HUMAN
RIGHTS GROUP SLAMS "INDEPENDENT" REPORT AS ANTI-DEMOCRATIC
The
"independent" report for the European Commission titled
"Supporting
Ironically,
this push to erode the EU's commitment to democracy
in
The
authors say the outlook for establishing a nominally democratic government in
the near future is positive. It is strange that they would recommend the EU
"nominally" support democracy, reconciliation and human rights in
The
October purge of Khin Nyunt resulted in the loss of the main communication
channels between the international community and the regime. This has in turn
led to a sense of desperation amongst those foreigners whose careers depend on
"engagement", who now advocate appeasement disguised as engagement.
They hope that such bribery will allow them a foot in the hardliners' door.
Altsean-Burma
wishes to respond to some of the points made in the report as follows:
1.
The report dismisses Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD as being incapable of drawing
public support.
Aung
San Suu Kyi and the NLD drew huge crowds during her travels throughout the
country in 2002/2003. The signature campaign calling for her release has
already attracted 500,000 signatures in Burma, despite intimidation and
harassment by the military authorities.* This has reinforced awareness of the
national aspiration for democracy, as expressed in the 1990 elections, in which
the NLD won 82% of the parliamentary seats.
*(During
a recent meeting at the NLD headquarters in Rangoon, a member of the
International Campaign to Ban Landmines discovered that 500,000 people has
signed the petition calling for Aung San Suu Kyi's
release. When asked whether the people were afraid to sign the petition, the
NLD members replied "Yes people are afraid but they are signing
anyway").
2.
They argue that civilians in
The
argument is arrogant and condescending - the SPDC is clearly inept at economic
and policy reform. The SPDC has purposefully undermined capacity development
opportunities as a strategy to subjugate the people of
The
authors appear to suggest that a regime which continues to loot, rape,
perpetrate forced labor and forcibly recruit child soldiers will somehow
transform into a capable government, once given enough money. This is
tantamount to saying the Ukrainian dictatorship should have been supported
because Ukrainians were too inexperienced for democracy.
3.
They say
This
argument has long been used by the SPDC it ignores the fact that the military
junta has facilitated ethnic and religious conflicts in order to justify their
continued dominance.
It
also ignores the inspiring solidarity that has been demonstrated amongst ethnic
nationality groups in recent years, for example the formation of the Ethnic
Nationalities Council (comprising ceasefire and non-ceasefire groups), and the
joint proposals of ceasefire groups to the National Convention. All the major
ethnic nationality groups have advocated for a united, federal system.
4.
They claim the difficulties experienced during
This
plays into the SPDC argument that the country is "too fragile" to
survive on its own under civilian rule. Strong governments are those where the
stakeholders are invested and people are represented. The people's will was
made obvious in the Burmese general elections, and clearly still applies.
It
is disgraceful that a report that reeks of colonialism, and to a certain
extent, racism, can have currency today. Such assertions seem to be informed by
the attitude that somehow the Burmese are less deserving of democracy and are
less capable of sustaining democracy.
At
this point, Altsean-Burma wishes to acknowledge that while many people from
Burma may not have the ability to glibly spout political science terms, they
definitely know what they want, and have faced great dangers to express their
wishes.
5.
The authors also make the hollow argument that enhanced engagement is more
likely to influence the SPDC and its institutions, a point disproved by the
experience of corporate engagement in the 1990s.
Further,
they argue that to contribute to social change, international actors need to be
"engaged on the ground" in close proximity to the people/institutions
want to influence. EU policy should aim for constructive dialogue with the
SPDC.
UN
Envoys including Razali Ismail, Sergio Pinheiro, several Nobel Laureates and
6.
One of their main arguments is that the country is more open to foreign
influence than previously: e.g. having senior officials exposed to the outside
world helped overcome their fear of foreigners.
This
logic is based on the assumption that dictators like Milosevic, Marcos and Suharto would have changed if only we had spoken nicely to
them. The regime's receptiveness to "foreign influence" has been a
response to pressure. Key overtures to engage foreign governments have taken
place only when there has been pressure. For instance, the regime paid
significant amounts to
On
the business front, the SPDC's monopoly over
7.
They say that renewed pressure is more likely to disrupt domestic process of
change and further punish the general population.
The
"domestic process of change" is a euphemism for reconsolidation of
the dictatorship. Nine political parties that won 91% of the seats in the
election are absent from the National Convention.
The
authors use the KNU gentleman's ceasefire as an example of a positive
development. This overlooks the actual dynamics of a ceasefire zone: Reports
from Karen areas since the gentleman's ceasefire in December 2003, have pointed
to heightened insecurity for civilian populations, including a raid on a Karen
community during Karen New Year on
The
authors congratulate the SPDC's "infrastructure development program".
SPDC-style "development" has meant improved military access to commit
forced labor, exploitation of natural resources and exploitation of the
civilian population.
8.
They argue that there is little room for negotiating genuine political reform
given the "very obvious corporate and personal interests they [the SPDC]
have in maintaining power."
This
undermines their entire argument - if you recognize that there is no
desire for political reform, why advocate rewarding the regime for this? This
is precisely why the EU should adopt comprehensive sanctions. When the personal
interests of the generals are directly at stake, the dialogue table might
finally get some meat on it.
9.
The authors argue that sanctions should be revised in favor of more realistic
benchmarks for progress whereby the EU reciprocates with concrete, positive
gestures when steps are taken. The authors berate the
international community for "failing" to promote economic reform, but
absolves the SPDC of all responsibility.
The
international community HAS promoted economic reform it has always been very clear that
sanctions and International Financial Institution prohibitions were a direct
response to poor economic management and governance. Were those management
policies to change, the international community would change alongside.
Benchmarks have been offered
for example, the initiation of a genuine tripartite dialogue.
10.
They make a particular point of arguing that the SPDC is not vulnerable to
pressure.
This
argument is based on the fact that the SPDC controls "every lever of power"
but ignores the fact that this control is also vulnerability. Without the
backing of public support, and without commitment to delivering positive
economic reforms, the SPDC is slowly imploding. Pressure is what has made the
SPDC react. Pressure, when backed by the power to implement
tough economic measures, from the ILO and FAT-F have elicited response.
Firm, consistent pressure is what is needed
11.
They argue for an increase in aid.
The
best aid for
12.
The authors are dismissive of the ethnic nationalities and local populations.
On
the National Convention, they recognize that ethnic participants will be
unhappy with the process. Yet, they "view their compliance as assured, as
they have no other viable options," thereby suggesting that coercion is
acceptable and the ethnic nationalities are a problem to be overcome. Accepting
coercion is perverse and unacceptable: the ethnic nationalities make up a
substantial portion of the population; preventing their involvement in politics
cannot bode well for the future. Without genuine political franchise a cohesive
and stable governing structure cannot emerge.
It
is curious why the authors have not directed their efforts to convince the SPDC
that they have no other "viable option" than genuine democratic
reform and reconciliation. Perhaps they have other priorities.
ENDS