A Peace of Pie?

Burma’s Humanitarian Aid Debate

Special Report

October 2002

ALTSEAN-Burma
Published 13 October 2002

CONTENTS

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2 A PEACE OF THE PIE?

5 AID & POLITICS: PEACEBUILDING & NATIONAL RECONCILIATION
National Reconciliation, Humanitarian Aid & ‘Neutrality’,
From ‘Secret Talks’ To Tripartite Dialogue

9 The humanitarian ‘crisis’
Taking The Politics Out Of Aid, Leaked UN Memo

11 “BETTER GOVERNANCE IS THE ANSWER”
Transcript Of Interview With Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, August 2002

14 THE DEMOCRACY MOVEMENT

17 the ETHNIC NATIONALITIES
The ‘NO AID’ Position

19 THE SPDC

23 Whose responsibility?
Causes Of Humanitarian PROBLEMS in Burma, Oppression Of Civil Society,
SPDC Society, Armed Conflict, Human Rights Violations, Killings, Forced Labour, Rape, Food Security, Forced Relocation & Dislocation, Economic Mismanagement, The Way Forward

31 ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT AID
Building Civil Society And Pluralism, Gongos, Independence Of Ingos,
Reducing Conflict, Assistance To The Most Needy, Strengthening State Capacity For Responsibility, Lack Of Expertise, Aid Cannot Wait, Witnessing Human Rights, Corruption, Complementary Work, Bums-On-Seats,

53 “THE RIGHT WAY”
Transparency, Accountability, Monitoring, The Role Of Aid Agencies,
Donors and The International Community

59 chronology

66 APPENDIX 1: NGOS & donors in burma
International Ngos In Burma, DONORS, Donor/Government Policies,
Multilateral Organisations, Corporate

71 APPENDIX II: POLITICAL & NATIONAL RECONCILIATION
by Dr. Chao-Tzang Yawnghwe

74 Appendix III: Myanmar: a silent humanitarian crisis in the making

78 Appendix IV: DCI associates – spdc’s newest weapon

ISBN 974 – 90692 – 1 – 8

Printed in Bangkok, October 2002

79 Bibliography

83 Resources from Altsean-Burma

A Peace of the Pie?

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Burma needs “intelligent aid” that helps create the very conditions to make aid effective and sustainable. Aid that empowers communities to be pro-active, to be able to critically assess the effectiveness of projects, to initiate self-help activities, and to develop negotiative capacity at the local and national level. Aid that actively supports and does not undermine dialogue and national reconciliation. In short, aid that actually helps people to build peace in the country.

One does not have to go far to discover the criteria for such “intelligent aid”. Despite the diversity of historical experience, perspectives and geographical location, there is broad agreement amongst pro-democracy forces inside Burma, on its borders and in exile:

w A political approach must be used when dealing with the question of aid, since the root cause of Burma’s humanitarian problems is political

w Aid should contribute to the process of national reconciliation that include political and economic reforms

w Aid should not be subject to the corruption and manipulation of the regime

w Aid should not be used as an alibi for, or lead to the maintenance or expansion of abusive practices, nor should it justify decreased national commitment to civil institutions

w Aid should directly benefit all people in the short and long-term

w Aid must be accountable and transparent

w Aid must be subject to independent monitoring

This general agreement, as implied in various statements made independently by a range of organisations, provide a contrast to the extreme ends of the spectrum. On one end, it is argued that any aid is good for Burma, while opponents of aid are horrified at the prospect of providing resources that may help sustain the regime and provide it with the means to commit more human rights violations. Voices on the side of caution have been accused of being irresponsible, lacking in compassion and prioritising politics above people. Those advocating massive injections of aid have been accused of short-sightedness and functioning as apologists for the regime.

It is undeniable that some committed international agencies have found ways to benefit the people of Burma despite adversity. However, the effectiveness of such work is limited by the need to obey perceived and actual restrictions imposed by the authorities. The conditions restricting the work of agencies, particularly those imposed by the regime, have been key obstacles to effective aid work in Burma.

In addition, the regime itself has been the single largest contributory factor to Burma’s humanitarian problems. Misrule by successive military regimes has deprived Burma’s population, particularly the ethnic nationality groups, of the benefits of the country’s rich natural resources. The regime has impoverished civil institutions to subsidise a growing military complex that perpetrates massive, systematic abuse of civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights of the people. Aid that does not work to pro-actively address this root cause risks becoming aid that prolongs Burma’s suffering.

The debate about aid, in particular humanitarian aid to Burma, has become particularly controversial in recent months. The debate has gained momentum as the Burmese regime steps up its campaign to obtain humanitarian aid as a means of obtaining desperately needed foreign exchange. Burma’s mini economic boom in the mid-90s saw an expansion in military resources that were used to crack down on ethnic nationality groups and the democracy movement.

Even as the regime cries poor in its efforts to obtain aid, it still had sufficient resources to purchase 10 MiG-29 fighter jets and a nuclear reactor from Russia last year. In May, it signed a contract with Washington lobbyists DCI Associates worth US$550,000 plus expenses for the year ended May 15, 2003. One objective was to obtain humanitarian assistance for HIV/AIDS projects. US$550,000 is over 18 times the regime’s budget for HIV/AIDs in 1999! It is no surprise then, that some refugee groups that have suffered the worst consequences of military aggression are outraged at the notion of more euros, dollars or yen reaching the regime. Exacerbating this suspicion is the fact that most international agencies operating in Rangoon have avoided contact, let alone co-ordination, with NGOs and Burmese groups doing aid and relief work in neighbouring countries.

While some donors insist that humanitarian assistance must be differentiated from other forms of aid, other donors have been quick to stretch their interpretation of “humanitarian”. Some activist groups feel obliged to challenge the prospect of increased humanitarian aid via Rangoon, mainly because the system is so skewed in favour of the regime. Humanitarian assistance also represents the thin edge of the aid wedge – with the worse scene scenario being direct grants and loans to the regime from IFIs like the Asian Development Bank or the World Bank.

Humanitarian aid should not function as a ransom payment for the release of political prisoners and Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. It has been implied that aid be provided as a “reward” for the release of political prisoners, or as an incentive to revive the talks between the regime and Aung San Suu Kyi that have apparently stalled since her release in May. Unconditional and uncritical aid under any circumstance is risky, more so in the case of a regime not known for its integrity. Equally dangerous is aid attached to conditionalities that are only worth the paper (or website) they appear on.

Burma is in such a severe state of deterioration that any help extended can make an immediate difference. Years of military rule have conditioned much of the local population to uncritical acceptance. This cocktail conspires to make the prospect of increasing aid to Burma extremely seductive. It is seductive to be able focus on the grateful smile of an aid recipient without pro-actively addressing the root causes of Burma’s humanitarian disaster. It is also seductive to be able to overlook the fact that the severity of the humanitarian problem is not a sudden phenomenon – Burma has gotten to this state because those dealing with the regime had failed to intervene effectively to halt the decline.

When asked if increased funding was the answer to Burma’s humanitarian crisis, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi clearly replied: “No, better governance is the answer to Burma’s humanitarian crisis.” Daw Aung San Suu Kyi has outlined “the right way” for aid as being accountable, transparent and subject to independent monitoring. These very same conditions are what most international agencies aspire to do. In the current situation however, genuine transparency, accountability and monitoring cannot exist because of the regime’s severe restraints on freedom of information, association, expression and movement.

Just as aid has the potential to sustain the regime, it also has the potential to contribute towards national reconciliation, democratisation and peace in Burma. So far, the potential joint leverage of the international community, donors and implementing agencies to achieve this has yet to be exercised.

This report works on the premise that humanitarian assistance and all other aid must complement national reconciliation, not undermine it. The report explores the intrinsic link between politics and humanitarian assistance and proceeds to outline the positions on aid taken by diverse political stakeholders and others. The report outlines what Daw Aung San Suu Kyi has called the ‘right way’ and includes the transcript of a recent interview. The report then discusses some of the assumptions underlying aid in Burma in their political context. The need for humanitarian assistance to actively support national reconciliation, most imminently genuine political dialogue, is the key criterion concerned bodies must adopt when considering decisions regarding humanitarian assistance and other aid.

Bangkok, October 2002

AID & POLITICS: PEACEBUILDING & NATIONAL RECONCILIATION

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Burma has suffered over 40 years of oppressive and violent rule by military governments amidst an ongoing civil war and human suffering. To ensure sustainable peace and equal access to basic goods, peacebuilding in Burma is imperative and must be supported by the international community.

The objective of peacebuilding is the establishment of a positive and sustainable peace by addressing the root causes of conflict and through promotion of dialogue and trust between all concerned actors. Boutros-Ghali, former UN Secretary-General, has said peacebuilding aims at structural changes that abolish violent and oppressive power relations, political oppression and social injustice and assures equal access to basic goods[01] .[1]

For an effective process of peacebuilding in Burma, there must first be political dialogue between all political stakeholders. Secondly, civil society must be allowed to develop to ensure the voices of the people of Burma can finally be heard. Humanitarian assistance and other aid must support both components of peacebuilding simultaneously. Peacebuilding in Burma therefore inevitably involves supporting a process of democratisation.

National Reconciliation

The most critical component of peacebuilding in the Burma context is national reconciliation. National reconciliation in Burma, as described by Dr. Chao Tzang Yawnghwe, means arriving at a political settlement which resolves the conflict between the Burman majority and diverse ethnic nationalities. [see Appendix II for Dr. Chao Tzang Yanghwe’s discussion of Political & National Reconciliation] The integrity of the relationship between ethnic nationalities and the state means that national reconciliation is broader than political reconciliation.

National reconciliation in Burma brings us back to the 1947 Panglong Accord between the AFPFL (Anti-Fascist People’s Freedom League) led by U Aung San and Shan princes and leaders of the Frontier Areas. The main principle of the Panglong Accord was, as described by Dr. Chao Tzang Yawnghwe, “the autonomy or freedom of all the national states of the Pyidaungzu, i.e. a union that is federal in form.” (Pyidaungzu, the Burmese word for the Union means a “coming together of national states.”)

National reconciliation has been identified by activists, scholars and politicians from Burma as the key to sustainable peace and equal access to basic goods. To quote Dr. Chao Tzang Yawnghwe, “National Reconciliation is at the core of Burma’s problems as well as an integral part of the solution.” National reconciliation is imperative for the long-term well being of the people of Burma and must be supported by the international community.

Humanitarian aid & ‘neutrality’

International aid agencies often claim their work is not political, but ‘neutral’. Claims of neutrality are naïve; all aid, humanitarian or otherwise, is intrinsically political. Aid is affected by and has an impact on the political context in which it is given. Political dynamics often have a greater determination than socio-economic factors. The humanitarian situation in Burma is a direct result of military rule. [see ‘Whose Responsibility?] Furthermore, the regime clearly views humanitarian assistance as political demonstrated by continuous surveillance and arbitrary heavy-handedness of international NGOs, UN agencies and independent local initiatives (civil society). [for further discussion see ‘A conducive environment?’ & ‘Occupational hazards’] The regime lacks the political will to recognise the extent of the HIV/AIDS epidemic and other humanitarian phenomena, hence exacerbating human suffering. [see ‘Assumptions about aid’]

The regime’s political agenda means that ‘neutrality’ in Burma has a perverted definition. ‘Neutrality’ is signing a memorandum of understanding (MOU), which effectively gives overall control of aid to a non-elected, oppressive military regime. ‘Neutrality’ is handing over thousands of aid dollars in a warped, 3-tiered exchange system, ensuring extra funds for military expenditure and increasing the socio-economic gap between junta generals, their families and cronies and the rest of Burma. ‘Neutrality’ is abiding by politically oppressive and aid blocking rules.

‘Neutrality’ is perhaps better defined as political naivety and a readiness to be fearful – often more so than national staff. [for further discussion of international agencies and fear see ‘Assumptions about aid’] Naivety renders humanitarian agencies wide open to manipulation by the regime, often reinforcing the power status quo and delegitimising the people’s representatives. Too many aid staff in Burma (and around the world) have proven to be naive and lack sufficient understanding of the context of their work, both culturally and politically. [for consequences of naivety see ‘Assumptions about aid’] While there are staff, often national staff, with keen awareness of the political context of their work, willingness to learn on the part of international agencies too often appears to be lacking. Knowledge and concerns of national staff must be heard by their agencies, particularly given the stifling of civil society in Burma.

Politics plays into humanitarian aid at every level. Claims that aid is neutral means “the humanitarian crisis [in Burma] is being addressed in a vacuum and the political context or cause of the crisis is being ignored. In order to be able to address the issue of humanitarian aid effectively and at the same time bring relief to the people, the terms of the debate must be shifted from its current context-less arena into one where the problem is seen in its political context.”[2] The 2 April 2002 report by the International Crisis Group, Myanmar: The Politics of Humanitarian Aid avoided integrating political analysis into the discussion of aid in Burma.

It is imperative that humanitarian aid is debated in its political context, recognising the SPDC as the root cause of the humanitarian situation and an obstruction to its alleviation.

from ‘secret talks’ to tripartite dialogue

There is an opportunity for a potentially momentous step to be taken as part of national reconciliation in Burma: the ‘secret talks’ must transform into genuine dialogue between all political stakeholders, otherwise known as and tripartite dialogue. Dialogue is a follow-on from Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s release, identified as “part of [the] reconciliation process” by UN Special Envoy Razali Ismail.[3]

The ‘secret talks’ were initiated in October 2000 between Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and the SPDC, headed by Sr-Gen Than Shwe.[4] Upon her release on 6 May 2002, the democracy leader stressed the urgency of the talks moving into substantial political dialogue immediately. However, 22 months after their initiation, the talks still have not progressed beyond the confidence building stage and she has not met with the generals since her release. Razali has stressed “there is no alternative to the ongoing talks if [Burma] is to achieve national reconciliation.”[5]

It is vital that this opportunity for change is not undermined and that genuine steps are made towards national reconciliation. Any aid given to Burma must therefore support transformation of the ‘secret talks’ into genuine political dialogue encompassing all political stakeholders.[6] Granting of aid that enables the generals to prolong their rule would be the ultimate betrayal of those suffering because of the regime.

There must be sustained efforts by the international community – including United Nations agencies, international NGOs, governments and donor bodies - to ensure objectives of aid actively support national reconciliation and peacebuilding. The international community must ensure the ‘secret talks’ transform into genuine dialogue between all political stakeholders. Aid must not give the regime an incentive to abandon or further postpone the talks.

The humanitarian ‘crisis’

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taking the politics out of aid

The humanitarian situation in Burma has long been bad; concerned sections of the pro-democracy movement and humanitarian field have stressed this for a long time. In the last 12 months however, the situation in Burma has commanded more attention and has been labelled a humanitarian crisis in wider, importantly, aid-related circles.

The ICG report ran with the theme of ‘humanitarian crisis’ in Burma to give an “unequivocal ‘yes’” to increased aid. According to the executive summary of the report Myanmar: The Politics of Humanitarian Aid released 2 April 2002, the “humanitarian crisis… requires more immediate and direct international attention” than the political crisis. “The social costs of social deprivation are simply too large to be ignored.”[7] The report used the word ‘crisis’ to justify pushing the political context to the periphery of the debate.

‘Crisis’ is highly evocative language and its use appears to be politically motivated. Use of the word ‘crisis’ supports the SPDC’s claims on aid (dubious at the least), enables donors to use aid as a foreign policy tool, and justifies international agencies’ existing, expanded and new programmes. For example, Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer explained AU$6.2 million (approximately USD3.27 million) aid to Burma by citing “the humanitarian crisis that is engulfing the country.”[8]

Discussions with humanitarian and health workers in Burma reveal that many do not appear to consider Burma to suddenly now be in an ‘emergency’ or ‘crisis’ situation. Most diseases and illnesses are at a plateau, although the prevalence of tuberculosis (TB) and HIV sero-positivity is reported to be increasing. HIV specialists had long warned of high prevalence rates, exacerbated by disintegrating human capital and lack of political will to recognise and address the virus.

The humanitarian situation in Burma has been a long time in the making and has been an issue of ongoing concern. Burma’s military regimes have consistently denied the extent of the humanitarian problems faced by the people of Burma. It is only relatively recently, as the value of the kyat crashed and foreign reserves shrank that the regime has acknowledged the problem.

Leaked UN memo

Leakage of an internal UN document, signed 30 June 2001, has been significant in framing the humanitarian situation in Burma as a ‘crisis’. [see Appendix III for full text] The document, Myanmar: a silent humanitarian crisis in the making, summarised what were called ‘critical concerns’ of the UN country team and declared Burma to be “on the brink of a humanitarian crisis.” (Critical concerns were identified as: HIV/AIDS, maternal health, TB, malaria, poor school completion rates, high child labour practices and growing numbers of street children.) The document called humanitarian assistance to Burma “a moral and ethical necessity” and “an obligation of the international community.”

While the memo acknowledged that “a fundamental change of domestic policies” was necessary, it asserted that the nature and magnitude of the humanitarian situation did not permit “delaying until the political situation evolves.” Such positioning plays into the hands of the SPDC who view aid as a potentially lucrative source of foreign exchange and legitimacy. The UN document begs the question why ‘critical concerns’ were not set in the political context of the country.

It must be noted that, according to reliable sources, this leaked document was not representative of all UN staff and although some expressed dissent, their comments were never recorded.

“BETTER GOVERNANCE IS THE ANSWER”

transcript of interview with Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, August 2002

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Q: Is increased funding the answer to Burma’s humanitarian crisis?

ASSK: No, better governance is the answer to Burma’s humanitarian crisis.

Q: Do you think that increasing humanitarian assistance to Burma will increase the capacity of civil society? Why? If not, what will?

ASSK: No, simply by increasing assistance you are not going to do anything to change the situation of the civil society. Other measures have to be taken to ensure that civil society is strengthened. For example, there have to be measures that will enable pluralism to flourish in Burma, without pluralism there can’t be a strong civil society.

Q: Those who advocate caution over a massive increase in humanitarian funding have been described as “irresponsible,” “lacking compassion” and “valuing politics over human suffering.” Do you have a comment?

ASSK: I think this is a very, very sweeping statement, to say that simply because people advise caution over something they are to be considered irresponsible, lacking in compassion, etc, etc. I thought caution was something that every reactionary rather approved of. Now, it’s strange that reactionaries would be saying this thing, that caution means irresponsibility. I think if people don’t like what you are doing then they will say you are irresponsible because you are doing too much and then again, if they don’t like the fact that you are doing too little, they start saying you’re irresponsible too. So, I think this is a very subjective comment.

Q: Are those who want to attach conditions to aid being too inflexible? Why?

ASSK: Too inflexible? Not at all, because it depends very much on the conditions. If the conditions are reasonable, then you cannot say that there is inflexibility.

Q: Those who promote increased humanitarian assistance in Burma say that the humanitarian crisis in Burma cannot wait for political change. Do you agree with this assertion?

ASSK: I think what I would like to say is that Burma cannot wait for political change, we need it now!

Q: The larger amounts of aid being received by Burma’s neighbours are sometimes cited as justification for a massive increase in aid to Burma. Is this comparison a valid justification?

ASSK: Not at all, it depends on what the differences between Burma and her neighbours [are]. What we have to look at is why Burma’s neighbours are receiving more aid than we are and then we have to decide whether or not this difference is justifiable.

Q: What conditions are necessary to ensure that humanitarian assistance to Burma will benefit its people?

ASSK: I’ve said this ad nauseam: accountability, transparency and independent monitoring. Unless there is accountability and transparency, you can never say what happens to all that assistance. It may not go to help the people, on the contrary, it may go into schemes that harm the people. So unless there is accountability and transparency we cannot say that humanitarian aid is assisting the people.

Q: If you could speak to those who would make decisions on increasing aid, or humanitarian assistance to Burma, what would you say?

ASSK: What I would like to say is the most important aspect of humanitarian assistance or any kind of assistance is good governance. Unless there is good governance, you cannot ensure that the assistance will really benefit the country. So, we cannot say often enough that good governance is the answer to Burma’s humanitarian problems.

Q: What type of aid do you think is important to sustain at this stage?

ASSK: It is possible that there are some forms of humanitarian aid that can be used properly at this time because there’s accountability and transparency and at the same time it is possible that there some kinds of development aid which also fit the bill.

Q: What about HIV/AIDS projects?

ASSK: There is a lot of interest in HIV/AIDS projects and I think that’s a good thing because certainly we need to be very concerned about this problem. But I don’t think we should forget other problems because there is so much concentration on HIV/AIDS.

Q: You have also stressed that aid should directly benefit the people and bring about democratisation. It has been claimed that trade and aid that increases the size of the middle class will bring about democratic change, therefore massive amounts of economic aid are needed for Burma. Do you agree?

ASSK: I don’t think that just because you create a middle class that you will bring about democratic change. I don’t think those two necessarily go together and I do not think that you can claim that certain forms of economic measures will bring about political reform automatically, political reform is political reform. I would have thought that on the contrary, it is the right kind of political reform that can promote economic reform.

Q: What are your criteria to determine satisfactory community consultation and community participation. Would the assertion that “our door is always open” or “they know where we are and they can talk to us when we are on-site” constitute adequate community consultation?

ASSK: No, of course not. In the community, the people of the community have to feel free to say what they want to say [and] they have to feel free to go and see whom they want to go and see. So unless there is that kind of freedom, freedom of association, freedom of speech, freedom of thought, I do not think that you can say that it is a satisfactory situation.

Q: Do you have an ideal model of community participation?

ASSK: No, I don’t have an ideal model. I don’t think you can talk about ideal models because one community is quite different from another. The basic requirements, as I said, are freedom of speech and freedom of association. Unless there are freedom of speech and freedom of association I do not think that community participation could be absolutely satisfactory.

Q: Should consultation include ethnic nationality groups?

ASSK: I think agencies should try and get in touch with everybody who is concerned with the projects that they are trying to run. I don’t think you can just say that, “in this matter we will only consult ethnic nationalities,” or in “this matter we will not consult ethnic nationalities,” it’s very much on the kind of project they are running. They have to consult whoever would be affected by these projects.

Rangoon, August 2002

THE DEMOCRACY MOVEMENT

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There is a consensus between all sections of the democracy movement and many concerned bodies and individuals on the following points:

1. there is a severe humanitarian situation in Burma

2. poor governance is the root cause of the humanitarian situation [see ‘Whose Responsibility?]

3. the governance of Burma has got to change

4. donors should address the political root cause of the humanitarian situation in Burma and the lack of political will which exacerbates it

5. the diverse peoples of Burma, other than the SPDC, must be officially included in discussions and decisions regarding aid

6. aid must support, not undermine progress towards national reconciliation

Key documents outlining this apparent consensus are identified as:

w Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s recent interviews, including one specifically on aid in August 2002 (see “Better Governance is the answer”)

w Statement on International Assistance to Burma by 22 Concerned Individuals on the Thai side of the border (20 July 2002)

w Document issued by the Strategy Co-ordination Committee (20 January 2002); signed by NCGUB, National Council of the Union of Burma, Karenni National Progressive Party, Shan State Army (South), United Nationalities League for Democracy – Liberated Area, United Nationalities Youth League and the Women’s League of Burma

w National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma’s (NCGUB) Memo on Humanitarian Aid, undated

w Daw Aung Suu Kyi’s Foreword to Humanitarian Crisis, Aid and Governance in Burma (1999)

Given the diversity and varying experiences of those comprising the democracy movement and other concerned persons and groups, there are varied opinions regarding the details of aid.

There is an emerging common ground among many groups within the democracy movement and activist network that stresses decisions regarding aid must be open. Hence it is imperative that there is genuine and official consultation with the National League of Democracy (NLD). Many also advocate for the inclusion of ethnic nationality representatives and local communities. There must be unbiased access to persons in need, particularly internally displaced persons (IDPs). Cross-border humanitarian aid continues to reach vulnerable populations near the border; this aid is effective, efficient and has potential to support progress towards national reconciliation.

There are strong shared concerns among the democracy movement, activists and other concerned groups and individuals that if substantial increases in humanitarian assistance and other aid are given prematurely and not in the ‘right way’, aid will undermine progress towards national reconciliation. Untimely and ill-planned aid may potentially solely benefit the regime, both financially and through legitimisation, removing the incentive to allow the ‘secret talks’ to transform into genuine political dialogue.[n2] To quote Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, “If the provision of aid simply enables an authoritarian government to assume less responsibility for the welfare of the people, or to strengthen its despotic grip, or to increase the opacity of its administration, it will do irreparably more harm than good.”[9] History has proved that these concerns are all too real.

The role of independent civil society groups in humanitarian assistance and aid programmes is strongly advocated by many. NCGUB stresses the importance of including “local affected communities” in discussions regarding aid, and the Strategy Co-ordination Committee demands humanitarian aid “be delivered only after prior consultation with independent local leaders and community organisations.” (point 2)

Truly effective civil society partnerships require freedom of information, association and movement. Aid agencies, donors and the wider international community must therefore advocate for independent civil society and agencies must ensure their programmes actively involve civil society and local communities. It is not enough for donors and international aid agencies to say the ‘door is open’. As Daw Aung San Suu Kyi says “the people of the community have to feel free to say what they want to say [and] they have to feel free to go and see whom they want to go and see.”

The issue of humanitarian aid for a country where an authoritarian government has a stranglehold on every aspect of the lives of its citizens has to be handled with the greatest care. Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, 1999

Daw Aung San Suu Kyi has stated she is prepared to accept humanitarian assistance as part of a political compromise, and is “willing to co-operate with the [SPDC] in ways that directly benefit all the peoples of [Burma] and are conducive to the evolution of a democratic state.”[10] She has aptly pointed out that increased funding is not the answer, “better governance is the answer to Burma’s humanitarian problems.”

Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and the democracy movement stress it is crucial that humanitarian assistance supports the transition to democracy and hence development of the talks into genuine political progress. “We would be happy to cooperate with the SPDC on aid and assistance programs which will benefit the people and which will also promote the process of democratisation,” said the Nobel Laureate. “And the second part is very important.”[11]

Daw Aung San Suu Kyi insists all humanitarian and other aid programmes be proposed and given in the ‘right way’ so that aid can directly benefit all people of Burma in a non-discriminatory fashion. The ‘right way’ has three priority components: accountability, transparency and independent monitoring.[12] Accountability and transparency are basic conditions of aid that all agencies should aim to optimise. The UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights in Myanmar Prof. Pinheiro has also advocated monitoring and evaluation. As Pinheiro stated, a body that brings dialogue between stakeholders “link[s] national peace/reconciliation promotion and political consultation and participation of key stakeholders: the Government, the democratic opposition, ethnic groups, NGOs and women.” [13]

The Strategy Co-ordination Committee has also demanded that humanitarian aid “be monitored by an (international) independent impartial body.” (point 10) At the time of publication, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi has not specifically suggested how independent monitoring would take place. It is anticipated that any particulars about a monitoring body would be the result of dialogue with ethnic nationality representatives, the democracy movement led by the NLD and Daw Aung Suu Kyi, the SPDC and other key players.

the ETHNIC NATIONALITIES

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In order to ensure real accountability and transparency, all political stakeholders must be officially included in the aid process. “Unity out of diversity is absolutely essential for a country like Burma,” Daw Aung San Suu Kyi said recently. “We want the true union in which the different ethnic nationalities trust and respect each other. We [have] got to work together to forge the union. We cannot afford to leave our ethnic nationalities out of any consideration for the future of Burma.”[14] If ethnic nationalities are not officially consulted at a national level they will have no voice to counter discrimination that may arise at the distribution stage. Aid must be transparent to all, not just a select few.[15]

The International Crisis Group (ICG) report (2 Apr 02) claims “local people and organisations, particularly but not exclusively from the ethnic minority areas” have urged for increases in humanitarian assistance.[16] The report then quotes Seng Raw, a representative of the Kachin. The fact that Seng Raw is talking quite clearly of cease-fire groups only is not given due recognition in the report. It is important to also note that Kachin State is somewhat unique in that Church and some other civil society groups are able to operate with more autonomy than is possible in many other areas than Burma. No other ethnic nationality representatives are mentioned, let alone quoted.

Consultation with a representative from the National Reconciliation Programme (NRP) reveals that rather than ethnic nationality groups calling for increases in aid, there is a general common ground on concerns regarding the direct flow of aid to the people without intervention by the regime. Most cease-fire groups have not been included in discussions concerning humanitarian assistance or the operations of aid agencies. For ICG to effectively position itself as a mouthpiece for all diverse ethnic nationality groups of Burma is misrepresentative. Ethnic nationalities must be able to speak for themselves.

Several key ethnic nationality groups, as well as umbrella ethnic nationality and democracy groups, are signatories to the document produced by the Strategy Co-ordination Committee. A significant number of the Concerned Individuals (who released a statement on 20 July 2002) are from different ethnic nationality groups, although their commitment does not represent their organisations. Concerned Individuals along the Thai-Burmese border expressed key concerns in their July 2002 statement. They called on the international community “to respect the concerns and engage Burman and non-Burman democratic groups and civil society organisations in a transparent and constructive debate before taking any decisions on increasing international aid to Burma.”[17]

It is integral that the international community keeps up the pressure for genuine tripartite political dialogue. The regime is doing all it can to delay co-operation with ethnic nationality groups, who are often referred to as ‘terrorists’ and ‘insurgents’.

THE ‘NO AID’ POSITION

There is a significant body of people and groups advocating for no aid to Burma. The regime has stalled any moves toward democracy, it continues to perpetrate human rights violations, armed conflict and violent targeting of civilian populations – particularly those of ethnic nationalities. The regime continues to practice gross mismanagement across the board and oppression of civil society.

For the survivors of such abuse, there is a real fear that humanitarian and other aid may be manipulated by the regime in order to benefit mainly themselves. They are concerned increased aid will free up resources that can be used to expand the army further, prolonging the suffering of the people of Burma. Even worse, there is the strong possibility that rights could be abused by the regime exercising their unique version of ‘participation’. The dangers of this threat mean that humanitarian and other aid should be postponed until the regime is removed from power.

Proponents of ‘no aid’ are largely refugees of ethnic nationality background who have survived military atrocities, including killings, looting, torture and sexual violence. They have borne the worst results of increased military access to resources. It is unsurprising that many NGOs and individuals that have witnessed the abuses of refugees feel the same way. The lack of consultation between Rangoon-based agencies and groups based along Burma’s borders and refugee communities exacerbates the atmosphere of suspicion and anxiety around aid. The fear of international agencies to liase with border agencies and communities reinforces distrust and the perception that some agencies are de facto apologists for the regime. Similarly, the continuing military aggression and violations in border areas strengthen distrust and hatred against the regime and do nothing to persuade civilians that aid via Rangoon could be helpful.

THE SPDC

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The regime has undertaken concerted efforts in recent times to push for widescale humanitarian assistance and other aid for Burma via Rangoon. It is largely for this reason that the highly paid Washington lobbyist group DCI Associates has been employed. [see Appendix IV for information about DCI]

Burma now holds the rotating Presidency of the ASEAN Chambers of Commerce and Industry for 2 years. In this position, U Pyone Maung Maung will work with international and regional funders such as the World Bank, Asian Development Bank (ADB) and UN Development Programme (UNDP) to narrow the “economic gap between the 6 older members of ASEAN and its 4 newest members.”[18] Burma clearly stands to benefit directly from ASEAN, but also through cultivating relationships with international funders.

The regime’s call for aid is premised on 3 key points:

· adequate political reforms are being made that warrant increased aid.

· the international community – the dreaded ‘external elements’ –and the democracy movement who advocate sanctions – both ‘external’ and ‘internal elements’ – are responsible for the humanitarian ‘crisis’ in Burma as they are ‘blocking’ aid.

· Burma needs international assistance as the country is too poor to solve the humanitarian ‘crisis’ alone.

Myth 1: there are adequate political reforms.

The regime claim they “have taken and are taking a series of steps [in] maintaining national identity and security for all the people of [Burma…and are] giving priority to national unity, peace and stability of the country as well as the region… [and] shall recommit [itself] to allowing all … citizens to participate freely in the life of [the] political process.”[19]

Reality: Current level of progress is merely tokenism. Saying the process of democratisation is fragile and should take a long time is an excuse. Reforms must be more far-reaching.

Frankly speaking, we can't find any proof yet that the military is willing to make democratic concessions.[20] Dr. Sann Aung, MP in exile

· there is no nation-wide cease-fire. Individual cease-fire agreements have not led to peace agreements or cessation of violations. Promised political dialogue has not started. Some cease-fires are clearly premised on ‘business’ interests. The UWSA cease-fire, premised on the profitable drug trade, is the most infamous.

· an estimated 1,500 political prisoners remain in jail, including at least 240 NLD members. Release of political prisoners has been Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s foremost demand. “Until all of our political prisoners are free, none of us can say that Burma is now truly on the road to democratic change.”[21]

U Aung May Thu (Ne Aung May Thu), aged 61, died on 17 September 2002 whilst being held in Thyawaddy prison. U Aung May Thu had already completed his sentence. He died of ill health, despite having no physical ailments when his family visited him on 16 September.[22]

Key political prisoners such as U Win Tin, U Win Htein and Min Ko Naing remain incarcerated. Political arrests continue, most recently with a group of students arrested, seemingly for connections to a peaceful demonstration out Rangoon City Hall on 18 August 2002.[23]

In June 2002, several students were sentenced to death for engaging in protests at military colleges. Seventeen more were sentenced to 20 years imprisonment with 72 more detained.[24]

The regime will only release “those who will cause no harm to the community nor threaten the existing peace, stability and unity of the nation.”[25]

· There have been no talks since Daw Aung San Suu Kyi was released from house arrest. The regime has not matched her willingness to engage in political dialogue. Razali was not allowed to visit until August. The talks have still not been mentioned in the Burmese state-controlled press. On July 30, Foreign Minister Win Aung told the ASEAN Regional Forum in Brunei that the SPDC was still “laying the groundwork” for the talks. Asked when the talks might resume, his answer was not encouraging. “I am not an astronomer. I cannot say.”[26]

Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s release was to improve the SPDC’s international image in the hope that donors would be forthcoming. The democracy leader is still forbidden to hold a public assembly, with Deputy Foreign Minister Khin Maung Win naming one of the reasons as: “When she gave her the speeches from her house, it caused a traffic problem.” [27]

· Political parties do not have freedom to operate. Only a handful of NLD offices have been allowed to re-open, and surveillance of members and activities continue. Other political parties remain subject to intense political restrictions.

· There is no timetable for election or any political reform.

Myth 2: the international community and democratic opposition are responsible for the humanitarian ‘crisis’.

Reality: The SPDC is directly responsible for the on-going human suffering.

· The SPDC refuses to declare a nation-wide cease-fire, necessary for the distribution of humanitarian assistance, particularly to IDPs, and a reduction of civilian suffering.

· Human rights abuses remain widespread. Forced labour remains with token efforts being made to ban it. There have been no cases tried in the courts. Murders, torture, forced relocation, extortion and systematic rape of ethnic nationality women[28] serve as examples of human rights abuses that continue unabated. Reports are coming in that the authorities are collecting signatures from villages to say there are no rapes. This strategy was previously used to deny forced labour.

· Gross economic mismanagement continues to hinder human development in Burma.

Myth 3: The SPDC is too poor to solve the humanitarian ‘crisis’ alone; it needs international assistance.

“Myanmar is still at a very young stage in her development where assistance, co-operation and encouragement from the international community are required to expedite its transition to democracy.”[29]

Reality: The regime is not committed to alleviating human suffering.

= 40% of state expenditure goes to the military, making it the largest beneficiary of state resources, and impoverishing basic social services. There have been no changes to budgetary priorities to begin addressing the humanitarian situation.

The regime has spent an estimated US$3 billion on arms from China alone since 1988, and seems bent on continued purchases of military hardware. It would appear that the regime is more committed to causing human suffering that alleviating it.

= The regime remains extremely defensive and paranoid against international criticism.

= Civil society is not given space to develop or respond to humanitarian needs. The regime continues to curtail the growth of a healthy civil society by severely restricting the people. There are only 2 legitimate independent civil society organisations. Non-SPDC groups are subject to intense scrutiny and MI surveillance.

Whose responsibility?

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Causes of humanitarian PROBLEMS in Burma

The humanitarian situation in Burma is man-made; the junta is directly responsible on numerous levels for inadequate access to basic needs. Vital indicators - health, education, development status and human rights situation - have all deteriorated under successive military regimes that have ruled over Burma. To quote the Strategy Co-ordination Committee in January 2002 (reiterated by the NCGUB in March 2002): “the root cause of the on-going humanitarian crisis in Burma is the lack of a democratic government accountable to the people and the military’s focus of holding on to power instead of promoting the interest of the nation.”[30]

Numerous well-documented reports explain how the regime continues to be responsible for multi-level human suffering. It is not necessary to reproduce this work here, but it is important to summarise some key points:

Oppression of Civil Society

The SPDC does not allow for independent civil society participation at any level. Freedom of information, association, movement and expression are all denied to the people of Burma. The people of Burma have been denied a voice for far too long. The right to advocate for their own protection has been harshly quashed and the people of Burma now live in a climate of fear. Autonomy is something that is grasped in denial of the state, not as a result of it.

There are numerous draconian laws obstructing the freedoms of civil society in Burma, perhaps one of the most extreme being Order 2/88, section B of which prohibits more than 5 people meeting, under any circumstances.[31] There are estimated to be over 100 unregistered small local organisations, indicating the costs of registration outweigh the benefits. Individuals joining such groups face great risks, not least of which is arrest and imprisonment.

By restricting the freedoms of the people the regime has prevented effective support networks from being established and obstructed people from developing knowledge, skills and capacities which would empower them to be better able to protect themselves and their communities. Knowledge about HIV/AIDS for example is severely lacking and has been hampered by restrictions on free flow of information, among others. In his report Fatal Silence, Martin Smith has shown that “without local participation, founded on freedom of expression and access to information, the health needs of many sectors of society are likely to remain unaddressed.”[32]

The regime has a long history of arresting community leaders or respected persons, many on trumped-up charges. The arrest and sentencing of Pastor Gracy, a woman Chin Baptist pastor, was allegedly for connections to the Chin armed group, but this was recognised as a cover-up for the arrest of an innocent respected civilian.

Systematically oppressing civil society is nothing short of a myriad of multiple human rights violations and a direct causal factor in the humanitarian situation in Burma.

SPDC Society

The regime has tried to control civil society by initiating civilian groups and government-organised NGOs (GONGOs) which are extensions of the military state apparatus and operate according to its political will.

The most promoted GONGOs include:

· The Myanmar Maternity and Child Welfare Association (MMCWA), run by the general’s wives with Daw Khin Win Shwe, Lt-Gen Khin Nyunt’s wife, as the Deputy Chair.

· The Myanmar Red Cross Society (MRCS) – which has been used to forcibly repatriate refugees.

· The Myanmar Auxiliary Fire Brigades – which receives training in warfare and the use of small arms.[33]

Membership of GONGOs is often mandatory. A former medical worker in Burma tells how Union Solidarity and Development Association (USDA) application forms would be delivered to the hospital with staff knowing they had “no option” but to sign up.[34] More disturbing reports tell of promises of employment, fines and beatings as forms of coercion used to enforce membership.[35]

The USDA is the largest mass civilian organisation with over 5 million members[z3] . The organisation is clearly military aligned with patrons including Sr-Gen Than Shwe, Gen Maung Aye and Lt-Gen Khin Nyunt. The USDA has been promoted as a development partner by the SPDC. USDA’s violent, racist and corrupt tendencies are worsening human suffering, undermining any attempts to improve the humanitarian situation.

Armed conflict

The Shan State Army (SSA), Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP) and the Karen National Union (KNU) are among rebel groups engaged in armed struggle against the Burmese military. Armed conflict in Burma disproportionately burdens peoples of ethnic nationalities. While the SSA and KNU have recently expressed interest in engaging in dialogue for peace,[36] the SPDC has proved to be hostile, exposing it is not serious about peace in Burma.[37]

Ongoing conflict directly results in human suffering. Landmine laying by both the Burmese military and armed opposition groups is a clear example of conflict that directly intensifies the humanitarian situation.[38] “Ordinary villagers – men herding cattle, women working in fields, children and wild animals, a Muslim trader who would travel out of the jungles for shopping in the towns – all have been victims of the buried explosives.”[39] The approximately 400 Karen amputees in refugee camps[40] suggest extraordinary numbers die from landmine explosions because they cannot access health care facilities.

Conflict prolongs human suffering by diverting expenditure away from social services. Furthermore, conflict blocks access to areas of the most need. The SPDC uses political bias to determine no-go ‘conflict’ areas where internally displaced persons are fighting for survival. While the regime continues to profiteer from the drug trade, and other illegal economies, a climate of instability and violence will prevail.

Human rights violations

Killings, forced labour, rape

There is strong correlation between militarisation and human rights abuses, and human rights abuses and humanitarian problems. The connection between human rights violations and human suffering has been long-lived in Burma. As Doctor Cynthia said in an interview with Altsean-Burma, when she was practising in Burma medical patients often presented with injuries endured during forced labour and military portering. “Some of them will be beaten.”[41]

A recent trip to the border by the Thai Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs, led by Chairman Kraisak Choonhavan, confirmed human rights abuses, including forced labour, and rape, by Burmese troops along the border.[42] These human rights violations are numerous and widescale and disproportionately target people of ethnic nationalities. A recent Amnesty International report has identified, “Those living in areas where ethnically-based armed groups operated were most likely to be subjected to forced labour, forced relocation, torture and extra-judicial killings by the tatmadaw.”[43]

Food security

Food security is jeopardised by human rights abuses. Human rights abuses are directly and indirectly linked to malnutrition and famines, most severely affecting women and children. Forced planting, forced procurement, forced land seizures, forced labour, low prices and taxes, for example, all make farmers (60% of the workforce) highly vulnerable and deny them and their families the right to cultivate and enjoy the fruit of their land and labour. As UNICEF has clearly stated, without attributing the root-cause, there is “a widespread problem of child malnutrition” in Burma, particularly in rural areas.[44] Doctor Cynthia has also remarked that staff at her medical clinic in Mae Tao “see more children [from Burma] with malnutrition.” [45]

These factual statements about food security are diametrically opposed to Lt-Gen Khin Nyunt’s fallacy that food scarcity is not a problem in Burma.[46] There may be enough to export, but there is a deadly cost borne by the people of Burma. As the People’s Tribunal on Food Scarcity and Militarisation in Burma found in 1999, “food scarcity and militarisation [are] daily obstacles with dire effects.”[47] [see below for how economic mismanagement further jeopardises food security]

Forced relocation & dislocation

Forced relocation, largely under the ‘Four-Cuts’ policy – a product of ongoing conflict, is responsible for between 1 and 2 million internally displaced persons (IDPs). In the name of nationalism, mass killings of ethnic nationalities continue. Hundreds of thousands of people flee out of fear after they have been forced from their homes and fight for survival in the jungle. IDPs have no access to health care services and other basic need facilities, while those in relocated areas often only have limited access to inferior services. “There is a lot of malnutrition because of frequent displacement so they cannot get enough food,” said Dr Cynthia.[48] Thousands cross the border into Thailand where they become refugees or migrant workers in order to survive.[49]

Human rights abuses and high levels of migration as a result of economic deterioration exacerbate poverty through the break up of families. Woman and children are extremely vulnerable in this process and often suffer heightened human rights abuses as a result. The high number of working and street children[50] is not only illustrative of the humanitarian situation, but is also telling of the regime’s breaking-up and undermining of essential family and community support structures.

The regime lacks the political will to guarantee human rights and as Pinheiro has said “people have no faith in the effectiveness of the courts or police, or they are afraid of the consequences.”[51] The ILO has noted the regime has not made significant steps in eradicating forced labour and the practice continues to be widespread.[52] Against all evidence the SPDC denies incidents of forced relocation and says all “[re]settlement of some local populace […is…] absolutely voluntary.”[53] The SPDC dismisses reports of human rights violations as “smear campaigns” and “unfounded allegations emanating from anti-government elements and insurgents.”[54]

While the regime remains responsible for, and in denial of, widespread human rights abuses it cannot pretend to be committed to the needs of the people.

Economic mismanagement

Due to sustained under-funding of the health system and other social sectors, there is neither the capacity in terms of personnel nor resources to assess, analyse or respond to the humanitarian situation meaningfully. “Because of the economic crisis, health workers and medical workers have not got enough support from the government, they do not have the necessary technology and they are not given the support they need,” says Dr. Cynthia. “Many health workers struggle for their own survival and they cannot give all they want.”[55]

According to a Rangoon based aid worker, the SPDC currently allocates US$1 per head to health and education. After (meagre) salaries are deducted – US$4-5 per month for midwives and US$6-7 per month for doctors, there is only enough for one paracetamol per person, per year. Publicising new hospitals[56] amount to nothing more than public relations exercises. The director of a European NGO tells of a displayed medicine cabinet full of expired drugs - so that it looks good during official visits. If these drugs were given to patients the doctor would have to replace them out of his/her own pocket.[57]

The regime, its cohorts and cronies, dominate both legal and illegal economies, and are responsible for sustained gross mismanagement and subsequent economic deterioration. SPDC stated growth figures are nothing more than illusionary. The regime has been printing FEC (Foreign Exchange Currency – the SPDC’s ‘monopoly money’) in excess of its gold reserves, pushing inflation through the roof.

Insecurity of the farmer, exacerbated by human rights abuses, is further worsened by the poor state of the economy as costs of farming double in 6 months, according to the World Bank.[58] Prices, including that of low-grade rice, have increased by 100% in recent months, and queues for cooking oil are a fact of life. The basic meal, even in urban areas, is rice, chilli and fish paste. The people of Burma’s fertile plains, once ‘the rice bowl of Asia’, are now suffering pockets of man-made famine.

Regardless, the regime continues to prioritise military spending, which currently receives an estimated 40% of budgetary allocations – twice that of education and health combined[z4] . UNDP in 1998, estimate military expenditure to be approximately 220% of combined expenditure on health and education. Combined expenditure on health and education was under 1% of GDP in 1999.[59] In 2001, the regime spent USD130million on 10 MiG-29 fighter jets from Russia, expanded Meiktila Military Air Base, declared interest in a nuclear reactor and upgraded guns. As the NCGUB said in its briefing paper to the UNCHR, “It is uncertain how this expansion in military capacity (or potential capacity) is compatible with the national reconciliation process.”[60]

Prioritising military spending over that for health and other social expenditure is nothing other than irresponsible and dangerous. As a result of the lack of funds allocated to the health department and the mismanagement of the health sector in general, the World Health Organisation (WHO) report in 2000 graded Burma 190^th in overall health system performance of 191 countries.[61] (This was immediately refuted by Lt-Gen Khin Nyunt.) Abandonment of health and other social services by the regime has intensified human suffering.

As the NCGUB says, “The SPDC must ensure sufficient funding of the public health system to enable health workers to meet the rights of all people to the highest possible standard of health care.”[62]

THE WAY FOrward

The military regime is directly responsible for the humanitarian situation in Burma mainly as a result of ongoing oppression of civil society, armed-conflict, human rights abuses and economic mismanagement. Rule by the SPDC is therefore inimical to positive humanitarian development. Statements of good intent are lifted straight from UN documents and do not mirror reality.

The NLD, democratic opposition groups, brave people in Burma and Burma observers have spoken out against the causes of human suffering for many years. It must be ensured that the people of Burma’s voices are not ignored in the rush to send aid to Burma.

Political pressure on the regime clearly cannot stop now; there are too many unresolved burdens for the people of Burma to bear. It is urgent that the international community maintains pressure on the regime to encourage it to make the following positive changes:

· Decentralised civil society

The international community must advocate for a decentralised civil society. Independent civil society is necessary for communities to develop and advocate strong and effective support networks. It is crucial that diverse local voices are heard and respected. The continued incarceration on U Win Tin, respected journalist and others like him, offers an excellent opportunity for the international community to support freedom of expression while insisting that U Win Tin, suffering long-term illness, be allowed to return home.

· Nation-wide cease-fire

The international community must advocate for a nation-wide and unconditional cease-fire to halt conflict induced suffering and ensure increased access of humanitarian assistance to vulnerable persons: “The best protection for civilians is clearly the prevention of conflict.”[63] The military junta must abandon conflict and aggression immediately by declaring a nation-wide cease-fire, completely withdrawing all Burmese military troops and engaging in dialogue with ethnic nationalities. This is the only way for a peaceful and long-term political solution to be reached otherwise insecurity in cease-fire areas will continue. The ongoing conflict in Burma is an important regional concern, and ASEAN members in particular should advocate for peace in the region.

· Human rights abuses must stop.

The international community must lend support to the work of the ILO and other organisations supporting the defence of human rights. It is vital that the permanent presence is not allowed to be a token gesture but is effective in eradicating forced labour. The international community must strengthen its voice in advocating on the wide range of other human rights abuses. The publication of Licence to Rape is an excellent opportunity for the international community to advocate for greater protection of women and girls who are particularly vulnerable to human rights abuses.

· Economic change

The international community must maintain sanctions against the regime, importantly as part of its support for human rights, but also to insist on positive economic changes and real moves to attack the illegal economy of drugs. There must be significant changes in budgetary priorities, meaning reduced expenditure on defence and increased expenditure on social and health sectors. The economy must benefit the country, not only the regime.

The fact that the regime is responsible for human suffering undermines the possibility of it initiating an adequate response. Only when the regime makes these changes will it be taking a step away from being the causal factor of human suffering in Burma.

The NLD and ethnic nationality groups have long advocated for structural change that enables effective and independent collection and analysis of data to allow the humanitarian situation to be properly assessed. Only then can the response be appropriate.

ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT AID

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It is crucial to examine some of the assumptions underlying the aid process in Burma as they will determine the effectiveness of humanitarian assistance in reaching the people directly and actively supporting political dialogue, identified as a step towards peacebuilding and national reconciliation.

Assumption: “International humanitarian and development assistance can help by… slowly building civil society and pluralism.” (ICG, 2 Apr 02, p17)

Fact: Much of the aid in Burma is not contributing to civil society as much as it should. There needs to be political change for nation-wide development of independent civil society.

Any development process works best when the beneficiaries of aid are engaged as partners. “You have to involve all the community,” says Dr. Cynthia.[64] This implies local communities must be involved in programme assessment, design, implementation and monitoring. In its strategy on helping the world’s poor one of the European Union’s political guidelines is “ownership of the process must lie with the developing countries themselves and involve maximum participation of civil society representatives.”[65]

Humanitarian workers have questioned the sustainability of many civil society projects given they can only establish formal partnerships with registered NGOs and ‘government-organised’ NGOs (GONGOs). There are only 4 registered national NGOs, 2 of which were created by ex-SPDC officers. The remaining 2 are the Metta Foundation, founded by a Kachin woman Seng Raw, and the Shalom Foundation, founded by the Kachin Baptist Council.

GONGOs (government-organised NGOs)

While some humanitarian agencies are seeking out independent local partners, many accept the path set out by the regime and form partnerships with GONGOs, extensions of the military state apparatus and operators of their agenda. For example, UNICEF works with the Myanmar Red Cross (MRC) and the Myanmar Maternity and Child Welfare Association (MMCWA). Even when GONGOs are not actively sought out, Union Solidarity Development Association (USDA) members have proved to be effective at infiltration. International agencies’ association and partnerships with GONGOs legitimises both them and the regime.

The planned hand-over of ICRC’s prosthesis centre in Pa-an, Karen State, to the MRC highlights many concerns of working with GONGOs. There are many victims of landmines, laid by the Burmese military, its ally the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA) and armed opposition forces such as the Karen National Union (KNU). There are pressing concerns of access once the MRC takes over the centre. Will civilians come to GONGO staff for treatment? Is it feasible for SPDC-aligned staff to travel Karen State and escort fearful villagers to Pa-an for treatment?

Partnerships with GONGOs and donors granting them funds will strengthen the military state, jeopardise effective assistance and risk prolonging human suffering. GONGOs as institutions cannot solve the humanitarian problems in Burma as their political bias impedes effective assessment of, and response to, humanitarian needs. The Burma Office was on-target when it said, “The existence of these organisations is part of the problem not the solution.”[66]

To actively support the development of independent civil society, aid agencies must work strategically by identifying independent local partners and engaging in capacity building at local levels to increases the number of such potential partners.

identifying independent local partners

Humanitarian agencies must work with local partners so that their increased resources complement the local work being done and strengthen partner groups. Staff and communities can then benefit from more efficiently utilised and shared resources, knowledge and skills.

Despite the regime’s efforts to inhibit the growth of civil society organisations, some strong local networks do exist. There are over estimated to be over 100 unregistered small local organisations, many of which are religious, others formed in response to local needs. Identifying independent local partners requires a thorough understanding of the situation. When agencies fail to seek out local partners, or partnerships are token rather than genuine, they may undermine the work of local groups. Local groups have lost staff and clients as a result of better salaries and resources at international agencies.

While there are some links between local groups and international agencies, the dynamics of these relationships are unknown. It is also unknown whether, in cases where individuals are clearly benefiting from capacity building through working with some INGOs, they would be able to use these skills autonomously.

engage in capacity building at local levels

The development of critical analysis has been severely suppressed by the regime. Boasting a high standard and expanding educational system prior to the military coup in 1962, Burma now suffers from outdated schooling, pro-military textbooks, and higher education institution closures, sometimes for years at a time.[67] Compounding the suffocation of free thought, all media is subject to extreme censorship.[68] Military officers frequently usurp the authority of village leaders. Civilians cannot speak out for their rights or justice. Absence of the rule of civil law and implementation of draconian regulations has done long-lasting damage to civilian institutions and the humanitarian situation in Burma. Freedom of speech, movement, association and information, along with other key human and political rights, are essential to assessing and responding to the humanitarian situation adequately and without bias.[69]

It is in the interest of international agencies to work with the people of Burma to claim back their voices. To quote a humanitarian worker, “What is the point if NGOs cannot empower the people?” To quote Martin Smith, “Communities and citizens need basic information to make informed choices over everyday health issues such as birth spacing, for example, as well as to understand how they can avoid the risks of illnesses such as HIV/AIDS or cholera.”[70] Community groups must be encouraged to discuss issues and concerns both with international agencies and amongst themselves. Similarly, the regime must hear the voices of civil society. Capacity building, involving skills such as dialogue, negotiation, critical analysis and conflict resolution, must be integrated into humanitarian and other aid programmes. To quote Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, international assistance must be “tailored to help our people [people from Burma] to help themselves. We want to empower our people; we want to strengthen them; we want to provide them with the kind of qualifications that will enable them to build up their own country themselves.”[71]

It appears only some agencies are engaging in community projects developing such capacity. While it is generally quite easy to get projects approved for children, for example, one humanitarian worker has described the regime as “jumpy” at the mention of youth projects. (Students have been one of the biggest thorns in the military regime’s side.)

It is important that capacity building involves creating conditions that are safe for participants, further that programmes are conducted in local languages. There have been reports of local officers being present during participatory projects and forcing unwilling or unprepared participants to join in. Civil society groups are monitored by the authorities, and fear that accepting foreign funds may provoke the authorities. Surveillance is common, the threat of imprisonment a real one. The more effective independent civil society groups become, the more the regime is interested.

Simply by increasing assistance you are not going to do anything to change the situation of the civil society… there have to be measures that will enable pluralism to flourish in Burma, without pluralism there can’t be a strong civil society.

Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, see transcript[05]

Recommendation: Development of a decentralised and independent civil society is crucial for effective and accountable humanitarian and development assistance. International agencies have the opportunity to work with the people of Burma in supporting the development of civil society. International assistance programmes must be in partnership with local groups and individuals, aiming to make programmes sustainable. Humanitarian agencies must support and protect the strengthening and development of independent partner groups. International agencies forming partnerships and donors granting money to GONGOs will strengthen the military state and not support development of civil society. One of the key challenges for international agencies to effectively contribute to the growth of civil society is for aid agencies and donors to advocate for pluralism and the removal of obstructive laws and practices.

Assumption: INGOs “insist on absolute independence in the design and implementation of specific projects.” (ICG, 2 Apr 02, p20)

Fact: Restrictions from the authorities make it is almost impossible for international humanitarian agencies to be able to design and implement appropriate programmes.

MOUs stipulate that the INGO “representative and personnel shall not interfere with the political and religious affairs of Myanmar [Burma] and shall abide by the laws and regulations of Myanmar [Burma].”[72] The parameters of activity are closely guarded by the regime. The ad-hoc interpretation of ‘political and religious’ affairs, compounded by the absence of the rule of law, means that working conditions for international agencies are never standard. For programmes to be approved by the relevant authorities and pass through the regime’s spoken and unspoken rules, humanitarian workers have conceded that a balance is often struck between self-censorship on the one hand and ‘creative-writing’ on the other.

Agencies are therefore unable to insist on complete independence, as asserted in the ICG report. Agencies’ programmes are compromised, if not jeopardised, by unacceptable and unsustainable working conditions. A too frequent tendency to be fearful and a lack of solidarity amongst agencies and aid staff compound these conditions. There have been numerous instances where expatriate staff have proven too ready to be fearful, often more so than their national counterparts.

These phenomena are results of political naivety [see ’Aid & Politics’] and a general unwillingness to acknowledge the political context. In their readiness to be fearful, international agencies have exercised anti-democratic and unethical behaviour themselves. In one alarming incident, fear, political naivety, lack of solidarity or plain thoughtlessness meant expatriate staff at Agency A placed national staff in a highly vulnerable and unnecessary position, subjecting them to high risk of official harassment. In the mid-to-late 1990s national staff were not invited to attend some INGO meetings because of the purported fear of informers. Such behaviour undermines ideals crucial in effectively addressing the humanitarian situation and supporting democratic political change.

Some UN agencies are particularly criticised among humanitarian workers in Rangoon for being too easy to manipulate, even when they are meant to work independently. UN agencies also have a bad reputation for failing to give due protection to staff. In the mid-1990s, for example, an expatriate working in the Wa region of the Shan State for the United Nations Drug Control Program (UNDCP) was reportedly dismissed for his fluency in Mandarin, which allowed him to communicate directly with the Wa, one of the world’s leading producers of drugs. According to a Burma observer, the regime was worried that he could potentially expose their relationship with the Wa.

Occupational hazards Some of the risks national aid staff & working partners face

· Detention as a result of their involvement with international humanitarian agencies[73]

· Loss of home [74]

· Being held responsible for misappropriation of funds[n6]

· Dismissal from job, both as a result of involvement with international project and sharing information[75]

A conducive environment? Examples of arbitrary decisions & actions affecting humanitarian aid in Burma.

· SPDC officials have become increasingly inaccessible.

· MI surveillance has increased.

· In late 2001 the right to a waived visa fee for expatriate aid staff was revoked.

· Expatriate aid workers have been randomly prevented from leaving Rangoon.

· Expatriate staff must be receive permission and be accompanied by an official from the Ministry of Health at all times when visiting project sites, as announced in July 2001. Pinheiro (10 Jan 02) para.113

· Importing supplies and vehicles is becoming increasingly problematic. Agency C reported a 4-month wait for vital medical equipment to pass through customs.

· International aid workers challenging the regime have been barred from working in Burma.

· All staff members must be listed with the authorities.

· SPDC can ‘influence’ the filling of local management positions – often rewards for USDA members.

· Restrictions are placed on numbers of staff for educational activities run by international agencies. Pinheiro (10 Jan 02) para.113

· Expatriate staff have been told whom they can and cannot talk to.

· International experts releasing ‘unfavourable’ reports have been condemned and blacklisted from Burma.

Effective programme implementation is jeopardised by whimsical tightening of security, surveillance and other forms of interference. [see ‘A conducive environment?’ & ‘Occupational Hazards’] Paranoia of the international community renders proper assessment impossible and impedes implementation. To appease the SPDC there have even been instances when agencies have overstated the success of projects in line with the regime’s propaganda of progress.

Numerous INGO workers have commented on the “heightened state of tension”[76] that has developed since the talks began, and intensified since Daw Aung San Suu Kyi was released on 6 May 2002. “The government does not love NGOs,” says one a Rangoon-based aid worker. Another goes as far to say, “They hate us. The government cannot stand the fact that INGOs are doing positive things here.”[77] According to an INGO worker, speaking on the condition of anonymity, this is because the military regime is “scared that the INGOs will expose the truth of Burma’s situation” - the reality and the causes. The worsening climate of aid, compounded by the lack of political change, has made at least one Rangoon-based humanitarian worker lose her enthusiasm about increases of aid to Burma.

Independence is also undermined when donors are corporate bodies accused of complicity in human rights abuses. UNOCAL is being charged with “vicarious liability” in massive human rights abuses resulting from the Yadana pipeline, also involving Premier Oil and Total.[78]. Save the Children (US), funded by Premier (2001 & 2000) and UNOCAL (2000), has a project near the Yadana pipeline. Such donor-driven work has led at least one Rangoon-based aid worker to conclude “some projects are not optimal.”

Recommendation: International agencies have greater bargaining power compared to the people of Burma. They must use their combined strength to establish a conducive working environment. A strong support network for aid workers, national and expatriate will help, especially when facing negative reactions from the regime. Donors should seriously consider withdrawing funds from an agency if it is working for dubious interests.

Assumption: Humanitarian assistance will reduce conflict.

Fact: Humanitarian assistance has a real potential to exacerbate conflict.

Aid more often worsens conflict, even when it is effective in humanitarian and or development terms, rather than helps mitigate it’. Warren Lancaster, 18 April 1998

While the ICG claims, as stated by President and Chief Executive Gareth Evans, to be guided by the wish to “prevent and contain deadly conflict,”[79] its “unequivocal ‘yes’” to aid[80] exposes the non-contextualisation of the humanitarian assistance debate in Burma. While humanitarian assistance may temporarily reduce some pockets of conflict, the wider picture is that humanitarian assistance and other aid has a real potential to exacerbate conflict.

The regime has used humanitarian assistance as a political tool to draw ethnic nationalities into cease-fires. However, there have been no development projects under the auspices of ethnic nationality groups, including those who have established cease-fire agreements. Biased distribution of humanitarian and other aid furthers the regime’s divide and rule politics by positioning communities against each other. Some areas are keen to see increases of aid while some ethnic nationality leaders have made it clear they know nothing of humanitarian assistance. The gap in understanding and knowledge of these very different experiences has the potential to exacerbate inter-ethnic and intra-ethnic conflict. To quote Martin Smith, well-respected author on ethnic nationalities in Burma, “If aid is given to only one sector, faction or group within such culturally diverse communities, not only can this be politically, socially, or religiously divisive, it could actually fuel even deeper grievances and misunderstandings.”[81]

In some cases, aid may directly result in conflict. Although the Japanese government grant [z7] for repairs to the Baluchaung hydropower station (2) is not strictly humanitarian assistance, it has been categorised as assistance for basic human needs (within the Official Development Assistance (ODA) scheme). The debate around the grant illustrates how aid has the potential to increase conflict and repression of local peoples by the military.[82] The power plant is located in a contested and thought to be heavily-landmined area in Karenni State and the Karenni National People’s Party (KNPP) has clearly stated it is against the timing of this grant. The cost of a potential increase in conflict outweighs the dubious benefits the repairs may bring.[83]

Recommendation: Humanitarian agencies must realise humanitarian and other aid has the potential to increase conflict. It is very clear however that an immediate halt to conflict will greatly benefit the effectiveness of humanitarian assistance. Given that the SPDC currently directs the geographical distribution of aid, agencies and their donors must ensure transparency in the process of aid and insist on access to all areas of need, particularly when welcomed by local groups. Agencies and their donors must further ensure independent monitoring and accountability at all levels and during all stages of the aid process to safeguard against increased conflict.

Assumption: International aid agencies will ensure assistance benefits the most needy.

Fact: International aid agencies are impeded by the SPDC from accessing many of the most needy.

Among the areas in most need of significant improvement is the situation of vulnerable groups, inter alia the poor, children, women and ethnic minorities and, in particular, those among them who have become internally displaced in zones of conflict between the army and armed groups. Pinheiro, 10 Jan 02, para.108

The regime currently denies access to many ethnic nationality areas on the grounds of ‘security concerns’, naming them as conflict areas. The regime determines where humanitarian agencies can work, using their political bias to actively direct aid away from internally displaced persons (IDPs); some of the most vulnerable people in Burma.[84] This is in direct contravention of the UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement.[85] A Rangoon-based aid worker has conceded that the regime’s determination of where aid projects can go ultimately means that projects are often ill suited to needs and context.

While one humanitarian staff has privately reported access to IDPs in ethnic nationality areas through personal contacts with local officials, this work is ad-hoc, unsustainable. “It’s not the norm.”[86] It is also questionable what ‘access to IDPs’ means. It cannot be sustainable without official and long-term access.

All indications suggest that gaining access to IDPs is not a priority to humanitarian agencies. While the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) threatens to withdraw programmes if denied access to prisoners, it does not play this card in relation to border areas and IDPs. It seems to be accepted that IDPs are out of bounds to humanitarian agencies. To quote the Burma Ethnic Research Group in 2000, “international agencies – such as UNDP, UNICEF, FAO, WHO or UNDCP – have not confronted the government over rights of access and NGOs have not gained unimpeded access to the displaced in contested areas.”[87] It is more than disturbing that this comment is still true 2 years later. Agencies and donors that do not prioritise equal access to all areas and people are denying people their basic rights.

There are other, non-ethnic, groups in Burma to whom access is not easy but who also have high levels of need. One humanitarian worker has criticised humanitarian agencies for not being prepared to walk the path less trodden. It means heightened bureaucracy and harder working conditions. To quote a Rangoon-based aid worker, “Everyone wants to go to Shan State. Shan State is beautiful.”

Recommendation: Humanitarian agencies must continually advocate for access to all needy groups, supporting a nation-wide cease-fire and challenging the authorities when access is denied. Donors must continue and extend their support to cross-border initiatives that reach IDPs. These initiatives are efficient, effective and pose no threat to the process of national reconciliation.

Assumption: “The best way to increase government [SPDC] responsibility and strengthen state capacity is to work with government departments.” (ICG, Apr 02,)

Fact: UN agencies and INGOs should promote democracy and engage all political stakeholders. Democracy and good governance are vital to ensure humanitarian assistance reaches people in need directly.

While working with the regime strengthen their capacity for common sense and competency is not a bad idea, the key problem is the SPDC’s lack of political will to change. The SPDC is the main cause of the humanitarian situation in Burma - this undermines any public statement of concern they may make. Furthermore, the regime lacks the political will to realistically assess the humanitarian situation, exacerbating it further. While the regime is slowly recognising the dangers of the HIV/AIDS epidemic, many draconian policies that escalate transmission remain in force, including controlling who can enter the health profession. The regime’s defensiveness and paranoia of international criticism have further intensified the humanitarian situation. Lt-Gen Khin Nyunt dismissed the critical WHO 2000 report immediately, saying it was based on false information. Analysis of the AIDS epidemic by international experts has been met with blacklisting. Meanwhile, there have been reports that demographic statistics have been doctored. A health official tells of signs in hospitals ordering not to share information with international humanitarian agencies. Another health worker has separately spoken of orders “not to write up HIV/AIDS cases, so they drop off the caseload[z8] .”

Considering the regime is one of the main causes and exacerbaters of the humanitarian situation, and that since the ‘secret talks’ between Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and the regime began the political will is still lacking, strengthening the SPDC is not the answer.

There are 2 critical reasons why official, equal and ongoing consultation with and between all political stakeholders in Burma is crucial for humanitarian assistance to be effective:

Theoretical level: Supporting democracy in Burma is not peripheral to aid work. As stated by the Secretary-General, “The United Nation remains committed to assisting the people of [Burma] to achieve progress and social viability in a democratic framework, since this is their inalienable right.”[88] UN agencies should respond to humanitarian problems “with a view to ensuring that all aspects, including the humanitarian, human rights, political and developmental dimensions, of a given emergency are coherently addressed.”[89] UN resolutions have repeatedly called for democratic change in Burma and it is reasonable to expect UN agencies to take these resolutions seriously. Political progress is essential in ensuring social stability and humanitarian agencies, “as exponents of the value of improving human life and bringing about social change,”[90] therefore have a responsibility to actively support democratic change.

Official, equal and continuous consultation with community representatives and elected MPs is the first principle of democratic practice, by which all humanitarian agencies should abide.

Practical level: If the process of aid becomes more democratic then humanitarian assistance can be more effective. As a Rangoon-based diplomat has said, “The problem is systemic. You can throw a ton of money at it but until the proper institutions are in place, you will only be able to work at the margins.” [91] Further, diverse political stakeholders often have substantial and valuable information enabling more effective and - crucially – less dangerous aid.

Daw Aung San Suu Kyi has long advocated for international aid agencies to consult with the NLD. “It is absolutely necessary for those providing humanitarian aid to work closely with the NLD – the duly elected representatives of the Burmese people.”[92] The UN Special Rapporteur on Myanmar, Prof. Paulo Pinheiro, has also urged for “involvement of the NLD in the planning and managing of international humanitarian assistance… [to] secur[e] the safe delivery of humanitarian assistance.”[93]

Despite continued requests for consultation by the NLD and other political stakeholders, there are few instances when such groups have been consulted officially. There have even been occasions when international agency staff have been explicitly told not to attend NLD events or talk with Daw Aung San Suu Kyi.

Talking of projects within earshot of someone known to be in contact with Daw Aung San Suu Kyi or another elected member, as has been the case on several occasions, is not consultation by any definition. Consultation after the event is equally meaningless. Although the democracy leader has been briefed by representatives of agencies including UNDP, UNICEF, the World Food Program, the UNDCP and WHO since her release, these presentations must not be confused with consultation.

Equally legitimate political stakeholders are ethnic nationality representatives. Official and equal consultation with ethnic nationality representatives does not look imminent. Tripartite dialogue seems a long way off, as the regime is resolute in their opinion that they are ‘terrorists’ and Razali speaks only of ‘the proper time’. Many ethnic nationality representatives claim to know nothing about humanitarian assistance; they have been left in the dark.

As Daw Aung San Suu Kyi says, “We cannot afford to leave our ethnic nationalities out of any consideration for the future of Burma.”[94] The NLD leader and her colleagues are consulting with ethnic nationality leaders – most recently during her trip to Mon State in late July 2002 - so as to build a more informed picture of the situation in Burma and establish connections. Past and current behaviour of international agencies based in Rangoon suggest they will not commit to consultation with all political stakeholders, either through inertia or fear. Not engaging in official consultation with all representative political stakeholders indicates disrespect and shoddy professionalism.

International agencies do have some leverage and are currently not challenging the system imposed by the regime. Consultation must be inclusive of all political stakeholders. The regime cannot simply choose to consult with its allies, such as the United Wa State Army (UWSA) and Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA). The United Wa State Army (UWSA) and the Burmese military have well established links to each other and the drugs trade and, as such, the Wa receive favouritism from the regime. Development projects have proven to be more numerous, for example hospitals and other infrastructure are built after the Wa move in to an area.[95] While the regime continues to profit from the drug industry, they will not have unbiased regard for human suffering.

Recommendation: International agencies have an opportunity to enable the democratically elected government to take responsibility for the humanitarian situation.

It is crucial that international agencies push for wide and democratic consultation with, but also between all stakeholders. Consultation with all political stakeholders is a basic pre-condition to effective delivery of humanitarian assistance. By insisting on consultation with all stakeholders, international agencies also have the opportunity to build a bridge of understanding between the diverse, and sometimes opposing, stakeholders in Burma.

Assumption: NLD and ethnic nationality representatives do not have the expertise necessary to assess humanitarian assistance interventions.

Fact: They are more qualified & committed to comment on humanitarian matters.

The ICG report claims that, “While the NLD (National League for Democracy) has valuable information and insights to share with aid organisations, it is not a development agency and has few people with experience in development work, at least among the top leadership. The party simply does not have the capacity to make professional judgements on priorities or methodology.”[96] There are 3 obvious points that the report fails to highlight. Firstly, aid to Burma is a fundamental political issue. Secondly, the regime has worked hard to prevent these groups from developing and expanding existing capacities. Thirdly, SPDC ministers are not just less able but also less open to input from qualified advisors. Why apply technical criteria only to the NLD and not the SPDC?

The impoverishment of the education system and a system that prizes military control over logical decision-making is the problem. The system encourages uncritical obedience, not competency. “In an ideal world you would have competent counterparts working in the government that would allow you to take these projects to a larger scale,” says one INGO worker. “Unfortunately that is not currently possible here.”[97]

While one can safely assert that the aggregate curriculum vitae of democracy and ethnic leaders trumps the SPDC’s, the real issue is about commitment to accountability, critical reasoning and openness to diverse ideas. Otherwise, ignorant, impractical, disastrous and bizarre policies and practices as perpetrated by the regime will continue to flourish.

Recommendation: International agencies should insist on real consultation with non-SPDC political stakeholders. Consultation is an opportunity for agencies to develop a wider picture of Burma whilst building strong working partnerships dedicated to the people and the particular needs of women and other particularly vulnerable groups, thus benefiting the people of Burma.

Assumption: Humanitarian and other aid along the border is temporary

Fact: Humanitarian and other aid along the border is long-term.

Even if the situation, or the political situation, changes, there are still many things to do for people who are underprivileged …. very vulnerable groups in Thailand or along the border, so we still need to continue some programme along the border, including Thailand. Dr. Cynthia Maung, Feb 02

There will be people from Burma on the border in the long-term. People will continue to cross the border in search of shelter and a better chance of survival. “We find more and more people from that village come and work in Mae Sot because of the economic situation,” says Doctor Cynthia of the famous Mae Tao hospital. “It is getting worse and worse… Some people come from Burma just to get treatment,” says Dr Cynthia. Neither political change nor increased aid to Rangoon will immediately change this

There will continue to be a need for cross-border aid. Cross-border initiatives, started in 1988, are often the most effective way to reach people near the border. Access via Rangoon to these areas of most need is usually blocked by the regime. Effective humanitarian assistance is reaching thousands of vulnerable people in Karenni, Mon and Karen areas through ‘backpack teams’ from Thailand, each targeting 2,000 people. “For IDPs, food security is the biggest problem, the unstable situation also all affect [health, as do] water, sanitation, security, transport, communication,” said Dr Cynthia. Backpack teams “provide treatment of common illnesses and injuries […and] public education – usually through this [programmes] can access some schools with teachers,” says Dr Cynthia. “Another programme is to train the traditional birth attendants and provide supplies.” [98] Peer training is an integral approach of the ‘backpack teams’.

Peer training is also integral to programmes targeting refugee and migrant communities. The benefits of training and capacity building amongst people who will eventually return to rebuild their country cannot be overestimated. Unfortunately such work is also subject to pressure from host governments concerned about offending the regime, however such governments are likely to listen to the concerns of the international community.

Recommendation: Donors must support efforts made through, along and across Burma’s borders to access communities in most need, IDPs, refugees and migrants. These communities will require assistance in the long-term, regardless of developments in Rangoon. It must be ensured that increased aid to Rangoon is not at the cost of border groups. The international community should encourage host governments to permit humanitarian work and peacebuilding initiatives. Cross-border and border aid is effective, long-term, and empowering. Such aid does not threaten the progress of the talks and contributes to national reconciliation.

Assumption: The humanitarian ‘crisis’ is so bad that anything is better than nothing; it cannot wait for political change.

Fact: Aid under the SPDC’s supervision has the potential to cause suffering.

Under the sole supervision of the SPDC, humanitarian assistance has the potential to lead directly to human suffering. When the state is responsible for human suffering at any level, legitimacy of aid is not peripheral.[99]

There have been cases where “intergovernmental agencies have inadvertently supported the relocation of populations and in particular ethnic [nationality] ones,” states the Burma Ethnic Research Group.[100] In 1999, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) was granted permission to visit prisoners in Burma. ICRC efforts unknowingly had an adverse affect on the people they were trying to protect, as many prisoners were transferred prior to their visit. Consultation with the NLD could have alerted ICRC staff to this violation of human rights.[101]

There are clear cases of development aid directly resulting in human rights abuses and the horror stories should serve as vital lessons. “Oppression often occurs during the course of development projects funded by foreign aid and investment. There is a distinguishable pattern that shows how development projects in Burma hurt the people of the country instead of helping them,” explains Hsao Tai, a representative of Sapawa (a Shan NGO in Thailand) and the Tsang Project Coordinator for Earthrights International. “[D]evelopment projects can directly cause human rights and environmental rights abuses when there is no rule of law, and where local communities are helpless without any means of public participation.”[102]

This is a primary concern of activists opposing the Japanese government grant for repair of the Baluchaung Hydropower Plant (2) dam. There is a possibility that the forth-coming grant will result in increased human suffering due to intensified military presence. The International Labour Organisation’s High Level Team stated in its November 2001 report that forced labour is “particularly associated with the presence of the military, especially in more remote areas.”[103]. There is also a concern that river water will be prioritised for the hydropower plant over agricultural needs, as has been reported in the past.[104] Decreased water for farming would intensify food insecurity.

Recommendation: Wide consultation is vital to ensure aid does not become a cause of suffering. Political stakeholders and civil society groups must therefore be involved at all stages of humanitarian assistance to ensure it benefits the people of Burma. There must be an active framework whereby the people’s voices can be heard.

Assumption: Humanitarian agencies are in a unique position to witness human rights abuses.

Fact: Most ‘humanitarian’ agencies are not witnessing human rights abuses.

Human rights abuses have clear social and economic consequences on the work of international agencies. Contact with humanitarian workers highlights cases where human rights abuses, for example forced labour, have undermined the effectiveness of humanitarian programmes.

The United Nations (UN) document, leaked in 2001, asserted that UN agency operations “could contribute significantly to the ongoing work of… the UN Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar, Mr. Paulo Pinheiro, as well as the work of the ILO.”[105] This is read to imply that aid agencies and staff can be active in witnessing human rights abuses. While some workers and agencies have acted as witnesses in ways they feel able, too many consider witnessing human rights violations too big a risk to them and their projects.

Absence of human rights witnessing and advocacy has been widely noticed and caused much unease among members of the democratic opposition and many humanitarian workers, both with INGOs and UN agencies. At least one agency, Medicins Sans Frontier, has a commitment to advocacy. The website claims to, “Specifically […have] undertaken advocacy positions when dealing with specific abuses of endangered populations.”[106] Such advocacy is much needed, but unfortunately is lacking in Burma.

Many speak strongly of their disappointment with UN agencies in particular concerning their failure to protect human rights, given the potentially influential role the UN may have on the regime. When asked what she considered the role of the UN to be in Burma, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi responded “to promote the articles of the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights and, through establishing the universality of human rights, to bring peace.”[107] One does not have to be a former UN employee to know the UN has a mandate to protect human rights. To quote the current Secretary-General, “United Nations bodies [respond to humanitarian problems…] with a view to ensuring that all aspects, including the humanitarian, human rights, political and developmental dimensions, of a given emergency are coherently addressed.”[108] By not bearing witness, international agencies are responsible for the suffering of the people through their complicity.

This is a matter of urgent concern, particularly given the SPDC’s recent use of international agencies as a means of covering up abuses.

The international organisations such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, the NGOs and the UNDCP are visiting Shan State during their official tours. Mr Pinheiro, who presented the special UN report on human rights in 2001 had visited the Shan State. If the reports on the rape cases were real, these organisations would have heard about them. But these organisations said nothing about the rape cases. SPDC, press conference, 30 Jul 02, Rangoon[109]

The statement was made in response to the Licence to Rape report, co-produced by the Shan Women’s Action Network (SWAN) and the Shan Human Rights Foundation (SHRF), detailing the systematic rape of Shan women and girls by the Burmese military. The Thai Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs, led by Chairperson Kraisak Choonhavan, has confirmed reports of rape of ethnic nationality women and girls – some as young as 11, by Burmese troops along the border.[110]

This is not the first time the regime has denied committing human rights violations by citing international bodies. On July 20, 2000, the SPDC released a statement dismissing a report by Human Rights Watch (HRW) which condemned the regime for not protecting the rights of Muslim communities and individuals. The SPDC statement said HRW must be unaware of their co-operation with UN agencies and independent and internationally respected teams and individuals on human rights issues, such as UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights Prof. Pinheiro and the ILO.[111]

As SWAN has said, the SPDC is “using the international aid agencies working in Shan State as a shield to hide their sexual crimes against ethnic Shan women.”[112] International agencies are in the best position to speak out for the women of Burma, but there has been no public response. Rape is a crime against humanity under Articles 7 & 8 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. UNICEF, to name but one agency, clearly has an obligation, as a number of those raped were children. It appears international humanitarian agencies would rather sit quiet and legitimise the regime than defend the rights of women and girls. Their silence is unforgivable and reinforces violent discrimination against women of Burma.

Recommendation: It is crucial to develop an environment within Burma whereby relevant bodies can handle the responsibility of protecting human rights. The UN, led by its expatriate staff should lead the push for negotiating space, and developing the will among staff, to genuinely address human rights violations. Violations against women are of particular concern, especially in light of the Licence to Rape report. Donors should adequately protect human rights while providing aid. Human rights are protected by a European Union clause “allowing for trade benefits and development co-operation to be suspended if abuses are established.”[113]

Assumption: Some corruption is inevitable in all recipient countries.

Fact: The regime has stacked the system to ensure massive top-down corruption.

Declaring corruption is always present during the process of giving aid is disingenuous. The overriding concern regarding increased humanitarian aid to Burma is that the regime may be strengthened as a result; a concern voiced by democratic opposition groups and some independent civil society groups inside Burma. There are 4 main ways whereby this possible:

1. All aid brings hard currency to the regime as a result of the 3-tiered exchange system. International agencies change US dollars into Foreign Exchange Currency (FEC), the monopoly money which has a growing disparity against the US$. Meanwhile, humanitarian workers in Rangoon independently claim the UN accepts a rate approximately 40% lower than the market rate; currently 400-450 kyat. [09] (At the time of printing the exchange rate is approximately 1,100 kyat to the US$.) Paying electricity, rent and so forth in inflated dollar prices also directly benefit the regime.[114]

2. Increased international money and services towards health and other social sectors may enable the regime to divert an even larger proportion of the state budget into military expenditure. [010]

The regime is discriminatory in its educational priorities with a history of developing military educational facilities at the expense of civilian ones. Recently, the Ministry of Health provided ministry staff children with assistance for education costs.[115] Even if the families are civilian, this is clearly discriminatory, favouring regime employees.

Donating money for building repairs so that students are not charged out of the school system may be a nice gesture by humanitarian agencies, but the regime has no incentive to increase expenditure on education. Agencies simply end up indirectly lining the regime’s pockets. It is unacceptable that international commitment to help the people of Burma is not matched by the authorities. In most successful aid situations there is a willingness by the national government to reprioritise the budget or adjust policies where necessary to match international commitments.

3. In some cases, such as the original aid for the Baluchaung hydropower plant, aid directly benefits the regime, often bringing untold misery to local populations. “Generals in Burma are millionaires now, and this is possible because of the electricity which powers their industries,” said Teddy Buri, MP in Karenni State.[116] It is because the infrastructure and necessary checks are not in place to prevent incidents such as this that development aid must wait until there is real structural change.

4. The regime siphons off money through taxes and other bureaucratic procedures. “There is pressure for money under the table in pushing MOUs through, although it is possible to resist,” says one INGO worker. It is unknown how many international agencies provide bribes to speed up the process, but with no system for redress if funds go astray and in most cases not even a façade of accountability, the possibilities are grim. The SPDC will continue to pose difficulties for cargo, particularly vehicle, importation - an ongoing problem reported by Pinheiro,[117] and charge exorbitant taxes – or gestures of goodwill - on necessary facilities.

The Myanmar Red Cross (MRC) allegedly requested and received vehicles from the Australian Red Cross.[118] Agency X found itself involuntarily donating one out of a batch of vehicles in a ‘goodwill gesture’. In another instance, Agency Y was suddenly told it had to pay more than 5 times the value of imported vehicles within a tight deadline. Failure to meet the deadline would result in seizure of the vehicles and subsequent auction by the authorities. It was not expected that this special auction would be open to all members of the public.

A number of workers have conceded that most international agencies cannot effectively absorb large amounts of money under current circumstances. Rapid inflows of large funds, such as those which would come from the World Bank and other large scale donors, cannot be appropriately absorbed in Burma as the supporting infrastructure, capacity and operational necessities are not present.

Many aid workers are concerned about money for increased humanitarian assistance going to the UN as they foresee much leakage. The issue is proving to be divisive in aid circles in Rangoon as many consider the UN should be exerting leverage on the regime, not vice-versa as appears to be the case now.

Recommendation: It is important to advocate for currency exchange at the market rate and abolition of the 3-tier system as currently exists. Otherwise, there is the real possibility that even more substantial amounts of money will be siphoned off by the regime. This is dangerous as it will strengthen the regime further, result in further oppression of the people of Burma. There must be mechanisms to ensure international agencies are working in the right way; that they are transparent and accountable. Donors and agencies must insist upon budgetary spending changes by the regime.

Assumption: International aid agencies in Rangoon and on the borders can complement each other’s work.

Fact: International aid agencies in Burma appear highly defensive about their operations and fear being linked to border groups.

It has proven to be extremely difficult to engage aid agencies in Burma in a real dialogue with those outside Burma. As Marc Purcell has noted, the absence of INGOs in Burma “is noticeable in international forums… with whom much could be shared and learnt for mutual benefit.”[119] Agencies inside appear highly defensive of their operations, often dismissing outside concerns as reactionary. This generalising viewpoint undermines many of the good points that well-informed concerned persons make – and can make from outside Burma, regarding access to beneficiaries and real fears about strengthening the regime. When there is a lack of transparency and reluctance to share, of course agencies will receive criticism and reactionary statements.

The lack of an official response by international aid agencies to the statement issued by Concerned Individuals on the Thai-Burmese border in August 2002 does not bode well for sharing of information and experiences between humanitarian agencies in Rangoon and along the borders. As correspondence from one INGO clearly stated, it would prefer groups on the border did not contact the country office directly regarding matters of concern. It was felt that receiving widely circulated ‘controversial’ correspondence made the agency too vulnerable. The obvious unanswered question is then: What is the protection for those vulnerable to, and survivors of, human rights violations?

It is important to note that there is no free flow of information among groups inside Burma either and some of the obstacles are self-designed with clear divisions being drawn among the aid community. Therefore Bertie Mendis’s (UNICEF) comment last year at UNICEF’s Signing Ceremony is somewhat bizarre:“We must continue to openly share ideas and exchange experiences on programmes and strategies,” he said. “Transparency and open communication are also critical ingredients to effective partnerships.” [120] An annual UNICEF report is not to be published this year; apparently it is too late. How does this make UNICEF’s work accountable and shared?

Recommendation: International aid agencies and other concerned groups on both sides of the border must seize the opportunity to establish meaningful dialogue with each other. Such dialogue is long overdue and will enable both sides to learn from each other and develop a more detailed picture of the humanitarian situation for the people of Burma. Dialogue and sharing of experiences, programmes and information will enhance humanitarian projects, not to mention encourage such skills among beneficiary communities.

Assumption: The more, the merrier.

Fact: Quality, not quantity is more strategic.

Aid in Burma appears to have taken a ‘bums-on-seats’ approach in many instances. Many humanitarian agencies are quick to churn out statistics and graphs to wow the public. Some quick maths often reveals training sessions average disconcertingly high numbers of participants. The quality of the learning process must be the priority.

Some co-operative local authorities have been reported to be quick to shepherd local residents to all sorts of events, without explanation. Forced participation is not unknown.

It is crucial that, given the socio-political climate in Burma, there is a strategic and qualitative analysis of aid. Humanitarian workers in Rangoon have suggested that vital questions often remain unanswered. Who and how many people do not access programmes? Why?

Such questions will remain unanswered as long as local communities do not feel safe or encouraged to speak up, and while the voices of those who have the courage to speak up are being suppressed. Similarly, key marginalised groups will not be accessible in any meaningful way if agencies opt to pursue participation as a numbers game.

Recommendation: Qualitative assessments must be undertaken to increase the level of civil society participation, both raising the effectiveness of humanitarian programmes and supporting empowerment of local people. Discussion and sharing between humanitarian actors inside Burma and on the border, political stakeholders, international experts and other concerned individuals are the only way to develop a more informed and synchronised picture of the humanitarian situation in Burma and the most appropriate responses.

“THE RIGHT WAY”

______________________________________________________________________

The most important aspect of humanitarian assistance or any kind of assistance is good governance. Unless there is good governance, you cannot ensure that the assistance will really benefit the country. So, we cannot say often enough that good governance is the answer to Burma’s humanitarian problems.

Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, Aug 02

Sustained poverty reduction requires equitable growth – but it also requires that poor people have political power. And the best way to achieve that in a manner consistent with human development objectives is by building strong and deep forms of democratic governance at all levels of society.

Mark Malloch Brown, UNDP Administrator

Analysis of some of the assumptions underlying humanitarian assistance and aid reveals that effective programmes are dependent on a democratic political system and appropriate responses by humanitarian agencies.

Currently, the design and delivery of many aid programmes provide loopholes that benefit the military, the people of Burma continue to suffer and there is a real potential that increased aid will be detrimental to the national reconciliation process. This is not to say that humanitarian workers inside Burma have not had some positive effect, but rather to stress that the pervasive hostile climate in Burma oppresses both international agencies and the people they are supposed to help.

Thus, liberal use of the word ‘empowerment’ in mission statements and websites of international agencies is somewhat ironic. Some agencies appear to intentionally disempower themselves by obeying spoken and unspoken rules of the regime, even if it means undermining their own mandate.

The existence of a ‘Joint Principles of Operation’ (JPO) is clearly insufficient. Many agencies have reportedly not signed the JPO because of wording issues and lawyers’ reservations. Comments from several INGO staff indicate the JPO does not have any real effect on operations, although it does help some in their funding proposals and has made some national staff feel more secure. To many observers, the JPO seems to be nothing more than a feel good exercise.

The ‘right way’

Despite the SPDC’s oppressive rule, international agencies can choose to engage in behaviours that actively support democracy and ensure that the impact of humanitarian assistance is optimal. As Daw Aung San Suu Kyi has repeatedly said, humanitarian assistance and all other types of aid must be given in the ‘right way’. As identified, there are 3 components of the ‘right way’: accountability, transparency and independent monitoring.

“Unless there is accountability and transparency, you can never say what happens to all that assistance,” says the NLD leader. “It may not go to help the people, on the contrary, it may go into schemes that harm the people. So unless there is accountability and transparency we cannot say that humanitarian aid is assisting the people.”[121] It is crucial that assistance and aid are open to public scrutiny, only then is it possible “to ensure that the right assistance is getting to the right people in the right way, ensure that our people are really benefiting from whatever aid or assistance is given to the state.”[122] To quote a pro-democracy aid worker, “The process of how we get there is the most important.”

All three criteria – accountability, transparency and monitoring - are mutually complementary and reinforcing. While the following section discusses why these 3 components are necessary for humanitarian assistance and aid to Burma, their interconnected nature means that there is inevitably some overlap.

The ‘right way’ begs the following general questions:

· Is the agency committed to democratic values?

· Who does the agency recognise as stakeholders? Do they include: civil society, recipients, elected MPs, the NLD, ethnic nationality parties, state & local authorities?

· Does the agency have the will and capacity to consult with all stakeholders?

· Does the agency consult all stakeholders on an equal and official level during all stages of humanitarian assistance programmes? To what degree do stakeholders participate in decision-making?

…and the following specific ones:

· Is the agency willing to challenge denial of access to areas, particularly where there are highly vulnerable people, such as IDPs?

· What does the agency do when it witnesses human rights abuses? What level of protection and support do individual staff members have if they report or leak reports of human rights violations?

· Does the agency advocate for basic freedoms such as freedom of expression, information, movement and association in its programmes? How does the agency advocate for these freedoms? How can the agency protect persons exercising their fundamental human rights?

· How does the agency meet the needs of women specifically? Do programmes aim to empower women?

Transparency

Transparency is crucial, as it is the key means of ensuring that money does not benefit the SPDC or their cronies and that aid is distributed in an unbiased fashion. Given the intrinsic problems of monitoring programmes under the SPDC’s intimidatory tactics, agencies’ commitment to transparency must be prioritised. Transparency will also allow input form stakeholders to ensure that aid can be more effective.

Transparency begs the following questions:

· Are donors declared?

· Are rates of currency exchange, detailed projected expenditure and detailed actual expenditure made public and easily accessible to all stakeholders?

· Do agencies give ‘gifts’ to get things done faster? Do agencies report such ‘gifts’?

Accountability

Agencies in Burma and their donors have a responsibility to ensure, firstly that all humanitarian assistance reaches the people directly and is not siphoned of by the regime; secondly that it does not result in inadvertent suffering of intended beneficiaries, and thirdly that programmes attain their stated aims and objectives. The basic underlying criteria is that agencies act independently of the regime.

Humanitarian agencies should be accountable to many different stakeholders, including their own governance structures, donors, civil society, local partners and local communities. Accountability requires that policies, decisions and goals are fully understood by these stakeholders. Agencies therefore have a responsibility to ensure that all stakeholders have the capacity and resources to understand and be involved programmes.

Primary accountability must be to the beneficiaries, the people themselves. Local communities should be allowed to continuously input into programmes so that they work in two directions – ‘giving’ and ‘taking’. This mechanism should allow input at all stages of the programme, starting with needs assessment and finishing with evaluation. In order for the consultation mechanism to be effective, creative methods must be applied so that the people of Burma can use their diverse voices. Daw Aung San Suu Kyi has stressed declaring an ‘open-door’ is not enough. International agencies have a responsibility to actively seek out input and feedback from local communities and individuals regarding their concerns and responses. This requires a commitment to help ensure development and protection of relevant skills, such as dialogue, negotiation and conflict resolution.

These skills are not only crucial to an effective consultation mechanism but will also help empower the people of Burma if allowed to develop. Speaking out has been repressed in Burma for a number of years. Aid does not necessarily empower the people, there must be a real and transparent commitment on behalf of delivering agencies.

Currently there is no clear system whereby humanitarian assistance or any other aid in Burma is accountable to the recipients.

Accountability begs the following questions:

· Is there local ownership of programmes? If no, how can this be established? What skills are being developed among local communities and civil society organisations?

· How are programmes assessed and designed, and who was involved?

· Were local stakeholders involved in need assessment and feasibility studies? Are they continually involved in negotiations and decisions?

· Is there an official consultative mechanism whereby local communities and other stakeholders can register concerns? What is the effectiveness of this mechanism? How is feedback encouraged? What skills are necessary for effective feedback? What steps does the agency take to ensure these skills are learnt and utilised by local communities?

· How does the agency respond to questions, concerns and complaints raised about the programme?

· How is the agency responsible to the people? Who ensures this?

· To what extent does the agency exercise self-censorship? Is this completely necessary?

· What are the agency’s staff recruitment policies? Who determines the employment contracts of each staff member?

· How do ‘gifts’ benefit beneficiaries of humanitarian assistance and other aid?

· Does the agency provide enough support for its workers and the humanitarian community in Burma in general?

· Are agency workers sufficiently aware of the political situation in which they work, and the ways in which this affects programmes and staff behaviour? What sort of briefing is given to staff regarding the political climate in Burma?

· What is the agency’s information sources regarding the situation of people in Burma?

Monitoring

There is currently no formal or standardised monitoring of humanitarian assistance in Burma, which ensures accountability and transparency of programmes. Considering the immense difficulties in guaranteeing transparency and accountability in Burma, there is a need for national monitoring. A monitoring body would support the development of ‘good governance’ as advocated by Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and serve both a practical and political purpose. Good governance is crucial.

A national monitoring body comprising representatives of the NLD, ethnic nationality parties and groups, and key civil society groups, where stakeholders are equals, would ensure stakeholders are not marginalised in the aid process. Further, local or recipient communities have another channel through which to express their concerns to complement local feedback mechanisms. This will develop the capacity of all those involved, particularly in the area of negotiation, conflict resolution and dialogue skills. Development and utilisation of such skills have long been oppressed under military rule and a monitoring body such as this would offer an excellent opportunity for stakeholders, the SPDC included, to develop their capacity and appreciate the value of such processes. Obviously, genuine commitment and political will to openness and negotiation to improve the humanitarian situation will be the key prerequisite of success.

The establishment and effective function of such a body would be the first time in many decades that all political stakeholders can engage in dialogue on an equal playing field, hence contributing to the development of pluralism and democratic governance.

The role of aid agencies

‘Good governance’ is crucial, not only at the national political level in Burma but also amongst aid agencies and donors themselves. Agencies must design and implement programmes in a transparent and accountable way. This requires recognition of diverse stakeholders, a commitment to political change, consultation and active respect for the principles of human rights and a thriving civil society. Strict adherence to the principles of accountability and transparency will promote good governance at macro and micro levels. If agencies avoid being transparent and accountable, it sends messages of tacit approval for or outright legitimisation of the regime.

There appears to be a consensus among many INGO humanitarian workers that UN agencies must play a strong role of leadership and support for other agencies. It is feared that INGOs programmes will be jeopardised should they seek to adopt such a role. While it has been identified that many agencies and staff are too willing to be fearful, it would appear that the UN should be able to exert more leverage on the regime. At this time, the regime is not being held accountable or being sufficiently challenged as to its arbitrary decisions regarding humanitarian assistance. Under no circumstances are lowering of standards acceptable, as suggested by an ICG representative in a letter to the International Herald on 17 April.

In advocating for consultation with all stakeholders, the international community, international agencies and donors have an excellent opportunity to support official and inclusive dialogue in Burma whilst ensuring accountability of humanitarian assistance programmes.

DONORS AND the international community

The international community must maintain pressure in order to bring about fundamental political change. Without democracy, it is impossible for humanitarian assistance, or any aid to be truly effective. While oppressive regimes rule Burma they will maintain obstacles to basic freedoms and empowerment of civil society. In short, without genuine political change, the people of Burma will continue to be impoverished, oppressed and abused. A democratic society in Burma is a vital step to ensuring truly effective humanitarian assistance that directly benefits the people. Donor governments must ensure that the humanitarian and other aid projects they are funding do not undermine their support for democracy in Burma.

Donors and agencies must maximize leverage and negotiative capacity to ensure the authorities will commit to positive working conditions for agencies to deliver effective humanitarian assistance. Donors must insist that agencies commit to genuine transparency and accountability in the operations of all programmes they fund, including capacity building for independent monitoring, dialogue and conflict-resolution. There must be genuine consultation with all political stakeholders. Donors must further encourage implementing agencies to share information and co-ordinate with border based groups.

Several humanitarian workers and local groups admit that local aid infrastructure is ill prepared to absorb large increases in funds in the present climate. Therefore, the lion’s share is likely to be sucked into projects dictated by the regime or its proxies. The absence of pluralism, rule of law, separation of powers, independent civil society and financial accountability, among other fundamental prerequisites, means that there is too much potential for leakage to and legitimisation of the SPDC.

Until there is genuine and irreversible political change donors must exercise extreme caution, i.e. restrict the size of grants and be prepared to withdraw funds if appropriate. The ICG report’s worst case scenario that “greater influx of money and organisations could make it easier for the [SPDC] to weed out INGOs it does not get along with”[123] overlooks the glaring reality that people of Burma may suffer catastrophic consequences from a strengthened military regime.

Donors must resist the urge to prematurely reward the SPDC when political progress has not stopped but actually taken a downward slope since the release of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi in May 2002. While aid is an industry, like any other, and there is often a tendency for agencies to gage their significance in terms of the size of their grants, the donor community should definitely adopt a ‘only small and tailored is workable’ position. Humanitarian and other aid, must be addressed within its political context at all times.

chronology

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A rough chronological overview of aid-related developments vis-à-vis Burma:

1975 1^st Japanese grant to Burma MOFA

1981/1982 World Bank stops fund-supported programmes http://www.worldbank.org

1986 ADB stops loans

1987 ADB stops technical assistance; Japanese loans are cut MOFA

1988 US cuts off bilateral aid

1989 Japan cuts grants MOFA

1990 Japan grants JPY3.5billion in debt relief MOFA

1993 Japan resumes grassroots grants, not included in debt relief MOFA

1995 Japan starts providing technical assistance & grant aid for “humanitarian purposes”

1997 The Clinton administration, US, unilaterally imposes sanctions on new investment in Burma

1998 Japan gives JPY2.5 billion loan to upgrade runway at Mingaladon airport, Rangoon & JPY1.6 billion for expansion of nursing facilities MOFA

Military regime rejects billion-dollar aid offer from World Bank and UN in exchange for political reforms

7 Aug 1998 U Saw Win (61), NLD MP, dies of unknown causes in Thayawaddy Prison. 3^rd NLD MP to die in prison.

2 Sep 1998 World Bank placed all credits to Burma on non-accrual status as repayments were overdue by more than 6 months

1999 Japanese humanitarian grants total JPY880 million for fiscal year 1999. Kyodo, 14 Mar 01

Mar 1999 US lobbying firms, Jefferson Waterman International & Bain and Associates confirm they are no longer working on Burma due to “non-payment”. Burmanet, 8 Mar 99

2000 Japanese humanitarian grants total JPY1.5 billion for fiscal year 2000. Kyodo, 14 Mar 01

2000 WHO report places Burma’s health system 190^th out of 191

Khin Nyunt refuses WHO assessment & says report is based on false information

Jan 2000 Japanese International Co-operation Agency (JICA, government aid agency) sends inquiry mission to Burma for 3 months for research on Baluchaung Dam. JICA, 18 Dec 01

Apr 2000 UN Secretary-General appoints Razali as UN Special Envoy on Burma

29 Jun–3 Jul 2000 Razali’s 1^st trip to Burma, meets with DASSK, Khin Nyunt & Win Aung

22 Sep 2000 DASSK & others arrested for trying to travel out of Rangoon. DASSK placed under house arrest, others under house arrest or in jail

Oct 2000 ‘Secret talks’ between DASSK & SPDC begin

5 Oct 2000 8 NLD members released

6 Oct 2000 SPDC cancels EU foreign policy troika’s Oct visit

9-12 Oct 2000 Razali’s 2^nd trip to Burma, meets DASSK, Aung Kham Htyi (Palaung leader), Than Shwe, Khin Nyunt, Win Aung, Ket Sein (Health Minister), Tin Hlaing (Home Affairs Minister)

12 Oct 2000 ASEAN Secretary-General says ASEAN is monitoring Burma situation but will not mediate

17 Oct 2000 6 elderly NLD political prisoners released, after request by Razali

20 Oct 2000 French Foreign Minister announces EU will resume talks with ASEAN in Dec 2000, after break of 3 years

1 Nov 2000 NLD woman political prisoner, Thin Thin Moe, released

20 Nov 2000 2 NLD political prisoners released

Dec 2000 11 imprisoned for accompanying DASSK to catch train to Mandalay in Sep

2 Dec 2000 6 CEC members released from house-arrest (arrested 22 Sep), including some CRPP members

9 Dec 2000 SPDC allows EU top officials to visit in Jan 2001

10 Dec 2000 U Lwin visits DASSK, her 1^st visitor since placed under house arrest

11-12 Dec 2000 ASEAN-EU meeting, Laos

14 Dec 2000 11 NLD members arrested 13-14 Sep are sentenced for 7-21 years for issuing statement when DASSK was forcibly returned from Dallah Township

15 Dec 2000 NLD woman political prisoner, San San Aye, released

Jan 2001 SPDC stops attacking DASSK & NLD in state-press

3-8 Jan 2001 Malaysian PM Mahathir visits Rangoon, meets Than Shwe

5-9 Jan 2001 Razali’s 3^rd visit to Burma

9 Jan 2001 Razali announces ‘secret talks’ for 1^st time

10 Jan 2001 NLD confirms ‘secret talks’

16 Jan 2001 Khin Nyunt says democracy can only happen when international community rolls back sanctions

16-19 Jan 2001 Meeting resurrects UNLD, umbrella organisation for non-Burman political parties

18 Jan 2001 Meeting with KNU & SPDC, no possibility of dialogue at present time

KNPP announce SPDC invited them to join development activities & talks

24 Jan 2001 U Tin Oo, NLD Vice-Chairperson, & 83 other NLD members are released

29-31 Jan 2001 EU troika visits Burma, Meets DASSK & SPDC

19 Feb 2001 Lt-Gen Tin Oo killed in helicopter crash with 2 cabinet ministers

23 Feb 2001 Internal coup in Kachin Independence Organisation (KIO)

26 Feb 2001 JICA sends 6 doctors & medical technicians to Mandalay for 1 month

Mar 2001 4 political prisoners released

6-7 Mar 2001 Leadership of Non-Burman Ethnic & Democracy Forces Opposing Military Rule in Burma meeting, Burma

14 Mar 2001 Exiled Burmese lawmakers urge Japan not to resume full ODA. Kyodo, 14 Mar 01

17-19 Mar 2001 International Strategy Meeting on Burma, Thailand

19 Mar 2001 Secretary-General of Zomi National Congress arrested, reason unknown

3-5 Mar 2001 Pinheiro’s 1^st visit to Burma

4 Apr 2001 Japan announces plans to provide approximately JPY3.5 billion (US$28 million) ODA for repairs to Baluchaung Dam. Largest aid since 1988 Jiji Press, 5 Apr 01

24 Apr 2001 KNPP statement opposing Japanese grant for Baluchaung repair citing concerns over human rights & improper timing for aid

9-20 May 2001 SPDC official permitted to Europe for UNLDC conference, despite being on blacklist

14-17 May 2001 Democratic Alliance of Burma conference

17-19 May 2001 ILO team visits Burma

25 May 2001 Australia announces it will renew its Human rights initiative at a cost of AUD140,000

29 May 2001 Bill S.926 introduced in US Senate to impose further sanctions

1-4 Jun 2001 Razali’s 4^th visit to Burma

12 Jun 2001 State House of Massachusetts, US, hears bill to drop companies engaged in Burma from state pension fund

13 Jun 2001 NLD Central Committee member, U So Thein (aka Maung Wuntha), released

14 Jun 2001 8 MP political prisoners released

15 Jun 2001 CRPP President, Dr Saw Mra Aung, released

19-21 Jun 2001 Japanese MOFA sends an official from Tokyo to survey the Baluchaung Hydropower Plant in response to an MP’s questions of concern

20 Jun 2001 NLD political prisoner, Tin Maung Lay (aka Tin Maung Myint) dies in Mandalay prison

22 Jun 2001 Burma added to International Money Laundering Blacklist

25 Jun 2001 NLD political prisoner, Maung Maung Aye, dies in Bassoon prison

29 Jun 2001 MOFA gives official written response to MP’s questions regarding Baluchaung, indicating problems are not serious enough to halt the grant

Jul 2001 Moustache Brothers released from prison

6 Jul 2001 Baptist Pastor Gracy sentenced to 2 years hard labour for alleged links with Chin armed forces

12 Jul 2001 Sithu, student leader arrested 1990, dies in Tharawaddy prison

13 Jul 2001 3 MP political prisoners released

18 Jul 2001 Daw San San Nwe, award winning journalist & NLD member, released from prison

19 Jul 2001 DASSK does not attend Martyrs’ Day ceremony

21 Jul 2001 NLD Youth leader, Khin Maung Myint dies in Kale prison

26 Jul 2001 Proposal, endorsed by 36 NGOs and 32 individuals in Japan, is submitted to MOFA calling for a thorough investigation into the human rights & environmental impacts of the Baluchaung repair project.

Aug 2001 Formation of ENSCC to co-ordinate tripartite dialogue NCGUB, dec 01

1-5 Aug 2001 Japanese MP Nobuhiko Suto visits Burma and Baluchaung Hydropower Plant to conduct own fact-finding. Is accompanied by Burmese officials at all times

2 Aug 2001 US delegation, led by Secretary of State for East Asian & Pacific Affairs meets with DASSK & SPDC

4 Aug 2001 Saw Tin Myint, KNU arrested 1983, dies in Tha-yet prison

9 Aug 2001 Japanese MP Nobuhiko Suto gives report on trip to Baluchaung and lauds it as very worthy of Japanese aid

13 Aug 2001 2 MP political prisoners released

26 Aug 2001 Chairperson Aung Shwe & Vice-Chairperson Tin Oo released from house arrest

27-30 Aug 2001 Razali’s 5^th visit to Burma, meets DASSK, SPDC, diplomats, ethnic nationality leaders, INGOs, ASEAN diplomats, OECD officials; encouraged SPDC to release 29 NLD MP political prisoners AFP, 29 Aug; Times of India, 2 Sep 01

4-6 Sep 2001 Khin Nyunt visits Thailand

6 Sep 2001 U Lwin, NLD spokesperson, denies DASSK is meeting with Khin Nyunt & there is any power sharing agreement BBC interview

9 Sep 2001 Mon splinter group re-engages in armed conflict with Burmese army

10 Sep 2001 6 political prisoners released AP, 10 Sep 01

17 Sep 2001 ILO starts 3-week assessment of SPDC’s ban on forced labour

21 Sep 2001 EU announces 2million euros (USD2.2 million) in aid MT, 1-7 Oct 01

3 Oct 2001 U Hla Soe released from prison Xinhua, 3 Oct 01

8 Oct 2001 EU extends common position on Burma until 29 Apr 2002 and speaks of aid for HIV/AIDS as a ‘reward’

9-17 Oct 2001 Pinheiro’s 2^nd visit to Burma

23 Oct 2001 Thinggangyun Township branch of NLD allowed to reopen Irrawaddy, 23 Oct 01

26 Oct 2001 8 political prisoners released AP, 26 Oct 01

29 Oct 2001 U Lwin says political freedom has not improved DVB, 29 Oct; AFP, 21 Nov 01

10-11 Nov 2001 Biggest cabinet reshuffles in Burma since 1988 AFP, 18 Nov 01 (BurmaNet)

20 Nov 2001 SPDC denies charges of forced labour in ILO report AFP, Reuters, 20 Nov 01

27 Nov–3 Dec 2001 Razali’s 6^th visit to Burma, meets DASSK, asks SPDC to release more political prisoners AFP, 2&3 Dec 01

29 Nov 2001 Professor Salai Tun Than arrested for peaceful demonstration at City Hall

8 Dec 2001 NLD office reopens AFP, 8 Dec 01

11 Dec 2001 Former Japanese Foreign Affairs minister says DASSK says dialogue has not begun, still at confidence-building stage AFP, 11 Dec 01

13 Dec 2001 4 NLD political prisoners released AFP, 13 Dec 01

4 Jan 2002 Expectations of ‘breakthrough’ are dashed, NLD makes 1^st formal statement calling for faster progress AFP, BBC, 4 Jan 02

8 Jan 2002 Start of USDA rallies in Rangoon AF, 16 Jan 02

9 Jan 2002 5 political prisoners released BBC, 9 Jan 02

22 Jan 2002 Professor Salai Tun Than sent to Insein prison Irrawaddy, 22 Jan 02

25 Jan 2002 Report that Min Ko Naing has had sentence extended by 1 year Irrawaddy, 25 Jan 02

29 Jan 2002 Latha township allowed to open NLD office DVB, 29 Jan 02

30 Jan 2002 Report Razali’s 7^th visit postponed until Mar DVB, 30 Jan 02

8 Feb 2002 Professor Salai Tun Than sentenced for 7 years under Article 5(j), Insein prison AHRC, 20 Mar 02

10-19 Feb 2002 Pinheiro’s 3^rd visit to Burma, meets DASSK, Dr Salai Tun Than, visits Kachin State & Insein prison; 11 political prisoners released AHRC, 20 Mar 02; Reuters, 19 Feb 02

13 Feb 2002 UN secretary-general reiterated SPDC has to begin democratisation if it hopes to attract foreign aid, in response to Foreign Minister Win Aung’s request that the UN play a more active role in Burma’s development. AP

Myo Myint Nyein, journalist, released RSF, 13 Feb 02

14 Feb 2002 Myo Myint Nyein says prison conditions are improved during Pinheiro’s visits Radio Burma, 14 Feb 02

19 Feb 2002 SPDC says sanctions are slowing down democratisation process Reuters, 19 Feb 02; Morning Star, 20 Feb 02

22-27 Feb 2002 ILO team visits Burma, denied meeting with DASSK AFP, 27 Feb 02

7 Mar 2002 Arrest of Ne Win’s son-in-law & 3 grandsons for supposed ‘coup plot’ FEER, 21 Mar 02

8 Mar 2002 3 political prisoners released & 3 women prisoners AFP, 8 Mar 02

13 Mar 2002 EU delegation to Burma, release of 25 women prisoners BBC, 13 Mar

19 Mar 2002 Razali’s 7^th trip to Burma postponed a 2^nd time; ILO & SPDC sign agreement for ‘Liaison Officer’ in Burma

31 Mar 2002 NLD office opens in Mingalataungnyunt Township DVB, 4 Apr

2 Apr 2002 Release of ICG report Myanmar: The Politics of Humanitarian Aid

4 Apr 2002 Report that Gen Maung Aye banned a meeting of Kachin Baptist Church Irrawaddy

Delegation from MMCWA meets with representative from China’s National People’s Congress Xinhua, 5 Apr

7 Apr 2002 Report that all cease-fire groups in Tachilek were ordered to close offices before 30 Apr SHAN, 7 Apr

8 Apr 2002 SPDC violates cease-fire with NMSP Kao Wao, 10 Apr

9 Apr 2002 Reports of SPDC leaflets calling for KNU to drop arms distributed at Tham Hin refugee camp Irrawaddy, 9 Apr

Announcement that repatriated migrants from Thailand would undergo mandatory HIV testing BBC, 9 Apr

15 Apr 2002 Deputy Minister for Social Welfare speaks at International Ageing Assembly in Madrid M2 Presswire, 15 Apr

22 Apr 2002 EU common position (2002/310/CFSP) reaffirmed

Japanese government announces JPY792 million medical aid for 3 hospitals Kyodo, 22 Apr

23-26 Apr 2002 Razali makes 7^th visit to Burma

May 2002 UNESCO seminar in Bagan, UNESCO say prepared to provide funding for eco-tourism projects, subject to permission by SPDC authorities MT, 8-14 Jul

3 May 2002 SPDC hires DCI Associates

5 NLD prisoner released SCMP, 4 May

6 May 2002 DASSK released from house arrest, ADB said this heightened the prospects of a resumption in aid Dow Jones, 9 May

8 May 2002 UNICEF urges for increased aid to Burma to avert looming humanitarian crisis AFP, 8 May

10 May 2002 Japanese government releases statement it will proceed with Baluchaung repair grant MOFA

13-17 May 2002 Col Kyaw Thein attends anti-narcotics meeting in US with officials AP, 8 May

14 May 2002 NLD-LA releases statement objecting to Baluchaung repair grant

15 May 2002 US government announces US$1 million for HIV/AIDS

16 May 2002 DASSK briefed by UNDP, UNICEF, WFP, UNDCP, WHO AP, 16 May

22 May 2002 UN International Narcotics Control Board reports Burma produces 50-60% of world’s opium Xinhua, 22 May

4 Jun 2002 Reported that Australian government will give AU$6.2million in aid Mizzima, 4 Jun

13 Jun 2002 Report that DASSK was blocked from meeting with INGO as in SPDC building BBC, 13 Jun

19 Jun 2002 Women of Burma Day SWAN & SHRF release Licence to Rape

23 Jun 2002 DASSK starts 10 day trip to Mandalay AFP, 23 Jun

27 Jun 2002 UNDCP representative reports a 40% drop in Burma’s opium production Australian, 27 Jun

1 Jul 2002 MOU with Japanese government to extend 3yr IT programme, started last year, providing IT training & scholarships MT 8-14 Jul

5 Jul 2002 MOU signed for first AusAID financial assistance to Burma MT, 8-14 Jul

15 Jul 2002 Thai NSC orders immigration police to check on Thai & foreign volunteers providing assistance to anti-Rangoon ethnic nationality groups Forumasia, 21 Aug

18 Jul 2002 Human Rights Watch (HRW) releases report on crackdown on Muslim communities

20 Jul 2002 SPDC releases statement dismissing HRW report, which claims the SPDC, does not protect Muslim’s rights

22-28 Jul 2002 Myanmar Times report Israel will increase annual training scholarships to Israel from 20 to 25 people

MT reports Japanese NGO, the Southeast Asia Exchange Association, has donated JPY2 million (US$17,000) for a Rangoon youth centre

31 Jul 2002 HRW release statement in Wall Street Journal, discusses humanitarian assistance

Early Aug 2002 Thai General Surayud Chulanont transferred from Army Chief to the less powerful Supreme Commander

2-6 Aug 2002 Razali makes 8^th visit to Burma

5 Aug 2002 DASSK meets with Japanese Foreign Minister Kawaguchi BP, 6 Aug

6 Aug 2002 UN Special Envoy Razali states substantive talks on Burma’s political future will start “very, very soon.”

DASSK says she is engaged in talks with a totally open mind & they must include ethnic nationality representatives BBC, 6&7 Aug 02

7 Aug 2002 DASSK message aired to urge for release of political prisoners Altsean-Burma

9 Aug 2002 14 political prisoners released, including 6 NLD members BP, 10 Aug 02

16 Aug 2002 SPDC announces release of 5 NLD political prisoners & CRPP Chairman U Aye Tha Aung, suffering from liver cancer AP, 16 Aug 02

Daw Aung San Suu Kyi interview published, quoting her saying "Dialogue always entails compromise" AP, 16 Aug 02

18 Aug 2002 Peaceful protest outside Rangoon City Hall, a group of students are arrested ABSFU-FAC, 20 Aug 02

18-19 Aug 2002 Malaysian PM Mahathir visits Burma, does not meet DASSK

20 Aug 2002 Thai police raid offices of the Burmese opposition along the border, over 30 people arrested as ‘illegal migrants’ Forumasia

30 Aug 2002 NLD office opens in Dallah Nation, 31 Aug

8-10 Sep 2002 EU Troika visits Burma, meeting with Lt-Gen Khin Nyunt cancelled due to heavy rains EC newsroom, 10 Sep

17 Sep 2002 U Aung May Thu, political prisoner, dies at age of 61 in Tharawaddy prison AAPP-B, 19 Sep

APPENDIX 1: NGOS & donors in burma

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International NGOs in Burma

There are 30 international NGOs and 2 Red Cross movement organisations operating in Burma. According to Pinheiro, they provide direct services such as food relief, health care and shelter and/or develop local capacities and 16 are subcontracted by United Nations (UN) agencies.[124]

1. Association For Aid And Development (AAR), Japan

2. Action Contre la Faim (ACF)

3. Adventist Development and Relife Agency (ADRA – Myanmar)

4. Association Francois Xavier Bagnoud (AFXB)

5. Association of Medical Doctors of ASIA (AMDA)

6. Aide Medicale Internationale (AMI)

7. Artsen Zonder Grenzen / Medicins Sans Frontieers – Holland (AZG/MSF (Holland))

8. Bridge Asia Japan (BAJ)

9. CARE – Myanmar

10. Capacity Building Initiative (CBI)

11. Grameen Trust

12. Groupe de Recherche et d’Echanges Technologiques (GRET)

13. Humanitarian Dialogue

14. Karamosia

15. Malteser Germany

16. Medicins du Monde (MDM)

17. Marie Stopes International (MSI)

18. MSF (France)

19. MSF (Switzerland)

20. OISCA

21. Pact / Myanmar

22. PARTNERS

23. Population Council

24. Population Services International (PSI)

25. Save the Children Japan (SCJ)

26. Save the Children Fund (SC-UK)

27. Save the Children Fund (SC-USA)

28. SWISSAID

29. World Concern

30. World Vision

31. International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)

32. International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (The Federation)

DONORS

Amount: Total aid to Burma in 1999 was US$56 million[011] .

Prior to 1988, Burma received almost USD400million per annum in ODA. ODA fell dramatically in the wake of the violent coup, the regime’s refusal to accept the results of the 1990 general election and increasing human rights abuses.

donor/Government Policies

Pro-Sanction:

Governments withholding aid to Burma are motivated by concern over human rights abuses and the oppressive political situation in Burma and seek to pressurise the SPDC into political change. They agree that international pressure is the effective way to support democratic change in Burma. They are also not convinced that aid under conditions perpetrated by the regime will be effectively delivered.

European Union (EU)

In a press release on 8 October 2001, upon extension of the Common Position on Burma, the Council stated it was prepared to provide 5 million euros (approximately US$4.86 million[125]) for individual HIV/AIDS programmes in Burma, under the auspices of specifically chosen INGOs and UN agencies. This was identified as a “positive measure designed to recognise the process that has been set in motion in Burma/Myanmar in expectation of further positive developments.”[126] The money is likely to be available by the end of 2002. In September 2001, the European Union granted 2.2 million euros (approximately US$2.14 million) for aid projects.[127]

The EU has stated it is eager that there be consultation with all relevant parties, including the NLD, and that aid reaches the people directly.[128] There needs to be more far-reaching concrete progress before the common position can be altered.

EU guidelines particularly pertinent to Burma:

In the strategy on helping the world’s poor one of the political guidelines is “ownership of the process must lie with the developing countries themselves and involve maximum participation of civil society representatives.”

Human rights are protected by a clause “allowing for trade benefits and development co-operation to be suspended if abuses are established.”[129]

United Kingdom, DFID

United States of America (US)

The US administration announced on 15 May 2002, just after the release of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi from house arrest, that it is willing to give approximately US$1 million for HIV/AIDS. The administration is working with Congress on plans to deliver assistance “through UN agencies or independent NGOs that are not connected to the military regime”. USAID stopped sending aid to Burma in 1988. The administration demands more far-reaching and concrete progress before the position on sanctions can change.

Pro-engagement:

Claim there are signs of political progress in Burma and that ‘engagement’ will be the catalyst for further change. Considering his praise of Japan’s aid,[130] it appears UN Special Envoy Razali is supportive of this position. Many critics consider the motivations of these ‘engaging’ governments to be more economic than philanthropic.

Japan

· over US$21 million[131] per annum, Burma’s largest aid donor.[132]

· approved grant of JPY3.5 billion (US$28 million) ODA for repairs to the Baluchaung dam – the largest official development assistance (ODA) since 1988. Highly controversial project. There are strong indications that Japan would have proceeded without the release of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi.

· Japanese Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, 1 July 2002, signed agreement to extend scholarship and aid programmes as part of a 3-year IT programme. The scheme provides Japanese IT training in Burma and scholarships to study in Japan.[133]

· Over JPY6.3 million (approx. US$52,000) for a micro hydro-power plant in Taw Bya Gyi village, Bago division. A Grassroots Grant Assistance programme monitored by Adventist Development & Relief Agency, intended to provide electricity to villagers. Initial completion date April 2002, reportedly delayed by adverse weather.[134]

Australia

· AUD6.2 million (approx. USD3.27 million) granted for HIV/AIDS, child health and basic health programmes, along with other Burma-related projects.[135] Increase of approximately 50% compared to last year.

· MOU signed on 5 July 2002 for initial stage of first financial assistance from AusAID (Australian govt overseas aid agency) to Burma for HIV/AIDS programme. Pilot schemes will focus on harm reduction with injecting drug users in Shan and Kachin States. MOU with the Central Committee for Drug Abuse Control. Developed with ASEAN Secretariat, and will distribute US$4.5 million between Burma, Vietnam and Yunnan Province in China.[136] Bertrand Mendis, Chairman of the joint UN plan for combating HIV/AIDS in Burma visited Australia just before MOU.

· Human rights workshops, funded by Premier Oil, will continue despite there being no significant improvement in the human rights situation. Daw Aung San Suu Kyi has likened this initiative to “the fox looking after the chickens.”

Multilateral Organisations

In the wake of shrinking bilateral assistance, the UN has become the largest source of aid, mainly humanitarian. At present, 68% of ODA is channelled through UN agencies operating in the country.[137]

The “no aid” lobby is concerned that increased humanitarian aid is the thin edge of the wedge to open up the possibility of grants and loans from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. IFIs assistance would go directly to the SPDC, thus delaying or suspending the possibility of positive reforms while increasing debt.

World Bank: [138]

1981/82 Fund-supported programmes stopped

1987 new loans stopped

2 Sep 1998 all credits placed on non-accrual status as repayments were overdue by more than 6 months.[139]

Asian Development Bank (ADB):

1986 stopped loans

1987 stopped technical assistance

current: After the release of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, it was announced there were prospects of aid increases.

Corporate

Premier Oil (UK):

2000, 2001 Save the Children Fund (USA)

Australian Human Rights workshops

Unocal:

July 2002: part sponsored – along with the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue and the Swiss based International Institute for the Rights of the Child (IDE).[140]

2000: Save the Children (US)

Total:

donated money for a cleft-palate surgery.

APPENDIX II: POLITICAL & NATIONAL RECONCILIATION

by Dr. Chao-Tzang Yawnghwe

______________________________________________________________________

With dialogue and national reconciliation looming, albeit at an indeterminate distance, questions have been asked about the difference between Political Reconciliation and National Reconciliation. Is there a difference?

In essence and in the conceptual, they are not different because reconciliation means to bring people or forces divided by interests and ideology, and which have moreover taken up contradictory or opposing positions, together. Reconciliation also implies seeking a middle or a common ground, based on compromise.

In context however, political reconciliation, narrowly defined, might in Burma mean reconciliation between ethnic Burmese (or Burman) protagonists – for e.g., between Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD on the one hand, and the ruling generals on the other.

Whereas national reconciliation might, in the same context, mean arriving at a settlement to resolve the conflict between the non- Burman ethnics – the ethnic nationalities (Mon, Karen, Shan, Chin, etc.) – and the state, dominated largely by ethnic-Burman military men (since 1962).

In a sense, national reconciliation is broader, especially in the Burma context. It is, in a lot of ways, a search for a formula and ideology of national unity that will provide all people of Burma with freedoms to contribute to the well-being and development of the country, and develop local communities, ethnically or otherwise defined.

Political Reconciliation, Narrowly Defined

It would seem that political reconciliation could be more easily affected among ethnic-Burman, comprising the majority, because “blood is thicker than water”, and that nothing would change in such an instance for the non-Burman ethnic nationalities. That is, the ethnic nationalities will continue to be oppressed by a reconciled Burman entity, and the Burmanization policy would still be implemented.

On second thought, this view can be regarded as too simplistic. Where power or power contestation is concerned, power is power, and ethnic affiliations become irrelevant. If we look at politics in non-democratic, but homogeneous, states and countries, there is as much intra-ethnic violence in situations where there are fierce contestations for power.

The military coup in Burma in 1962 was immediately challenged by mainly ethnic-Burman student leaders. This was followed by successive anti-military protests till the mid-1970s. In 1988, thousands of ethnic-Burmese rose up to protest military rule and were mercilessly mowed down by the military’s massed fire-power. What mattered was power, pure and simple, nothing else.

The conflict among ethnic-Burmans is intensely political as it is essentially about power, and as importantly, it is about how power is exercised and by whom, and who is excluded and put at the mercy of power-holders. The majority of ethnic-Burmese are determinedly opposed to the military holding exclusive power and their arbitrary and selfish use of said power at the expense of the many.

The pertinent question then is: Is political reconciliation between ethnic-Burmese on the basis of “blood being thicker than water,” possible or likely?

The answer would be ‘yes’ if the majority of ethnic-Burman and their leaders, including Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, were reconciled to living under the oppressive rule of the military for several more decades. That is, they will have to give up all freedom, rights, individual dignity and human (democratic) values to continue the oppression of ethnic nationalities. The oppression by one ethnic nation of another is not cost free, on the contrary it does not benefit anyone. Oppression is very expensive for the oppressor nation and for the whole country, as the history of independent Burma starkly shows.

But will some sort of compromise not be necessary between the ethnic-Burmese – one may ask, for the sake of political reconciliation? Certainly, but not exclusive of national reconciliation, broadly defined.

National Reconciliation, Broadly Defined

National reconciliation, as earlier stated, is broader than political reconciliation, as it applies to the relation of the state with, in particular, the various or many ethnic segments that make up the whole country. National Reconciliation is at the core of Burma’s problems as well as an integral part of the solution.

Burma in the modern or post-1948 sense, rests on the Panglong Accord signed in February 1947 between the AFPFL (Anti-Fascist People’s Freedom League) led by U Aung San and Shan princes and leaders of the Frontier Areas. Panglong represents the union of territories -- i.e., of Ministerial Burma and the Frontier Areas. Pyidaungzu, the Burmese word for the Union means a “coming together of national states.” The aim of Panglong was to jointly win freedom of Ministerial Burma and the Frontier Areas from British rule, and the main principle involved was the autonomy or freedom of all the national states of the Pyidaungzu, i.e., a union that is federal in form.

The founding principle of modern Burma, the Panglong Spirit, has yet to be honoured, although lip-service has been regularly and routinely paid to it by successive military juntas. The restoration of the Panglong Spirit lies therefore at the core of national reconciliation for this spirit not only represents the founding principle of Burma, but is the key to the reconciliation of all the ethnic segments and people of Burma, i.e., political reconciliation broadly defined.

In the Burma context, National Reconciliation and Political Reconciliation are two sides of the same coin, and one merges into the other.

Given, however, the large gap between significant political stakeholders in Burma – the National League for Democracy (NLD) led by Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, the SPDC, and the ethnic nationalities – on how Political and National Reconciliation is to be achieved, the question of compromise, i.e., who will concede what in the interest of generations to come, must be seriously considered by the current leaders of Burma. The future lies in their hands.

The future does not lie in a vacuum. What Burma will become must be decided here and now, by the actions, political skills the intellectual maturity, and the wisdom of the present crop of leaders.

Appendix III: Myanmar: a silent humanitarian crisis in the making

______________________________________________________________________

(Text only)

UNITED NATIONS

Office of the Resident Coordinator, Yangon, Union of Myanmar

Reference: ORG/130/1/1 (RC/UNCT)

30 June 2001

Myanmar: a silent humanitarian crisis in the making

Myanmar is on the brink of a humanitarian crisis. At a time when economic sanctions against Iraq are being redesigned and when the world is reaching out to reintegrate North Korea into the wider international community, we, the members of the UN Country Team (UNCT) in Myanmar, wish to bring to your attention our deep concern over Myanmar’s humanitarian situation. We summarise our critical concerns below:

· Estimates in the UNAIDS “Report on the Global HIV/AIDS Epidemic” of June 2000 reveal a figure of over 530,000 HIV infected persons in Myanmar as of the end of 1999. During the past twelve years, over 26,000 HIV sero positive cases have been identified of which 3,500 were confirmed as AIDS. A recent analysis of data available in the country covering the last three years indicates that the Human Immuno-deficiency Virus has moved into the general population.

· Official figures of net enrolment and retention rates of school-age children reveal that only half of the Myanmar children aged 5 to 15 years old complete the primary cycle. Based on these figures, it is estimated that 25% of children never enrol and, out of those who do, only one third are able to complete the full 5-year cycle of primary schooling. Furthermore, approximately one quarter of the children in the 10-14 age group (about 1.25 million children) are engaged in paid work and there is a growing number of “street children” concentrated in urban areas. This is further aggravated by the plight of thousands of children and women who have become the victims of cross-border human trafficking with neighbouring countries.

· Maternal health, tuberculosis and malaria are major concerns in the country. The Maternal Mortality Ratio (MMR) is high with estimates ranging between 230 and 580 per 100,000 live births. It is estimated that about half of maternal deaths are due to complications resulting from unsafe abortions. Almost one quarter of Myanmar babies are born underweight, with long-term nutritional implications. By the time children reach the age of 5, one in three is moderately to severely malnourished. This is compounded by the fact that about 3.6 million children and 1.1 million pregnant women live in areas considered to be at high or moderate risk for malaria transmission. Furthermore, the country is estimated to have no less than 81,000 new cases of tuberculosis annually. To date only a limited proportion of the population has had access to drugs for proper treatment.

· Economic activity has slowed down – with high inflation and wide fluctuations in the value of the local currency since January 2001, as well as contraction of real public expenditure on basic services. This inflicts further hardship on the poor.

Under these critical circumstances, humanitarian assistance to Myanmar is a moral and ethical necessity, as well as an obligation of the international community. To deny the people of Myanmar basic humanitarian assistance not only causes unnecessary suffering in the short-term, it also has long-term negative implications.

The cost of neglecting assistance will be substantially higher if delayed, as the magnitude of problems escalates (e.g. HIV/AIDS), human capital disintegrates (e.g. increasing illiteracy, low completion rates in primary school), natural resources diminish and disparities widen (e.g. among geographical regions and among ethnic minorities). Delayed assistance may also have an escalating effect on the illicit narcotic business, resulting in negative social impact within Myanmar and in the region, as well as on other transnational problems, such as human trafficking, illegal migration and population displacements. The current peripheral or piece-meal assistance provided to Myanmar is not adequate to reverse or even slow down certain negative trends. Nor is it sufficient to decrease economic and social disparities, which pose a potential threat to internal and regional peace and security.

While recognising that fundamental change of domestic policies is necessary to fully address the above challenges, accelerated and efficient delivery of humanitarian assistance will have positive short-term effects by alleviating suffering and maintaining a minimum standard of well-being. It will also be conducive to longer-term fundamental change in Myanmar. Indeed, strengthening human capital, developing leadership capacity, and encouraging a more dynamic civil society will contribute to laying the foundations for democratic processes.

However, the fact remains that Myanmar has very limited access to Official Development Assistance (ODA) and does not benefit from assistance from the International Financial Institutions. As a result, the population’s needs are only marginally addressed by restricted humanitarian assistance mostly provided through the UN system. The total annual ODA currently provided to Myanmar is about US$l per capita compared with US$35 for Cambodia and US$68 for Laos (1997 figures). This very low level of ODA fails to uphold the minimum threshold to cover basic humanitarian needs.

In addition, governing bodies of some UN organisations have laid down specific caveats that limit their ability to deliver full assistance in accordance with their global mandates and their assessment of the country’s needs. Nevertheless, UN organisations operating in Myanmar make the utmost effort to address the most crucial humanitarian issues in a co-ordinated and collaborative manner, within the above-mentioned financial and modus operandi constraints.

As an immediate response to the above, we, the members of the UN Country Team, have selected three important areas for consultation and common action based on our assessment of the country situation. These areas are HIV/AIDS (where action is already underway through the UN Joint Plan of Action), illicit drugs and food security. They are by no means exclusive of future joint action in other areas. Furthermore, this initiative is part of a larger process that includes a continued UN humanitarian assessment of the country, and dialogue with the international community.

This common approach must be viewed as in the context of Myanmar’s political environment that forms the backdrop for all humanitarian assistance to this country. However, the nature and magnitude of the humanitarian situation does not permit delaying until the political situation evolves.

In addition, UN organisations operational in Myanmar working effectively to address the most urgent needs could contribute significantly to the ongoing work of the UN Secretary General’s Special Envoy, Mr. Ismail Razali, and the UN Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar, Mr. Paulo Pinheiro, as well as to the work of the ILO.

Taking into consideration the need to accelerate humanitarian interventions, we, the members of the UN Country Team in Myanmar, have decided to take steps to actively contribute to change and to pursue this matter with the support of our respective headquarters and the international community. We therefore appeal for your support to attain the following:

1. a dramatic overhaul of the budget allocations for Myanmar within the UN system, and an increased effort for a concerted advocacy strategy to expand ODA to Myanmar through the UN system;

2. a consistent approach related to the mandates of the respective UN organisations active in Myanmar;

3. a cohesive approach between the activities of the UN organisations operational in Myanmar and the political and normative initiatives launched from within the UN system, as well as a close anticipatory consultation between both;

4. a presentation of the complex humanitarian situation in Myanmar to the UN organisations’ constituencies.

It is our earnest hope that all possible and appropriate action may be taken to address this situation urgently.

With our very best regards,

(signed)

UN Resident Coordinator, Patrice Coeur-Bizot

UNICEF Representative, John B. Mendis

WFP Chief of Operations, Bradely B. Guerrant

UNFPA Country Director, Sheila Macrae

UNDCP Representative, Jean-Luc Lemahieu

UNHCR Chief of Mission, Rajiv Kapur

FAO Representative, Francis Rinville

WHO Representative and UNAIDS Theme Group Chairperson, Agostino Borra

UNDP Deputy Representative (Programme), Renata Lok-Dessallien

Appendix IV: DCI ASSociates – spdc’s newest weapon

______________________________________________________________________

The military regime signed an agreement with lobbyists DCI Associates 2 days prior to the release of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, according to documents filed by DCI Associates with the Justice Department. DCI's main contact in the SPDC is Lt-Gen Khin Nyunt, head of the military intelligence (MI). The contract is for one year, ending May 15, 2003. Negotiations between the 2 parties began in April 2002, after the regime made contact with DCI through undeclared ‘‘mutual relationships’’, according to DCI official, Charles Francis.[141]

The value of the contract is US$450,000 plus a retainer of US100,000 plus expenses, to be paid by monthly wire transfers of US$35,000. NOTE: The total value of the contract - US$550,000 - is over 18 times the SPDC’s 1999 budget for HIV/AIDS!

The ‘SPDC’ campaign’

According to a DCI official, the campaign’s first focus is to win greater assistance to fight HIV and drugs.[142] In crude terms, the campaign’s goal is “to begin a dialogue on political reconciliation and humanitarian issues affecting Myanmar and US relations, with goal to ultimately normalize relations”[143] – read roll back sanctions and increase humanitarian assistance and other aid. It is bizarre that the regime is willing to spend over half a million dollars on political dialogue with the US, while avoiding dialogue with its own people that won’t cost it a kyat.

Methods:

To improve diplomatic relations between the US and Burma, DCI has stated it will meet with congressional and administration officials. The focus will be on “trade policy, the war on drugs, war on terrorism, human rights, public health, HIV/AIDS and promotion of democracy.”[144] DCI will “work with members of Congress and the administration to begin a dialogue on political reconciliation and humanitarian issues.”[145]

Bibliography

______________________________________________________________________

Alexander Downer, Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs (14 May 2002) Australia's aid budget: Promoting growth and stability in the Asia Pacific region, AA 02 024

Altsean-Burma (Jul 02) Rangoon Suspense, Report Card, Dec ‘01 – Mar ’02

Altsean-Burma (Apr 02) Some Talk, Little Action; special report, Bangkok

Amnesty International (17 Jul 02) Myanmar: Lack of Security in Counter-Insurgency Areas, ASA 16/007/2002

Article 19 (Mar 99) Acts of Oppression: Censorship and the law in Burma, Article 19, London

Aung San Suu Kyi, General Secretary, National League for Democracy, video message (first aired 7 Aug 02) produced by Altsean-Burma in support of The Free Political Prisoners in Burma Campaign

Aung San Suu Kyi, General Secretary, National League for Democracy, video message on humanitarian assistance (2002) Altsean-Burma

Aung San Suu Kyi (Aug 02) miscellaneous Q&A, released by Altsean-Burma

Aung San Suu Kyi, General Secretary, National League for Democracy, audio message (19 Jul 02) 10th Anniversary of DVB, copied by NCGUB-Bkk Office

Aung San Suu Kyi, General Secretary, National League for Democracy, video message (17 Jul 02) Burma Campaign UK

Aung San Suu Kyi, General Secretary, National League for Democracy (1999) foreword, NGO forum in USA, 24 May 1999

Beyrer, Chris (1998) War in the Blood: Sex, Politics and AIDS in Southeast Asia, White Lotus, Bangkok, Zed Books Ltd., London & New York

Burma Ethnic Research Group (Sep 00) Internal Displacement in Burma; in Disasters 24(3), pp228-239

Burma Office, Australia (1999) NGOs in Burma: Partnership with a military regime and contributing to civil fragmentation, a submission to CAA (Community Aid Abroad) for their investigation into the establishment of projects inside Burma

Boutros-Ghali, Boutros (1992) An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping, New York: United Nations

Concerned Individuals (20 Jul 02) Statement on International Assistance to Burma, signed by 13 persons

ENSCC (2002) The New Panglong Initiative: Re-Building the Union of Burma

European Commission (1996) Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development, Communication from the Commission of 30 April 1996

EU (Mar 01) The European Union and the World www.deltha.cec.eu.int/eu/eu_global_player/2.htm

Fink, Christina (2001) Living Silence: Burma Under Military Rule, Zed Books, London & New York; White Lotus, Bangkok; The University Press Ltd., Dhaka

Forum-Asia, news alert (21 Aug 02) Thai Authorities Raided Ethnic And Democratic Groups, Sunai Phasuk

Galtung, Johan (1976) Three Approaches to Peace: Peacekeeping, Peacemaking, and Peacebuilding, in: Galtung, Johan (ed.) Peace, War, and Defense: Essays in Peace Research. Volume II, Copenhagen: Christian Ejlers, pp. 282-304

ICRC (15 Mar 02) Myanmar – Field Activities in January 2002

ICRC (22 Jan 02) The ICRC in Myanmar

International Crisis Group (ICG) (2 Apr 02) Myanmar: The Politics of Humanitarian Aid, ICG Asia Report No.32

International Labour Organisation (ILO), High Level Team (HLT) (Nov 01) GB282/4

Kuloy, H. K., Chairperson Norwegian Burma Council (Jun 99) Current Status of NGO Strategies and the Limitation: Engagement vs. Hard-line, paper presented at the Forum of democratic Leaders in the Asia-pacific (FDL-AP) Meeting, Seoul

Lancaster, Warren (18 Apr 98) The Code of Conduct: whose code, whose conduct? in Journal Of Humanitarian Assistance www.jha.ac/articles/a038.htm

Liddell, Zunetta (1999)_ No Room to Move: Legal Constraints on Civil Society in Burma, in BCN/TNI ed. Strengthening Civil Society in Burma, pp.54-68

Mekong Watch (15 Dec 01) Development, Environment and Human rights in Burma/Myanmar ~ Examining the Impacts of ODA and Investment, Public Symposium Report, Tokyo

Mekong Watch (2001) Findings on the situation in Karenni State, Burma (esp. near Baluchaung Hydropower Station, No.2), Tamaki Ohashi

Mendis, Bertie, UNICEF (24 Jul 01) speech delivered at the Signing Ceremony of the UNICEF-Myanmar master Plan of Operations, 2001-2005

NCGUB (27 Mar 02) Position on HIV-AIDS in Burma

NCGUB, Burma UN Service Office (13 Feb 02) Briefing paper on the human rights situation in Burma 2002, For the 58^th Session of the UN Commission on Human Rights, resolution on ‘the human rights situation in Myanmar’

NCGUB, undated, Memo: Humanitarian Aid

NDD (Aug 02) The plot unfolds to transform the Fire Brigade into the stooges of the dictators

The People’s Tribunal on Food Scarcity and Militarisation in Burma (Oct 99) Voice of the Hungry Nation, Asian Human Rights Commission, Hong Kong

Permanent Mission of the Union of Myanmar (28 Mar 02) Statement by His Excellency U Mya Than, Permanent Representative and Leader of the Myanmar Observer Delegation to the 58^th session of the Commission on Human Rights on the oral presentation by His Excellency Professor Paolo Sergio Pinheiro under Agenda Item 9, Geneva

Pinheiro, Paulo Sergio, Special Rapporteur on Human rights (10 Jan 02) Report on the situation of human rights in Myanmar to UNCHR, in accordance with resolution 2001/15, Fifty-eighth session, Item 9 of the provisional agenda E/CN.4/2002/45

Shan Human Rights Foundation (SHRF), Shan Women’s Action Network (SWAN) (May 02) Licence to Rape: The Burmese military regime’s use of sexual violence in the ongoing war in Shan State

Smith, Martin (1996) Freedom of Expression and the Right to Health in Burma, Article 19, London

Strategy Co-ordination Committee (Jan 02) The Decisions of the Strategy Co-ordination Committee, Meeting on Thai-Burmese border, 18-20 January 2002; in ENSCC (2002) pp19-22

Statement by five ethnic groups (15 May 02) on the release of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, signed by Shan National League for Democracy, Mon National Democratic Front, Zomi National Congress, Karen National Democratic Congress, Arakan League for Democracy.

Terry, Fiona (2000) Condemned to Repeat? The Paradoxes of Humanitarian Action, Canberra, Australian National University/Department of International Relations, Dissertation

UNICEF Myanmar (Apr 01) Children and Women in Myanmar: Situation Assessment and Analysis

UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan (1-25 Jul 02) Strengthening of the coordination of emergency humanitarian assistance of the United Nations, Background Information, Draft, General Assembly 57^th Session, Item 21(a) of the preliminary list, Item 5 of the provisional agenda

UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan (18 Mar 02) Question of the violation of human rights and fundamental freedoms in any part of the world, Report of the Secretary-General on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, submitted pursuant to general Assembly resolution 56/231, Commission on Human Rights, 58^th session, Item 9 of the provisional agenda, E/CN.4/2002/35

US Committee for Refugees USCR (Apr 00) No Way In, No Way Out: Internal Displacement in Burma, Washington

World Bank (2000) World Bank Report on Burma

Yawnghwe, Harn, Director Euro-Burma Office (8 Dec 01) The Non-Ethnic Peoples of Burma; in ENSCC (2002) pp29-32

Resources from Altsean-Burma

______________________________________________________________________________

1998 Jun Book: Burma ~ Voices of Women in the Struggle. 116pp. US$10

1998 Jul Report Card: Burma’s Regime on the Edge. 40pp. $5 [p-copy only]

1999 Jan Report Card:The Burma Junta Grits its Teeth. 68pp. $5 [p-copy only]

1999 Apr Report Card:The Stakes are Raised in Burma. 60pp.$5 [p-copy only]

1999 Apr Report Card:The Situation of Women in Burma. 20pp.$5 [p-copy only]

1999 Aug T-Shirt (Multilingual): “COURAGE”. US$15 ea.[US$400 for 40]

1999 Aug Badge (Bilingual): “COURAGE”. US$10 for 10

1999 Sep Burma Special Report: The Committee Representing the People’s Parliament (CRPP). A5, 32pp. Gratis

1999 Sep Report Card:Looming Crackdown. A5, 56pp. Gratis

2000 Jan Report Card:New Hope, Old Reality. A5, 56pp

2000 Apr Special Briefing: Women’s Report Card on Burma 2000. 36pp. $5

2000 May Report Card:Consequences of Violence. A5, 40pp. Gratis

2000 Jun Book: Burma ~ More Women’s Voices. 108pp. US$10

2000 Sep Report Card:Stand Off!. A5, 40pp

2001 Mar Report Card:Tentative Steps. A5, 80pp. Price $5 each

2001 Jun Special Briefing: Women’s Report Card on Burma 2001. 36pp. US$5

2001 Jun Poster: What Women of Burma Want! A2. Price $5 for 5

2001 Jun T-Shirt: “Burma: Asean’s Shame” US$15/40 for US$400

2001 Sep Report Card: Still Waiting. A5, 66pp. Price $5 each

2001 Oct Report Card: Burma’s Plea. A5, 80pp. Price $5 each

2001 Dec T-Shirt (Multilingual): “Free Aung San Suu Kyi” US$15/40 for US$400

2002 Jan POSTER: ALTSEAN-BURMA ACTIVISTS’ CALENDAR 2002. A2. Gratis.

2002 Mar Report Card: Labor Pains. A5, 64pp. Price $5 each

2002 Apr Special Report: Some Talk, Little Action, Burma’s Secret Talks. A5, 60pp. Price $5

2002 Apr POSTER: Burma – Prison State! A2. Gratis.

2002 Jun Book: Burma ~ Women’s Voices for Change. 116pp. US$10

2002 Jul Report Card: Rangoon Suspense. A5, 60pp. Price $5 each

2002 Sep Report Card: New Page, Old Story. A5, 68pp. Price $5 each

2002 Oct Special Report: A Peace of Pie? Burma’s Humanitarian Aid Debate. A5, 84pp. Price $5 each

Please fax (662 693 4939) or email <[email protected]> to order

Note: This is not a complete list of resources produced by Altsean-Burma.

About altsean ~ burma

______________________________________________________________________

The Alternative Asean Network on Burma (Altsean-Burma) is a network of diverse organisations and individuals based in Asean member states working to support the movement for human rights and democracy in Burma.

We were formed at the conclusion of the Alternative Asean Meeting on Burma held at Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok, in October 1996.

Our activities are focused on supporting the movement for human rights and democracy in Burma within the context of Asean. In doing so, we also work to strengthen the human rights and democratization agenda in Asean. While our focus has been on Burma, we have worked with our partners to support human rights causes within the region.

We regard the political participation of women as an essential element of democracy and therefore incorporate this approach into our work.

Visit the Burma Online Library

at www.burmalibrary.org

to access thousands of online documents

on diverse Burma-related topics.

---

[1] Boutros-Ghali (1992) para.15

[2] NCGUB (2000)

[3] Razali Ismail, UN Special Envoy For Myanmar (16 May 02) Press Conference

[4] see Altsean-Burma (Apr 02)

[5] UN Secretary-General (18 Mar 02) para.5

[6] A briefing paper presented by the NCGUB (13 Feb 02) at the 58^th Session of the UN Commission in Human rights advocated ways in which the talks develop into irreversable political dialogue.

[7] ICG (2 April 2002) Myanmar: The Politics of Humanitarian Aid, ICG Asia Report No. 32, pi

[8] Alexander Downer, Minister For Foreign Affairs (14 May 02) Australia's aid budget: Promoting growth and stability in the Asia Pacific region, AA 02 024; http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/6686f45896f15dbc852567ae00530132/2758c87fe5af6064c1256bbb00342bc0?OpenDocument

[9] Aung San Suu Kyi (1999)

[10] Razali, written statement; quoted in Bangkok Post (7 Aug 02) Razali says talks ‘soon’

[11] UN Wire (21 Aug 02) Myanmar: Suu Kyi "Cautiously Optimistic", interview with Steve Hirsch, www.unwire.org

[12] see Aung San Suu Kyi (19 Jul 02), (2 Aug 02); comments by U Lwin, NLD spokesperson in Bangkok Post (8 Aug 02) Suu Kyi sets terms for talks, front page

[13] Pinheiro (10 Jan 02) paras.110, 111

[14] Aung San Suu Kyi (19 Jul 02)

[15] For the diverse bodies of the democracy movement to reach a consensus on aid is not easy. Consensus has been obstructed over the years by the divide and rule policies of successive military regimes, political restrictions including imprisonment, and lack of freedom of information - to begin to describe just the tip of the iceberg. However, significant steps have been taken to overcome these barriers. Diverse groups of Burman and ethnic nationalities have formed alliances and are engaging in dialogue addressing topics such as humanitarian assistance, national reconciliation and the long-term peace of Burma.

[16] ICG (2 Apr 02) p7

[17] Concerned Individuals (20 Jul 02)

[18] Myanmar Times (8-14 Jul 02) Myanmar Takes Lead Role in ASEAN Chamber, Vol.7, No.123

[19] SPDC Information Sheet, Rangoon (6 May 02) Turning of a New Page N0. C- 2200 (I/L)

[20] Christian Science Monitor (13 May 2002) Burma's slow freedom push, Dan Murphy

[21] Aung San Suu Kyi (7 Aug 02)

[22] see Altsean-Burma, press release (19 Sep 02) The Burmese Military regime’s murderous anniversary

[23] ABFSU-FAC, Press Release (20 Aug 02) A group of students were arrested in Rangoon

[24] Irrawaddy (18 Jun 02) Students sentenced to death; DVB (17 Jun 02) Two student protestors jailed for seven years

[25] SPDC Information Sheet, Rangoon (6 May 02) Turning of a New Page N0. C- 2200 (I/L)

[26] see NCUB Secretariat & Presidium Board (31 Jul 02) Statement of the Joint Meeting 2/2002

[27] VOA News, Singapore (3 Jun 02) Senior Burmese Diplomat Urges West to Ease Sanctions on Rangoon, Geraldine Goh

[28] see SHRF, SWAN (May 02)

[29] Myanmar Times (4 June 02) Myanmar Responds to US Move by calling for Encouragement

[30] Strategy Co-ordination Committee (Jan 02) p19

[31] see Liddell (1999) for legal orders oppressing civil society in Burma

[32] Smith (Jul 96) p1

[33] NDD (Aug 02)

[34] personal contact, July 2002

[35] Burma Office (1999) p8

[36] Altsean-Burma (Jul 02) pp39-40

[37] According to a long-time Burma observer, the regime has no intention in talking with ethnic groups as they want to ‘win’, not ‘give in’. Any step made towards peace is a dodged one, it is not genuine. The KNU believes this is true of the regime’s recent ‘Arms for Peace’ proposal. (August 2002)

[38] Armed opposition groups also have a responsibility to protect civilians by not violating their security and human rights.

[39] Bangkok Post (4 Aug 02) More mines by the minute, Perspective, Suthep Chaviwan, p6

[40] Pastor Robert, Chairman of the Karen Relief Committee; cited in Bangkok Post (4 Aug 02) More mines by the minute, Perspective, Suthep Chaviwan, p6

[41] Dr Cynthia (Feb 02)

[42] Bangkok Post (17 Aug 02) Kraisak panel hears abuse reports

[43] Amnesty International (17 Jul 02) p2. Tatmadaw means army in the Burmese language.

[44] UNICEF Myanmar (Apr 01) pp61-62

[45] Dr Cynthia (Feb 02)

[46] Myanmar Times (22-28 Oct 01) Food scarcity will never be a problem, assures Secretary-1, Vol.5, No.86, P3

[47] The People’s Tribunal on Food Scarcity and Militarisation in Burma (Oct 99) p.ix

[48] Dr Cynthia (Feb 02)

[49] Survivors of the slaughter of a Karen village along the border on 29 April 2002 fled to find refuge in Thailand. (Bangkok Post (4 Aug 02) Terror came at night, Perspective, Phil Thornton, p4)

[50] UNICEF Myanmar (Apr 01) pp112-113

[51] Pinheiro (28 Mar 02)

[52] While an ASEAN Joint Communique stated, “the Myanmar government had also taken concrete legislative, executive and administrative actions to prohibit forced labour,” all expert opinion and reliable human rights sources contradict this. (10-11 May 01, 15^th Labour Ministers Meeting, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia)

[53] Permanent Mission of the Union of Myanmar (28 Mar 02)

[54] Permanent Mission of the Union of Myanmar (28 Mar 02)

[55] Dr Cynthia (Feb 02)

[56] for the regime’s boasting of hospitals see http://www.myanmar.com/build/hospital/hos.html

[57] Irrawaddy (Mar 99) NGOs in Burma: “No-Good Outsiders”? Vol.7, No.3

[58] UNICEF (Apr 01) p81

[59] Review of the Financial, Economics and Social Conditions for 1997/98; cited in UNICEF (Apr 01) p22

[60] NCGUB, Burma UN Service Office (13 Feb 02)

[61] Only Sierra Leone was ranked lower.

[62] NCGUB, Burma UN Service Office (13 Feb 02)

[63] UN Secretary-General (1-25 Jul 02) para.33, p11

[64] Dr Cynthia (Feb 02)

[65] EU (Mar 01) The European Union and the World www.deltha.cec.eu.int/eu/eu_global_player/2.htm

[66] Burma Office (1999) p9

[67] see Fink (2001) p182

[68] see Article 19 (Mar 99)

[69] see Beyrer (1998), Smith (1996)

[70] Smith (1996) p9

[71] Aung San Suu Kyi (17 Jun 02)

[72] Purcell (1999) p82

[73] In his January 2002 report, Pinheiro spoke of 2 incidents where NGO staff were detained (para.113)

[74] Burma Office (1999) p11

[75] Persons who have shared statistics with the persons in the international community, on HIV/AIDS, for example, have been dismissed from their jobs. (NCGUB (27 Mar 02))

[76] INGO staff in Rangoon, quoted in (Irrawaddy Dec 01, Inside INGOs: Aiding or Abetting? Vol.9. No.9, Cover Story)

[77] INGO staff, quoted in (Irrawaddy Dec 01)

[78] for update and political discussion see Energy Compass (23 Aug 02) US: California Scheming, Jim Washer

[79] ICG (2002) p3

[80] ICG (2 Apr 02) pi

[81] Smith (1999) p48. Cease-fires have failed to provide real solutions, and damaging discrimination on the basis of ethnicity continues and results in intensified division among communities. The regime has done nothing to bring the people in Burma together but has instead divided the people through ‘divide and rule’ policies, the most systematic being used to build rifts between ethnic nationality groups.

[82] Mekong Watch (2001)

[83] The benefits of the repairs are doused in controversy, see Mekong Watch publications.

[84] Broadly speaking the regime considers helping IDPs as part of the problem. Under the ‘Four Cuts’ policy, the regime has actively created IDPs by driving people from their homes and cutting off support networks in order to weaken the ‘terrorist’ armed opposition groups they are charged to support. Indicative of the regime’s lack of political will to address the suffering of IDPs is the recent agreement made between the Burmese and Thai authorities – at the former’s initiation – that means those providing services along and across the border are under increased scrutiny. (see Bangkok Post (19 Aug 02) Border talks set for next month, front page; ForumAsia, news alert (21 Aug 02) On Thursday, 29 August 2002, 8 Italian volunteer doctors and nurses were arrested in Tak province. (Sunai Phasuk (2 Sep 02) News Update: Thai-Burmese Border Situation) This can only have adverse affects on IDPs accessed by cross-border teams. If the regime were truly interested in the well being of the people of Burma it would not jeopardise the process of humanitarian assistance in this way. [Bangkok Post (19 Aug 02) Border talks set for next month, front page; ForumAsia, news alert (21 Aug 02)]

[85] The Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2

[86] in USCR (Apr 00) pp23-24

[87] Burma Ethnic Research Group (Sep 00)

[88] UN Secretary-General (18 Mar 02) para.14

[89] UN Secretary-General (1-25 Jul 02) para.11,p5

[90] Purcell (1999) p96

[91] Irrawaddy (Dec 01, Inside INGOs: Aiding or Abetting? Vol.9. No.9, Cover Story

[92] Aung San Suu Kyi (1996)

[93] Pinheiro (10 Jan 02) para.110

[94] Aung San Suu Kyi (19 Jul 02)

[95] There is forced relocation of the Wa into areas of Shan State which then forcibly displces the Shan who have no place to go, forcing many to cross the border into Thailand. Information regarding infrastructure projects in Wa areas was gained through personal contact with a religious leader in the area, August 2002.

[96] ICG (2 Apr 02) p20

[97] Irrawaddy (Dec 01) Inside INGOs: Aiding or Abetting? Vol.9. No.9, Cover Story

[98] Dr Cynthia Maung (Feb 02)

[99] The ICG (2 Apr 02) report suggests that when humanitarian aid has results, legitimacy becomes peripheral. (p15, ftnt.58)

[100] Burma Ethnic Research Group (Sep 00)

[101] Aung San Suu Kyi (1999)

[102] Hsao Tai; speech transcribed in Mekong Watch (15 Dec 01) p18, 19

[103] ILO, HLT (Nov 01) GB282/4 para.55

[104] Mekong Watch (15 Dec 01) pp15-16, Mekong Watch (2001)

[105] UN (30 Jun 01)

[106] www.msf.org/content/index.cfm?indexid=F7767938-C5FE-11D4-B1FE0060084A6370 (Sep 02)

[107] UN Wire (21 Aug 02) Myanmar: Suu Kyi "Cautiously Optimistic", interview with Steve Hirsch, www.unwire.org

[108] UN Secretary-General , 1-25 Jul 02, para.11,p5; author’s emphasis

[109] see also SPDC, Myanmar Information Committee, Rangoon (5 Jul 02) Information Sheet, No.C-2274 (I/I)

[110] Bangkok Post (17 Aug 02) Kraisak panel hears abuse reports

[111] Myanmar Times (29 Jul – 4 Aug 02) Government rejects claims on Muslim’s rights, Thet Khaing, Vol.7, No.126, p3

[112] SWAN (10 Aug 02) Statement of concern regarding international assistance to Burma

[113] EU (Mar 01) The European Union and the World www.deltha.cec.eu.int/eu/eu_global_player/2.htm

[114] Purcell (1999) p85

[115] Myanmar Times (22-28 Jul 02) Education stipend introduced, Vol.7, No.125, p5

[116] quoted in Mekong Watch (15 Dec 01) p15

[117] Pinheiro (10 Jan 02) para.113

[118] Purcell (1999) p85

[119] Purcell (1999) p85

[120] Mendis, UNICEF (24 Jul 01)

[121] Aung San Suu Kyi (Aug 02)

[122] Aung San Suu Kyi (19 Jul 02)

[123] ICG (2 Apr 02) p21

[124] Pinheiro (10 Jan 02) para.112

[125] exchange rate is US$1:1.03 euro (18 Sep 02)

[126] EU, Press release (8 Oct 02) Burma/Myanmar: Council conclusions (General Affairs Council 08/10) Luxembourg

[127] Myanmar Times (1-7 Oct 01) European Union gives $2.2m for aid projects, Vol.5, No.83

[128] European Union, General Affairs Council (8 Oct 01) Burma / Myanmar: Council conclusions http://www.deltha.cec.eu.int/en/news_2001/gac_8_october.htm

[129] EU (Mar 01) The European Union and the World www.deltha.cec.eu.int/eu/eu_global_player/2.htm

[130] Irrawaddy (Dec 01) Inside INGOs: Aiding or Abetting?

[131] exchange rate at US$1:JPY121.84 (18 Sep 02)

[132] AFP (21 Jul 02) Japanese aid to Myanmar remains stable this financial year; Myanmar Times (22-28 Jul 02) JICA commits US$21 million in aid to Myanmar, Myo Theingi Cho, Vol.7,No.125, p5

[133] Myanmar Times (8-14 Jul 02) Japan extends assistance for IT project, Vol.7, No.123, p3, Moe Zaw Myint

[134] Myanmar Times (8-14 Jul 02) Micro hydro-electric power plant, Vol.7, No.123, p4, Nwe Nwe Yin

[135] Myanmar Times (17 - 23 Jun 02) Australian aid to help fight AIDS, Vol.6, No.120, Thet Khaing

[136] Myanmar Times (8-14 Jul 02) Australian government provides funding for campaign on AIDS, Vol.7, No.123, Nwe Nwe Aye

[137] Pinheiro (10 Jan 02) para.109

[138] World Bank, IMF, IDA (11 May 01) International Monetary Fund And The International Development Association, HIPC Initiative—Country Implementation Status Notes http://www.worldbank.org/hipc/hipc-review/51101A-Country_Implement_Status.pdf

[139] The World Bank Group (4 Sep 98) World Bank Places Credits to Union of Myanmar in non-accrual status, News Release No.99/1930/EAP http://www.worldbank.organisation/html/extdr/extme/1930.htm

[140] Myanmar Times (15-21 Jul 02) International seminar addresses children’s rights, Vol.7, No.124

[141] Reuters Washington DC (31 May 02) Firm lobbies with US for more sops to Myanmar government

[142] The Washington Post (31 May 2002) Burma Moves to Improve Relations with US: Ruling Junta Hires Lobbying Firm of GOP Strategist to Press for Normalization, Glenn Kessler <www.wahingtonpost.com> 23 July 2002

[143] The Washington Post (31 May 2002)

[144] DCI filings with the US Justice Department, quoted in The Washington Post (31 May 2002)

[145] The Washington Post (31 May 2002)

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[01]Galtung, highly respected Professor of peace studies, identifies peacebuilding as ensuring an absence of structural violence.

[n2]For example see Teddy Buri in Mekong Watch and Ko Soe Aung in July update and analysis

[z3]Steinberg (1999) p12

[z4]UN Working Group on Human Development

[05]A key lesson is that there can be no transition to development without the involvement and participation of the community and local structures and institutions.

UN General-Secretary , 1-25 Jul 02, para.58, p19

[n6]Burma Office 1999, p11

[z7]of JPY628 million (approximately US$5.2 million[1])

[z8]Considering the regime is one of the main causes and exacerbaters of the humanitarian situation,

[09]Personal contact Aug 02 & BRC personal contact, Burma Trip to Rangoon, Pa-an, Moulmein report (22 Jul – 4 Aug 02)

[010]The Christian Science Monitor (13 May 2002) Burma's slow freedom push, Dan Murphy

[011]IMF, in ICG 2 apr 02 p16