Constitutional Period (1947-62)
On 4 January 1948, Burma gained its independence from the British who, in the nineteenth century, fought three wars against the Burman Empire and finally conquered it in 1886. On the eve of the Second World War, the Japanese secretly promised to help Burma recover its freedom by training 30 youth led by Gen. Aung San who then formed the nucleus of a national army. During the war, the Japanese drove the British out of Burma and governed the country directly under military rule until 1 August 1943, when it was granted independence under its protection.
On 27 March 1945, the armed forces of Burma revolted against the Japanese and joined the Allies. Also during the war period, the leaders of the new army, together with an underground civilian group, formed a broad anti-Japanese coalition, the Anti-Fascist People’s Freedom League (AFPFL). The AFPFL and the army were led by Gen. Aung San. On 19 July 1947, Gen. Aung San and some of his colleagues were assassinated while the constituent assembly that was writing a new constitution was in recess. U Nu, a civilian and close colleague of Aung San, was able to lead Burma to gain its independence on 4 January 1948. A parliamentary federal union system was introduced as the basis of the system of governance.
Independence did not bring peace and progress to Burma. Within three months of independence, the members of the Communist party in Burma revolted, resulting in the defection of two army battalions. In January 1949, following growing hostility between the ethnic Karen and Burman, the Karen also revolted. Several other political and ethnic groups also took up arms against the State. The multiple insurgencies nearly caused the Union of Burma to completely collapse. Prime Minister U Nu managed to keep his government in power and he gradually recovered control of the people and territories, though the country remained unstable.
During this tumultuous period, democracy took root and began to grow. However in 1958 unity among the leaders of the ruling AFPFL dissolved. Prime Minister U Nu proposed that the parliament decide which group should govern the country. U Nu won by such a narrow margin that within a few months he resigned and recommended that Gen. Ne Win, the head of the army, replace him and conduct new elections.
Gen. Ne Win’s provisional government, comprising senior military officers, was short-lived, lasting only 16 months. When the promised elections were held, a U Nu-led faction won. After he resumed leadership U Nu called a meeting for February 1962 where he planned to discuss with all ethnic leaders a way to find a solution to their grievances through peaceful and open discussions. However, before U Nu could instate his recommendations for peace, Gen. Ne Win led a military coup to seize power on 2 March 1962. Gen. Ne Win established a Revolutionary Council comprised of 17 senior officers, effectively ending the constitutional period.
Military Rule (1962-88)
The Revolutionary Council established a military dictatorship replacing the parliamentary federal system enshrined in the constitution. In July 1962, the Revolutionary Council created its own party, the Burma Socialist Program Party (BSPP), after having failed to win the backing of the established political parties. The Revolutionary Council published its first ideological statement entitled, “The Burmese Way to Socialism” at the end of April 1962. A year later it moved to a policy of rapid nationalization and assumed direct control of the economy. In 1971, the BSPP transformed itself into the governing structure though it retained the same military rulers, many of whom had retired from the armed forces. In 1974, a new constitution was adopted with additional centralized powers, serving to further entrench BSPP’s position as the only legal political party in the country.
The second constitution of independent Burma differed markedly from its predecessor. The Pyithu Hluttaw or People’s Assembly, a single chamber legislature, became the highest governing structure in the country and U Ne Win, who was the head of the BSPP, took over the Presidency. Under the one-party regime, freedom for the people of Burma was largely repressed. Furthermore, civil strife continued with the military instigating campaigns against the forces of the ethnic nationalities and the Burma Communist Party (BCP). During this period, the ruling regime faced popular unrest. Workers staged violent strikes in 1974 and 1975. Students also demonstrated throughout this period. A particularly serious student protest erupted in 1974 after a struggle between the students and the regime over the proper burial of the remains of U Thant, the third Sec. Gen. of the UN. In 1981 Ne Win abdicated the presidency but continued to head the BSPP. Political mismanagement and instability also severely affected the economy. For example, in 1987, following intense criticism from Ne Win, the regime demonetized three banknotes without warning or reimbursement. As a result, nearly 70 percent of the currency in circulation became worthless.
Tension within the country escalated to a breaking point in 1988. In March 1988, a teashop brawl led to the death of a student from the Rangoon Institute of Technology (RIT) after the intervention of riot police. Daily protests by RIT students ensued and spread to other universities. After twelve days of violent clashes with police, the regime closed the universities. The riots left several students dead and missing. When the universities reopened in June, the students resumed protests, calling for accountability into the student deaths and injuries. The military, however, responded with force, killing at least 20 more students and arresting hundreds of others. And once again the universities closed.
The wave of social unrest spread as the people of Burma became unified in their demand for political change. In response, the military declared a state of martial law. On 23 July 1988, the BSPP appointed Gen. Sein Lwin as the new party head and later president. To demonstrate opposition to continued military rule in the country, students and activists organized a peaceful, nationwide strike on 8 August 1988. The now notorious 8888 uprising led to the death and arrest of thousands of protestors and demonstrators at the hands of the regime.
Following the protest, on 12 August 1988 Gen. Sein Lwin was replaced by a civilian lawyer named Dr. Maung Maung. The period of civilian rule was not only superficial but short-lived. On 18 September 1988, the military regained power through a bloody coup. During the month of civilian leadership, agents of the military spread rumors that criminals had been released into the general population, the water supply was poisoned and that other heinous acts had been committed in order to stimulate an environment of fear and chaos. The revived military dictatorship forcibly took control under the name “State Law and Order Restoration Council” (SLORC). Opting for martial law, SLORC suspended the 1974 constitution and brutally suppressed all opposition through force, resulting in thousands of deaths and arrests.
SLORC’s Military Rule (1988-1997)
On 23 September 1988, having established himself as Burma’s leader, the head of the SLORC, Gen. Saw Maung, assured the public that the sole aim of military intervention was to restore law and order, improve the economic conditions of the people, and organize multiparty elections as soon as possible. He insisted that it was not his intention to “cling to State power for long.”
Within months parties began to register with the advent of a new election law. The National League for Democracy (NLD) led by Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, daughter of the national hero Gen. Aung San, quickly emerged as the leading opposition party. Daw Aung San Suu Kyi traveled throughout the country attracting large crowds, despite the SLORC decrees limiting public gatherings to four persons. As her following expanded, the military tried to discredit her. They accused her of not having “pure” motives, disparaged her marriage to a foreigner, questioned her loyalty to Burma, and suggested that she was being manipulated by Communists in her party. Unable to sway her supporters, in July 1989 SLORC placed Daw Aung San Suu Kyi under house arrest and disqualified her from participating in the elections. In spite of these tactics, the NLD achieved a landslide victory in the elections held on 27 May 1990, winning 392 of the 485 seats contested. In contrast, the SLORC-backed National Unity Party (NUP) won 10 seats.
Rejected by popular vote, the junta refused to implement the results claiming a constitution must be drafted before Parliament can convene. Meanwhile, the SLORC maintained control over the country through martial law. On 27 July 1990, the SLORC promulgated Declaration 1/90 confirming this stating, “[the SLORC] is not an organization that observes any constitution; it is an organization that is governing the nation under Martial Law.” Following this announcement SLORC began to arrest, harass, and intimidate NLD members as well as members of other political parties. As time progressed and the SLORC persisted in its refusal to hand over power, in December 1990 members of the elected Parliament established the National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma (NCGUB) with the support of all major ethnic groups struggling to assert themselves within Burma.
On 24 April 1992, two years after the elections, SLORC issued Order No. 11/92 titled the “Convening of a National Convention.” It indicated that a National Convention (NC) would be convened “in order to lay down basic principles to draft a firm constitution.” On 2 October 1992, however, without consulting any political or ethnic leaders, the regime delineated six objectives to “guide” the NC. The sixth principle essentially guarantees a dominant role for the military in any future government. In January 1993, the convention finally assembled with 702 delegates, of whom only 106 were elected representatives. The remaining delegates were either handpicked by the SLORC to “represent” workers, peasants, intellectuals, national races, and service personnel, or were “specially invited persons.” Regardless, meetings were repeatedly suspended after ethnic delegates persist in opposing a centralized state structure. Overriding such opposition and alternative proposals, the regime imposed another 104 principles to “guide” the constitutional drafting process. Furthermore, to suppress opposition to the NC, the SLORC also issued Order No. 5/96 on 7 June 1996 prohibiting criticism of the NC. The order carries a potential 20 year sentence.
On 10 July 1995, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi was released from almost six years of house arrest. Although her release initially raised hopes for an improvement in the human rights situation in Burma, nothing changed. Rather, the pace of political arrests and persecution accelerated dramatically after November 1995 when the NLD withdrew, along with other groups, from the SLORC-controlled NC due to its undemocratic processes. SLORC responded to the NLD withdrawal by expelling the NLD permanently from the convention. Increased targeting and harassment of NLD members and supporters followed. On 9 November 1996, a group of about 200 young men attacked Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s motorcade with iron bars and sticks. The men were thought to be members of the Union Solidarity Development Association (USDA), a puppet organization created by the regime to feign civilian support for the regime and intimidate the pro-democracy movement. In December 1996, more than 2,000 people, including hundreds of students, were arrested after engaging in peaceful demonstrations calling for genuine reforms. Public gatherings on weekends in front of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s home have been banned since the end of 1996.
Hostilities between the SLORC and armed ethnic resistance groups meanwhile continued throughout this period. The SLORC maintained a military presence throughout the ethnic minority areas, instigating attacks against resistance fighters. Singapore, China, and Pakistan supported the SLORC campaign by supplying the weaponry needs of the regime. Thailand disregarded increased offensives against border groups after the SLORC granted timber and fishing concessions in the border areas. In 1989, the SLORC heightened aggressive tactics in an effort to pressure opposition groups into one-sided ceasefire pacts. At this time, several resistance groups succumbed to the regime’s pressure and signed onto restrictive ceasefire agreements. Meanwhile attacks have continued in the ethnic minority areas. During the offensives, the military committed a range of human rights violations and abuses against ethnic minority villagers living within the conflict zones.
SPDC’s Military Rule (1997-Present)
On 15 November 1997, the SLORC was paradoxically renamed the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC). Although the three most senior members of the regime retained their posts in the SPDC, 14 former members, all senior military officers, were replaced and a four - member SPDC advisory group was established. In late November three members of this advisory group were placed under house arrest, including the former Tourism Minister Lt. Gen. Kyaw Ba; the former Commerce Minister Lt. Gen. Tun Kyi; and the former Agriculture Minister Lt. Gen. Myint Aung. A number of their aides and staff at other ministries were also placed under investigation. Following the detention, the advisory group was dissolved on 10 December 1997, less than one month after its formation. Officials said the members of the advisory group no longer held their military posts. The changes did not stop there. On 20 December, there was another unexpected reshuffle within the second tier of the military regime’s cabinet and eight posts were replaced and one new member was added. SPDC leaders conducted another reshuffle of top generals in November 2001, and in March 2002 arrested four relatives of former top general Ne Win. The four were accused of plotting to overthrow the current government in a military coup, and were sentenced to death for treason in September 2002.
With instability plaguing the military ranks and the regime refusing to cede power, the Committee Representing the People’s Parliament (CRPP) formed on 16 September 1998. In accordance with the 1974 Pyithu Hluttaw Law requiring the approval by 34 percent or more of the MP’s to convene Parliament, 52 percent of the elected MPs (or 251) gave approval to the ten founding members to form the CRPP. The CRPP’s objective was to convene as a provisional Parliament until all elected MPs are able to convene. As the first official act of the CRPP, the group repealed all SLORC and SPDC orders, decrees, notifications, rules and laws. In immediate response, the SPDC outlawed the organization. Despite serious restrictions and the imprisonment of Chairman Dr Saw Mra Aung, the CRPP has survived and continues to operate, although under constant threat.
In September 2000, a major crackdown by the SPDC on NLD leaders led to the detention of Chairman U Aung Shwe, and the house arrest of Vice-Chairman U Tin Oo and Gen. Sec. Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. The crackdown, however, acted as a catalyst for the initiation of UN brokered ‘talks’ between the regime and the NLD. In the months that followed, the SPDC allowed a number of NLD offices to reopen and released substantial numbers of political prisoners, acts which were hailed by the international community as a sign of the regime’s sincerity towards pursuing change. As dialogue continued, the SPDC agreed to release Daw Aung San Suu Kyi from 19 months of house arrest on 6 May 2002. The military intelligence, however, continued to monitor NLD leaders and attend meetings in Rangoon. Following her release, the junta allowed Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD a greater measure of freedom to travel around the country and to meet with representatives of foreign governments and international organizations.
By the end of 2002, it was clear that the regime was using the talks merely as a tool to deflect international criticism and garner increased aid and investment rather than to genuinely advance the country towards democratic reform. As the economic situation deteriorated inside Burma, dialogue between the NLD and SPDC came to a halt. Despite repeated calls for more open lines of communication, the SPDC increasingly withdrew from further discussions and throughout the first half of 2003 the regime refused to schedule more talks. In addition, beginning in 2003 and continuing throughout 2005, the regime has excluded Razali Ismail, the UN Special Envoy for Burma, and Paulo Sergio Pinheiro, the UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights in Burma, from entering the country. Although Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD were able to engage in several campaigning tours in the first half of 2003, harassment and targeting of NLD members continued. Tension escalated to a breaking point when on 30 May 2003, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and her entourage were violently attacked by members of the USDA and other state organized individuals on the road to Depayin, Sagaing Division. An unknown number of individuals were killed in the attack, subsequently labeled the “Depayin Massacre.” In addition, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, NLD Deputy Chairman U Tin Oo, and all members of the Central Executive Committee of the NLD were placed under military custody. NLD offices across the country were also ordered closed.
In an attempt to assuage international criticism following the Depayin Massacre, the junta reshuffled the military leadership on 25 August 2003. In the military reshuffle, the relatively moderate Gen. Khin Nyunt was removed from the position of Secretary 1 and placed in a newly created position of Prime Minister. Lt. Gen. Soe Win, who is believed to have planned the Depayin attack on the NLD, replaced Gen. Khin Nyunt as Secretary 1. To further deflect international criticism, the regime also announced a seven-point road map to democracy just five days later on 30 August 2005, the first step of which was to resume the NC.
Reconvening on 17 May 2004 without the participation of eight ethnic minority groups and several political parties including the NLD, the NC proved to be a continuation of the previous undemocratic, unrepresentative sessions. In total, 1,076 out of 1,088 delegates attended the 2004 session of the NC. Only 15 MPs elected in the 1990 elections were present. In addition, only seven legally registered political parties that participated in the 1990 elections attended. Besides being unrepresentative in nature, the 2004 session of the NC proceeded under highly restrictive conditions that suppressed the freedoms of opinion, expression, movement, assembly and association of the delegates. On 9 July 2004, the NC recessed with very little progress achieved towards genuine democratic reform.
Disagreements among the SPDC military elite resulted in yet another reshuffling of the ranks in October 2004. On 19 October 2004, Prime Minister Khin Nyunt was removed from his post, arrested, and placed under house arrest. His two sons, Zaw Naing Oo and Ye Naing Win were also arrested. Gen. Khin Nyunt was charged on eight grounds, including bribery and corruption, and given a 44-year suspended sentence on 22 July 2005. His sons along with other relatives were given similarly lengthy sentences.
Following Gen. Khin Nyunt’s removal, Lt. Gen. Soe Win took over the office of Prime Minister. Meanwhile, the regime underwent a widespread purge of everything associated with the former Prime Minister. In addition to the removal of all photographs, posters and billboards of Gen. Khin Nyunt, all his cronies and affiliates were dismissed and subject to potential arrest. The purge resulted in the dismantling of the National Intelligence Bureau (NIB), the body that controlled the Defense Ministry’s Military Intelligence Services (MIS). In the months that followed, 300 top level former MI agents were arrested, some 1,500 were allowed to “retire,” and about 2,500 were transferred to combat duty. Dismemberment of the NIB, however, has not meant the end to MI in Burma. Intelligence operations have since reorganized now functioning under the Office of the Military Affairs Security and reporting directly to the regional military commands. The reshuffle also included several other shifts in the leadership and was viewed as a consolidation of hardliners among the military elite of the SPDC.
The removal of Gen. Khin Nyunt as prime minister and dissolution of the NIB also led to three mass prison releases over the course of 2004. However, out of the 14,318 prisoners released from November to December 2004, only 76 were political prisoners. Among the 76 political prisoners released was Min Ko Naing, chairman of the All Burma Federation of Student Unions (ABFSU), who had been imprisoned for over 15 years. Another mass release of prisoners occurred on 3 January 2005, with the NC a little over a month away and the regime desperate to gain political favor. The SPDC released 5,588 inmates from prisons around the country, however only 23 political prisoners were among those released. Despite these releases, over 1,100 political prisoners remained incarcerated at the end of 2005.
The removal of Gen. Khin Nyunt, however, did little to stabilize the political atmosphere in Burma. Since the ouster of Gen. Khin Nyunt, the military leadership line-up has been in constant flux. Power struggles between SPDC chairman Sen. Gen. Than Shwe and his second-in-command Vice Sen. Gen. Maung Aye continued throughout 2005 spurring rumors of another potential ouster. At the end of May 2005 and in August 2005, the regime underwent yet another major reorganization with a reshuffle of about half of the regional commanders. In addition, several high ranking SPDC officers were removed from their posts in August 2005 and placed under house arrest or “permitted to retire,” including the Director General of the SPDC Office Lt. Col. Pe Nyein, Director General of the Prime Minister’s office Soe Tint, as well as Brig. Gen. Pyi Sone and Than Shwe who are attached to the Prime Minister’s office.
Several bombings throughout the country further demonstrated the lack of stability within the country. From the end of 2004 throughout 2005, a total of 18 bombs were detonated. Following a series of bombings on 7 May 2005 in Rangoon that killed at least eleven people and injured 162, the junta increased restrictions. Despite being unable to produce concrete evidence of the perpetrators of the bombings, the regime blamed several opposition groups subsequently outlawing them, labeling them as terrorist organizations and conducting widespread arrests.
In an attempt to feign some level of stability and progress within the country following the ouster of Gen. Khin Nyunt, the regime announced plans to recommence the NC on 17 February 2005. However, in the lead up to the February 2005 session, the junta made efforts to stifle all potential opposition to the process by targeting and harassing opposition groups. Political and ethnic minority leaders were subject to arrest, detention, and other abuses at the hands of the SPDC in an attempt to silence resistance to the regime’s agenda. The regime arbitrarily extended the detention of ten prominent political dissidents, including NLD leaders, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and U Tin Oo as well as several elected MP’s. Military build-up and increased hostilities in the ethnic areas also continued. The SPDC also arrested several prominent Shan activists and leaders, including Gen. Hkun Htun Oo and Gen. Hso Ten, chairmen of the Shan Nationalities League for Democracy (SNLD) and the Shan State Peace Council (SSPC) respectively, only days before the February session was scheduled to resume. These leaders were later handed severely harsh sentences ranging from 70 years to 93 years of imprisonment.
The February 2005 sessions adjourned on 31 March 2005 without achieving any genuine progress towards democratic reform. Despite indications by the regime in May 2005 that the December 2005 NC proceeding would be the final session of the protracted constitutional drafting process, the Convention adjourned in January 2006 without any real advancement. Participation in both 2005 sessions remained highly unrepresentative with several political and ethnic minority groups excluded from the proceedings. Like past Conventions, a majority of the delegates in attendance were members of SPDC-sponsored organizations, such as the USDA. Furthermore, open discussion was largely circumscribed by the regime, with the regime actively stifling all proposals initiated by delegates that were not in keeping with its predetermined agenda. Meanwhile, hostility against ethnic minority groups and harassment against political organizations continued. The regime again extended the terms of house arrest for Daw Aung Suu Kyi and U Tin Oo on 27 November and 13 February 2005 respectively. The undemocratic nature of both terms of the 2005 proceedings spurred criticism within the country as well as throughout the international community.
In another unexpected move, the SPDC relocated its ministries, civil servants and operations to the remote village of Pyinmana, Mandalay Division, located about 320 km. from Rangoon. The move occurred at the auspicious time of 6:37 am on 6 November 2005. Without advanced notice, civil servants were forced to relocate to Pyinmana, leaving families and businesses behind. The civil servants meanwhile found Pyinmana unprepared for their arrival, with basic accommodations, facilities, and commodities lacking. However, civil servants who applied for resignations were threatened with imprisonment, causing some to go into hiding. The site itself is reportedly surrounded by barbed wire and under heavy military guard.
Throughout 2005, the regime continued to commit severe human rights abuses against the people of Burma, including forced labor and portering practices, forcible recruitment of child soldiers, extrajudicial killings, arbitrary arrests, rape, torture, forcible relocation and confiscation of property. Furthermore, the regime continued to restrict basic freedoms, including the freedom of speech, press, assembly, association, movement, and religion.
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