This conference took place in February 1946 at Panglong, a market centre six miles north of Loilem, and it came about largely through the initiative of

1. The all-powerful civil service cadre for the Shan States.
a few sawbwas led by Khun Kyi of Hsahtung, Sao Samhtun of Mongpawn and Sao Shwethaike of Yawnghwe. Of its political nature there was no doubt, for both U Saw and Thakin Nu came and made fiery speeches, but it was not clear what were the exact aims and objects of this conference, and it has not left behind any permanent mark anywhere. The whole affair clearly indicated a change in the Shan outlook on political happenings inside and outside their homeland. It seems that the Shan leaders were no longer scared of the modern ogre called politics, and they were joining hands with other leaders of the Frontier Areas to bargain with the Burmese politicians for a say in the fate of the whole country.

(This term "Frontier Areas" was created in Simla by the British Government of Burma during its exile, and it embraced the Arakan Yomas, Chin and Naga hill tracts, Bhamo and Myitkyina Districts, the Shan States, Karenni and the Salween District. The areas form a big horse-shoe arch round the central plains of Burma, the homeland of the majority race. The Frontier Areas were administered exclusively by officers of the Burma Frontier Service after the war, and the set-up was called Frontier Areas Administration, directly responsible to the Governor.)

Again in February 1947 a second Panglong Conference was held. This time the object was to discuss the very fate of the whole Frontier Areas vis-a-vis Burma proper. Much had happened on the plains and deltas of the Irrawaddy between this Panglong and the previous one. The Burmese lowlands were gripped by political tensions which were causing much unrest there. It all centred round the fight by the major Burmese political organisation, the AFPFL, for political supremacy in the country. The crux of the matter was that the AFPFL leaders, supported by their branch organisations all over the country and reinforced by their experiences during the Japanese occupation, refused to accept the old politicians who came in with the British administration from Simla and they were forcing British hands to grant independence to Burma within a specified time. The British attitude was that the country should be fully rehabilitated before any promise of independence could be given. British officers on the spot would have liked to arrest all the AFPFL leaders but this plainly was not allowed by London. The first round of victory came to the AFPFL when the Governor, Sir Reginald Dorman-Smith, was replaced by Major General Sir Hubert Rance. With the arrival of Rance things moved swiftly, and the AFPFL leaders filled almost all the posts in the Governor's Council and virtually became Government of the country. When this happened political freedom for Burma was a foregone conclusion, and General Aung San and his advisers were invited to London to discuss how this freedom was to come about and whether it would be independence within or outside the British Commonwealth of Nations.

This was just before the second Panglong Conference, and there was no representative from the Shan States among Aung San's advisers in London. The Shans went so far as to cable to London pointing out
this shortcoming. It was not known whether this omission was due to
the fact that Burmese politicians regarded the Shans as politically
immature or as opportunists who wanted to jump on to their band wagon
when victory seemed near. But certain it was that there was no politi-
cal connection between political parties in Burma and the Shan
leaders (as far as national politics were concerned) during the whole
of British rule in Burma, and whether this had worked to the advantage
or disadvantage of the Shan States should form a lively and interest-
ing essay subject.

Aung San had returned from his negotiation in London shortly
before the Panglong Conference was convened and the news was all over
the country that Burma was to be granted complete independence within
one year, and it was to discuss the future of the Frontier Areas in
that light that he came to Panglong. Perhaps, too, he attended the
Panglong Conference to placate the Frontier Areas' opinion for not hav-
ing their leaders among his advisers in London.

As to be expected the Frontier leaders were at first wary of
the intentions of Aung San and his party at Panglong; they had in the
past dissociated themselves from any political party in Burma. But
Aung San was no ordinary politician and he lacked all the guile usually
associated with politicians. He bluntly but honestly laid all his
cards on the table for all to see. He even admitted that in the past
the Frontier Areas had not had a square deal from Burma proper, and
stated that in future the Government of Burma with himself at the helm
would give the Frontier peoples all the consideration they deserved.
Of course he blamed the British divide-and-rule policy in keeping the
Frontier peoples from coming into contact with their Burmese brethren.
He said that independence for Burma without the Frontier Areas would be
curry without salt and that without independence the Frontier peoples
would be forever in darkness. In any case, whether the Frontier
Areas wanted it or not, and with or without them, Burma proper would go
ahead with independence, Aung San declared. But should the Frontier
Areas decide to associate themselves with Burma's demand for complete
independence they would never regret it. His exact words were these:
"If Burma receives one kyat, you will also get one kyat". To prove his
practical sincerity, he promised to ask the Governor to appoint
immediately a Shan Counsellor, assisted by two Deputy Counsellors -
one Kachin and the other Chin, to sit in the Governor's Council to
manage the affairs of the Frontier Areas, should their leaders wish
to share the responsibility of independence for the whole country.
It was also said that the Burmese promised that should the Frontier
leaders agree to put their shoulders to the wheel of independence the
first President of Burma would be a Shan.

Looking back, that, to my mind, more than anything else, carried
the day for General Aung San. The Shans, Chins and Kachins were con-
vinced of his sincerity. If there were British officers who might have
tried to influence the Frontier leaders to doubt the sincerity of the
Burmese, their own senior officers never regarded the Frontier peoples
as anything approaching grown-ups politically, and their own Government
never offered any political concessions beyond the tribal stage. The sawbwas of the biggest Shan States might have been invited to teas and dinners with the Governor in Rangoon, but at home they had to obey the orders of the Governor's most junior officers. In a manual called The Frontier Areas Regulations, prepared in Simla during the war, a status quo was advocated under new names and terms, but the position and status of the Frontier leaders were at the lower rungs of the ladder of the official hierarchy. Here at Panglong the Burmese bilu unmasked himself, and the Shans, Kachins and Chins found him to be not the bilu they were wont to regard him but an ordinary human being as themselves, who regarded them as his equals and colleagues. By a stroke of the pen, so to speak, three Frontier leaders were immediately placed as bosses of their former rulers, and the holder of that pen was none other than a Burman. The sceptic might say that the Frontier Areas were not really ready for union with the plains without the Burmese getting the upper hand. In that case, it might as well be said that the whole of Burma was unready for independence. The road to real independence and complete unity doth never run smooth. It is up to the various peoples within that union to fight for their rights and equal shares. Nothing is gained in life without hard work and in politics it is even more necessary to work harder.

And so the following historic Panglong Agreement was signed on the 12th February 1947:

A conference having been held at Panglong, attended by certain Members of the Executive Council of the Governor of Burma, all Saohpas and representatives of the Shan States, the Kachin Hills and the Chin Hills;

The Members of the Conference, believing that freedom will be more speedily achieved by the Shans, the Kachins and the Chins by their immediate co-operation with the Interim Burmese Government;

The Members of the Conference have accordingly, and without dissentients, agreed as follows:-

1. A representative of the Hill Peoples, selected by the Governor on the recommendation of representatives of the Supreme Council of the United Hill Peoples (S.C.O.U.H.P.), shall be appointed a Counsellor to the Governor to deal with the Frontier Areas.

2. The said Counsellor shall also be appointed a member of the Governor's Executive Council, without portfolio, and the subject of Frontier Areas brought within the purview of the Executive Council by Constitutional Convention as in the case of Defence and External Affairs. The Counsellor for Frontier Areas shall be given executive authority by similar means.
3. The said Counsellor shall be assisted by two Deputy Counsellors representing races of which he is not a member. While the two Deputy Counsellors should deal in the first instance with the affairs of their respective areas and the Counsellor with all the remaining parts of the Frontier Areas, they should by Constitutional Convention act on the principle of joint responsibility.

4. While the Counsellor, in his capacity of Member of the Executive Council, will be the only representative of the Frontier Areas on the Council, the Deputy Counsellors shall be entitled to attend meetings of the Council when subjects pertaining to the Frontier Areas are discussed.

5. Though the Governor's Executive Council will be augmented as agreed above, it will not operate in respect of the Frontier Areas in any manner which would deprive any portion of these areas of the autonomy which it now enjoys in internal administration. Full autonomy in internal administration for the Frontier Areas is accepted in principle.

6. Though the question of demarcating and establishing a separate Kachin State within a Unified Burma is one which must be relegated for decision by the Constituent Assembly, it is agreed that such a State is desirable. As a first step towards this end, the Counsellors for Frontier Areas and the Deputy Counsellors shall be consulted in the administration of such areas in the Myitkyina and the Bhamo Districts as are Part II Scheduled Areas under the Government of Burma Act of 1935.

7. Citizens of the Frontier Areas shall enjoy rights and privileges which are regarded as fundamental in democratic countries.

8. The arrangements accepted in this Agreement are without prejudice to the financial autonomy now vested in the Federated Shan States.

9. The arrangements accepted in this Agreement are without prejudice to the financial assistance which the Kachin Hills and the Chin Hills are entitled to receive from the revenues of Burma, and the Executive Council will examine with the Frontier Areas Counsellor and Deputy Counsellors the feasibility of adopting for the Kachin Hills and the Chin Hills financial arrangements similar to those between Burma and the Federated Shan States.1

Karenni, which came under the British rule at the same time as the Shan States, sent representatives only as observers because they regarded their State as having a special treaty status with the British, a point of view regarded by many as unrealistic considering the position and resources of the State and the plight of its peoples, and during the British rule this status existed only in legal documents. The Karens of the Salween District also were not party to the Agreement; but with the Shans, Chins and Kachins in it progress towards unity was irresistible.

There was much rejoicing and feasting at the signing of this Panglong Agreement, and the Shan flag of yellow, green and red stripes with a white moon at the centre of the green, was hoisted.

Mr. Bottomley and Colonel Reese-Williams who came all the way from London as the chief British delegates-cum-observers did not seem to have much to do, for the problem which they had come to tackle had solved itself. They probably came with instructions to agree to anything that the Burmese and the Frontier leaders agreed among themselves. This was inevitable; once the British Government in London (Labour) decided to yield to Burma's demand for independence there was little else that any outsider could usefully do. There were some dissenters who thought the British might have agreed to the Frontier Areas deciding to be an independent unit within the British Commonwealth, and it was even said that a senior member of the Frontier Areas Administration went round various Frontier leaders trying to persuade them to remain in that Commonwealth. I have no documents to support these statements and people who told me about this matter never liked to be quoted, but cold logic seems against it. The British may be a gallant and civilised people, but they are also hard-headed businessmen, and the Frontier Areas had not done anything in terms of international politics that would make the British taxpayers pay for their soldiers to die for us as equal partners. British protection could be had gratis or at a price only as long as the British navy reigned supreme over the seven seas. Moreover, the promise of the first president, the three counsellors and of equal "kyat" treatment was far more attractive and real much and much nearer home.

And so Sao Samhtun, the Sawbwa of Mongpawn, was soon appointed a Counsellor in the Governor's Council - the first cabinet portfolio to be held by a Shan under the British, with two deputies in the persons Sima Duwa Simwa Nawng, a Kachin, and U Vum Ko Hau, a Chin. The Frontier Areas Committee of Enquiry was rushed through to decide "the best method of associating the Frontier peoples with the working out of the new constitution for Burma". The constitution was to be drafted by a Constituent Assembly or Parliament. Elections were held successfully and the Constitution drawn up and rushed through all its stages in the Parliament. Within less than eleven months of the signing of the Panglong Agreement, Independence was proclaimed. The day was the 4th January 1948 and the auspicious moment 4.20 a.m. The first President of the Union of Burma was a Shan, as rumoured at Panglong. He was Sao Shwethaike, the Sawbwa of Yawngwe.
Aung San, that youth of genius who managed to unify all Burma, and Sao Samhtun, Sawbwa of Mongpawn, the first Shan Counsellor, the first cabinet portfolio held by a Shan during the British regime, did not live to witness the fruit of their labour, for they were murdered on the 19th July 1947 along with five of their colleagues during a cabinet meeting. Sao Khunkhio, Sawbwa of Mongmit, succeeded Sao Samhtun as Counsellor, and since Independence he has been Head of the Shan States.

The most momentous event for the Shan States in the post-Independence era was the surrender by all Shan chiefs of their executive powers in their own States to the Shan State Government. This took place officially on the 24th April 1959. Each ruler was given a commuted pension and the total cost of these pensions, borne by the Union Government in the form of aid to the State Government, amounted to 2,58,64,029 kyats.¹ And the prerogatives and status of the sawbwas and other chiefs which had been regularised by the British in the sanads and letters of appointment which they granted to the rulers, were brought to an end in a document called "Agreement between Shan State and the Saophas".²

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1. See Appendix for the amount received by each State.

2. See Appendix XIII for the terms of the Agreement. The term saopha is a Shan word for sawbwa. At the second Panglong Conference the various sawbwas, myosas and Ngwegunhmus came to an agreement to level up all Shan States rulers and call them all by the term "saopha".
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Those marked * are profusely illustrated and contain many pictures taken in the Shan States.

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<td>104-117.</td>
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<th>No.</th>
<th>King</th>
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<td>1.</td>
<td>Khoolliee</td>
<td>80</td>
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<td>2.</td>
<td>11 kings</td>
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<td>3.</td>
<td>Murgnow</td>
<td>667-777</td>
<td>13th</td>
<td>Son of 3 and brother of Samlongpha the conqueror.</td>
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<td>4.</td>
<td>Sookampha</td>
<td>777-808</td>
<td>14th</td>
<td></td>
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<td>5.</td>
<td>10 kings</td>
<td>808-1315</td>
<td></td>
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<td>7.</td>
<td>2nd son</td>
<td></td>
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<td>Reigns for 3 years (?)</td>
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<td>8.</td>
<td>3rd son</td>
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<td></td>
<td>&quot; &quot; 28 &quot; (?)</td>
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<td>9.</td>
<td>Soo-ooppha</td>
<td>1364-</td>
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<td>-1445</td>
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<td>Sooheppha</td>
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<td>Title: Soohoongkhum or Chowhoomo. Alliance with Manipur.</td>
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<td>Killed in battle with Chinese</td>
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<td>15.</td>
<td>Chowoongkhum</td>
<td>1592-1596</td>
<td>Title: Soohoongpha.</td>
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<td>16.</td>
<td>10 years interregnum</td>
<td></td>
<td>1596-1606 (?)</td>
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<td>17.</td>
<td>4 rulers</td>
<td>1617-1662</td>
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<td>18.</td>
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<td>19.</td>
<td>5 rulers</td>
<td>1672-1734</td>
<td></td>
<td>Of Pong Lineage.</td>
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1. cf. 1 to 6 with table of Mau Kings, and 12 to 21 with that of Mogaung.
2. Bayinnaung's army in his invasion of Siam had Mogaung contingents (assuming that Pong is Mogaung from 1334 onwards - see text.
APPENDIX II.

THE STORY OF MUNG-MAU.

Though the Mau Shans trace their existence as a nation to the fabulous and comparatively recent source of the heaven-descended kings, Kun-Lung and Kun-Lai, as will be seen below, still as a race they appear, from the Burmese books, to have a legend assigning their origin to the earliest period of Burmese history, and indeed to a common parentage with the latter people. That this is not an original tradition of their race, but one imported in the course of Buddhist teachings, there can be little doubt, but it is remarkable that no other appears to exist, either in their own or Burmese writings. The legend is probably the one briefly referred to in the opening lines of Chap. II of Yule's Mission to Ava, and of which the author justly remarks that it is one "of equal value and like invention to that which deduced the Romans from the migrations of the pious Aeneas, the ancient Britons from Brut the Trojan and the Gael from Scots, daughter of Pharoah".

However, as the story is not produced in any English writings that I am acquainted with, except insofar as it refers to the Burmese, it may be worth while to give an epitome of it as derived from that section of the Burmese history known as the Tagaung Raza Weng.

About 300 years before the birth of Gaudama, or 923 B.C., and 1191 years before the descent of Kun-Lung and Kun-Lai, a Sakya prince called Abhi Raja arrived from Kapilavastu by way of Arakan and founded the city of Pagan (called Thindue in some accounts) on the left bank of the Irrawaddy. He had two sons, whose Burmese names were Kang-gyi and Kang-ngai (elder and younger Kang), and at his death the former retired to Arakan and became king of that country, whilst Kang-ngai succeeded his father at Pagan, and in his turn was succeeded by thirty-one of his lineal descendants, whose names are given in the Burmese record, but no dates. The last of these, or the 33rd from Abhi Raja, was one Beinaka, who reigned, roughly speaking, about the commencement of the religious era, or partly during Gaudama's lifetime. In the course of Beinaka's reign a Chinese army invaded his country, captured

2. Or Kapilenagara, the birth place of the last Buddha identified by General Cunningham with Nagar on the Upper Manurama or Cooanee tributary of the Gogra. (Ancient Geography of India)
3. Also Thanay Myo.
4. Mr. Mason ("Burma", p. 37) says "the people who destroyed Tagaung came from Kandahar, the modern Candahar, and were, therefore, the Khanadrin of the Greeks", but as we know the Buddhistical name
Pagan, destroyed it, and obliged him to take refuge at Malei on the right bank of the Irrawaddy and nearly opposite the present ruins of lower Tsamanago. Here he shortly afterwards died, and his people became broken up into three divisions. One of these remained at Malei under Beinaka's queen, Naga Seing, a second wandered towards the south and was absorbed by the Piu, a section of the Burmese proper, while the third migrated eastward and became Shans, forming the nineteen original Shan districts or states.

Of these districts or states no names are given, and probably the number is an imaginative one; but it is remarkable that the legend of the Pwons, derived from an entirely different and original source, carries us back to this same event - the first fall of old Pagan. These people pretend that they are descendants of the elephant drivers whom the Chinese conquerors pressed into their service to conduct the elephants captured in the city back to China; that they escaped thence, and wandered westward to the third defile (Kyaukdwen) of the Irrawaddy where they are still settled.

After the Chinese had retired from Pagan, one Dhaja Raja, another prince of Kapilavastu, came from India, married the widow Naga Seing, and rebuilt the capital immediately beyond the north wall of the old city. This was the Tagaung of the Burmese and the Tai-Tung-Kung of the Shans, and the date of its foundation given by the Burmese is the 20th year of the Bel. Era (523 B.C.), and by the Shans the 21st year (519 B.C.). After this there are no dates, or numbers of generations, recorded with any certainty, but Dhaja Raja's dynasty appears to have ruled at Tagaung until Kun-Lung displaced it and put his son, Ai-Kun-Lung, on the throne at some date probably within one generation posterior to the year 568 A.D. (see Table "Kun-Lung's posterity") if, indeed, it occurred at all.

applied to China is Gandala (a form of Candahar), and as the name used in the Burmese text of this legend is frequently "Tarouk Gandala Rit", there can be no doubt that China is meant.

In Colonel Burney's translation, above quoted, he says "the Chinese and Tartars came from the country of Tsein, in the Empire of Gandalareet".

1. Champa-nagara (?).

2. The Pwons, I am informed, do not speak the Tai language, but it is said that they write it, their own language never having been reduced to writing. They are closely allied to the Kadus on the borders of Munnipur both in language and customs, and are probably of one origin with the latter, whether the above tradition be true or not.

3. In Colonel Burney's text (J.A.S.B., Vol. V, p. 163) the older city is called Tagaung, and the one rebuilt by Dhaja Raja, Pagan or Pinja-la-rit or Pinja Tagaung. Dr. C. Williams visited the ruins in 1863 and made plans of the walls (partly from inspection and partly from the information of the local officials), which will be found in the 33rd vol. of the J.A.S.B., p. 194.
It is, however, with the Mau Shans rather than with Tagaung that we are concerned, so let us pass on at once to their earliest national legend, which is told in all the Shan histories with, apparently, little variation, thus:-

In the year of Religion 1111 or 568 A.D., two sons of the gods, named Kun-Lung and Kun-Lai, descended from heaven by a golden ladder and alighted in the valley of the Shuei River. They were accompanied by two ministers, Kun-Tun and Kun-Bun, one of whom was descended from the sun and the other from the moon; they were also attended by an astrologer descended from the family of Jupiter, and by a number of other mythical personages. On arriving at earth they found men who immediately submitted to them as rulers sent from the gods, while one of the mortals called Laun-gu or Chau-Ti-Kan offered to become the servant of the two brothers. Before leaving heaven, the god Tenkam had given them a cock and a knife and had enjoined them, immediately on arriving at earth, to kill the cock with the knife and to offer up prayers to him at the same time; when the ceremony was over, they were to eat the head of the bird themselves and give the body to their ministers and attendants. It was found, however, that by some mistake the cock and the knife had been left behind and Laun-gu was sent to heaven to bring them down. He went and returned with both, but reported that the god Tenkam being angry with the brothers for their carelessness in leaving these things behind, had sent a message that after duly sacrificing the cock, the brothers were to eat a portion of the body only and give the rest to their attendants. In this way Laun-gu managed to secure for himself the head. He then asked the brothers to confer upon him some reward for the service he had rendered in regaining the sacrificial objects from heaven, and they gave him the country of Mithila to govern. Having eaten the head of the cock he became a wise and powerful Chinese ruler, while the heaven-descended brothers, only having eaten of the body, remained ignorant Mau Shans.

Laun-gu, on arriving in Mithila, founded the capital Mung-Kyei and commenced his rule in 568 A.D. He died after 60 years' reign in

1. Regarded by the Shans as the son of Indra. See Garnier (p. 173, Vol. I) where Phva Then is spoken of as the Laos god who created heaven and earth.

2. The Pali or classical name for Mung Kyei or Mung Chei, which properly speaking is the Shan name for China generally, but in reality Yunnan only, is meant. Garnier mentions M. Tche as the Shan name for Yunnan (I, p. 474), and the Chinese as a people are known to the Shans as Kyei or Chei. (See also Yule's Ava, p. 308; Dr. Anderson, "Expedition to Yunnan", p. 4; and Ritter, Erdkunde von Asien, IV, p. 765.) On Colonel Yule's map of Burma, 1855, the classical name for Yunnan is given as Wideharit; this, however, implies Mithila, for Vidotha or Vaideha was but another name for the ancient Mithila (see Cunningham, Ancient Geography of India, p. 64. Also Wilson's Sanscirt Dictionary).
628, and was succeeded by his son Chau-Pu, who also reigned 60 years, and was followed in his turn by his son Sek-Ka in 688. This last, with his lineal descendants, it is stated, ruled for two hundred years when a relation (of the same race) named Pwei-No-Ngan-Maing succeeded to the throne, and, together with his descendents, retained it for 150 years or to A.D. 1038. Further than this the Shan records do not follow Laun-gu alias Chau-Ti-Kan.

Shortly after their descent to earth Kun-Lung and Kun-Lai quarrelled on the subject of precedence, and the former determined to abandon his claim to the kingdom in the Shuuli valley and to found a new one for himself. With this view he packed the two images of his ancestors, one male, called Sung, and one female, called Seng, into a box and started towards the west, carrying the box upon his head. He crossed the Irrawaddy and shortly afterwards arrived at a place near the Uru (Ooroo) tributary of the Kyendwen, where he established himself and founded a city called Maing-Kaing Maing-nyaung, and whence he sent forth his sons, or relations, to become rulers of neighbouring states. Of these there appear to have been seven, but whether sons or not is uncertain; however, it is of little importance, as from the following list it will be seen that this part of the record has hardly yet emerged from the domain of fable:

1. Can this be the original tradition of Nanchao? The term 60 years so often used in these half mythical writing is, I suspect, merely a way of indicating roughly a considerable length of time and means about one cycle.

2. This box, still containing one of the idols, is said to have been in the possession of the Asamese prince Parundur Sing when he took refuge in Bengal in 1818.

3. Sometimes called Mung-Kung, but must not be confounded with Mo-gaung (M. Kaung). The position is difficult to define exactly. There is said to be a modern town of M. Nyaung on a small left tributary of the Kyendwen below the Uru, but above the town of Kendat, and another called Maing-Kaing on the left bank of the Uru. The whole district is perhaps meant.
Distribution of Kun-Lung's posterity (i.e., his seven sons or descendants).

1. Aing Kun-Lung ... ... King of Tai-tung-kung or Tagaung.
2. Kun-pha ... ... King of Mo-nyin (Mung-nyaung). He was appointed in consideration of paying Kun-Lung a yearly tribute of ten lakhs of horses. (A large number of horses is probably meant.)
3. Kun-Ngu ... ... King of Lamung-Tai; i.e., Labun near Zim-meil in Siam. Yearly tribute, 300 elephants.
4. Kun-Kwot-pha ... ... King of Yun-lung or Mung Yong (probably Garnier's M. Yong, I, p. 173). He was the origin of the Taipong race of Maus. Yearly tribute, a quantity of gold.
5. Kun-La ... ... King of Mung-Kula or Kalei on a west tributary of the Kyendwen. Tribute, water from the Kyendwen.
6. Kun-Tha ... ... King of Ava-sic, but probably Momiet is meant, especially as a ruby mine is said to have existed at his capital. Tribute, two viss (about 7 lbs.) of rubies yearly.
7. Kun-Su ... ... King of modern Mung-nyaung on or near the Uru tributary of the Kyendwen, at which place his father (Kun-Lung) had also reigned.

Kun-Su reigned for 25 years, viz., from 608 to 633 A.D.
Chau-Sen-Sau (a son) 19 " " " 633 to 652 "
Chau-Kun-jau " 15 " " " 652 to 667 "
Chau-Kun-jun " 11 " " " 667 to 678 "

During the reign of this last, his son Kham-pong-pha went to reside at Mung Ri Mung-Ram, and afterwards reigned there as King of Mung-Mau. (See No. 3 of Mung-Tau Table,

Thus Kun-Lung and his posterity reigned at M. Kaing M. Nyaung for 110 years, and meanwhile Kun-Lai had founded a capital called Mung-Ri Mung-Ram at a short distance from the left bank of the Shueli, and supposed to be some eight or nine miles to the eastward of the present city of Mung-Mau. Here he reigned for 70 years, and was succeeded by his son Ai-dyep-that-pha, who ruled for 40 years, but who died without issue in 678 A.D., and consequently in the fortieth year of the Burmese era. The son of Chau-Kun-Jun, mentioned in the above list, was then created king, and in his person Kun-Lung's line became

1. See Table, for all the Mau kings to follow.
supreme among the Mau. The length of his reign is not known, but he was followed by his son, during whose rule the capital M. Ri M. Ram declined, and became of secondary importance to the town of Ma-Kau Mung Lung (or Ka-Kao-Mung Lung),1 which was situated on the right bank of the river and believed to be some six or seven miles west of the capital. This king was succeeded by his younger brother, Kam-Sip-pha, who ascended the throne in 703 A.D. and established his court at Ma-Mau Mung-Lung, thus finally abandoning Mung-Ri Mung-Ram.

During the next 332 years Kam-Sip-pha and his descendants appear to have reigned in regular succession, while nothing worth recording is to be found during the whole of this period. The succession, however, was broken at the death of Chau-Lip-pha in 1035, and a relation of the race of Taipong of Yun Lung2 was placed on the throne in that year. He was called Kun-Kwot-pha3 and signalled the change in the succession by establishing a new capital, called Cheila, on the left bank of the Shueili and immediately opposite Ma-Kau Mung-Lung. He is also said to have incorporated Bamo with his dominions.

At this period the dominant power in all these regions was that of the king of New Pagan, Anauratha, and in the history of M. Mau it is recorded that Kun-Kwot-pha's son and successor gave his daughter in marriage to the Pagan monarch, thus almost implying that he acknowledged him as liege lord, though it is also stated that he never went to the Pagan court, as a true vassal must have done.4

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1. See Hannay (Sketch of Singphos, &c., 1847, p. 54) where the name of Kai Khao Mau Loung, the great and splendid city, is given as the capital of the Pong Kingdom on the Shueili. The word Mau is significant, though my informants make it "Mung". At p. 55 Hannay gives Moong Khao Loung as the old name for the present Mogaung; in both these names Khao probably means city.

2. See list of Kun-Lung's posterity No. 4, p. vi.

3. It may be remarked here that the word Kun means King, and is nearly equivalent to Chau Pha or Tsaubwa; thus Chau Lip Pha, or King Lip, the middle syllable being the name, the others the royal title. In modern English documents relating to Siam it is generally written Chow-fa or Chau-Phya (e.g., in Aitchison's Treaties, vol. I, p. 324, &c.).

4. Sir Arthur Phayre, in his translation of the Maha-Radza-Weng, says of King Anauratha during his return journey from China: "While passing through Shan, a Chinese Province of Mau, he married Tsau-Nwun-hla, the daughter of the Prince of the Province". (J.A.S.B., XXXVII, pt. I, No. 11, 1868, p. 94). At p. 107 also, he remarks that Anauratha is represented as having married a daughter of the king of Weithali, but rightly observes that the ancient kingdom of Weithali, situated to the north of the present Patna, could scarcely have been in existence at this time. But the adopted Buddhistical name of Asam was (and is to the present day) Weisali; thus the lady whom Anauratha married may have been an Asamese (i.e. Kamrup) princess of the then reigning dynasty.
But however this may have been during Anuratha's lifetime, certainly the succeeding kings of Man were entirely independent, and they appear to have reigned in peace and unbroken succession until the death of Pam-Yau-Pung in A.D. 1210, when a third influx of Kun-Lung's posterity occurred in the person of Chau-Ai-Mo-Kam-Neng, of the race of Kun-Su of Maing-Kaing Maing-Nyaung. And it is remarkable that this new influx took place while Pam-Yau-Pung's younger brother was actually in power in the neighbouring state of Monist, where he had just previously founded the capital and commenced an almost independent reign, as will be seen in the note on Monist and Asam.

Chau-Ai-Mo-Kam-Neng reigned for ten years and had two sons, Chau-Kwam-pha (or Chau-Kam-pha, the Soo-Kam-pha of Pemberton) and Sam-Lung-Kun-Maing (or Sam-Lung-pha), the latter perhaps the most remarkable personage in the Man history. The first succeeded to the throne of Mung-Mau at the death of his father in 1220 A.D., but Sam-Lung-pha had already, five years previously, become Tsaubwa of Mung-Kaung or Moguang, where he had established a city on the banks of the Nam Kaung, and had laid the foundation of a new line of tsaubwas, tributary only to the kings of Man. He appears to have been essentially a soldier and to have undertaken a series of campaigns under his brother's direction or perhaps as Commander-in-Chief of his army. The first of these campaigns began by an expedition into Mithila when he conquered Maing-ti (Nan-tien), Momien and Wan Chang (Yung Chang) and from thence extended his operations towards the south, Kaingma, Maing-Maing, Kiang-Hung, Kaing-Tung and other smaller states, each in turn falling under the Man yoke. With Theinni an amicable arrangement was come to, in virtue of which the tsaubwa of that state became so far a vassal as to engage to send a princess, periodically, to the harem of the Man king.

Immediately on Sam-Lung-pha's return to Mung-Mau he was ordered away on a second expedition to the west, and on this occasion crossed the Kyendwen river and overran a great portion of Aracan, laying the capital in ruins, and establishing his brother's supremacy in a number of towns on, and beyond, the right bank of the Kyendwen.

A third expedition was then undertaken to Munnipur with similar success to the two last, and again a fourth to Upper Asam, where he conquered the greater portion of the territory then under the sway of the Chutya or Sutya kings.

1. See note on Moguang.

2. The number of Sam-Lung-pha's army is not given, but when the whole was assembled it was tallied by each man dropping one Yuei seed (Abrus precatorius) into a basket, when 3-3/4 baskets were filled.

3. See separate note on the Sutya.
While on his return from this expedition Chau-Kwam-pha being jealous or fearful of his brother's influence decided to put him to death, and with this end in view left his capital on the Shueli and proceeded to meet him at Maing-pet-Kham and on the Tapeng river. A great ovation was given to the successful general, but after the lapse of some time, according to the most trustworthy account, his brother succeeded in poisoning him, or according to another account, he failed in the attempt, and Sam-Lung-pha made good his escape to China.

This was probably the period of greatest extension reached by the Mau kingdom, and certainly if their own account be accepted, their country now formed a very respectable dominion. The following is the list given by the Shan historians of the states under the sovereignty of the Mau kings immediately subsequent to Sam-Lung-pha's conquests, but a mere glance at the names of some of them, such as Aracan, Tali, &c., will show it to be greatly exaggerated, though it is possible that at one time or another some portion of all the places named may have fallen under their power:

1. Momiet, comprising seven maings, viz., Eham Molai, Maing-lung, Ungbaung, Thibao, Thungzei, Singu, Tagaung.
2. Mogaung comprising ninety-nine maings, among which the following were the most important: Mung-lung (Asam); Kassei (Mun-nipur); part of Aracan; the Yaw country; Kalei; Taungthwot (Sum-jok); Maing-Kaing; Maing-Taung; Maing-Kwon; Sankring Khamti; Maingli (Khamti proper); Monyin; Mautshobo; Kunung-Kumun (Mishmi country); Khang-sei (Naga country); &c., &c.
3. Theinni, comprising thirty-nine maings.
5. Kaingma.
6. Kyain Sen (Kiang-Tsen on the Cambodia?)
7. Lamsan (Linzing).
9. Yun (Zinmei).
10. King-lung (said to be Kiang Hung, Kiang-Yung-ghi or Cheili).
11. King-laung (said to be a district north of Ayudia).
12. Mung Lem.
13. Talai (Tali-fu ?)
15. The Palaung country (Taungbain, &c.).
16. Sang-pho (the Singpho country ?)

1. Probably Hentha sometimes called Shue-Hentha-myo near old Bamo, which is the exact meaning of the Shan words Kham-pet-maing, viz., golden-duck town.
2. Said to be southeast of Bamo, and probably near the present Nam-Kam.
3. Sometimes known as Kham Nyang.
4. Sometimes called the forty-nine maings.
17. The Karen country.
18. Lawaik.
19. Lapyit.
20. Lamu (?)
21. Lakhaing (Arakan - meaning probably that portion not under Mogaung).
22. Langsap (?)
23. Ayudia (Siam).
24. Yunsaleng.

During the two reigns following that of Chau-Kwam-pha, the capital of Mung-Mau remained at Cheila or at the opposite town of Mau-Kau Mung-Lung, but in 1285 one Chau-Wak-pha became king, and though, apparently of unbroken lineal descent, a new capital was founded called simply by the name of the country, Mung-Mau, and situated, as far as can be ascertained, on the site of the present town of Mung-Mau - certainly this is the last change of capital recorded.

Chau-Wak-pha died after a reign of thirty years in 1315, and for nine years subsequently the throne of Mung-Mau was vacant. Eventually, however, a natural son named Ai-Puk was elected to fill it, but he proved profligate and incompetent to discharge the duties of a ruler, and after six years was deposed by the ministers, when a second period of nine years ensued, during which no king could be found to assume the direction of affairs.

Eventually in 1339 a relative of Chau-Wak-pha named Chau-Ki-pha, otherwise known as Tai-Pong, was crowned, and with him an era of wars with China appears to have commenced, which was destined, finally, to end in the fall of the Mau kings as independent sovereigns.

The first record of Chinese invasion is an unimportant one, and merely states that in the fifth year of Chau-Ki-pha's reign (Lakli Plek-Sings, 55=705 B.E. = 1343 A.D.) an army arrived in Mau territory from Mithila for the purpose of reconnoitering, but that no fighting ensued. The next occasion was just fifty years subsequently, during the reign of Chau-Ki-pha's son Tailung, when a Chinese force appeared and attempted the conquest of the country; it was defeated, however, by the Shans and returned after suffering great losses.

Tailung, after a reign of fifty years, was succeeded by his son Chau-Tit-Pha, or Tau-Lwei, as he was also called, who appears to have carried on certain negotiations with the Chinese during the early part of his reign, and in the 16th year of it (Rai-ungi 3=773 B.E. = 1111 A.D.) to have gone on a visit to the governor of Yunnan. The Shan history indeed chronicles that he went to Mung-Kyei, the capital of Mithila, to consult with the Emperor, and that during an interview with the latter, in which he was accompanied by his son Chau-Ngan-Pha, he was given a cup of spirit to drink, which so completely intoxicated him that the Emperor, at the instigation of
a Minister named Maw-pi, obtained from him his royal seal and thus rendered his country tributary. In Plek-si 5, or two years after this event, Chau-Tit-Pha returned to Mung-Mau, and in the next year a party of Chinese with 130 mules came down from China. Each mule was loaded with silver cut into small pieces, and on arriving in the neighbourhood of the capital, those in charge led them into the bamboo jungle that surrounded the city, and scattered the silver among the trees. The party then returned to China, and the inhabitants of Mung-Mau cut down the jungle in order to find the silver. The sequel of this story is not given, but the inference is that the ruse was practised by the Chinese to clear the environs of the city of the jungle in order to attack it more easily.

In the following year Chau-Tit-Pha died and was succeeded by his son Chau-Ngan-Pha, the events attending the latter part of whose reign are well known from Burmese history. He had two brothers named Chau-Si-Pha, and Chau-Hung-Pha, with whose assistance he invaded and subdued the Shan states to the east and south-east of his country, and then marched on to Tai-lai, which state he also conquered. Here he was reinforced by the armies of all the chiefs he had subdued so far, and decided, with this enormous host, to attempt the conquest of Mithila. He started accordingly from Tai-lai, but was met by a Chinese force under the walls of the capital (Mung-kyei) and was defeated; he then fell back on Tai-lai, afterwards on Wan-Chang (Yung-chang), and eventually retired into Mau territory, followed by the inhabitants of all the places he had subdued, who preferred to cast in their lot with his, rather than endure the vengeance of the Chinese. On arriving near his capital, he found the inhabitants panic stricken and flying to Ayudia and in many other directions; his army broke up and joined in the flight, whilst he himself, accompanied by his brother Chan-Si-Pha, (Chau-Hung-Pha had died just previously) sought an asylum at Ava. The Chinese followed however, took up a position north of the city of Ava and demanded the surrender of Chau-Ngan-Pha from the Burmese king. The latter replied that one of his nobles called Ming-ngei-kyo-dwen was in rebellion at Zei-mei-thin (Yemethen

1. We have already seen that the capital of Mithila is Yunnan-foo, and here the minister's name, according to the Shan record, is Mawpi, so that possibly it may have been he who, as governor of Mithila, was visited by Chau-Tit-pha, and not the Emperor, whose residence was at that time at Nan-King, and whose reign was known as that of Cheng-tsu-Wen-ti. (See Puathier, Chine Moderne, I, p. 188.)

2. See Table of Mogaung line, No. 10.

3. This force tallied in the same way as Sam-Lung-pha's army is said to have been represented by four baskets of yuel seeds.

4. This Tai-lai would certainly appear to be Tali-foo, though Garnier gives the Shan name of the latter as "Mung-Koue" (Vol. I, p. 479).
near Enlay), and that if the Chinese commander would first subdue and bring this rebellious noble to the capital, he would deliver to him the Mau king. The Chinese general consented and despatched a portion of his army to Zai-meir-thim. The place was surrounded, and Ming-ngai-kyo-dwen captured and brought into Ava, but on hearing of his arrival Chau-Ngan-Pha finding his end inevitable took poison and died. His body nevertheless was given up to the Chinese commander, who had it disemboweled and dried in the sun, and immediately afterwards returned with it to Yunnan (B.E. 807 or 1445 A.D.).

Chau-Si-Pha was then placed on the throne of Mogaung, and Chau-Ngan-Pha’s queen went at the same time to Khamti with her two children, Chau-Hung II, aged 10, and Chau Hup, aged 2; on arrival there a third, named Chau Put, was born, and one of these three became Tsaubwa of Khamti.1

For three years after Chau-Ngan-Pha’s death, Mung-Mau was again without a king, but at the end of that time an uncle2 of the late Chau-Wak-Pha, called Chau-Lam-Kon Kam-Pha, and nearest remaining relative to Chau-Ngan-Pha, was placed on the throne (Rai-saw 40=1446). In the fourth year of his reign a large force from China invaded his country, defeated his troops, and compelled him to take flight or seek a refuge with the Burmese at Ava. After five years of exile he returned to his country and died in Rai-si 53=1461 A.D. He was succeeded in the same year by his son Chau-Hum-Pha, who was assailed almost immediately on his accession by a Chinese army of great strength, which however he defeated and drove back within the border of their country after eighteen days of continued fighting. But at a later period of his reign (viz., about 64 B.E. or 1479 A.D.) the Chinese returned and this time routed the Mau, Chau-Hum-Pha, like his predecessor, flying to Ava for protection. After four years he returned to his capital, and seven years later died there. His death however did not terminate the wars with China, for in the sixth year of the reign of his son and successor, Chau-Kaa-Pha, (1495 A.D.) the enemy again came down in force and invaded the Mau territory. Some fighting occurred of which no particulars are given further than it proved adverse to the Shans, though not absolutely disastrous, but still sufficiently humiliating to the pride of Chau-Kaa-Pha to cause him to abdicate and make over the government to his son, Chau-Pim-Pha, while he himself retired to Ai-Kham, the northern division of Khamti, and afterwards to Mogaung, of which state he became Tsaubwa.

Chau-Pim-Pha appears to have been permitted by the Chinese to remain in peace for twenty years, when a force from Yunnan under a general named Li-Sang-Fa, attempted an invasion of the country, but was repulsed. Li-Sang-Fa, however, only retired to a short distance within his own border, and shortly afterwards conceived the idea of taking Mung-Mau by means of a ruse. He constructed a number of rafts,

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1. See note on Mogaung under "Chau-Kaa-Pha".

2. Probably a descendent of an uncle is meant.
placed a goat on each, and set them floating down the Shuei; the
Shans on seeing the goats approaching from the side of China exclaimed
"Kyei-poi-pei-ma" - the Chinese goats are coming floating down - a cry
that quickly spread through the town as "the Chinese are coming float­ing down", and caused a general panic. The citizens, together with
the army, fled in all directions, and Chau-Pim-Pha,¹ who was ill at
the time and unable to move, died as the enemy entered his city.

The causes of these wars are never mentioned, and it is almost
impossible to believe that the Chinese were always the aggressors,
unless some provocation had been previously given by the Shans; still
the next and last two Chinese wars are described by the Shan chroni­
clers, to be, like all the previous ones, purely unprovoked movements
on the part of the enemy - before these took place however the Maus
were destined to experience what I believe was their first and only
war with the Burmese.²

Chau-Pim-Pha was followed in 1516 by his son Chau-Hum-Pha II,
who reigned for the extraordinary period of 88 years, and administered
his country so successfully that it enjoyed a state of prosperity it
had never before attained. Whether it was that this condition of
prosperity excited the cupidity of the Pegu king, or whether he
attacked Mung-Mau in the course of a general plan of conquest of the
Shan states, it is impossible to say, but probably some cause other
than that assigned by the Burmese chroniclers³ is to be looked for.
These pretend that shortly before 1560 the Maus had seized some
villages within the borders of Momiet, and that the tsabwā of the
latter place had appealed to the Burmese for aid, but as Momiet had
up to within a year or two of this time been a part of the dominion
of the Mau kings, and the Burmese had been steadily advancing their
conquest of the Shan states from south to north, it is scarcely
necessary to look for any special cause for quarrel. In any case,
during the year 924 B.E. = 1562 A.D., the king of Pegu is reported to
have sent an army to Mung-Mau, numbering 200,000 men, under the
command of his son, the heir-apparent, and three of his younger
brothers, rulers respectively of Prome, Tongu, and Ava. They appear
to have commenced the campaign with an incursion into the northern
tsabwāships and to have burned Sanda, Maing-la, and other neighbour­
ing towns, and afterwards to have descended on the capital, where
after little or no fighting they compelled Chau-Hum-Pha to acknowledge
himself a vassal of the Pegu king, and to send him a princess in token

1. He was surnamed Kyei-poi-pei-ma on account of the above episode.

2. There had previously been several wars between the Burmese and
dependent portions of the Mau country, chiefly Monyin in which,
from its position, was perhaps more accessible than other parts,
to the Burmese.

3. See the Burmese account translated by Colonel Burney (J.A.S.B.,
VI, p. 125) where however the date is placed about two years
later.
of homage. When the Burmese army retired the city was spared, and teachers of Buddhism were left there to instruct the Shan priests in the worship of Gautama and to convert the rulers and people.

Some twenty years after these events (viz., in Mung-siu 544 B.E. = 1582 A.D.), and apparently during a time of peace between China and Burmah, the Maus were again attacked by a Chinese army numbered, in the usual inflated style, at 300,000 men. Three great battles were fought, none of which were decisively in favour of either party, but eventually the Chinese sued for peace, and when accorded by Chau-Hum-Pha, their army retired to Yunnan. Another twenty years of tranquillity then ensued, but in Kat-mau 1604 B.E. = 1604 A.D., a Chinese general named Wang-sang-su with a considerable force made a descent on the borders of Mung-Mau, and Chau-Hum-Pha being old and feeble decided to make over the government of his country to his son Chau-Po-Reing, then the reigning tsaubwa of Theinni. He had scarcely done so when he died, and at the same time the Chinese army commenced its march on the capital. The Shans appear to have made but a feeble resistance, if indeed any at all, for Chau-Po-Reing, a few days after his accession to the throne, abdicated and fled on the Chinese being reported to have arrived above the capital at the crossing of a certain tributary of the Shueli. He made for Mogaung with a part of the Chinese pursuing him, and reached Kakyo-Wainmaw, on the left bank of the Namkiu (Irrawaddy), where his followers mutinied, and in despair he drowned himself in the river. The Kakyo-Wainmaw pawraaing recovered his body and buried it, subdued the mutinous followers, and sent them to Ava, where they petitioned the king to grant the grandson, and only remaining descendants, of Chau-Hum-pha, a territory to reign over, as Mung-Mau was now in the permanent occupation of the Chinese. This prince was called Chau-Tit-Pha, and he was relegated to Mogaung, where a certain line of tsaubwas had just then become extinct (see under Mogaung).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Relationship to preceding</th>
<th>COMMENCEMENT OF REIGN</th>
<th>Capital</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Name of Shan year or Lakli</td>
<td>Burmese era</td>
<td>Length of reign, years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Kun-lai</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>Kap-saw 1</td>
<td>* 568</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Ai-Dyep-Thatpha.</td>
<td>Son</td>
<td>Kaa-raw 10</td>
<td>1 638</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Kam-Pong-pha</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>Kaa-plaw 50</td>
<td>40+ 678</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Kam-Sap-pha</td>
<td>Son</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Kam-Sip-pha</td>
<td>Younger brother</td>
<td>Plek-ngi 15</td>
<td>65 703</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Ni-Fa-maung</td>
<td>Son</td>
<td>Plek-si 5</td>
<td>115 753</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Chau-Khunpha.</td>
<td>Do</td>
<td>Plek-sau 45</td>
<td>155 793</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Chau-Kai-pha</td>
<td>Do</td>
<td>Kat-plaw 26</td>
<td>196 834</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Chau-Han-pha</td>
<td>Do</td>
<td>Kaa-kiu 60</td>
<td>230 868</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Chau-Tau-pha</td>
<td>Do</td>
<td>Rai-san 33</td>
<td>263 901</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Chau-Pwotpha.</td>
<td>Do</td>
<td>Plek-si 5</td>
<td>295 933</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Chau-Won-pha</td>
<td>Do</td>
<td>Dap-mut 32</td>
<td>322 960</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Chau-Hon-pha</td>
<td>Do</td>
<td>Plek-singa.</td>
<td>345 983</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Chau-Hau-pha</td>
<td>Do</td>
<td>Khut-singa.</td>
<td>7 357 995</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Chau-Lip-pha</td>
<td>Do</td>
<td>Kat-plaw 26</td>
<td>376 1014+</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- *Religious era llll or 70 years previous to Burmese era.
- Died heirless.
- +Sic. Son of Chau-Kun-Jun (see list of Kunlung's posterity, p. vi).
- +The reigns of Nos. 3 & 4 are said to have aggregated about 25 years, but no date is given for No. 4.
- +This date is uncertain to about three years.
- Of the race of Tai-pong of Yun-lung (see Kunlung's posterity, p. vi).
Table of Mung-Mau Tsaubwas (Continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Relationship to the preceding</th>
<th>Name of Shan year or Lakli</th>
<th>Commencement of Reign</th>
<th>Capital</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Chau-Tai-pha</td>
<td>Son</td>
<td>Dap-plaw</td>
<td>1412</td>
<td>1050</td>
<td>12 Ma-Kau-Mung Lung, and or Cheila.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Chau-lu-lu</td>
<td>Do</td>
<td>Mung-plaw</td>
<td>1424</td>
<td>1062</td>
<td>19 Do.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Chau-Sang-mun.</td>
<td>Do</td>
<td>Rai-san</td>
<td>1433</td>
<td>1081</td>
<td>15 Do.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Chau-Sang-yaw.</td>
<td>Do</td>
<td>Rung-kin</td>
<td>1458</td>
<td>1096</td>
<td>7 Do.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Chau-Shen-Nga</td>
<td>Son</td>
<td>Mung-mau</td>
<td>1474</td>
<td>1112</td>
<td>11 Ma-Kau-Mung-Lung, and or Cheila.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>Chau-Nga-Chu</td>
<td>Do</td>
<td>Taw-si</td>
<td>1499</td>
<td>1137</td>
<td>8 Do.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>Chau-Khun-ming</td>
<td>Son</td>
<td>Khut-saw</td>
<td>1507</td>
<td>1145</td>
<td>18 Do.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>Chau-Khun-Kum</td>
<td>Do</td>
<td>Plek-singa</td>
<td>1555</td>
<td>1163</td>
<td>8 Do.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>Chau-Tai-Pum</td>
<td>Do</td>
<td>Rai-nga</td>
<td>1533</td>
<td>1171</td>
<td>17 Do.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>Chau-Tai-Lung</td>
<td>Do</td>
<td>Kaa-mut</td>
<td>1556</td>
<td>1188</td>
<td>15 Do.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>Pam-Yau-Pung</td>
<td>Son</td>
<td>Plek-mit</td>
<td>1565</td>
<td>1203</td>
<td>7 Do.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

His younger brother, Fu-San-kang, became Tsaubwa of Momiet and founded the Asam line of Tsaubwas.

A descendant of Kwan-Su of Maing-Nyaung (see No. 7 Kunlung's posterity, p. vi).
Table of Mung-Mau Tsaubwas (Concluded)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Relationship of the preceding</th>
<th>Name of Shan year or Laklja</th>
<th>Burmese era</th>
<th>A. D.</th>
<th>Length of reign years</th>
<th>Capital</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>Chau-Kwam-pha</td>
<td>Son</td>
<td>Dap-mau 52</td>
<td>582</td>
<td>1220</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>Do</td>
<td>The Soo-Kam-Pha of Pemberton. His younger brother was Sam-Lung-Kung-Maing or Sam-Lung-Pha, the conqueror.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>Chau-Piu-pha</td>
<td>Do</td>
<td>Dap-raw 22</td>
<td>612</td>
<td>1250</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>Do</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>Tai-Feng or Chau-Kam-pha</td>
<td>Do</td>
<td>Mung-siu 54</td>
<td>644</td>
<td>1282</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Do</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>Chau-Wak-pha</td>
<td>Do</td>
<td>Khut-san 57</td>
<td>647</td>
<td>1285</td>
<td>30 Mung-Mau.</td>
<td>Do</td>
<td>Probably the founder of the present town of Mung-Mau.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>No King</td>
<td></td>
<td>Khut-ngi 27</td>
<td>677</td>
<td>1315</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>Do</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36</td>
<td>Tai-Lung or Chau-Ki-pha</td>
<td>Son and relation</td>
<td>Kat-kiu 36</td>
<td>686</td>
<td>1324</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Do</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37</td>
<td>Chau-Ngan-pha</td>
<td></td>
<td>Dap-siu 42</td>
<td>692</td>
<td>1330</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>Do</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38</td>
<td>Chau-Tit-pha or Dap-siu</td>
<td></td>
<td>Kap-ngi 51</td>
<td>701</td>
<td>1339</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Do</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39</td>
<td>No King</td>
<td></td>
<td>Rung-raw 58</td>
<td>708</td>
<td>1346</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>Do</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>Chau-Lem-Kon-Kam-pha</td>
<td></td>
<td>Rung-kin 48</td>
<td>758</td>
<td>1396</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>Do</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41</td>
<td>Chau-Hum-pha</td>
<td></td>
<td>Khut-singa. 7§</td>
<td>777</td>
<td>1415</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>Do</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42</td>
<td>Chau-Kaa-pha</td>
<td></td>
<td>Khut-saw 37</td>
<td>807</td>
<td>1445</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Do</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43</td>
<td>Chau-Pim-pha</td>
<td></td>
<td>Rung-saw 40</td>
<td>810</td>
<td>1448</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>Do</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44</td>
<td>Chau-Rung-kiu</td>
<td></td>
<td>Surnamed Kyie-poi-pei-ma.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Do</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45</td>
<td>Chau-Kaa-pha</td>
<td></td>
<td>Kat-mau 16</td>
<td>966</td>
<td>1604</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>Do</td>
<td>Of Theinni</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*§ Said to be an uncle (probably descendant of an uncle) of Chau-Wak-pha, No. 34, and nearest remaining relative of Chau-Ngan-pha, No. 39.
APPENDIX III.

THE STORY OF MOGAUNG.

The most important province or section of the Mau kingdom under the central state of Mung-Mau, or Kusambi, was that known at the present day as Mogaung. Not only was it the most extensive but it was usually also more powerful than the other sections, and its history, as an independent state, outlasted that of Mung-May by some 150 years.

In the legend of Kun-Lung we saw that the western portion of the province was said to have been occupied by him in the earliest days of Mau history, but from the date of this fabulous, or half fabulous, occurrence down to the time of Sam-Lung-pha, little or nothing is to be found about it except when occasionally mentioned as the country of the Nora; and indeed it is most probable that until conquered by Sam-Lung-pha it (together with parts of Khamti, &c.), formed an entirely independent Nora state, and possibly, though I have heard of none as yet, annals may exist to this day recording their history. For the Noras were a comparatively civilized people, and the few who remain are still regarded in Mogaung, Khamti, and Upper Asam as a learned class, and are generally employed among the Buddhist priesthood and others as astronomers and writers. From the little I have been able to glean of the Noras from native sources it would seem that they formerly constituted the aboriginal population of the region in question, but afterwards became mixed with the Mau and Khamti Shans. Their original seat was probably in Khamti, though in former times that province extended far beyond its present limits towards the south and west, and was divided into two districts called Ai-Kham and Ai-Ton, the former to the north, the latter to the south. They were a

1. The western part was afterwards called Sankring Khamti but this was not an original division of the country. Wilcox was informed by the Khamti Shans that they themselves came from the region bordering on Siam and Yunnan, and that at the time of their first arrival in their present locality the country was inhabited "by Lamas or the Khaphok tribe". - Wilcox could find no trace of their having at any time had intercourse with Tibet (Selections, Bengal Government, No. XXIII, 1855, p. 117, and Asiatick Researches, XVII, p. 411 &c.). Major Pemberton fixed the home of the Noras in Upper Asam - in the country of the Moamerias or Muttucks - but in the next sentence he says - "The Shan Chieftain of Mogaung is also called the Nora Rajah by the Singphos, and it appears that the term is also applied to the Shans between Hookong and Mogaung". (Eastern Frontier, p. 68.) The two statements are scarcely reconcilable, but the latter I believe to be correct; and moreover it coincides with Fr. Hamilton (Buchanan), who says they spoke a dialect very little different from that of Siam, called themselves Tay-Loun (Tai-lung, i.e., great Tai or Shans), and had "Princes of the same family with the dynasty which then (circa 1795) governed Asam". Their kingdom was called by the Munnipuris Bong. (Edinh. Phil. Journal, II, p. 263, 1820.)
valley-dwelling agricultural people and superior in point of civiliza-
tion to the hill tribes by whom they were surrounded, but whether,
in the first instance, of a purely Tai race or an offshoot of some
Tibetan tribe it is impossible to form an opinion. Their independence
seems to have dated down to about the reign of the May King, Chau-kam-
pha, when the general, Sam-Lung-pha, prior to his extensive conquests
appears to have been created first Tsaubwa or chief ruler of the
greater part of their country, under the suzerainty of his brother.
The precise date of Sam-Lung-pha's accession in Nora is somewhat
uncertain, but 577 of the Burmese era or 1215 A.D., is the year gen-
erally indicated in the Shan records, and would not be far from the
truth.1 At this time, it is related, that Sam-Lung-pha in crossing
the river now known as the Nam Kaung (Mogaung river), a short distance
above the site of the present Mogaung, found a sapphire drum2 in the
bed of the stream, and, regarding it as a good omen, at once established
a town near the spot, and called it Mung-kaung or "drum town".3 He re-
tained the sapphire, and it was afterwards handed down to his success-
ors, and held by them for many generations as a mark of power.

The Mogaung annals claim for their first chief, the govern-
ment of eight separates who were divided into ninety-nine Tsaubwa-
ships and spread over the following provinces:— (1) Khamti; (2)
Sankring Khamti (or Western Khamti on the Kyendwen); (3) Hukung;
(4) Maing-Kaing; (5) Maing-Ngyaung; (6) Mo-Nyin; (7) Taungthwot
(Sumjok); (8) Kalei; (9) the four Yaw towns (the most northern of
the districts inhabited by the Yaws); (10) Mautshobo. This is
probably an exaggeration, especially as regards the southern provinces,
or if not, it must at all events be regarded as the greatest extension
to which Mogaung ever attained, for like the other Shan provinces its
extent fluctuated greatly with the varying fortunes of its rulers.
The eight races were (1) the Noras, divided into the Ai-Ton, the Ai-
Kham, and Faksi (the latter were not true Noras, but fugitives from
Mung-Mau); (2) the Khang or Khang-sei (i.e., the Khyens or Nagas);
(3) the Singphos or Kachyens; (4) the Pwons, divided into great and
small Pwons; (5) the Kudas, a kindred people to the latter, similarly
divided; (6) the Yaws, a tribe of Burmans on the right bank of the
Irrawaddy; (7) the Kunbaw (said to be the Burmese of the neighbourhood
of Mautshobo); (8) the Kunungs and Kumuns, or Mishmis, divided by the
Asamese into Miju and Chullicotla Mishmis.

Sam-Lung-pha's reign, as tsaubwa of Mogaung, lasted only
thirteen years, for in 1228, while engaged in his western conquests,
he appears to have been succeeded by a nephew named Noi-San-pha, a

1. This would be five years earlier than his brother's accession to
Mung-mau.

2. Kaung is said to mean "drum"; a sapphire in the shape of a drum is
probably meant.

3. The adopted Pali name is Udigiri-rata.

4. Meaning probably an indefinite, large number.
son of the Mau king, but who in assuming the tsaubwaship took his father's name, Chau-Kam-pha. His descendants continued to reign uneventfully and in regular succession until the year 1443 A.D., when Chau-Si-pha, the brother of the unfortunate Chau-Ngan-pha, as we have already seen in the history of the Mung-Mau line, succeeded to the tsaubwaship. He was surnamed Chau-Kwon-pha, and his reign at Mogaung is recorded to have lasted for the extraordinary period of fifty years. He was followed in 1493 by the Mung-Mau king, Chau-Kaa-pha, who had abdicated as we have seen above in favour of his son on suffering a defeat from the Chinese, and had retired first to Khamti and afterwards to Mogaung. To signalise his accession and to commemorate the beginning, as he probably hoped, of a new era in Mogaung, he founded a new capital at a distance of one day's journey to the N.W. of old Mogaung, and which at first was known by the name of Tsei-Lan, but afterwards by that of Tsei-En or Chei-En. From here he set out with a considerable army to undertake the conquest of Asam, but on arriving at the border of that country the Ahom king offered him large presents of cattle and horses, and he retired peacefully to Tsei-En. Chau-Kaa-pha is also said to have built another city called Pha-kung, now in ruins; but the position of this place I cannot ascertain. His reign lasted twenty-four years, and some time before his death he distributed various portions of his country among his relatives and others whom he appointed governors or tributary tsaubwas. Thus one Chau-Luung-Tu-mung is said to have been appointed governor of a district called Mansai on the right bank of the Kyendwen, and Tsa-Tsaw-Yot was created governor of another district, on the opposite bank, called Maing-Tung. The country of the Kunungs and Kumuns (Mishmis), together with Ta-Wi and Ta-Wai, he gave to Chau-Luung-Mung-Chang; Kassei or Munipur to Haw Yot, and three districts of the Khang-sei, or Naga country, to one Chau-ho-tom. To his only son, named Chau-Hun-pha, he assigned the Yaw country west of the Kyendwen, and thus it was that the latter did not succeed his father in the tsaubwaship of Mogaung.

So far the Mogaung tsaubwas had all been of the Mau line, but here a break occurred for about ninety years, commencing with Chau-Kaa-pha's minister, Chau-sui-pha or Sam-Lung-pawmaing, as his title had previously been, and who reigned for six years. His successor was one Chau-Sui-Kwei (surnamed Chau-Peng), but of what relationship to the pawmaing or any previous tsaubwa there is nothing to show. In the 30th year of this prince's reign (Lakli Rung, maw 28=1556 A.D.) a Burmese army despatched by the king of Hentha-wadi (Pegu) invaded Mogaung and conquered it, establishing priests and teachers for converting the people to Buddhism. The Tsaubwa gave in his submission and became a tributary chief; two years afterwards he died, and was followed for four reigns (forty-seven years) by his lineal descendants, during which

1. The situation of this district is said to be towards the north. Can it have any connection with the central of the three southern provinces of Tibet, called by the Chinese Wai or Wei? It can have no reference to Tavoy.
time war was frequently carried on, in a desultory way, with the Burmese, but never with the result of effecting absolute independence, except for a short time during the reign of the last of the four, Chau-Hum-pha. The most formidable of these wars, however, was one waged by the second of the four tsaubwas, called Chau-Kaa-pha II (No. 15 of table below). The King of Pegu, known by the title Sing-pyu-nya-yen, had had several wars with the Siamese, in some of which Mogaung, Monyin, Momiet, &c., were asked, or ordered, to take part, and had generally done so until the reign of Chau-Kaa-pha II, who on one occasion refused assistance to the Peguans, and thereby brought on a war in his own country which lasted three years. His army was eventually beaten and he was taken prisoner to Pegu, where he was exposed for seven days at each of the twenty gates of the king's palace.

In 1605, with the sanction of the Pegu king, a prince of Mung-Mau called Chau-Tit-pha, probably a grandson of Chau-Hum-pha, was placed on the throne of Mogaung, and from this time until the final subjection of the province to the Burmese, the Mau line remained intact. They were, however, never thoroughly independent except for short intervals during periods of weakness or dissension in Burma.

The only remarkable point in Chau-Tit-pha's reign was the founding of the present town of Mogaung. At his death in 1626 a tsaubwa of Maing-Lang, near Momiet, was appointed by the Burmese king, but though he received allegiance from the people of Mogaung, he never resided in the province, and three years after his accession died, leaving no heir. The queen of Chau-Tit-pha named Lang-chu-paw, who had meanwhile been acting as regent during the absence of the Maing-Lang tsaubwa, now continued the regency for a further period of ten years when she was created tsaubwa in her own right and filled the post for an additional term of twelve years.

After the death of the queen in 1651 nothing noteworthy occurred until the year 1751, when a tsaubwa called Haw Seing (i.e., gem of the palace) after a reign of nine years abdicated in favour of his son. The reason given in the Mogaung history is that his pride would no longer allow him to remain tributary to the Burmese, but in all probability an unsuccessful war occurred about this time which obliged the chief to take flight. In any case the son, called Haw Kam (or golden palace), died after seventeen years when Haw Seing returned from his retirement and again assumed power. He was attacked with leprosy, and in consequence built a Haw or royal residence called Lang Seng near the north end of the Endawgyi lake, to which he retired after three years. A Burmese official called Moung Kiaw was then sent from Ava to act as tsaubwa, but according to the Shan account, he proved a traitor and joined with the tsaubwas of Bamo, Theinni, and other places in inducing the Chinese to make

1. See under Mung-Mau above and No. Lii, Table I.
war upon Burma. But however this may have been, Mogaung became mixed up in the war between Burma and China, which commenced in 1765, \(^1\) and in the course of which Moung Kiaw fled to China, leaving his brother, Moung Piu, to administer the province. The latter died in 1775, and the Burmese being fully engaged in reorganising their country after the wars, allowed the Shans of Mogaung to replace old Haw Seing at the head of affairs. He lived, however, only for two years, and after his death in 1777 the tsaubwship became vacant for eight years. A Shan named Yaw-pan-kyung was then placed in power and succeeded, for a time, in attaining a certain degree of independence, but the Burmese attacked him, took him prisoner, and eventually put him to death after plundering his palace and committing great havoc in the town. This was in B.E. 1158 or 1796 A.D., and from that time forward Mogaung became an integral part of the kingdom of Burma, and was governed by woons appointed from Ava - only one break occurring, viz., from 1810 to 1843, when an Asamese prince, called Tipun Raja (brother to the exiled prince of that country, then confined at the Court of Ava), was created tsaubwa of Mogaung, and in addition received the district of Bamo as a jaghire. \(^2\)

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1. See Burney in J.A.S.B., VI, pt. I, p. 128, et. seq. for a full account of the war from the Burmese point of view.

2. Elias, N., Introductory sketches of the History of the Shans in Upper Burma and Western Yunnan, pp. 1, 2, 11-25, 39-44. All footnotes belong to the original.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Relationship to the preceding</th>
<th>Name of Shan year or Lakl</th>
<th>Burmese era</th>
<th>A.D.</th>
<th>Length of reign years</th>
<th>Capital</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Sam-Lung-pha</td>
<td></td>
<td>Khut-mit 47</td>
<td>577</td>
<td>1215</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>Old Mogaung</td>
<td>Otherwise Sam-Lung-kung-maing, son of No. 31 of Mung-Mau.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Chau-Kam-pha</td>
<td>Nephew</td>
<td>Kaa-kiu</td>
<td>590</td>
<td>1220</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>Do</td>
<td>This was his father's name which he assumed; his real name was Noi-San-pha.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Chau-Kun-law</td>
<td>Son</td>
<td>Kaa-mut</td>
<td>610</td>
<td>1248</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>Do</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Chau-Pu-Reing</td>
<td>Do</td>
<td>Kaa-mut</td>
<td>670</td>
<td>1308</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>Do</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Chau-Tei-pha</td>
<td>Do</td>
<td>Kat-mut</td>
<td>706</td>
<td>1344</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Do</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Pwa-Ngan-maing</td>
<td>Do</td>
<td>Rung-raw</td>
<td>708</td>
<td>1346</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>Do</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Kun-Tau-pha</td>
<td>Do</td>
<td>Rai-saw</td>
<td>723</td>
<td>1361</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>Do</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Chau-Hung-pha</td>
<td>Do</td>
<td>Rai-san</td>
<td>743</td>
<td>1381</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>Do</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Chau-Pin-pha</td>
<td>Do</td>
<td>Rai-angi</td>
<td>773</td>
<td>1411</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>Do</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Chau-Si-pha</td>
<td></td>
<td>Rung-plaw</td>
<td>808</td>
<td>1446</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>Do</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Chau-Kaa-pha</td>
<td></td>
<td>Rung-mau</td>
<td>858</td>
<td>1496</td>
<td>2h</td>
<td>Chei-En</td>
<td>Surnamed Chau-Kwon-pha. He was brother of Chau. Ngan-pha (No. 39)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Chau-Sui-kwei</td>
<td></td>
<td>Rung-raw</td>
<td>888</td>
<td>1526</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>Uncertain</td>
<td>Otherwise Chau-Sui-fin. Here the Mau line breaks off.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Chau-Hum-pha</td>
<td>Son</td>
<td>Kaa-siu</td>
<td>920</td>
<td>1558</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Do</td>
<td>Surnamed Chau-peng.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Chau-Kaa-pha</td>
<td>Do</td>
<td>Kat-kiu</td>
<td>926</td>
<td>1564</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>Do</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Chau-Kon-kam</td>
<td>Do</td>
<td>Plek-sing-ga.</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>1583</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Do</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Chau-Hum-pha</td>
<td>Do</td>
<td>Rai-angi</td>
<td>953</td>
<td>1591</td>
<td>1h</td>
<td>New Mogaung.</td>
<td>He became temporarily independent of Burmah. Surnamed Chau-kung-maing, and probably a grandson of Chau-Hum-pha (No. 1h) of Mung-Mau. Here the Mau line recommences.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Chau-Tit-pha</td>
<td></td>
<td>Khut-si</td>
<td>967</td>
<td>1605</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>Do</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Relationship to the preceding</td>
<td>Name of Shan year or Lakli</td>
<td>Burmese era</td>
<td>A. D.</td>
<td>Length of reign years</td>
<td>Capital</td>
<td>Remarks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------</td>
<td>------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------------------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Chau-Sain-Lung</td>
<td></td>
<td>Rung-plaw 38</td>
<td>988</td>
<td>1626</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Do</td>
<td>The country administered by Chau-Tit-pha's queen, No. 20.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No King</td>
<td></td>
<td>Kap-si 41</td>
<td>991</td>
<td>1629</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Do</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Lang-Chu-paw</td>
<td></td>
<td>Kap-ngi 51</td>
<td>1001</td>
<td>1639</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Uncertain Dowager queen of Chau-Tit-pha.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Chau-Sui-Yaw</td>
<td>Son</td>
<td>Plek-ngi 15</td>
<td>1025</td>
<td>1663</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Do</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Chau-Sui-Kyek</td>
<td></td>
<td>Plek-saw 25</td>
<td>1035</td>
<td>1673</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>Mogaung</td>
<td>Said to have been a grandson of Chau-Humpha (No. 44) of Mung-Mau.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>Chau-Hum</td>
<td>Son</td>
<td>Kap-san 21</td>
<td>1091</td>
<td>1729</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Do</td>
<td>Born at Ava and called by the Burmese Chau-Maung-pu.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>Haw-Seing</td>
<td>Do</td>
<td>Kap-singa 31</td>
<td>1101</td>
<td>1739</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>Do</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>Haw-Kam</td>
<td>Son</td>
<td>Kaa-mau 40</td>
<td>1110</td>
<td>1748</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>Mogaung</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Again Haw-Seing</td>
<td></td>
<td>Khut-sau 57</td>
<td>1127</td>
<td>1765</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Lang-Seing</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>Maung-Kiaw</td>
<td>Son?</td>
<td>Kaa-ku 60</td>
<td>1130</td>
<td>1768</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Mogaung</td>
<td>A Burmese. His Shan name was, perhaps, Haw-Kam.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>Maung-Piu</td>
<td>Brother</td>
<td>Rai-ngi 3</td>
<td>1133</td>
<td>1771</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Do</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Again Haw-Seing</td>
<td></td>
<td>Khut-singa 7</td>
<td>1137</td>
<td>1775</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Do</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>Chau-Yaw-Pan-Kyung</td>
<td></td>
<td>Taw-san 9</td>
<td>1139</td>
<td>1777</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Do</td>
<td>Was captured by the Burmese in B.E. 1158 or A.D. 1796.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX IV.

List of the Shan & Karenni States in order of precedence of their rulers during British regime,1 (together with state classical names where available.2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>States</th>
<th>Classical names</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Kengtung</td>
<td>Khemarata Tungaburi</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Hsipaw</td>
<td>Dutawadi</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Mongnai</td>
<td>Saturambha or Nandapwa</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Yawnghwe</td>
<td>Kambawsarata</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Tawngpeng</td>
<td>Pappatasara</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. South Hsenwi</td>
<td>Siwirata or Kawsampi</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. North Hsenwi</td>
<td>Siwirata or Kawsampi</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Mongmit</td>
<td>Gandhalarata</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Mongpai</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Lawksawk</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Laikha</td>
<td>Hansawadi</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Mawkmai</td>
<td>Lawkawadi</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Mongpan</td>
<td>Dhannawadi</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Mongpawn</td>
<td>Rajjawadi</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Manglun</td>
<td>Jambularata</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. Kantarawadi</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. Samka</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. Mongkung</td>
<td>Lankawadi</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. Being compiled.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>States</th>
<th>Classical names</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>II. Myosas</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19. Nawngwawn</td>
<td>Pokkharawadi</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20. Mongnawng</td>
<td>Nandawadi</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21. Mongsit</td>
<td></td>
<td>amalgamated with 12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22. Kehsi-Bansam</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23. Mawnang</td>
<td></td>
<td>amalgamated with 34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24. Loilong</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25. Hsahtung</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26. Wanyin</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27. Hopong</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28. Namkhok</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29. Sakoi</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30. Mongshu</td>
<td>Hansawadi</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31. Kenglun</td>
<td></td>
<td>amalgamated with 22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32. Bawlake</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33. Kyetbogyi</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34. Hsamongkham</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35. Maw</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36. Pwela</td>
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</table>

III. Ngwegunhmu

<table>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>37. Yengan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38. Pangtara</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39. Pangmi</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40. Loi-ai</td>
<td></td>
<td>amalgamated with 34</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### APPENDIX IV-A.

**Table of Salutes to Shan Sawbwas.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>States</th>
<th>No. of guns</th>
<th>Authority</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2. Hsipaw</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Mongnai</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Khunsang Awn,</td>
<td></td>
<td>Foreign &amp; Political Department Notification No. 1, I. C., dated the 1st January, 1918.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K.S.M., sawbwa</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of Tawngpeng.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

APPENDIX V.

**Titles of Kings Mindon and Thibaw.**

King Mindon

.. Thiri pawara wizara nanda yathapandita maha dhamma raza dhiraza.

King Thibaw

.. Thiri pawara wizara nanda yathatilawka dhipati pandita maha dhamma raza dhiraza.

**Titles of Shan Sawbwas, Myosas, Ngwekunhmus.**

Kenghung (Kyaingyon-gyi)

.. Zawti nagara maha wuntha thiri thudhamma raza.

Kengtung, Kengchung (Kyaington, Kyaingchaing)

.. Pyinsala ya-hta maha wuntha dhamma raza.

Mongnai (Mone)

.. Kambawsa ya-hta maha wunthiri pawara thudhamma raza.

Hsenwi (Theinni)

.. Thiri ya-hta maha wuntha pawara theta thudhamma raza.

Yawnghwe (Nyaungywe)

.. Kambawsa ya-hta thiri pawara maha wuntha thudhamma raza.

Mongpai (Mobye)

.. Kambawsa maha wuntha thiridhamma raza.

Mongpan (Maingpan)

.. Kambawsa thiri maha wuntha dhamma raza.

Laikha (Legya)

.. Kambawsa ya-hta mahawuntha thiri thudhamma raza.

Mongpu (Maingpu)

.. Kambawsa ya-hta wuntha thiha dhamma raza.

Mawkmai (Maukme)

.. Kambawsa ya-hta maha wuntha thiri raza.

Loilong (Taungbaing)

.. Maha thiri pappada thuya raza.

Mongmit (Momeik)

.. Gantala ya-hta maha thiri wuntha raza.

Hsawnghsup (Thaung-thut)

.. Mawriya maha wuntha thiha raza.

Wuntho

.. Maha wuntha thiri zeya thohonbwa.

Kale, Teinnyin

.. Mawriya thiri maha wuntha dhamma raza.

Kanti

.. Maha wuntha duyein raza.

**Titles of Myosas.**

Hsumhsai (Thonze)

.. Thiri ya-hta maha wuntha thudhamma raza.

Mongpawn (Maingpun)

.. Thiri maha tho-nganbwa.

Samka (Saga)

.. Maha raza tho-nganbwa.

Hailong (Helon)

.. Maha zeya tho-nganbwa.

Kantarawadi (Karenni)

.. Pappada kyawgaung.

Kyemmongs (Kyamaings)

.. Kambawsa maha wuntha.

---

1. GUBSS, I.2, 89.
2. GUBSS, I.1, 290-291.
Monglong (Mainglon) .. Nemyo-minhla raza.
Mawhson (Bawsaing) .. Nemyo-thiri kyawdin.
Pwehla (Poi La) .. Nemyo-thiri raza.
Pindaya (Pangtara) .. Nemyo-raza nawrata.

Pongmu (Pon-mu) Da-kunhmu. .. Thiri maha raza tho-nganbwa.
### APPENDIX VI.

**List of Bo-hmus, and Sitke-gyis.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Bo-hmu.</th>
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**APPENDIX VII.**

**List of Bo-hmus, and Sitke-gyis.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Bo-hmu.</th>
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**APPENDIX VIII.**

**List of Bo-hmus, and Sitke-gyis.**

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<th>Year</th>
<th>Bo-hmu.</th>
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<th>Sitke-gyis</th>
<th>Left</th>
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APPENDIX VII.

(i) FORM OF SANAD GRANTED TO SAWBWAS.¹

WHEREAS the was formerly a subject to the King of Burma, and the Governor-General of India in Council has now been pleased to recognise you as of and, subject to the provisions of any law for the time being in force, to permit you to administer the territory of in all matters, whether civil, criminal or revenue, and at any time to nominate for the approval of the Chief Commissioner a fit person according to Shan usage to be your successor in the

Paragraph 2.- The Chief Commissioner of Burma, with the approval of the Governor-General of India in Council, hereby prescribes the following conditions under which your nomination as is made. Should you fail to comply with any of these conditions you will be liable to have your powers as rescinded.

Paragraph 3.- The conditions are as follows:-

(1) You shall pay regularly the same amount of tribute as heretofore paid, namely, Rs. a year now fixed for five years, that is to say, from the to the and the said tribute shall be liable to revision at the expiration of the said term, or at any time thereafter that the Chief Commissioner of Burma may think fit.

(2) The Government reserves to itself the proprietary rights in all forests, mines, and minerals. If you are permitted to work or to let on lease any forest or forests in your State, you shall pay such sums for rent or royalty as the Local Government may from time to time direct; and in the working of such forests you shall be guided by such rules and orders as the Government of India may from time to time prescribe. If you are permitted to work or let on lease any mine or mines in your State, you shall pay such royalty on all metals, precious stones, and other minerals produced in as the Governor-General in Council may from time to time direct.

(3) You shall administer the territory of according to the custom of the country, and in all matters subject

¹. Except for (iii) sanad granted to the sawbwa of Kengtung in 1889, all forms are from the Shan States Manual, Appendix VI, pp. 225-241.
to the guidance of the Superintendent of the Shan States; you shall recognize the rights of the people and continue them in the same, and on no account shall you oppress them or suffer them in any way to be oppressed.

(4) You shall maintain order within the territory of and keep open the trade routes within that territory. Should traders or caravans be attacked within the boundaries of the said territory, you shall pay such compensation as the Superintendent of the Shan States may fix.

(5) You shall, if the Superintendent of the Shan States so desires, keep an agent, who shall reside at the headquarters of the Superintendent, and who shall keep him informed concerning the conditions of the territory of

(6) In case of a dispute arising connected with any other part of the Shan States, you shall submit the matter to the Superintendent of the Shan States and abide by his decision. Should any inhabitants of commit raids on any place outside the limits of, you shall pay such compensation as the Superintendent of the Shan States may fix.

(7) If the Government wishes at any time to make a railway through the territory of, you shall provide land for the purpose, free of cost, except that of the compensation adjudged to the actual occupiers of occupied land, and shall help the Government as much as possible.

(8) Opium, spirits, or fermented liquor, and other articles which are liable to duties of customs or exercise when imported by sea into Lower Burma, or when produced in any part of Upper Burma to which the Regulations of the Governor-General in Council apply, shall not be brought from into Lower Burma or into any such part as aforesaid of Upper Burma, except in accordance with rules made by the Government and on payment of such duties as may be prescribed in those rules.

(9) You shall deliver up, on the requisition of an officer of the Government, any criminal who takes refuge in the territory of; you shall aid officers of the Government who pursue criminals into the said territory; and in the event of offenders from the said territory taking refuge in any place beyond the limits of that territory you shall make a representation of the matter to the authorities concerned.

(10) You shall not exercise criminal jurisdiction over European British subjects; in the event of any criminal charge being brought against any such person, you shall make a representation of the matter to the Superintendent of the Shan States.
(ii) FORM OF SANAD GRANTED TO MYOAS AND NGWEGUNHMUS.

WHEREAS you have been a Myoza subject to the King of Ngwegunhmu Burma, and you have now been recognized by the Chief Commissioner of Burma as Myoza of Ngwegunhmu you will be permitted to retain your office, and at any time to nominate, for the approval of the Chief Commissioner, a fit person to be your successor, provided that you observe the following conditions which are hereby prescribed with the approval of the Governor-General of India in Council:-

(1) That you collect and pay into the treasury of the Superintendent, Shan States, at his headquarters, the revenue assessed by his orders from time to time on the persons or property of the residents in your territory.

(2) That opium and other articles, which are liable to duties of customs or excise when imported by sea into Lower Burma or when produced in any part of Upper Burma to which the Regulations of the Governor-General in Council apply, shall not be brought from Lower Burma or into any such part as aforesaid of Upper Burma, except in accordance with rules made by the Government and on payment of such duties as may be prescribed in those rules.

(3) That generally, in all matters connected with the administration of the territory under your charge, you shall obey any law or laws that may be made applicable to it by the Government and conform to such rules, orders, or instructions as may from time to time be made or issued by the Chief Commissioner or the Superintendent, Shan States, or any of his Assistants for your guidance.

(iii) FORM OF SANAD GRANTED TO THE SAWBWA OF KENGTUNG 1889.

WHEREAS the Governor-General of India in Council has been pleased to recognize you as Sawbwa of the State of Kyaintung and to permit you to administer the territory of Kyaintung in all matters whether civil, criminal, or revenue, and at any time to nominate, subject to the approval of the Chief Commissioner, a fit person according to Shan usage to be your successor in the Sawbwaship.

Paragraph 2.- The Chief Commissioner of Burma, with the approval of the Governor-General of India in Council, hereby prescribed the following conditions under which your nomination as

1. Burma Foreign Department Proceedings, February 1890.
Sawbwa of Kyaington is made. Should you fail to comply with any of these conditions you will be liable to have your powers as Sawbwa of Kyaington rescinded.

Paragraph 3.- The conditions are as follow:

(1) You shall pay tribute to the same amount and in the same form as formerly paid to the King of Burma.

(2) You shall abstain from communication with States outside British India. Should necessity arise for communication with such States, you shall address the Chief Commissioner through the Superintendent of the Shan States.

(3) You shall accept and act upon any advice that may be given by the Chief Commissioner of Burma either in respect of the internal affairs of Kyaington or its relations with other States.

(4) You shall administer the territory of Kyaington according to the custom of the country; you shall recognize the rights of the people and continue them in the same, and on no account shall you oppress them or suffer them in any way to be oppressed.

(5) You shall maintain order within the territory of Kyaington and keep open the trade routes within that territory. Should traders or caravans be attacked within the boundaries of the said territory, you shall pay such compensation as the Superintendent of the Shan States may fix.

(6) You shall, if the Superintendent of the Shan States so desires, keep an Agent, who shall reside at the headquarters of the Superintendent, and who shall keep him informed concerning the condition of the territory of Kyaington.

(7) In case of a dispute arising connected with any other part of the Shan States, you shall submit the matter to the Superintendent of the Shan States and abide by his decision. Should any inhabitants of Kyaington commit raids on any place outside the limits of Kyaington, you shall pay such compensation as the Superintendent of the Shan States may fix.

(8) If the Government wishes at any time to make a railway through the territory of Kyaington, you shall provide land for the purpose free of cost, except that of the compensation adjudged to the actual occupiers of occupied land, and shall help the Government as much as possible.

(9) Opium, spirits, or fermented liquor, and other articles which are liable to duties of customs or excise when imported by sea into Lower Burma, or when produced in any part of Upper Burma to which the Regulations of the Governor-General in Council apply, shall not be brought from Kyaington into Lower Burma or into any such
part as aforesaid of Upper Burma, except in accordance with rules made
by the Government and on payment of such duties as may be prescribed
in those rules.

(10) You shall deliver up, on the requisition of an
officer of the Government, any criminal who takes refuge in the terri­
tory of Kyaington; you shall aid officers of the Government who pursue
criminals into the said territory; and, in the event of offenders from
the said territory taking refuge in any place beyond the limits of
that territory, you shall make a representation of the matter to the
Superintendent of the Shan States.

(11) You shall not exercise criminal jurisdiction over
European British subjects; in the event of any criminal charge being
brought against any such person, you shall make a representation of the
matter to the Superintendent of the Shan States.

C. H. T. CROSTHWAITE,
Chief Commissioner of Burma.

(iv) SANAD GRANTED TO THE SAWBWA OF KENG TUNG, 1896.

WHEREAS by a Sanad, dated the 10th day of February 1890, Sau
Kawn Hkam Hpu, of Kengtung, was, subject to the conditions therein
contained, recognised by the Governor-General of India in Council as
Sawbwa of the State of Kengtung; and whereas the said Sau Kawn Kham
Hpu died on the 12th day of April 1896; and whereas you Sau Kawn Kiau
Intaleng, of Kengtung, have been selected to be the successor of the
said Sau Kawn Hkam Phu as Sawbwa of Kengtung, the Chief Commissioner
of Burma hereby notifies to you that the Governor-General of India in
Council has been pleased to recognize you as Sawbwa of Kengtung, and
subject to the provisions of any law for the time being in force and
to the conditions hereinafter set forth, to permit you to administer
the territory of Kengtung in all matters, whether civil, criminal, or
revenue, and at any time to nominate, for the approval of the Chief
Commissioner, a fit person according to Shan usage, to be your suc­
cessor in the Sawbwaship. Should you fail to comply with any of the
said conditions, you will be liable to have your powers as Sawbwa of
Kengtung rescinded.

For the purposes of this Sanad the States of Mong Pu, Mong
Hsat, Hsen Yawt, and Hsen Mawng shall be considered as forming part
of and as included in the territory of Kengtung.

2. The said conditions are as follows:

(1) In recognition of the loyal conduct of the late
Sawbwa and as a mark of favour, the Governor-General of India in
Council is pleased to exempt the State of Kengtung for a period of five years from the 1st January 1897 from the payment of any tribute. The tribute payable by the State of Kengtung will be fixed at the expiry of the term for which all tribute is hereby remitted, that is, on the 31st December 1901.

(2) You shall abstain from communication with States outside British India. Should necessity arise for communication with such States, you shall address the Superintendent of the Southern Shan States through the Assistant Political Officer at Kengtung.

(3) The Government reserves to itself the proprietary right in all forests, mines, and minerals in the State of Kengtung. If you are permitted to work or to let on lease any forest or forests in the said State, you shall pay such sums for rent or royalty as the Local Government may from time to time direct; and in the working of such forests you shall be guided by such rules or orders as the Government of India may from time to time prescribe. If you are permitted to work or let on lease any mine or mines in the said State, you shall pay such royalty on all metals, precious stones, and other minerals produced therein as the Governor-General in Council may from time to time direct.

(4) You shall administer the territory of Kengtung according to the custom of the country, and in all matters subject to the guidance of the Superintendent of the Southern Shan States. You shall recognize the rights of the people and continue them in the same, and on no account shall you oppress them or suffer them in any way to be oppressed.

(5) You shall maintain order within the territory of Kengtung and keep open the trade routes therein. Should traders or caravans be attacked within the limits of the said territory, you shall pay such compensation as the Superintendent of the Southern Shan States may fix.

(6) You shall, if the Superintendent of the Southern Shan States so desires, appoint an agent, who shall reside at the headquarters of the Superintendent, and who shall keep the Superintendent informed concerning the condition of the territory of Kengtung.

(7) In case of a dispute arising connected with any other part of the Shan States, you shall submit the matter to the Superintendent of the Southern Shan States, and abide by his decision. Should any inhabitants of the State of Kengtung commit raids on any place outside the limits of the said State, you shall pay such compensation as the Superintendent may fix.

(8) If the Government wish at any time to make a railway through the territory of Kengtung, you shall provide land for the purpose free of cost to the Government, except the cost of the compensation adjudged to the actual occupiers of occupied land, and shall help the
Government as much as possible. The Government may without further notice resume all jurisdiction over and in respect of all lands used or required for railway purposes.

(9) Opium, spirits, or fermented liquor, and other articles which are liable to duties of customs or excise when imported by sea into Lower Burma, or when produced in any part of Upper Burma to which the Regulations of the Governor-General in Council apply, shall not be brought from the State of Kengtung into Lower Burma or into any such part as aforesaid of Upper Burma, except in accordance with rules made by the Government and on payment of such duties as may be prescribed in those rules.

(10) You shall deliver up, on the requisition of an officer of the Government, any criminal who takes refuge in the territory of Kengtung. You shall aid officers of the Government who pursue criminals into the said territory; and in the event of offenders from the said territory taking refuge in any place beyond the limits of that territory, you shall make a representation of the matter to the authorities concerned.

(11) You shall not exercise criminal jurisdiction over any European or American or any servant of the Government. In the event of any criminal charge being brought against any such person, you shall make a representation of the matter to the Superintendent of the Southern Shan States.

Dated the 21th April 1897.

(v) DRAFT ORDERS BY THE VICEROY AND GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF INDIA IN COUNCIL CONCERNING THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE STATE OF THIBAW (1887).

The Viceroy and Governor-General of India in Council confirms Kun San in his appointment as Sawbwagyi of Thibaw subject to the following conditions:-

I.- The Sawbwagyi shall not pay allegiance to any other Prince or State, and shall rule in accordance with Shan customs and the Buddhist religion.

II.- The Sawbwagyi shall maintain order in Thibaw, and keep open the great trade route from Theinni to Mandalay as far as concerns the territory of Thibaw, that is, from Nanma to Ngokteik.

III.- The Sawbwagyi may levy tolls on caravans passing through Thibaw at rates not exceeding those specified below, that is to say,
For every laden bullock going down to Mandalay 1 8
For every laden bullock entering Thibaw and returning without going to Mandalay 3 0
For every three laden bullocks, at each police post 1 0
For every six laden bullocks, at each ferry 1 0

No tolls shall be levied on ponies or mules, or on man carrying loads, or on unladen bullocks, or on traders returning from Mandalay. The tolls payable at the police posts shall be levied on traders returning from Mandalay by a different road from that by which they went down; but not on traders returning by the same road as that by which they came down. Ferry tolls shall be payable on all occasions of crossing a ferry.

IV.- The Sawbwagyi shall keep an Agent (Myogan) to be always resident at Mandalay. The Agent shall, at least once every month, obtain information concerning the State of affairs in Thibaw, and communicate the substance of it to the Chief Commissioner, or his representative at Mandalay. Once in every four months the Sawbwagyi shall submit a report concerning his State.

V.- The Sawbwagyi shall not fight with any other Prince, Sawbwa, or State, except with the permission of the Chief Commissioner. He may defend his territories from attack. In case of difference about boundaries or other matters with any other Sawbwa, he shall submit the matter to the Chief Commissioner and abide by his decision. Should the Sawbwagyi's subjects commit raids on any other State, the Sawbwagyi shall pay such compensation as may be fixed by the Chief Commissioner.

VI.- The British Government will levy no duties, beyond the sea customs and excise levied in British territory, on goods brought by traders from or taken into Thibaw, and will keep open the trade routes from Pyinulwin to Mandalay. Traders may sell their goods without restriction. But opium must be sold only in accordance with the rules made by the English Government; and arms or ammunition must not be imported into British territory.

VII.- The British Government will support the Sawbwagyi and will not interfere in the internal arrangements of Thibaw so long as order is maintained and the trade routes are kept open.
VIII.- As a mark of special favour and friendship, and in recognition of the loyal behaviour of the Sawbwa of Thibaw, His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General in Council remits for ten years the whole of the tribute payable by the State of Thibaw. This concession does not apply to the tributes of minor States like Mainglon, which may be subordinate to the State of Thibaw.

IX.- Whenever the office of Sawbwa of Thibaw is vacant, His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India in Council will appoint to the post a person who shall be acceptable to the Sadaws, Heins, Patatagas, and Kyaungtagas of Thibaw. With the approval of the Chief Commissioner the Sawbwa may at any time nominate his successor from his family, and such nomination, if according to Shan custom, and if there is no grave reason against it, will be accepted by the Government of India.

X.- If hereafter the British Government wishes to make a railway through Thibaw, the Sawbwa shall grant land for the purpose, and shall help the British Government as much as possible. Compensation will be paid for occupied or cultivated land given for the purpose of making a railway. But rent will not be paid for it.

XI.- Whenever the Chief Commissioner of Burma may call upon him to do so, the Sawbwa shall furnish, at his own expense, for service in the Shan States, a military force, the number of which shall be proportionate to the resources of the State of Thibaw and shall not be less than 300 men.

XII.- The Sawbwa shall supply for service in the police in Upper Burma not less than 500 men, to be armed and paid by the British Government.

XIII.- If civil disputes arise between the subjects of the Sawbwa of Thibaw and the subjects of any other Sawbwa, the plaintiff shall seek his remedy in the Court of the State to which the defendant belongs. If either party is not satisfied with the decree of the Court, the matter shall be referred for decision by an officer appointed by the Chief Commissioner.

XIV.- The States of Mainglon and Maington shall be considered subordinate to the Sawbwa of Thibaw, and shall communicate with the British Government through him; and the Sawbwa shall, with the approval of the Chief Commissioner, appoint Myosas and Myooks in those States. The Sawbwa shall not remove any Myosa or Myook of Mainglon or Maington except with the previous consent of the Chief Commissioner.

(vi) SANAD GRANTED TO THE SAWBWA OF HSIPAW (THIBAW) (1906)

WHEREAS by a Sanad, dated the 13th March 1889, Hkun Hseng (Hkun Saing), of Hsipaw, was, subject to the conditions therein contained, recognised by the Governor-General of India in Council as
Sawbwa of the State of Hsipaw; and whereas the said Hkun Hseng died on the 8th day of May 1902; and whereas you, Sao Hke (Saw Hke), of Hsipaw, have been selected to be the successor of the said Hkun Hseng as Sawbwa of Hsipaw, the Lieutenant-Governor of Burma hereby notifies to you that the Governor-General of India in Council has been pleased to recognize you as Sawbwa of Hsipaw, and subject to the provisions of any law or order for the time being in force and to the conditions hereinafter set forth, to permit you to administer the territory of Hsipaw in all matters, whether civil, criminal, or revenue, and at any time to nominate for the approval of the Lieutenant-Governor a fit person according to Shan usage to be your successor in the Sawbwaship.

Should you fail to comply with any of the said conditions, you will be liable to have your powers as Sawbwa of Hsipaw rescinded.

For the purposes of this Sanad the sub-States of Mong Long, Mong Tung, and Hsum Hsai, shall be considered as forming part of and as included in the territory of Hsipaw.

2. The conditions are as follows:

(1) You shall pay regularly the tribute of Rs.70,000 a year, now fixed for five years, that is to say, from the 1st December 1902 to the 30th November 1907, and the said tribute shall be liable to revision at the expiration of the said term or at any time thereafter that the Lieutenant-Governor of Burma may think fit. If within the said period the State is relieved in whole or in part of the charges connected with the appointment of Adviser to the Hsipaw Sawbwa, you shall pay such additional sum as tribute, not exceeding such charges, as the Lieutenant-Governor may think fit.

(2) The Government reserves to itself the proprietary right in all forests, mines, and minerals. If you are permitted to work or to let on lease any forest or forests in your territory, you shall pay such sums for rent or royalty as the Local Government may from time to time direct; and in the working of such forests you shall be guided by such rules or orders as the Government of India or the Local Government may from time to time prescribe. If you are permitted to work or let on lease any mine or mines in your State, you shall pay such royalty on all metals, precious stones, and other minerals produced in Hsipaw as the Governor-General in Council may from time to time direct.

(3) You shall administer the territory of Hsipaw according to the custom of the country and in all matters subject to the guidance of the Superintendent, Northern Shan States. You shall recognize the rights of the people and continue them in the same, and on no account shall you oppress them or suffer them to be oppressed.

(4) You shall maintain order within the territory of Hsipaw and keep open the trade routes within that territory. Should
traders or caravans be attacked within the boundaries of the said territory, you shall pay such compensation as the Superintendent of the Northern Shan States may fix.

(5) You shall, if the Superintendent of the Northern Shan States so desires, keep an agent, who shall reside at the headquarters of the Superintendent, and who shall keep him informed concerning the condition of the territory of Hsipaw.

(6) In case of a dispute arising connected with any other part of the Shan States, you shall submit the matter to the Superintendent of the Northern Shan States, and abide by his decision. Should any inhabitants of Hsipaw commit raids on any place outside the limits of Hsipaw, you shall pay such compensation as the Superintendent of the Northern Shan States may fix.

(7) If the Government wishes at any time to make further railways through the territory of Hsipaw, you shall provide land for the purpose free of cost, except that of the compensation adjudged to actual occupiers of occupied land, and shall help the Government as much as possible. The Government may without further notice resume all jurisdiction over and in respect of all lands used or required for railway purposes.

(8) Opium, spirits, or fermented liquor, and other articles, which are liable to duties of customs or excise when imported by sea into Lower Burma, or when produced in any part of Upper Burma, to which the Regulations of the Governor-General in Council apply, shall not be brought from Hsipaw into Lower Burma or into any such part as aforesaid of Upper Burma except in accordance with rules made by the Government and on payment of such duties as may be prescribed in those rules.

(9) You shall deliver up, on the requisition of an officer of the Government, any criminal who takes refuge in the territory of Hsipaw; you shall aid officers of the Government who pursue criminals into the said territory; and in the event of offenders from the territory taking refuge in any place beyond the limits of that territory, you shall make a representation of the matter to the authorities concerned.

(10) You shall not exercise criminal jurisdiction over any European or American. In the event of any criminal charge being brought against any such person, you shall make a representation of the matter to the Superintendent of the Northern Shan States.

Dated the 29th April 1906.
WHEREAS the State of Mong Mit was formerly a Sawbwaship subject to the King of Burma; and whereas by a Sanad, dated the 10th April 1889, Saw Maung, ex-Sawbwa of Nyaungywe, was, subject to the conditions therein contained recognized by the Governor-General of India in Council as Sawbwa of Mong Mit, and was thereby to be permitted to administer the territory of Mong Mit for a period of five years; and whereas in 1892 the administration of the State of Mong Mit was resumed by Government, and the State has since been administered as a Subdivision of the Ruby Mines District; the Lieutenant-Governor of Burma hereby notifies to you, Kin Maung of Mong Mit, that the Governor-General of India in Council has been pleased to recognize you as Sawbwa of Mong Mit, and, subject to the provisions of any law or order for the time being in force and to the conditions hereinafter set forth, to permit you to administer the territory of Mong Mit in all matters, whether civil, criminal or revenue, and at any time to nominate for the approval of the Lieutenant-Governor a fit person according to Shan usage to be your successor in the Sawbwaship.

Should you fail to comply with any of the said conditions you will be liable to have your powers as Sawbwa of Mong Mit rescinded.

I. The conditions are as follows:

1. You shall pay regularly as tribute Rs. 20,000 a year now fixed for five years from the 1st April 1905, and the said tribute shall be liable to revision at the expiration of the said term, or at any time thereafter that the Lieutenant-Governor of Burma may think fit.

2. The Government reserves to itself the proprietary right in all forests, mines and minerals. If you are permitted to work or to let on lease any forest or forests in your territory, you shall pay such sums for rent or royalty as the Local Government may from time to time direct; and in the working of such forests you shall be guided by such rules or orders as the Government of India or the Local Government may from time to time prescribe. If you are permitted to work or let on lease any mine or mines in your State, you shall pay such royalty on all metals, precious stones, and other minerals produced in Mong Mit as the Governor-General in Council may from time to time direct.

3. You shall administer the territory of Mong Mit according to the custom of the country and in all matters subject to the guidance of the Superintendent. You shall recognize the rights of the people and continue them in the same and on no account shall you oppress them or suffer them to be oppressed.

4. You shall maintain order within the territory of Mong Mit and keep open the trade routes within that territory. Should
traders or caravans be attacked within the boundaries of the said territory, you shall pay such compensation as the Superintendent may fix.

(5) You shall, if the Superintendent so desires, keep an agent, who shall reside at the headquarters of the Superintendent and who shall keep him informed concerning the condition of the territory of Mong Mit.

(6) In case of a dispute arising connected with any other part of the Shan States, you shall submit the matter to the Superintendent, and abide by his decision. Should any inhabitants of Mong Mit commit raids on any place outside the limits of Mong Mit, you shall pay such compensation as the Superintendent may fix.

(7) If the Government wishes at any time to make railways through the territory of Mong Mit, you shall provide land for the purpose free of cost, except that of the compensation adjudged to actual occupiers of occupied land, and shall help the Government as much as possible. The Government may without further notice resume all jurisdiction over and in respect of all lands used or required for railway purposes.

(8) Opium, spirit or fermented liquor, and other articles, which are liable to duties of customs or excise when imported by sea into Lower Burma or when produced in any part of Upper Burma, to which the Regulations of the Governor-General in Council apply, shall not be brought from Mong Mit into Lower Burma or into any such part as aforesaid of Upper Burma except in accordance with rules made by the Government and on payment of such duties as may be prescribed in those rules.

(9) You shall deliver up, on the requisition of an officer of the Government, any criminal who takes refuge in the territory of Mong Mit, you shall aid officers of the Government who pursue criminals into the said territory; and in the event of offenders from the said territory taking refuge in any place beyond the limits of that territory, you shall make a representation of the matter to the authorities concerned.

(10) You shall not exercise criminal jurisdiction over any European or American. In the event of any criminal charge being brought against any such person, you shall make a representation of the matter to the Superintendent.

(viii) SANAD GRANTED TO SAWLAWI, LATE MYOZA OF KANTARAWADI OR EASTERN KARENNI.

WHEREAS the Governor-General of India in Council has been pleased to recognize you as Myoza of the State of Kantarawadi, or
Eastern Karenni, and to permit you at any time to nominate, subject to the approval of the Chief Commissioner, a fit person, according to Karenni usage, to be your successor in the Myozaship.

Paragraph 2.- The Chief Commissioner of Burma, with the approval of the Governor-General of India in Council hereby prescribes the following conditions under which your nomination as Myoza of Kantarawadi, or Eastern Karenni, is made. Should you fail to comply with any of these conditions, you will be liable to have your powers as Myoza of Kantarawadi, or Eastern Karenni, rescinded.

Paragraph 3.- The conditions are as follows:

(1) You shall pay tribute regularly every year. For the five years from the 1st January 1889 to the 31st December 1893, the amount of such annual tribute is fixed at Rs.5,000. Thereafter the amount of tribute will be subject to revision.

(2) You shall abstain from communication with States in or outside British India. Should necessity arise for communication with such States, you shall address the Chief Commissioner through the Superintendent of the Shan States.

(3) You shall accept and act upon any advice that may be given by the Chief Commissioner of Burma, either in respect of the internal affairs of Kantarawadi or Eastern Karenni or in respect of its relations with other States.

(4) You shall administer the territory of Kantarawadi or Eastern Karenni according to the custom of the country; you shall recognize the rights of the people and continue them in the same, and on no account shall you oppress the people or suffer them in any way to be oppressed.

(5) You shall maintain order within the territory of Kantarawadi, or Eastern Karenni, and keep open the trade routes within that territory. Should traders or caravans be attacked within the boundaries of the said territory, you shall pay such compensation as the Superintendent of the Shan States may fix.

(6) You shall, if the Superintendent of the Shan States so desires, keep an agent, who shall reside at the headquarters of the Superintendent, and who shall keep him informed concerning the condition of the territory of Kantarawadi or Eastern Karenni.

(7) In case of dispute arising connected with any part of the Shan States, you shall submit the matter to the Superintendent of the Shan States and abide by his decision. Should any inhabitants of Kantarawadi, or Eastern Karenni, commit raids on any place outside the limits of Kantarawadi or Eastern Karenni, you shall pay such compensation as the Superintendent of the Shan States may fix.
(8) If the Government of India wishes at any time to make a railway through any part of the territories of Kantarawadi, or Eastern Karenni, you shall provide land for the purpose free of cost, and shall help the Government as much as possible.

(9) Opium, spirits, or fermented liquor, and other articles which are liable to duties of customs or excise when imported by sea into Lower Burma, or when produced in any part of Upper Burma to which the Regulations of the Governor-General in Council apply, shall not be brought from Kantarawadi, or Eastern Karenni, into Lower Burma, or into any such part as aforesaid of Upper Burma, except in accordance with the rules made by the Government and on payment of such duties as may be prescribed in those rules.

(10) You shall deliver up, on the requisition of an officer of the Government, any criminal who takes refuge in the territory of Kantarawadi, or Eastern Karenni; you shall aid officers of the Government who pursue criminals into the said territory; and in the event of offenders from the said territory taking refuge in any place beyond the limits of that territory, you shall make a representation of the matter to the Superintendent of the Shan States.

(11) You shall not exercise criminal jurisdiction over any British subject; in the event of any criminal charge being brought against any such person, you shall make a representation of the matter to the Superintendent of the Shan States.

(12) You shall not employ, or retain in the service of your State, without the consent of the Chief Commissioner of Burma, any one who is not a subject of your State.

(ix) FORM OF SANAD FOR WESTERN KARENNI CHIEFS.

Sanad granted by the Chief Commissioner of Burma to Myoza of Western Karenni.

WHEREAS the Chief Commissioner has been pleased to recognize you as Myoza in Western Karenni and to permit you to nominate, subject to his approval, a fit person according to Karenni usage to be your successor in the Myozaship.

2. The Chief Commissioner of Burma, with the approval of the Governor-General in Council, hereby prescribes the following conditions under which your nomination as Myoza of is made. Should you fail to comply with any of these conditions, you will be liable to have your powers as Myoza of rescinded.

3. The conditions are as follows:
(1) In token of your subordination to the Superintendent, Shan States, you shall pay annually to that officer a nominal tribute of Rs.100.

(2) You shall abstain from communication with States in or outside British India. Should occasion arise for communication with such States, you shall address the Superintendent, Shan States.

(3) You shall accept and act upon any advice that may be given to you by the Superintendent, Shan States, either in respect of the internal affairs of or in respect of its relations with other States.

(4) You shall administer the State of according to the custom of the country. You shall recognize the rights of the people and continue them in the same, and on no account shall you oppress the people or suffer them in any way to be oppressed.

(5) You shall maintain order within the territory of and keep open the trade routes within the territory. You shall not impose transit dues of any kind upon trades passing through your territory save such reasonable tolls as may be approved by the Superintendent, Shan States. Should traders or caravans, or travellers of any kind, be attacked within the boundaries of the said territory, you shall pay such compensation as the Superintendent, Shan States, may fix.

(6) You shall, if the Superintendent, Shan States, so desires, keep an agent, who shall reside at the headquarters of the Superintendent and shall keep him informed concerning affairs in

(7) In the case of a dispute arising with Eastern Karenni or any other State, you shall submit the matter to the Superintendent, Shan States, and abide by his decision. Should any of the inhabitants of commit raids on any place outside the limits of , you shall pay such compensation as the Superintendent, Shan States, may fix.

(8) If the Chief Commissioner wishes at any time to make a railway through any part of , you shall provide land for the purpose, free of cost, and shall help the Government as much as possible.

(9) Opium, spirits, or fermented liquor, and other articles which are liable to duties of customs or excise when imported by sea into Lower Burma, or when produced in any part of Upper Burma to which the Regulations of the Governor-General in Council apply, shall not be brought from into Lower Burma, or into any such part as aforesaid of Upper Burma, except in accordance with rules made by the Government and on payment of such duties as may be prescribed in those rules.
(10) You shall deliver up, on the requisition of an officer of the Government, any criminal who takes refuge in the territory of . You shall aid officers of the Government who pursue criminals into the said territories; and in the event of offenders from the said territory taking refuge in any place beyond the limits of that territory, you shall make a representation of the matter to the Superintendent, Shan States.

(11) You shall provide for the administration of civil and criminal justice as between your own subjects and as regards offences committed within your own territory, but in cases in which either party is not your subject, or where an offence was not committed within your territory, you shall refer the case to the Superintendent, Shan States, for orders. You are authorized to pass upon your own subjects any sentence which is just and in accordance with Karenni custom, but you shall not carry into effect any sentence of death until the said sentence has been confirmed by the Superintendent, Shan States.

(12) You shall not employ or retain in the service of your State, without the consent of the Chief Commissioner, any one who is not a subject of your State.

(x) FORM OF SANAD AS SANCTIONED IN THE LETTER ORDER OF APPOINTMENT FROM THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA IN THE FOREIGN DEPARTMENT, No. 1294E., DATED THE 16th JUNE 1893, FOR CASES OF SUCCESSION TO SHAN AND KAREN CHIEFSHIPS.

To

WHEREAS by a Sanad (or Order of Appointment), dated the day of 19 , (name) of was, subject to the conditions therein contained, recognized by the Governor-General in Council (or the Lieutenant-Governor of Burma) as of

AND WHEREAS the said (name) died on the day of 19 , having in accordance with the permission in this behalf given by the said Sanad (or Order of Appointment), nominated you to be his successor, the Lieutenant-Governor of Burma is hereby pleased (or hereby notifies to you that the Governor-General in Council has been pleased) to recognize you as of with the like powers and subject to the like conditions as those conferred on and prescribed, for the said by the said Sanad (or Order of Appointment) above referred to.
AGREEMENT REGARDING THE INDEPENDENCE OF WESTERN KARENEE, 1875.

In accordance with the request of His Excellency the Viceroy of India that Western Karenee should be allowed to remain separate and independent, His Majesty the King of Burma, taking into consideration the great friendship existing between the two great countries and the desire that the friendship may be lasting and permanent, agrees that no sovereignty or governing authority of any description shall be exercised or claimed in Western Karenee, and His Excellency the Kinwoon Mengyee, Minister for Foreign Affairs on the part of His Majesty the King of Burma, and the Honourable Sir Douglas Forsyth, C.B., K.C.S.I., envoy on the part of His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India, execute the following agreement:-

AGREEMENT.- It is hereby agreed between the British and Burmese Governments that the State of Western Karenee shall remain separate and independent, and that no sovereignty or governing authority of any description shall be claimed or exercised over that State.

Whereunto we have on this day, the 21st day of June 1875, corresponding with the 3rd day of the waning moon of Nayoung 1237 B.E., affixed our seals and signatures.

(Seal) (Sd.) T. D. Forsyth (Seal) (Sd.) Kin-Woon Mengyee
APPENDIX VIII.

The Sipsawng (Twelve) Pannas of Kenghung.

I. McLeod's list from his Journal of the 24th March 1837 (Parliamentary Accounts & Papers, C. Volume 50, 1807).

1. Muang Khie
2. Muang Long
3. Muang Khang
4. Kiang Khieng
5. Muang Phung
6. Muang La
7. Muang La Esmok (a. Ssumao)
8. Muang Ham
9. Baula Luang
10. Muang U
11. Kiang, or Chin Tong
12. Muang Hing

II. Scott's first list from section 22 of his No. 001 dated the 19th May, 1890 to the Chief Commissioner of Burma. (Secret Despatch No. 97 of 1890 dated Simla the 4th August 1890, from the Government of India, Foreign Department, to the Secretary of State for India.)

Five western Pannas

(1) Kaing Hung
   Muang Kwom
   Muang Hsung

(2) Muang Long
   Muang Hun
   Muang Pan

(3) Ta Law

(4) Muang Se
   Muang Tong

(5) Kaing Sung
   Muang Hal.

Seven eastern Pannas

(6) Muang La
   Muang Wang
   Kaing Tau
   Kaing No

(7) Muang Hing
   Muang Wang
   Kaing Tong

(8) Muang U Tau
   Muang U No

(9) Mawla
   I Ngu
   I Pi

(10) Muang La
   Muang Pan

(11) Muang 'Pong
   Muang Mang

(12) Muang Wen
   Muang Hom
   Long Hu
   Long No
   Long Pi
   Long To
III. Scott's second list from Section 17 of his Report "on his recent visit to the Kengtung-Chiengmai Boundary and to Mongsing and Kenghung" under his memorandum No. 1A dated Mandalay the 21st May 1891 (Burma Foreign Department Proceedings No. 1, June 1891)

**East of the Mekhong**

(1) Meung Hpung  
Meung Mang  
Meung Yun  
Meung Hpa  
Meung Wen  

(2) Meung La (South)  
Meung Wan  
Pu Kaw  
Pu Long  

(3) U Tau  
U No  
Long Ngai  

(4) Meung Wang  
Keing Tong  

(5) Meung Heng  

(6) Meung La (North)

**West of the Mekhong**

(1) Meung Long  

(2) Meung Se  
Meung Hun  
Meung Pan  

(3) Meung Mang  
Keing Law  

(4) Meung Hai  
Keing Sung  
Meung Yang Noi  

(5) Meung Hkong  
Meung Ong  
Tea grown  
Meung Ngat  
Meung Wang  

(6) Chieng Hung west of the Mekhong  
Wan Sum  
Mot Yen  
Keing Lu  
Lo Lai  

Chieng Hung east of the Mekhong  
Meung Hem  
Meung Nun  
Meung Ham  
Meung Hkong  
Meung Yang  
Maw He  
Hsang Yong  
Hsao Noi  
Tea hills now usurped by  
Hsao Long  
Meung Se.
IV. Daly's list from Section 28 of his Report on Daly-Warry Expedition to Kenghung (Secret Despatch No. 182 of 1891 from the Government of India, Foreign Department, to the Secretary of State for India).

A. West of Cambodia

(1) Meung Long
(2) Meung Se
(3) Meung Hun and Meung Pan
(4) Keng Law, Meung Mang, Meung Lang Neu, and Meung Khang.
(5) Keng Seung, Meung Hai, Meung Ngat, Meung Yang, Keung Khawm, and Meung Wi.
(6) Meung Hpong, Meung Yan, and Meung Man.
(7) Kaing Hung, Meung Ham, and Meung Nun.

B. East of Cambodia

(8) Meung La and Meung Wang
(9) Meung Heng and Meung Pang
(10) Meung Keng Tawng and Meung Nawng Teu
(11) Meung U Neu and Meung U Teau
(12) Meung La and Meung Num Man.
APPENDIX IX.

CONVENTION BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND CHINA, GIVING EFFECT TO ARTICLE III OF THE CONVENTION OF JULY 24, 1886, RELATING TO BURMA AND THIBET.

SIGNED AT LONDON, 1st March 1894.

Ratifications exchanged at London, 23rd August 1894.

Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, Empress of India, and His Majesty the Emperor of China, being sincerely desirous of consolidating the relations of friendship and good neighbourhood which happily exist between the two Empires, have resolved to conclude a Convention with the view of giving effect to Article III of the Convention relative to Burma and Thibet, signed at Peking on the 24th July 1886, and have appointed as their Plenipotentiaries for this purpose, that is to say:

Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, Empress of India, the Right Honourable the Earl of Rosebery, Knight of the Most Noble Order of the Garter, Her Britannic Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs;

And His Majesty the Emperor of China, Sieh Ta-jen, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of China at the Court of St. James, and Vice-President of the Imperial Board of Censors;

Who having mutually communicated to each other their respective Full Powers found to be in good and due form, have agreed upon the following Articles:

ARTICLE I.

It is agreed that the frontier between the two Empires, from latitude 25°35' north shall run as follows:

Commencing at the high conical peak situated approximately in that latitude and in longitude 98°14' east of Greenwich and 18°16' west of Peking, the line will follow, as far as possible, the crest of the hills running in a south-westerly direction through Kaolang Pum and the Warong Peak, and thence run nearly midway between the villages of Wanchon and Kaolang - leaving the former to Burma and the latter to China - on to Sabu Pum.

From Sabu Pum the frontier will run in a line slightly to the south of west through Shatrung Pum to Namienku Pum; thence it will be
continued, still running in a south-westerly direction, along the crest of the hills until it strikes the Tazar Kha River, the course of which it will follow from its source to its confluence with the Nam Tabet or Tabak Kha, thus leaving Uka to the east and Laipong to the west.

From the confluence of the Tazar Kha River with the Tabak Kha the frontier will ascend the latter river to its junction with the Lekra Kha, which it will follow to its source near Nkrang. From the source of the Lekra Kha, leaving Nkrang, Kukam, and Singra to the west, and Sima and Mali to the east, the line will follow the Lesa Kha from its western source to its junction with the Mali River, and thence will ascend the Mali to its source near Hpunra Shikong; thence it will run in a south-westerly direction along the Laisan Kha from its source down to the point where it falls into the Mole River near Kadon, leaving the village of Kadon to the west and that of Laisa to the east.

The line will then follow the course of the Mole in a south-easterly direction to the place where it receives the Che Yang Kha, which latter river it will follow to its source in the Alau Pum. It will then be directed along the Nampaung River from its western source down to where it enters the Taping River.

This concludes the description of the first section of the frontier.

ARTICLE II.

The second section of the frontier, or that portion of it which extends from the Taping River to the neighbourhood of Neung Mao, will run as follows:

Starting from the junction of the Khalong Kha with the Taping River the frontier will follow the Khalong Kha and its western branch to its source; it will be drawn thence southward to meet the Sipaho or Lower Nanthabet at a spot immediately to the south-west of Hanton, leaving Matin to Great Britain and Loilong-ga-tong, Tieh-pi-Kwan, and Hanton to China; thence it will ascend the branch of the last-named river which has its source nearest to that of the Mantein Kha. It will thence follow the crests of the line of hills running in a south-easterly direction to the more southerly of the two places named Kadaw, which is close to the Namwan River, leaving Kadaw to China and Palem to Great Britain. It will follow the Namwan River in a south-westerly direction down to the point in about latitude 23°55', where that river takes a south-easterly course. Thence it will run in a direction somewhat west of south to the Nammak River, leaving Namkhai to Great Britain. It will follow the Nammak River to the point where it bifurcates in about latitude 23°47', and will then ascend the southern branch till it reaches the crest of a high
range of hills to the south of Mawsiu, in about latitude 23°45'. It will follow the crest of this range (which runs slightly to the north of east) until it reaches the Shweli River at its junction with the Namok, thus leaving to China the district of Mawsiu, the spot recently identified as Tien-ma-Kwan and the villages of Hinglon and Kongmow, lying to the north of the above-mentioned range.

It will then follow the course of the Shweli River and where the river bifurcates it will follow the more southerly of the two branches, leaving to China the island formed by them, until it reaches a point near the eastern end of the loop, which the river forms opposite to Meung Mao, as indicated in the next Article of the Convention.

The Government of China consent that the most direct of the roads between Bhamo and Namkham, where it passes through the small portion of Chinese territory south of the Namwan, shall, while remaining entirely open to Chinese subjects and to the tribesmen subject to China, be free and open to Great Britain for travellers, commerce, and administrative purposes, without any restrictions whatever. Her Britannic Majesty's Government shall have the right, after communication with the Chinese authorities, to execute any works which may be desirable for the improvement or repair of the road, and to take any measures which may be required for the protection of the traffic and the prevention of smuggling.

It is equally agreed that British troops shall be allowed to pass freely along this road. But no body of troops more than 200 in number shall be dispatched across it without the consent of the Chinese authorities, and previous notice in writing shall be given of every armed party of more than twenty men.

ARTICLE III.

The third section of the frontier will run as follows:

It will commence from a point on the Shweli River, near to the east end of the loop formed by that river opposite to Meung Mao; thence paying due regard to the natural features and the local conditions of the country, it will trend in a south-easterly direction towards Ma-li-pa until it reaches, at a point in about latitude 98°7' east of Greenwich (18°23' west of Peking), and latitude 23°52', a conspicuous mountain range. It will follow the crests of that range through Loisipong and Loipanglom until it reaches the Salween River, in about latitude 23°41'.

This portion of the frontier from the Shweli to the Salwean River shall be settled by the Boundary Commission provided for in Article VI of the present Convention, and in such a manner as to give to China at least as much territory as would be included if the frontier were drawn in a straight line from Meung Mao towards Ma-li-pa.
If it should be found that the most suitable frontier will give to China a larger amount of territory than is stated above, the compensation to be given to Great Britain on some other part of the frontier shall be matter for subsequent arrangement.

From latitude 23°14' the frontier will follow the Salween until it reaches the northern boundary of the circle of Kunlong. It will follow that boundary in an easterly direction, leaving the whole circle of Kunlong, and the ferry of that name, to Great Britain, and leaving to China the State of Kokang.

It will then follow the course of the river forming the boundary between Somu, which belongs to Great Britain, and Meng Ting, which belongs to China. It will still continue to follow the frontier between those two districts, which is locally well known, to where it leaves the aforesaid river and ascends the hills; and will then follow the line of water-parting between the tributaries of the Salween and the Meikong Rivers, from about longitude 99° east of Greenwich (17°30' west of Peking), and latitude 23°20', to a point about longitude 99°10' east of Greenwich (16°50' west of Peking), and latitude 23°, leaving to China the Isawwaships of Keng Ma, Mengtung, and Mengko.

At the last-named point of longitude and latitude the line strikes a very lofty mountain range, called Kong-Ming-Shan, which it will follow in a southerly direction to about longitude 99°30' east of Greenwich (17° west of Peking), and latitude 22°30', leaving to China the district of Chen-pien T'ing. Then, descending the western slopes of the hills to the Namka River, it will follow the course of that river for about 10° of latitude, leaving Munglem to China, and Manglun to Great Britain.

It will then follow the boundary between Munglem and Kyaing Tong, which is locally well known, diverging from the Namka River a little to the north of latitude 22°, in a direction somewhat south of east, and generally following the crest of the hills till it strikes the Namlam River in about latitude 21°45' and longitude 100° east of Greenwich (16°30' west of Peking).

It will then follow the boundary between Kyaing Tong and Kaing Hung, which is generally formed by the Namlam River, with the exception of a small strip of territory belonging to Kaing Hung, which lies to the west of that river just south of the last-named parallel of latitude. On reaching the boundary of Kyaing Chaing, in about latitude 21°27' and longitude 100°12' east of Greenwich (16°18' west of Peking), it will follow the boundary between that district and Kaing Hung until it reaches the Meikong River.
It is agreed that the settlement and delimitation of that portion of the frontier which lies to the north of latitude 25°15' north shall be reserved for a future understanding between the High Contracting Parties when the features and condition of the country are more accurately known.

ARTICLE V.

In addition to the territorial concessions in Northern Theinni, and the cession to China of the State of Kokang which results from the frontier as above described, Her Britannic Majesty, in consideration of the abandonment of the claims advanced by China to the territory lying outside and abutting on the frontier of the Prefecture of Young Chang and Sub-Prefecture of Teng Yueh, agrees to renounce in favour of His Majesty the Emperor of China, and of his heirs and successors forever, all the suzerain rights in and over the States of Munglem and Kaing Hung formerly possessed by the Kings of Ava concurrently with the Emperor of China. These and all other rights in the said States, with the titles, prerogatives, and privileges thereto pertaining, Her Majesty the Queen-Empress renounces as aforesaid, with the sole proviso that His Majesty the Emperor of China shall not, without previously coming to an agreement with Her Britannic Majesty, cede either Munglem or Kaing Hung, or any portion thereof, to any other nation.

ARTICLE VI.

It is agreed that, in order to avoid any local contention, the alignments of the frontier described in the present Convention, and shown on the maps annexed thereto, shall be verified and demarcated, and, in case of its being found defective at any point, rectified by a Joint Commission appointed by the High Contracting Parties; and that the said Commission shall meet, at a place hereafter to be determined on by the two Governments not later than twelve months after the exchange of the ratifications of the present Convention; and shall terminate its labours in not more than three years from the date of its first meeting.

It is understood that any alterations in the alignment which the Joint Commission may find it necessary to make shall be based on the principle of equivalent compensations having regard not only to the extent, but also to the value, of the territory involved. Further, that should the members of the Commission be unable to agree on any point, the matter of disagreement shall at once be referred to their respective Governments.

The Commission shall also endeavour to ascertain the situation of the former frontier post of China named Hanlung Kwan. If this
place can be identified, and is found to be situated in British
territory, the British Government will consider whether it can, with­
out inconvenience, be ceded to China.

If it shall be found to the south-east of Meung Mao so as
to be on the northern side of the straight line drawn from that place
towards Ma-li-pa, it will in that case already belong to China.

ARTICLE VII.

It is agreed that any posts belonging to either country which
may be stationed within the territory of the other when the Commission
of Deminitation shall have brought its labours to a conclusion shall,
within eight months from the date of such conclusion, be withdrawn,
and their places occupied by the troops of the other, mutual notice
having in the meantime been given of the precise date at which the
withdrawal and occupation will take place. From the date of such
occupation the High Contracting Parties shall each within its own
territories hold itself responsible for the maintenance of good order,
and for the tranquility of the tribes inhabiting them.

The High Contracting Parties further engage neither to con­
struct nor to maintain within 10 English miles from the nearest point
of the common frontier, measured in a straight line and horizontal
projection, any fortifications or permanent camps, beyond such
posts as are necessary for preserving peace and good order in the
frontier districts.

ARTICLE VIII.

Subject to the conditions mentioned hereafter in Article X
and XI, the British Government, wishing to encourage and develop the
land trade of China with Burma as much as possible, consent, for a
period of six years from the ratification of the present Convention,
to allow Chinese produce and manufactures, with the exception of
salt, to enter Burma by land duty free, and to allow British manu­
factures and Burmese produce, with the exception of rice, to be ex­
ported to China by land free of duty.

The duties on salt and rice so imported and exported shall
not be higher than those imposed on their import or export by sea.

ARTICLE IX.

Pending the negotiation of a more complete arrangement, and
until the development of the trade shall justify the establishment
of other frontier Customs stations, goods imported from Burma into
China or exported from China into Burma shall be permitted to cross the frontier by Manwyne and by Sansi.

With a view to the development of trade between China and Burma, the Chinese Government consent that for six years from the ratification of the present Convention the duties levied on goods imported into China by these routes shall be those specified in the General Tariff of the Maritime Customs diminished by three-tenths, and that the duties on goods exported from China by the same route shall be those specified in the same Tariff diminished by four-tenths.

Transit passes for imports and exports shall be granted in accordance with the Rules in force at the Treaty ports.

Smuggling or the carrying of merchandise through Chinese territory by other routes, than those sanctioned by the present Convention shall, if the Chinese authorities think fit be punished by the confiscation of the merchandise concerned.

ARTICLE X.

The following articles, being munitions of war, shall neither be exported from Burma into China, nor imported from China into Burma, save at the requisition of the Government desiring their importation; neither shall they be sold to parties other than those who have been duly authorized by their respective Governments to purchase them:—

Cannon, shot and shell, cartridges and ammunition of all kinds, firearms and weapons of war of every description. Saltpetre, sulphur, brimstone, gunpowder, dynamite, gun-cotton, or other explosives.

ARTICLE XI.

The exportation from Burma into China of salt is prohibited.

The exportation from China into Burma of cash, rice, pulse, and grains of every kind is prohibited.

The importation and exportation across the frontier of opium and spirituous liquors is prohibited, excepting in small quantities for the personal use of travellers. The amount to be permitted will be settled under Customs Regulations.

Infractions of the conditions set forth in this and the preceding Article will be punishable by confiscation of all the goods concerned.
The British Government, wishing to promote frontier trade between the two countries by encouraging mining enterprise in Yunnan and in the new territorial acquisitions of China referred to in the present Convention, consent to allow Chinese vessels carrying merchandise, ores, and minerals of all kinds, and coming from or destined for China, freely to navigate the Irrawaddy on the same conditions as to dues and other matters as British vessels.

ARTICLE XII.

It is agreed that His Majesty the Emperor of China may appoint a Consul in Burma to reside at Rangoon; and that Her Britannic Majesty may appoint a Consul to reside at Manwyne; and that the Consuls of the two Governments shall each within the territories of the other enjoy the same privileges and immunities as the Consuls of the most favoured nation.

Further, that, in proportion as the commerce between Burma and China increases, additional Consuls may be appointed by mutual agreements, to reside at such places in Burma and Yunnan as the requirements of the trade may seem to demand.

The correspondence between the British and Chinese Consuls respectively, and the chief authority at the place where they reside, shall be conducted on terms, of perfect equality.

ARTICLE XIV.

Passports, written in Chinese and English, and identical in terms to those issued to foreigners at the Treaty ports in China, shall on the application of the proper British authorities, be issued to British merchants and others wishing to proceed to China from Burma, by the Chinese Consul at Rangoon or by the Chinese authorities on the frontier; and Chinese subjects wishing to proceed to Burma from China shall, on the application of any recognized Chinese official, be entitled to receive similar passports from Her Britannic Majesty's Consul at Manwyne or other convenient places in China where there may be a British Consular officer.

ARTICLE XV.

Should criminals, subjects of either country, take refuge in the territory of the other, they shall, on due requisition being made, be searched for, and, on reasonable presumption of their guilt
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being established, they shall be surrendered to the authorities demanding their extradition.

"Due requisition" shall be held to mean the demand of any functionary of either Government possessing a seal of office, and the demand may be addressed to the nearest frontier officer of the country in which the fugitive has taken refuge.

ARTICLE XVI.

With a view to improving the intercourse between the two countries, and placing the Chinese Consul at Rangoon in communication with the High Provincial Authorities in Yunnan, the High Contracting Parties undertake to connect the telegraphic systems of the two countries with each other as soon as the necessary arrangements can be made; the line will, however, at first only be used for the transmission of official telegrams and of general message for and from Burma and the Province of Yunnan.

ARTICLE XVII.

It is agreed that subjects of the two Powers shall each within the territories of the other enjoy all the privileges, immunities, and advantages that may have been, or may hereafter be accorded to the subjects of any other nation.

ARTICLE XVIII.

It is agreed that the commercial stipulations contained in the present Convention being of a special nature and the result of mutual concessions, consented to with a view to adapting them to local conditions and the peculiar necessities of the Burma-China over-land trade, the advantages accruing from them shall not be invoked by the subjects of either Power residing at other places where the two Empires are conterminous, excepting where the same conditions prevail, and then only in return for similar concessions.

ARTICLE XIX.

The arrangements with regard to trade and commerce contained in the present Convention being of a provisional and experimental character, it is agreed that should subsequent experience of their working, or a more intimate knowledge than is now possessed of the requirements of the trade, seem to require it, they may be revised at
the demand of either party after a lapse of six years after the ex­change of ratifications of the present Convention, or sooner should the two Governments desire it.

ARTICLE XX.

The ratification of the present Convention under the hand of Her Britannic Majesty and of His Majesty the Emperor of China shall be exchanged in London in six months from this day of signature, or sooner if possible.

The Convention shall come into force immediately after the exchanges of ratifications.

In token whereof the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed this Convention in four copies, two in Chinese and two in English.

Done at London this first day of March, one thousand eight hundred and ninety-four, corresponding to the 24th day of the 1st moon of the 20th year of Kuang Hsu.

(L.S.) ROSEBERY.
(L.S.) SIEH.

Declaration

On proceeding to the signature this day of the Convention between Great Britain and China, giving effect to Article III of the Convention relative to Burma and Thibet, signed at Peking on the 21th July 1886:

The undersigned Plenipotentiaries declare that, inasmuch as the present Convention has been concluded for the special purpose mentioned in the preamble thereof, the stipulations contained there­in are applicable only to those parts of the dominions of Her Britannic Majesty and of His Majesty the Emperor of China to which the said Convention expressly relates, and are not to be construed as applic­able elsewhere.

Done at London the 1st day of March 1894.

(L.S.) ROSEBERY
(L.S.) SIEH.
AGREEMENT BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND CHINA, MODIFYING THE CONVENTION
OF MARCH 1, 1894, RELATIVE TO BURMAH AND THIBET.

Signed at Peking, February 4, 1897.

Ratifications exchanged at Peking, June 5, 1897.

IN consideration of the Government of Great Britain consenting
to waive its objections to the alienation by China, by the Convention
with France of the 20th June, 1895, of territory forming a portion of
Kiang Hung, in derogation of the provisions of the Convention between
Great Britain and China of the 1st March, 1894, it has been agreed be­
tween the Governments of Great Britain and China that the following
additions and alterations shall be made in the last-named Convention,
hereinafter referred to as the original Convention:-

ARTICLE I.

It is agreed that the frontier between the two Empires from
latitude 25°35', north shall run as follows:

Commencing at the high peak situated approximately in that
latitude and in longitude 98°14' east of Greenwich and 18°16' west of
Peking, the line shall follow, as far as possible, the crest of the
hills running in a south-westerly direction to Warung Peak (Kaulyang),
and shall extend thence to Sabu Pum.

From Sabu Pum the frontier shall run in a line along the waters­
shed slightly to the south of west through Shatrung Pum to Namienku
Pum.

Thence it shall follow a line to be fixed after local investi­
gation, dividing the Sis and the Kumsas as far as the Tabak Kha; thence
the Tabak Kha to the Namtabet; thence the Namtabet to the Paknoi Kha;
thence the Paknoi Kha to its source near Talang Pum; thence the Talang
Pum ridge to Bumra Shikong.

From Bumra Shikong the frontier shall follow a line running in
a south-west direction to the Laisa Kha; thence the Laisa Kha to the
Mole stream, running between Kadon and Laisa; thence the Mole to its
confluence with the Cheyang Kha; thence the Cheyang Kha to Alaw Pum; thence the Nampaung stream to the Taping.

ARTICLE II.

(The Taping to the Shweli River)

From the junction of the Taping and the Nampaung streams the frontier shall follow the Taping to the neighbourhood of the Lwalaing ridge; thence a line running approximately along the Lwalaing ridge and the Lwalaing stream to the Namwan; thence the Namwan to its junction with the Shweli.

Great Britain engages to recognize as belonging to China the tract to the south of the Namwan River, near Namkhai, which is inclosed to the west by a branch of the Nam Mak River and the Mawsiu range of hills up to Loi Chow Peak, and thence by the range running in a north-easterly direction to the Shweli River.

In the whole of this area China shall not exercise any jurisdiction or authority whatever. The administration and control will be entirely conducted by the British Government, who will hold it on a perpetual lease from China, paying a rent for it, the amount of which shall be fixed hereafter.

ARTICLE III.

(The Shweli to the Mekong)

From the junction of the Namwan and Shweli the frontier shall follow the northern boundary of the State of North Hsinwi, as at present constituted, to the Salween, leaving to China the loop of the Shweli River, and almost the whole of Wanting, Mong-ko, and Mong-ka.

Starting from the point where the Shweli turns northward near Namswan, i.e., from its junction with the Namyang, the frontier shall ascend this latter stream to its source in the Mong-ko Hills, in about latitude 24°7' and longitude 98°15', thence continue along a wooded spur to the Salween at its junction with the Namoi stream. The line shall then ascend the Salween till it meets the north-west boundary of Kokang till it meets the Kunlong circle, leaving the whole circle of Kunlong to Great Britain.

The frontier shall then follow the course of the river forming the boundary between Somu, which belongs to Great Britain, and Meng Ting, which belongs to China. It shall still continue to follow the frontier between those two districts, which is locally well
known, to where it leaves the aforesaid river and ascends the hills, and
shall then follow the line of water-parting between the tributaries
of the Salween and the Meikong Rivers, from about longitude 99° east of
Greenwich (17°30' west of Peking), and latitude 23°20', to a point about
longitude 99°40' east of Greenwich (16°50' west of Peking), and lati­
tude 23°, leaving to China the Tsawubuships of Keng Ma, Mengtung and
Mengko.

At the last-named point of longitude and latitude the line
strikes a very lofty mountain range, called Kong-Ming-Shan, which it
shall follow a southerly direction to about longitude 99°30' east of
Greenwich (17° west of Peking), and latitude 22°30', leaving to China
the district of Chen-pien T'ing. Then, descending the western slopes
of the hills to the Namka River, it will follow the course of that
river for about 10 minutes of latitude, leaving Munglem to China and
Manglun to Great Britain.

The frontier shall then follow the boundary between Munglem
and Kiang Tong, which is locally well known, diverging from the Namka
River a little to the north of latitude 22°, in a direction somewhat
south of east, and generally following the crest of the hills till it
strikes the Namian River in about latitude 21°45' and longitude 100°
east of Greenwich (16°30' west of Peking).

It shall then follow the boundary between Kiang Tong and Kiang
Hung, which is generally formed by the Namlam River, with the exception
of a small strip of territory belonging to Kiang Hung, which lies to
the west of that river, just south of the last-named parallel of
latitude. On reaching the boundary of Western Kyaing Chaing, in about
latitude 21°27' and longitude 100°12' east of Greenwich (16°18' west
of Peking), the frontier shall follow the boundary between that
district and Kiang Hung until it reaches the Mekong River.

ARTICLE IV.

\[No addition to original Convention.\]

ARTICLE V.

It is agreed that China will not cede to any other nation
either Mung Lem or any part of Kiang Hung on the right bank of the
Mekong, or any part of Kiang Hung now in her possession on the left
bank of that river, without previously coming to an arrangement with
Great Britain.
Article VI of the original Convention shall be held to be modified as follows:-

It is agreed that, in order to avoid any local contention, the alignments of the frontier described in the present Agreement shall be verified and demarcated, and, in the event of their being found defective at any point, rectified by a Joint Commission appointed by the Governments of Great Britain and China, and that the said Commission shall meet, at a place hereafter to be determined by the two Governments not later than twelve months from the date of the signature of the present Agreement, and shall terminate its labours in not more than three years from the date of its first meeting.

If a strict adherence to the line described would intersect any districts, tribal territories, towns, or villages, the Boundary Commission shall be empowered to modify the line on the basis of mutual concessions. If the members of the Commission are unable to agree on any point, the matter of disagreement shall at once be referred to their respective Governments.

ARTICLE VII.

[No addition to original Convention.]

ARTICLE VIII.

[No addition to original Convention.]

ARTICLE IX.

Add as follows:-

In addition to the Manwyne and Sansi routes sanctioned by the Convention of 1894, the Governments of Great Britain and China agree that any other routes, the opening of which the Boundary Commissioners may find to be in the interests of trade, shall be sanctioned on the same terms as those mentioned above.

ARTICLE X.

[No addition to original Convention.]
ARTICLE XI.

No addition to original Convention.

ARTICLE XII.

Add as follows:

The Chinese Government agrees hereafter to consider whether the conditions of trade justify the construction of railways in Yunnan, and, in the event of their construction, agrees to connect them with the Burmese lines.

ARTICLE XIII.

Whereas by the original Convention it was agreed that China might appoint a Consul in Burmah, to reside at Rangoon; and that Great Britain might appoint a Consul to reside at Manwyne; and that the Consuls of the two Governments should each within the territories of the other enjoy the same privileges and immunities as the Consuls of the most favoured nation, and, further, that, in proportion as the commerce between Burmah and China increased, additional Consuls might be appointed by mutual consent to reside at such places in Burmah and Yunnan as the requirements of trade might seem to demand.

It has now been agreed that the Government of Great Britain may station a Consul at Momein or Shunning-fu, as the Government of Great Britain may prefer, instead of at Manwyne, as stipulated in the original Convention, and also to station a Consul at Ssumao.

British subjects and persons under British protection may establish themselves, and trade at these places, under the same conditions as at the Treaty ports in China.

The Consuls appointed as above shall be on the same footing as regards correspondence and intercourse with Chinese officials as the British Consuls at the Treaty ports.

ARTICLE XIV.

Instead of "Her Britannic Majesty's Consul at Manwyne" in the original Convention, read "Her Britannic Majesty's Consul at Shunning or Momein", in accordance with the change made in Article XIII.
ARTICLE XV.

No addition to original Convention.

ARTICLE XVI.

No addition to original Convention.

ARTICLE XVII.

No addition to original Convention.

ARTICLE XVIII.

No addition to original Convention.

ARTICLE XIX.

Add as follows:—

Failing agreement as to the terms of revision, the present arrangements shall remain in force.

SPECIAL ARTICLE.

Whereas on the 20th day of January, 1896, the Tsung-li Yamen addressed an official despatch to Her Majesty's Charge d'Affaires at Peking, informing him that on the 30th day of December, 1895, they had submitted a Memorial respecting the opening of ports on the West River to foreign trade, and had received an Imperial Decree in approval, of which they officially communicated a copy.

It has now been agreed that the following places, viz., Wuchow-fu, in Kwangsi, and Samshui City and Kong Kun Market, in Kwangtung, shall be opened as Treaty ports and Consular stations, with freedom of navigation for steamers between Samshui and Wuchow and Hong Kong and Canton, by a route from each of these latter places to be selected and notified in advance by the Imperial Maritime Customs, and that the following four places shall be established as ports of call for goods and passengers, under the same Regulations as the ports of call on the Yang-tzu River, namely Kongmoon, Komchuk, Shiuheing, and Takhing.
It is agreed that the present Agreement, together with the Special Article, shall come into force within four months of the date of signature, and that the ratifications thereof shall be exchanged at Peking as soon as possible; in witness whereof the Undersigned, duly authorized thereto by their respective Governments, have signed the present Agreement.

Done at Peking in triplicate - three copies in English, and three in Chinese - the 4th day of February, in the year of our Lord, 1897.

(Signed) CLAUDE M. MACDONALD.

(Seal) (Chinese signature of His Excellency Li.)

(Seal)
APPENDIX XI.

SINO-BURMESE BOUNDARY TREATY

The President of the Union of Burma and the Chairman of Burma and the Chairman of the People’s Republic of China, being of the agreed opinion that the long outstanding question of the boundary between the two countries is a question inherited from history, that since the two countries successively won independence, the traditional friendly and good-neighbourly relations between the two countries have undergone a new development, and the fact that the Prime Ministers of the two countries jointly initiated in 1954 the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence among nations with different social systems as principles guiding relations between the two countries has all the more greatly promoted the friendly relations between the two countries and has created conditions for the settlement of the question of the boundary between the two countries;

Noting with satisfaction that the successive Governments of the Union of Burma and the Government of the People’s Republic of China, conducting friendly consultation and showing mutual understanding and mutual accommodation in accordance with the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, have overcome various difficulties, and have eventually reached a successful and over-all settlement of the question of the boundary between the two countries; and

Firmly believing that the formal delimitation of the entire boundary between the two countries and its emergence as a boundary of peace and friendship not only represent a milestone in the further development of the friendly relations between Burma and China, but also constitute an important contribution to the safeguarding of Asian and world peace;

Have resolved for this purpose to conclude the present Treaty on the basis of the Agreement on the Question of the Boundary Between the Two Countries signed by Prime Minister Ne Win and Premier Chou En-lai on January 28, 1960 and appointed their respective plenipotentiaries as follows:

U Nu, Prime Minister, for the President of the Union of Burma, and Chou En-lai, Premier of the State Council, for the Chairman of the People’s Republic of China,

Who, having mutually examined their full powers and found them in good and due form, have agreed upon the following:

ARTICLE I

In accordance with the principle of respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity and in the spirit of friendship and mutual accommodation, the Union of Burma agrees to return to China the area of Hpimaw, Gawlum and Kangfang (measuring about 153 square kilometres, 59 square miles, and as indicated in the attached map) which belongs to China; and the People's Republic of China agrees to delimit the section of the boundary from the junction of the Nam Hpa and the Nam Ting Rivers to the junction of the Nam Hka and the Nam Yung Rivers in accordance with the notes exchanged between the Chinese and the British Governments on June 18, 1941, with the exception of the adjustments provided for in Article II and III of the present Treaty.

ARTICLE II

In view of the relations of equality and friendship between Burma and China, the two Parties decide to abrogate the "perpetual lease" by Burma of the Meng-Mao Triangular area (Namwan Assigned Tract) which belongs to China. Taking into account the practical needs of the Burmese side, the Chinese side agrees to turn over this area (measuring about 220 square kilometres, 85 square miles, and as indicated in the attached map) to Burma to become part of the territory of the Union of Burma. In exchange, and having regard for historical ties and the integrity of the tribes, the Burmese side agrees to turn over to China to become part of Chinese territory the areas (measuring about 189 square kilometres, 73 square miles, and as indicated in the attached map) under the jurisdiction of the Panhung and Panlao tribes, which belong to Burma according to the provision in the notes exchanged between the Chinese and the British Governments on June 18, 1941.

ARTICLE III

For the convenience of administration by each side and having regard for the intratribal relationship and production and livelihood needs of the local inhabitants, the two parties agree to make fair and reasonable adjustments to a small section of the boundary line as defined in the notes exchanged between the Chinese and the British Governments on June 18, 1941, by including in China Yawng Hok and Lungnai Villages and including in Burma Umhpa, Pan Kung, Pan Nawng and Pan Wai Villages, so that these boundary-line-intersected Villages will no longer be intersected by the boundary line.
ARTICLE IV

The Chinese Government, in line with its consistent policy of opposing foreign prerogatives and respecting the sovereignty of other countries, renounce China's right of participation in mining enterprises at Lufang of Burma as provided in the notes exchanged between the Chinese and the British Governments on June 18, 1941.

ARTICLE V

The Contracting Parties agree that the section of the boundary from the High Conical Peak to the western extremity of the Sino-Burmese boundary, with the exception of the area of Hpeimaw, Gawlum and Kangfang, shall be fixed along the traditional customary line, i.e., from the High Conical Peak northward along the watershed between the Taping, the Shweli and the Nu Rivers and the section of the Tulung (Taron) River above Western Chingdam Village on the one hand and the Nmai Hka River on the other, to a point on the south bank of the Tulung (Taron) River west of Western Chingdam Village, thence across the Tulung (Taron) River and then further along the watershed between the section of the Tulung (Taron) River above Western Chingdam Village and the Tsayul (Zayul) River on the one hand and all the upper tributaries of the Irrawaddi River excluding the section of the Tulung (Taron) River above Western Chingdam Village on the other, to the Western extremity of the Burmese-Chinese boundary.

ARTICLE VI

The Contracting Parties affirm that the two sections of the boundary from the High Conical Peak to the junction of the Nam Hpa and the Nam Ting Rivers and from the junction of the Nam Hka and the Nam Yung Rivers to the south eastern extremity of the Sino-Burmese boundary at the junction of the Nam La and the Lanchang (Mekong) Rivers were already delimited in the past and require no change, the boundary being as delineated in the maps attached to the present Treaty.

ARTICLE VII

1. In accordance with the provisions of Articles I and V of the present Treaty, the alignment of the section of the boundary line from the High Conical Peak to the western extremity of the Sino-Burmese boundary shall be as follows:

(1) From the High Conical Peak (Mu Lang Pum, Manang Pum) the line runs northwards, then southeasterwards and then north-eastwards along the watershed between the Taping River (Ta Ying
Chiang), the Lung Chuan Chiang (Shweli) and the Nu (Salween) Rivers on the one hand and the Nmai Hka River on the other, passing through Shuei Cheng (Machyi Chet) Pass, Panwa Pass, Tasasin Shan, Hpare (Yemawlaunggu Hkyet) Pass and Chitsu (Lagwi) Pass to the source of the Chu-Ita Ho (Chu-iho Ta Ho).

(2) From the source of the Chu-i Ta Ho (Chu-iho Ta Ho) the line runs northwesterly along the Chu-i Ta Ho (Chu-iho Ta Ho) to its junction with its tributary flowing in from the north, thence northwards along this tributary to a point on the watershed between the tributaries of the Hpimaw (Htangkyam Kyaung) River on the one hand and the Wang Ke (Moku Kyaung) River and its tributary, the Chu-i Ta Ho (Chu-iho Ta Ho) on the other, thence westwards along this watershed, passing through Ma Chu To Waddy (Height 2123 metres, 7950 feet), thence northwards till it crosses the Hpimaw (Htangkyam Kyaung) River west of Hpimaw Village; thence northwards along the ridge, passing through Lukang Bum and crossing the Gan (Kang Hao) River to reach the Wu Chung (Wasok Kyaung) River; thence westwards along the Wu Chung (Wasok Kyaung) River to its junction with the Hsiao Chiang (Ngawchang Hka) River; thence northwards up the Hsiao Chiang (Ngawchang Hka) River to its junction with the Ta Hpawte (Hpawte Kyaung) River. Thence the line runs north of Kangfang Village generally eastwards and then southeasterly along the watershed between the Hsiao Hpawte (Hpawshi Kyaung) River and the Wu Chung (Wasok Kyaung) River on the one hand and the Ta Hpawte (Hpawte Kyaung) River on the other, to a point on the watershed between the Nu (Salween) and the Nmai Hka Rivers.

(3) From the above mentioned point on the watershed between the Nu (Salween) and the Nmai Hka Rivers, the line runs generally northwards along the watershed between the Nu (Salween) River and the section of the Tulung (Taron) River above Western Chingdam Village on the one hand and the Nmai Hka River on the other, passing through Kia Ngo Tu (Sajyang) Pass, Sala Pass, Ming Ke (Nahke) Pass, Ni Chi Ku (Gi Gi Thara) Pass, Kawchi Thara Pass, Jongit L'ka, and Maguchi Pass; thence the line continues to run northwards and then generally westwards, passing through Alang L'ka, mawa L'ka, Pan Teng Shan (Pumtang Razi), Lonlang L'ka, Hkora Razi to Tusehpong Razi.

(4) From Tusehpong Razi, the line runs generally north-westwards along the ridge, passing through height 2892 metres and height 21h0.3 metres, to a point on the south bank of the Tulung (Taron) River west of the Western Chingdam Village. Thence it crosses the Tulung (Taron) River to its junction with its tributary on its northern bank, and thence north-westwards along the ridge to Kundam Razi (Lungawng Hpong).

(5) From Kundam Razi (Lungawng Hpong) the line runs generally northwards and north-westwards along the watershed between the section of the Tulung (Taron) River above Western Chingdam Village on the one hand, and the upper tributaries of the Irrawaddy.
River (excluding the section of the Tulung (Taron) River above Western Chingdam Village) on the other passing through Thala Pass, Sungya (Amansan) L'Ka to Yulang Pass.

(6) From Yulang Pass the line runs generally south-westwards along the watershed between the Tsayul (Zayul) River on the one hand and the upper tributaries of the Irrawaddy River on the other, passing through Gamlang L'ka to the western extremity of the Sino-Burmese boundary.

2. In accordance with the provisions of Article I, II, III and VI of the present Treaty, the alignment of the section of the boundary line from the High Conical Peak to the southeastern extremity of the Sino-Burmese boundary shall be as follows:

(1) From the High Conical Peak, the line runs generally south-westwards along the watershed between the upper tributaries of the Taping River, the Mong Ka Hka and the upper tributaries of the Ta Pa Chiang (Tabak Hka) Rivers on the one hand and the lower tributaries of the Nmai Hka River on the other, passing through Ta Ya Kou (Lunghkyen Hkyet) and thence northwestwards to Hsiao Chueh Pass (Tabak-Hku Hkyet).

(2) From Hsiao Chueh Pass (Tabak-Hku-Hkyet) the line runs down the Ta Pa Chiang (Tabak Hka), the Mong Ka Hka and up the Shih Tzu (Pankoi Hka) River (the upper stretch of which is known as the Hkatong Hka River) to its source.

(3) From the source of the Shih Tzu (Paknoi Hka) River the line runs south-westwards and then westwards along the watershed between the Monglai Hka on the one hand and the Pajao Hka, the Ma Li Ka River and the Nan Shan (Namsang Hka) River on the other to the source of the Laisa Stream.

(4) From the source of the Laisa Stream, the line runs down the Laisa Stream and up the Mu Lei Chiang (Mole Chaung) and the Ga Yang Hka (Cheyang Hka), passing through Ma Po Tzu (A-law-Hkyet), and then runs southwards down the Nan Pen Chiang (Nampaung Hka) to its junction with the Taping River; thence eastwards up the Taping River to the point where the Taping River meets a small ridge west of the junction of the Kuli Hka Stream with the Taping River.

(5) From the point where the Taping River meets the above-mentioned small ridge, the line runs along the watershed between the Kuli Hka Stream, the Husa (Namsa Hka) River and the tributaries of the Namwan River on the one hand and the tributaries of the Taping River west of the Kuli Hka Stream on the other, up to Pang Chien Shan (Pan Teng Shan).

(6) From Pang Chien Shan (Pan Teng Shan), the line runs southwards to join the Kindit Hka then down the Kindit, Hka and the Nam Wa Hka (Pang Ling River) to a point on the south bank of the Nam
Wa Hka (Pang Ling River) southeast Man Yung Hai Village and north of Nawang Sa Village, thence in a straight line southwestwards and then southwards to the Nam Sah (Manting Hka) River; then it runs down the course of the Nam Sah (Manting Hka) River as at the time when the boundary was demarcated in the past, to its junction with the Namwan River, thence down the course of the Namwan River as it was at that time, to its junction with the course of the Shweli River as it was at that time.

(7) From the junction of the courses of the Namwan River and the Shweli River as at the time when the boundary was demarcated in the past, to the junction of the Shweli and the Wanting (Nam Yang) Rivers, the location of the line shall be as delineated on the maps attached to the present Treaty. Thence the line runs up the course of the Wanting (Nam Yang) River as at the time when the boundary was demarcated in the past, and the Weilshang Hka, then turns northwestwards along a tributary of the Nam Che Hka (Nam Hse) River to its junction with the Nam Che Hka (Nam Hse) River, thence eastwards up the Nam Che Hka (Nam Hse) River, passing through Ching Shu Pass, and thence along the Monglong Hka and the course of Mong Ko (Nam Ko) River as at the time when the boundary was demarcated in the past, thence up the Nam Hkai and the Nam Pang Wa Rivers, passing through a pass, and then along the Man Hsing (Nam Hpawn) River (whose upper stretch is known as the Nam Tep (Nam Lep) River) to its junction with the Nu (Salween) River, thence eastwards up the Nu (Salween) River, thence eastwards up the Nu (Salween) River to its junction with the Ti Kai Kou (Nam Men) Stream.

(8) From the junction of the Nu (Salween) River with the Ti Kai Kou (Nam Men) Stream, the line runs southwards along the Ti Kai Kou (Nam Men) Stream, then southwards along the watershed between the Meng Peng Ho (the upper stretch of the Nam Peng River) on the one hand and the tributaries of the Nu (Salween) River on the other, up to Lao Lou Shan.

(9) From Lao Lou Shan, the line runs southeastwards along the Wa Yao Kou Stream, the ridge south of the Mai Ti (Mai Ti Ho) River, the Pan Chiao Ho and the Hao Lu Chang (Hsin Chai Kou) Stream up to the source of the Hao Lu Chang (Hsin Chai Kou) Stream. From the source of the above stream to the junction of the Nam Hpa and the Nam Ting Rivers, the location of the line shall be as delineated on the maps attached to the present Treaty. The line then runs eastwards for about four kilometres (about three miles) up the Nam Ting River and thence southeastwards along the northwest slope of the Kummuta Shan (Loi Hseng) to the top of Kummuta Shan (Loi Hseng).

(10) From the top of Kummuta Shan (Loi Hseng) the line runs southeastwards along a tributary of the Kung Meng Ho (Nam Loihsa) River to its junction with another tributary flowing in from the southeast; thence up the latter tributary to a point northwest of Maklawt (Ma-Law) Village. Thence, the line runs in a straight line to a point southwest of Maklawt (Ma-Law) Village, and again in a straight line across a
tributary of the Yun Hsing (Nam Tap) River to Shien Jen Shan, located east of the junction of the above mentioned tributary with another tributary of the Yun Hsing (Nam Tap) River; thence along the watershed between the above two tributaries of the Yun Hsing (Nam Tap) River to the source of the one to the west and then turns westwards and south-westwards along the Mong Ling Shan ridge, up to the top of Mong Ling Shan. Thence it runs eastwards and south-eastwards along the Nam Pan River to its junction with a tributary, northeast of Yakaw Chai (Ya Kou Sai) Village, which flows in from the southwest; thence in a south-westerly direction up that tributary, to a point northeast of Yakaw Chai (Ya Kou Sai) Village, from where it turns southwards passing through a point east of Yakaw Chai (Ya Kou Sai) Village, and crosses a tributary of the Nam Pan River south of Yakaw Chai (Ya Kou Sai) Village, thence westwards to the source of the Nam It River a little east of Chao Pao (Taklyet No) Village. Thence the line runs southwards along the Nam It and the Nam Mu Rivers, and then turns eastwards along the Nam Kunglong and the Chawk Hkrak River.

(11) From the northwest source of the Chawk Hkrak River, the line runs southwards and eastwards along the watershed between the upper tributaries of the Nam Kunglong River on the one hand and the southern tributaries of the Chawk Hkrak River and the Nan Tin (Nam Htung) River on the other, to a point on the west side of Umhpa Village. Thence it runs eastwards passing a point 100 metres north of Umhpa Village, and then eastwards up to the source of a small river, on the above-mentioned watershed; then along the ridge eastwards to the source of a tributary of the Mongtum (Nam Tun) River (the upper stretch of which is called the Ta Tung River), which it follows in an easterly and north-easterly direction to its junction with another tributary of the Mongtum (Nam Tun) River flowing in from the southeast; thence it follows this tributary to its source on the watershed between the Mongtum (Nam Tun) and the Lung Ta Hsiao Ho (Nam Lawng) Rivers. It then crosses the watershed in an easterly direction to the source of the Lung Ta Hsiao Ho (Nam Lawng) River which it follows to its junction with its tributary flowing in from the north, thence in northerly direction along the above-mentioned tributary, passing through a point on the Kanpinau ridge, thence generally eastwards along a valley, crossing the junction of two sub-tributaries of a tributary of the Lung Ta Hsiao Ho (Nam Lawng) River, then northeastwards to the watershed between the Mongtum (Nam Tun) River on the one hand, and the Nam Ma River on the other, until it reaches height 1941.8 metres (6370 feet). Thence the line runs eastward, then southwards and then north-westwards along the watershed between the Mongtum (Nam Tun) the La Meng (Nam Meng Ho), the He (Hei Ho), the Ku Hsing Ho (Nam Hka Lam) and the Nam Hka Hkao (Nam Hsiang Ho) Rivers on the one hand and the Nam Ma River on the other, up to a point on this watershed north-west of La Law Village.

(12) From the point on the above-mentioned watershed northwest of La Law Village, the line runs down the nearest tributary of the Nam Hka Hkao River and thence down the Nam Hka Hkao
River to its junction with a tributary flowing in from the southwest. Thence the line runs generally southwestwards up that tributary to its source, which is northeast of and nearest to height 2180 metres (7152 feet). Thence it crosses the ridge at a point 150 metres (492 feet) southeast of the above-mentioned height and then turns southwards to the source of the nearest tributary of the Nam Lung (Nam Sak) River, rising at the above-mentioned height. Thence it runs along this tributary to its junction with the Nam Lung (Nam Sak) River, from where it proceeds along the Nam Lung (Nam Sak), the Nam Hse and the Nam Hka Rivers to the junction of the Nam Hka and the Nam Yung Rivers, and thence up the Nam Yung River, to its source.

(13) From the source of the Nam Yung River the line runs in southeasterly direction to the watershed between the Na-Wu (Nam Wong) and the Nam Pei (Nam Hpe) Rivers; thence generally eastwards along the above-mentioned watershed and then eastwards along the Na Wu (Nam Wong) River, which it follows to its junction with the Nan Lai (Nam Lai) River, thence along the watershed between the Na Wu (Nam Wong) and the Nan Lai (Nam Lai) Rivers to the Anglang Shan (Loi Ang Lawng) ridge; thence northwards along the ridge to the top of Anglang Shan (Loi Ang Lawng), thence generally eastwards along the ridge, crosses the Nan Tung Chik (Nam Tonghseik) River and then follows the watershed between the tributaries on the west bank of the Nam Lei (Nam Lwe) River at the north of the La Ting (Hwe-kye-tai) River and the Nan La Ho (a tributary of the (Nam Ma) River) on the one hand and the tributaries of the west bank of the Nam Lei (Nam Lwe) River at the south of the La Ting (Hwe-kye-tai) River on the other, up to the top of Pang Shun Shan (Loi Pang Hsun).

(14) From the top of Pang Shun Shan (Loi Pang Hsun) the line runs generally eastwards along the La Ting (Hwe-kye-tai) River, the Nam Lei (Nam Lwe) River, the course of the Nan Lo (Nam Law) Stream as at the time when the boundary was demarcated in the past, and the Nan Wo (Nambok) River to the source of the Nan Wo (Nambok) River at Nan Wo Kai Nan Shan (Loi Kwainang).

(15) From the source of the Nan Wo (Nambok) River at Nan Wo Kai Nan Shan (Loi Kwainang) the line runs generally eastwards along the watershed between the Nan La (Nam Lak) (a tributary of the Nam Lei (Nam Lwe) River), the Nan Pai (Nam Hpe) and the Nam Hsi (Nam Hok) Rivers on the one hand and the Nan Ping (Nam Hpen), the Nan Mau (Nam Mawng) and the Nam Hse Pang (Nam Hsi Pang) Rivers on the other, up to San Min Po (Loi Hsammong).

(16) From San Min Po (Loi Hsammong) the line runs in a general northeasterly direction to a point on the west bank of the Nam Lam River. Thence it descends the Nam Lam River to the foot of Chiu Na Shan (Kyu-nak) on the south bank of the Nam Lam River and then runs in a general southeasterly direction passing through Hue Ling Lang (Hwe Mawk-hkio), La Ti (La Tip), Nan Meng Hao (Nammong Hau) to Mai Niu Tung (Mai Niu-tawng); thence the line runs in a general northeasterly
direction passing through Lang Man Tang (Longman Tawng) to the Hui La (Hwe-La) Stream, which it follows northwards to its junction with the Nam Lam River. Thence the line runs eastwards and southwards along the Nam Lam, the Nan Chih (Nam Se) Rivers and the Nam Chia (Hwe Sak) Stream, to Lei Len Ti Fa Shan (Loi Len Ti Hpa). The line then follows the Nam Mot (Nam Mai) the Nam Tung (Nam Tung) and the Nam Ta Rivers to Hsing Kang Lei Shan (Loi Makhinkawng).

(17) From Hsing Kang Lei Shan (Loi Makhinkawng) the line runs eastwards along the watershed between the Nam Nga River and its upper tributaries on the one hand and the Nam Loi River (including its tributary the Nam He River) on the other, to the top of Kwang Pien Nei Shan (Kwang Peknoi).

(18) From the top of Kwang Pien Nei Shan (Kwang Peknoi) the line runs generally northeastwards along the Hu Le (Nam Luk) River and the course of the Nam Nga River as at the time when the boundary was demarcated in the past, to the junction of the Nam Nga and the Lanchang (Mekong) Rivers; thence down the Lanchang (Mekong) River up to the southeastern extremity of the Sino-Burmese boundary line at the junction of the Nam La and the Lanchang (Mekong) Rivers.

3. The alignment of the entire boundary line between the two countries described in this Article and the location of the temporary boundary marks erected by both sides during joint survey are shown on the 1/250,000 maps indicating the entire boundary and on the 1/50,000 maps of certain areas, which are attached to the present Treaty.

ARTICLE VIII

The Contracting Parties agree that wherever the boundary follows a river, the mid-stream line shall be the boundary in the case of an unnavigable river, and the middle line of the main navigational channel (the deepest watercourse) shall be the boundary in the case of navigable rivers. In case the boundary of the river changes its course, the boundary line between the two countries shall remain unchanged in the absence of other agreements between the two sides.

ARTICLE IX

The Contracting Parties agree that:

(1) Upon the coming into force of the present Treaty, the Meng-Mao Triangular Area to be turned over to Burma under Article II of the present Treaty shall become territory of the Union of Burma;
(2) The area of the Hpimaw, Gawlum and Kangfang to be returned to China under Article I of the present Treaty and the areas under the jurisdiction of the Panhun and Panlao tribes to be turned over to China under Article II shall be handed over by the Burmese Government to the Chinese Government within four months after the present Treaty comes into force;

(3) The areas to be adjusted under Article III of the present Treaty shall be handed over respectively by the Government of one Contracting Party to that of the other within four months after the present Treaty comes into force.

ARTICLE X

After the signing of the present Treaty, the Burmese-Chinese Joint Boundary Committee constituted in Pursuance of the Agreement between the two Parties on the Question of the Boundary Between the Two Countries of January 28, 1960, shall continue to carry out necessary surveys of the boundary line between the two countries, to set up new boundary markers and to examine, repair and remould old boundary markers, and shall then draft a protocol setting forth in detail the alignment of the entire boundary line and the location of all the boundary markers, with detailed maps attached showing the boundary line and the location of the boundary markers. The above-mentioned protocol, upon being concluded by the Governments of the two countries, shall become an annex to the present Treaty and the detailed maps shall replace the maps attached to the present Treaty.

Upon the conclusion of the above-mentioned protocol, the tasks of the Burmese-Chinese Joint Boundary Committee shall be terminated, and the Agreement between the two Parties on the Question of the Boundary Between the Two Countries of January 28, 1960 shall cease to be in force.

ARTICLE XI

The Contracting Parties agree that any dispute concerning the boundary, which may arise after the formal delimitations of the boundary between the two countries shall be settled by the two sides through friendly consultations.

ARTICLE XII

The present Treaty is subject to ratification and the instruments of ratification will be exchanged in Rangoon as soon as possible.
The present Treaty shall come into force on the day of the exchange of the instruments of ratification.

Upon the coming into force of the present Treaty, all part treaties, exchanged notes and other documents relating to the boundary between the two countries shall no longer be in force, except as otherwise provided in Article X of the present Treaty with regard to the Agreement between the two Parties on the Question of the Boundary Between the Two Countries of January 28, 1960.

Done in duplicate in Peking on October 1, 1960, in the Burmese, Chinese and English languages, all three texts being equally authentic.

Plenipotentiary of the Union of Burma:

(Signed) U Nu

Plenipotentiary of the People's Republic of China:

(Signed) Chou-En-lai.
# APPENDIX XII.

Commuted lump-sum pensions for Shan Chiefs who have surrendered executive powers with their states.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>States</th>
<th>Pensions based on 15 years of Land Revenue</th>
<th>Pensions based on 15 years of Forest Revenue</th>
<th>Total pension</th>
<th>Total pensions as decided by the Union Cabinet at its 88th sitting</th>
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<td>Ks</td>
<td>Ks</td>
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<td>15. Kesi-Bansam</td>
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| Total           | 2,47,58,327                                  | 8,85,330                                     | 2,56,13,567   | 2,58,63,029                                                      |

* Including Mine Revenue K.1,63,012 for Tawngpaw State.

AGREEMENT BETWEEN SHAN STATE GOVERNMENT AND THE SAOPHAS

THIS AGREEMENT is made the ......................... 1959 between the Government of the Shan State represented by the Head of the Shan State and the Saopha of ......................... hereinafter referred to as the Saopha.

WHEREAS in the immediate and the best interests of the ......................... State and its people as well as of the Government of the Shan State, the Saopha of ......................... State is desirous that the administration of the said State should vest solely in the Government of the Shan State without any reserve of power, authority or jurisdiction in favour of the said Saopha.

AND WHEREAS the Government of the Shan State and the Government of the Union of Burma welcome the said transfer of power, authority and jurisdiction.

IT IS HEREBY AGREED AS FOLLOWS:-

ARTICLE 1

The Saopha of the ......................... State hereby transfers to and vests in the Government of the Shan State all his power, authority and jurisdiction in relation to the Government of his State as from the ............ day of .........................

ARTICLE 2

In consideration of the said transfer the Saopha shall be entitled to receive as his commuted pension an outright payment of the sum of K ............ (Kyats ......................... only) free of all taxes.

The amount so paid is intended to cover payments by the Saopha to his relatives of such sums of money and in such manner as he may think fit in lieu of pension received by them prior to this Agreement. The said amount is also intended to cover expenses for the maintenance of the Saopha's personal body guards (if any) maintained by him.

ARTICLE 3

Without prejudice to any future amendment of the Constitution of the Union of Burma, the Saopha shall be entitled to enjoy the use of the title of Saopha.

ARTICLE 4

The Saopha shall subject to law be entitled to the full ownership, use and enjoyment of all his private properties, e.g., Haws, Private Houses, paddy fields, gardens, plantations, arms, etc., belonging to him on the date of this Agreement as distinct from the properties, e.g., Offices, Schools, Jails, Lock-ups, Bungalows, Hospitals, other buildings, lands, etc., of the ....................... State.

The Saopha will furnish to the Government of the Shan State before the ........... day of ........... 1959 an inventory of all the immovable property, held by him as his private property.

ARTICLE 5

No enquiry shall be made by or under the authority of the Government of the Shan State and no proceedings shall lie in any court in the Shan State against the Saopha in respect of anything done or omitted to be done by him in bona fide exercise of his powers, authority or jurisdiction as Saopha or under his authority as such during the period of his administration of the ....................... State.

ARTICLE 6

Except with the previous sanction of the Government of the Shan State, no criminal proceedings shall be instituted against any person in respect of any act done or purported to be done in the exercise of his duties as a servant of the ....................... State before the day on which the Saopha transfers the administration of the said State to the Government of the Shan State.

ARTICLE 7

(1) The Government of the Shan State hereby guarantees either the continuance in service of the permanent members of the ............. State Service on such condition as are not less advantageous than those under which they were serving before the 1st June 1959 or the payment to them of reasonable compensation.

(2) The Government of the Shan State further guarantees the continuance of pensions and leave salaries sanctioned by the Saopha to members of the ....................... State Service who have
retired or proceeded on leave preparatory to retirement, before the 1st June, 1959.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the Head of the Shan State for and on behalf of the Government of the Shan State and the Saopha on behalf of himself, his heirs and successors have hereunder set their hands at ................. the day, month and year first above written.

Sd/- Sao Hom Hpa.
Head of the Shan State.
(For and on behalf of the Government of the Shan State).

Saopha of the ............State
I. SOUTHEAST ASIA PROGRAM DATA PAPERS
   including Cornell Thailand Project Interim Reports Series.

II. CORNELL MODERN INDONESIA PROJECT PAPERS
    Bibliography Series, Interim Reports Series,
    Translation Series, and Monograph Series.

III. STUDY AND TEACHING MATERIALS
The papers listed here have been issued irregularly since 1951 in processed format by the Cornell Southeast Asia Program or by research projects associated with the Program. These series are designed to provide materials on Southeast Asia which should be made available promptly and not be delayed by publication in more permanent form; which are explicitly tentative or provisional in character, but which may elicit helpful criticisms or suggestions to be incorporated in a later publication; which may not be suitable for either ultimate journal or monograph publication because of length, the nature of the data, or other reasons; or which, as in the case of translated or reprinted materials, may not be readily accessible to teachers, scholars or others interested in the area. Suggestions for additional numbers will be welcomed.

Some papers have been reissued because of a constant demand. Others will be reissued when the demand warrants. For this reason, as well as to provide some impressions of the character of the materials which the Program is interested in issuing in this form, the following lists include a section giving titles which are currently out of print.

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IN PRINT

I. SOUTHEAST ASIA PROGRAM DATA PAPERS - 100 Franklin Hall, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York, 14850.


Number 18 CONCEPTIONS OF STATE AND KINGSHIP IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, by Robert Heine-Geldern. 1956. (Second Printing 1963) 14 pages. $1.00


Number 31 A BIBLIOGRAPHY OF INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS AND SELECTED INDONESIAN WRITINGS ON GOVERNMENT IN THE CORNELL UNIVERSITY LIBRARY, by Daniel S. Lev. 1958. 58 pages. $2.00

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THE DYNAMICS OF COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT IN RURAL CENTRAL AND WEST JAVA: A COMPARATIVE REPORT, by Selo Soemardjan. 1963. 40 pages. $2.00

THE CHINESE COMMUNITY IN A SUNDANESE TOWN: A STUDY IN SOCIAL AND CULTURAL ACCOMMODATION, by Giok-Lan Tan. 1963. 314 pages. $4.00

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AN APPROACH TO INDONESIAN HISTORY: TOWARDS AN OPEN FUTURE, by Soedjatmoko. 1960. 22 pages. $1.00

MARHAEN AND PROLETARIAN, by Soekarno. (Translated by Claire Holt) 1960. 30 pages. $1.00

THE PROVISIONAL CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA, by Prof. Dr. R. Supomo. (Translated by Garth N. Jones). 1964. 104 pages. $2.00

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<td>Verb Constructions in Vietnamese</td>
<td>William W. Gage and H. Merrill Jackson</td>
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<td>An Account of the Japanese Occupation of Banjumas Residency, Java, March 1942 to August 1945</td>
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<td>Gerald D. Berreman</td>
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<td>Bibliography of Thailand, A Selected List of Books and Articles with Annotations by the Staff of the Cornell Thailand Research Project</td>
<td>Lauriston Sharp, Frank J. Moore, Walter F. Vella and associates.</td>
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