Country Reports on
Human Rights Practices for 1995
Released by the Bureau of Democracy,
Human Rights, and Labor
March
1996
The SLORC permitted a relatively free election in 1990, but it failed to honor
the results--which were an overwhelming rejection of military rule--or to cede
power to the victorious prodemocracy forces. Instead,
the SLORC attacked the coalition of winning parties and their leaders through
intimidation, detention, and house arrest. In April 1992, the SLORC began
taking some steps to lessen its harsh rule. The regime reopened universities,
released some political prisoners, and introduced modest economic reforms. But
in January 1993 the SLORC established the "National Convention," a
body ostensibly tasked with working out a new constitution and primarily made
up of delegates handpicked by the military. The SLORC has carefully
stage-managed the Convention's proceedings and ignored even limited opposition
views. Despite having no mandate from the people, the SLORC seems determined to
draft a constitution that will guarantee a dominant role for the military in
the country's future political structure.
The Government reinforces its rule via a pervasive security apparatus led by
the Directorate of Defense Services Intelligence (DDSI). Control is buttressed
by selective restrictions on contact with foreigners, surveillance of
government employees and private citizens, harassment of political activists,
intimidation, arrest, detention, and physical abuse. The Government justifies
its security measures as necessary to maintain order and national unity,
although almost all major insurgent groups have reached accommodations with the
SLORC in recent years, and the others pose little threat to major population
centers. Members of the security forces committed numerous serious human rights
abuses.
The Government's severe repression of human rights continued essentially
unchanged during 1995, despite a few potentially significant moves on the
political front and the appearance of greater normalcy fostered by increased
economic activity. Out of sight of most visitors, citizens continued to live
subject at any time and without appeal to the arbitrary and sometimes brutal
dictates of the military. There continued to be credible reports, particularly
from ethnic minority dominated areas, that soldiers committed serious human
rights abuses, including extrajudicial killings and rape. Disappearances
continued, and members of the security forces beat and otherwise abused
detainees. Prison conditions remained harsh, and the judiciary is not
independent of the executive.
The use of porters by the army--with attendant mistreatment, illness, and even
death for those compelled to serve--remained a standard practice. The military
continued to force ordinary Burmese on a massive scale (including women and
children) to "contribute" their labor, often under harsh working
conditions, on construction projects throughout the country. A midyear
directive ordering a halt to certain kinds of forced labor appeared to have
only a limited impact. Although the Government continued to release some
prisoners, it continued arbitrarily to arrest and detain
citizens for the slightest expression of dissenting political views. Several
hundred, if not more, political prisoners remained in detention, including
approximately 20 Members of Parliament elected in 1990. The International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) closed its office in July as a result of the SLORC's refusal to accept the ICRC's
standard modalities for conducting prison visits.
The SLORC continued to restrict severely basic rights to free speech, press,
assembly, association, and privacy. Worker rights are also severely limited.
Political party activity remained severely restricted, and citizens do not have
the right to change their government. By year's end, the Government had still
not taken up Aung San Suu Kyi's call for a genuine dialog on political reform. The
Government's rejection of the appeal of the opposition National League for
Democracy (NLD) for a reform of the National Convention's working procedures
led most of the Convention's elected representatives to withdraw in November.
Although more than 196,000 Rohingyas (Burmese Muslims from
Several positive developments occurred, most notably the release of
Despite these positive moves, by year's end the SLORC had yet to make a
fundamental break with its past behavior and demonstrate a willingness to cede
its hold on absolute power. Most importantly, the generals have failed thus far
to begin negotiating with the country's prodemocracy
forces and ethnic groups on a genuine political settlement to allow a return to
the rule of law and respect for basic human rights.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
There was no evidence of an explicit or systematic government policy
encouraging summary killings. However, there continued to be credible reports
of instances of brutality and killings of civilians by the military,
particularly in minority dominated areas and among those impressed as porters.
The Government's general disregard for human rights has created a climate
clearly conducive to such abuses.
b. Disappearance
As in previous years, private citizens and political activists continued to
"disappear" temporarily for several hours to several weeks. DDSI
officials usually picked up people for questioning without the knowledge of
their family members and in many cases, though not all,
released them soon afterward. At the same time, large numbers of people
continued to be taken away by the military for porterage
or other duties, often without the knowledge of their family members. The
whereabouts of those conscripted, as well as of prisoners transferred for labor
or porterage duties, remained difficult to trace (see
Sections 1.g. and 6.c.).
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
Again in 1995, political detainees were held incommunicado for long periods.
Detainees were routinely subjected to harsh interrogation techniques designed
to intimidate and disorient. The most common forms of mistreatment were sleep
and food deprivation coupled with round-the- clock questioning, but some were
also kicked and beaten. In recent years, there have been credible reports of
prisoners being forced to squat or assume unnatural positions for lengthy
periods. In the past, there have also been reports of practices such as
electrical shocks to the genitals, suffocation, and cigarette burns, but there
were no known instances of these techniques being employed in 1995.
There continued to be credible reports that security forces subjected ordinary
citizens to harassment and physical abuse. In rural villages the military
routinely entered villages to confiscate property and food and used abusive
recruitment methods to procure porters. Those forced into porterage
or other duties faced extremely difficult conditions and mistreatment that
sometimes resulted in death. There was a steady pattern of reports that
soldiers raped ethnic minority women (see Section 1.g.).
The regimen at Insein prison near
Unlike in the past, in May the SLORC refused to allow visiting U.S. Congressman
Bill Richardson to meet with political prisoners. Similarly, the SLORC refused
a request by U.N. Special Rapporteur Yozo Yokota to
visit several political prisoners during his October trip. Credible reports
indicate a group of political prisoners at Insein
prison was mistreated after smuggling information to Professor Yokota on
conditions in that facility. The Government continued to bar the ICRC from
visiting detainees or convicted prisoners of any kind. After the Government
officially notified the ICRC that it was not prepared to accept the ICRC's standard procedures for conducting prison visits,
the ICRC closed its
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
The SLORC routinely practiced arbitrary arrest and
incommunicado detention. Prior to being charged, detainees do not have access
to legal counsel or their families. There is no provision in the law for
judicial determination of the legality of detention, and political detainees
cannot obtain release on bail.
Because of the high level of intimidation discouraging overt political
activity, detentions for public antigovernment activities remained at a
relatively low level. Nonetheless, the authorities continued to detain scores
of political activists for low-level political activity, such as handing out
opposition flyers or shouting political slogans in public. For example, in
February at least 20 young people were arrested in connection with a short
demonstration at the funeral of former Prime Minister U Nu; 9 were later
sentenced to 7 years in prison. Other small groups of young people were
detained in July for distributing flyers, and at year's end only a few were
known to have been released.
In June the authorities detained former National League for Democracy (NLD)
acting chairman Kyi Maung, who had been released from prison only 3 months
earlier. Kyi Maung and two
of his four companions picked up at the same time were subsequently released.
The other two were held and later tried in a summary procedure without benefit
of legal counsel and sentenced to 7 years in prison. This included the former
chairman of the Democracy Party, Thu Wai. At the same
time, another former Democracy Party activist, Htway Myint, was also arrested, tried, and given a 7-year
sentence. All three were convicted for allegedly violating the country's
security laws when in fact they appear to have merely engaged in political
discussions.
In November three supporters of Aung San Suu Kyi were arrested and within
days sentenced to 2 years in prison for objecting to the placement of
traffic-control barriers by police in front of the NLD leader's residence.
Forced exile is not used as a method of political control.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
The judiciary is not independent of the executive. The SLORC names justices to
the Supreme Court, who, in turn, appoint lower court judges (with the approval
of the SLORC).
The court system, as inherited from the British and subsequently restructured,
is comprised of courts at the township, district, state, and national levels.
Throughout 1995 the Government continued to rule by decree and was not bound by
any constitutional provisions providing for fair public trials or any other
rights. Although remnants of the British-era legal system were formally in
place, the court system and its operation remained seriously flawed. Many
observers believe there has been an improvement over the last few years in
judicial procedures, at least in the handling of nonpolitical cases. But
ongoing unprofessional behavior by some court officials, pervasive
bribe-taking, the misuse of overly broad laws, and the manipulation of the
courts for political ends continued to deprive citizens of the right to a fair
trial and the rule of law.
Some basic due process rights, including the right to a public trial and the
right to be represented by a defense attorney, were generally respected except
in sensitive political cases. Defense attorneys are permitted to call and
cross-examine witnesses, but their primary purpose is to bargain with the judge
to obtain the shortest possible sentence for their clients. Most court
proceedings are open to the public. However, in political cases, almost all
trials are held in courtrooms on prison compounds and are not open to the
public. In these instances, defense counsel appears to serve no purpose other
than to provide moral support, since reliable reports indicate verdicts are
dictated by higher authorities.
During the first 3 months of the year, 105 persons believed to be political
prisoners were released, including former NLD Member of Parliament-elect and
one-time National Convention delegate Dr. Aung Khin Sint. This group also
included former NLD chairman Tin Oo and former acting
NLD chairman Kyi Maung. On
July 10, Aung San Suu Kyi was freed unconditionally after serving 6 years under
house arrest. During the remainder of the year, 49 other persons believed to
have been political prisoners were released. By year's end, at least several
hundred--if not many more--political prisoners remained incarcerated.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, and Correspondence
The military ruled unchecked by any outside authority, and the State continued
to interfere extensively and arbitrarily in the lives of private citizens.
Through its extensive intelligence network, the Government closely monitored
the travel, whereabouts, and activities of many citizens, particularly those
known to be politically active. Security personnel selectively screened private
correspondence and telephone calls and conducted warrantless
searches of private premises. On occasion the Government attempted to jam
foreign radio broadcasts (see Section 2.a.). Government employees were required
to obtain advance permission before meeting with foreigners.
The SLORC continued to move people out of cities to peripheral new town
settlements, though not on the same scale as in the early 1990's. While
facilities in some of these areas have improved over time, residents targeted
for displacement continued to be given no option but to move, usually on short
notice. The military also continued to relocate forcibly some rural villages,
especially in ethnic minority areas.
Those able to remain in established cities and towns were subject to arbitrary
seizure of their property. In a number of urban areas, residents were compelled
to cede land for road-widening projects decided upon without any public
consultation or endorsement. Other long-term city residents were required to
cede land for commercial redevelopment and were compensated at only a fraction
of the value of their lost homes. Automobiles and other movable property
remained vulnerable to arbitrary seizure. In rural areas, military personnel at
times confiscated livestock and food supplies.
g. Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian Law in Internal
Conflicts
For more than four decades the Burmese Army has battled diverse ethnic
insurgencies. These ethnic minority insurgent groups have sought to gain
greater autonomy from the dominant ethnic Burman majority. In 1989 the SLORC
began a policy of seeking cease-fire agreements with most ethnic insurgent
groups. In late 1994, however, the army moved militarily against the largest remaining
ethnic insurgent group, the Karen National Union (KNU). In late 1994, the KNU
broke into two factions, in part because of government efforts to stir up
religious tension between the Karen Christian and Buddhist communities. The
Buddhist faction, known as the Democratic Karen Buddhist Organization (DKBO)
subsequently allied itself with the Government.
In January the Burmese army offensive led to the fall of Manerplaw,
the longtime headquarters of the KNU and of semiexiled
prodemocracy forces. Less than a month later, the KNU's last major defensive encampment along the Thai border
also fell to army troops. These two incidents unleashed a flood of as many as
10,000 refugees into
In connection with the military's campaign against the Karen, Karenni, and drug
trafficker Khun Sa and his Shan United Army, as many
as several thousand civilians were believed to have been coerced into working
as porters in jungle areas in or near combat zones. According to reliable
reports, military sweeps for porters or demands for porter "taxes"
(i.e., cash payment instead of porter duties) reached as far as
Antigoverment insurgent groups were also responsible
for violence; mines laid by insurgents caused both civilian and military
deaths. At least one former insurgent group that concluded a cease-fire
agreement with the SLORC is known to have used forced labor. In addition, the
narcotics-trafficking Shan United Army brutalized and murdered villagers, conducted
forced recruitment of boys, and impressed porters while fighting against the
army and ensuring continued cultivation of opium by peasant farmers.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
Severe restrictions on freedom of speech and the press persisted throughout
1995. The security services continued to clamp down on those attempting to
express opposition political views, such as by handing out flyers or chanting
slogans (see Section 1.d.). Many more refrained from speaking out for fear of
arrest and interrogation. Major exceptions were Aung
San Suu Kyi, and NLD Vice
Chairmen Tin Do and Kyi Maung,
who following Aung San Suu Kyi's release in July regularly gave short speeches in
front of her residence to those willing to run the risk of being seen by
military intelligence.
All forms of domestic public media were officially controlled or censored. This
strict control in turn encouraged self-censorship on the part of writers and
publishers. Private citizens were generally unable to
subscribe directly to foreign publications. A limited supply of secondhand
copies of international newsmagazines and a sizable number of private
publications on nonpolitical issues were available to the public at large, but
censors occasionally banned issues or deleted articles deemed unwelcome by the
Government.
The government-monopoly television, radio, and newspaper media remained
propaganda instruments. With the exception of coverage of some limited aspects
of the National Convention, these official media did not report opposing views
but rather attacked those in the democratic opposition who dared to take issue
with government policies. Editors remained answerable to military authorities.
While the English-language daily New Light of Myanmar continued to include many
international wire service reports on foreign news, domestic news hewed
strictly to and reinforced government policy.
Many foreign journalists, including television crews, were able to visit and
report on developments in the country, although their movements were sometimes
restricted and monitored. However, other journalists were denied visas or
issuance was so delayed as to render a planned visit impossible.
Foreign radio broadcasts, such as those of the British Broadcasting Corporation
(BBC), Voice of America (VOA), and Norway-based Democratic Voice of Burma,
remained prime sources of uncensored information. The authorities at times
attempted to jam or otherwise interfere with the reception of these broadcasts.
However, the head of the BBC's Burmese service was officially received in May,
and two reporters for VOA's Burmese service were each
allowed to remain in the country for several months. The Government also
allowed some foreign government-sponsored information programs.
The authorities took new steps to restrict the use of satellite television.
After imposing a September 1993 deadline for registering satellite dishes, they
failed to approve additional licenses or clarify who in the future would be
allowed to have access to foreign television. In June the Government issued an
official warning threatening up to 3 years' imprisonment for operation of an
unlicensed satellite television receiver.
University teachers and professors remained subject to the same restrictions on
freedom of speech, political activities, and publications as other government
employees. These included warnings against criticism of the Government;
instructions not to discuss politics while at work; and strictures against
joining or supporting political parties, engaging in political activity, or
meeting foreign officials. Teachers continued to be held responsible for
propagating SLORC political goals among their students and for maintaining
discipline and preventing students from engaging in any unauthorized political
activity.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
The Government does not respect these rights. The
government prohibition on unauthorized outdoor assemblies of more than five
people remained in effect, although authorities enforced it unevenly. For
example, at times between 2,000 and 3,000 people were able to gather in front
of Aung San Suu Kyi's residence to listen to her weekly talks. However,
legal political parties remained formally required to request permission from
the authorities to hold internal meetings of their own membership. During one
weekly gathering at the home of Aung San Suu Kyi, three people were
arrested for confronting policemen about the placement of barriers to control
the crowd (see Section 1.d.).
Despite these restrictions, the NLD leadership held internal meetings, traveled
upcountry to meet with its supporters, and hosted large public gatherings.
Citizens engaged in these activities, including those attending Aung San Suu Kyi's
addresses, remained subject to arrest at any time for their activities. Late in
the year, the Government's own mass mobilization organization, the Union
Solidarity and Development Association (USDA), orchestrated a series of rallies
as a mass demonstration of support for the SLORC's
political objectives. With few exceptions, attendance was coerced, with
explicit threats of penalities for those who
contemplated staying away. Religious groups, by contrast, sometimes encountered
problems holding outdoor gatherings.
In addition to the USDA, the right of association existed only for
organizations, including trade associations and professional bodies, permitted
by law and duly registered with the Government. Only a handful continued to
exist, and even those were subject to direct government intervention or took
special care to act in line with government policy. This included such benign
groups as the Myanmar Red Cross and the Myanmar Medical Association. Only 10
political parties (compared to 75 in 1992) remained legal at year's end
c. Freedom of Religion
Adherents of all religions duly registered with the authorities generally
enjoyed freedom to worship as they chose, although Buddhists continued to enjoy
a privileged position. In recent years, the Government has made special efforts
to link itself with Buddhism as a means of asserting its own popular
legitimacy. For example, during the year the military arranged the visit of a
venerated Buddha tooth relic from
The Government monitors the activities of members of all religions, in part
because they have in the past been politically active. Security services
demanded that religious groups seek prior authorization to conduct services out
of doors. These regulations were also in effect in and around Buddhist
monasteries and pagodas. Religious publications remained subject to the same
control and censorship imposed on secular ones. Christian Bibles translated
into indigenous languages could not be imported. It remained extremely
difficult for Christian and Muslim groups to obtain permission to build new
churches and mosques.
Religious groups were able to establish links with coreligionists in other
countries, although these activities were reportedly monitored by the
Government. Foreign religious representatives were usually only allowed visas
for short stays, but in some cases were permitted to preach to Burmese
congregations. In August Roman Catholic Cardinal Josef Tomko
was able to visit
Credible reports continued of isolated incidents in which the Government
removed cemeteries in the course of infrastructure projects in urban areas.
These removals targeted adherents of many faiths, including Buddhists, but were
a particularly serious problem for Muslims and Christians, who--unlike
Buddhists--consider such "final resting places" to be sacred ground.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
Although citizens have the legal right to live anywhere in the country, both
urban and rural residents were subject to arbitrary relocation (see Section l.f.). Except for limitations in areas of insurgent activity,
citizens could travel freely within the country but had to notify local
authorities of their whereabouts. Those residents unable to meet the
restrictive provisions of the citizenship law, (e.g., Chinese, Arakanese
Muslims, etc.) had to obtain prior permission to travel (see Section 5). Rural
farmers were also not free to leave the land at will.
While the Government relaxed restrictions on passport issuance, it carefully
scrutinized all prospective travel abroad. Many applicants were also forced to
pay bribes to obtain passports to which they were entitled. The official board
that reviews passport applications denied passports in some cases apparently on
political grounds. All college graduates obtaining a passport (except for
certain government employees) were required to pay a special education
clearance fee to reimburse the Government. Citizens who emigrated legally were
generally allowed to return to visit relatives, and even some who had lived
abroad illegally and acquired foreign citizenship were able to return to visit.
In January the authorities extended until the end of the year special
procedures allowing former citizens residing abroad to reacquire citizenship.
In anticipation of the Government's planned "Visit Myanmar Year
1996," restrictions were further eased on foreign travelers. As of
September 1, Burmese embassies began issuing tourist visas within 24 hours and
lowered visa fees. However, select categories of applicants, such as human
rights advocates, certain journalists, and political figures, continued to be
denied entry visas unless traveling under the aegis of a sponsor acceptable to
the Government. Although some areas of the country remained off-limits to
foreigners for security reasons, the authorities officially opened up a substantial
number of new domestic destinations.
In 1995 over 60,000 of the Rohingya Muslims who fled to
The Government was reportedly reluctant to allow the UNHCR to play a similar
role along the Thai border in connection with the expected repatriation of
large numbers of Mon returnees.
The Government does not allow refugees or displaced persons from abroad to
resettle or seek safe haven.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to Change Their
Government
Despite the overwhelming desire citizens demonstrated in the 1990 elections for
a return to democracy, they continued to be denied the right to change their
government. Since 1988 active duty military officers have occupied an
increasing number of important positions throughout the bureaucracy,
particularly at the policymaking level. Despite the appointment of several
civilians to the Cabinet in 1992, the process of placing military or recently
retired military officers in most key senior level positions once held by
technocrats in the economic ministries continued.
Following the NLD's victory in the 1990 elections,
the SLORC set aside the election results and disqualified, detained, arrested,
or drove into exile many successful candidates. Since then 201 of the 485
Deputies elected have either been disqualified,
resigned under pressure, gone into exile, been detained, or died. Approximately
20 successful candidates from the election remain in prison.
Rather than accept the will of the citizenry, the SLORC convened a National
Convention in January 1993 to draw up principles for a new constitution. The
SLORC handpicked delegates, and proceedings have been carefully stage-managed;
even limited opposition views have been ignored. Despite having no mandate from
the people, the SLORC tasked the Convention with drafting principles for a new
constitution ensuring a dominant role for the military in the country's future
political structure. The SLORC leadership met with prodemocracy
leader Aung San Suu Kyi on two occasions in late 1994, but throughout the
following year they failed to heed her call for genuine dialog on the country's
political future and instead proceeded with their own controlled
"consultations" on a new constitution. In late November, the NLD
delegates withdrew from the Convention pending agreement by the authorities to
discuss revising the convention working procedures. Two days later they were
formally expelled. This left the Convention exercise almost solely in the hands
of government appointees and definitively removed whatever semblance of claim
it might once have had to represent the Burmese people.
Minorities and women are underrepresented in the top ranks of government service
and largely excluded from military leadership. Members of certain minority
groups continued to be denied full citizenship (see Section 5).
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and Nongovernmental
Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human Rights
The Government does not allow domestic human rights
organizations to exist, and it remained generally hostile to outside scrutiny
of its human rights record. However, the authorities continued formally to
receive the U.N. Secretary General's Special Representative. In February
Assistant Secretary General for Political Affairs Alvaro
After considering the January report of its Special Rapporteur for
A limited number of nonpolitical international NGO's continued project work in
Burma, while a few more established a provisional presence while undertaking
the protracted negotiations necessary to set up permanent operations in the
country.
The ICRC closed its office after failing to gain access to Burmese prisons.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, Language, or
Social Status
The Government continued to rule by decree and was not
bound by any constitutional provisions concerning discrimination.
Women
In part because of the strong role of religion, violence against women,
including spousal abuse, is not considered socially acceptable and occurs
relatively infrequently.
The trafficking of women and girls to
In general, women in
Women did not consistently receive equal pay for equal work. There were no
independent women's rights organizations, and no government ministry
specifically targeted the safeguarding of women's interests. A
government-controlled agency, the Myanmar Maternal and Child Welfare
Association (MMCWA), provided some assistance to mothers, and a new
professional society for businesswomen, the Myanmar Women Entrepreneurs'
Association, was formed in 1995.
Children
Despite the establishment of various child welfare programs, the Government
allocated few resources for programs relevant to children, and once again cut
the share of the national budget for education (to 13 percent), with a mere 0.5
percent allocated to social welfare services (versus an official 33 percent for
the military).
There is no pattern of societal abuse of children, although poverty and
alcoholism sometimes lead to instances of abuse. Many families allowed their
young daughters to travel to
People with Disabilities
Official assistance to persons with disabilities is extremely limited.
There is no law mandating accessibility to government facilities. While there
are several small-scale organizations to assist the disabled, most disabled
persons must rely on traditional family structures to provide for their
welfare. Funding from the South Korean Red Cross allowed a prosthesis program
begun by the ICRC to continue. Because of land mines and train accidents,
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities
Burma's myriad ethnic minorities have long resented the dominance of the
country's Burman majority. Over the last few years and continuing in 1995, the
SLORC, in the name of national solidarity, has sought to pacify these ethnic
groups by means of negotiated cease-fires, grants of limited autonomy, and
promises of development assistance. By year's end, the Government had
negotiated cease-fire agreements with 15 of 16 recognized ethnic insurgent
groups, and talks with a final ethnic group, the Karen National Knion (KNU), were believed to be underway. However, the
Government's settlement with the Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP)
broke down after the Burmese army forcibly entered areas under KNPP control.
The Government included a large number of ethnic minority representatives in
the National Convention and permitted extended debate on the issue of minority
autonomy. However, the ethnic minority populations complain that their concerns
have not been addressed adequately by the Government, and none is satisfied
with the provisions on limited "self-administration" which the
authorities plan to accord a few groups under the new constitution.
Government investment in the border areas in road, hospital, and school
construction has been modest at best, and economic development of ethnic
minority areas continued to lag, leaving many living at barely subsistence
levels. Since the focus of the hostilities against armed insurgencies has been
in the border areas where most minorities are concentrated, those populations
have been disproportionately victimized by the general brutalization associated
with the military's activities.
Since only people who can prove long familial links to
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
There were no functioning trade unions; even former government- controlled ones
were dormant. Workers continued to be unable to strike, and there were no
reported instances of attempts to do so.
In July 1989, the
Because of
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
Workers do not have the right to organize and bargain collectively to set wages
and benefits. The Government's Central Arbitration Board, which theoretically
provides a means for settling major labor disputes, continued to exist on paper
but in practice was dormant. Township-level labor supervisory committees
remained in place to address various low- level labor concerns.
The Government unilaterally sets wages in the public sector. In the private
sector, wages are set by market forces. The Government pressures joint ventures
not to pay salaries greater than those of ministers or other high-level
employees. Joint ventures circumvent this with supplemental pay, including
remuneration paid in foreign exchange certificates, as well as through
incentive and overtime pay and other fringe benefits. Foreign firms generally
set wages near those of the domestic private sector but follow the example of
joint ventures in awarding supplemental wages and benefits.
No special export processing zones exist.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Despite government promises to alter the Village and Town Acts to withdraw the
claimed statutory basis for forced labor in the country,
at year's end the legislation was not changed. As the military continued its
program of road, rail, dam, and other infrastructure projects, its recourse to
forced labor remained at a high level. Hundreds of thousands--if not more--of
ordinary citizens were compelled to contribute labor to these public works. In
preparation for the "Visit Myanmar Year- 1996," in 1995 the Mandalay
Moat Project was completed by using a combination of prison, military, and paid
labor, and the Ye- Tavoy railroad in southern Burma
continued to employ large-scale forced labor, including child labor, according
to credible reports .
In June the ILO Conference Committee on the Application of Standards cited
Although the Government refused to acknowledge its use of forced labor
publicly, in June it issued an internal order instructing officials to use paid
labor on large-scale infrastructure projects. By year's end, many instances of
forced labor (or forced monetary contributions in lieu of labor) nevertheless
continued to be reported.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
Although the law sets a minimum age for the employment
of children, in practice the law is not enforced. Working children are highly
visible in cities, mostly working for small or family enterprises. Children are
hired at lower pay rates than adults for the same kind of work, and economic
pressure forces them to work not only for their survival but also to support
their families. Arts and crafts is the only sector
producing for the export market which employs a significant number of children.
Despite a compulsory education law, almost 40 percent of children never enroll
in school, and only 27 percent complete the 5-year primary school course.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
Surplus labor conditions and lack of protection by government authorities
continue to dictate substandard conditions for workers, despite recent annual
economic growth of at least 5 percent. The Law on Fundamental Workers Rights of
1964 and the Factories Act of 1951 regulate working conditions. There is a
legally prescribed 5-day, 35- hour workweek for employees in the public sector
and a 6-day, 44-hour workweek for private and public sector employees, with
overtime paid for additional work. The law also allows for a 24-hour rest
period per week and workers have 21 paid holidays a year. Such provisions
actually affect only a small portion of the country's labor force.
Only government employees and employees of a few traditional industries are
covered by minimum wage provisions. The minimum monthly wage for salaried
public employees (based on the market exchange rate of 120 kyats
= $1.00) is $5.00 (600 kyats), but this sum is
supplemented by various subsidies and allowances. The minimum wage is
insufficient to provide a decent standard of living for a worker and family. In
particular, the low level of remuneration of public employment fostered
widespread corruption. The government minimum wage for day labor is $0.16 daily
(20 kyats). Workers in the private sector are much
better paid. The actual average wage rate for casual laborers in
Numerous health and safety regulations exist on the books, but the Government
has not made the necessary resources available to those charged with their
enforcement. Although workers may in principle remove themselves from hazardous
conditions, in practice workers cannot expect to retain their jobs.