HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH/ASIA
July 1995 Vol. 7, No. 10
BURMA
Entrenchment or Reform?
Human Rights Developments and the Need
for Continued Pressure
I. SUMMARY
3
Summary of Recommendations 5
II. THE PATTERN OF ABUSE 6
Political Prisoners 7
The Political Process 9
The National Convention 11
Forced Labor 14
Discrimination Against Minorities 16
III. HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES DURING COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS 20
The Renewed Offensive in the Karen State 21
The Offensive Against Khun Sa 23
IV. THE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE 25
The United Nations 25
China 26
India 28
The Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) 28
Japan 30
The United States 32
V. RECOMMENDATIONS 33
To the State Law and Order Restoration Council 33
To the International Community 34
APPENDIX I 37
APPENDIX II 40
I. SUMMARY
"It is not yet the end. There is still a long way to go and the way might be very, very hard. So please stand by...Don't think we are there home and dry."[1] - Aung San Suu Kyi
The release of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi on July 10, 1995,
a day before the end of her period of detention under Burmese law, was a welcome
move on the part of the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC).
Her release comes after years of international pressure on the SLORC, including five resolutions by the U.N. General
Assembly and appeals from numerous governments, including the
It is perhaps too early to say which road it will
take, but it is certainly far too early to reward the SLORC with further
investment and bilateral or multilateral assistance. "Of course, in the
long run I think we would need international investment, but I don't think we
should rush into this...I want to study the situation carefully before I can
say whether I truly believe that this is the right time for investment,"
said Daw Suu, speaking to the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) on July
12, 1995. The SLORC itself has highlighted the linkage between rising
levels of international investment and the failure of international efforts to
bring an end to abuses. David Abel,
Although some western countries always cite
human rights or democracy, these tools have not been effective because if you
look at the amount of investment, the
Indeed, while other members of the National League for
Democracy (NLD)—the political party Daw Suu founded—have been free to meet with
Daw Suu at her home, and the crowds gathering outside her house have thus far
faced no harassment, no other political prisoners have been released. Human Rights Watch/
Even though Daw Aung San Suu Kyi
has been released, the overall human rights situation in
The international community has long recognized that
the detention of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi was only
one in a long list of abuses which the SLORC has been called on to
address in successive U.N. resolutions. On
Summary of Recommendations
Human Rights Watch/Asia believes that following the release of Daw Suu, there are several
steps that the SLORC must take in order to improve the human rights situation
in
We urge the international community to respond to the release of Daw Suu by engaging in dialogue with
SLORC about what specific steps they will take to implement the U.N.'s
resolutions, while at the same time initiating direct, ongoing contacts with
Daw Suu in order to discuss the human rights situation, and strongly supporting
the efforts of the U.N. secretary-general.[10] Any
talks with SLORC should not take place without parallel discussions with Suu
Kyi regarding the human rights situation in
These measures should include, for example, a freeze on all future private investment until and unless forced labor in Burma has ended; continued suspension of bilateral assistance and a clear statement from the donor countries of the World Bank that multilateral assistance cannot be resumed until basic human rights and political reforms are undertaken and verified; a decision by the International Labor Organization (ILO) to conduct a Commission of Inquiry into forced labor; and a concerted effort to stigmatize China for its role as SLORC's major arms provider.
In addition, the international community should
closely monitor developments in Burma triggered by Daw Suu's
release and should respond promptly and vigorously to any attempts
by SLORC to intimidate, harass, detain or restrict the activities of Burmese
citizens (including Daw Suu's party members and
supporters) seeking to exercise their internationally recognized rights of
freedom of association, expression and assembly. The U.N. Commission on
Human Rights should urgently consider dispatching its Special Rapporteur for
Since 1990 Human Rights
Watch/Asia has documented an ongoing pattern of abuses in Burma, including arbitrary
detention, denial of the right of freedom of expression and association as well
as the right of citizens to participate in their government and choose their
own leaders, forced labor, abuses of humanitarian law in the course of military
operations against insurgents, and discrimination against ethnic minorities.[12] The
United Nations Commission on Human Rights has also taken note of the nature and
severity of these abuses. Since 1990, the U.N. Economic and Social Council has mandated a Special Rapporteur on
This international scrutiny has achieved some results,
most clearly in the release of Daw Suu and over 2,000 other political prisoners
since 1992. Reports from the Special Rapporteur and U.S. Representative
Bill Richardson, who were able to visit recently arrested political prisoners
in 1994,[14]
would suggest that there has been a
decrease in the torture of political prisoners in the first days and weeks of
detention, at least in Rangoon. Interviews with refugees and escaped
porters conducted by Human Rights Watch/Asia in
early 1995 suggest that in the
Political Prisoners
"It seems anyone who has contact with diplomats is being arrested, and the only ones left now are the elderly." - Diplomat [16]
Daw Aung San Suu Kyi was the most prominent political
prisoner in
There are many other political prisoners in
Even as these releases occurred, there have been more
arrests. On
Many of those still in detention are believed to have
been sentenced under Article 17/1 of the 1957 Unlawful Associations Act.[28] Under
this article, any association or group can be declared unlawful by the
government, including not only the armed ethnic opposition but also political
parties, student unions, professional groups and Buddhist monk
associations. In November 1989, the SLORC published a list of some
associations considered unlawful, which included the Kachin
Independence Organization (KIO), the Karen National Union (KNU), the New Mon
State Party (NMSP) and the Karenni Nationalities Progressive Party (KNPP).
While cease-fires have been agreed between the SLORC and the KIO (February
1994) and the KNPP (March 1995), bringing them into "the legal fold,"
there has been no formal revocation of their status as unlawful associations,
and their members and supporters continue to face arrest. By contrast, eight groups representing the ethnic
The Political Process
Shortly after taking power on
Sixteen members of parliament elected in 1990 remain in detention.[33] All of them were elected to represent the NLD and its allied parties, and are among a total of eighty-three elected representatives who have been detained in Burma since 1990. The majority were arrested in late 1990 and charged under Sections 122, 122-1 and 124 of the Penal Code (high treason) for their part in attempting to force the SLORC to transfer power by establishing a parallel government. They were tried and sentenced in summary trials in closed courts, often inside prisons, under martial law provisions in violation of their right to a fair trial. Having been sentenced, in July 1991 the MPs were stripped of their positions by SLORC Order 4/91, which states that anyone convicted of "moral turpitude" or offenses relating to law and order "ha[s] no right to continue to be a People's Assembly representative."[34] Furthermore, a second decree was issued on the same day stating that anyone convicted of those offenses "shall have no right to stand for election as a People's Assembly candidate in elections to be held in the future".[35]
By means of these laws, Burma's most able politicians, many of whom were members of the NLD, have been denied the right to participate as actors in the political process. In addition to the eighty-three elected representatives, there are the hundreds of students, teachers, lawyers, doctors, peasant leaders and others arrested for their political beliefs since 1988 who will not be permitted to stand for election in the future. In a further move to restrict political freedom, many of those political prisoners who were released since April 1992 under Order 11/92, and all of those released under Section 104 (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedures were forced to sign papers saying that they would not take part in politics. Since being released, three MPs-elect have been re-arrested. Two of them, U Khin Maung Swe and U Sein Hla Oo, were arrested in August 1994. Two months later they were sentenced to seven years' imprisonment under Section 5(e) of the Emergency Provisions Act for "writing and distributing false news that could jeopardize the security of the state." Three other political activists arrested at the same time received sentences of between seven and fifteen years.[36] The third MP, U Kyi Maung, was released in March after spending five years in jail. He was taken in for questioning on June 2, along with five others, but was reported to have been released on June 8. Press reports of his detention suggested that he was arrested for meeting with foreign diplomats.[37]
The National Convention
"[I]t is difficult to assume that, in the National Convention, open and free exchange of views and opinions are taking place in order to produce a truly democratic constitution." - U.N. Special Rapporteur.[38]
The ongoing National Convention has been billed by the SLORC as a representative body to draw up the principles of a new constitution, under a which a new election will be held and the military will then transfer power to the new government. Despite repeated calls in U.N. resolutions for the SLORC to give a timetable for the convention, there is still no sign of the convention coming to an end, two and a half years after the process began. It appears that the SLORC may prolong the convention until it has secured cease-fire agreements with all the armed ethnic rebels and has gained some popularity at home through improvements in the standard of living of the small but influential middle class. The proceedings of the convention reveal how closely it is controlled by the SLORC and how it is in fact the SLORC that is writing the constitution.
In May 1992, exactly two years after the election, the SLORC announced the formation of the Coordination Meeting for the Convening of the National Convention, to be guided by a steering committee headed by a SLORC member and Rangoon division army commander, Myo Nyunt. For two months this committee discussed how the National Convention would work and who would attend. In January 1993 the convention finally opened with 702 delegates, of whom only 106 were elected representatives. All of the rest were either hand-picked by the SLORC to "represent" workers, peasants, intellectuals, national races and service personnel or were "specially invited persons." In accordance with Announcement No.1/90, the SLORC stated that the convention would only be drawing up the "principles" of a new constitution, and the final draft would still be written, as promised, by the elected representatives. Moreover, the principles discussed by the delegates had to conform with the "objectives" of the convention, as defined by the SLORC, which included the "participation of the Tatmadaw [armed forces] in the national political leadership role of the State in the future."[39]
To further control the process of the convention, the SLORC established strict rules for delegates to the convention which effectively prevent free discussion, even within the convention hall. All papers presented at the convention are censored by the National Convention Convening Committee (NCCC)[40] and the discussions which take place within the convention on a day-to-day basis are not reported to the public. While the convention is in session, the delegates have to live in dormitories and are only allowed to leave the Kyaikkesan compound with official permission. The political parties have complained that they are also not allowed to discuss the proceedings and their own party policy with other members of their parties.[41] While some of the martial law provisions of 1988 and 1989 have been repealed,[42] there has been no formal repeal of paragraph (b) of SLORC Order 2/88 which forbids gatherings of more than five people. In August 1993 an NLD representative, Dr. Aung Khin Sint, and his colleague U Than Hla were arrested for disseminating speeches delivered to the convention. They were sentenced to twenty and fifteen years' imprisonment respectively, though Dr. Aung Khin Sint has since been released.[43] Others have reported harassment and obstruction of NLD delegates; in one case a delegate was prevented from buying a train ticket from the Shan State to attend a session and had to make his way on foot and by bus.[44]
Given these restrictions on discussion within the convention, it is not surprising that a clear pattern has emerged from the four full sessions that have been held since January 1993. Each session has opened with a speech by a member of the NCCC in which "suggestions" have been made about the particular chapter under discussion. This speech is reported in the government-controlled media, and the delegates then meet in their respective groups to discuss the suggestions.[45] Some weeks or even months later, the chairman of the NCCC, Myo Nyunt, presides over a plenary session. In three out of the four sessions, the summing-up speech by the chairman, which purports to be the "agreed" principles, has been identical to the opening speech. The only issue which the SLORC failed to push through was the suggestion in June 1993 that the names of the ethnic states which reflect the majority ethnic population in that state (Mon, Karen, Shan, Kachin, Chin and Arakan) be changed to historical Pali or Burmese names.
Underscoring the SLORC's control of the process, Myo Nyunt explained the SLORC's involvement in the convention in April 1995:
To explain the activities of the National Convention, the National Convention Convening Work Committee compiled the proposals presented by the National Convention delegates, scrutinized them, and has always presented them to the National Convention Convening Committee (NCCC) for confirmation. The NCCC in turn will also have to seek the approval of SLORC. The SLORC, which has taken the leadership role and is responsible for the state, will take the appropriate action as deemed necessary to be included in the constitution if the basic principles are in compliance with the policies.[46] (emphasis added)
To date, the "principles" decided on at the convention would create a bi-cameral legislature with a House of Representatives and a House of Nationalities. In both houses, representatives from the armed forces would have a quarter of the seats (110 of the 440 seats in the House of Representatives, fifty-six of the 224 seats in the House of Nationalities). However, it is unclear what powers the two houses will have, as the president of the Union, who must have served active duty as a member of the armed forces, would have ultimate authority on all decisions.
At the session of the convention which began in September 1994, the topic of discussion was the status of ethnic minorities that had no representation under the 1974 and 1947 constitutions.[47] The session continued for six months, an indication of the difficulty of reaching consensus on this issue. On December 8, 1994, the Wa, Kokang and Palaung, who had signed cease-fire agreements with the SLORC in 1989 and who are represented at the convention, formed a new alliance, called the Peace and Democratic Front, in order to press for their common political and economic demands. In a clear challenge to the SLORC, they also agreed to cooperate militarily. Despite this open opposition to the proposals, the concluding remarks of the chairman of the National Convention Convening Work Committee U Aung Toe, in March 1995, were again identical to his opening speech. Groups with more than 0.1 percent of the population in any one area would have "self-administered zones." The Wa, who had called for the creation of a Wa State, would have a larger "self-administered area." In both cases, this designation entitles the groups to one representative in the House of Nationalities. Reports in the government media show that in speeches to the convention, representatives of the minorities to be given "zones" and "areas" voiced dissatisfaction with the proposal, while representatives of political parties called for a population census to take place before proposals could be made which should then be put to a national referendum.[48]
The SLORC claims that the National Convention is a truly representative assembly. But while groups which signed cease-fires after the convention opened have been invited to attend under the "specially invited persons" category, the degree to which they can participate is not clear. The KIO represents a large population in the Kachin State and has an armed force of some 7,000 soldiers, and has refused even to send observers. Others, like the Karen National Union, which have not signed cease-fire agreements, are not invited, and the Muslim Rohingyas, who are a significant minority in the Arakan State, are not recognized by the SLORC as an ethnic group and therefore also have no representation at the convention.[49] Any groups that sign cease-fires in the future, including the New Mon State Party which agreed to a cease-fire on June 29, will have no opportunity to discuss the principles which have been already "agreed" on.
On April 8, 1995, the convention was adjourned by the NCCC; it will not resume until October 24. When it does reconvene, the SLORC is likely to push through the last chapters of the constitution so that a new election can be held. Now that Aung San Suu Kyi has been released, it is unclear what role she and her fellow members of the NLD will be able to play in the writing of the constitution. While the SLORC Announcement 1/90 is still in effect, in the past two years, the SLORC has dropped all reference to the principle that the elected representatives would ultimately be the authors of the new constitution.
In a further move to ensure its political control, the SLORC formed the Union Solidarity and Development Association (USDA) on September 15, 1993. The aims of USDA are those of the SLORC: "1. nondisintegration of the union; 2. nondisintegration of national unity; 3. perpetuation of national sovereignty," with the additions of "4. commission and vitalization of national pride," and "5. emergence of a prosperous, peaceful and modern union." Within months, USDA offices opened across the country, many of them in town halls and government offices. Within a year, USDA officials at the annual general meeting declared that 833,022 people had become members.[50] A large part of this membership came in the form of mass rallies held in January 1994, which civil servants, school children, peasants and others were forced to attend. The objectives of the national convention were presented and "passed" at these rallies by a show of hands, although participants said they did not understand the implications of the "voting."[51]
It is clear from these developments that the SLORC has
used every means possible to manipulate the political process and deny the
citizens of
Forced Labor
"[B]asic rights and democracy must be in harmony with the nature of the country and the people...Thus we are giving priority to create firm infrastructure of basic rights, such as food, clothing and shelter needs. As long as the infrastructure is firm, a super structure of human rights can be built stage by stage." - Sr. Gen. Than Shwe [52]
Forced labor is endemic in Burma. As the SLORC
has opened up the economy to international investors, it has forced civilians
and prisoners to rebuild the country's infrastructure, which was badly
neglected by the previous government. The SLORC claims that these
"development projects" are designed for the long-term benefit of all,
because they will create the infrastructure for improvements in the standards
of living of their people. Human Rights Watch/
The SLORC continues to insist, in the face of all evidence to the contrary, that such labor is "donated" voluntarily by the people as a "noble act of charity." SLORC officials have claimed to be proud of the spirit of the people who are "voluntarily cooperating in the various development projects across the country. These citizens did not even ask for money because they would consider it an insult."[53] It should be noted that the main reason given for this spirit of voluntarism is their common Buddhist culture, in which "the giving of labor is a noble deed and...the merit attained from it contributes to better personal well-being and spiritual strength."[54] However, the 20 percent of the population in ethnic minority areas who are not Buddhist bear the burden of this labor. The SLORC publishes figures of the numbers who have contributed to individual projects. On December 15, 1993 the New Light of Myanmar reported that 921,753 people had contributed to the building of the Pakokku-Monywa railway. More recently, in their submission to the ILO, the SLORC said that "799,447 working people...contributed voluntary labor" on the Aungban-Loikaw railway.[55]
The pattern of forced labor has been documented by Human Rights Watch/Asia since 1990.[56] From the testimony of people who have worked on such projects, it is abundantly clear that coercion and force have been used to make them work. Typically, the local army commander contacts the village headman, or in urban areas the council chairman, who is told to supply labor for a certain section of the road or railway. It is then usually left to the headman to choose which families will work at which times, on a rotating basis. There is no option to choose not to go; the only alternatives to going are to pay heavy fines ("porter tax") or to flee the area. As one woman from the Karen State interviewed by Human Rights Watch/Asia in January 1995 said, "Sometimes we didn't go because we were tired, and they came at night and dragged us from our house. My children were screaming and crying, but I just had to leave them there." Families have to work until the job is finished, which can be up to a month, but most jobs take between ten days and two weeks. In some areas, families have to work on such a basis every month, leaving them little time to earn their living.
Laborers are often subject to further abuse from the soldiers who control the project sites. The old and infirm are particularly vulnerable and have been beaten when they take rests or are thought to be working too slowly. Human Rights Watch/Asia learned from reliable sources in Burma that an old man died from being beaten by an army captain on February 22, 1995, while working on the Rangoon - Kyaukpyu road in Arakan State in southwest Burma. At the same site, twelve others died during December 1994 and January 1995 from fevers that were not treated. Sources in the Kachin State, in northern Burma, in late 1994 reported that some 3,000 people were taken from Putao to work in a very remote area on the Putao-Sumprabum road. After walking for six days to reach the site, they found that the rice supplies which had been promised by the army had not arrived, and they had to walk back. Scores of people died on the journey from malaria and other diseases, exacerbated by a lack of food. Nevertheless, the project has continued, and thousands of people were still working there in May 1995. In the northwest, a recent visitor to the Chin State reported that a woman was killed while working on the Pakokku-Kalemyo railway line after she had stopped working twice to feed her young baby. The woman had been forced to take her baby with her to the site as all her relatives were also working on the railway. In the south, refugee relief workers from the Burma Border Consortium report that two to three families a week continue to arrive at the Thai border in June 1995, escaping forced labor on the Ye-Tavoy railway.
The ILO has investigated the practice of forced labor in Burma under Convention 29.[57] In November 1994 a committee of the ILO found: "[T]he exaction of labor and services, in particular porterage service, under the Village Act and the Towns Act is contrary to the Forced Labor Convention, 1930 (No. 29), ratified by the government of Myanmar in 1955." The committee called on the SLORC to "ensure that the formal repeal of the powers to impose compulsory labor be followed up in practice and that those resorting to coercion in the recruitment of labor be punished."[58] In June 1995, the report of the ILO's Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations investigated the case further and threw out the SLORC's attempts to justify forced labor under the criteria of the convention.
Discrimination Against
Minorities
Peoples of different races and religions should not mix....[O]nly if there is one race and one religion will our country be prosperous and peaceful. - Lt. Gen. Myo Nyunt.[59]
At least one-third of Burma's population, that is, about fifteen million people, belong to ethnic minorities. In addition to the large ethnic groups, the Mon, Karen, Shan, Kachin, Chin, and Rakhine, within which there are dozens of sub-groups, there are also significant populations of immigrants of Chinese and South Asian origin.[60] Whereas the ethnic Burman population is overwhelmingly Buddhist, the ethnic minorities, with the exception of the Shan, Mon and Rakhine, tend to have large Christian or Muslim minorities within them. The degree of integration of ethnic minorities differs greatly but in general depends on geographic location: those minorities based in remote highland areas (many sub-groups of the Karen, the Chin and Kachin) are least integrated and most Christian, whereas the lowland Karens as well as the Mon and the Shan tend to be more integrated. All the ethnic groups have had armed groups which claim to represent them. The coincidence of ethnicity, religion and armed insurgency has meant that allegations of religious persecution or racial discrimination are often combined. Since those ethnic minorities which are also religious minorities live in the remotest parts of Burma, it has also meant that there has been little information about the situation in their areas. Nevertheless, in his report of 1993, the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Religious Intolerance and Discrimination wrote: "[T]he concrete cases concerning the freedom of religion by the members of the Muslim and Christian faiths merits an investigation that would identify the persons, locations and situations concerned, which has not been carried out."[61]
Over the past three years there have been indications of an increasingly intolerant SLORC attitude towards the ethnic and religious minorities, albeit at a time when the government has professed a policy of "national reconciliation." Without going as far as calling Buddhism the state religion, the SLORC has enacted a clear policy to promote Buddhism in Burma, both in order to enhance the legitimacy of the military government and to forge "national solidarity." In response to the 1993 report of the Special Rapporteur on Religious Intolerance, the SLORC claimed that it "is prudent and careful in taking measures so that there is no discrimination against other religious faiths...For this reason, a separate Ministry of Religious Affairs...was established in 1992." The statement did not add that the religious affairs ministry is located in the grounds of the World Peace Pagoda (Kaba Aye) in Rangoon, a compound which also serves as the home of the most senior committee of Buddhist monks, the Sangha Maha Nayaka Committee. Nor did he mention that one of the main functions of the Ministry of Religious Affairs is the propagation of Buddhism, both nationally and internationally, through the publication of Buddhist scriptures and the establishment of Buddhist missionary schools in ethnic minority areas.[62]
The SLORC policy of promoting Buddhism as an essential
facet of being a "true" Burman, has led to discrimination on ethnic
and religious grounds. Human Rights Watch/Asia has received information
concerning incidents of discrimination against Christian ethnic minorities from
the Chin State, northern Sagaing division, and
Mandalay. The
In northern Sagaing division, there have been reports of forced conversions since the arrival of a particularly active army battalion, led by Maj. Khin Soe, in October 1994. The population of this area is largely Naga, the majority of whom are Christian. In December 1994, the people of Konkailon village were ordered to demolish their church and construct a Buddhist monastery in its place. The following month, villagers from Kokailon, Kuki, Nurnitmumpi and Pansat were forced to accept sila (Buddhist vows) from monks who had been brought in by the army to occupy church buildings.
In
Of all the minority groups,
While all Indians are likely to experience
discrimination, the Muslims among them are particularly targeted.[67] In late
1994, the entire Muslim population of a village in Yamethin
township, near
Human Rights Watch/Asia has also received reports of
continuing abuses against Muslims in
• In July 1994, over 500 Muslims from Nga Let village tract in Minbya township, Akyab (Sittwe) division were woken early in the morning by the
army and forced onto boats which took them close to the
• Between November 1994 and February 1995 over 1,500 Muslim villagers from four villages in Mrauk Oo township, Akyab division were similarly taken by boat to Maungdaw.
• In late 1994, 150 households from Min Pya and 350 households from Myo Haung townships were also moved to Maungdaw. [68]
• On
The continuing abuses against Muslims in the
The Rohingyas and all other
ethnic and religious minorities will remain vulnerable so long as they are not
officially recognized as citizens of
III. HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES DURING COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS
"I am gravely concerned at the continued reports of forced porterage, forced labor, forced relocation, arbitrary killings, beatings, rapes and confiscation of property by the army soldiers" - U.N. Special Rapporteur.[75]
Undoubtedly the worst abuses against ethnic minorities
have taken place in the context of
Where fighting continues, abuses by the SLORC consist
of arbitrary arrest and executions of suspected rebels or rebel sympathizers,
attacks on civilian locations, detention of civilians to use as porters, and
forced relocations. Forced portering is the
most widespread of these abuses. In the period between November 1994 and
June 1995, thousands of porters have been taken
to the front line in the offensives against the KNU and the MTA, and hundreds
have died.[77]
Civilians fleeing the fighting in the Karen
state have been attacked in refugee camps in
The Renewed Offensive in the
In December 1994, as
SLORC representatives held discussions about national reconciliation at the
U.N. with officials from the secretary-general's office, preparations were
being made in the
Since the fall of KNU bases in the north, abuses against civilians have continued. Porters described being subject to physical abuse and inhumane treatment from the moment of capture. All but one of the fifty porters interviewed by Human Rights Watch/Asia had been severely beaten by the soldiers when they slipped or fell from exhaustion, and all had witnessed the deaths of fellow porters. As the SLORC and DKBO (who were reported to number around 2,000 troops by June 1995) sought to consolidate their position and move further south to the territory of the KNU's Sixth Brigade, the taking of porters continued. According to a June 1995 Amnesty International report, porters taken in March and April 1995 described the same kinds of abusive treatment, and all had witnessed the killings of fellow porters along the way.[81] On June 13, 1995 press reports from Thailand quoted Thai military authorities as saying that more than 200 Burmese civilians from the area around the town of Myawaddy had been rounded up to serve the Burmese army as porters in three days.[82]
Refugees interviewed by Human Rights Watch/Asia in
January also told of forced relocations to the headquarters of the DKBO at Myaing Gyi Ngu
and forced recruitment into the DKBO. Because no human rights groups or
reporters have been allowed access to the SLORC-controlled areas in the
The forcible relocation of civilians inside
On
The Offensive Against Khun Sa
In January 1995, the SLORC vowed to crush the Muang Tai Army (MTA), led by the internationally notorious
drug baron Khun Sa.[87] The
announcement followed a failed attempt to crush Khun Sa the year before. Burmese state television described the
offensive as the government "fighting the danger to all mankind—narcotic
drugs—from all the directions by employing all kinds of methods...now the
production of heroin, a danger for the world population, will be reduced by
two-thirds because the Defense Services personnel sacrificed hundreds of
lives."[88] Khun Sa has
been indicted in the
As in other areas, there have been reports of the
seizure of hundreds of men to work as porters for the Burmese army as the SLORC
increased its military presence. In May 1994, when some villagers were
able to escape into
Internally displaced people from villages between Tachilek and Kengtung, who were
prevented from entering
There have also been reports of attacks on civilian
villages near places where the MTA had attacked government positions. In
January, aerial bombardment west of Kengtung resulted
in entire villages fleeing to the border. One man interviewed by the aid worker
showed scars on his arm and neck from shrapnel which hit his home. In March,
the MTA launched a surprise attack on the Burmese army post just outside Tachilek, a town which is just the other side of the narrow
Mae Sai river which marks
the border between
Forced relocations also appear to have taken place
throughout the
Since May 1995 there has been a lull in the fighting
in the
In areas where the SLORC has attempted to forge
"national reconciliation" by signing cease-fire agreements with
fifteen ethnic rebel groups since 1989, human rights abuses have continued to
be reported, and there has been no move on the part of the SLORC to engage in
political discussions with these groups to reinforce the military
cease-fire. Under the terms of the cease-fires, ethnic groups have been
allowed to keep their arms and soldiers and in many cases have increased the
number of soldiers under their command. These agreements do not represent
a long-term solution to the conflict which has plagued the country since
1948. The Wa, Palaung
and Kokang expressed their dissatisfaction with the
agreements when they formed the Peace and Democratic Front; the Kachin Independence Organization has also issued several
press releases since their cease-fire expressing dissatisfaction that the
expected process of political dialogue has not begun. One of the most recent
cease-fires only lasted three months; on
IV. THE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE
The United Nations
The United Nations General Assembly
and Commission on Human Rights have adopted increasingly strong
resolutions on
The most recent resolution at the General Assembly
called on the U.N. secretary-general to "continue his discussions with the
Government of Myanmar in order to assist in the implementation of the present
resolution, as well as in its efforts to achieve national reconciliation."[96] In
accordance with the wishes of all the member states of the United Nations, the
Secretary General sent a team of negotiators from his political affairs
department to
There is no sign that discussions with Daw Suu have
yet begun, and the ICRC announced recently that their negotiations had
failed. Acknowledging the release of Aung San Suu Kyi, Boutros-Ghali said
that, "this is an important step which I hope will be followed by many others,
toward the establishment of a multi-party system in
The move towards a more hard-line stance by the SLORC
seems to have coincided roughly with the visit by Li Peng,
which may have led Burma's generals to conclude that they could afford to pay
the price of U.N. condemnation so long as Beijing kept the arms and trade
flowing. In addition, China's success in muting international criticism
of its own human rights record by attracting Western trade and
investment may have served as an encouraging object lesson to SLORC, which has
enthusiastically embraced a similar strategy. The SLORC was reportedly
elated by President Clinton's decision in May 1994 to "delink"
human rights and
Chinese officials, including Li Peng,
have repeatedly stressed that
The Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN)
ASEAN has had a long courtship with
Abandoning a long-held policy of a "buffer
zone" of ethnic rebels along its border in favor of potentially vast
economic deals, Thailand has interpreted "constructive engagement" to
mean that it would no longer support Burma's enemies. During 1993 these
groups suddenly faced arrest, harassment, restrictions in travel, and the
closure of all offices in
The greatest threat to Thai-Burmese relations came in
January 1995, soon after the fall of Manerplaw, when
armed groups of DKBO and SLORC soldiers crossed into
The Thai authorities reacted to these killings of
innocent civilians, the attacks on refugees under their protection, and the constant
incursions into their territory by Burmese and DKBO soldiers by continuing to try to appease the SLORC--a strategy
which seemed only to encourage SLORC's aggression. In
a hard-hitting attack at a press conference in
Meanwhile, other ASEAN countries are capitalizing on
The trade and investment deals that ASEAN countries
have signed, especially since January 1995, are proof that at least one of the
aims of their "constructive engagement" policy is working. However,
the policy is also intended to lead to political change and
basic improvements in human rights conditions. On this level, the policy
has failed miserably. After six years of engagement, it is now time for
On
Daw Suu's release was
immediately welcomed by Japanese Prime Minister Tomiichi
Murayama, who added, "I hope democratization
will proceed further." [123]
Foreign Minister Yohei
Kono announced that Tokyo was eager to begin
discussions with SLORC regarding resumption of ODA "once they [Burma] are
ready to do so," and later said he would visit Burma soon -- the highest
ranking Japanese official to go to Rangoon since 1988. Foreign Ministry
officials indicated that high priority ODA projects being considered include a $287 million expansion of the
It remains to be seen how energetically the Japanese
government will continue to push SLORC for further, meaningful change and
whether any new economic assistance will be linked to specific human rights
improvements. As a leading power in the region,
The
American policy towards
In the weeks leading up to Aung San Suu Kyi's release, the Clinton administration faced growing
Congressional pressure to respond to the "further deterioration of human
rights in Burma," as described by sixty-one members of the House of
Representatives in a letter to President Clinton on June 1, 1995. The
members urged
Despite the lack of progress on human rights admitted by
Hubbard, the administration announced at a Congressional hearing on
In the end, the administration attempted to fashion a
"compromise" between its human rights and counter-narcotics policies,
saying it would hold discussions with
SLORC officials on drug policies, provide in-country training to SLORC
anti-drug enforcement units, exchange intelligence information (especially to
assist SLORC's offensive against Khun
Sa), and increase funding for the U.N. Drug Control Program's activities in
ethnically-controlled areas of Burma. Initial Congressional
reaction was negative. The House of Representatives firmly rejected the
administration's compromise by adopting, by a
decisive 359-38 vote, an amendment to the 1996 financial year
appropriations bill prohibiting counter-narcotics funds to
The administration reacted cautiously to word of Aung
San Suu Kyi's release. President Clinton issued
a statement welcoming the news but expressing "concern about a number of
serious and unresolved human rights problems in
V. RECOMMENDATIONS
Those countries in favor of increasing engagement in
The SLORC's continued
violations of international law and its refusal to fulfill U.N. resolutions
should not be tolerated by the international community. But unless firm
steps are taken to back up the U.N.'s resolutions and various governments'
diplomatic appeals to
Human Rights Watch recommends:
To the State Law and Order Restoration Council
!
! Burma should allow those meeting with Aung San Suu Kyi, including her party's leading members and supporters, to freely associate with her without suffering reprisals, and the government should take no action to detain, harass or punish Burmese citizens seeking to peacefully exercise their internationally-guaranteed rights of freedom of association, expression and assembly.
! All laws which prohibit freedom of association, expression and the right of citizens to participate freely in the political live of the country must be repealed or reformed to bring them into line with international standards. This includes SLORC Orders 2/88, 4/91, 10/91, 1950 Emergency Provisions Act, 1957 Unlawful Associations Act, 1962 Printers' and Publishers' Registration Act, 1975 State Protection Law and the 1908 Villages and Towns Act (which permits village councils to order civilians to work as forced laborers).
!
! Burma should take immediate steps to comply with the U.N. Economic and Social Council's resolution of March 8, 1995 (E/CN.4/1995/L1.01) and the U.N. General Assembly resolution of December 2, 1994 (A/C.3/49/L.43), especially "to put an end to violations of the right to life and the integrity of the human being, to put an end to torture, abuse of women and forced labor, to enforced displacements of the population and to enforced disappearance and summary execution" and "to allow all citizens to participate freely in the political process."
!
! In accordance with the International Labor Organization convention, the practice of forced labor and forced portering should be stopped immediately, and those found recruiting or employing villagers and others for this purpose should be prosecuted and punished.
!
To the International Community
!
The international community should closely
monitor developments triggered by Aung San Suu Kyi's
release and should respond immediately to any attempts by SLORC to
restrict her movements or activities, or to punish or detain her supporters solely
because of their peaceful activities. Members of the U.N. Human Rights
Commission should consider dispatching the Special Rapporteur on
!
Governments should consider responding to the
release of Aung San Suu Kyi by establishing
direct, ongoing contact with her in order to discuss the human rights situation
in
!
At the ASEAN
meetings in
!
!
Under no circumstances should the World Bank,
Asian Development Bank, International Monetary Fund or Burma's key donors
resume bilateral or multilateral economic assistance – including debt relief –
until and unless basic human rights are restored and can be monitored, and
steps are taken to implement the results of the 1990 elections.[130]
The Chairman's Statement at the G-7 summit in
Halifax, Nova Scotia issued on June 17, 1995 called on Burma to"release Aung San Suu Kyi and other political
prisoners, without conditions, and to engage in a dialogue of reconciliation
aimed at the full and early realization of democracy and national
unity." The World Bank donors should issue a statement as soon as possible reiterating these basic concerns
in the context of the bank's "good governance" policy and its
inability to fund viable development in
!
The International Labor Organization should
initiate a commission of inquiry, under Article
26 of the ILO Constitution, into
!
Until there are verifiable guarantees that
forced labor and forced portering have ceased, investment and export credits to companies seeking to
operate in
! There should be no increased anti-narcotics assistance or cooperation extended to the SLORC until there is a genuine improvement in the overall human rights situation and an end to abuses committed against ethnic minorities.
APPENDIX I:
PARTIAL
LISTING OF EUROPEAN COMPANIES DOING BUSINESS IN
Country & Company Date of entry Type of Business
|
|
|
|
|
Transurb Consultants |
April 1994 |
Transport Railways upgrade, funded by UNDP |
|
|
|
|
|
Maersk |
September 1993 |
Oil Drilling contractor for Total |
|
|
|
|
|
Andaman Company |
March 1992 |
Trade concrete pipe parts |
|
Banque Nationale de Paris |
January 1995 |
Office
in |
|
Croisieres Paquet |
1992 |
Tourism: luxury cruise ships |
|
Elysee Investissements SA |
August 1994 |
Industry: wood production factory, j/v[132] Myanmar Timber |
|
Heli Union |
|
Oil and gas Industry services |
|
Setraco |
January 1990 |
Transport Renault buses |
|
Schlumberger |
August 1992 |
Oil and gas Industry services |
|
Soga |
March 1991 |
Renovation of concrete pipe plant |
|
Total |
July 1992 |
Oil and gas |
|
|
|
|
|
Fritz Werner |
May 1991 |
Industry Machine tools |
|
Siemens |
December 1991 |
Trade j/v with MEHB for $1.8million for Siemens goods |
|
Theodore Nagel |
|
Trade
teak imports to |
|
Trans-Oceanic |
February 1991 |
Tourism |
|
|
|
|
|
ABN Ambro Bank |
March 1995 |
Office
in |
|
Fokker Aircraft |
November 1991 |
Sale of F-27 planes |
|
G. Van Den Brink |
1988 |
Breeding rhesus monkeys for export (for experimentation) |
|
Heineken |
February 1995 |
j/v to produce beer through their Singaporean subsidiary |
|
Royal Dutch Shell |
October 1989 |
Oil and gas |
|
Vanleeuwan B.V. Company |
September 1994 |
Trade purchase of chrome |
|
|
|
|
|
Industries Nacionias Defensa |
November 1992 |
Arms mortars and shells |
|
|
|
|
|
Bofors |
October 1990 |
Arms cannons for patrol boats |
|
FFV (via Chartered Industries) |
|
Arms Carl Gustav rockets |
|
Nobel Industries (via Allied |
|
Arms |
|
|
|
|
|
Karaweik SA |
1962- |
Trade |
|
Samouri SA |
1962- |
Trade gems, diamonds, pearls. |
|
|
|
|
|
|
1994 & 1995 |
Sponsored two "British Weeks" to promote trade and culture |
|
Binnie & Partners |
March 1992 |
Water
supply and drainage for |
|
Cable and Wireless (via |
April 1990 |
Leased transponders |
|
|
1990 |
Duck breeding (ten year contract) |
|
Eastern and Oriental Express Group |
January 1995 |
Tourism: j/v with MEHB for tourism services |
|
Glaxo Pharmaceuticals |
|
Trade |
|
Keppel |
1995 |
Investment fund |
|
|
|
|
|
Premier Oil |
May 1990 |
Oil
and gas blocks in Martaban and Tenasserim, j/v
with Total, Unocal, PTTE ( |
|
Rolls Royce |
|
Attended "British Week" in 1995 |
|
Specialist Services Int'l |
October 1990 |
export advice. |
APPENDIX II:
PARTIAL LISTING OF UNITED STATES
COMPANIES DOING BUSINESS IN
Company Date of Entry Type of Industry
|
America World Export Company |
|
Transport: auto parts, farming implements |
|
American Express |
October 1974 |
Tourism: American Express Card agreement |
|
American Standard |
Discussions only |
|
|
Apex Development Co., Ltd. |
|
Consultants |
|
Apple MacCenter |
|
Computer Training/Distributing |
|
Arvin International |
|
General Trading |
|
Atlantic |
Discussions only |
Oil |
|
Bates |
|
Advertising |
|
Caltex Petroleum (Chevron/Texaco) |
|
Oil |
|
|
|
Oil and Gas: Industry services |
|
Caterpillar |
|
Trucks |
|
Chase Manhattan Bank |
|
financing |
|
Coca-Cola |
1992 |
Trade: sold in |
|
Dean Hardwoods |
|
Forestry: teak purchases |
|
Eastman Kodak (via Consumer Imaging Markets (CIM) in
|
November 1993 |
Operates
four Kodak Express Color Labs in |
|
General Electric (via G.E. Thailand) |
December 1992 |
Trade, planning new markets |
|
Grant Norpac |
June 1991 |
Oil and Gas: industry services |
|
Halliburton Co. |
April 1991 |
Oil and Gas: industry services |
|
Home Shopping Club |
September 1993 |
Gems: Burmese ruby rings |
|
Interdigital Communications Corp. |
|
Wireless Communications |
|
ITT Sheraton (via |
September 1990 |
Tourism: hotel study |
|
Maxus Energy |
|
Oil and gas |
|
Miriam Marshall Associates |
July 1990 |
Fisheries: $US 74 million |
|
Myanmar Connection Resorts, Ltd |
|
Tourism |
|
Northwest/KLM |
|
Airline service |
|
P.A.E. (via |
November 1990 |
Oil and Gas: industry services |
|
Pan America Pharmaceutical, Ltd. |
August 1990 |
Pharmaceutical, general trading, wood base products |
|
Parker Drilling |
June 1990 |
Oil and Gas: Drilling for, BHO, Idemitzu, Yukong |
|
Pepsico |
April 1990 |
Trade: 35% share bottling plant, $US 1 million |
|
|
|
Building Materials |
|
Pier One |
|
Apparel |
|
Raytheon (via Seismograph Services, |
|
Oil and Gas: Industry services |
|
Schlumberger (via GECO-PRAKLER) |
August 1992 |
Oil and Gas: Industry services |
|
Sears Roebuck |
August 1993 |
Textile: Clothing |
|
SGS ( |
|
Surveyor |
|
Teak Imports |
October 1993 |
Forestry: Custom sculpture and furniture |
|
Texaco |
May 1990
September 1992 |
Oil and Gas: 50% Premier-UK blocks M-13 & 14
Oil and Gas: share Premier-UK M-12 concession |
|
Textron (via |
October 1991
July 1992 |
Arms: proposed repair facility
Arms:
proposed |
|
The Limited |
August 1993 |
Textile: clothing |
|
Triton Energy Corp. |
(discussions only) |
Oil and Gas |
|
United Parcel Service |
June 1994 |
Package
services to |
|
Unocal |
April 1993 |
Oil and Gas: 47.5% share Total blocks M-5 & 6 oil and gas concession pipeline. |
|
Watana Trading Ltd. |
May 1989 |
Mining, General trading |
|
|
|
Sporting goods |
|
Zin International, |
|
Rice, beans, and pulses |
|
Bolder Adventures |
February 1994 |
|
|
Cunard Ships Hotel Resort Co. |
January 1995 |
Cruise
Ships: MS Sea Goddess
and MS Mermoz ( |
|
DeGolyer & MacNaughton |
|
Petroleum
Resevior Engineers ( |
|
Disney |
April 1994 |
Trade:
Marketing Consumer Goods ( |
|
B.J. Service International |
October 1991 |
Oil
and Gas: Industry services ( |
|
Baker Hughes Inteq (Eastman Christensen Co) |
May 1991 |
Oil
and Gas: Industry services ( |
|
|
October 1991 |
Oil
and Gas: Industry services
( |
|
Dowell Schlumberger Eastern |
June 1990 |
Oil
and Gas: Industry services ( |
|
Drilling Fluids, Inc (Milpark Drilling Fluids) |
May 1991 |
Oil
and Gas: Industry services ( |
|
Geco Geophysical Co., Ltd. (Geco-Prakler) |
August 1990 |
Oil
and Gas: Industry services ( |
|
Halliburton Geophysical Services |
October 1990 |
Oil
and Gas: Industry services ( |
|
I.B.M. World Trade Corp. |
September 1989 |
( |
|
Oiltools, Ltd. |
March 1992 |
Oil
and Gas: Industry services ( |
|
Poly Technologies One |
March 1992 |
Oil
and Gas: Industry services ( |
|
Pratt Ryan Oilfield Services Pte. Ltd. |
October 1991 |
Oil
and Gas: Industry services ( |
|
Smith International, Inc. |
August 1991 |
Oil
and Gas: Industry services ( |
|
Western Atlas International, Inc. |
August 1990 |
Oil
and Gas: Industry services ( |
|
Sprint |
Discussions only |
Telecommunications
( |
|
Caltex (Chevron/Texaco) |
|
Oil and Gas: Industry Service |
[1]
Message to the international community from Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, British
Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) World Service TV,
[2] The SLORC held the country in the balance between greater political freedom and further repression once before when it allowed a national election to be held in May 1990. Clearly expecting to win in the election, they did not disrupt it, but on realizing the scale of their defeat, they refused to hand over power and arrested many of the victors.
[3]
Brig. Gen David Abel, quoted by Kyodo news agency (
[4]
Kyodo news agency,
[5]
Written under the pen name "Nawarhta," The
New Light of Myanmar,
[6]
On
[7]
See Human Rights Watch/Asia,"
[8]For the full text of the recommendations, see Human Rights Watch/Asia, "Abuses Linked to the Fall of Manerplaw."
[9]
Figures published by the Burmese government on March 9, 1995, which show all
investment in Burma since 1989, reveal France as the largest investor
(equivalent to U.S. $1.05 billion), followed by Singapore ($293.4 million),
Thailand ($265 million), the U.S. ($203 million) and Japan ($101 million).
Total SA, an oil company in which the French government and state-owned
enterprises own 25 percent of the voting rights,
accounts for almost all French investment.
[10]
The secretary-general's representative is expected to visit
[11]Prof. Yozo Yokota,
the Special Rapporteur for
[12] 11See Asia Watch, "Worsening Repression," March 1990; Asia Watch, Human Rights in Burma (Myanmar) May 1990; Asia Watch, "Burma: Post-Election Abuses," August 1990; Asia Watch, "Burma: Time for Sanctions," February 1991; Asia Watch, "Human Rights Abuses in Burma (Myanmar) in 1991," Vol.4, No.3, January 1992; Asia Watch, "Burma: Rape, Forced Labor and Religious Persecution in Northern Arakan," Vol.4, No.1, May 1992; Asia Watch, "Changes in Burma?," Vol.4, No.24, September 1992; Human Rights Watch/Asia, "The Mon: Persecuted in Burma, Forced Back from Thailand," Vol.6, No.14, December 1994; Human Rights Watch/Asia, "Burma: Abuses Linked to the Fall of Manerplaw," Vol.7, No.5, March 1995, (New York: Human Rights Watch).
[13] These are the Special Rapporteur on Religious Intolerance and Discrimination; the Special Rapporteur Concerning Extrajudicial, Summary, or Arbitrary Executions; the Special Rapporteur on Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment; the Special Rapporteur Concerning Persons Subjected to any Form of Detention or Imprisonment; and the Working Groups on Arbitrary Detention and Fundamental Freedoms.
[14] In November 1993, the special rapporteur met with Dr. Aung Khin Sint, who was arrested in August 1993. While the interview was conducted with prison officials present, it was apparent that Aung Khin Sint had not been subjected to torture. In February 1994, Congressman Richardson met with Dr. Thida, among others, who was arrested in August 1993. All four prisoners he met were in poor health as a result of conditions in the prison, but Dr. Thida had not been subjected to torture during interrogation.
[15]
Human Rights Watch/Asia has been denied access to
[16]A diplomat talking about the arrest of the National League for Democracy member of parliament, seventy-seven-year-old U Kyi Maung and three others on June 2, quoted by Reuters on June 7, 1995. The men were released on June 8.
[17] Article 9 of the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) states: "Anyone arrested or detained on a criminal charge shall be brought promptly before a judge or other offices...and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release."
[18] Article 4 of the ICCPR specifies which articles of the convention are not derogable during times of public emergency. This includes Article 15, which prohibits the retroactive application of new or altered laws or penalties.
[19]
Yozo Yokota, "Final Report on the Situation of
Human Rights in
[20] The laws most commonly used to detain political activists are the 1950 Emergency Provisions Act, which allows for imprisonment for up to seven years of any one who "infringes upon the integrity, health, conduct and respect of state or military organizations...or spreads false news about the government"; the 1957 Unlawful Associations Act, which allows for imprisonment of up to five years for anyone has been a member of, or assisted, any association "(a) which encourages or aids persons to commit acts of violence or intimidation...or (b) which has been declared unlawful by the President"; Sections 121, 122-1 and 124 of the 1957 Penal Code, which allow for death, life or seven years' imprisonment for anyone committing high treason, or misprision of high treason; the 1962 Printers' and Publishers' Registration Act (amended in 1989) which allows for imprisonment for up to five years for anyone with a permit for printing who publishes material which "opposes the SLORC...insults, slanders or attempts to divide the Defense Forces;" and the 1975 State Protection Law.
[21] Such rights are protected under Articles 19, 22 and 25 of the ICCPR.
[22] BBC World Service,
[23]
Human Rights Watch/Asia is particularly concerned about the lawyer U Nay Min,
who was arrested for giving information to the BBC in November 1988. Nay Min
was sentenced to fourteen years in jail and was reported to have been badly
beaten at the time of his arrest and during a hunger strike at
[24] This section states that "the President may at any time, without conditions or upon any conditions which the person sentenced to accepts, suspend the execution of his sentence or remit the whole or any part of the punishment to which he has been sentenced."
[25]
Article 10 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states, "Everyone
is entitled in full equality to a fair public hearing by an independent and
impartial tribunal". See Amnesty International, "
[26] During the 1988 demonstrations, U Nu claimed that since the coup of 1962 was an illegal seizure of power, he was still prime minister. He was arrested soon after the military regained their authority in September 1989 and held under house arrest until 1992. U Nu was eighty-two years old.
[27] They are: Ma Moe Kalayar, Ma Aye Moe, Ma Cho Nwe Oo, Ko Moe Maung Maung, Ko Moe Myat Thu, Ko Maung Oo, Ko Aung Zeya, Ko Tin Than Oo and Ko Hteik.
[28]
The U.N. Special Rapporteur on
[29]
SLORC Notification 2/91, May 14, 1991. The groups
were:
[30] Many parties were declared illegal before the election, in which twenty-seven parties won seats. By 1992 all but seven of these parties had been declared illegal.
[31]
SLORC Announcement No. 1/90,
[32]
See Amnesty International, "
[33]U Ohn Kyaing, MP-elect for Mandalay Southeast-2; U Tin Htut, MP-elect for Einme-1; U Win Hlaing, MP-elect for Tatkon-2; Saw Naing Naing, MP-elect for Pazundaung; U Tin Aung Aung, MP-elect for Mandalay Northwest-1; Dr. Zaw Myint Aung, MP-elect for Amarapura-1; Dr. Myint Aung, MP-elect for Kanbalu-2; U Kyi Myint, MP-elect for Latha ; Dr. Zaw Myint, MP-elect for Henzada-2; U Mya Win, MP-elect for Ingapu-1; U Hla Than, MP-elect for Coco Islands; U Tin Soe, MP-elect for Kyauktada; U Saw Win, MP-elect for Htilin; U Hla Tun, MP-elect for Kyimyindine ; U Khin Maung Swe (re-arrested August 1994); U Sein Hla Oo (re-arrested August 1994)
[34]
Radio
[35]
SLORC Order 10/91, Radio
[36] The others are: Dr. Khin Zaw Win, Daw San San Nwe and her daughter, Ma Myat Moe Moe Tun.
[37]
Kyodo news agency,
[38]
U.N. Special Rapporteur on
[39]
SLORC Order 13/02, "The Formation of the Commission for Holding the
National Convention,"
[40] The NCCC is led by its chairman, Maj. Gen. Myo Nyunt (member of the SLORC, minister for religious affairs and Rangoon divisional commander); and vice-chairmen Maj. Gen. Maung Thint (SLORC member and minister for border areas); Brig. Gen. Myo Thant (SLORC member) and Brig. Gen Aung Thein (SLORC member and secretary of the defense services public relations and psychological warfare).
[41] See U.N. Special Rapporteur, "Report on the Situation..." February 1995, p. 32.
[42] In September 1992, paragraph (a) of SLORC Order 2/88, which established a nationwide curfew from 11P.M. to 4A.M..; Order 1/89 which granted martial law powers to regional commanders; and Order 2/89 relating to procedures for military tribunals were all "deleted." As far as Human Rights Watch/Asia is aware, no other SLORC Orders have been officially revoked.
[43]
They were sentenced under the 1950 Emergency Provisions Act and the Printers
and Publishers Law. Dr. Aung Khin Sint was released
on
[44] Personal communication to Human Rights Watch/Asia, April 1994.
[45]
Censorship laws in
[46]
New Light of
[47]
These groups are minorities in the seven ethnic states and the seven ethnic
Burman divisions. ("Burmese refers to all the citizens of the country of
[48]
The United Wa State Party, the Shan State Kokang
Democratic Party, the Shan National League for Democracy and the National
League for Democracy were particularly outspoken. An NLD representative, U Khin
Maung, said "it is not appropriate for this National Convention to
prescribe self-administered areas without soliciting the wishes of the local
people of the regions concerned."
[49]
Between 1961 and 1969 Burmese Radio had a "Rohingya"
program, which was stopped "in the interests of national
unity." In 1991 some 270,000 Rohingyas
fled from Arakan to
[50]
Radio
[51] BBC World Service,
[52]
Quoted by SLORC Secretary-1 Khin Nyunt in a speech given in his role as
chairman of the Myanmar Education Committee at a "refresher" course
for primary school teachers, Rangoon Radio,
[53] Foreign Minister U Ohn Gyaw, quoted in U.N. Special Rapporteur "Report on the Situation...," February 1995.
[54]
Government statement of May 1993, quoted in ILO "Report of the Committee
of Experts," APPL\149-3.E95 (
[55] Ibid. The SLORC also said that it had generously given a total of 20 million kyats to the volunteers: less than 25 kyats per person, roughly U.S. $0.20 at the market rate of exchange.
[56]
See Human Rights Watch/Asia "
[57]
For a full discussion of the application of ILO Convention 29 in
[58] International Labour Organization, "Report of the Committee set up to consider the representation made by the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions under article 24 of the ILO Constitution alleging non-observance by Myanmar of the Forced Labor Convention, 1930 (No. 29)" (Geneva: International Labour Organization) November 7, 1994.
[59]
Article reporting a speech by Lt. Gen. Myo Nyunt, SLORC member and minister for
religious affairs, speaking at a Buddhist novitiation
ceremony for orphans in the Myanma Alin, the Burmese language government-controlled
newspaper,
[60]
See Martin Smith, Ethnic Groups in
[61]
Angelo Vidal d'Almeida Ribeiro,
"Report of the Special Rapporteur on Religious Intolerance," (
[62] There is a Department for Propagation and Promotion of the Sasana (faith) to which both laymen and monks can apply to join these missionary course. The applications are processed through the township Law and Order Restoration Councils.
[63]
Article in the New Light of
[64]
This population in the main came to
[65]
The 1982 Nationalities Act requires that to be full citizen a person must prove
family residency in
[66]
See Human Rights Watch/Asia "
[67]
It should be noted that while there is a significant population of Chinese
Muslims, known as "Panthays," they do not suffer the same discriminatory policies.
A 1994 article noted that while the SLORC was pulling down an
"Indian" mosque in Myawaddy, it was
supporting the construction of a new Panthay mosque
in Tachilek. Wilson and Henley, "The SLORC and
Islam,"
[68]
These incidents were also reported by the Special Rapporteur to
[69]
The name "Rohingya" is a term used by some,
but not all, Muslims from the
[70]
UNHCR press office, "Return to
[71]
Refugees reported that the soldiers used racist terms of abuse and often told
them to "go back to your own country." See
[72] The military present in Arakan is the army supplemented by the "Na Sa Ka," a Burmese acronym for the border patrol police. There are at least 9,000 Na Sa Ka in Maungdaw and Buthidaung.
[73]
[74]
See Prof. Yokota, "Report on the Situation of Human Rights in
[75]"Introductory
statement by the Special Rapporteur"
[76] See Human Rights Watch/Asia, "The Mon..." for a discussion of the history of the NMSP cease-fire negotiations.
[77]
See Human Rights Watch/Asia, "
[78]
See Human Rights Watch/Asia, "
[79]
Myawaddy Radio which began transmission in December
1994 in the Karen area, was very active in SLORC's propaganda war against the KNU. On
[80]
See Human Rights Watch/Asia, "
[81]
Amnesty International, "
[82]
Reuters,
[83] Leaflets published by the DKBO called for all Buddhist Karen "to rise up against the Christian leaders," suggesting that Christians would not be welcome.
[84]
Yindee Letcharoenchok, The Nation (
[85] BBC World Service,
[86] See Amnesty International, "No Law At All..."
[87] BBC World Service,
[88]
Quoted in the BBC SWB,
[89]
A State Department spokeswoman told reporters, "We view [the closure of
refineries] as a positive development, and would welcome similar developments
that might result from the current offensive." Reuters,
[90] Refusing to admit refugees is tantamount to making them return, and is therefore a violation of the principle of non-refoulement, as expressed in Article 33 of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. While Thailand has not ratified this convention, the principle of non-refoulement is part of customary international law.
[91] Bangkok Post, March 17, 1995.
[92] Because of the difficulties of access to these people, who were in great need of humanitarian aid, the aid worker wishes to remain anonymous.
[93] Reuters, "Fear of Rangoon forces drives Shan into Thailand." March 22, 1995.
[94] This first mission was conducted under the U.N.'s 1503 Procedure and the report was not made public. Mrs. Sadako Ogata had made the first mission under this procedure in 1990.
[95]
See Professor Yokota, " Report on the Situation
of Human Rights in
[96] U.N. General Assembly Third Committee Resolution "Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar" A/C.3/49/197 (New York: United Nations), December 23, 1994.
[97] This was the second mission to Burma by a representative of the secretary-general, the first having been in November 1994.
[98] U.N. Economic and Social Council, "Report of the Secretary General on the Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar," E/CN.4/1995/150 (Geneva: United Nations), February 21, 1995.
[99]
Press statement by secretary-general Boutros
Boutros-Ghali,
[100] Trade between Burma and China is officially valued at $550 million annually, but thought to be at least double that, according to Wang Jun-fu, China Association for International Friendly Contact, quoted in Radio Australia, June 7, 1995.
[101] This comprised a $400 million contract to buy helicopters, armored vehicles, assault rifles, parachutes and patrol boats and a $40 million interest-free loan to buy Chinese naval vessels. Jane's Defense Weekly, November 30, 1994.
[102] Burmese TV, December 27, 1994.
[103] Reuters, December 28, 1994.
[104] Reuters, March 27, 1995. This is believed to have been the first time that any foreign army has been present at Burma's Armed Forces Day.
[105]
"SLORC is known to be elated at last week's decision by Washington to
uncouple human rights from trade in renewing China's MFN status. The
generals in
[106] Li Peng in Rangoon, Reuters December 28, 1995.
[107] See Lintner, Burma in Revolt.
[108] In 1967 anti-Chinese riots in Rangoon, which included attacks on the Chinese embassy, resulted in several hundred Chinese dead and over 1,000 Chinese arrested. This action was influential in China's decision to support the Communist Party of Burma from 1968 - 1978.
[109] BBC World Service, October 5, 1994.
[110] Quoted in BBC SWB October 18, 1994.
[111] All India Radio, quoted in BBC SWB, April 12, 1995.
[112] Sanjoy Hazarika, "India and Burma Join to Hunt Rebels by Border," The New York Times, June 7, 1995.
[113]
The final contract for the pipeline between the
Thai Electricity Generating Authority, the SLORC-owned Myanmar Oil and Gas
Enterprise, Total (
[114]
The Nation,
[115] Burmese TV, May 9, 1995. This contradicted previous claims by the SLORC that they had no control over the DKBO.
[116]
The Nation,
[117] Burmese TV, May 28, 1995.
[118] Reuters,
[119]
The Financial Times (
[120] Kyodo, March 9, 1995.
[121] Khin Nyunt said that political prisoners are released only on the condition they do not disturb society after their release. According to Fukada, Khin Nyunt said that Suu Kyi "still does not fully understand the Myanmarese situation." Jiji Press (Japan), April 7, 1995.
[122]Kyodo,
[123] Kyodo, July 11, 1995
[124]Reuters,
[125] In a letter to Lane Kirkland, president of the AFL-CIO labor confederation, who wrote to the State Department urging a trade and investment embargo against Burma, U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher said on April 5, 1995, "We have regularly explored whether there would be support for such an embargo with our allies, and with Burma's major trading and investment partners in Asia. We have found no interest in a U.N. embargo." In fact, the European Parliament, on June 15, 1995, adopted a resolution calling on the European Council and member government to "investigate possible cooperation between companies of the European Union in Burmese projects applying forced labor and examine the desirability of imposing economic sanctions."
[126] The Richardson-Rohrabacher amendment was voted by the House on June 28, 1995.
[127]
The Financial Times,
[128] Nicholas Burns, State Department Briefing, July 10, 1995.
[129] Japan's ODA Annual Report for 1994, published in March 1995, cites the ODA Charter in relation to China and notes that "serious concern has been expressed internationally over its [China's] rising defense expenditures and a trend toward the exporting and importing of arms. In light of such developments, Japan realizes that careful consideration should be given to the compliance of the ODA Charter's principles with regard to aid for China and has conveyed this to China."
[130] The Asian Development Bank is reportedly planning to send a mission to Burma in August, 1995. The Financial Times, July 12, 1995.
[131]Sources of Information: Asian American Free Labor Institute, Burma Issues, International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, Franklin Research and Development Corporation, Council on Economic Priorities, New Light of Myanmar, and Burma Alert!
[132] j/v means joint-venture.
[133]Sources of Information: Asian American Free Labor Institute, Burma Issues, International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, Franklin Research and Development Corporation, Council on Economic Priorities, New Light of Myanmar, and Burma Alert!
Human Rights Watch/Asia
Human Rights Watch is a nongovernmental organization established in 1978
to monitor and promote the observance of internationally recognized human
rights in