NCGUB’s Comments on the Burma Day Event in Brussels

The National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma (NCGUB) is disturbed by the way the European Commission has organized the Panel on Burma on the 5^th April. The composition of the panel is questionable since most of the panelists are known as apologists for the regime as demonstrated by their stand against any kind of international pressure through political, diplomatic or economic means. It is absurd that neither elected representatives of the 1990 general elections nor Civil Society groups in Europe appear on the panel.

Analysis of the "independent" report which is the focal point of the conference, reveals a multitude of flaws and subjective conclusions. The thesis put forward is that the Burma Army is the only strong and united institution in Burma, that it consists of patriotic military personal keen on preserving the stability of the country and building a modern and prosperous nation. The report portrays them as a progressive force able to lead in taking initiatives for political and economic reform. Since the Burmese military is determined to exclude the leaders of the democratic forces from the nation-building process and pursue any policy direction they deem appropriate at their own speed, the authors claim that the only option for international actors is to engage the regime and encourage them to carry out gradual reforms. Trade and aid is suggested as the main policy tool to normalize relations with the Burmese military regime and encourage gradual reforms in various sectors.

Are the elites of Burma Army agents of modernization?

The deteriorating political and economic situation in Burma since the Burmese Army seized state power through a coup in 1962 is a proven historical fact. The whole time span of 42 years should have been more than enough for the military leaders to demonstrate their capacity. However, Burma, a country rich in natural resources, fertile land, located in a strategic geographical location with talented people educated within the education system inherited from Britain, became a Least Developed Country (LDC) in 1987. This failure was not because Burma did not obtain any financial and technical assistance from international donors. Indeed, it obtained a sizable amount of assistance in the form of ODA (Official Development Assistance) mainly from Japan and Germany, as well as International Financial Institutions such like IMF, the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank (ADB) in response to its nominal reform in adopting a constitution and establishing a semi-civilian government dominated by the military in 1974 and promises of economic reforms.

The current military elite obtained substantial economic opportunities when they declared an open market economy and opened up the country in 1990s. Since Burma is a land rich in natural resources, foreign investors rushed into the country and there was an economic mini-boom in Rangoon. The military was not able to sustain it and there has been a decline since the later part of the 1990s. Since economists have already revealed the structural weakness of the Burmese economy and the regime’s policy failure, we will not go into it here. What we want to emphasize is that the root cause of the economic crisis is not a lack ideas about reform. The World Bank and IMF have already proposed a set of recommendations, as has the Government of Japan through Economic Structural Adjustment Research projects implemented in cooperation with the SPDC. The basic problem is the regime’s unwillingness to actually carry out reforms and its adherence to the traditional means of State Monopolized Military Command Economy. The totalitarian administration is clearly incompatible with a market economy. It is important to ensure that the necessary political and economic reforms are already in place before bilateral development assistance and financial assistance from IFIs pour into Burma.

The issue of ethnic nationalities:

In support of the military’s claim to a leading role in the political life of Burma, the authors echoed the regime’s usual argument about the threat of the disintegration of the Union due to the ongoing “ethnic and religious conflict”, and the weak sense of “national unity and identity”.

Is there really a threat to national unity and territorial integrity? It is true that ethnic nationalities of Burma would like to enjoy greater autonomy and the right to preserve their language, literature and culture within a federal framework. They were unhappy with the 1947 Constitution, which failed to address these aspirations, and some forces felt compelled to choose armed insurrection as a resort. Still, the majority of the ethnic leaders attempted to fulfill these aspirations by amending the 1947 Constitution through Parliament. If the Constitutional Seminar involving leading political figures of all ethnic nationalities in cooperation with U Nu’s AFPFL Government had not been disrupted by the military coup of 2 March, 1962, modern Burmese history might not have seen more than 50 years of civil war.

Unfortunately, the means proposed by the ruling military elite to achieve national unity and territorial integrity is national consolidation by force. We, on the other hand, believe that long-lasting national unity and peace can be restored only by negotiation, compromise and national reconciliation. Since 1988, the NLD conducted discussions on the ethnic nationalities issue with ethnic-based political parties, which are members of the United Nationalities League for Democracy (UNLD) and reached an agreement on basic principles with regard to rebuilding the Union, known as the “Bo Aung Gyaw Street Declaration”. The NLD had also publicly announced its intention to organize a “national consultative seminar” where genuine representatives of ethnic nationalities would be able to freely discuss their vision for the future Union. The flight of thousands of urban political dissidents to the frontier areas controlled by armed ethnic resistance groups after the suppression of the 8888 democratic uprising also created an atmosphere in which the political dissidents and ethnic nationalities were able to enhance their interaction and build understanding. The authors seem to ignore the historic milestones in the national reconciliation process reflected in the “Manerplaw Agreement”, the “Thumwaekaloe Agreement” and the more recent “Basic Principles for the Constitution” unanimously adopted by the Seminar on Basic Principles for the Union held on the Thai-Burma border on February 12, 2005.

All these agreements, reaching inside Burma as well as at the border, reaffirm the willingness of all ethnic nationalities to coexist peacefully within a Federal Union. The Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP) which upholds the historical fact about Karenni’s existence as an independent nation have given up their claim for independence and publicly announced their commitment to take part in nation building within the framework of a Federal Union. The threat of disintegration of the Union is a myth propagated by the military. The conflict in Burma is actually a vertical conflict between the military regime and the people of Burma, made up of various ethnic nationalities and democratic forces. It is not a horizontal conflict among ethnic groups as in the former Yugoslavia. And again, all ethnic and democratic forces have been consistently asking for a tripartite dialogue in which the military can join, as the best means for solving the political crisis in Burma.

Capacity of a civilian government to deal with peace and development:

The authors of the independent report argue that civilians are not capable of managing policy in a democratic Burma, and make a biased prediction that: "it is questionable whether a civilian government would have the capacity to deal with the immense structural obstacles to peace and development." This is indeed an insult to the people of Burma who cast their votes in the 1990 general elections and gave their mandate to the NLD to form a civilian government. The high percentage of voter turn-out, more than has been achieved in many developed democratic countries, showed the high level of political consciousness of the Burmese people, essential for people-centered participatory development. The NLD leadership consists of not only of civilians from various background -- economists, lawyers, physicians, engineers, journalists, retired civil servants and veteran politicians -- but also retired high-level military officers who had experience in defense and security affairs. Making a negative judgment about the capacity of these elected representatives, who have been prevented from taking office, is not only unfair but also far from objective scholarly analysis.

The authors blame the NLD and the democratic forces for the current political stalemate in Burma and the socio-economic crisis. They say: “the NLD has totally failed to engage the government on socio-economic policy issues or develop a coherent policy position themselves.” In addition, they argued, “Prodemocracy forces, meanwhile, have failed to build a truly national movement for change and do not appear any effective response to the regime.”

Even though they have been prevented from convening a parliament, the Committee Representing the Peoples’ Parliament (CRPP) correctly analyzed the various policy areas: health, education, economy, defense, foreign affairs, social welfare etc. and outlined their vision and strategy respectively. These policy papers were intended to engage dialogue with the military regime in various socio-economic issues.

Similar initiatives were taken by the NCGUB (the government in exile), and other democratic forces. The NCGUB provided policy options for a democratic transition outlined in concept papers submitted to the UN such as “Proposal for a Possible Democratic Transition in Burma” (before the ICGM meeting in Seoul) and “Framework for the Democratic Transition” (after the Depayin Massacre in 2003). In April, 2004, it also provided positive response to the non-paper formulated by Mr. Leon de Riedmatten before the SPDC resumed its National Convention on May 17 (actually, a modification of the SPDC’s seven point roadmap, with particular incentives in each phase.)

In parallel with efforts to begin a substantive dialogue for democratic transition, the NCGUB also explored the opportunities for confidence building through a problem-solving approach. In the face of the growing humanitarian crisis in Burma, we submitted a concept paper on the humanitarian issue in August 2002 to the UN Department of Political Affairs, to UN humanitarian agencies and key international actors. In that paper, we recommended a possible mechanism through which the military, the NLD and representatives of ethnic groups could jointly address the humanitarian crisis. The NCGUB asked the UN and its humanitarian agencies to help organize a workshop on the humanitarian issue that would involve all concerned parties. In 1996, The NCGUB also requested Burmese economists in exile to conduct a policy research for the economic reconstruction of Burma. After several rounds of consultative meetings within the democracy movement, the final paper, “Economic Development of Burma; A Vision and A Strategy ” came out as the economic blueprint of the Burmese democracy movement. While the Government of Japan was conducting research on a structural adjustment program for Burma in cooperation with the SPDC, we explored the possibility of organizing an informal discussion on the early stages of economic reconstruction with Burmese economists in exile. An economic reform agenda as a probable entry point for confidence building among all Burmese parties concerned, leading to national reconciliation, was the main focus at the UN Informal Consultative Meeting in Japan. These proposals for confidence building were conveyed via the UN Special Envoy as well as relevant diplomatic channels, but ignored by the Burmese military regime.

The NCGUB formed the Burma Fund, a Policy Think Tank which has conducted policy research in various sectors. With the assistance of Burmese intellectuals in exile, Economy; Civil and Military Relations; the Truth and Reconciliation approach in seeking justice for human rights crimes; electoral system; learning lessons from other democratic transitions; Among these policy researches, “Vision and Strategy for Reconstruction of Burma” is widely regarded as a credible blueprint for economic transition. It is true that the quality of education inside Burma has declined and one generation has lost its opportunity, and we will need to make educational policy reform and invest a lot in education for future generations. However, hundreds of young activists who fled from Burma were able to continue studying in developed countries through scholarship programs awarded by the Open Society Institute and Prospect Burma. Over the last 16 years, activists from various ethnic backgrounds have taken part in capacity-building programs in various fields: human rights and rule of law; Federalism; Media; Transitional Economy; Sustainable Development; Conflict Resolution, etc. Many scholars and activists in exile are determined to go back to the country and serve in nation-building. The civilian government will not be helpless or lack experienced technocrats.

The National Convention

The authors blame the NLD for not taking part in the ongoing National Convention orchestrated by the SPDC. Actually, NLD was prepared to take part in the National Convention under certain conditions: the release of Aung San Suu Kyi and Vice-Chairman U Tin Oo; the reopening of the NLD Offices and the recognition on the right of political parties to select their own delegates to the National Convention. With regard to the 104 principles adopted during 1993-1996, the NLD took the flexible position that it would be acceptable if these principles were revisited and opened for discussion. It was heard that agreement had been reached on these conditions between the NLD and the SPDC delegation consisted of Brig. Gen. Kyaw Win, Col. Tin Hlaing and Col. Than Tun but finally rejected by Sr. Gen. Than Shwe. Who should be blamed for this? Taking the opportunity of the adjournment of the National Convention on 9 July, 2004, the NLD and CRPP proposed to the SPDC that they should have a political dialogue before Independence Day on 4 January, 2005 and even suggested that the first phase of the talks be concentrated on exploring means of mutual forgiveness. However, there was no response. The authors of the “Independent Report” should rather urge the SPDC to respond positively to the appeal of UN Secretary-General “to resume without delay a substantive political dialogue with the representatives of all ethnic nationality groups and political leaders, including Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, to help achieve a genuine process of national reconciliation” mentioned in his statement on February 18, 2005.

Against the background of the National Reconciliation Process, the Burmese military has been preaching about a transition to “discipline flourishing democracy”, the essence of which is legitimizing the leading role of the military in the future political life of Burma, through their seven point roadmap. The authors attempt to convince EU policy makers to endorse the Burmese military’s way to discipline flourishing democracy which they name “nominal democracy”. We believe that the current National Convention, which excludes the representatives of the people elected in the 1990 general elections, and genuine representatives of ethnic nationalities, and attempts to impose military prerogatives from the top, will not be able to produce a constitution which will guide the nation to political stability and economic prosperity. Instead, it will lead more to direct confrontation between people and the ruling military elite.

Engagement at the Sectoral Policy level:

The authors also recommended that the EU be "engaged on the ground" in close proximity to the people/institutions it wants to influence. Their recommendation is that the EU should enter dialogue on sectoral policy issues e.g. HIV/AIDS, Environment, Agriculture, Health etc with line ministries or technocrats working on the ground, in anticipation of gradual reform, instead of critically pushing for democratic change. Here, the authors seem to ignore the military leaders’ habit of making policy in an ad hoc manner by overriding the rational advice by the lower officers or technocrats and putting “security and stability first”. Analysts say that micro-management by Sr. Gen. Than Shwe quite often causes bottle-necks in policy-making and even some Ministers in the regime have complained about policy paralysis after Gen. Khin Nyunt was ousted.

Another problem is the inconsistency of the policy reforms due to direct intervention from the top and sudden changes of policy. Abolition of new Policy reform on rice export is a recent example. The new policy, which lifted the Government’s tight control of the sale of rice on the domestic market as well as for export, lasted only 6 months. When it reached harvest season, the government abruptly banned the export of rice, mainly due to the fear that price rises in the domestic market could generate urban unrest if the government were unable to distribute rice to its civil servants at a subsidized price. Lack of transparency is another factor which makes the regime unable to make immediate and effective policy responses in many crisis areas. Information which the top generals might feel as tarnishing the image of the regime such as natural disaster, HIV/AIDS are not disclosed to the public or superiors. We doubt that dialogues with low level officials or technocrats on sectoral policy issues will have much impact on the course of overall development.

Good governance is the essential ingredient for comprehensive development and it can flourish best in the atmosphere of democracy. Therefore, critical engagement at the highest level to push for an opening for a democratic transition is the only option to alleviate the suffering of the Burmese people.

Conclusion:

Constructive engagement in the form of providing development assistance in exchange for sectoral policy dialogue at the lower level will not bring any substantial change to Burma. The failure of ASEAN’s constructive engagement is clear. As there are growing voices in the region for a review of ASEAN’s constructive engagement policy, the EU should better strengthen its current common position to be more effective. The EU should appoint a Special Envoy with a high personnel profile and diplomatic skills in conflict resolution. A set of minimum benchmarks for a democratic transition in Burma should be formulated in consultation with the US and the UN Secretary-General. After achieving consensus among key actors, the EU Special Envoy for Burma should have high level consultations with leaders from the region -- ASEAN, China and India. Regional players should understand that peaceful transition in Burma is also in the best interest of the region. Restrictive measures already in the EU Common Position on Burma can be used as negotiating tools, while sending a clear message to the regime that reciprocal responses will be made by the EU, depending on political and human rights development in Burma. Regional actors should be encouraged to apply their maximum diplomatic influence to materialize the agreed set of minimum benchmarks for democratic transition. The UN should continue to exercise moral authority and coordinate the diplomatic initiatives of all actors.

5 April, 2005.

For further information, please contact Dr. Thaung Htun, Tel: 41-78-871 1529