

**Summary Report of the
Investigation Commission
for
the Du-Chee-Yar-Tan incident of January
2014 and related events
February 2014**

Executive Summary

On 13 January 2014, one police sergeant and his team visited a Bengali village called Du-Chee-Yar-Tan as part of their routine security patrol work. Conflict developed during that routine visit, which led to the death of the police sergeant and the disappearance of his weapons. An Investigation Commission (the Commission) was set up to investigate this incident and related events. Additionally, the Commission was charged with determining the accuracy of reports circulated by the United Nations and the allegations posted on various news websites and on social media pages.

The Commission conducted field assessments from 15 to 21 February 2014 in Maungdaw Township, Rakhine State. The Commission interviewed a total of 175 persons. Methods used were focus group discussions, in-depth interviews and field observations. Purposive sampling was used to select field investigation sites.

Key findings of field investigations

Police Sergeant Aung Kyaw Thein and the weapons issued to him are still missing at the time of this Commission report. Pieces of his bloodstained clothing and insignia, however, have been recovered. Suspects taken into custody since Police Sergeant Aung Kyaw Thein's disappearance have identified these as the belongings of Police Sergeant Aung Kyaw Thein. The Commission heard from a Bengali eyewitness, who reported that the Du-Chee-Yar-Tan villagers had surrounded the Police Sergeant, attacking him until he sustained serious injuries and that the Police Sergeant had moaned in pain during the attack. Additionally, traces of blood and other evidence were documented along the trail where the Police Sergeant had been dragged, along the banks of the Gawduthaya river, next to some potato fields. The Commission concludes that Police Sergeant Aung Kyaw Thein is most likely dead and that the cause of his death was murder by the Du-Chee-Yar-Tan villagers.

The Commission found no basis for the reports posted on Muslim Internet sites, such as RB news (Rohingya Blogger), which provided the numbers and names of Bengalis purportedly killed by the Rakhine community and security forces in the related events. For example, one villager reported that a family member had been killed; however, the Commission found that this person was still detained as a suspect in the Maungdaw police station.

The fire in West Du-Chee-Yar-Tan village was investigated. It was found that the first house burnt at the same time as its boundary fence and that it was 200 metres away from the nearest next house. Photo evidence shows that the police and local authorities had contributed to extinguishing the fire. The Commission found no basis for the allegations that the police force was involved in starting the fire. It concludes that there is a strong possibility that the fire was started by an entity or entities with political motivation.

Recommendations of the Commission

1. To build trust with both communities, the Commission recommends that the government implement the actions already committed to as part of its Rakhine Action Plan, resolve issues and problems with full transparency, and take firm action against entities that instigate unrest.

2. To prevent future problems and build trust, the Commission recommends starting the process of citizenship assessment in accordance with the 1982 Citizenship Law, and for those who fit the criteria, give citizenship status.
3. The Commission recommends the empowerment of all civil servants serving in Rakhine State by motivating them with incentives and encouragement, providing them with appropriate training and modern equipment, sensitizing them on the political aspects of all issues, ensuring appropriate delegation of authority at each level, and protecting them so that they can discharge their duties consistently with the law.
4. The Commission recommends all State and local authorities in Rakhine State to make efforts to understand and empathize with the Islamic culture of the Bengalis, including the Koran.
5. The Commission recommends that the government enhance security measures and border control.
6. The Commission recommends that strong measures be taken to counter the false allegations made by media. This includes timely sharing of information with the public and establishing channels and mechanisms to counter the false allegations.
7. The Commission recommends timely and transparent briefings with the media and the international community to ensure that their reports are based on facts.
8. The Commission recommends that the Government ensure timely response to emergencies by improving transport networks in Rakhine State.
9. The Commission recommends that to prevent international non-governmental organizations (INGOs), United Nations agencies and international bodies from inflaming sectarian tensions within Rakhine State, rules and operational procedures be set for such entities and that the government support their efforts to follow these guidelines. On the other hand, firm and effective action should be taken against those organizations that break the rules and do not follow the procedures set by the Government.
10. Therefore, the Commission recommends that all international organizations working in Myanmar, including INGOs and the UN, work closely with the Government and all parties and seek to establish the truth before releasing statements obtained only from one side.
11. The Commission recommends measures to strengthen communication, good relations and trust by appointing a Union-level Minister with full authority and responsibility for Rakhine State, so that relief, rehabilitation and development activities within Rakhine State can be accelerated.
12. The Commission recommends that township authorities directly oversee the local governance structures of areas of mixed Bengali and Rakhine villages.

Report of the Commission

1. Purpose of investigation

International agencies and social media sites allege that from 13 to 28 January 2014, the Rakhine people killed some Bengalis in Maungdaw Township, as a consequence of an incident that took place in Du-Chee-Yar-Tan Village in that Township. The said incident was the attack of a police patrol by Du-Chee-Yar-Tan villagers and the subsequent disappearance of Police Sergeant Aung Kyaw Thein, his weapon and other possessions on 13 January 2014. On 6 February 2014, the Commission was charged by the Office of the President of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar to investigate these allegations and the incidents and report back on the true sequence of events.

The Commission focused on the following tasks:

- To determine the circumstances of the death of Police Sergeant Aung Kyaw Thein from Khayay-Myaing police post in Du-Chee-Yar-Tan Village;
- To determine the cause of the fire in West Du-Chee-Yar-Tan Village, whether it was an act of arson and if so, by whom;
- To investigate the allegations about the fire in West Du-Chee-Yar-Tan Village and who was responsible for these allegations;
- To investigate the alleged deaths, injuries and loss of property associated with these incidents;
- To recommend measures for preventing further sectarian violence.

2. Background

Maungdaw Township is the westernmost township in Myanmar. The township, with an area of 585.9 square miles, is 72 miles from north to south and extends only 8.4 miles across, from east to west. To the west and north, Maungdaw Township has a long border with Bangladesh, separated in the west only by the Nat River. To its east lies the town of Butheetaung. Rathe-Taung township and the Bay of Bengal form its southern limit. Maungdaw was ruled by the British colonial administration from 1825 on, and after independence, Maungdaw became part of Sittwe District. Maungdaw's border with Bangladesh is 83 miles long, comprising a riverine border of 41 miles along the Nat River and a land border of 42 miles.

Bengalis make up an overwhelming majority of the Township's population. There are currently 1,999 civil servants (including 104 senior officials) serving in Maungdaw Township. The township has a population of over half a million (513,751), of which only 38,778 live in the town, and the rest in villages. Of the township's population of half a million, Bengalis account for 93.88 per cent, while indigenous national races (Kachin, Kayah, Kayin, Chin, Mon, Bamar, Rakhine, Shan, etc.) and others account for only some 6 per cent. Accordingly, 94 per cent of the township population are Muslim, around 5 per cent are Buddhists, and the remaining 1 per cent are Hindus, Christians and Animists.

3. Methodologies and limitations

A small preliminary team was sent to conduct investigations from 22 to 26 January 2014. Preparatory work for this trip involved research and follow-up of media reports and various reports from international sources. Following the appointment of the Commission, the 24 members of the Commission undertook a field trip to Rakhine State from 15 to 21 February, supported by the original research team. The teams conducted field assessments from 15 to 21 February 2014 in Maungdaw Township, Rakhine State. Methods used were focus group discussions (FGDs), in-depth interviews and field observations. Purposive sampling was used to select people and groups in field investigation sites. The teams interviewed a total of 175 persons in 101 individual or group interviews. The respondents included representatives from both Rakhine and Bengali communities, local authorities, security and administrative staff.

At the time of the investigation, the relations between the two communities were very tense. Many of the Du-Chee-Yar-Tan villagers who had been involved in the incident had run away and could not be found. Eyewitness accounts were hard to come by. Respondents would recount events that, on further checking and probing, turned out to be hearsay or fabrications. Accordingly, the Commission had to expend considerable time and effort to check and crosscheck such reports with eyewitness accounts and other means.

Language difficulties were another challenge. To ensure that the translation from one language to another was accurate and unbiased, the Commission used two interpreters – one for the Rakhine language and the other for the Bengali language. The Commission asked each translator to check the work of the other.

4. Reports by the media and allegations by local communities

A summary account of these reports and allegations is provided in the sections that follow.

4.1. Police Sergeant Aung Kyaw Thein's murder

- On 14 February 2014, internet news and Facebook pages reported a conflict between Du-Chee-Yar-Tan villagers and a police security patrol, which had led to the death of Police Sergeant Aung Kyaw Thein. The initial news report said that the police had demanded money from the villagers and that this had led to the conflict.
- On 15 February 2014, the Burma News International (BNI) internet page reported on the death and disappearance of a Police Sergeant. The same report noted that the police patrol was surrounded and attacked by around 70 Bengalis, and that following this attack and the disappearance of Police Sergeant Aung Kyaw Thein, the police forces had closed off Du-Chee-Yar-Tan village and were conducting searches. The report mentioned that the villagers had fled out of fear, particularly the men.
- On 16 February 2014, Yangon Media Group on its Facebook page reported the discovery of the Police Sergeant's bloodstained effects, without however the police weapon.
- On the same date, the Bangladesh-based Lewadi news reported on the disappearance of the Police Sergeant together with his M22 rifle and on the subsequent discovery of his bloodstained personal effects.
- On 17 February 2014, the BBC news reported that 80 Du-Chee-Yar-Tan villagers had been arrested in relation to the disappearance of the Police Sergeant and were being

questioned.

4.2. Allegations on the killings of Bengalis

- On 15 January 2014, RB (Rohingya Blogger) News claimed that the authorities overseeing Du-Chee-Yar-Tan village had arrested and killed 8 Bengalis who had come from Butheetaung to Maungdaw to work, and that the bodies were buried in a trench. The RB News subsequently reported that the Du-Chee-Yar-Tan villagers had gone to excavate the bodies and had taken photographs, and that on their way back, carrying one body, the (Rakhine) villagers from Khayay-Myaing village had seen this and reported them to the police. The RB news alleged that the police and local authorities were covering this up.
- The RB News also reported conflict between the Khayay-Myaing police and the Bengalis over the killings of the 8 Bengalis. The report accused the police of attempting to cover up the murders, which, it said, had led to further conflict and the death of 11 more Bengalis. It noted that the Myanmar police had even arrested women and old people from Du-Chee-Yar-Tan village. The RB News provided a list of those who had been killed and injured.
- Similarly, the women in Du-Chee-Yar-Tan village told the Commission's research team that they had heard the reports of the killings of 8 Muslims and that these reports had angered all the Bengalis. Furthermore, these women reported that Bengali villagers in their search for firewood encountered a rotting smell and subsequently discovered dead bodies covered by coconut fronds at a site 1 furlong from Kin Chaung village pagoda. They claimed that 10 villagers had gone to search for these bodies but had returned without finding any. However, on a second trip, 15 villagers found had apparently found the bodies and had taken photos of these with their mobile phones, which the women had seen. The conflict with the police was attributed to police attempts to trace and confiscate the Bengalis' mobile phones in order to cover up these deaths.

4.3. The alleged killings at Du-Chee-Yar-Tan Village

- One UN Report alleged that, Muslims arrested in Kin Chaung Village were killed and put in "oddly-shaped loads" which were then carried by the villagers from Kin Chaung (the UN report called this "Kan Chaung"), as witnessed by local Muslims. The UN report also alleged that the Bengalis from nearby villages heard "screams of pain" coming from torture of the Bengali men by the Rakhine in the house of U Aung San Pyu, the administrator of Kin Chaung Village, and that subsequently the Bengalis who had been tortured and killed by the Rakhines had been buried in a Buddhist cemetery, that a Bengali had come across these bodies and recorded these on his mobile phone. The UN Report also alleged that the Bengalis tried to dig and recover the bodies but had been chased away by Rakhine men with knives.
- The UN Report further states that to cover up the killing of Bengalis which had been captured on Bengali mobile phone cameras, a group of police and armed Rakhine men entered Du-Chee-Yar-Tan village and tried to confiscate the cell phones. However, the Bengalis purportedly yelled for help, drawing a large crowd of other Bengalis and forcing the police and Rakhine men to flee. The police and Rakhine then returned with reinforcements and the UN report details how a fight had ensued and how the Bengalis had captured and killed the Police Sergeant.
- The UN Report then goes into a detailed report of police operations to retrieve the missing sergeant and his weapon. It noted that gunshots were fired. After the gunshots, the UN Report alleged that "a large group of Rakhine villagers carrying swords and

knives entered from the east” and that the Muslim population was “overrun” and had to retreat towards Gawdutharya, the village tract directly south of Du-Chee-Yar-Tan. The UN Report also goes into detailed allegations of the violent acts carried out the police and Rakhine communities, saying that these were eyewitness accounts.

- AZG/MSF Holland (Médicines sans frontières-Holland) issued a statement that it had to treat several Bengali who had been injured in the Du-Chee-Yar-Tan incident. It alleged that one Bengali had died of gunshot wounds, two had been injured from beatings, 10 had suffered from penetration wounds and 7 had suffered from trauma.
- The UN alleged that an eyewitness saw the police carry away the bodies of some 20 dead Bengalis. The UN also alleged that on 14 January 2014, Bengali “witnesses” found a 4 ft. x 4 ft. water tank containing ten to 12 “severed human heads” among which were the “heads of women and children.”
- The 16 January report of the Associated Press, entitled, “Myanmar Mob Kills More Than A Dozen Muslims” by Robin McDowell, stated that a Buddhist crowd had killed at least 12 Bengali women and children. One Chris Lewa from the Arakan Project also alleged that 10 to 60 Bengalis were killed, citing its field sources. The report mentioned the anti-Muslim speeches broadcast through loudspeakers by Buddhist monks from the 969 movement. It also mentioned dead bodies in the stream near Du-Chee-Yar-Tan. However, the report also mentioned that one U Khin Maung Than, a Bengali living close to Du-Chee-Yar-Tan, had said there was no evidence of these events.
- On 16 January, the Facebook page of a “Robert Elhose” from the USA alleged that 20 Bengalis had been killed. It provided the list of those killed, purportedly based on the report of one “Aung Naing Sadam Khan.”
- On 17 January 2014, one “Aung Kyaw Moe” from the Myanmar Muslim Network in Malaysia circulated the report from Robert Elhose. Bengalis inside Myanmar thus started using this report on their Facebook pages.
- On 17 January 2014, the US and UK Embassies issued statements expressing regret for the loss of lives and the injuries and urged the Government to investigate these incidents.
- On 17 January 2014, the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) expressed concern about the events of 14 January 2014 at Du-Chee-Yar-Tan, noting that these were a violation of human rights and calling on the Government of Myanmar to ensure human rights and rule of law.
- On 17 January 2014, the Burma American Association condemned the acts of Myanmar’s security forces in relation to the Du-Chee-Yar-Tan incident and warned that the Association would go to the United Nations Security Council, and that the Security Council should transfer this matter to the International Criminal Court. This Association urged investigations led by the US and European countries.
- On 17 January 2014, Associated Press (AP) issued a report alleging knife attacks against Bengali women and children, with 5 to 10 deaths, purportedly from both knife and gunshot wounds.
- On 17 January 2014, the Irrawaddy news outlet noted that it had received reports that the security forces and Rakhines had attacked Du-Chee-Yar-Tan Village, looted and raped women, and killed women and children. The number of deaths was said to be between 10 and 60. The Irrawaddy further mentioned that it contacted the police commander in Maungdaw, U Tin Ko Ko, who had refuted the reports as attempts to instigate unrest, and who had said that the area was calm.
- On 18 January 2014, the “M Media” Facebook page reported on the killings of Bengali in Du-Chee-Yar-Tan and alleged that gunshot and knife wound victims had been treated by AZG/MSF.
- On 18 January 2014, the BBC reported that the Myanmar Government had denied the

reports on the Bengali deaths in Maungdaw, and that 80 Bengali were under arrest. It also reported that the incidents had happened because police had come to search and question four Bengalis who had taken photographs of eight Bengalis who had been killed; that following the Police Sergeant's death, 8 more Bengalis had been killed; and that the Du-Chee-Yar-Tan villagers had run into hiding.

- On 18 January 2014, the Voice of America (VOA) reported on the conflict and deaths, noting that the US was concerned at the use of violence, that a monitoring team should be allowed to the area and that a long-term sustainable solution was needed, together with rule of law, equity and humanitarian relief.

4.4. Reports of arrest and torture

- The UN alleges that the Rakhines captured and tortured 8 of the 44 Bengalis who had come from Kyauktaw to Maungdaw to work. The report alleged that the captured Bengalis were kept without food, tortured and killed at the house of village administrator U Aung San Pyu at Kin Chaung village.
- The Danyawadi newspaper reports the rape of a Bengali woman in Du-Chee-Yar-Tan village by the police and Rakhine on 14 January 2014 and subsequent conflict, which killed two Bengalis.
- The Muslim Youth Facebook page also reported that the cause of the Du-Chee-Yar-Tan incident was the fact that one Bengali had taken a photograph of Bengali bodies killed by the Rakhine and dumped in a stream.
- One Du-Chee-Yar-Tan villager told the Commission that Bengalis are often beaten physically by the Rakhine, bullied to give them their products without any charge, and were subject to extortion attempts by the police whenever they went into the forest in search of firewood.
- Another Du-Chee-Yar-Tan villager, a woman, told the Commission that the police and Rakhine administrators often beat them, and drove them out from villages. Another Bengali woman reported that she saw her grandfather arrested and taken away by the police.

4.5. The reports on looting and destruction of property

- The majority of women in Du-Chee-Yar-Tan reported to the Commission that gold, money, buffaloes, cows and other property owned by Bengalis were looted and carried off by the police and the Rakhine on 13 January 2014.
- Some Maungdaw residents reported to the Commission that following the 13 January events, the goods looted from the Du-Chee-Yar-Tan villagers were sold at Myothugyi village market and at Lay Maing market.
- One Bengali villager reported that his 6 cows, 2 ticals of gold and Kyat 700,000 were taken by looters and the police.
- Some local villagers (Bengali) reported to the Commission that the Rakhines took, killed and ate the buffaloes and cows belonging to the Bengali.
- One Bengali woman reported that the police and the Rakhine men had taken her 10 cows.

4.6. Reports on arson at West Du-Chee-Yar-Tan village

- On 28 January 2014, Muslim activists inside and outside of Myanmar accused the police of burning down Bengali houses in West Du-Chee-Yar-Tan village.
- The Butheetaung Representative from the Pyithu Hluttaw (House of Representatives)

gave an interview to the Democratic Voice of Burma (DVB), describing what he called eyewitness accounts of deliberate arson by the police force.

- On 28 January 2014, internet news sites such as Rohingya blog, The Stateless and the Burma Times, alleged that 7 to 8 Bengali houses in West Du-Chee-Yar-Tan village were burned by the police and the Rakhine. These websites alleged that during the fire, around 300 soldiers and security personnel prevented the Bengalis from leaving, which led to 50 Bengali deaths by fire and 300 more missing.
- RB news reported that a 60-year old woman who was an eye witness to the arson had been killed by the Myanmar security forces and that her body had been dumped on the east side of the bridge in Gawduthaya village.
- Maungdaw Muslims accuse the police and Rakhines of setting fire to the West Du-Chee-Yar-Tan Village and allege that during the fire, the police and local authorities had offered no help.
- One Muslim woman from West Du-Chee-Yar-Tan village reported to the Commission that her husband disappeared during the fire, that the Rakhine drove the Bengalis out from the village so she had to cross the stream to escape, that around 15 children drowned to death during the crossing, that the mothers of those children had run away to other places.
- A group of Bengali women from Du-Chee-Yar-Tan village told the Commission that they saw the Rakhine burning down Muslim houses with petrol bottles.
- A Bengali woman from West Du-Chee-Yar-Tan village claimed that the police killed young children by stamping on them, putting the bodies into jute sacks and carrying these away. She said that over 100 Muslims had died in this way.

5. The confidential report from the United Nations

The key points from the UN report, some of which were cited above, are summarized below.

- On 3 January 2014, a group of Rakhines led by Kin Chaung Village Administrator U Aung Zan Pyu captured 44 Bengalis who had come from Kyauktaw, purportedly starved and then killed them. The nearby Bengali villagers discovered this through stealthy visits to Kin Chaung.
- The bodies of these Bengali were then reportedly buried near the Buddhist cemetery. Du-Chee-Yar-Tan villagers had photographed these acts on their mobile phones.
- Another allegation was that on 12 January 2014, the bodies of these Bengalis killed in Kin Chaung Village were put in "oddly-shaped loads" which were then carried by the villagers from Kin Chaung. The bodies were put in a pit on a hill and traces were covered with coconut fronds. The UN claimed that this was witnessed by nearby Bengali villagers, who also reported seeing groups of Rakhine villagers with knives.
- On 13 January 2014, security forces and local administration went to Du-Chee-Yar-Tan to try to confiscate the mobile phones with the photos of the Kin Chaung killings. A conflict arose with the villagers, whereupon the villagers cried for help. At that time, the police team and around 30 Rakhine armed with knives reportedly fled. One hour later gunfire was heard. Later, a large group of Rakhine villagers carrying swords and knives entered from the east, and the security forces from the west, both of them attacking the Du-Chee-Yar-Tan villagers who had to flee to Gawduthaya village.
- On 14 January, the police carried away around 20 dead bodies. On the same day, Bengali "witnesses" reported a 4 ft. x 4 ft. water tank, containing ten to 12 severed human heads among which were those of women and children.
- The UN report is attached.

6. Key findings from field visits

6.1. Allegations of arrest, torture and looting by the security forces

From 112 Bengali respondents, 85% reported the arrest and torture of Bengalis by security forces. The remaining 15% said they had no knowledge of this. From among the 85% claiming that the security forces had attacked, tortured and looted, 9.5% said these security personnel had killed, 8.4% said they had beaten people, 9.5% said they had arrested people, while 3.1 per cent stated that the security forces had looted. However, the rest (69.5%) could not be specific about how the security forces had conducted their arrest, torture and looting activities.

On the other hand, interviews with the government security forces gave the following account of their activities. After Police Sergeant Aung Kyaw Thein disappeared with his weapons on 13 January 2014, 200 security personnel were called in to conduct an intensive and systematic search. Around midnight, when the security forces were preparing to enter the village, a Bengali mob came out armed with sticks and knives, shouting and challenging the police. The police then had to fire their weapons upon which the mob retreated. As the search progressed, the security forces approaching the village from the west were challenged by a Bengali mob of 500 with sticks and knives, who crowded around the government security forces. Despite warnings, the mob approached until they were within 50 yards of the security forces and were driven back only when the police fired their weapons.

The Commission team found a number of injuries among the Du-Chee-Yar-Tan villagers. However, the Commission believes that the nature of these injuries shows that they could have been sustained in two ways: first, in defensive action taken by the police when confronted with a large hostile mob, knowing that one of them (Police Sergeant Aung Kyaw Thein) had in all likelihood been killed, and that therefore the mob would also kill them had they not fired. Second, once the mob had dispersed, the villagers ran away from the security forces and doing so in the dark, they sustained some minor injuries, since the village is surrounded by fields with numerous small wells and uneven ground.

6.2. The killings reported in the Du-Chee-Yar-Tan incident

From 112 Bengali respondents, 88.4% claimed that Bengalis had been killed as a result of the incident. 11.6% said they did not know of any deaths. Among those who claimed that there were Bengali deaths, 26.3% were able to state the number of deaths; 7% could not. The rest (66. 7%) said that they had heard about the deaths second-hand and could not confirm anything in detail.

The Facebook page of "Robert Elhose" provided a detailed list of the 20 Bengalis purportedly killed by the Rakhine, with names, ages and father's names. The Commission checked this list against the administrative records of all households in Maungdaw Township. The lists were found to be fraudulent. No person was found anywhere in the records with the characteristics detailed by the Elhose list. The Commission asked Du-Chee-Yar-Tan villagers whether there were any family members who were missing in relation to the incidents on the night of 13 January 2014. One Daw Ahraysha, living in North Du-Chee-Yar-Tan village, said that she saw with her own eyes her husband Mahmud Rawfi killed by the police, who then dragged away his corpse. However, in examining the government's administrative records on households, the Commission found out that the said Mahmud Rawfi had become one of the suspects in the murder of the Police Sergeant. Therefore, the police had already

arrested Mahmud Rawfi and he was now in Maungdaw undergoing investigations. Clearly, his wife was lying when she said she saw his dead body dragged away by the police.

Similarly, the Myanmar Human Rights Commission was given a list of 52 Bengalis purportedly killed by the police and the Rakhines. Out of these 52 Bengalis, 47 names were of non-existent persons. In the remaining 5 cases, similar names were found in the government records; but the father's names, or age did not match, or they were the names of people who had died earlier.

The Commission therefore concluded that the purported Bengali deaths did not happen, and that there were missing Bengalis, who were those arrested by the Government in connection with the 13 January incident. The lists of dead people and their households were found to be fabricated. The Commission was not able to trace the remains of dead people. There is thus no evidence for the stories circulated by the UN and the Muslim websites.

6.3. The death of Police Sergeant Aung Kyaw Thein

Regarding the death of Police Sergeant Aung Kyaw Thein on 13 January 2014, the Commission's research team interviewed 112 Bengalis, of which 26.9% claimed knowledge of the incident. The rest (73.1%) stated they had heard about this, but that they did not really know the details. Among the 26.9% who claimed to know how Police Sergeant Aung Kyaw Thein died, 20% said he had died, 50% said he was still missing only, and 30% could not decide whether he had died or merely disappeared. In interviews, the Du-Chee-Yar-Tan villagers said the Police Sergeant had not been killed in the conflict that took place in their village, but that the whole incident had been invented by the Government as an excuse to persecute the Bengalis.

The Commission took the following steps to further investigate the disappearance of Police Sergeant Aung Kyaw Thein.

First, the Commission examined previous criminal cases in the area in the recent past. From 2008 up to the present time, criminal records show that the Bengalis, an overwhelming majority in this area, had attacked and killed government staff five times. Additionally, the area often suffers from violent acts, mainly burglary and kidnapping for ransom. It is highly unlikely that Police Sergeant Aung Kyaw Thein had been kidnapped for ransom, since no demands for ransom have been received.

Second, a Bengali suspect who purportedly witnessed the event is currently in custody at Maungdaw Police Station. He reported that the Du-Chee-Yar-Tan villagers had surrounded and physically attacked the Police Sergeant, causing the young policeman to moan in pain, which he heard. He said that following this, four villagers had dragged away the Police Sergeant by the hand along the fields, avoiding the planted areas of their crops. Subsequently, security forces checked the area the day after and found that the account of the witness matched with the evidence, as they found traces of blood along the path the witness had described. Furthermore, they recovered bloodstained pieces of the Police Sergeant's uniform, police insignia, and his underclothes, which appear to have slipped off while he was being dragged.

The Commission therefore concludes that Police Sergeant Aung Kyaw Thein in all likelihood is no longer alive, having been murdered by the Du-Chee-Yar-Tan Bengali villagers. Furthermore, the Commission concludes the following:

- At the time of the incident, Police Sergeant Aung Kyaw Thein was on a security patrol,

doing his duty in accordance with orders to monitor the situation for disturbances.

- The eye witness account from a Bengali of the attack against the Police Sergeant by the Du-Chee-Yar-Tan villagers, the grievous nature of his injuries that had caused him to moan in pain, and the discovery of blood traces and the Police Sergeant's bloodied clothing, all show that Police Sergeant Aung Kyaw Thein had been murdered, not kidnapped.

6.4. The fire in West Du-Chee-Yar-Tan Village

Out of 112 Bengalis questioned on their knowledge of the fire in West Du-Chee-Yar-Tan Village, 87.5% claimed having knowledge of the origin of the fire; 12.5% responded that they did not know about what had caused the fire. Of those who said they knew about what caused fire, 5.1% stated that the fire had been started by the police and the Rakhine community; 1% stated that the fire had been started by the Bengalis themselves to their own houses; 10.2% stated that the fire had been started by arson, but they said they did not know by whom this deliberate act was done. The remaining 83.7% of the Bengalis who had claimed to have knowledge about the fire turned out to have only second-hand information from others.

Bengali village leaders give different accounts of the fire. Most accuse the police of having started the fire but were unable to show any photo or other evidence to support this accusation. So-called eye witnesses offered different accounts to the Commission, some saying that two men on a motorcycle came and started the fire, others saying that it was a group of 10 men. Bengalis living in Maungdaw stated that it was neither the police nor the house owners themselves who had started the fire; rather, they believed that it was a group opposed to the Government with political motivations for starting the fire and subsequent unrest.

Field investigations show that at the time of the first field visit, there were no security forces stationed in West Du-Chee-Yar-Tan village but only in Central Du-Chee-Yar-Tan village, from which the villagers had run away. On 23 January 2014, the security forces left Central Du-Chee-Yar-Tan, also leaving it vulnerable, as the majority of men had not returned from hiding.

The Commission concludes the following, concerning the fire at West Du-Chee-Yar-Tan Village which started around 20:45 on 28 January 2014.

- The first house burnt at the same time as its boundary fence and was 200 metres away from the nearest next house. Therefore, the fire does not appear to be accidental but rather, a deliberate act.
- The Commission found no basis for the allegations that the police force was involved in starting the fire. Photo evidence shows that the police and local authorities had contributed to extinguishing the fire.
- The Bengali community in Maungdaw itself rejects that the idea that the fire was started by the police or that it was started by the house owners themselves. Rather, they believed that it was a group opposed to the Government with political motivations for starting the fire and subsequent unrest.
- The Commission concurs with this view.

Yet false allegations about this fire have been circulating unchecked. Muslim websites report that the police had started it and that during the fire, around 300 soldiers and security personnel had prevented the Bengalis from leaving. Furthermore, U Shwe Maung,

representing Butheetaung in the Pyithu Hluttaw (Myanmar's House of Representatives), gave an interview to DVB, describing what he called eyewitness accounts of deliberate arson by the police force.

6.5. The allegations against U Aung Zan Pyu and other Rakhine villagers

The Bengalis and the UN accused the Kin Chaung Village Administrator U Aung Zan Pyu, a Rakhine, of having personally attacked, tortured, killed Bengalis and looted Bengali houses. Out of the 112 Bengalis interviewed, the majority stated that these accusations were correct. Yet 82% said that all the accounts of U Aung Zan Pyu's behaviour during the Du-Chee-Yar-Tan incident were hearsay and they did not really know. 6.3% believed he had killed Bengalis; 5.4% believed in the stories of torture; 6.3% stated he had carried out the looting and the arson.

Some allegations made to the Commission about U Aung Zan Pyu are reproduced below:

- Daw Hamida stated that U Aung Zan Pyu had thrown her two-year old into the air and sliced the child with a long knife on the way down.
- Daw Mayanahatu reported being asleep with her three-month old son when Aung Zan Pyu and the police came in, took her son away and killed him.
- Daw Aishah (from Central Village) stated that U Aung Zan Pyu had killed her two-year old son by slashing him with a knife in front of their house at midnight, and that the corpse could still be seen at 8 am.
- Daw Halamatatu (South Village) stated that U Aung Zan Pyu and some police had entered her house at midnight and slashed her son.
- Daw Shoshida alleged that U Aung Zan Pyu murdered her mother-in-law by cutting the old woman's body in half.

In trying to reconstruct these purported incidents in detail with dates and times, the Commission found that the accusations from the Bengali women placed Aung Zan Pyu in two places at almost the same time, and that the descriptions of these so-called murders were exaggerated.

The Commission did not find any evidence to support these allegations, rather, the allegations seem to be misrepresentations.

Regarding the eight Bengalis who had travelled from Butheetaung/Kyauktaw/Rathetaung, and who, the UN alleges, were killed by the Rakhine, the administrative records show no such group travelling to Maungdaw. There was also no evidence that the Rakhine killed the Bengalis in any such group. Importantly, the Commission found no evidence that anybody had been recently buried in a Buddhist cemetery, as alleged by the UN report. The Commission itself went over the ground surrounding the alleged burial site. The Commission found only undisturbed vegetation without any signs of recent burial.

The Bengalis claimed that they had photo-evidence of this crime, and told the Commission that they would bring these photos on subsequent days. However, in reality, this did not happen despite reminders from the Commission. When pressed, the Bengali community said it was not they who had taken the photo but someone else. They then gave the Commission the names of the four men who reportedly took the photographs. Three of the four matched with the administrative records. Upon investigation, it turned out that these three men were among the leading suspects in the murder of the Police Sergeant and were already in custody. The fourth was not found in any administrative record.

Just by looking at the demographic situation on the ground, the Commission concludes that the UN's allegations are untrue about the Bengali population having to retreat because they were "squeezed" by a large group of Rakhine villagers entering from the east and the police entering from the west. In this area, there are only 3 Rakhine villages, comprising around 260 houses and 1,300 Rakhine population. Surrounding these small Rakhine villages are four large Bengali villages, with around 3,000 houses and a total population of 21,000. Before the Du-Chee-Yar-Tan incident, the area had two police stations: one at Khayay-Myaing with five police and the other at Gawduthaya Bridge with six police, making a total of 11 policemen in all. The allegations of the UN that the Rakhines are able to torture and attack Bengalis in this area are ill-informed and should not have been made without checking the geography and population numbers. The Rakhine villages near Du-Chee-Yar-Tan are the minority in this area, living in constant fear of Bengali attacks.

Regarding the accusations of looting by the police and the Rakhine, some of the claims may be inflated. The woman who claimed that her ten cows were stolen lived in a house unlikely to have this kind of wealth. Upon inquiry at the places where the stolen goods were reportedly sold, the Commission found that the stolen goods received here following the incidents were foodstuff and some kitchen goods. Similarly, after visiting the houses of those who claim losing their gold, cash, buffaloes and cows, the Commission finds the claims uncorroborated, not least due to the general poverty of the area. It is unlikely that these villagers possessed so much wealth.

7. Recommendations of the Commission

7.1. Recommendation 1

The Du-Chee-Yar-Tan incident did not happen in isolation. A long term solution for the problems that happened at Du-Chee-Yar-Tan will require tackling the root causes. The root causes of these problems lie in the relations between the Rakhine and the Bengalis in Rakhine State.

One of the underlying causes is that the two communities do not have mutual trust. The Rakhine in the Butheetaung Maungdaw area are the minority. From before Independence, in British colonial times, the Rakhine had little trust in the Bengali community. In a recent poll of 500 Rakhine, 99% responded that they had no trust in the Bengali community.

The Bengali community also has little trust in the Rakhine. The Bengalis resent not being one of the officially classified indigenous national races (Taing-Yin-Tha) and see the Rakhine as standing in the way of their interests. There are some in both Rakhine and Bengali communities who wish to live in peaceful coexistence. The same poll found that 78% of Rakhine respondents stated that although they did not like the Bengalis, they could live side by side with them. However, extremists on both sides have inflamed tensions and have made threats against the moderates in their own communities, with the result that these formerly moderate people have started to act like the extremists. The gap between the communities has widened.

Exacerbating the situation, both communities have little trust in the government. The Rakhines feel that both the Union Government and the State Government have not supported them. Some Rakhines blame the Government for not having systematically controlled or dealt with the Bengali issue much earlier on. Some even say that the Myanmar

Government only wishes to placate the international community and do not prioritize the needs of the Taing-Yin-Tha (indigenous national races) in the country. The Rakhines accuse Government officials working in Rakhine State of having accepted bribes from the Bengalis and having acted to the detriment of the Rakhines. The Bengalis blame the Government for their lack of status as a citizen or indeed as Taing-Yin-Tha, and accuse the Government of wishing to keep them only in Bengali areas or in camps for internally displaced persons (IDPs). The Du-Chee-Yar-Tan incident happened because of the lack of trust and mutual respect between the Government and the Bengalis. This made the Bengalis attack against Government institutions and their representatives and circulate false allegations.

The Bengalis rely strongly on INGOs and international entities. On the other hand, the Rakhines are opposed to the INGOs and international entities and see them as taking the side of the Bengalis. It would not be possible for INGOs and international organizations to solve the problems between the two communities. Instead, the government must play a leading role in building mutual trust and calming tensions.

Accordingly, the Commission recommends the following:

- The government should keep to the commitments it has already undertaken and implement those actions without delay.
- The Government should plan and implement a systematic action plan to resolve the situation.
- All actions by the State and Union Government should be implemented in a clear, decisive and transparent way.
- The Government should take swift and firm action against instigators on both sides who seek to inflame tensions and create problems between the two communities.

7.2. Recommendation 2

The issue of the citizenship of the Bengalis, if not resolved, will only create further problems. The Rakhines see the Bengalis as foreigners without any citizenship status or rights.

On the other hand, the Bengalis are resentful since they do not have any of the rights of citizens. This longstanding problem has turned formerly moderate Bengalis into extremists. Bengali leaders stated to the Commission that one of the contributing causes to the current problem was that successive Rakhine administrators have been treating the Bengalis as illegal immigrants. This has made the armed and extremist Rohingya Solidarity Organization (RSO) and other extremist groups into heroes among the Bengali communities. Thus, the majority of Bengalis will not support any action or position that enhances the prestige and reputation of the Myanmar Government or that of the Rakhine. On the other hand, they will readily engage in actions and statements to damage the reputation of the Government and the Rakhine. Some of the Bengalis living in Maungdaw admitted this to the Commission.

Although the Government has committed to beginning the citizenship assessment process for the Bengalis according to the 1982 Citizenship Law, delays in implementation have made the Bengalis lose further trust, according to Bengali leaders. Without resolving the citizenship issue, problems such as those happened in Du-Chee-Yar-Tan will continue erupting. Accordingly, the Government should find ways of implementing the citizenship assessment process without further delay.

7.3. Recommendation 3

The rule of law is an urgent need in Maungdaw township. While the government is transitioning to a more democratic form and is understandably reluctant to use force, some measures need to be imposed in a top-down way to ensure security, stability and the rule of law in Rakhine State. These measures will involve the security forces and the immigration, customs and the General Administration branches of the Government.

Interviews with the civil servants in Butheetaung and Maungdaw show the low morale of government servants in those townships and their feelings of not being supported in their work adequately, especially because of their low salaries. They see their current positions in Butheetaung and Maungdaw as hardship postings and report that both the Rakhine and Bengali communities resent them and that it was difficult for them to conduct their work effectively because the public did not understand the duties and responsibilities of civil servants. On the other hand, Rakhine and Bengali leaders stated that the majority of civil servants posted to the area were not competent and were incapable of enforcing the rule of law. These leaders said that because of this, respect for the government is low. Thus, a contributing cause to the Du-Chee-Yar-Tan problem is the weakness of local government, the inadequacy of government personnel and the long history of not having enforced the rule of law. The security forces feel that they are not fully backed up by the authorities and are therefore hesitant to take firm action.

Clearly, the Bengali communities have become deeply resentful of the situation. Some measure of stability and the rule of law is being imposed on the Bengalis, only because of the security forces. These communities would take any opportunity offered by lapses in security as a signal for attacking members of the security forces as the Du-Chee-Yar-Tan incident has shown.

The Government should therefore prioritize the establishment of effective, firm and just local governments in northern Rakhine State. It should transfer the best and brightest officials in the country to northern Rakhine State, only those on the upward career path, and offer appropriate monetary incentives from the Union budget for serving in the townships of northern Rakhine because of the special situation there. It should ensure that the local governments act with full transparency, and are able to monitor the situation and issue timely news bulletins and broadcasts.

The Commission recommends:

- Staffing crucial government positions in Rakhine State with the most able and competent officials, offering them appropriate incentives;
- Providing training on political issues to government staff in Rakhine as the situation in that State is politically sensitive;
- Empowering the security forces in Rakhine State with appropriate training and equipment for crowd control and psychological warfare;
- Empowering local officials by giving them appropriate delegation with full authority to act effectively and promptly, and to take decisions within the policy and legal framework set by the Government;
- Protecting and supporting security personnel in all actions within the law;
- Implementing sanctions against government personnel who do not discharge their duties properly.

7.4. Recommendation 4

All government officers serving in areas such as Maungdaw dominated by a Muslim culture should make efforts to study and understand Islam. The Ministry of Religious Affairs should appoint a non-Muslim official who understands Islamic practices and local culture as advisor to the local authorities. Additionally, arrangements should be made for local authorities to consult with sociological and anthropological experts as needed.

7.5. Recommendation 5

It is highly likely that some of the criminals responsible for the murder of Police Sergeant Aung Kyaw Thein have already escaped over the border. The current state of security of the riverine border with Bangladesh is highly unsatisfactory; at the very minimum, border patrols on the river and on land should be strengthened, and dredging operations conducted on the Nat River as needed. The central and State Governments should ensure security of the local populations and the security of the Rakhine border to prevent further acts of violence and illegal immigration, and if necessary, in full cooperation with Bangladesh. Measures must be taken to provide adequate logistics, infrastructure, personnel and training support to all government units charged with these tasks, particularly in community policing.

7.6. Recommendation 6

The Du-Chee-Yar-Tan incident and chain of events were strongly influenced by the media. While the Myanmar Government was still striving to explain its position to some 60 million of its citizens, the well-organized networks on the other side, supported by international agencies and certain governments, had already successfully disseminated its version of the events to a world audience of several billion. Hence, Myanmar needs to strengthen its position in media.

The Government needs to draw lessons from the Du-Chee-Yar-Tan incident and address the weaknesses that have been exposed in its media and public relations systems by taking appropriate decisions and implementing capacity strengthening measures. News releases must be targeted to the appropriate audiences.

The Bengali networks both inside and outside have used the systemic weaknesses of Myanmar in the transition period by taking the opportunity to manipulate international media with false allegations. Some Bengalis and their allies in the international community have done this with the intention of destabilizing the country's reforms, casting the current Government in a bad light and stoking sectarian violence in order to provide further opportunities for their interventions. Such untruths have contributed in no small way to the hatred and violence between the two communities and therefore, the source of propagation of such untruths inside the country should be identified and firmly dealt with. The Government should establish systems for data/intelligence gathering and for monitoring the Rakhine-Bengali issue.

All violence or potentially violent situations must be stopped with all necessary means, including by using the armed forces, when needed in support of the civilian administration. A chain of command should be firmly established for emergency situations, such as Du-Chee-Yar-Tan.

7.7. Recommendation 7

The Government should ensure adequate transport, personnel and logistics support on land, on the sea and along the Nat River so that in potential or actual emergency situations, swift action can be taken to stop violence and sectarian conflict.

7.8. Recommendation 8

Although the Union Government has already held media briefings for the international community, the Government is still being blamed and criticized for its handling of the problem. The Government should ensure greater transparency and more timely briefings to the media and the international community, including real-time reports from the ground.

7.9. Recommendation 9

Reports have been received of bad relations between INGOs and government officials in Maungdaw township. The INGOs have contributed in no small way to the exacerbation of the sectarian tensions; they have done this by favouring one side only, even though that side may have instigated the violence. The local authorities perceive these INGOs as difficult to cooperate with, and report that the INGOs are exceeding their mandate as defined by their cooperation agreements or Memoranda of Understanding with the Government. They also report that foreigners employed by the INGOs treat local government officials with arrogance; the senior Commission members have also observed the same. In particular, the majority of Rakhines are highly dissatisfied with the behaviour of MSF.

At a meeting between district officers and two doctors (one international, one Myanmar) from MSF, the two doctors were asked which Bengalis they had treated. Both doctors denied that MSF clinics had treated any of the Bengalis from the incident. This is recorded in the meeting minutes at the Township Administration Office. Yet one officer from MSF made statements of blame to the local government in connection with 22 Bengalis to whom MSF had allegedly provided medical treatment. This was recorded at a meeting. Furthermore, the MSF Country Director wrote to the Rakhine State Medical Chief stating that his agency had to medically treat 22 Bengalis.

The Rakhine State local authorities wish to cooperate fully with INGOs; however, the cooperation has to be mutual. By giving different versions in their accounts at different points and by not checking the veracity of allegations from one side with the authorities and the other side, the MSF statement has become one more piece of ammunition to use against the Rakhine State Government and the Union Government, despite the efforts of these Governments to implement reforms on all fronts. Because of the MSF statements, the Myanmar Government is blamed for hiding the facts.

The Government needs to set clear guidelines for INGOs and UN agencies to operate in the politically sensitive Rakhine State. These agencies on their part need to follow the rules and guidelines set by the sovereign Government of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar. The Government needs to take firm and effective action against those agencies who break the protocol and procedures established with the central Government.

The local authorities on their part need to change their perception of INGOs and the UN as problem makers and regard them as partners in cooperation, working together to address the humanitarian needs of Rakhine State.

7.10. Recommendation 10

It is unfortunate that the Du-Chee-Yar-Tan incident, from being an incident of the murder of a policeman, has become an issue that the international community views as a matter for discussion with the Government of Myanmar. The UN contributed in no small way to the conflation of this issue, by issuing reports without verifying the facts. The Commission has established that the statements coming from the Bengali community alone cannot be accepted without further checking among other elements of Rakhine State. Yet the UN, wishing to escape the type of criticism levelled at it by the rest of the international community, issued a highly biased report stating that this was the truth verified by “eye witnesses,” and accusing the local authorities of gross atrocities such as the decapitated heads of children and women in a water tank. Certain foreign embassies in Myanmar have also taken it upon themselves to issue strongly worded statements of blame. The Union Government has already issued statements on its part refuting these allegations.

Instead of working together with the Myanmar Government to resolve misunderstandings and problems, the UN has focused on trying to prove the veracity of its report, thereby wasting its time, and in trying to enhance its reputation among its donors. Not surprisingly, the majority of the Myanmar public views the UN negatively in relation to its biased role in the Rakhine sectarian violence. In polls conducted in 2012 and 2014 in Rakhine State and other regions among 1,000 Myanmar citizens, 80% stated that the UN was not a just and even handed organization in relation to its operations in Rakhine State and its position on this issue. In particular, they believed that the UN prioritized only the Bengalis in Maungdaw area. This has contributed to the deterioration in relations between the UN organizations and the Myanmar Government and between the UN organizations and the indigenous Rakhine people.

The actions of INGOs and the UN to date have been to enhance their reputation among their donors at the expense of inflating tensions in the host country. To make political gains, they seek to denigrate the “other side,” including the new Government of Republic of the Union of Myanmar. Because of their actions, a criminal issue – the murder of Police Sergeant Aung Kyaw Thein while he was legitimately discharging his duties – has become charged with unfounded accusations against the Rakhine communities, the local Government and even the Union Government.

Therefore, the Commission recommends that all international organizations working in Myanmar, including INGOs and the UN, work closely with the Government and all parties and seek to establish the truth before releasing statements obtained only from one side.

7.11. Recommendation 11

The government needs to accelerate the relief, rehabilitation and development activities that are now ongoing in Rakhine State, prioritizing those areas in Maungdaw that are prone to violence. Local officials have told the Commission that their work is being delayed by having to wait for decisions from the different levels in the different Ministries. To accelerate this work and enhance effectiveness and coordination, it is recommended that the Government appoint a Union-level Minister with full authority and responsibility for Rakhine State, including the oversight of security, immigration control and development functions state-wide.

7.12. Recommendation 12

In order to resolve potential and current problems such as Du-Chee-Yar-Tan, effective village administration systems are needed. Currently, Rakhine State implements three kinds of village administration systems: Rakhine villages are administered by Rakhine administrators, Bengali villages are administered by Bengali administrators, and mixed Rakhine-Bengali villages are administered by Rakhine administrators. The Bengalis blame the Du-Chee-Yar-Tan incident on this last point. Since the sectarian violence in 2012, the Rakhine and Bengali communities have not been able to work together in cooperation. Hence, while tensions are still running high, the mixed population villages should be administered directly from the township-level Administration Office. In doing so, the administration should not distinguish between the different races. It should reduce bureaucratic red tape as much as possible. Those who are citizens and non-citizens should be treated fairly according to the law, and the non-citizens should be protected from human rights violations and other excesses. Such a system should be a bridging mechanism between the Government and the Bengali community.

8. Conclusions

The Commission reiterates that the Du-Chee-Yar-Tan incident became inflated from the murder of a policeman, to rising inter-ethnic tensions and accusations of atrocities due to the actions of international media and the international organizations who disseminated unchecked reports. The five main conclusions drawn by the Commission are as follows:

- First, statements from arrested suspects and the discovery of the Police Sergeant's bloodstained clothing and insignia indicates the strong likelihood that Police Sergeant Aung Kyaw Thein is no longer alive and was murdered by the Bengali villagers from Du-Chee-Yar-Tan.
- Second, the fire at West Du-Chee-Yar-Tan Village was an act of arson directly or indirectly by an entity seeking to discredit the present Government of Myanmar, and not by the police or by the Rakhine community as alleged.
- Third, the allegations that the police and the Rakhine community committed acts of atrocity after the death of Police Sergeant Aung Kyaw Thein are unfounded and were circulated by an entity seeking to discredit the present Government of Myanmar.
- Fourth, the only major losses proven as a result of the fire in West Du-Chee-Yar-Tan village were the burned property of the affected residents. Claims of substantial amounts of property such as gold, large sums of money, cows and buffaloes were not substantiated by field investigations and are, therefore, dubious at best. On the other hand, the Commission found that during the fire, small amounts of kitchen goods and foodstuff were looted.
- Fifth, the Commission has made certain recommendations for implementation as follows:
 - Implement measures to enhance mutual trust between all parties;
 - Implement a citizenship assessment process according to the 1982 Citizenship Law;
 - Ensure maximum security and rule of law and reinforce the capacity of security forces to this end;
 - Take measures to sensitize government officials on Islamic beliefs and culture;
 - Reorganize police forces to be more effective, including in community policing;
 - Establish measures to enhance intelligence and monitoring to enable security forces to take preventive actions against violence;
 - Improve land, river and sea transportation;
 - Organize timely and transparent news dissemination mechanisms and forums;

- Systematically improve cooperation with international organizations working in Myanmar and take swift action against those that break the agreed protocols and rules set by the Government;
- Improve communication with INGOs;
- Appoint a Union-level Minister with full responsibility for Rakhine State;
- Implement a new administrative system directly from the township level for village areas that have mixed communities.

In conclusion, all actors, international, national and local will need to work together in a positive spirit of cooperation for Rakhine State to achieve peace and prosperity.