Burma/Myanmar: How to read the generals' "roadmap"
- a brief guide with links to the literature
by David
Arnott
The seven-step “roadmap” to disciplined democracy announced by Gen. Khin Nyunt
on
(1) - Reconvening of the National
Convention that has been adjourned since 1996.
(2) - After
the successful holding of the National Convention, step by step implementation
of the process necessary for the emergence of a genuine and disciplined
democratic system.
(3) - Drafting of a new constitution
in accordance with basic principles and detailed basic principles laid down by
the National Convention.
(4) - Adoption of the constitution
through national referendum.
(5) - Holding of free and fair
elections for Pyithu Hluttaws (Legislative bodies) according to the new
constitution.
(6) - Convening of Hluttaws attended
by Hluttaw members in accordance with the new constitution.
(7) - Building a modern, developed and
democratic nation by the state leaders elected by the Hluttaw; and the
government and other central organs formed by the Hluttaw.
Introduction
This guide is not so much an analysis – political, legal or other -- of the “roadmap” as an introduction to some of the elements, in particular the National Convention process[1], which the “roadmap” is based on. For analyses, see Roadmaps/National Convention in the Online Burma/Myanmar Library. This guide has a limited scope and makes three main points:
* The first and most crucial stage of the "roadmap" announced
by Gen. Khin Nyunt on 30 August 2003 is the re-launch, scheduled for May 17
2004, of the 1993-1996 National Convention, and there is no indication
by Burmese military spokesmen that the
resumed Convention will differ substantially in structure or procedure from its
earlier form;
* The abundant commentaries and documentation on the 1993-1996 National Convention apply equally to this stage of the "roadmap";
* International, regional and national actors should take these into account when assessing the "roadmap" and developing their policies.
A frequent comment on the “roadmap” is that details are lacking. If, however,
as seems likely, the reconvened National Convention follows its 1993-1996 pattern, we actually know a great deal about the first,
crucial step of the “roadmap” by way of documentation and commentary.
The present guide sets the “roadmap” within this process, itself a stage in the events which followed the collapse of the Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP) in 1988, the coming of the SLORC[2], the 1990 elections and their aftermath. The guide:
1) Provides a chronology and documentation of the shifting positions of the Burmese military from 1988 onwards with regard to handing over power to the party which won the elections -- from the 1988 promise of unconditional transfer of power, to the NLD’s apparent exclusion in August 2003 from any authority or responsibility at all deriving from the electoral mandate of 1990;
2) Provides introductions and hyperlinks to a substantial collection of commentaries and documentation on the National Convention process, which the “roadmap” is intended to complete (something not denied by the SPDC[3]);
3) Recommends that international, regional and national actors recognise the “roadmap” as an integral part of the National Convention process and that they study the purpose, principles and procedure of the whole process when developing their policies.
1.
Chronology and documentation
As documented in the Chronology of statements by Burmese military spokesmen on multi-party elections, constitution-drafting, the National Convention, transfer of power etc..[4] the Burmese military has adopted a number of positions since 1988 regarding the powers to be assumed by the party which won the multiparty election. The positions shifted from:
* an unconditional undertaking in 1988 to transfer power to the party which won the multiparty elections; to
* the 1989 to mid-1990 statements that the elected representatives could and then should and then (after the election victory of the NLD) must first draft a new constitution;
* the June 1989 Information Committee statement, strengthened and developed after 27 May 1990, that the new constitution must be approved by the whole nation;
* the
* SLORC Declaration No. 1/90 of July 27, 1990 (see footnote 9) delivered by Gen. Khin Nyunt on 27 July 1990, which stated that the elected representatives were “those who have the responsibility to draw up the constitution of the future democratic State”, a constitution which would, however, have to be “firm” and “drawn up according to the desires and aspirations of the people” (the National Convention would subsequently be announced as the setting in which these desires and aspirations would be expressed). No mention is made of transfer of power to the party which won the elections.
* the decision, announced in late 1990[5] and proclaimed in 1992, to convene a National Convention which, as the supporting documents of this guide demonstrate, pre-defined the structure and content of the proposed new constitution;
* the key requirement (unilaterally decreed by the military in October 1992, three months before the first meeting of the National Convention) that one of the “objectives” forming the framework of “the basic principles for the drafting of the Constitution of the State at the National Convention” must be the “participation of the Tatmadaw [the Burmese military] in the leading role of national politics of the State in (the) future”;
* the September 1993 requirement that the constitution to be drafted by the elected representatives be based on these “basic principles” (“the 104 Principles”) which were, in effect, drafted by the military via its National Convention;
* the 1994-1996 drafting of “Detailed Basic Principles” by the National Convention – “principles” so detailed as to leave no discretion for further drafting and to amount, within the chapters completed, to the text of a draft constitution;
* the “roadmap” of
Thus, from firm promises in 1988 that the victors in the multiparty elections would be able to form a government, with no conditions attached, the generals gradually, from 1989 (in terms which were frequently contradictory, vague and ambiguous[6]) introduced more and more conditions on transfer of power until, after the elections, the victors' role was reduced to constitution drafting until this too, in the “roadmap”, dropped off the agenda.
The conditions, which emerge one by one, mainly after
1) A new constitution must be drawn up before power can be transferred
2) This constitution must follow certain principles, to be drafted by a National Convention
3) The whole nation must approve the constitution
4) The government to which power is ultimately to be transferred must be strong (it is not stated who will decide what is “strong”).
The conditions may be considered under two headings:
A. Conditions for taking office
B. Conditions for drafting a new constitution
A. Conditions for taking office
A new constitution
The first reference I have found to a new constitution is in Gen. Ne Win’s speech to the Extraordinary Congress of the BSPP
of 23 July 1988 in which, presenting the option of multiparty elections, he
said that: “The Hluttaw elected thus, can write the Constitution and other
necessary laws according to its own wishes…”. Then on
A strong government based on a new constitution as a condition for transfer of
power
The language began slowly to
change in mid-1989 with a somewhat ambiguous statement during a SLORC
Information Committee press conference on
Then, in an apparent reversion to the 1988 position, the SLORC Information Committee
stated on 17 November 1989 that “…the Tatmadaw will do all it can to assist the Election Commission so that it can
hold the free and fair multi-party democracy general election. All the service
personnel including the Tatmadaw members can cast their votes on their own free
will. After the election is held
according to law, State power will be
duly handed over…”
From then I have found no clear statements on the subject until
This argument varied little in the following months and years: e.g. at a
meeting of the Election Commission of
What changed after the election was the body to which
power would be transferred. As late as
For an alternative reading of the degree to which the SLORC made its
conditions for transfer of power public in advance of the 1990 elections, see
Derek Tonkin's thoughtful study, The 1990 Elections in
B. Conditions for drafting a new constitution
I have seen no substantial military statement from 1988 to the NLD election
victory that anyone other than the elected representatives would have input into
a new constitution. As late as May 1990, for instance, at the SLORC press
conference of
Following the NLD election victory, however, we see the onset of a barrage
of statements on the need for a nation-wide consultation, e.g. “Constitution
concerns not only a party or a group but also the people of entire nation and
thus it must be the one accepted by the entire national people." (Maj-Gen. Tin Oo,
These views were to be solicited by means of an exercise announced by then
Foreign Minister U Ohn Gyaw
to the UN General Assembly on
Thus, under the rubric of “soliciting the wishes and views of the people” the NLD, having been denied Executive, Judicial and the rest of the Legislative powers saw even its diminished role as Constituent Assembly whittled away through the emerging National Convention, a SLORC-controlled constitution-drafting exercise where the party found itself in a permanent minority.
The National Convention process
Phase 1 – 1993 to 1996
The National Convention process is the central mechanism whereby the NLD’s “responsibility to draw up the constitution of the
future democratic State” (Declaration 1/90) was progressively eroded until,
in the “roadmap” announced on
The National Convention was formally proclaimed by SLORC Declaration
11/92: Convening of the National Convention [9] , first convened on
The key objectives of the National Convention were stated to be:
1) Non-disintegration of the
2) Non-disintegration of National Solidarity;
3) Consolidation and perpetuation of Sovereignty;
4) Emergence of a genuine multi-party democratic system;
5) Development of eternal principles of justice, liberty and equality in the
State; and
6) Participation of the Tatmadaw [the Burmese military] in the leading role of
national politics of the State in (the) future.
These
objectives – No. 6, for political dominance by the military, being the key one,
and the one which produced the most resistance - were set out in SLORC Order 13/92: Formation
of the Convening Commission for the National Convention [10] of
Phase 2 – 2003 to ?
(the "roadmap")
That these Principles are at the heart of the present "roadmap" is
clear from Gen. Khin Nyunt's
(1) - Reconvening of the National Convention that has been adjourned since 1996.
(2) - After the successful holding of the National Convention, step by step implementation of the process necessary for the emergence of a genuine and disciplined democratic system.
(3) - Drafting of a new constitution in accordance with basic principles and detailed basic principles laid down by the National Convention.
(4) - Adoption of the constitution through national referendum.
(5) - Holding of free and fair elections for Pyithu Hluttaws (Legislative bodies) according to the new constitution.
(6) - Convening of Hluttaws attended by Hluttaw members in accordance with the new constitution.
(7) - Building a modern, developed and democratic nation by the state leaders elected by the Hluttaw; and the government and other central organs formed by the Hluttaw.
For the full text of the General's speech, see Adjourned National
Convention to be reconvened; New Constitution will be drafted [13] Points 1-3 refer
specifically to the National Convention. Point 3 openly states that the new
constitution will in accordance with the “basic principles and detailed
basic principles laid down by the National Convention” which, if the texts
adopted by the 1993-1996 National Convention are retained, ensure a
military-dominated State, and points 4 and 5 were already mentioned in a 1994
briefing by Brig. Gen. David Abel to a group of Japanese businessmen: "Myanmar's
new constitution will be adopted by a referendum, and general elections will be
held in accordance with the new charter… " Kyodo,
In the months following the announcement of the “roadmap”, various SPDC Declarations and Orders were issued announcing the members of the National Convention committees. Though some members are civilians, these are largely government officials and others associated with the regime while the rest, including the Chairs and Vice-Chairs, are serving military officers. None of the members are elected representatives. See Changes in the assignment of duties in the National Convention Convening Commission [15] Assignment of members of National Convention Convening Commission [16] Reformation of National Convention Convening Work Committee [17] and
The State Peace and
Development Council (Order No 13/2003): Reconstitution of the National
Convention Convening Management Committee [18]
There has as yet been no announcement about any changes in the Discipline,
Rules and Regulations – whose restrictive and oppressive nature was a
major cause of alienation among the delegates to the 1993-1996 sessions. See SLORC restrictions on
delegates to the National Convention [19]. Nor has there been any indication that
the Anti-Subversion Law will be repealed. See SLORC Law No.
5/96 of June 7 1996: The Law Protecting the Peaceful and Systematic Transfer of
State Responsibility and the Successful Performance of the Functions of the
National Convention against Disturbances and Oppositions [20]
In fact, nothing that the SPDC has said so far about its "roadmap" suggests that it will deviate from the 1993-1996 National Convention route. The identity of the first step of the "roadmap" with the National Convention process was further demonstrated at a seminar in Rangoon on 26-28 January 2004 when U Khin Maung Win, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs, stated, in his presentation, "Myanmar Roadmap to Democracy: The Way Forward", that "the formulation of the State Constitution will be based on the following six objectives" – including the 6th one, which gives political supremacy to the military - and went on to present the objectives set out in SLORC Order 13/92, followed by the 15 National Convention chapter headings (the agenda of the National Convention) and the 104 "Principles laid down to serve as bases in prescribing State Fundamental Principles" - Myanmar Road to Democracy: The Way Forward [21] . Other descriptions of the “roadmap” which confirm its identity with the National Convention process may be found in Reports on mass rallies in support of the 7-point roadmap from “The New Light of Myanmar” [22]
Any act of stripping the NLD of the authority mandated by the people would of course be diametrically opposed to the consistent affirmations expressed in the consensus resolutions of the United Nations that “the will of the people is the basis of the authority of government and that the will of the people of Myanmar was clearly expressed in the elections held in 1990" -- See Language on the 1990 elections and transfer of power in Burma taken from the resolutions of the UN General Assembly and Commission on Human Rights [23]
One central factor not stated by the “roadmap” is, after the National
Convention has ended, who will actually draft the new constitution. The
Detailed Basic Principles are so detailed as to leave little room for further
drafting. This has led some observers to consider the National Convention as a de facto constituent assembly. The third
step of the “roadmap”, however, the drafting of a new constitution, is placed
as a separate stage, after “the
successful holding of the National Convention” and will presumably be carried
out by another body. What body is not stated, though SLORC Declaration 1/90 of
Step one: Reconvening of the National Convention
that has been adjourned since 1996:
a. Regarding the procedures, categories and proportions of delegates, committee structures etc. in the reconvened National Convention: will those of the 1993-1996 Convention be retained in full, amended or scrapped? And who will decide?
b. Regarding the “6 objectives”, the “104 Principles” and the seven completed chapters of “Detailed Basic Principles”: will they be retained in full, amended or scrapped? And who will decide?
Step two: After the successful holding
of the National Convention, step by step implementation of the process
necessary for the emergence of a genuine and disciplined democratic system.
a. What does this mean in concrete terms?
Step three: - Drafting of a new constitution in accordance
with basic principles and detailed basic principles laid down by the National
Convention.
a. Since the “roadmap” places this step after the completion of the National
Convention, what body will act as the Constituent Assembly? According to Declaration 1/90 of
b. Question b. on step one applies here also.
Steps
2.
Commentaries on the National Convention process
* The principal extended commentary is Janelle Diller's
seminal 1996 report[24] The National Convention
in Burma (Myanmar): An Impediment to the Restoration of Democracy [25]
“The report's specific findings about the SLORC's current actions are the following:
Supplanting the Electoral Mandate. The SLORC
has consistently refused to convene the parliamentary assembly elected in 1990,
despite repeated requests by the landslide victor, the National League for
Democracy (NLD). The NLD made its most recent request on
Obstructing Genuine Dialogue. The SLORC
government has roundly rebuffed any calls for genuine negotiations, even from
highly respected elders in the country, with the NLD and its leader Daw Aung
San Suu Kyi and ethnic minorities' representatives. Consistently, the SLORC has
offered the unrepresentative National Convention as the only forum for dialogue
regarding
Dismantling Political Structures and Suppressing Independent Activity. SLORC has used the now three-year old National Convention as a means to gain time to methodically suppress independent political activity. Since the elections in 1990, the SLORC has systematically nullified the elected status of nearly 25 percent of the winners in the 1990 elections, and has de-registered more than 80 percent of the parties that participated in the 1990 elections. The results have left gaping holes in the membership of a yet-to-be convened parliamentary assembly (Pyithu Hluttaw), and only 10 of 93 political parties that contested the elections are still functioning lawfully. In addition, a governmental policy of retaliation in the form of arrests, detention, denial of educational and economic benefits, and violent threats have chilled most independent attempts at political expression and association.
Ensuring Permanent Military Control over Law and Politics. Over
objection by elected representatives, the SLORC has required that all
constitutional principles being drafted at the Convention conform with six Convention objectives, one of which is to provide a
leading role for the military in the political life of
(extract from the Overview and summary)
* The United Nations resolutions on the situation of human rights in
Myanmar have made regular comments on the National Convention - see Language
on the National Convention in UN General Assembly and Commission on Human
Rights resolutions [26]
Contrary to the National Convention/“roadmap” process, which sets aside the
results of the 1990 elections, the United Nations General Assembly in its
annual Burma resolutions has, since 1991, consistently upheld the results of
those elections, urging the Government of Myanmar "to take all
necessary steps towards the restoration of democracy, fully respecting the will
of the people as expressed in the democratic elections held in 1990"
(A/RES/47/144 of 1992 at GA 1992: Resolution on
the situation in Myanmar [27]
) and affirming that "the will of the people is the basis of the
authority of government and that the will of the people of Myanmar was clearly
expressed in the elections held in 1990" (A/C.3/58/L.68/Rev.1 of 2003
at GA 2003: Resolution
on the situation of human rights in Myanmar [28]) Similar resolutions have been adopted by the
Commission on Human Rights.
* The Special Rapporteurs
on the situation of human rights in
* The Inter-Parliamentary Union, the world's
most authoritative body on parliaments and constitutions, has dismissed the
National Convention as a device to frustrate the democratic process, and at its
October 2003 session extended this assessment to the "roadmap":
"[The Inter-Parliamentary Union] … Expresses serious doubts about the
recently presented "road map", step one of which suggests that the
National Convention be reconvened; reaffirms its conviction that the National
Convention is designed to prolong and legitimise
military rule against the will of the people, as expressed in the 1990
elections, and thus stands in direct opposition to the principle enshrined the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights that the ‘will of the people shall be the
basis of the authority of government’"; (para
20 of Inter-Parliamentary
Union (Geneva, October 2003): Myanmar [30]
* See The National Convention (commentaries, chronologies etc.) [31] for several more texts
3. International and regional actors
should assess the "roadmap" by examining the National Convention
process.
If, as seems likely, the resumed National Convention follows the procedure and structure indicated above, then we can learn a lot about the first step of the "roadmap" from the proceedings of the National Convention at The National Convention (preparations, procedures, proceedings, legislation, official statements etc.) [32] The National Convention (texts of Principles) [33] and elsewhere, and from the various analyses by international bodies and legal authorities which can be found, for instance, at The National Convention (commentaries, chronologies etc.) [34]
International and regional actors, some of whom are taking the "roadmap" seriously as a possible way forward for Burma/Myanmar, should therefore make a careful study of this material and allow it to inform their policies.
Email [email protected]
The present document is online (easier to follow the links) at http://www.ibiblio.org/obl/docs/how10.htm
[1] This guide uses the term “National Convention process” to include the planning, legislation and other aspects of the process such as the “roadmap” which precede or succeed the actual National Convention which began in 1993 and was adjourned in 1996.
[2] The State Law and Order
Restoration Council, which took power on
[3] The State Peace and Development Council – the re-named SLORC (from 1997)
[5] e.g. in then Foreign
Minister U Ohn Gyaw’s
[6] The rather breezy statements of then Head of State, Sr. Gen. Saw Maung, contain very little in the way of pre-conditions for transfer of power. In contrast, the statements of Gens. Khin Nyunt and Tin Oo and the Information Committee, especially after the 1990 election, are much more guarded and packed with conditions.
[7] WPD
= The Working People’s Daily, the regime’s daily English-language
newspaper, subsequently re-named The New Light of
[24] For the International League of Human Rights and Rights and Democracy.