A Proposal for a Currency Board in a Democratic
by
Sean Turnell*
August 1999
Abstract
This paper argues that a currency board will provide a newly-democratic
The
'Currency Board' arrangement is a plan desperately needed in a country
rebuilding itself, and where there had been a widespread mistrust of government
and the banking system.
Peter
Nicholl
Governor,
Central Bank of
Introduction
A necessary first step in reforming
Restoring confidence in
Currency boards have no control over monetary base, which fluctuates
according to the reserves of the anchor currency, and therefore cannot
determine a discretionary monetary policy. Currency boards cannot allow
for the monetisation of government debt either, which puts some constraint on
the use of fiscal policy too. In the context of
One of the most attractive features of a currency board for
The paper will proceed by first examining some recent experiences with
currency boards in a number of inflation-prone and transition economies. The
remainder of the paper will be spent in examining currency boards themselves,
their essential features and their implications for macroeconomic and banking
policy. The paper will highlight throughout the specific circumstances of
Recent
Currency Board Arrangements
Although an idea dating back to the nineteenth century, currency boards
have come back into vogue in recent years.[1]
There are currently 14 currency boards (or currency board-like systems) in
operation around the world in countries with widely varying economies. Though
down on the 50 or so that were in place at the beginning of the 1950s, it is a
substantial increase on the few residual colonial systems that were the sole
remaining examples of currency boards in the early 1980s (Enoch and Gulde 1998, p.40). For many years out of intellectual
fashion, the disappointing performance of central banks, especially in
developing countries, has seen the idea re-emerge in a 'new wave' of currency
boards established in the last decade or so.[2]
The most relevant of these to
Perhaps most instructive for
Features
of Currency Boards
As noted in the introduction to this paper, the most distinctive
feature of a currency board is that the currency it issues is backed by
reserves of a foreign anchor currency. In a 'pure' or 'orthodox' currency
board, these reserves should be at least 100 percent of the issued currency.[7]
The rate at which the domestic currency is exchanged must be permanently fixed
by law, and the currency board must be ready to exchange the domestic currency
on demand. In the interests of reserve cover though, the currency board should
not convert bank deposits into the local or anchor currency. Similarly, a pure
currency board is prohibited from acquiring domestic government or private
commercial securities. Pure currency boards are essentially passive
institutions that issue and destroy currency according to movements in anchor
reserves, and do not engage in any other activity. Such currency boards are the
most simple, but also the most restrictive in terms of policy. They are also
the most credible.
In practice, as well as in theory, a number of alternative systems to
'pure' currency boards are possible. A less than pure arrangement, for example,
could be one in which there was less than 100 percent anchor reserves for the
amount of currency on issue. This would allow for greater room to pursue
discretionary monetary policies, and/or allow for the provision of lender of
last resort facilities to the banking system, but has the obvious pitfall of
clouding the transparency and credibility of the system. As noted above,
Argentina has maintained less than 100 percent reserves - with the result that
its arrangements suffer from doubts as to its credibility and which have led to
speculative attacks against the exchange rate.
Though a currency board holds reserves denominated in the anchor
currency, these need not be in actual notes and coin. Indeed, by far the
substantial component should not be - since by holding anchor currency
denominated government securities (zero risk, like currency), the currency
board country can yield substantial seigniorage revenues (more of which below).[8]
The provision of sufficient reserves of the anchor currency could
initially be a problem for a currency board in
In the longer run
Implications
for Monetary and Fiscal Policy
A currency board system is rule based. In its pure form neither it, nor
any other institution of government, has any discretionary control over
monetary management. A currency board can have no control over the domestic
rate of interest, nor be in a position to conduct open market operations or any
other activity typically employed by central banks to influence domestic
monetary conditions. The activities of the currency board rather, are passive
and automatic, and limited to the issuing or destruction of domestic currency
in response to changes in its stock of the anchor currency.
Discretionary fiscal policy is likewise limited in a currency-board
system. A pure currency board cannot accept any other liabilities save that of
the currency on issue. This means that a currency board cannot accept
government bonds nor lend to the government in any way. Significantly, this
means that a budget deficit cannot be 'monetised'.[11]
Government spending under a currency board arrangement, therefore, is limited
to taxation receipts plus whatever can be raised by the sale of government
securities to the private sector. The political pressures to spend vastly in
excess of their ability to raise funds is, as Judy (1995) notes, often
'overwhelming in nascent democracies undergoing difficult economic and
political transitions'. Currency boards can provide something in the way of a
counter to these pressures.
The principle virtue of a currency board then is precisely the same as
its policy limitations. By imposing more transparent and rule-based monetary
and fiscal policies, currency boards bring with them the expectation that
accompanying policies must likewise be responsible and rule-based. Above all, a
currency board symbolises a country's serious intent to maintain a sound
currency and a stable exchange rate. The credibilty
that a currency board brings to this intention in the eyes of international and
domestic investors is its greatest promise.
In the case of
In the absence of a functioning tax system, and the ability to source
funds from abroad,
Choice of Anchor Currency
The choice of the foreign anchor currency is one of the most difficult
but crucial questions faced by the architects of a currency board. Of most
relevance to the selection of the anchor currency though are the following
considerations:
1) The anchor
currency must be one that is widely accepted as an international reserve
currency. A fairly obvious point perhaps, but one that narrows the set of
choices rather dramatically in practice. In the current environment there are
probably only three currencies that fit this criteria; the
Of the fourteen currency boards currently in
operation, ten use the US dollar as the anchor currency, three use the German
mark (euro) and one the
2) The anchor
currency should also be one in which a substantial proportion of the trade of
the country concerned is denominated. An anchor currency divorced from the
trade of the currency board country poses the risk that exchange rate changes
will damage competitiveness. This could be of particular importance to a
country such as
3) A related
consideration is that the anchor currency ideally would be one in which the
currency board country could expect flows of foreign investment. As with the
issue of trade, the importance of this simply relates to the fact that the
currency board should be able to count on an intertemporal
growth in money base.
As noted above, the great majority of present-day currency board
arrangements anchor their domestic currencies against the US dollar. The de facto global reserve currency, in the
view of this author a convincing argument for an alternative to the dollar,
which could only realistically rely upon considerations two and three above,
would be hard to make. The Federal Reserve System is by no means a perfect
central bank, but it maintains a global reach and credibility in financial
markets unmatched by any other central bank. This is especially true when one
considers the attributes of any similar institution in
The case for anchoring the Burmese currency against the yen rather than
the US dollar could only be because of a possible predominance over the
American currency in likely Burmese trade and inward investment. A decade ago
such a case could be argued much more strongly than it can now. Fueled by a
high domestic saving rate, booming share and real estate markets and aggressive
and successful exporters, Japanese banks expanded dramatically worldwide in the
1980s - but especially into
There is much to suggest that
Exchange Rate
If the choice of the anchor currency is a crucial decision in the establishment
of a currency board, then clearly so too will be the rate at which the local
currency will be fixed against it.[15]
Fixing at too high a rate will damage
It is the collapsing value of the Burmese currency that a currency
board is primarily designed to stop. At the same time, the currency board must
also bring about an end to the extreme divergences between 'market' and
'official' rates of exchange. The currency board should begin, therefore, in a
position in which the domestic currency is neither over nor under valued. There
is little reason, in short, not to choose the market rate of exchange for the
domestic currency that prevails at the time the currency board is established.
This has been the approach taken in establishing most of the currency boards
currently in operation.
In the transition period,
'Dollarisation'
Given that, under a pure currency board, the domestic currency must be
fully backed by foreign reserves, a question that naturally arises is why a
local currency is required at all. Why not simply circulate the anchor
currency? As noted above, this is a question currently under consideration in
Notwithstanding the surety that might be yielded by using the anchor
currency in circulation, three reasons stand out for maintaining a domestic
currency in a country such as
The first of these is simply the recognition that a national currency
is important symbolically as a statement of independence and national unity.
Ephemeral notions perhaps, but no less powerful for that if the controversies
in
A second reason why
A third reason for
Banking Policy
As noted above, the operation of a pure currency board arrangement
necessarily precludes the provision of lender-of-last-resort (LLR) facilities
to the commercial banking sector. When bank failure occurs under an LLR
facility, the central monetary authority (usually a central bank) is
effectively forced to acquire a proportion of the liabilities of the failed
institutions. But the liabilities of a pure currency board (otherwise simply
the notes and coin on issue) must be fully backed by reserves of the anchor
currency. The provision of an LLR facility, therefore, could result in the
erosion of reserves and places in jeopardy the operation of the entire system.
Of course, it also undermines the transparency and independence of a currency
board arrangement.
Should a currency board be established such that it holds anchor
reserves in excess of 100 percent of the currency on issue, then clearly this
would leave a margin to provide for an LLR facility. The Bank of Estonia has
attempted something along these lines. It is divided into two departments - an
'Issue Department' that contains the currency board, and a 'Banking Department'
that undertakes a range of traditional central bank activities, including
limited assistance to the financial sector. It is the Banking Department that
holds the 'excess reserves' of the currency board, and its activities are
limited to the extent of these. Bank failures were a feature of
To a large extent modern bank supervision practice has, in any case,
moved beyond LLR facilities as the appropriate guarantors of financial system
stability. Indeed, to the extent that they create moral hazard, they have come
to be regarded as more of a problem than a solution, especially amongst
developing and transition economies.[18]
The best policy for
An immediate policy which should be adopted upon the establishment of a
currency board in
concerning banks (taxation, licensing and so on) should be as close as
possible to that of the anchor currency country.[22]
As with the initial provision of reserves, the development of
Access
Conversion of the domestic currency into the anchor currency should be
automatic, but this does not imply that individuals (or individual enterprises)
should have access to the currency board for the purposes of exchange. As Hanke and Schuler (1991) note, multitudinous small scale
transactions would be very costly administratively and, for a country the size
and geographical diversity as
Exchange/Capital Controls
The operation of a pure currency board does not allow for exchange or
capital controls since it guarantees the exchange of the domestic for anchor
currency. Less than pure arrangements will allow the possibility for controls
on capital flows, but clearly the currency board will be compromised in
proportion to the extent that they are applied. Most existing currency board
arrangements have no exchange or capital controls in place.
Instructive perhaps for
The robustness of currency board arrangements in the face of capital
flows, long claimed by their advocates, were tested and upheld during the
financial crises that began in
Openness to foreign capital is not an end in itself, but a vehicle for
the enhancement of economic growth and the transfer of modern technologies and
techniques. This is an idea central to Khin Maung Ky et al (1998, p.32, more of which below),
which makes the central assumption that a post-democratic
Other Benefits
In the wake of the Asian financial crisis much thought has been given
to reform of the global financial system, and in particular the when and why of
financial 'bailouts'. The United States, with something of a veto over
proposals that might emerge, has recently proposed that financial assistance to
countries facing financial crises be conditional upon such countries having
appropriate exchange rate regimes in place. Deciding that a key cause of the
Asian turmoil was exchange rates pegged unrealistically against the dollar, the
(then) Treasury Secretary, Robert Rubin, declared in April 1999 that currencies
should either be floating or 'credibly
fixed via an institutional arrangement such as a currency board'. Given that a
democratic
Colonialism
One possible psychological obstacle to the establishment of a currency
board, particularly for a country such as
Burmese
Economists
The author of this paper is not Burmese, and what has been outlined in
this paper therefore is merely offered as part of the international debate that
is currently taking place regarding the future of that country. For too long
though the destiny of
In 1998 a group of Burmese economists launched a report (Khin Maung
Kyi, et al, 1998) which attempted to
construct a strategy for the reconstruction of their country. This report did
not go into specifics on an exchange rate regime, but it included the following
broad recommendation:
We favour the conservative Currency Board
approach, of the type
Conclusion
Sean Turnell, August 1999
(
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* The author is a member of the Economics Department at
[1] The intellectual genealogy of currency boards can be traced as far back as the 1820s, and the controversies in the United Kingdom surrounding the transition from the era of 'free banking' to that of the Bank of England as the monopoly issuer of currency. For more on the early history of currency boards, see Hanke and Schuler (1993).
[2] The first of these new wave currency boards was that of
[3] For more on
[4] As shall be examined in more detail below,
[5] For more details of
[6] For more detail on the Central Bank of
[7] Currency boards in the past have usually held greater than 100 percent reserves - for the most part the product of accumulated seigniorage (more of which below). Such a buffer provides a margin to allow for fluctuations in the value of the anchor currency denominated securities.
[8] The reserves should therefore be a mix - of highly liquid short-term anchor country government securities, anchor country bank deposits and cash, and higher yielding but less liquid longer-term anchor country government securities.
[9] The three core principles for which the IMF was formed was to ensure exchange rate stability, convertibility and freedom from exchange restrictions - three principles assured under a currency board (de Vries 1986, p.3).
[10] See, for example, the estimates in Khin Maung Kyi et al (1998), p.83.
[11] This is the principle reason why their advocates claim that
currency boards bring with them a superior performance on inflation than
alternative monetary regimes. It is not the only one. Another is the idea that under a currency
board, domestic inflation is bound to that of the anchor currency country
through arbitrage. So long as relative purchasing power parity holds between
the anchor currency country and the currency board country, arbitrage should
ensure that (within limits) domestic prices do not diverge from the prices
prevailing in the anchor country. In practice these 'limits' can be quite wide.
There are, after all, a very wide range of goods that are not 'tradable' and,
therefore, not subject to the price discipline arbitrage will impose.
Nevertheless, the idea is clearly not without foundation given the increasing
integration of markets. Schuler (1998) found that price inflation for tradable
goods in
[12] Though cited from EIU (1998, p.16), these statistics are those of
the Burmese government. The reliability of these is less than assured, a fact
no better illustrated than in this example. What has happened in
[13] Estimates of the size of
[14] A further potential hurdle for the use of yen as an anchor currency is the legacy of its role in the Second World War as the anchor currency of the Japanese occupation forces.
[15]
[16]
[17] The issue of the seigniorage benefits of national currencies is comprehensively argued in Fischer (1982).
[18] But not limited to them, as the 'savings and loans' crisis in the
[19]
[20] This is also roughly the approach adopted in
[21] Such benefits have been apparent in the case of
[22] For more on this idea, see Osband and Villaneva (1993), p.211.
[23] This is not, of course, an issue of principle and whatever
arrangement is chosen, confidence that exchange is ultimately guaranteed
remains paramount. In
[24] Of course, this issue assumes an even greater importance should the
US dollar become the anchor currency in
[25] The conventional wisdom in the World Bank and similar institutions in the 1990s is that sound macroeconomic policies (by which is meant budget balance, low inflation and openness to trade) and sound institutions (the rule of law, minimal corruption and an efficient bureaucracy) are prerequisites for successful aid programs. This general philosophy is no better exemplified than in International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank (1998).
[26] The 'Burma Currency Board' was established under the British
Currency and Coinage Act of 1946. Headquartered in