

Viewing cable 06BEIJING24800, PRC/BURMA: BEIJING'S OPPOSITION TO UNSC RESOLUTION

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Reference ID	Created	Released	Classification	Origin
06BEIJING24800	2006-12-27 09:10	2011-08-30 01:44	CONFIDENTIAL	Embassy Beijing

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FM AMEMBASSY BEIJING

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3375

INFO RUEHGO/AMEMBASSY RANGOON PRIORITY 4469

RUCNASE/ASEAN MEMBER COLLECTIVE

RUEHOO/CHINA POSTS COLLECTIVE

RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE

RUEHJA/AMEMBASSY JAKARTA 1861

C O N F I D E N T I A L BEIJING 024800

SIPDIS

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EAP FOR DAS JOHN

EAP/MLS FOR RAPSON

USUN FOR PHEE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/27/2026

TAGS: [PREL](#) [PHUM](#) [UNSC](#) [BM](#) [CH](#)

SUBJECT: PRC/BURMA: BEIJING'S OPPOSITION TO UNSC RESOLUTION

UNCHANGED

REF: BEIJING 24497

Classified By: Political External Unit Chief Edgard Kagan. Reasons 1.4
(b/d).

[1](#). (C) The PRC continues to "strongly oppose" a UN Security Council Resolution on Burma and though ready for a "political confrontation" with the United States in order to block a resolution, prefers to work with Washington to find "more effective" ways to communicate dissatisfaction to the Burmese regime, according to MFA International Organizations Department UN Affairs Division Director Yang Tao. Yang told Poloff December 27 that Beijing was surprised that the United States backed off from pushing for an early vote on a Burma resolution so quickly and with so little warning, adding that the PRC was also surprised that the United States had not suggested the possibility of a Presidential Statement (PRST).

Arguing that, as a neighbor, China has a much greater interest than in Burma than does the United States, Yang repeated his previous statement that Beijing will not accept any linkage of a possible UNSC veto of a Burma resolution to

overall U.S.-China relations.

¶2. (C) Yang claimed that the addition of South Africa and Indonesia to the UNSC would make it much harder for the United States to win support for a Resolution. Indonesia would have a particular impact, he stated, insisting that Latin American and African non-permanent members would hesitate to support a resolution that did not have the support of one of Burma's neighbors. In that regard, Yang said that MFA IO Director General Wu Hailong had just hosted his Indonesian counterpart for consultations in Beijing that had largely focused on Burma. Claiming that he had been surprised to learn that Beijing has a tougher position toward Burma than does ASEAN, Yang stated that Indonesia's presence on the Council might make even a PRST on Burma impossible.

¶3. (C) Poloff stressed the importance of UNSC action on Burma, emphasizing that Burma is a breeding ground for drug trafficking, infectious diseases and insurgencies, all of which have cross-border impact on the rest of Southeast Asia, including China. U/SYG Gambari has asked the UNSC to provide clear support the Secretary General's Good Offices mission. Poloff pointed out that a resolution remains the best way to signal the international community's concern in a way that would get the attention of the Burmese Junta.
SEDNEY