14. The Situation of Refugees

People fleeing Burma are responsible for the largest displacement and migration in all of Southeast Asia.

(Source: “Forced Back: Burmese Chin Refugees in India in Danger,” Refugees International, 9 May 2003)

(1)               Everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution.

–Article 14, Universal Declaration of Human Rights

14.1 Background

According to the U.S. Committee for Refugees, more than 600,000 Burmese refugees and asylum seekers remained in countries neighboring Burma at the end of 2003. Driven out by the ruling military regime’s policies and practices that suppress their freedom and violate their human rights, refugees and asylum seekers have fled to countries including Bangladesh, India, Malaysia and Thailand. Refugees flee forced labor, forced relocation, torture, rape, and other human rights violations perpetrated by members of the Tatmadaw (armed forces) or other State sponsored individuals or organizations. As the SPDC continues to try and eliminate all armed and unarmed resistance, the military presence and involvement in every area of the country and all aspects of life continues to grow, forcing many to leave their homes fleeing to neighboring countries or to become displaced within Burma. There are an estimated one million internally displaced people in Burma who have the potential to become cross border refugees in times of increased military conflict.

In Thailand, the U.S. Committee for Refugees reports a population of over 400,000 refugees, the majority of whom are from Karen, Karenni, Mon, and Shan ethnic groups. At the same time, there are more than one million migrant workers in Thailand who go there for many of the same reasons as refugees. A new trend is more ethnic Burmese leaving Burma from both urban and rural areas in family groups. They usually become migrant workers and leave Burma due to forced labor, heavy taxation, corruption, inability to maintain an adequate standard of living and interference with their livelihood through the theft or confiscation of land, property and livestock.

In 1992, over 250,000 Rohingya fled religious persecution and other gross human rights violations in Arakan State to take refuge in Bangladesh. While most have been repatriated, there are still over 20,000 Rohingya refugees in the two remaining refugee camps as well as over 100,000 who are living and working among the Bangladeshi communities (source: Forum-Asia, 2003). Rohingya have also fled to Malaysia while the refugee population in India of approximately 50,000, consists mostly of ethnic Chin people. In smaller numbers, other ethnic groups including Burman, Kachin, and Rakhine have also fled to Bangladesh, India, and Malaysia.

The Refugee Convention states that refugee protection rests on the principle of non-refoulement, which dictates that no refugee should be returned to any country where he or she is likely to face persecution on grounds of race, religion, nationality, political opinion or membership of a particular social group. This principle has been repeatedly violated by the governments of Bangladesh, India and Thailand, who continue to forcibly repatriate refugees back to areas where their safety cannot be guaranteed. 

14.2 Situation in Thailand

Refugee Demographics in 2003

The Burmese Border Consortium (BBC) reported a population of 139,568 refugees living inside the Thai border refugee camps at the end of 2003, which is a small decrease in numbers from the end of 2002. Throughout the year, there was a low rate of new arrivals which was attributed to weather conditions such as an unusually long and heavy rainy season. The decrease in arrivals has not been attributed to an improvement in the human rights situation in Burma. In addition, the number of new arrivals was balanced by the departure of approximately 1,200 refugees from Mae Khong Kha camp prior to the camp relocation. Yet, there remains a significant hidden population of new arrivals in the camps who stay despite the Royal Thai Government's policy of "no new arrivals" which denies this population the opportunity to become registered camp refugees. Since the end of 2001, new arrivals have not been able to officially register in the camps. In addition, the Ministry of the Interior and the UNHCR conducted the last official population headcount in 1999. As a result, there is a growing discrepancy between the official camp population as recorded by the Ministry of the Interior and the actual population. From 1999 to 2003, the monthly rate of new arrivals has averaged from 750 to 800. (Source: Six-Month Report, BBC, July–December 2003)

The breakdown by age and sex reported by the Karen, Mon and Karenni Committees in December 2003 was as follows: 

·        For Karen and Mon, this is over 12 years old, for Karenni over 14 years old. (Source: Six-Month Report, BBC, July–December 2003)

A significant number of Burmese refugees and asylum seekers reside outside of the camps. Due to a variety of factors including ethnicity, political involvement, or Thai policy, these groups are either not recognized as refugees or not accounted for in any official refugee population numbers. According to the BBC, there are approximately 50,000 ethnic refugees residing outside of the camps, 2,000 UNHCR recognized Persons of Concern, 500 political refugees, and 200,000 Shan refugees. (Source: “Overview of the Situation of Burmese Refugees in Thailand," Burmese Border Consortium, 6 November 2003)

Thai Government Policy towards Refugees and Asylum Seekers

"They were activists, but according to government policy we have to send back all illegal immigrants or anyone who doesn't have work permits or identification cards."

- Thai Military Officer commenting on the arrest and deportation of Burmese pro-democracy activists in Sangklaburi, Kanchanaburi province, in December 2002 and January 2003. (Source: “Myanmar Dissidents Living in Fear under Thai Crackdown,” AFP, 23 January 2003)

Thailand is one the main destinations for political dissidents, ethnic minorities, and any other groups fleeing from the oppressive policies and practices of the SPDC military regime. However, Thailand is not a signatory to the 1951 United Nations Convention on the Status of Refugees (Refugee Convention) and as a result, is not obligated to follow any international norms or standards in the treatment or protection of refugees. Thailand also lacks an adequate legal framework with which refugee status determination can be made. This creates a tenuous environment for those who come to Thailand seeking protection and security. The Thai government’s attitude towards the refugees is based on the belief that any assistance offered by NGOs and the UNHCR serves as a ‘pull’ factor to encourage refugees to enter Thailand and a deterrent to their eventual repatriation. According to Thai policy, the nearly 140,000 people residing in the refugee camps along the Thai-Burma border are displaced persons in temporary shelters fleeing the effects of fighting. Ethnic refugees living outside the camps, political activists in urban areas, Shan refugees, and migrant workers who can also be considered refugees are all classified as illegal migrants according to Thai law and are vulnerable to arrest and deportation. 

Many prominent members of the international community disagree with the Thai government’s contention that the presence of the camps and some limited assistance ‘encourages’ people to come to Thailand as refugees. Instead there is overwhelming evidence that people flee to Thailand as a last resort, to escape an intolerable situation of systematic SPDC abuses. The majority of people arriving in refugee camps have previously been living on the run as IDPs inside Burma. The Burmese Border Consortium estimates that at the end of 2003 there were 268,067 IDPs living in hiding inside Tenasserim Division, Mon State, Karen State, Karenni State, and Shan State, all of whom are potential refugees. There are many other IDPs who are living in over 176 resettlement areas controlled by the SPDC, where they are frequently conscripted for forced labor and forced portering, as well as subjected to many other abuses (please see the chapter on forced labor for more information). A large number of people living in these areas also attempt to flee to Thailand. (Please see chapter on internal displacement and forced relocation for more information on IDPs.)

However, since 1992, the Thai government has based its policies on only allowing those fleeing fighting or systematic human rights abuses to remain in Thailand. Refugees who are allowed to stay are placed in camps close to the borderline and the Thai government severely limits the role of the UNHCR. As a method of solving the refugee problem, the Thai government has worked to promote cease-fires and cooperation between ethnic resistance groups and the SPDC military regime. Thai Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra has worked diligently to improve historically troublesome relations with Burma since he came to office in 2001. His efforts have been supported by a government filled with a large proportion of high level businessmen who have little interest in Burmese asylum seekers and activists. The Thai government has been consistently criticized for compromising humanitarian standards for the sake of economic interests and appeasing the Burmese military regime.

In 2003, the Thai government continued to improve economic and political relations with the SPDC while advancing harsher policies towards Burmese asylum seekers and refugees. Since the end of 2002, Thai authorities have expressed that Thailand would no longer allow foreign groups working against neighboring countries to operate on Thai soil. Burmese political activists operating in exile in Thailand fell into this category. Moreover, on 29 December 2002, Secretary General of the National Security Council, General Winai Phattiyakhul stated, “Thailand would not welcome refugees from Burma and other neighboring countries anymore,” and “from now on, Thailand would force refugees to go back where they came from.” These sentiments continued throughout 2003 as the Thai government engaged in several crackdowns on pro-democracy activists outside of the refugee camps and tightened restrictions on refugees in the camps. (Source: “Thai Army Raided Karen Village in Sangklaburi,” Forum-Asia, 3 January 2003)

During a crackdown on illegal migrants in Sangklaburi, Kanchanaburi province, which commenced in late 2002 and continued through early 2003, the offices of several Burmese pro-democracy organizations were forced to close. Activists’ personal belongings were confiscated, landlords were instructed not to rent to illegal residents, and many activists were arrested. Seven activists who were arrested on 20 January 2003 were reportedly deported to Burma on 22 January. While local Thai officials admitted to knowing that the seven were activists and that they were staying in Sangklaburi peacefully, they expressed that Thai policy compelled them to deport the group because they did not hold any legal documents permitting them stay in the Kingdom. By the end of the month, Kyaw Kyaw Htet of the People’s Democratic Front, a Burmese pro-democracy group working in exile in Thailand, reported that approximately 60 activists who had been residing in Sangklaburi had been forced back to Burma. While Thai officials repeated again and again that the crackdown was merely an enforcement of Thai immigration law, it coincided with Prime Minister Thaksin’s first visit to Burma since border fighting broke out in May 2002. The visit was held from 9-10 February (source: “Myanmar Dissidents Living in Fear Under Thai Crackdown,” AFP, 23 January 2003). Prime Minister Thaksin returned from the meeting with Senior General Than Shwe indicating that Thailand would promote national reconciliation in Burma. In early March, the Thai 3^rd Army was ordered to push Burmese ethnic armed groups out of Thailand in an attempt to force them to negotiate with the military regime (source: Nanuam, Wassana, “Army Told to Give Rebels a Hard Time," Bangkok Post, 2 March 2003).

Again in July, the Thai authorities led a crackdown on pro-democracy and opposition groups based in Mae Sariang, Mae Hong Son province. The authorities ordered the offices of pro-democracy and ethnic organizations to be closed and vacated by the end of the month if they did not possess legal documents allowing them to stay in Thailand. Two days prior to the deadline, the border police entered the office of the Karen Women’s Organization (KWO) and arrested six members. As a result, other groups indicated that they would close their offices in accordance with the order and relocate either inside Burma or to undisclosed locations. These groups included the All Burma Students’ Democratic Front, the Karen National Union, and the Network for Democracy Development (source: Moe, Kyaw Zwa “Dissidents Targeted in Mae Sariang," Irrawaddy, 29 July 2003).

The UNHCR and the Refugee Status Determination Process

Until the end of 2003, individual asylum seekers outside of the refugee camps could apply to the UNCHR for recognition as a refugee, also known as Person of Concern (POC) status, by the conditions in article 1(A) of the 1951 Refugee Convention. POCs receive a document certifying they are refugees under the UNHCR’s mandate. The document includes their photographs, some biographical information, and the UNHCR’s address and contact information in the event that a POC encounters difficulties with the Thai authorities. POCs receive a small monthly subsistence allowance from the UNHCR and tend to reside in urban areas. Refugees in the border camps are not eligible to receive POC status. Instead, the UNHCR grants status to asylum seekers who are not part of the border caseload. Asylum seekers who have registered with the UNHCR but whose cases have not yet been determined are also provided a certificate indicating that they are under the protection of the UNHCR. (Source: Out of Sight, Out of Mind, Human Rights Watch, February 2004).  However, POC status and possession of UNHCR documents does not guarantee any greater protection as many POCs and those who are awaiting determination have reported harassment, extortion, confiscation of documents and arrest by both the police and immigration police. Some POCs have also reported being deported back to Burma.

Following the 30 May attack on Aung San Suu Kyi, NLD members and supporters near Depayin, Sagaing Division, this option of seeking POC status from the UNHCR came under fire making the already difficult situation for refugees and asylum seekers increasingly so. While Prime Minister Thaksin joined with other members of the international community in calling for the release of Aung San Suu Kyi, he simultaneously warned all Burmese dissidents in Thailand against staging protests or demonstrations. When 11 members of the Democratic Federation of Burma demonstrated peacefully in front of the Burmese Embassy in Bangkok demanding the release of Aung San Suu Kyi on 26 June, they were arrested and charged with illegal entry to Thailand. Yet, the 11 activists all possessed documents from the UNHCR confirming their status as Persons of Concern (POC) (source: “Police Chief Warns Burmese Dissidents,” Bangkok Post, 30 June 2003). The 11 activists had all applied to the UNHCR, had been reviewed through the UNHCR’s Refugee Status Determination process and were recognized for their legitimate fear of persecution upon return to Burma.

In response, Prime Minister Thaksin accused the UNHCR of undermining the sovereignty of Thailand and operating without properly sharing information or informing the Thai government of their activities. Disapproving of the POCs’ ability to “roam freely around the country," Prime Minister Thaksin proposed that all POCs be transferred to a border refugee camp to which the UNHCR agreed. At the end of 2003, the POC population consisted of approximately 1,900 Burmese asylum seekers. All of whom were at risk of being stripped of their POC status in the event that they refused to move to a border camp (source: “Thai Border Camps to Take 1,500 Myanmar Refugees," AFP, 2 July 2003).  Furthermore, in July, the Thai government announced a new policy that all new asylum seekers from Burma should not go to Bangkok or other urban centers. Instead, all refugees and asylum seekers should seek admission to the border refugee camps through an admission procedure to be determined by the Thai government. As of 1 January 2004, all asylum seekers and refugees who approached the UNHCR would be considered for admission to the camps and not for Persons of Concern or refugee status from the UNHCR on an individual basis (source: “Suspension of refugee status determination processing for new applications from Myanmar asylum-seekers as of 1 January 2004,” UNHCR, 6 January 2004). At the time of this report, the urban refugee population had yet to be relocated to the border camps and many had been presented with the option for resettlement in countries such as the USA and Norway.

The Provincial Admission Boards

Newly arrived asylum seekers to the camps also face great obstacles finding official permission to remain in Thailand. The Provincial Admission Boards (PABs), which handle the cases of new arrivals to the refugee camps, stopped meeting at the end of 2001 and therefore did not examine any new cases in 2003. While they were meeting, the PABs only considered those who were fleeing from direct fighting in border areas. Since the middle of 2000, the PABs had been rejecting the majority of cases with the justification that they did not fit the criteria of fleeing from fighting.  This is despite the fact that in the 1998 working arrangements worked out between Thailand and the UNHCR, it was noted that people fleeing "the effects of fighting," should also be given consideration. UNHCR’s statistics show that 38,088 persons sought admission to Thailand from May 1999 to June 2003. Of these, 11,731 were accepted as refugees (31%), while 10,408 were rejected (27%) and 11,288 (42%) are still waiting for a decision to be made regarding their status. UNHCR has stated that they believe that the 10,408 rejected cases have a legitimate fear of persecution if they return to Burma and they are appealing the decision to repatriate these individuals. Currently 5,541 of these cases have been reconfirmed as rejected with 330 people already repatriated. (Source: Six-Month Report, BBC, July-December 2003)

Situation in the Camps

Due to continued armed conflict and pervasive human rights abuses in Karen, Karenni, and other ethnic border areas, refugees continued to arrive to the nine refugee camps along the border throughout 2003. Because Thai policy has not allowed for new arrivals to the camps since the end of 2001, many new comers fear deportation if they make their presence known. As a result, new arrivals remain in the camps as a hidden unregistered population. Because the last official Ministry of the Interior (MOI) and UNHCR population headcount was conducted in 1999, the difference between the official and unofficial number of refugees in the camps is significant.

Refugees flee to Thailand in search of greater security. Yet, those residing in the camps still face many risks including human rights abuses perpetrated by their own communities and by Thai citizens. In addition, their fundamental rights are limited because Thai policy confines refugees to the camps and does not allow them to go outside. If refugees do go outside of the camps, they face arrest, deportation, and abuse from the Thai population. Moreover, as camps are situated close to the borderline, refugees also face security threats from across the border. (Source: “Overview of the Situation of Burmese Refugees in Thailand," Burmese Border Consortium, 6 November 2003)

In the past, refugees only received partial assistance from humanitarian aid organizations and remained self reliant in many ways. When different ethnic opposition groups controlled greater areas of land near the border, the refugees were able to engage in black market trade and to maintain small farms to provide for their needs. Others found employment in seasonal labor or raised small gardens to maintain a simple but poor life similar to conditions living inside Burma. As the Burmese Army dominated the ethnic opposition groups in the border areas, the Thai government tightened control of the refugees’ movement and made self-sufficiency increasingly difficult. In 1997, refugees in some camps were restricted from exiting, making foraging and gathering vegetables outside the camp impossible. Relief organizations have gone from providing 50 percent of staple diet needs in 1984 to 100 percent by the mid 1990s. In addition, refugees have become increasingly dependent upon relief organizations for other basic living necessities such as cooking materials, clothing, housing materials, and cooking fuel.

Because refugees are no longer able to supplement their diet through foraging or additional wages earned from seasonal labor, nutritional intake has been impacted. Refugees receive a basic food basket of rice, salt, yellow beans, oil, and fish paste from relief agencies. In 2001, BBC conducted a food consumption/nutrition status survey in Mae La and Karenni Camp 2. Again in May 2002, a rapid nutrition survey was conducted in Ban Don Yang, Tham Hin, and Umpiem Mai refugee camps. The surveys revealed that the refugee diets were lacking in micro-nutrients while excessive in carbohydrates. Despite the fact that most refugees living in Mae La and Karenni Camp 2 have been in Thailand for a considerable amount of time, they are very poor and are unable to supplement their rations. The BBC survey indicated that the average monthly expenditure for food is about 55-70 baht per family. In addition, registered refugees often share their rations with those who are unregistered and do not receive any. As a result, most refugees suffer from chronic malnutrition. The BBC study showed that as a result of poor living conditions, frequent infection, and a diet lacking in animal protein and micronutrients, low-level, chronic malnutrition is prevalent among children in the camp. The survey indicated that the acute malnutrition rate for children averaged at 4.9%. According to the World Health Organization, less than 5% is acceptable. (Source: Six-Month Report, BBC, July–December 2003)

In March 2002, the Ministry of the Interior instructed the BBC that in the future supplies must only be sent for the registered camp population of 108,000, as determined by the UNHCR and the Ministry of the Interior (MOI). BBC was also notified that they would not be permitted to provide food and supplies to new arrivals in the future. According to the BBC, providing only for the registered population would cause an extreme food and supply shortage as well as insufficient nutrition in the camps. The policy was not enforced in 2002 but remained an issue in 2003. The BBC reported that shortages were averted through compromise and discussions between the UNHCR, MOI, and BBC were ongoing to find a solution to the issue of the unregistered refugee population. (Source: Six-Month Report, BBC, July–December 2003)

In conjunction with the policy that the refugees in the camps are only temporarily displaced people, Thailand does not permit the refugees to build permanent structures. As a result, most homes and buildings are assembled with materials that are obtained locally such as bamboo and wood. Most homes are not durable and suffer from damage each rainy season. Deforestation of areas local to the camps has become an increasing source of tension for the Thai authorities and forestry services. While various reports indicated that illegal logging activities in these areas have caused greater damage, Thailand started to impose restrictions on the refugees’ ability to cut bamboo in 1997. These restrictions have increased through the years and in 2002, it was reported that the sale of bamboo to refugees was barred in some areas. Consequently, refugees rely on humanitarian organizations such as BBC, to supply building materials as well. (Source: Six-Month Report, BBC, July–December 2003)

Damage to the environment caused by the refugees was highlighted as one of the main reasons for the relocation of Karenni Camp 3 to Karenni Camp 1 in 2002. Similarly, in 2003, deforestation and illegal logging practices were emphasized as a pivotal motivation behind the relocation of Mae Khong Kha refugee camp, located in Mae Sariang Township of Mae Hong Son province. The camp was situated in close proximity to the Salween National Park and Thai authorities had long felt that the refugees were responsible for or contributing to the illegal logging and felling of timber in the area. Fearing that the refugees would not agree with the relocation, Thai Border Security Forces warned the camp population not to demonstrate against the move. Members of the Karen Refugee Committee reported that the refugees supported a relocation feeling that Mae Khong Kha was subject to too many natural disasters (source: “Thai Security Officer Warns Burmese Refugees, No Protest Against Relocation," Network Media Group, 14 July 2003). Yet, in October, it was reported that many refugees were voluntarily returning to Burma for fear of the new location. Mae La Oon, the new camp site, is located 4 kilometers from the Thai-Burma border and opposite Manerplaw, the former KNU headquarters now controlled by the SPDC. Many refugees feared cross border attacks and did not trust the Thais to provide proper protection (Source: “Some refugees go back to Burma as the New Relocation Site Seems Insecure," Network Media Group, 21 October 2003). According to BBC, approximately 1,200 refugees returned to Burma preceding the move which commenced on 25 November and completed in early 2004 (source: Six-Month Report, BBC, July–December 2003).

Situation of Women in Refugee Camps

Most refugees in camps live in family units, either arriving as such or reuniting after separate arrivals. The ratio of males to females is 51:49 and there are relatively few single mothers. The average family size is 5.5 people. Nearly 6% of households are headed by single women. Women tend to be under-represented in the committees that organize the day-to-day administration of the camps, but are active in areas such as teaching, health care work and home visits to gather information about the daily routine of refugees. Obstacles to increased participation of women in camp administration are lack of education and basic knowledge about their rights. There are various women’s groups in all the camps, some focusing on the daily needs and welfare of women and some on the more political aspects of women’s rights. (Source: Six-Month Report, BBC, July-December 2003)

The majority of refugee women come from ethnic minority groups and suffer from a wide range of human rights violations prior to arrival in the camps. Ethnic minority women living in conflict areas are used as forced labor on infrastructure projects and forced porters for the military, are subject to the constant threat of rape and have virtually no personal security. Conditions in the camps vary from place to place, but women have generally suffered from the recent tighter restrictions on movement outside the camps and have seen their ability to be self-sufficient decline. The conditions of refugee women strongly effect children, of whom women are the primary caregivers.

Situation of Refugee Children

Although the decision to flee one’s home is usually made by adults, children are deeply affected by the situation. The physical dangers for children during flight are immense. They are threatened by landmines, shelling, sudden attacks and their health is put at severe risk due to long days of walking without adequate food and water. They become malnourished and their resistance to diseases, such as malaria, is lowered. Unaccompanied children are vulnerable to neglect, military recruitment, sexual assault and other types of abuse. Children also suffer greatly from the emotional effects of fleeing their homes. They leave behind friends, relatives, possessions and established social structures and witness the fear and uncertainty felt by adult authority figures. This is in addition to the their exposure to the factors that caused their flight to begin with, such as the killing, torture, rape and use of forced labor of their family and community members. All of this, along with shortages of basic resources, can lead to harmful effects of the physical, psychological and social development of refugee children.

Children born of Burmese parents in Thailand are not eligible for Thai citizenship. The Thai government denies citizenship to children born to both legal and illegal immigrants and refugees from Burma. At the same time, under Burma’s Citizenship Act, these children are ineligible for citizenship because they were born outside of the country by parents who left illegally. As a result, a growing population of stateless children is emerging, born from both migrant workers and refugees. Beginning on 1 July 2003, the Thai government allowed birth certificates to be issued to babies born to registered camp refugees. This move was considered a major step forward in the issue of stateless children. (Source: Six-Month Report, BBC, July–December 2003)

Situation of Specific Ethnic Groups of the Refugee Population

Situation of Karen Refugees

The Karen, like the other ethnic minority groups, have settlements on both sides of the Thai/Burma border. With an estimated population of between 3 and 4 million, they are one of the largest ethnic minority groups in Burma. The majority of Karen support and consider themselves represented by the KNU and its army, the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA). Large numbers of Karen refugees began crossing from Burma in 1984, and since that time they have received assistance from the KNU-linked, Karen Relief Committee (KRC). At the end of 1994, 400 former KNLA soldiers left to form the break away Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA). They claimed that KNLA Christian commanders had persecuted Buddhist KNLA soldiers. The split was partly engineered by the SPDC as part of their ‘divide and rule’ strategy, and since 1994 the DKBA troops have attacked Karen camps inside the Thai border, sometimes in cooperation with the Burmese military.

Throughout 2003, Karen villagers continued to flee to Thailand due to fighting, conscription of forced labor, and numerous other human rights abuses. Yet, on 22 November, Col. San Pwint of the SPDC Ministry of Defense met with KNU Secretary General Padoh Manh Shah, Deputy Chairman Gen Bo Mya, and other KNU leaders in Mae Sot, Thailand. The purpose of the visit was to discuss Prime Minister Khin Nyunt’s seven-point road map to democracy and the possibility of future talks between the KNU and the SPDC. In response, the KNU sent a delegation of 5 junior officers to Rangoon to investigate the genuineness of Prime Minister Khin Nyunt’s plans for national reconciliation from 3-8 December. The meeting resulted in Gen Bo Mya expressing that he had diminished doubts about Khin Nyunt’s intentions and a verbal cease-fire agreement was reached. In addition, Gen Bo Mya expressed the need to establish peace for the future of the country.  In the beginning of 2004, the KNU and SPDC held their first round of cease-fire talks in Rangoon. (Source: “KNU Returns from Rangoon,” Irrawaddy, 9 December 2003)

Despite the verbal cease fire agreement and the continuing cease-fire discussions, reports of human rights abuses including forced labor, forced relocation, extortion, looting and arbitrary killing committed by SPDC troops have not abated. According to BBC, a cease-fire agreement could cause conditions, which would result in the spontaneous repatriation of refugees independent of any repatriation programs. Yet, due to the nature and length of the SPDC’s campaigns to wipe out the ethnic resistance and overtake the border ethnic states, the conditions inside Burma may not be suitable for the return of the refugees and the population of Internally Displaced Persons inside Burma.  Decades of laying landmines and destroying villages will call for proper planning before the two populations can fully return and reestablish their lives (source: Six-Month Report, BBC, July- December 2003). While some refugees have expressed the desire to return to their homes in Burma, they wish to do so under the conditions of true peace and safety. Conversely, others expressed doubt about the SPDC’s impetus along with fears that peace would not be long standing (source: Paung, Shah and Aung Su Shin “Refugees Pray for Peace," Irrawaddy, 20 January 2004). As of the time of this report, a formal written cease-fire agreement between the KNU and the SPDC had not been reached. 

Situation of Karenni Refugees

In 1989 the small Karenni State, with a relatively low population, Karenni State had four separate armed groups. In the early 1990s two of these groups signed cease-fire agreements with the SPDC, which left the two larger groups, the Karenni Nationalities People’s Liberation Front (KNPLF) and the Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP) continuing their armed struggle against the Burmese government. In 1992, as a result of mass forced relocations carried out by the SPDC (then SLORC) in their area of operations, the KNPLF was forced into a cease-fire agreement. As the situation remained insecure, most people who had fled the area did not return. The KNPP also signed a cease-fire with the Burmese government in March 1995, but by June SLORC troops had violated the agreement and it was discarded. In 1996 the Burmese military began a large-scale forced relocation program in areas they perceived as sympathetic to the KNPP. By the end of March 1998 there were 12,500 Karenni refugees in Thailand, and today there are over 20,000. (Sources: BBC & HRW, 2001)

Situation of Mon Refugees

The Mon have been struggling for autonomy since 1948 led by the New Mon State Party (NMSP) and its armed wing, the Mon National Liberation Army. There are nearly 2 million Mon people. When Mon refugees began to flee to Thailand in growing numbers, the NMSP, like the KNU, formed their own organization, the Mon National Relief Committee, to coordinate assistance to the refugees. In June 1995 the NMSP signed a cease-fire treaty with the Burmese military, which enabled them to retain their arms within a few areas in Mon State. The agreement also mandated that Mon refugees in Thailand be repatriated, which was done the following year. The newly repatriated refugees however remained afraid to return to their homes, and instead established new camps in NMSP-controlled territories. Currently these individuals remain internally displaced within Burma, while a further 13,000 remain in camps in Thailand. (Sources: BBC & HRW) 

In late 2001, fighting broke out between the NMSP and the Hongsawatoi Restoration Party (HRP), a breakaway group from the NMSP which formed in November 2001, with the SPDC. As a result of the fighting, the situation of the Mon resettlement sites was tenuous throughout 2002 and the refugees faced new obstacles in obtaining proper food. In conjunction with the fighting, new landmines were laid making farming and foraging exceedingly dangerous. In conjunction with the Thai crackdown on opposition groups working in Sangklaburi in late 2002, the HRP office was forced to close and several members decided to return to the NMSP at that point. In the beginning of 2003, approximately 100 members of the HRP were reported to have reunited with the NMSP.  (Source: Seng, Naw “Mon Splinter Group Members Return," Irrawaddy, 3 January 2003)

Throughout 2003, it was reported that Mon refugees continued to arrive to Khalokhani refugee camp, located inside Mon State, as well as locations in Thailand. Refugees fled from both fighting and human rights abuses such as forced labor and portering in Mon State, particularly near Ye Township. (Source: "Thais to Close Down Refugee Camp," DVB, 22 May 2003)

Situation of Pa-O Refugees

The Pa-O live primarily in the Taunggyi area of southwestern Shan State. A smaller number live in the Thaton area of Mon State in Lower Burma. The Pa-O in the Thaton area have largely become "Burmanized" and like their neighbors the Mon and Karen, they have adopted Burmese language, dress and customs. The Pa-O in southwestern Shan State have learned to speak Shan, but have maintained their own distinct language and customs.

Forced relocation programs carried out by the SPDC have been particularly sweeping in Mon, Karen and Shan States, the states where most of the Pa-O live. The Pa-O Nationalist Army signed a cease-fire with SLORC in 1991, but because the Pa-O live in many of the areas where other rebel groups are still active they have been swept up in the forced relocations and human rights abuses for which the ruling junta has become infamous. (Source: Pa-O Human Rights Watch)

Situation of Shan Refugees

Shan State is the largest ethnic minority state in Burma, and one of the most ethnically diverse.  While the Shan are the largest ethnic group in Shan State, there are many other ethnic groups inhabiting the State such as the Palaung, Lishau, Lahu and Wa. At one time, Shan State was an autonomous region in Burma. The Shan were promised the right to secede from Burma after 10 years when independence from the British was gained in 1948. Yet, this agreement was not honored as civil war between the ruling authorities and the ethnic nationalities prevailed following independence. For decades, Khun Sa, the notorious drug warlord, ran his drug production operations in Shan State and along the Thai border with the support of various Shan armed groups.  In January 1996, Khun Sa officially surrendered to the Burmese government and Burmese troops launched a major relocation program in attempt to eliminate all support for the Shan armed resistance groups and to control the region’s natural resources. It is estimated that within a 6-month period between March and September 1996, more than 450 villagers in the area between Namsan-Kurng and Heng-Mong Nai were moved to relocation sites. By 1998, it was estimated that over 300,000 Shan in central Shan State had been affected by the relocation programs. In 1999, the SPDC sanctioned the Wa to lead resettlement programs relocating Wa people from the China border to the Thai border area across from Chiang Rai and Chiang Mai, Thailand. By 2002, 50,000 to 100,000 people had already been moved with the intention of resettling 250,000 Wa people. (Source: Caouette, Therese M, and Mary E. Pack, Pushing Past the Definitions, Migration from Burma to Thailand, OSI & RI, December 2002)

The programs of forced relocation and other human rights abuses have led Shan and other ethnic groups from Shan State to flee across the border to Thailand. In November 2003, the Burma Border Consortium (BBC) estimated a population of approximately 200,000 Shan refugees in Thailand, and arrivals in Fang district alone reached a rate of approximately 925 people each month during the year. However, due to the fact that Shan language and culture is closely related to Thailand’s, many Shan people have been able to find temporary seasonal work across the border when fighting or economic factors made it difficult to survive in Shan State. As a result of their prevalence as migrant laborers, and more importantly the large amount of illegal drugs produced in Shan State, Thailand has consistently refused to recognize any Shan people as refugees, instead labeling them ‘economic migrants.’ As a result of Thailand’s position towards the Shan, NGOs are largely prohibited from providing them with any assistance. Access to healthcare is minimal, and children have little opportunity for education.

Many Shan and humanitarian organizations contest the Thai government’s notion that all Shan are economic migrants. In a report entitled Charting the Exodus from Shan State, the Shan Human Rights Foundation presented evidence illustrating that most new arrivals to Fang district, Thailand originate from one of the twelve townships that were subject to the forced relocation programs which commenced in 1996. Prior to 1996, the numbers of Shan people arriving in Fang district were reported to be around 4,000 per year.  They would arrive during the dry season from January to May. In addition, most were men ranging in age from 20 to 40 years old. However, after 1996 the number of arrivals increased ranging from 8,000 to 15,000 each year. Unlike those who arrived prior to 1996, there was no seasonal correlation to their arrival time. In addition, 32% were under 18 years old and 15% were 45 years or above, and approximately half were working age adults. SHRF argues that those arriving as migrant workers do not bring their families as it would only create complications for staying in Thailand. Instead, the difference in age groups indicates that full families were arriving in flight of persecution and not in search of work. (Source: Charting the Exodus from Shan State, Shan Human Rights Foundation, 2003).

The majority of the Shan people who have fled Burma live in the fields and orchards of Chiang Mai, Chiang Rai, and Mae Hong Son provinces. Most are able to survive on the meager wages of seasonal work. Without any official status, Shan people in Thailand are subject to abuse by their employers and frequent arrest and detention. A health concern for Shan refugees is their unprotected exposure to pesticides in the orange orchards where they live and work. (Source: Six-Month Report, BBC, July-December 2003)

Shan refugees also settle in one of the two unofficial refugee camps located along the border. The camp populations range from 2-3,000. The camp locations are close to areas where the SSA has been carrying out anti-drug operations and continuing its opposition against SPDC/Wa troops. In these areas the situation remains very volatile and insecure. If there is an SPDC/Wa attack, the refugees in these camps would almost certainly have to flee into Thailand.

Timeline of Major Refugee Related Events on the Thai/Burma Border in 2003

January

On 1 January, “Pro-democracy and dissident groups as well as the News Media Group and the Burmese Women’s Union received a warning from Thai intelligence agencies to close their offices for ten days during the visit of Deputy Prime Minister General Chavalit Yongchaiyudh to Mae Hong Son. Around the same time, intelligence officers from the Naresuan Taskforce of the Third Army started to collect information from all pro-democracy and dissident groups in Mae Hong Son in the same pattern as security officials’ behavior in the crackdown in Sangkhlaburi district.” (Source: Out of Sight, Out of Mind, Human Rights Watch, February 2004)

On 10 January, the KNU reported fighting between the Burmese Army and the KNU had broken out earlier in the week and resulted in the death of one captain and nine soldiers from the Burma Army. Two KNU soldiers and ten Burmese soldiers were wounded. The fighting caused approximately 300 Karen villagers to flee to Thailand in search of refuge. (Source: “Rebel Army Says Myanmar Officer, Nine Soldiers Killed in Clashes," AFP, 10 January 2003)

On 15 January, it was reported that approximately 614 ethnic Karen villagers crossed the border to Wallay, Phoppra, Thailand as a result of dry season fighting in Karen State. The Karen villagers were allowed to stay in the village’s monastery and were provided with clothes and rice by BBC. It was anticipated that the group would return to Burma when the fighting dissipated. (Source: “Changing Politics A Worry for Myanmar Refugees," AP, 15 January 2003)

On 20 January, nine Burmese pro-democracy activists and one child based in Sangklaburi, Kanchanaburi province were arrested in a joint army-police operation to crackdown on illegal residents. Seven were deported on 22 January and one was sentenced to 48 days in a Thai prison for harboring illegal immigrants. In addition, those who were considered illegal were fined 4,000 baht each. (Source: “Dissidents to Be Forced out Ahead of Talks," The Nation, 22 January 2003)

On 21 January, Thai army Commander in Chief Gen Somdhat Attanand went to Burma to meet with SPDC officials to discuss a myriad of issues including drug suppression and repatriation of Burmese refugees. In addition, the topic of pro-democracy activists working in Thailand was addressed. Before his visit, the General indicated that Thailand would not proceed with repatriation plans until they could "ensure a safe environment in Burma." At the same time, he indicated that Thailand would eliminate all opposition groups conducting activities on Thai soil. (Source: “Army Commander Headed to Burma," Irrawaddy, 16 January 2003)

On 23 January, SPDC troops seized the KNU’s Law Khaw Camp while attacking three other camps during their first major offensive of the dry season. On 24 January, a KNU officer reported that their troops had withdrawn from Lay Khaw which caused nearly 700 Karen villagers to escape across the border to Phop Phra district, Thailand. SPDC officers ordered the village headman and two monks to return so as to encourage the villagers to return as well. Yet, the refugees were too frightened to return and remained in the monastery at Yaphaw in Thailand. Some indicated that they feared forced labor. In addition, the refugees indicated that they did not want to be placed in Umpiem Mai refugee camp. The village headman indicated that if the conditions in their village improved, they would return to Burma. (Source: Shin, Aung Su, “Junta Seizes KNU Camp," Irrawaddy, 24 January 2003)

On 30 January, approximately 600 Karen villagers returned to their villages in Burma. The villagers had been part of a larger group of refugees who crossed the border fleeing fighting between SPDC and KNU troops in Lay Khaw and U Ru Hta villages. While the group of 600 was concerned about how they might be treated by the DKBA upon their return to Burma, they felt that they wanted to return to their homes. (Source: Shin, Aung Su, “Refugees Return Home," Irrawaddy, 31 January 2003)

On 31 January, DVB reported the Thai authorities’ plan to commence a three-month-long crackdown on illegal migrants in conjunction with a crackdown on drug trafficking. According to reports from KNPP Joint Secretary Saw U Reh, the crackdown was scheduled to begin on 1 February. In regards to the situation in Mae Hong Son, Saw U Reh reported “There are increasing movements and numbers of Thai soldiers here. They are increasing the troops for border security reason, I was told but I don’t know the number. They have been restricting the movements of refugees in the camps for awhile.” In regards to the situation of Mae Sariang, Ko Htay Aung of NDD indicated the following: “We have also heard that it is not only in the Mae Sariang area but also they are planning to tighten the securities in refugee camps and the areas connecting to inner Thailand. With this kind of restrictions, we will not have any chance to move. There will be more difficulties for refugees.” (Source: “More Arrests in Thailand," DVB, 31 January 2003)

February

On 24 February, it was reported that “Prime Minister Thaksin said support from NGOs for Burmese ethnic groups was interfering with the government’s effort to mediate peace talks between Rangoon and the rebels. A senior military source said the NGOs would be closely watched as authorities tried to bring the parties to the negotiation table.” (Source: Out of Sight, Out of Mind, Human Rights Watch, February 2004 &”NGOs Hampering Burmese Peace Effort,” Bangkok Post, 24 February 2003)

March

“In March, it was reported that villagers fleeing SPDC military expansion and operations in Eastern Shan State continued to arrive at a de-facto refugee camp opposite Mae Fah Luang on the northern Chiang Rai border.” (Source: Charm Offensive, ALTSEAN, Burma, 1 January – 31 March 2003)

On 2 March, Thai Defense Minister General Thammarak Isarangkurana Ayudhaya reported that the Thai Third Army had been instructed to take stricter measures when dealing with the KNU and Shan State Army as a method of pushing the armed groups to negotiate with the SPDC government. The General indicated that the Thai army should push the groups out of Thailand and not allow entry for any reason. The instructions were issued following Prime Minister Thaksin’s trip to Rangoon after which he stated that Thailand would assist in creating national reconciliation in Burma. (Source: Nanuam, Wassana “Army Told to Give Rebels A Hard Time,” Bangkok Post, 2 March 2003)

On 4 March, Third Army Commander Lt-General Udomchai Ongkhasing reported that the Third Army had forced Shan State Army troops in the mountains of Chiang Mai, Chiang Rai, and Mae Hong Son provinces to lower ground in order to prevent them from attacking SPDC troops. Lt-Gen Udonmchai also indicated that representatives were sent to meet with SSA leader Chao Yodsuek in order to convince him to negotiate with the SPDC government. (Source: “Army Forces Shan State Troops Off Mountains to Appease Burma,” Bangkok Post, 5 March 2003)

Yet on 5 March, the SSA denied reports that they the Third Army had forced them to relocate from the mountains. At the same time, the SSA spokeswoman, Nam Khur Hsen, indicated that the SSA troops were not on Thai soil but in SSA territory. Therefore, there was no reason for the Thai Army to expel them from the northern mountains of Thailand. (Source: Moe, Kyaw Zwa, “Shan State Army Unmoved,” Irrawaddy, 5 March 2003)

At the beginning of March, the Karen Women’s Organization (KWO) indicated that 3,500 new refugees arrived to Noe Poh refugee camp in the first two months of 2003. The refugees were reported to be from five different villages in Karen State including Kyar Ein and Kyondo and fleeing from increased conscription of forced labor and forced porters. It was also reported that the Thai government had been blocking Burmese Border Consortium food and supply deliveries to Noe Poh camp for over one week. The reason for the block was unknown and stalled construction of bamboo shelters for new arrivals. Moreover, this was the first instance of supplies being blocked since the camp opened in 1997. (Source: Paung, Poe, “Refugees Continue to Arrive," Irrawaddy, 5 March 2003)

On 6 March, a group of over 100 people comprised of refugees from Mae La camp and their relatives were arrested and detained by Thai soldiers when they went outside of the camp to collect dry leaves for roofing. The group was handed over to the Tak Province Immigration Office. (Source: “100 Karen Refugees Missing," DVB, 6 March 2003)

April

In April, the Burma Border Consortium reported that nearly 1,000 Shan refugees arrived to Fang District of Chiang Mai Province each month. The majority of the refugees were fleeing from relocation site in Central Shan State. (Source: Burma Border Consortium, Update No. 1/2003, 2 April 2003)

It was reported that 67 Mon families arrived to Khalokhani (resettlement site) in Kanchanaburi district during the month. Relief organizations were only able to provide for 1/3 of each individual’s needs due to continual reductions in aid. (Source: “Thais to Close Down Refugee Camp," DVB, 22 May 2003).

On 10 April, a Muslim religious leader from Mae La refugee camp was detained by camp rangers after he tried to connect a water supply line without permission. The Muslim man was tied to a tree and his beard was cut with a knife. As a result, more than 100 Muslims gathered to assail the rangers and prevent them from harming the man. While most of the rangers ran away, one opened fire on the crowd with an assault rifle injuring one Karen woman and one Muslim man. The crowd then beat the remaining ranger until he was unconscious. (Source: “Rangers Clash with Muslims in Thai Refugee Camp, Three Injured," AFP, 11 April 2003)

May

During May, it was reported that approximately 30 families arrived to Khalokhani Refugee Camp in Kanchanaburi District. The majority of the refugees were from Ye Township, Mon State and fled fighting in the area. (Source: “Thais to Close Down Refugee Camp,” DVB, 22 May 2003)

On 7 May, Thai authorities ordered the population of disabled refugees from Karenni Camp 3 to relocate to Karenni Camp 1 before the end of the month. The group of approximately 35 disabled families had remained in the site after Thai authorities ordered Karenni camp 3 to move to Karenni camp 2 in August 2002. It was reported that Thai authorities informed camp leaders that all refugees who remained in the area following the deadline would be subject to arrest and deportation. Camp leaders expressed concern about difficulties the disabled refugees would face building new homes in the new location. (Source: “Disabled Refugees in Karenni Camp to Be Relocated,” Network Media Group, 12 May 2003)

On 8 May, a heavy rainstorm coupled with strong winds destroyed 300 huts and injured five Karen refugees in Mae Khong Kha camp in Mae Sariang. (Source: “Rainstorm Crashes 300 Refugee Huts, 5 Injured in Karen Refugee Camp,” Network Media Group, 9 May 2003)

On 22 May, it was reported that Thai authorities informed the Burmese Student Association of their plans to close Tham Hin camp in Ratchaburi province. (Source: “Thais to Close Down Refugee Camp," DVB, 22 May 2003)

On 27 May, Hina Jilani, the UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights, expressed concern over the declining human rights situation in Thailand. Her concern included the Thai government’s increased pressure and crackdowns on Burmese pro-democracy activists in exile in Thailand. She stated,” "Many of the Burmese human rights defenders feel very insecure with regard to their freedom of movement inside Thailand.” (Source: “Human Rights Defender Hits at Thailand,” Irrawaddy, 28 May 2003)

On 30 May, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, her convoy, and thousands of National League for Democracy supporters were attacked in what has been called an act of State-sponsored violence in a small village just outside of Depayin, Sagaing Division, Burma. Eyewitness accounts report that members of the USDA, monks, and others used bamboo sticks and iron rods to beat members of the NLD convoy and supporters who had gathered. Some women had their clothes torn off and were left naked. The total number of fatalities and injuries is still disputed. The event also resulted in the imprisonment of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, U Tin Oo and other leaders of the NLD.

June

On 4 June, approximately 30 protestors gathered in front of the Burmese embassy in Bangkok to call for the release of Aung San Suu Kyi, who had been taken into custody and held in an unknown location following the attack on the NLD convoy and supporters on 30 May. After 10 minutes, police ordered the demonstrators to cease or face arrest. (Source: “Myanmar Exiles Rally for Suu Kyi in Thailand," Reuters Alertnet, 4 June 2003)

On 17 June, six people gathered and commenced a hunger strike outside the Burmese Embassy in Bangkok. The protestors planned to refuse food for 58 hours in conjunction with Aung San Suu Kyi’s 58^th birthday the following day. The group was relocated to the UNHCR headquarters by the Thai authorities, where they were joined by three additional protestors and their activities continued. (Source: Shine, Aung Su and staff reporters, “More Hunger Strikes for Suu Kyi’s Release,” Irrawaddy, 18 June 2003)

On 25 June, following a warning from the SPDC that pro-democracy activists in exile might take hostages to protest for the release of Aung San Suu Kyi, a senior Thai police official reported that security for Myanmar diplomats in Thailand would be tightened and exiled pro-democracy activists would be monitored closely. Lieutenant General Jumpon Manmai, head of Special Branch police indicated that pro-democracy activists would still be allowed to protest peacefully, yet anyone engaging in illegal acts would face arrest. (Source: “Myanmar Junta Warns Thailand of Possible Dissident Hostage Plan," AFP, 25 June 2003)

On 26 June, 11 members of the Democratic Friends of Burma were arrested and charged with illegal entry after staging a peaceful protect in front of the Burmese Embassy in Bangkok. The 11 protestors all carried UNHCR certificates indicating they are Persons of Concern (POC). (Source: “Police Chief Warns Burmese Dissidents,” Bangkok Post, 30 June 2003)

On 27 June, Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra accused the UNHCR of undermining the sovereignty of Thailand by granting refugee status to asylum seekers from Burma without the knowledge of the Thai government. He also stated, “Anyone holding a UNHCR card must stay in their camp and they are not supposed to freely roam across the country.” The UNHCR responded that they had been working with the acquiescence of the Thai government for over 20 years. In addition, the UNHCR indicated that because Thailand is not a signatory to the 1951 Refugee Convention and does not have a legal framework for determining refugee status, it has the right to confer status. (Source: “Thai PM Lashes UN Refugee Agency over Myanmar Exiles,” AFP, 27 June 2003) 

On 30 June, Police Chief San Sarutanont warned that any group of people including UNHCR certificate holders, engaging in political activities, such as protests, against a neighboring country would face arrest. His warning came in response to reports of a potential protest held by Burmese dissidents in front of the Burmese Embassy in Bangkok (source: “ Police Chief Warns Burmese Dissidents," Bangkok Post, 30 June 2003). Meanwhile, more than 80 police surrounded the Burmese Embassy instructed to arrest any Burmese protestors while allowing Thai NGOs and Thai students to remain. Burmese protestors did not appear. (Source: “Only Police Show Up at Rally," The Nation, 1 July 2003)

July

On 2 July, Thai foreign ministry spokesman Sihasak Phuangketkeow announced, “All people of Myanmar nationality who have been granted ‘person of concern’ (POC) status, some 1,500 will be transferred to camps along the border.” He added, “If they refuse to move to the camps, they will be stripped of their POC status.” His comments followed a meeting between the UNHCR and the Thai government concerning the UNHCR’s refugee status determination process (source: “Thai Border Camps to Take in 1,500 Myanmar Refugees," AFP, 2 July 2003). He also commented, "They are not supposed to be able to engage in political activities that would affect relations with other countries. They are here as guests," (source: “Exiles from Burma Face Clampdown in Thailand," Financial Times, 3 July 2003).

On 4 July, Wunna Maung and Khin Zaw, two eyewitnesses to the attack on Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD on 30 May, were prevented from presenting testimony about the event to the Thai parliament. Upon their arrival to the Parliament Building, Thai authorities ordered the two to be arrested. The authorities also canceled a press conference scheduled for the same day at the Foreign Correspondence Club of Thailand in Bangkok. The two witnesses immediately sought the protection of the UNHCR and applied for refugee status, which they were granted by the end of the day. It was reported that the two witnesses were granted status on the condition that they did not speak to the press or they would face arrest. The two were successful in submitting an affidavit with the Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs. (Source: Zin, Min and Kyaw Zwa Moe, “Witness Reports Shed Light on Ambush,” Irrawaddy, 8 July 2003)

On 10 July, in a meeting between refugees and the Border Security Force of Thailand, Officer Gordon warned the approximately 17,000 refugees of Mae Khon Kha camp not to hold any demonstrations in protest of the camp relocation. Saw Htoo Htoo of the Karen Refugee Committee indicated the refugees were more than willing to relocate due to the negative results of natural disasters in the area. (Source: “Thai Security Officer Warns Burmese Refugees, No Protest Against Relocation," Network Media Group, 14 July 2003)

On 16 July 2004, Prime Minister Thaksin ordered the Thai Labour Ministry and various security agencies to prepare for a possible increase in the number of Burmese entering Thailand and negative consequences of the US sanctions against Burma. (Source: “PM: Prepare for Refugees," The Nation, 17 July 2003)

On 18 July, Thai officials ordered Mae Sariang based Burmese activists and ethnic organizations to vacate their offices by the end of the month or face arrest. (Source: Moe, Kyaw Zwa, “Dissidents Targeted in Mae Sariang," Irrawaddy, 29 July 2003)

On 29 July, Thai border police entered the office of the Karen Women’s Organization and arrested six members, including the joint secretary, who were released in the afternoon of the same day. The six women arrested were Christer Bell, Naw Myaing Po, Naw Shwe Paw, Htoo Wah Paw, Paw Hset Hser and Naw Hser Nay Moo. The arrests came two days before the end of the month deadline for the organizations to vacate their offices. It was reported that the police questioned the women about their plans for the future. (Source: Moe, Kyaw Zwa, “Dissidents Targeted in Mae Sariang,” Irrawaddy, 29 July 2003)

On 31 July, it was reported that the Thai authorities banned Burmese visitors from staying overnight in Mae Samplet, a village on near Mae Sariang on the Thai-Burma border. Local villagers were also instructed to cease carrying Burmese passengers on their boats on the Salween River and to allow people holding refugee camp papers to only stay for one night. (Source: “Thai Says No More Burmese Visitors at Border Village," Network Media Group, 31 July 2003)

August

On 7 August, it was reported that in a meeting between Thai authorities and Mae Khong Kha refugee camp authorities, stricter regulations concerning movement in and out of the camp for both refugees and visitors would be implemented. It was indicated that all vehicles going into the camp were required to obtain a permit from the township authorities. In addition, NGO and organization vehicles were required to register all their information with the camp security authorities. (Source: “Refugee Camp under Tight Securities," Network Media Group, 11 August 2003)

On 8 August, Thai police allowed a confined 15 minute 8/8/88-memorial demonstration in front of the Burmese Embassy. Fearing arrest, only 20 demonstrators participated from groups including the NLD-LA, PDP and ethnic organization such as Shan, Pa-o, and Chin. (Source: “Fear of Crackdown Hampers 8/8/88 Demonstration," MAN, 8 August 2003)

On 15 August, it was reported that the Burmese Border Consortium (BBC) would cease providing rations to Burmese opposition groups based in Mae Sot. This decision affected approximately 10 organizations, many of which were entirely dependent upon the rations which include rice, salt, cooking oil, chili, beans, and fish sauce. A representative from the BBC indicated that their mission was to support refugees living inside the refugee camp. (Source: “Opposition Rations Slashed,” Irrawaddy, 15 August 2003)

On 19 August, Thai police raided the National Catholic Commission on Migration (NCCM), which provides assistance to Burmese migrant workers. One Burmese woman seeking survival assistance was arrested and later deported. (Source: “Thai Police Raid NGOs," Mizzima News, 21 August 2003)

On 27 August, it was reported that Colonel Panlop Pinmanee, deputy directory for the internal security office, indicated that Burmese refugees living outside of the refugee camps would be confined to one of nine detention centers during the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) meeting as a security precaution. Political refugees were to be contained at a detention center in western Ratchaburi province. (Source: “Thailand to Confine Refugees to Camps During APEC," AFP, 27 August 2003)

September

On 7 September, “Burmese activists were arrested soon after participating in a fast organized by Forum-Asia at a public park to call for the release of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. They were charged with immigration violations and released on September 24 after paying 200,000 baht each (U.S. $5,000).” (Source: Out of Sight, Out of Mind, Human Rights Watch, February 2004)

On 18 September, in an attempt to build strong relationships with Thailand’s neighbors, Prime Minister Thaksin pledged to prevent rebels from neighboring countries from entering into Thailand. He indicated the political refugees and NGO employees would not be affected by this policy and would not be blacklisted. (Source: “Thai PM Vows to Bar ‘Hard-core’ Rebels from Kingdom," AFP, 16 September 2003)

On the same day, 15 Burmese activists with UNHCR POC status were arrested by Thai police when they protested in front of the Burmese Embassy in Bangkok. The demonstration marked the 15^th anniversary of the coup which brought the ruling junta to power. The group was transported to the Immigration Detention Center (IDC) and told they would be sent to Special Detention Center at the Bang Khen Police Academy in northern Bangkok. The UNHCR indicated that they had no power to gain their release. (Source: “Activists Arrested on Coup Anniversary," Irrawaddy, 18 September 2003)

On 23 September, it was reported that 14 Karen refugees crossed into Prachuap Kiri Khan, Thailand as a result of intensified attacks by the Burmese Army in the border region. The group consisted of five women, eight children, and one man. Mr Prasat Prasertying, Thap Sakae district chief, indicated that border and local authorities along with health and charity organizations were addressing the situation. (Source: “Karen Refugees Pour into Thailand as Myanmar Army Steps Up Crackdown," Thai Press Reports, 23 September 2003)

On 24 September, it was reported that approximately 150 villagers from Karen State arrived to Tak province, Thailand. The refugees fled to Thailand after receiving orders to provide food and labor to the soldiers of Burma Army battalions 701, 703, and 706 as well as DKBA battalion 999. (Source: “Karens Flee Labor Conscription," Irrawaddy, 24 September 2003)

October

On 2 October, it was reported that a high-level police source indicated that the foreign activists planning to visit Thailand during the APEC summit and who might pose a threat to national security would have their visas revoked. (Source: Ngamkham, Wassayos, “Visa Ban to Keep Foreign Activists Out of Country," Bangkok Post, 3 October 2003)

On 13 October, it was reported that the Thai Sangha Council, Thailand’s main Buddhist council, passed a resolution barring Burmese monks from inhabiting monasteries in Thailand. According to a Thai labor official, there were more than 500 Burmese monks living in temples in five districts along the Thai-Burma border. At the time of this report, over 100 monks had returned to Burma for fear of the repatriation that was anticipated to begin at the end of the Buddhist Lent. (Source: Shin, Aung Su, “Thais to Expel Burmese Monks,” Irrawaddy, 13 October 2003)

On 17 October, it was reported that several hundred Karen villagers crossed the border to Thailand as a result of a major offensive which resulted in the Burma Army overtaking the KNLA 7^th Brigade headquarters in Pa’an district. Approximately 1,500 people were displaced and considered potential refugees. (Source: “Myanmar Troops Take Karen Rebel Base, Hundreds Displaced," AP Worldstream, 17 October 2003)

On the same day, immigration chief for Tak Province, Col Sanit Komonwanit, reported that Mae Sot police, immigration officials, and Myawaddy security forces engaged in a two-day security sweep operation in preparation for the 21 October APEC Summit. As a result, approximately 500 Burmese people were handed over to the Burmese authorities in Myawaddy. In addition, Mae Sot district chief, Virut Pusingh indicated that groups considered to be potential security threats were being monitored closely. (Source: Shin, Aung Su, “Border Sweep Proceeds Apec," Irrawaddy, 17 October 2003)

On 18 October, Governor Supoj Laowansiri confirmed the plan to relocate the 17,062 refugees inhabiting Mae Khong Kha to a new site called in Ban Mae La Oon, in Sop Moei district by the end of December. The new site is located 4 kilometers from the Thai-Burma border. Thai authorities reported that the move was an attempt to address the problem of deforestation in Mae Sariang district, Mae Hong Song province. (Source: “Relocation of 17,000 Refugees to Go Ahead," Bangkok Post, 18 October 2003)

On 21 October, it was reported that refugees from Mae Khong Kha camp in Mae Hong Song province were returning to Burma out of fear of the relocation of the camp to a site near Manerplaw, the former headquarters of the KNU and now controlled the SPDC. Those who returned were reportedly afraid of an attack by the Burma Army or the DKBA and did not trust the Thais to provide protection. (Source: “Some Refugees Go Back to Burma as the New Relocation Site Seems Insecure," Network Media Group, 21 October 2003)

November

In November, it was reported that a resort in Phuket, Thailand offered to purchase three to five families of the Kayan, also known as the “long necked” refugees, who had been allowed to remain in the site of Karenni Camp 3 after the camp relocation had completed in 2002. The Thai authorities had allowed the Kayan to remain because they are considered a tourist attraction. The resort in Phuket reportedly offered to relocate the Kayan families to the resort for tourist viewing for 10 million baht. Members of the tribe were reportedly positive about the offer feeling that they would have an opportunity to improve their living conditions. Yet, Governor of Mae Hong Son Suphot Laowansiri indicated that because the Kayan were refugees fleeing active fighting, they must remain in the Mae Hong Son area in the event that the fighting abates and they can return to Burma. In addition, he indicated that a special area was reserved for these refugees which would be monitored by the Thai army and volunteers to ensure that they do not escape (source: “Bt10 Million Offered for ‘Long-Necked’ Padaung Tribe," Thai Press Reports, 5 November 2003).

On 24 November, Col San Pwint, a spokesman for the Burma Ministry of Defense, met with KNU Secretary General Padoh Mahn Sha, Deputy Chairman General Bo Mya, and other leaders of the KNU in Mae Sot, Thailand. It was reported that Col San Pwint discussed the Prime Minister Khin Nyunt’s seven-point road map to democracy, the National Convention, and the prospect of future meetings between the KNU and the military government. (Source: “KNU Meets Junta," Irrawaddy, 24 November 2003)

December

From 3-8 December, a KNU delegation of five junior army officers traveled to Rangoon to meet with Prime Minister Khin Nyunt and discuss the credibility of the seven-point road map for national reconciliation designed by the junta.  Upon the delegation’s return, KNU Deputy Chairman Gen Bo Mya indicated that he had fewer doubts about the genuineness of the SPDC’s intentions for national reconciliation. (Source: “KNU Returns from Rangoon," Irrawaddy, 9 December 2003)

On 24 December, Jakrapob Penkair, spokesman for the Thai Government, stated that the Interior Ministry’s office of policy coordination on refugees would solicit funding for processing Burmese refugees from the Finance Ministry and not from the UNHCR. He further indicated that this decision was evidence of Thailand’s willingness to address the refugees and not an attempt to diminish the role of the UNHCR. In addition, Prime Minister Thaksin indicated that the Thai government would continue to work with international agencies on an “equal partnership” level. (Source: “Thai Government Denies Sidelining UN Role in Handling Burmese Refugees," Kosajan, 25 December 2003)

14.3 Situation of Refugees in Bangladesh

The Burmese refugee population in Bangladesh can be divided into three categories; Rohingya refugees in the two official refugee camps, Rohingya refugees classified as illegal immigrants living outside the camps, and Rakhine Buddhist refugees mostly in Dhaka and the Chittagong Hill Tracts. Bangladesh has not signed the 1951 Refugee Convention and does not have a legal framework through which refugees can find protection. While the influx of new refugees from Burma has not stopped, Bangladesh does not provide assistance or protection to them.  Refugees frequently report the appalling conditions of the refugee camps, slums, or jungle where they remain.  

Bangladesh has been burdened by two major exoduses of Rohingya refugees with steady trickles of new comers at all other times. The first occurred in 1978 following operation Naga Min or Dragon King, when General Ne Win ordered a crackdown to drive out all “foreigners” from the country. The campaign led to extra-judicial killings, rape, and other acts of violence causing approximately 200,000 Rohingya to flee across the border to Bangladesh.   Following the repatriation – often involuntary - of these refugees, the Burmese regime enacted a new Citizenship Law in 1982, which renders the Rohingya de facto stateless. In addition, the Rohingya are not considered one of the 135 national races. In 1990, the increased military presence caused an escalation in human rights abuses perpetrated against the Rohingya such as forced labor, forced relocation, execution, torture, and rape.  From 1991 to 1992, approximately 250,000 Rohingya fled to Bangladesh.  From 1992 to 1994, Bangladesh forcibly repatriated over 50,000 refugees from this group. In April 1994, the UNHCR gained access to the Burma side of the border and then oversaw a mass repatriation program.  The voluntary nature of the exercise was highly questioned by humanitarian agencies working in the camps.  There were reports that officials withheld food from and beat the refugees in order to coerce them to return.  In 1997, the repatriations halted and commenced again the following year only in very limited numbers.

Since the mass repatriations in 1994 and 1995, access to the refugee camps has been denied to new arrivals. Despite the fact that similar oppressive conditions in Burma forced these new refugees to cross the border, the Government of Bangladesh labels them economic migrants and they are considered illegal in Bangladesh.  Since they are denied access to the refugee camps, they are not eligible for humanitarian assistance. They hide in jungle areas or in slums in Cox’s Bazaar. (Source: Myanmar: The Rohingya Minority: Fundamental Rights Denied, Amnesty International, 16 May 2004).

Over the years, repatriation has continued in smaller numbers. In 2003, approximately 3,000 Rohingya were repatriated.  According to Amnesty International, approximately 236,000 refugees have been repatriated to Burma with approximately 20,000 Rohingya refugees in the two remaining refugee camps at Nayapara and Kutupalong in the Cox’s Bazaar area at the beginning of 2004 (source: Myanmar: The Rohingya Minority: Fundamental Rights Denied, Amnesty International, 16 May 2004). The Bangladeshi government has consistently maintained the perspective that all the Rohingya must return to Burma and has worked to continue the process of repatriation. One obstacle to this goal, has been the fact that the SPDC has not officially cleared the remaining refugees in the camps and has created extensive bureaucratic procedures that have complicated the repatriation process. Marking improved diplomatic and economic relations between the two countries, Bangladeshi and Burmese border officials met for the first time in 10 years on May 18 to 22 to discuss a variety of border related issues including arms smuggling, human trafficking and fishing in the Bay of Bengal. Bangladeshi officials were also reported to have requested the Burmese government to accelerate the repatriation process (source: “Bangladesh Repatriates 704 Rohingya Refugees to Myanmar in May," Xinhua, 30 May 2003). The meeting concluded with an agreement to meet every six months and a Joint Record of Discussion was signed (source: “Dhaka Rangoon Talks Conclude; Meeting to Solve Border Problems," Narinjara , 23 May 2003).

Of the 20 original camps that were erected to accommodate the masses of refugees in 1991, only Nayapara camp near Teknaf and Kutupalong camp near Ukhia remain. According to a survey conducted by Medecins sans Frontieres (MSF) in 2002, 53% of adults and 58% of children in the camps are malnourished. These figures result from the consistent problems the refugees face receiving food and water supplies. Over population is another problem leading to over crowding and poor sanitation. The 2002 MSF survey also indicates that the average house holds 6-7 people in a 100 sq. ft. space. The Government of Bangladesh prohibits any construction of permanent structures or improvements to old ones because the refugees’ stay is viewed as temporary. Officially, all refugees are not allowed to leave the camps or to work. Most are completely dependent upon humanitarian aid for their survival, while a minority work outside the camps. As these activities go against camp regulations, those who go outside risk arrest by the local police or punishment from the camp police if they are caught. Rohingya refugees also continually report harassment from the local community. (Source: 10 Years for the Rohingya Refugees In Bangladesh: Past, Present and Future, MSF, 2002)

UNHCR Disengagement and Forced Repatriation

“It would be better if you go back.  By this time, Burma has now improved a lot. It is not like before.  It is much calmer and more peaceful than in the past."

– Statement by the head of UNHCR sub-office in Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh, according to a refugee from Kutupalong camp on 9 April 2003. (Source: “We Are Like A Soccer Ball, Kicked by Burma, Kicked by Bangladesh," Forum-Asia, June 2003)

In early 2003, the UNHCR announced a plan for “promoting self sufficiency pending voluntary repatriation," which proposes the transfer of responsibility for the assistance tasks in the two refugee camps to the Bangladesh authorities and the phasing out of UNHCR’s presence. To enable the refugees to become self-reliant, the UNHCR proposal includes income-generating projects, vocational training and quick impact projects, as well as the upgrading of facilities and infrastructure for the local community to increase absorption capacity  (source: Forum-Asia, 2003). As part of the UNHCR’s disengagement process, partner NGOs providing medical services or supplementary nutrition programs are required to transfer their programs under the responsibility of the Civil Surgeon’s Office of the Bangladeshi Ministry of Health. The UNHCR has proposed to provide assistance to upgrade the Civil Surgeon’s facilities to accommodate the services. Yet, concern has been voiced that the UNHCR is not allowing an adequate amount of time for both NGOs and the Civil Surgeon’s office to prepare for the transition in responsibility putting women and children relying on the supplementary nutrition program at risk of further nutrition deficiencies. (Source: Burmese Rohingya in Bangladesh Face an Uncertain Future, Refugees International, 22 May 2003)

This plan also raises concerns over the possible abuses that could ensue without the presence of the UNHCR as it is the only international organization with a protection mandate. On several occasions the Bangladeshi government has expressed its desire for the UNHCR to remain an active participant in the repatriation process and a source of assistance for the camps. The government of Bangladesh also indicated that a program to promote self sufficiency might create a "pull factor" encouraging refugees to stay as opposed to returning to Burma, which is contrary to their aims of repatriating all refugees. (Source: Forum-Asia, 2003)

In May 2003, two months before the UNHCR’s planned date to disengage from the repatriation process, reports of harassment, coercion, intimidation, and forced repatriation came in high volume from the camp. The number of refugees repatriated dramatically increase from 93 in April to 704 in May. UNHCR officials denied the occurrence of any non-voluntary repatriation with one official commenting, “Everybody knows that voluntary repatriation to Myanmar is his right. The Government of Bangladesh agrees with voluntarism. I do not believe that there is any forced repatriation at all,” (source: Caught between a Crocodile and a Snake, Burma Centrum Nederland, April/May 2003). Conversely, MSF accumulated over 550 complaints from the refugees citing the use of coercion in the form of intimidation or threats of physical abuse as a method to impel return to Burma (source: Thousands of Refugees Harassed to Return to Myanmar, MSF, 17 September 2003). At the same time a local official admitted, “UNHCR’s decision to withdraw from the camps has caused us to try to speed up repatriations.  The refugees who do not want to return cannot stay here.  The Government will send them back even if they do not want to go.  Bangladesh is a poor country and cannot take care of this situation,” (source: Lack of Protection Plagues Burma’s Rohingya Refugees in Bangladesh, Refugees International, 22 May 2003).

According to a report prepared by Forum-Asia entitled “We Are Like A Soccer Ball, Kicked by Burma, Kicked by Bangladesh," refugees reported that preparations for repatriation commenced several months prior to May in the form of restrictions and reduction of services. More specifically, local markets in the camps were closed down, shed extensions were demolished, household gardens were banned, and health care provided by the Bangladeshi government declined. In addition, the Bangladeshi camp authorities exerted increased pressure on the refugees to sign affidavits confirming their willingness to return to Burma. In May, repatriations occurred two days each week on Monday and Wednesday. Prior to May, repatriations only occurred once a week with approximately 10 people going back each time. Refugees also reported an increase in camp police engaging in surveillance of the refugees who had been cleared by the Burmese government to return to Burma. Others were detained in the Camp in Charge’s office until they were deported the following day. Most refugees were not allowed any preparation time and several families were separated in the repatriation exercise. Other methods of coercion perpetrated by the camp police, Camp in Charge, camp staff, majees, and volunteer refugees include confiscating ration books, arbitrary arrest and detention, confiscation of refugees’ property, and detention in the Camp in Charge’s office, and relocation in the camp away from friends and family. Most forms of coercion presented the refugees with the option of repatriating as a means to prevent going to jail, not having food, or other forms of suffering. (Source: “We Are Like A Soccer Ball, Kicked by Burma, Kicked by Bangladesh," Forum-Asia, June 2003)

As a result of advocacy efforts carried out by various NGOs, the UNHCR in Geneva led an investigation and increased the number of protection staff in Bangladesh. While reports of physical threats have decreased, other methods of harassment and pressure are still exerted by the majees and volunteers. As the UNHCR continues to move forward with its plan for disengagement, concern is continually raised about the protection of the remaining refugee population. In particular as the Bangladeshi government has not endorsed the UNHCR’s plan, many have criticized the UNHCR for furthering “an environment of weakened protection.” (Source: The Situation of Burmese Refugees in Bangladesh, Forum-Asia, 6 November 2003)

The Unofficial Rohingya Refugee Population

Outside of the two official refugee camps, the unofficial Rohingya refugee population has been estimated to be anywhere from 100,000 to 300,000 people. Denied access to the camps because they arrived after the mass repatriations of 1995, they are considered illegal immigrants and have mostly settled in the Cox’s Bazaar and Teknaf areas of southern Bangladesh. The government of Bangladesh views them as “economic migrants” and not as refugees. In actuality, these refugees are continuing to flee conditions in Burma where they are unable to find suitable employment, feed themselves, or maintain a home as a direct result of the SPDC’s discriminatory policies and practices of forced labor, extortion, and land confiscation. Those considered new arrivals are both refugees fleeing Burma for the first time as well repatriated refugees who found the conditions in Burma unsuitable and returned to Bangladesh. (Source: “The Situation of Burmese Refugees in Bangladesh,” Forum-Asia, 6 November 2003).

Because they are considered economic migrants, the unofficial Rohingya refugee population does not have access to humanitarian support. They are vulnerable to both harassment from authorities and the local population. In particular, the Rohingya community is often targeted as the source of social problems, crime, and environmental degradation by the media which result in tension and poor relations with the local community. Most Rohingya refugees find employment in low paying jobs such as rickshaw drivers, porters, factory workers, and domestic servants while some resort to begging on the streets for money. (Source: “The Situation of Burmese Refugees in Bangladesh”, Forum-Asia, 6 November 2003)

In 2002, the Bangladeshi authorities forced several thousands of Rohingya to vacate their homes. As a result, an unofficial makeshift camp in Teknaf near the Naf river was created in the beginning of 2003. Approximately 4,000 people live in the camp which is essentially a slum with houses made of plastic sheeting. The conditions in the camp are reported to be extremely poor as there are only a few water pumps, latrines, and no proper sanitation.  Each hut houses approximately six or seven people (source: Burma's Rohingya: The fate of one forgotten community in Bangladesh, Refugees International, 20 May 2003). In addition, the camp residents are not eligible for health services from NGOs or the government. As a result, the Burma Centrum Nederland reports that diarrhea, skin and other infection diseases, worms, and malaria are quite common (source: Caught Between A Crocodile and A Snake, Burma Centrum Nederland, April/May 2003). Moreover, the camp is located in a low level area that is prone to flooding which has raised great concern for the welfare of the residents during the rainy season (source: Burma's Rohingya: The fate of one forgotten community in Bangladesh, Refugees International, 20 May 2003).

Situation of Rakhine Refugees in Bangladesh

According to Forum-Asia, there are approximately 70 Rakhine and other Burmese in Dhaka who are recognized as refugees by the UNHCR. The Burma Centrum Nederland reported that a few thousand Rakhine refugees also reside in the jungles of the Chittagong Hill Tracts who have not been recognized by the UNHCR. The population in Dhaka mostly consists of activists who left Burma following 1988 and the pro-democracy uprising. Those who are recognized by the UNHCR as refugees or Persons of Concern are allowed to remain in Bangladesh but are not provided work permits which would allow them to legally obtain employment. Until 1998, the UNHCR provided monthly financial support to the refugees. However, in 1998, the UNHCR began to promote refugee self-reliance by cutting monthly financial assistance. Instead, the UNHCR offered a lump-sum small business grant to the refugees and discontinued the monthly subsistence allowance. UNHCR also provides a degree of skill and language training (source: The Situation of Burmese Refugees in Bangladesh, Forum-Asia, 6 November 2003). UNHCR recognized refugees face many difficulties surviving due to cultural differences and the language barrier. Many refugees have reported feeling that they need further support from the UNHCR is terms of assistance with job placement and more skill and language training (source: Caught Between A Crocodile and A Snake, Burma Centrum Nederland, April/May 2003).

In early February 2003, approximately 50 refugees led a two-day hunger strike in front of the UNHCR office in Dhaka.  Most of the protestors were not yet recognized by the UNHCR but reported that they had applied several times and been rejected without an adequate explanation. They called for a faster process for receiving recognition as a Person of Concern, an end to the lump-sum small business grants, and the granting of a monthly subsistence allowance for Persons of Concern. The protestors indicated that the lengthy duration of the application process creates a major obstacle for the Rakhine population in the Chittagong Hills. These refugees do not have enough money to pay for repeated trips from the jungle to Dhaka or to stay in Dhaka while they are awaiting the UNHCR’s decision. In addition, refugees who had taken the lump-sum grant reported that their attempts to start a business had failed because of language difficulties, lack of opportunity in the local job market and inadequate funds for properly starting a business. The protestors halted when UNHCR representatives agreed to meet with them to discuss their concerns. (Source: “Burmese Refugees’ Hunger Strike in Dhaka: Respite after Talks with High Officials," Narinjara, 8 February 2003)

Again on 18 March, it was reported that three Burmese refugees staged a hunger strike at the Refugee Counseling Services Unit (RCSU), an NGO which assists with the refugee status application process. The three protestors were later joined by two more, all of whom were calling for a monthly subsistence allowance as opposed to the lump-sum grant. One woman, Maik Maik San, indicated that women face particular difficulties, as Bangladeshi society is not so friendly to woman. Coupled with the inability to properly speak the local language, she felt that it is impossible for a woman to subsist on her own. (Source: “Burmese Refugees’ Hunger Strike Intensifies," Narinjara, 18 March 2003)

According to the Burma Centrum Nederland, the UNHCR has not responded to the refugees’ requests and concerns. Instead, they insist that the UNHCR has provided a great deal of support to the POCs. In response to concerns about the language barrier, the UNHCR was reported to have said, “People do not need a language course for selling cigarettes in the streets.”  (Source: Caught Between A Crocodile and A Snake, Burma Centrum Nederland, April/May 2003).

Burmese in Bangladeshi Prisons

According to a report by Forum-Asia, there are more than 500 Burmese detained in Bangladeshi jails. These detainees are mostly "released prisoners" who have completed their prison sentences but because the SPDC does not recognize them as Burmese citizens, they can’t be released. Some have been detained for over 10 years past the finish of their sentence. Half are Rohingya and half are fisherman from areas such as Mon State and Tenasserim Division, who were employed by Thai fishing boats and were arrested for fishing in Bangladeshi waters. (Source: Forum-Asia, 2003)

In early 2001, the SPDC agreed to take back prisoners in small numbers. On 28 September 2001, 89 approved prisoners were taken from the Cox’s Bazaar prison by officials from the Burmese embassy and handed over to the SPDC Nasaka border security forces in the border town of Maungdaw. Each prisoner was given 1,000 kyat to cover the cost of their journey to their homes. (Source: Narinjara, 2002)

In 2003, Narinjara news reported that only 11 prisoners who had overstayed their sentenced were released with the assistance of the UNHCR and other human rights NGOs. One of the greatest obstacles the prisoners face in trying to be released is the Burmese government’s failure to recognize them as citizens, thus preventing their repatriation. Prisoners have reported that they are aware of the Bangladeshi authorities’ efforts to contact the Burmese government to arrange for their repatriation. (Source: “Burmese Lingering in the Prison of Bangladesh," Narinjara, 21 June 2003)

14.4 Situation of Refugees in India

The Burmese refugee population in India is mostly comprised of ethnic Chin people, with a small number of Kachin and Burman. According to the U.S. Committee for Refugees’ World Refugee Survey 2004, there are approximately 50,000 Chin refugees residing in India. Yet, the Indian government is not a signatory to the 1951 Refugee Convention nor does India have the legal framework through which refugee status can be determined. Following the exodus of refugees after the 1988 uprising, the Indian government established refugee camps. In 1992 these camps were closed and all humanitarian assistance provided to Burmese refugees was halted.

According to the Chin Human Rights Organization, the arrival of Burmese refugees to India can be divided into two categories. The first is university students, activists, and others who fled to India following participation in the 1988 democracy uprising. The second is ordinary people and villagers who have fled ongoing human rights abuses including religious persecution, forced labor, rape, torture, and ethnic discrimination since the mid-1990s. In particular, the Chin, concentrated mostly in Chin State, are mostly Christian and face a great deal of persecution aimed at conversion to Buddhism. The SPDC often prohibits or limits religious gatherings and prohibits evangelists from giving sermons. In addition, Christians have been forced to engage in labor for Buddhist pagodas. The occurrence of human rights abuses has only increased as the SPDC military presence has grown in Chin State. (Source: CHRO, 2003) (Please see chapter on religion for more information about the situation of Chin in Chin State.)

Situation of Chin Refugees in the Northeastern States of India

Approximately 50,000 Chin refugees reside in the northeastern states of India, with the majority living in Mizoram State and a small proportion living in southern Manipur State. The Indian government does not allow foreigners or the UNHCR to access these areas. There is no refugee camp or humanitarian aid available to the refugees in this area. As a result, most Chin refugees find employment in low-paying jobs such as weaving or road construction and attempt to integrate into the local community in order to survive. Because the Mizo and the Chin are ethnically and linguistically related, the Chin were initially accepted in the local communities. In recent years, the Chins have met increasing intolerance as they are often blamed for social problems. The refugees have often become targets for local political organizations like the Young Mizo Association (YMA) and are often threatened with eviction, arrest and deportation. In 2002, an eviction campaign prompted by the Young Mizo Association forced Chin refugees in Lunglei district to vacate their homes leaving nearly 5000 refugees homeless. Again in July 2003, the Young Mizo Association launched the “Quit Mizoram Campaign” to evict all of the Chin refugees from Mizoram. The campaign followed the rape of a nine year-old Mizo girl on 19 July. Because the perpetrator was believed to be a Burmese man who owned a hotel, the YMA led the destruction of the suspect’s hotel as well as many Chin residences. The Chin refugees were ordered to vacate their homes by 20 August. By November 2003, the CHRO reported that over 6,000 refugees had been forced back to Burma. It was reported that the authorities did nothing to stop the violent attacks or evictions led by the YMA. Refugees International reported that the authorities even went so far as to assist the YMA by supplying trucks to transport the Chin refugees back to the border. In addition, the authorities posted guards at the border to prevent the deportees from reentering India (source: “Forced Back: Burmese Chin Refugees in India in Danger,” Refugees International, 9 May 2003). The evictions continued through to the end of the year.

Situation of Refugees and Asylum Seekers in New Delhi

According to the Chin Refugee Committee (CRC), there are approximately 1,400 Chin, Kachin and Burman refugees living in New Delhi. Approximately 1,000 refugees have received Person of Concern or refugee status from the UNHCR in Delhi. Refugees International reports that New Delhi holds the largest population UNHCR recognized refugees in the world at approximately 15,000 refugees. Those who are recognized by the UNHCR receive residence permits but do not receive work permits, which makes obtaining employment both difficult and illegal. For more than 10 years, the UNHCR provided a monthly subsistence allowance of 1,400 rupees (about US$30) per month for recognized refugees. The monthly allowance was meant to address food and housing costs. An education allowance was provided for each child to cover school costs ranging from 2,500 to 3,100 rupees (about US$55-$68). Many refugees have reported that the subsistence allowance was not adequate as the cost of housing is approximately 1,500 rupees per month and education costs far exceed the educational allowance, which has caused many children to drop out of school. (Source: “India: The Situation of Burmese Refugees in New Delhi,” Refugees International, 24 November 2003)

In March 2003, the UNHCR announced a plan to phase out the subsistence allowance and promote a system of self-reliance. The UNHCR contends that the monthly subsistence allowance has created dependency among the refugees and prevented them from properly integrating into the community, learning the local languages, and learning new skills. In an attempt to equip the refugee population to integrate, the UNHCR is providing Hindi, English, computer, and vocational training.  Despite the provision of trainings, many refugees have voiced concern that the lack of proper work permits, high levels of unemployment, and discrimination will still prevent them from obtaining jobs. (Source: “India: The Situation of Burmese Refugees in New Delhi,” Refugees International, 24 November 2003)

Prompted by the new UNHCR policy, several protests ensued through the year. On 20 October 2003, several hundred refugees gathered in front of the UNHCR office in New Delhi calling for recognition as refugees, third country resettlement, and continued subsistence support. On 12 November after several weeks of continued protesting, Indian riot police arrived to the UNHCR office and opened water canons on the protestors. Different sources report 500-800 Burmese protestors were in attendance on the day of the incident.  The police also used electric batons and canes to try and force the protestors to disperse, causing severe injuries to at least 25 people including head and chest wounds, bruises and broken bones. The UNHCR and police both claimed that the protestors had become unruly and violent, while the protestors claimed that they were merely leading a peaceful demonstration. Several hundred Burmese protestors were detained and released the same evening, while 24 were charged with rioting and obstructing police. Thereafter, they were sent to Tihar Central Jail. Attempting to prevent further demonstrations, the New Delhi police imposed a 30-day curfew prohibiting gathering within 200 meters of the UNHCR office. On 13 November, police arrested and sent 20 more Burmese to Tihar Jail when another group of over 100 people assembled in front of the UNHCR.  A total of 44 protestors were detained over the course of the protests and were eventually released on bail. Despite protests, appeals, and statements of concern by both refugees and NGOs alike, the UNHCR has not altered its policies leaving the future uncertain for Burmese urban refugees. (Source: “India: Investigate Police Attack on Burmese Demonstrators," Human Rights Watch, 2 December 2003)

14.5 Situation of Refugees in Malaysia

Burmese asylum seekers and refugees make up the second largest group of refugees in Malaysia. According to the UNHCR, there are approximately 15,000 Rohingya refugees in Malaysia and the Chin Refugee Center reports the presence of approximately 5,000 Chin refugees. Both groups flee religious and ethnic persecution along with other human rights abuses perpetrated by the Burma Army. Like other neighboring countries to Burma, Malaysia has not signed the 1951 Refugee Convention and provides little to no sanctuary for those fleeing the persecution of the SPDC military regime or any other oppressive governments. Refugees and asylum seekers are considered illegal immigrants according to Malaysian law and are therefore subject to severe immigration laws under the Immigration Act. As illegal migrants, Burmese refugees are vulnerable to extortion, theft, sexual abuse, and many other difficulties. They also face a lack of access to medical care and educational opportunities.

In 2002, the Malaysian government amended the Immigration Act to include harsher penalties for both illegal immigrants and those providing shelter to illegal immigrants. The authorities often attribute social problems and violent crime to illegal undocumented immigrants. In 2002, the Malaysian government adopted a zero-tolerance policy whereby an illegal immigrant or foreigner who has overstayed his or her visit is subject to a maximum fine of RM 10,000, up to five years in jail, and up to six strokes of the cane. Any person found to be sheltering an illegal migrant is also subject to a fine ranging from RM 10,000 to 50,000, up to five years in jail, and caning. When brought to court, most illegal or undocumented immigrants do not have access to legal representation and are often convinced to plead guilty (source: Overview of the Situation of Refugees and Asylum Seekers in Malaysia, SUARAM, 6 November 2003). Malaysia and Burma do not have a repatriation agreement and Burmese refugees are often deported to Thailand where they fall into the hands of traffickers often leading to work in brothels or on fishing boats.

A few asylum seekers apply to the UNHCR in Kuala Lumpur for recognition as refugees. In June 2002, it was reported that since the beginning of the 1990s, over 2,000 Rohingya have applied for refugee status but only 100 have been resettled in third countries. Between 2000 and 2002, over 470 Chin refugees have petitioned for refugee asylum, 29 of which have been recognized (source: Ching, Mun, “No Asylum: Burmese in Malaysia," Irrawaddy, 5 June 2002). Yet, recognition from the UNHCR does not afford any greater protection as the Malaysian authorities have been known to harass, arrest, detain, and even deport UNHCR recognized refugees or those who are being considered for refugee status. Malaysian police are often present to block access to the UNCHR which intimidates and prevents refugees from registering with the UNHCR. In August 2003, it was reported that the UNHCR office in Kuala Lumpur closed its operations due to the police presence in front of the office. The UNHCR refugee eligibility coordinator Evan Ruth commented, “We cannot operate with the police present and deterring people from approaching our office. We will have to decide on a day-to-day basis (whether to resume operations) depending on what the police decide to do." (Source: “Police Presence Forces UNHCR to Cease Operations," Malaysiakini, 20 August 2003)

On 19 August, more than 300 asylum seekers attempting to approach the UNHCR were arrested and detained at the Brickfield Police Station in Kuala Lumpur. The group of asylum seekers consisted of various nationalities including Burmese. The large number of asylum seekers is attributed to the fact that the UNHCR only has one day each week for registration, Tuesday. This was a recent change to the UNCHR system and has caused large groups of asylum seekers to gather on Tuesday, which the police had been monitoring. On the Tuesday before the arrests, it was reported that over 650 asylum seekers came (source: SUARAM, 19 August 2003). Again on 26 August, it was reported that 50 more asylum seekers were arrested near or in front of the UNHCR office, 30 of which were Burmese. While representatives from the police indicated that the arrests were part of "normal crime prevention to look after the whole district," the UNHCR contends that the police activities prevent the UNHCR from fulfilling its mandate of protection and support to refugees in Malaysia (source: Szu-Mae, Yoon, “50 More Asylum-Seekers Arrested in KL," Malaysiakini, 26 August 2003).

On 19 June, six Burmese refugees were arrested when they tried to stage a protest in front of the Burmese Embassy calling for the release of Aung San Suu Kyi. The six were part of a group of 40 protestors who attempted to march past the Embassy with pictures and posters of Aung San Suu Kyi but were stopped by police. One was a UNHCR recognized refugee, and two had reportedly applied for UNHCR recognition. The six were arrested for engaging in an illegal assembly and sent to Cheras police station. (Source: Chin, Yap Mun, “Six Held for Staging Demo Outside Burmese Embassy," Malaysiakini, 19 June 2003)

14.6 Refugees from Burma in Other Locations

Germany repatriates a Burmese asylum seeker

In May 2003, it was reported that the German authorities repatriated a 30-year-old Burmese asylum seeker, Tun Kyaw, after his application for asylum was rejected. Tun Kyaw arrived in Germany in 2001 and immediately applied for asylum with the German government.  His application was rejected by the High Court. On 6 May, when he reported to the local foreigner’s office, he was arrested, sent to Frankfurt Airport, and deported to Burma on the same day. At the time of the reports, the details of what happened to him upon his return to Burma were not known. Concern was expressed that Tun Kyaw would be arrested and imprisoned by the Burmese authorities when he arrived. In 2002, the German authorities repatriated two other rejected asylum seekers from Burma, one of whom was arrested and sentenced to 10 years in prison soon after his return to Burma. The repatriations have left the 53 other asylum seekers awaiting their determination feeling very apprehensive about their future. (Source: Seng, Naw, “Germans Repatriate Burmese Man," Irrawaddy, 15 May 2003)

The Burma Bureau Germany reported that several rejected asylum seekers were instructed to contact the Burma Embassy to arrange travel documents for returning to Burma. If they do not do as requested, they risk losing their temporary stay permits in Germany and would face strict immigration laws. At the same time, according to Section 16 Special Supplement of the Burma Citizenship Law, Burmese asylum seekers lose their citizenship when they leave their country permanently and apply for asylum in Germany. (Source: Aung, Nwe, Statement on Burmese Asylum Seekers in Germany, Burma Bureau Germany, 15 May 2003)

Three Burmese granted asylum in South Korea

On 29 January 2003, South Korea granted three Burmese activists refugee status. The three asylum seekers were political activists opposing the military regime in Burma and came to Korea between 1996 and 1998. They all applied for asylum in May 2000. As recognized refugees, they receive residence permits and later they are able to health insurance and other assistance. The three Burmese refugees make up half of the six total recognized refugees in South Korea. (Source: “Four More Asylum Seekers Granted Refugee Status," Korea Times, 31 January 2003)

14.5 Personal Accounts

Chin Refugee Testimony Regarding the Situation in Mizoram State, India

"My name is Emi and I am originally from Chin State, Burma. I left Burma in 1989 after my school was shut down. I am now living in Aizawl, Mizoram State, India. I started to work in the Chin Women's Organization in the year 2000 after I completed my Bachelor of Theology till today. The Chin Women's Organization works to help Chin refugee women from Burma by giving trainings in women's rights and other issues, and running community projects to assist women and children.

Today, I'm here to talk about my experiences during the deportations which have been happening in Mizoram this year.

On July 19, 2003, the local Mizo Women's Organization demonstrated in Aizawl to demand the arrest of the rapist of a nine-year-old girl in Aizawl. The police announced the arrest of the rapist and the man happened to be from Kalay Myo Township in Burma. As a result of this, feelings against Burmese flared up, stating in the Chanmari section of Aizawl where the rape took place. Residents demanded that no one from Burma (mostly Chin) be allowed to reside in their locality. An angry mob destroyed two houses. The Young Mizo Association led the mob and went house to house in search of the Burmese and warned them to leave their section.

Announcements from loud speakers for Burmese to move out could be heard in every section of Aizawl from 19 July onwards. The deadline they gave was 31 July.

So many people left Aizawl and went to the border. Many crossed back to Burma.

During that time, many people, mostly women, came to our organization crying and said that they could not go back to Burma. So three members of our group went and talked to one of the politicians from Mizoram about the situation of our people. Luckily, he let the refugees who could not go back stay at his big motor workshop. Our group gave information to people as much as we could.

Altogether 107 refugees came and took shelter in the temporary refugee camp while waiting for the situation to cool down. But the first evictions, which started in Aizawl, spread to many villages around Aizawl and Lunglei and Champai. These areas have many refugees from Burma staying there.

Some of our group slept at the motor workshop with other refugees to see things and buy some necessities and food for them from 27 July 2003. The people who lived there were those who did not have money and did not have close relative in Burma, Many were sick, mostly women and children. The children cried because they wanted to go to school.

At this time in Aizawl, many Chin people from Burma were facing a difficult situation. Many people did not have a place to sleep at night. The people who owned houses or shops had difficulties as they had more things to carry. Many people sold their belonging at very low prices. Whenever we met the local Mizos, they asked questions like "when are you going to leave?" or "do you have anything to sell?" or "I think I should come and shift to your room as your room seems better than mine."

One night in July, the local Young Mizo Association visited the refugees staying in the motor workshop and told them to leave the place. As a result, a 20-year-old girl fell unconscious and was admitted to the Hospital in Aizawl. We had to look after her and phone to her relatives late at night. When we arrived at the hospital, a nurse asked, "When are you going to leave?" I was thinking, "why didn't she ask me about the sick person. Is our leaving more important than my friend's life?"

The temporary refugee camp we had set up in Aizawl did not last long. The local Mizo groups ordered all the refugees to leave by 2 August saying that if the refugees died it would be their own fault. We had only one day to leave and we didn't know where to go. We heard the news that the government was going to send us to the border. So, we contacted the local politician that we knew and he requested the authorities not to hand over the refugees to the Burmese soldiers. On 3 August, at 3:00 am, 20-30 Mizo soldiers came to the camp with three buses to send the refugees to the border.

Many people cried a lot. While they were getting on the bus, I told them they could get down at any placed they like from the bus. When I arrived home, they rang me and said that they had got down at Seling, which is a three hour drive from Aizawl and requested me to bring some plastic covering for shelter and bread at least for children. After I had my breakfast, they rang me again and said that they Seling Young Mizo Association and Village Council had come and told them not to live in their territory. I asked them what they wanted to do? They said that they wanted to go to Lawngtlai district further south, where there were not so many problems with deportation. So, I rang many other leaders who lived secretly in Aizawl and they arranged two buses for them and sent them to Lawngtlai. The Lawgtlai Church welcomed them warmly but they couldn't stay there long. The central Young Mizo Association sent a letter to Lawgltai Young Mizo Association that if they wouldn't take action for those refugees, then the Central Young Mizo Association would come and take action. So, those refugees were sent to Saiha again by the government. The village leader of Saiha then granted them a place to live in called Vombuk. So, they are there until today.

There are many refugees living in different places in Aizawl. But, since the deportations there are now two camps in Vombuk and Sairang. Sairang is a village which is located very close to Aizawl. Many Chin have lived there as farmers for years. Now in August, they had to shift from their home and live in one place as a camp. But the Mizo Welfare Committee of Sihhmui sent them a letter ordering them to move out from their section before the end of last month. I don't know how they are going to live. As many people don't employ Burmese workers now, they can't find work anywhere. That means they have no income and no food to eat except if the Chin and Mizo people donate something to them. It is like this until today.

Women face more difficulties. There are many pregnant women who are going to deliver in the next month or two. Our group from New Delhi sent a letter to the Mizo Women's Organization to consider the women and children during the deportation. They said they would try and help. So, we told some of the pregnant refugee women to see the Mizo Women's Organization. But in fact the Mizo Women's Organization refused to help saying that they couldn't do anything. A Burman women delivered a baby between Tio and Tedim in Burma when she was being deported and as there was no proper medical treatment, the baby died on 25 July. A pregnant woman with her three kids also died while crossing the river during the deportation. And an 18-year-old girl broke her leg and was admitted to the hospital when she was chased into the forest by a group of young Mizo in Lunglei at night.

Access to education has now become difficult for children from Burma. The children have to stop going to school and line in the camp. Our organization just sent some books and pens, but this will not be sufficient for all of them at the refugee camp. The refugees in the camp urgently need food and medicine. They have been helped by other Chin, but we need more support. "

(Source: Personal Account of Chin Refugee in India, presented at the Regional Conference on the Protection for Refugees from Burma, Chiang Mai, Thailand, 6-7 November 2003)

Account of A Karen Refugee in Thailand

Interviewed by Human Rights Watch

Interview Date: 12 November 2003

Profile:  One of the Unlucky Ones—Former Child Soldier Deported to Burma

The DKBA were there on the other side of the border. They were searching for KNU soldiers. … My whole body was shaking with fear.

- Former child soldier, describing being deported in August 2003.

“S” is one of many refugees who knows that Burmese who are “informally deported” may face a dangerous and harrowing experience. A former child soldier with the KNU, S was terrified when he was forced to meet his former enemies—soldiers from the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA)—upon being dropped off in Burma, on the other side of the river from Mae Sot.

For those who come to Thailand just to find a job, who have no security problems in Burma, it’s no problem. But for me, it was a problem. There are SPDC agents in Mae Sot and DKBA soldiers across the border. There were money and security problems for me—I had to borrow money to get back.

S had left his village in Burma when he was fourteen years old and joined the KNU, along with his younger brother. “We left because the government army mistreated us,” he said. “Forced labor, portering, taxes—plus they asked for food and shot our pigs and cows. They treated the women badly.”

S was schooled by the KNU, but spent the “summer holidays” on the front lines carrying a gun with the other soldiers. When he finished high school he joined the KNU army full time. In 1998 his captain sent him back to his village for his own safety after S was named in a personal conflict with members of an allied resistance faction. His family helped S hide near the village for a year, fearing that he would be arrested or killed by the SPDC. After SPDC troops interrogated and tortured people in his village to get information about the whereabouts of S and other KNU soldiers, he fled.

S walked for eight days—mostly at night—to the Thai border, which he crossed at the end of June 1999. He stayed in a Thai-Karen village where he had a relative, but soon had to leave because of the danger of arrest by Thai authorities or reprisals from KNU soldiers.

“The KNU leaders were searching for soldiers who had deserted, to catch them and take them back, or punish them,” he said.

A friend helped him get to Bangkok. On July 23, 1999, he applied for an interview with UNHCR. The next morning he went to one of the refugee camps, where he stayed unofficially for almost a year. Finding it difficult to survive as an unregistered refugee in the camp, he returned to Bangkok, where he volunteered with a church. In November 2001, when UNHCR finally recognized S as a refugee, his situation did not get much better:

It is hard—there is no security, no protection. I only have the UNHCR

paper. Police can arrest me at any time. Plus I can't find a job because the Thai employers want only people with work permits. It’s difficult to make it on 2,000 baht (U.S. $50) a month.

S, who married a Karen refugee in June 2003, was detained several times in Bangkok by Thai police, who shook him down for bribes after demanding to see his papers. On August 5, 2003, both S and his wife were arrested by Thai police when they were returning from UNHCR. They were sent to a police station, and then on to the Immigration Detention Center (IDC) in Bangkok. S identified himself as a refugee to

UNHCR staff at the IDC and asked for help.

They said they couldn’t help—I should go to Mae Sot [and be “informally” deported]. I said I wouldn’t go to Mae Sot. The U.N. staff said it was my decision. I hadn’t made any decision when two days later my wife and I were sent to Mae Sot.

Upon arrival in Mae Sot with sixty other deportees, Thai military intelligence officers processed them at an immigration detention center. The group was then driven to the river marking the border, where they were sent across to the Burma side by boat. There, S faced his worst enemy: soldiers from the DKBA, the renegade faction of the KNU, who were searching for KNU soldiers:

When I saw the DKBA soldiers I threw all my documents in the water. My whole body was shaking with fear. The DKBA soldier asked me my name. They asked in Burmese, not Karen. I felt unconscious with fear and couldn’t answer. One of the soldiers hit me from behind and said, “Did you hear the question?” I gave them a false name.

My biggest fear was to say I was KNU. The DKBA knows that KNU refugees say bad things about DKBA. It’s a big problem. If you can’t answer, they ask again. Then they hit you, and ask again. After that, they put you in prison, and ask again. Then they kill you. Killing is the last question for you.

After telling their names to the soldiers, the group of deportees were able to circle back around to the bank of the river. They got into the very same boat that had taken them to the Burmese side, and returned to Thailand—at a cost of 500 baht (US$12.50) per person.

As soon as S and his wife arrived back in Mae Sot, they were arrested—again. “The police said they were going to send us back across the very same day,” he said. “If we paid 2,000 baht (US$50) each, they said they would release us.”

S paid the bribe, and made his way to a friend’s house in Mae Sot, where he and his wife hid for a month. Then they arranged for an agent to take the couple by foot to Tak, avoiding police checkpoints along the way, and then continued by bus to Bangkok. That set the couple back another 10,000 baht (US$250), a sum they are still struggling to repay.

(Source: Out of Sight, Out of Mind, Human Rights Watch, February 2004)

Refugee Accounts of Forced Repatriation from Nayapara and Kutupalong Camps in Bangladesh

Account #1

Refugee #:                    50

Name:                          Latifa

Date:                            February 2003

Type of abuses:            Family separation/vulnerability of women, rape

Latifa Khatun is a young married woman and mother of one child.  Her husband is not a registered refugee and he cannot stay in the camp with her.  He usually visits the camp once or twice a month to see his wife and child.  Latifa is living in her parents’ shed and she is the eldest daughter.  The clearance for repatriation of her parents’ family arrived a couple of months ago.  At that point, her father fled from the camp.  About one month later, Latifa’s mother went to join her husband to live with him outside the camp.  Latifa and her infant baby continued to stay in the refugee camp together with her younger brother and sister.

At about 10:30 am on xx February, a refugee woman came to Latifa’s room and told her that the Camp-in-Charge wanted to see her at once.  Latifa followed the woman and arrived at the Camp-in-Charge’s office. The Camp-in-Charge invited Latifa inside while he asked the other refugee woman to sit outside.  He asked Latifa the whereabouts of her parents.  “Has your father come to see you recently?  Where does he live now?”  Latifa replied that she knew nothing about him, and she hadn’t seen him for about two months.

Then the Camp-in-Charge ordered her to follow him and took her into his residence.  The Camp-in-Charge has a separate house at the back of his office where he lives.  His family lives in government housing in Cox’s Bazar but visits him sometimes in the camp for one or two nights.  Latifa followed the order and went to the Camp-in-Charge’s residence.  The Camp-in-Charge locked the door and forced her onto a bed and raped her.  The Camp-in-Charge kept her in his house for many hours and raped her many times.  At 4:00 pm, he let her go through the back door.  Latifa did not return to her shed.  Her face, cheeks, neck and hands bore marks of the rape.  She went directly to the UNHCR office, but it was already closed.  She then rushed to the Concern office, but it was also closed.  She finally came back to her room. 

The next day, Latifa first went to the Concern office and the field coordinator took her to the UNHCR office to report the incident.  The national UNHCR protection officer asked her why she had not come immediately to the UNHCR and Latifa explained that, as soon as she was released, she had come to the UNHCR and Concern office, but both were already closed.  The UNHCR staff wrote down her testimony and told her that the UNHCR office in Cox’s Bazar would be informed.  A week later [when Forum-Asia received this first account], she had not yet heard anything from the UNHCR.  Life in the camp became hell for Latifa as information about the rape circulated throughout the camp and she still had the marks of abuse on her body.

A month later, Osman, the majee of the camp section where Latifa lives, was called to the Camp-in-Charge’s office.  Osman had been cleared for repatriation long ago but, being a majee, he was never called for repatriation.  Immediately after Latifa’s rape, the Camp-in-Charge was busy with the local elections and did not bother him.   However, as soon as the local elections were over, the Camp-in-Charge called Osman and accused him: “How could this girl dare to complain against me?  Where were you when she was making all these accusations?   Your duty as a majee was to stop her spreading this story!  If you fail to control a girl, how would you deal with and control a group of people?  I suspect that you are the one who encouraged the girl to make false accusations against me.  You are the one who asked her to tell all this.   Now it is your time to get ready for repatriation!”  The Camp-in-Charge called the police to the office to take Osman in custody.   Osman took a quick decision and managed to run away from the camp before the police arrived.

A few days after Osman fled, the Camp-in-Charge sent his assistant to talk to Latifa.  He put pressure on her to withdraw her rape allegation against the Camp-in-Charge and offered her some money.  He also suggested that she file the rape charge against Osman. At the same time, Osman’s family was transferred to another section of the camp.

Latifa complained that, although she was investigated by UNHCR and RRRC, her allegations could not be validated because she did not undergo a medical examination immediately after the rape, and she claimed she was not advised to do so by the UNHCR local staff in the camp when she first reported the incident.

Note:  In April 2003, a UNHCR official in Geneva confirmed to Forum-Asia that UNHCR was seriously concerned by this allegation of rape and that a Geneva representative had recently visited the camps and addressed the case.  He said: “We told the woman that rape is a very serious offense that should be prosecuted in [a Bangladesh] court and that UNHCR would provide her with full support in the legal proceedings.  However, the woman was not willing to do so. In these circumstances, how can her claim be substantiated?”

(Source: “We are Like A Soccer Ball, Kicked by Burma, Kicked by Bangladesh," Forum-Asia, June 2003)

Account #2

Refugee #:                    45
Name:                          Shah Alam and Mahmouda
Date:                            March 2003
Type of abuses:            Beatings, forced relocation

Shah Alam’s family clearance had arrived.  On xx March, he was summoned to the Camp-in-Charge’s office.  The Camp-in-Charge asked him to go back to Burma.  He refused and pleaded for more time.  He told the Camp-in-Charge that his country was not safe enough for him and his family, and he promised to return as soon as the situation improved.  The Camp-in-Charge was not ready to hear any argument and he gave him a choice: go back to Burma or spend two years in jail.  Shah Alam looked around and saw no policemen nearby.  He took the chance and suddenly ran off towards the jungle.  The Camp-in-Charge shouted, and ordered the police to arrest him.  But he had already disappeared in the hills outside the camp and the police could not find him.

Later in the day, the Camp-in-Charge, camp police and a UNHCR field assistant went together to Shah Alam’s room where his family was anxiously waiting to see the consequences of his escape.  The Camp-in-Charge called some volunteers and ordered them to pack all the family’s belongings and bring them to the waiting truck.   He also asked female volunteers to bring Shah Alam’s wife Mahmouda and her children to the truck.  The two young boys were crying a lot and Mahmouda, who was eight months pregnant, firmly refused to leave her room.  She told the UNHCR representative that she did not want to go, and that her health condition did not allow her to travel.  Neither the Camp-in-Charge nor the UNHCR staff gave any attention to her appeal.  The women volunteers dragged her out of her room and beat her.  They also hit her belly.  Finally, they managed to put her on the truck.  In the truck, Mahmouda could no longer find her two sons. The Camp-in-Charge became angry and ordered the driver to take her to the other refugee camp [not to the repatriation camp].  Mahmouda felt sick in the back of the truck.  After an hour, they reached the other refugee camp and she went to the clinic to explain her condition.  The doctor examined her and sent her to the Cox’s Bazar government hospital to get treatment.

At the end of March, Mahmouda’s father and brother were summoned by the Camp-in-Charge.  They went to his office at about 10:00 am.  The Camp-in-Charge told them: “Shah Alam, who fled from the camp to avoid repatriation, is your son-in-law, and two of your grandsons also fled that morning.  But I have been informed that your son-in-law and your grandsons stay in contact with you and that you know their whereabouts.  Give me their address, otherwise both of you will be in trouble.”  The old man denied that they were in contact and explained that he had not seen them since the date of the incident.  The Camp-in-Charge did not believe him and told the old father: “If you do not bring your grandsons by tomorrow, I will be compelled to file a child abduction case against you!”  The Camp-in-Charge was angry and beat Mahmouda’s brother.  It was very painful for the old man to watch someone beating his son in front of him.  He tried to stop it but failed.  He told the Camp-in-Charge: “Please do not hurt my son!  Give us some time to find them. But we are not sure that we will succeed.”  The Camp-in-Charge gave them until the same evening.

Mahmouda’s father and brother returned to their shed and both went out searching for her husband and the two missing grandsons.  They did not return to the camp. (Source: “We are Like A Soccer Ball, Kicked by Burma, Kicked by Bangladesh," Forum-Asia, June 2003)

Account #3

Refugee #:                    13

Name:                          Jafar    

Date:                            4 May 2003

Types of abuses:           Beatings, detention/forced repatriation, family separation

Jafar has two wives and both are living in the same shed.  Jafar and his second wife are registered in the same refugee book and they were not cleared for repatriation.  His first wife and her two children have a separate refugee book and they had been cleared.  

On 13 May 2003, the camp police and volunteers came to Jafar’s house and cordoned it off.  The police ordered all the members of the family to come out and follow them to the Camp-in-Charge’s office.  The Camp-in-Charge told Jafar’s first wife: “You must go back to Burma now!  I have no time to hear your arguments.”  His first wife refused and Jafar replied: “OK.  She will go back but we need some time to get ready.  Please give her two or three days to prepare ourselves!”  But the Camp-in-Charge did not hear anything and sent volunteers to bring her belongings to his office and sent her and her two children in custody at the police camp.

On 14 May, Jafar’s first wife and her two children were ordered to get onto the truck [to the repatriation camp] but they refused to board it.  The police beat them with a cane and a stick and pushed them onto the truck guarded by other policemen.  They arrived in Burma on the same day. (Source: “We are Like A Soccer Ball, Kicked by Burma, Kicked by Bangladesh," Forum-Asia, June 2003)

Account #4

Refugee #:                    8

Name:                          Ahmed

Date:                            9 May 2003

Types of abuses:           Detention and forced repatriation, family separation

On 9 May, the Camp-in-Charge sent volunteers to bring Ahmed to his office and told him that he should go back to Burma.  Ahmed replied to the Camp-in-Charge: “Three of my daughters have married young men who are also refugees from this camp.  But my three daughters are still registered in my family book.  I can’t take them with me because they are married and have their own families.  It will be unfair for them to take them with me and leave their husbands and children behind!”

A new magistrate named Yasin, who had just been appointed the previous evening, became very angry and insulted the old Ahmed.  He used bad language, not only insulting Ahmed but also all Rohingya people.  He finally told him: “You must go back.  Leave your three daughters and three grandchildren here!”

The Magistrate and the Camp-in-Charge did not allow Ahmed to return to his shed.  They ordered the volunteers to bring his belongings and the rest of his family.  They kept them inside the police camp until the next Monday morning when part of Ahmed’s family was repatriated to Burma, without his three daughters and grandchildren. (Source: “We are Like A Soccer Ball, Kicked by Burma, Kicked by Bangladesh," Forum-Asia, June 2003)

Account #5

Refugee #:                    19

Name:                          Ayasha Begum

Date:                            18 May 2003

Types of Abuses:          Family separation

Ayasha Begum’s family has also been cleared by the Burmese authorities.  But her husband and her younger brother have a case in Burma.  Both are wanted in Burma as members of the RSO.  On 18 May, she was summoned to the Camp-in-Charge’s office.  The Camp-in-Charge told her to go back to Burma.  Ayasha explained her situation.  The Camp-in-Charge replied: “OK!  Leave here the members of your family who cannot return because of their case in Burma.  Take the rest of your family with you and go back to Burma!”  Ayasha was repatriated the next day with the other members of her family.  She left her husband and brother behind in the camp.  Before leaving, she asked other refugees:  “Is this what they call a voluntary repatriation?”

(Source: “We are Like A Soccer Ball, Kicked by Burma, Kicked by Bangladesh," Forum-Asia, June 2003)

Account #6

Refugee #:                    21

Name:                          Syed Islam

Date:                            22 May 2003

Types of Abuses:          Beatings, detention and forced repatriation

Syed Islam is living with his father and is registered on the same refugee book.  This large family has been cleared.  Syed is a teacher at one of the camp schools.   His father, the head of the family, ran away from the camp a long time ago to avoid repatriation.  About seven-eight months ago, Syed had talked to the majee and some police, seeking advice on how to bring his father back to the camp.  The majee and the police had assured him that they would not create any problem if his father returned to the camp.  Syed paid some money to the police through the majee.  About six months ago his father returned to the camp.  Since then Syed has been paying some money to the police every month through the majee. 

Around mid-May, Syed and four other youths went out of the camp for a few days. Syed and his friends returned to the camp on 14 May.   The camp police learnt that Syed had been out of the camp for several days.  They caught him on 22 May and beat him up. Then the police arrested his father too and detained them until 26 May.  In the morning of 26, the father and son as well as the other members of his family were repatriated to Burma.

Account #7

Refugee #:                    2

Name:                          Hussein

Date:                            6 May 2003

Types of Abuses:          Deprivation of food

On 6 May, the Camp-in-Charge gave a list of 11 cleared families to volunteers and ordered them to bring the head of those 11 families to his office. Among them only one head of family, Hussein, came forward to meet the Camp-in-Charge. The other ten did not.

Hussein was home when the volunteers arrived.  They told him to accompany them and also asked him to bring his family ration book. Hussein followed them to the Camp-in-Charge’s office.  The Camp-in-Charge told Hussein to repatriate to Burma.  “I will not return until peace and security are re-established in Burma,” Hussein replied.  The Camp-in-Charge had no time to argue with Hussein and he told him: “Give me your ration book and go back.”  Hussein gave his ration book to the Camp-in-Charge and returned to his shed.

The Camp-in-Charge gave the store staff the list of the 10 other families who did not come to his office, with a note not to distribute any food ration to these 10 families.  His instructions were that when these families come to receive their food ration, their ration books must be seized and the Camp-in-Charge’s office informed immediately.

Six May was also the food distribution day.  Those 10 families came to queue for their ration.  All the other refugees received their rations but these 10 families were taken aside.  When one of them asked why they were not given their ration, the store staff replied to them: “Go to the Camp-in-Charge’s office and talk to him.  I am sending your ration books there.” But they did not go to the Camp-in-Charge’s office and returned to their respective sheds empty-handed without their ration and without their ration book.

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