PRESENTATION TO EU “BURMA DAY” Brussels, 5 April 2005

BY FORMER AUSTRALIAN AMBASSADOR TO MYANMAR

TREVOR WILSON*

AUSTRALIA’S HUMAN RIGHTS INITIATIVE 2000-2003

A BRIEF CASE STUDY

Australia’s human rights training program was an attempt by the Australian Government to deal indirectly with one of the worst problems of present day Burma, the widespread abuse of human rights. The program was the result of long negotiations with the Myanmar Government, during which Australia set out explicitly what it sought from the program, namely an opportunity to expose Burmese officials and others to Burma’s human rights obligations under international law. (In the workshops, the word “obligations” was often use on the banners for the workshop.) The program was “frozen” in June 2003 after the Depayin incident and has now been discontinued because of the unconducive political situation that has prevailed since then,

No detailed public report or evaluation of the program exists, but in 2004 AusAID released a factual “Summary” of the program which gave only “bare bones”. But the program was certainly regarded at the time as being successful. As at May 2003, at the conclusion of Phase 1 of the program, the Australian Government was about to expand the program with Phase 2 that included a high-level human rights advocate as well as a substantive and geographic extension of the program. This was a clear indication that, at that stage, the program was judged favourably based on in-house evaluations by all those involved, including by me as Ambassador.

The Australian program was successful because its objectives were long-term, limited, and realistic; because it did NOT claim, unrealistically, that the workshops would bring about immediate improvements in the human rights situation, but rather said they WOULD extend awareness of human rights and build capacity for the eventual formation of a human rights committee; and because we strove to invest the conduct and content of workshops with credibility and integrity despite the fact that they were being run under the auspices of the military government.

It was also successful because the Australian Government was at all times sensitive to the concerns of the Myanmar Government about the handling of the program. We judged it more important to undertake the program and open up these issues for normal attention, rather than worry about “handling” issues, as long as our own objectives were not being prejudiced. An important initial objective was to ensure that senior levels of the Myanmar Government were comfortable with the conduct of this unprecedented initiative. For example, all publicity about the program was handled carefully in the early stages until both sides were more comfortable with the idea; but by the end of the program, the Myanmar side - which had begun by insisting that no publicity be given the program inside Burma - was preparing press releases for their own official media. This certainly added to the transparency of the program, which was important, given that human rights had so long been a “taboo” subject (although critics would always argue that this showed the Myanmar Government was “using” the program for its own propaganda advantage).

Discontinuation of the project equally demonstrates one of the ever-present risks associated with undertaking such exercises in Burma, namely that the fragile political basis on which such activities are undertaken tends to make it easy for them to fall by the wayside. But Australia’s subsequent record with other direct government-to-government projects with the Myanmar Government – some of them also in the human rights areas, such as people trafficking, and most continuing right up until now - is also very good.

It is worth analysing why we were “successful” at that time.

Launching the program was essentially a matter of establishing mutual trust. Crucial factors in the process of securing Myanmar Government agreement to the proposal, was to use a high-level, respected and neutral “consultant” (then Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commissioner Sidoti) to engage in “technical” discussions about the type of training to be provided; to be absolutely transparent, reasonable and focused about the content and format or the “workshops” (handing over teaching materials to be “vetted”). As a result, we received approval to proceed, and no restrictions were placed on our training. The only subject area “off-limits” initially was the ILO conventions, because we started just as the ILO Governing Body was considering sanctions in 2000, but this restriction was soon lifted and issues of forced labour were raised constantly and frankly in subsequent sessions.

An important key in securing Myanmar Government agreement to the content was to pitch this entirely in terms of the universally accepted human rights instruments (the UN Charter, and human rights conventions to which Myanmar adhered or might be expected to adhere, such as CEDAW and CRC) rather than purely Western ideas of human rights. We did not want to be seen to be simply attacking them for their violations of conventions, but rather showing them how it was in their interests to accede to these conventions, but also to observe properly the obligations of the conventions to which they had already acceded. One Australian objective was to help improve their reporting for CEDAW, CRC, etc., although it was not easy to set and agree on measurable targets for this.

In dealing with us, the Myanmar Government was acknowledging its obligations under international conventions. It was not just a public relations exercise, because they were acknowledging their existing obligations to their own people who participated in the workshops, as well as undertaking to consider ratifying other conventions. However flawed or incomplete its observance of the conventions to which Myanmar had adhered, they were committed to improving their performance. Our program was the first bilateral program to work WITH the Myanmar Government on such issues rather than just “pointing the finger” and criticising them from afar.

Another important factor was the Australian Government’s undertaking to help build capacity for the establishment of a Human Rights Commission through our awareness program. On the Myanmar Government’s part, this was only possible because of their readiness to publicly commit to moving towards the establishment of an independent HRC in accordance with the “Paris Principles” for such bodies endorsed by the OECD. Implausible as this might seem, the Myanmar Government set up a government-run Human Rights Committee as a first step, and allowed Australian human rights experts to brief members of their Human Rights Committee on several occasions (at Deputy Minister level). With Australian help, Myanmar Government representatives attended meetings of the (Australian-funded) Asian Human Rights Forum as observers. It was important to demonstrate to the Myanmar Government that other countries also faced similar problems in dealing with human rights, and to allow the Myanmar representatives to “bench-mark” themselves against other countries in their region.

This Committee still exists, has just been allocated a separate office outside any Ministry from which to operate, and its new membership is expected to be announced in the weeks ahead.

Tactically, we maintained enormous flexibility, always “pushing the envelope” in terms of content, format and target groups. In terms of content, we eventually were able to circulate the UNGA Third Committee’s annual resolution on Myanmar to workshop participants in 2002, the first time such a document had been distributed with government approval; we encouraged open discussion of even sensitive subjects such as forced labour, child soldiers, the 2002 “Shan Rape Report”, torture, etc. In terms of format, we made the workshops highly inter-active with (reverse) role play; participants were encouraged to report back to their workplaces on the training (and we know that they did); we targeted relevant areas of the government such as the police, prison officers, legal officers, but not the military (because this was politically difficult for us, but in retrospect it could/should have been attempted; we pressed for wider non-government representation, which was successful to the extent of involving the Bar Council, Chamber of Commerce, and educators, but NOT to the extent of including the NLD (which did not necessarily want to participate depending on who you spoke to); we included ethnic representatives and business people, and took the workshops to regional centres (Mandalay and Taunggyi), but not as far as we would have liked (mainly a matter of needing more time); whereas the status of the workshops was initially delicate for the Myanmar Government, we were eventually allowed to invite relevant UN agencies to formal opening ceremonies for the workshops, and Australia’s team including the Ambassador was invited to attend a meeting of the Human Rights Committee for the first time.

One guiding principle we adopted was to try to make the conduct of the Human Rights program as “normal” as possible. We did NOT try to modify our approach for conditions in Myanmar or soften our treatment of issues just because they were sensitive or controversial. Our Myanmar Government counterparts respected this and responded well. Our own human rights experts described their training in Myanmar as more rewarding and more effective than similar programs they had undertaken in other countries in Asia.

There were no strings attached to our program. We told the Myanmar Government explicitly that we hoped they would at least move towards ratification of some of the other core conventions, such as the International Convention on Cultural, Social and Economic Rights, and this went onto their medium-term agenda. It was always implicit that their human rights record should improve as we undertook the program, because if would be untenable if it were otherwise. And in many respects their performance did improve, but the period was also marked by some highly adverse reports on their performance record historical and current – such as the Shan Rape Report.

As we undertook the program, we consulted widely with Myanmar people, international agencies and other countries. We also made a practice of keeping any interested parties informed, as we had been strongly criticised by many for undertaking such a program with the Myanmar Government. In particular, we consulted the NLD and Aung San Suu Kyi about the program and sought their views on it. Aung San Suu Kyi was almost the only Myanmar person that opposed the program; other NLD leaders at one point expressed interest in participating in the program, but the Myanmar Government could not come at allowing ordinary Myanmar people to participate alongside the NLD in a government-to- government program such as this. Aung San Su Kyi proposed that if we continued the program we should at least include members of the military, and this was under consideration when the program was curtailed. We also consulted representatives of other political parties, business people, educators, lawyers, monks, and journalists. Almost all of these strongly supported what we were doing; many wanted to participate themselves.

Ity is difficult to evaluate the results of the program, as it was discontinued before it reached its conclusion and before it could reach its full potential. But long-term hopefully “sustainable” outcomes include:

a. increased awareness and recognition of Myanmar’s human rights obligations among Myanmar Government agencies and key local organisations;

b. acknowledgement of Myanmar’s human rights obligations in education (Yangon University international law curriculum, high school text books) and training (standard Police College training, Civil Service Training Institute, Defence Services Academy courses);

c. subsequent indications of Myanmar Government readiness to improve conditions for protection of human rights in areas such as people trafficking, HIV/AIDS-affected drug addicts, juvenile justice, etc.;

d. extension of human rights training by the Myanmar Government on its own initiative into geographic areas and with groups not previously covered in the Australian program, using their translation of Australian teaching materials;

e. decision by the Ministry of Home Affairs in late 2004 to allocate a separate building as an office for the Human Rights Committee..

The Australian program was a relatively small step in the overall scheme, but it is important to remember that it “broke the ice” in terms of such topics being dealt with directly in a government-to-government program. Following it, many other organisations and agencies were able to undertake human rights related programs that were not possible before. After the Australian program, and thanks mainly to more systematic efforts by other organisations such as the ICRC, UNHCR, UNICEF, and the ILO in particular, definite improvements in human rights were observed, and independently reported on, in areas such as prisons, child protection, forced labour.

* Visiting Fellow, Department of Political and Social Change, Australian National University, Canberra