Published
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BURMA
Burma is ruled by a highly authoritarian, military regime
that has been
condemned for its serious human rights abuses.
Heading the latest version of a military dictatorship
that has presided
over the country with an unyielding grip for more
than three decades is
the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC), which took power
in September 1988 after harshly suppressing massive prodemocracy
demonstrations.
Longtime dictator General Ne Win,
whose policies had
pushed Burma to the
margins of the international community and driven
the country into a
deep economic decline, resigned shortly before
SLORC's
emergence. Nevrtheless, he
continued to wield the power
behind the scenes.
The SLORC, headed by the armed forces commander and
composed of senior
military officers, permitted a relatively free
election in 1990.
However, it failed to honor the results--which were an overwhelming
rejection of military rule--or to cede power to the victorious party
headed by prodemocracy movement leaders. Instead, the SLORC attacked
the coalition of winning political parties through detentions, house
arrests, and intimidation.
Since General Than Shwe became Chief of State in April
1992, the SLORC
has taken some modest steps to lessen its harsh
rule, including
reopening the universities and releasing over 2,000 political
prisoners. In
January 1993, the SLORC inaugurated a
national
convention to begin work on a new constitution. However, SLORC
officials stage-managed the proceedings and overrode even limited
opposition, interrogating and harassing delegates whoattemped to
deviate from the regime's position, and even sentenced one prodemocracy
delegate to 20 years in
prison for distributing information critical of
the convention
proceedings. It seems clear that
the SLORC's domination
of the convention,
which has no mandate from the people, is to ensure
adoption of a constitutional blueprint effectively
guaranteeing the
military's continued hold on power.
The Government reinforces its rule via a pervasive
security apparatus
led by the Directorate of Defense Services Intelligence
(DDSI) and the National Intelligence Bureau (NIB). Control is buttressed by restrictions on
contact with
foreigners; surveillance of government employees and
private citizens;
and arrests, detentions, harassment, intimidation, and mistreatment of
political activists.
The Government justifies its security measures as necessary to maintain
order and national unity, although
several longstanding insurgent groups
have reached accommodations with the SLORC in recent years and th ohers pose
little threat to major population centers.
Burma is primarily an agricultural country, although it
also has
substantial mineral, fishing, and timber resources. After
Ne Win's
26-year rule reduced southeast Asia's richest land to a U.N.-designated
"least developed country," the SLORC abandoned the "Burmese Way to
Socialism" in 1988, opening up the
economy to permit private sector expansion and attract investment and badly needed foreign exchange,
which has
resulted in a limited improvement in the economy. The
Government has hindered development of the private sector, however, by failing to address fundamental
problems: restrictions on private
commerce; constantly changing rules and
regulations; overcentralized decision making; a bloated
bureaucracy; a greatly overvalued currency; poor civilian infrastructure; and grossly disproportionate
military spending.
There was no marked increase in the level of human
rights abuses in
1993, in large measure because the SLORC had already been so successful
in intimidating the Burmese people. At the
same time, Burmese authorities took only limited steps to correct longstanding, serious human rights
violations. The Government's use of forced labor--especially
as porters for the army--as well as
forced resettlement of civilians continued,
causing hundreds of deaths due to
disease, harsh treatment, and overwork.
Five hundred or more Burmese
remained in prison for
political reasons, including more than 40 parliamentarians elected in 1990; approximately 200,000
Rohingyas (Burmese Muslims from Arakan
State) remained in refugee camps in Bangladesh; a few thousand students and
dissidents continued as exiles in
Thailand; and roughly 71,000 Burmese live in ethnic minority camps in Thailand near the Burma
border.
Nobel Laureate Aung San Suu Kyi remained under house
arrest, her fifth
year of detention by the SLORC, without being
charged or having access
to legal proceedings.
The SLORC persisted in denying
basicfredom of
speech and assembly, and arbitrary intrusions into private life remained
pervasive. In a closed trial, in October, the regime sentenced 12
dissidents,
including one of the delegates to the National
Convention, to 20 years
in prison for distributing anti-SLORC information.
The SLORC ignored a comprehensive resolution on Burma
adopted by
consensus in 1993 at the U.N. Human Rights Commission
(UNHRC) calling
for an end to human rights violations in Burma, the unconditional release of Aung San Suu Kyi
and all other political prisoners, and
the implementation of the 1990
elections.
On the positive side, the SLORC commuted all death
sentences handed
down since it took power; released over 700 persons believed to be
political prisoners; permitted the first-ever meetings between
political prisoners and foreign visitors; and allowed additional family
visits to Aung San Suu Kyi. Over
50,000 Rohingyas returned to Arakan
State in 1993, and the
Government sgnd a Memorandum of Understanding in
November with the
U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) providing
for a presence in Arakan State to monitor the
repatriation and reintegration of
Rohingyas from Bangladesh.
Nonetheless, on balance, in view of the persistent abuses
by the SLORC,
including its use of forced labor, its wholesale denial of basic political rights,
and blatant manipulation of the national convention, Burma must continue
to be judged a serious violator of
international human rights norms.
The expressions of deep concern
by the international community about the
human rights situation in Burma in successive resolutions adopted since 1991 by
the UNCHR and the U.N.
General Assembly have failed thus far to have an
appreciable impact on
the SLORC's behavior.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect
for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
Although secret, extajuicial killings reportedly were
carried out in
recent years, there were no such reports in 1993. As in
the past,
credible sources reported many deaths among those impressed for forced
labor projects and porterage.
There were no confirmed incidents of summary executions
of civilians in
1993. In late
February, U Win Ko, a deputy-elect of
the National
League for Democracy (NLD) and finance minister in the opposition
National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma (NCGUB), was
murdered in Kunming, China. Burmese
authorities have denied any involvement, and independent sources suggest other parties were
responsible. U Hla Pe, who served as the NCGUB's Minister of Education
and Health and Minister of
Information, was murdered in Bangkok in mid-June. There is, however,
no evidence as to the perpetrators.
b. Disappearance
The number of disappearances in 1993 was probably little
changed from the previous year, but accurate estimates
are impossible
since the Government will not provide information on these cases.
Family and friends assume that those who have disappeared are under
detention or have died in jal. Family members can generally determine
that relatives have been arrested, but the process of
obtaining information can take a long
time. Some who disappeared were later
reported as
arrested. Others
may have dropped out of sight or quietly
attempted to
leave the country for fear of arrest.
Authorities rarely responded to inquiries from families
concerning the whereabouts and welfare of disappeared or
jailed
relatives. The few
replies routinely consisted of only general
statements that such people were arrested for violations
of existing
laws.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or
Degrading
Treatment
or Punishment
Fragmentary evidence documents that mistreatment of
political detainees
continued to take place in Burmese prisons and detention centers operated by the security
services. There has been a declin inthe number of detentions,
during which the worst abuse reportedly
occurs. Political detainees are
held incommunicado, with family or
lawyers unable to visit during what can
be a protracted retrial period. The most
common forms of maltreatment during this
period were sleep and food deprivation coupled with round-the-clock
interrogation.
In recent years, severe beatings and forcing prisoners to
squat or
assume unnatural positions for lengthy periods have
also been reported,
and techniques designed to intimidate and disorient prisoners prior to interrogation
have been routine. Such practices as
electrical shocks to the genitals,
suffocation, and cigarette burns have also been reported
in the past,
but there were no confirmed reports of these practices
in 1993.
During 1993 there were no reports alleging torture of
convicted
political prisoners or deaths linked to the conditions of
their
imprisonment. Khin
Maung Myint of the leftist People's
Progressive Party (PPP) died in prison in 1993,
apparently of natural
cauesafter repeated stays in a prison medical facility despite his family's request for his
transfer to a civilian hospital. Interviews by U.S. citizens and
Congressional visitors on private travel with
SLORC-selected prisoners
at Insein prison near Rangoon indicate an overly harsh prison regimen,
i.e., little exercise, no reading or writing materials for many if not
most prisoners, poor nutrition, years of solitary
confinement for some, and illness
induced by sleeping on concrete cell floors. Student leader Min Ko Naing, who
met with two visiting American Congressmen at Insein Prison in August,
displayed the effects of serious physical and psychological abuse. A
few prominent prisoners,
such as former NLD Chairmen Tin Oo and Kyi
Maung, were provided
limited reading material and bungalow
accommodations.
Those interviewed acknowledged
receiving medicine as
well as supplemental food brought by their families
during 15-minute visits
permite every 2 weeks.
The Government continued to bar the International
Committee of the Red
Cross (ICRC) from visiting detainees or convicted prisoners of any
kind.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
Arbitrary arrest and detention are practiced routinely by
the SLORC.
Throughout the year at least scores of political
activists were detained for low-level political protests,
such as
handing out opposition flyers, painting political
graffiti, or shouting
opposition slogans.
Some detentions coincided with
the startup of
sessions of the national convention or with various political
anniversaries.
Shortly after the January 9
launching of the national
convention, for example, the authorities announced the arrest of 23
activists including Nay Lin, a youth
organizer for the Federation of Trade Unions of
Burma, who allegedly painted graffiti on a Rangoon wharf. Some
students were
picked up for staging a brief demonstration on June 7 at a suburban
campus of Rangoon University. Several NLD
members, including at least
one successful candidate in the 1990 election, were detained after
taking part in a wreath-laying ceremony at Aung San's
tomb. Between June and August, the authorities also arrested 12
persons, including the writer Ma Thida
and the successful NLD candidate and delegate to the national
convention, Dr. Aung Khin Sint, for distributing opposition literature. In what was widely recognized as a warning to others, all were
convicted in mid-October and given harsh 20-year prison sentences.
While most detainees were members of political parties
or engaged in
overtly political activities, businessmen and other private citizens
were also subject to arbitrary detention, particularly as the increase
in private economic activity in 1993 led to additional scrutiny of
businesses by security
forces.
The military again extended the house arrest of former
NLD General
Secretary and Nobel Peace Laureate Aung San Suu Kyi. The decision was
taken under the provisions of the Law to Safeguard the State from the Dangers of
Subversive Elements--also the basis for her initial year of house arrest which
began in 1989. As
amended in August 1991, the law
authorizes 1-year extensions of arbitrary detention without charge or trial for up to 5 years. Aung San Suu Kyi has never been formally charged. The authorities have offered her an opportunity to substitute foreign exile for
her current house arrest, but she
declined to leave the country. The
military Government again allowed her
husband and two sons to visit her in
1993. The authorities refused a proposed
visit by a group of fellow Nobel
Laureates seeking her release.
There is no provision in Burmese law for judicial
determination of the
legality of detention.
Bail may be granted by civilian
courts in some
circumstances. The
number of political detainees not
sentenced by year's end was impossible to determine accurately.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
Throughout 1993 the Government continued to rule by
decree and was not
boundby ny constitutional provisions guaranteeing fair public trials or
any other rights.
Until abolished in September
1992, military tribunals exercised jurisdiction over all cases involving defiance of orders issued
by the SLORC or local commanders. These tribunals could mete out only
three sentences--the death penalty, life
imprisonment, 3 years or more
imprisonment with labor--regardless of existing laws. On January 1, however, a government decree
codified an existing moratorium on
capital punishment by commuting all previous
SLORC-imposed death sentences to life imprisonment. It also
capped all other prison terms at 10 years for anyone convicted during the SLORC era.
After denying for years that it held any political
prisoners, in April 1992, the Government
announced its intention to free those
persons "detained politically" who did not represent a threat to state security. Between that time and the end of 1993, the SLRC announced the release of more
than 2,000 persons, although fewer than 200 were publicly identified. The
failure to identify most released persons invites suspicions about whether they were actually political
prisoners, but opposition activists believe this was generally the case. Reliable
sources indicate that some of those released in 1993 were monks imprisoned
for participating in 1988 prodemocracy rallies and a 1990 boycott action,
including prominent Rangoon Abbot Thu Mingala; prodemocracy businessman
Ye Htoon; and
numerous Karens and others suspected of supporting the 1991
Irrawaddy Delta insurgency.
The 1992 decree also implicitly acknowledged that
political prisoners
had been held not only in
upcountry locations--many of which were still believed to hold some
political prisoners at the end of 1993. The remaining political
prisoners included former military officers Tin Oo and Kyi Maung, both
of whom had served as
chairmen of he LD, comedian Zargana, student
leader Min Ko
Naing, and lawyer U Nay Min.
Since September 1992, civil courts have handled civil
and criminal
cases, as well as political trials. Civilian courts have reportedly
become fairer in handling nonpolitical cases since 1988, but remain
plagued by corruption, inordinate delays in processing cases and
appeals, and poor training and unprofessional behavior on
the part of some court officers. Some
basic due process rights, including the right to a public trial
and to be represented by a defense attorney, are generally respected by civilian judges. Judges are appointed by the Supreme Court with the approval of the
SLORC (which also names justices to the
Supreme Court). At present, judges
must be at least law officers with legal
training. Defense attorneys are permitted to call and
cross-examine witnesses, but their
primary purpose is to bargain with the judge to
obtain the shorest possible sentence for their clients. Cases,
almost all political, which are tried in courtooms in prison compounds are not open to the public.
In such cases, while
defendants may have access to a defense attorney,
counsel appears to
serve no purpose other than to provide moral
support. Reliable
reports indicate that in political cases due
process
is largely ignored and verdicts manipulated.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family,
Home, or
Correspondence
The State continued to intrude extensively into the lives
of private
citizens during 1993.
Forced entry and warrantless,
unannounced
searches of private homes were often conducted. Through its extensive
intelligence network, the Government closely monitored the travel,
whereabouts, and activities of many Burmese, particularly those known
to be politically
active. Security personnel
selectively monitored private
correspondence and telephone calls. Contacts or communications
involving foreigners were subject to especially
intense scrutiny, and government
emloyees wre required to obtain advance
permission before meeting with foreigners.
Despite some efforts by the
Government to improve its image by meeting
in October with the head of the British Broadcasting
Corporation Far Eastern Service, official propaganda
continued in 1993
to take aim at various foreign news services, and private citizens were
generally unable to subscribe directly to foreign publications. Two
international newsmagazines were distributed through official channels
and were available to the
public at large, but censors occasionally
banned issues or
deleted articles criticizing local conditions or
reporting
opposition activities. Foreign
radio broadcasts remained a
prime source of information for the people and even for
the military,
despite the Government's hostility to this news source.
The
authorities sought to register the growing number of television
satellite receivers but appeared ready to tolerate ther se. Some foreign journalists, including
television crews, continued to be granted access to the
country, but their movements and contacts were closely
monitored.
In its most intensive and egregious infringement of
privacy rights, the
Government continued its program of forced resettlement,
involving an estimated half-million urban
residents throughout Burma since 1989.
While most of those forced to
move were described as "squatters," some people had been living in and
paying rent on their former home sites for many years and had
constructed permanent houses. The
Government has made people move, almost totally at their own expense, to "new towns" which are
far from their previous residences. "New
town" occupants often live on former rice paddy land, subject to flooding in the rainy
season, without adequate transportation,
medical
facilities, shelter, or sanitation. In 1993 conditions at some resettlement
sites improved, but, according to
international observers, such
improvements er often
unable to keep pace with the rate of new arrivals.
Some outside experts accept the Government's explanation that the resettlement program
serves legitimate long-term urban
planning objectives, but they do not endorse
the forceful methods used to move people.
g. Use of Excessive Force and Violations of
Humanitarian
Law in Internal Conflicts
The Burmese Army has battled diverse insurgencies for
more than four
decades in conflicts that have resulted in
widespread human rights
violations, including mistreatment and killing of prisoners, rape,
neglect of the sick and wounded, impressment of civilians for porter
duty, and indiscriminate attacks on civilians.
While the Government
was responsible for the bulk of these abuses (the Burmese armed forces
nearly doubled the
number of combat units since 1988), insurgent groups
have also violated
humanitarian principles. Insurgent
groups, such as
the Karen, Mon, and Karenni, continued to engage in
small-scale
fighting, motl in remote areas, to try to gain
greater autonomy from the dominant
ethnic Burman majority. Some receive limited outside support from private
international humanitarian and religious
organizations. The Shan United Army (SUA) also claims to be fighting for greater
autonomy but engages primarily in drug
trafficking. Several former insurgent
groups with which the Government now has cease-fire accommodations likewise are important
narcotics trafficking
organizations. The
continued suspension of large-scale military offensives against insurgents in
Karen state and elsewhere, together with
ongoing government efforts to reach a
peace accord with the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), sharply reduced the level of fighting during 1993.
In 1993 the use of forced porterage continued, with
attendant
casualties. Most
of these deaths, roughly estimated to be in
the
hundreds, were from disease and overwork, though reports
of
mistreatment and rape were also common. The Burmese military also
continued t us corvee labor and prison labor in
combat areas. There
were unconfirmed reports, for example, that on at least two occasions a
combined total of as many as 700 inmates from a prison near Rangoon
were taken to work as porters in eastern Burma. Credible reports from
multiple sources
indicated that porters have
carried ammunition, supplies, and the
wounded under the harshest conditions.
Other well-placed sources also
note that they are subject to hostile fire as well as maltreatment at
the hands of Burmese soldiers. When porters
are wounded, ill, or
unable to continue their work, some have been reportedly left
unattended to die.
At the end of their service,
survivors often have
had to find their own means to return home.
It was also credibly
reported that some members of the military used sham threats of
impressment to extort
money from villagers.
Forced rural resettlement displaced ethnic minority
villagers in Karen
and Kayah states and contributed to an increase of about 6,000 urese in
camps on the Thai side of the border. Local sources reported some
amelioration of conditions following the completion of
the railroad to Loikaw for Catholic villagers in Kayah State who had been
resettled in March 1992, and that
many returned to their original homes. Reports from
Karen State suggest rural relocation schemes continued to play a key role in the Government's
counterinsurgency strategy.
Despite this evidence that the Burmese authorities were
not prepared
fully to implement their obligations under the
Geneva Conventions, in
April and November the Government for the first time permitted the
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to conduct two short
seminars on humanitarian law for groups of military officers.
Antigovernment groups were responsible for violence
causing civilian
and military deaths, including reported killings of civilians during
attacks on villages and ambushes or mining of transportation routes.
In two separate inidnts in February and March, over 100 confirmed
civilian deaths resulted from military conflicts involving the narcotics-
trafficking Shan
United Army. Credible reports
indicate Karenni insurgents executed at
least eight captured Burmese soldiers, and civilian deaths in a transport train blown up by a
land mine were attributed to Mon
activists. Additionally, reliable
multiple source sindicated that Karen
insurgents resorted to forced labor for
porterage and impressed youths into military service.
Section 2 Respect
for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
Severe restrictions on freedom of speech and the press
persisted throughout 1993. Although the degree of enforcement varied,
the Government generally continued to demonstrate little tolerance for
opposing views or criticism. Private
citizens remained reluctant to
express opinions for fear of government informers. The U.N. Human
Rights Commission (UNHRC)
Special Rappoteu deplored the "pervasive
atmosphere of fear
and repression" in Burma in his report adopted by
the UNHRC in
March. The Government exercised
strict censorship of all
news and
publications produced in the country.
Nevertheless, private magazines found it possible to
publish articles
on once taboo economic subjects, and some former political prisoners
were allowed to publish on nonsensitive topics.
The government-controlled press and broadcast services continued to publish some limited criticism
and satire in 1993. The Government adopted a tolerant approach
toward the increasing activities of the
United States Information Service in
Rangoon, permitting it to distribute publications and organize discussions which treated themes
involving human rights and fundamental
freedoms. The authorities' actions
in attempting to register private
satellites dishes and impose fines on
the many Burmese
who had set up unauthorized satellite television receivers slowed the
spread of access to uncensored television nes ad other programming from
abroad. No
seizures of satellite receivers,
however, were reported in
1993.
The Government made heavy use of its monopoly of
television and radio
to pursue its political policies and, with the
exception of coverage of
some aspects of the national convention, did not accord air time to
opposing views.
The same was true of all
newspapers--two national
dailies in Burmese and one in English, as well as daily papers
published by the Rangoon city government and the Central
(Mandalay area) Military Command. A
revamping and renaming of the country's main daily in April resulted in increased publication of locally
edited international wire service news,
but that paper, as well as other
newspapers, remained staunchly official organs, with military officials appointing editors and
vetting editorials. Especially for
domestic news, journalists had to hew to strict
publishing and broadcast
guidelines. All
forms of media--domesti ad imported
books and periodicals, stage
plays, motion pictures, and musical recordings--were
officially controlled and censored.
Persons working in these fields
admitted to exercising self-censorship lest they run afoul of the authorities.
University teachers and professors remained subject to
the same
restrictions on freedom of speech, political activities,
and
publications as other government employees. These included warnings
against criticism of the Government; instructions
not to discuss
politics while at work; and strictures against joining or supporting
political parties, engaging in political activity, and meeting foreign
officials. While
all teachers remained subject to
dismissal for
political disloyalty, some left the profession voluntarily to escape
the political
pressure.
The universities, closed for several years after the
1988 disturbances,
were open for most of 1993. However, they were closed from December
1992 until mid-February in what many believe was amoe to avoid student
demonstrations during the
startup of the politically sensitive national
convention.
Meanwhile, on the main campus of Rangoon University,
fences built around
the various faculties prior to the university's
reopening remained in place, reportedly to help
control potential student unrest. In a move also widely believed intended primarily to disperse and isolate
students, a fifth national university
opened outside Rangoon in November.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
The Government does not respect the right to freedom of
peaceful assembly.
A prohibition on outdoor assemblies of more than
five people was unevenly enforced, but political demonstrations were strictly banned.
Political parties were required to request permission
from the authorities even to hold internal meetings of their own membership.
The military's intimidation generally served to discourage public expressions of
antigovernment sentiments. In the few reported instances of unauthorized
political activity, security forces
generally intervened swiftly to detain or
imprison participants in unauthorized
meetings and to halt
distribution of antigovernment leaflets.
The authorities reportedly were
quick to deploy a large-scale force in Mandalay
in September when a spontaneous demonstration unexpectedly took on political overtones.
The right of association existed only for those
organizations, including trade
associations and professional bodies, permitted
by law and duly registered with the Government. Moreover, the
Government severely restricted the activities of even these organizations. Ten political parties remained formally
legal at the end of 1993--down from 75
at the beginning of 1992--but they were
virtually paralyzed through arrests, intimidation, and surveillance. In February the authorities permitted a large private funeral to be organized for the
wife of
one-time oppositionist
and former Prime Minister U Nu. While
the
Government deie visas to two sons living abroad, it
permitted a
daughter active in the Burmese opposition in India to
attend.
c. Freedom of Religion
Freedom of religion is provided for in law. Despite the privileged position of Buddhists
in government service, this right is
widely observed in practice although there have been human rights abuses against some
believers. Buddhist pagodas, Muslim mosques, and Christian churches
operate openly with minimal
interference, at least in those areas of central Burma accessible to independent observers.
Christians, Muslims, and animists are
particularly numerous among
minority ethnic groups.
While generally allowing these groups to practice freely,
security services monitor the activities of
religious communities. The
Government requires all religious organizations to
register and subjects religious publications
to the same control and censorship imposed on secular ones. Restrictions on unauthorized religious
groups remained in force, and the
military
continued to monitor activities i and arund Buddhist monasteries and
pagodas. The SLORC
has been largely successful in halting
political
activism among the
Buddhist clergy.
Religious groups can and did establish links with coreligionists in other countries, although
such links were reportedly monitored by
the Government. The Catholic
Church, for example, maintained ties to
the Vatican. While foreign religious
representatives were usually allowed only to obtain visas for short stays, in some cases they
were permitted to preach to Burmese
congregations. Though permanent
missionary establishments have not been
permitted since the 1960's, some foreign
Catholic nuns and at least one priest continued to reside upcountry, most working in homes for
the aged.
As part of its large-scale "urban development"
program in recent years,
the Government has taken control of several Christian and Muslim
properties throughout Burma, including cemeteries. Onthe other hand,
school authorities in Rangoon eventually exempted Muslim students from
bowing to their
teachers, when those students complained the action resembled a practice
used in Buddhist worship.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country,
Foreign
Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation
Although Burmese citizens have the legal right to live
anywhere in the
country, both urban and rural residents have been subject to arbitrary relocation. Except for limitations in areas of insurgent activity, Burmese citizens
could travel freely within the country
but had to inform local authorities of
their temporary place of residence.
People staying overnight with friends or relatives within their home
cities or villages were also required to
report this to the authorities.
People who failed to report either guests or intentions
to stay overnight to the authorities were theoretically subject to a jail term, and arrests were occasionally
made. Noncitizen residents, inluding ethnic Indians and
Chinese born in Burma who hold
foreigners' registration cards, had to obtain prior permission to travel.
Though travel strictures continued to ease, the
Government maintained
controls on departure from the country. While the
authorities simplified certain requirements for obtaining a passport, other requirements plus
bureaucratic procedures and corruption
still presented formidable hurdles.
Those traveling abroad to work,
however, encountered fewer difficulties,
particularly as Burmese authorities sought to increase hard currency earnings from the taxes they impose
on such persons' earnings.
Emigrants, by contrast, were required to reimburse the Government for
"educational expenses" before receiving
exit permission and were
severely limited in what they could take with them.
Burmese citizens who left legally were generally allowed
to return to
visit relatives, and those wishing to extend their stays found it easier to obtain permission to
do so. Even some who had staye aboad illegally and acquired
foreign citizenship found it easier to
return to visit or do business. In a
move widely believed to be intended to encourage
wealthy older overseas
Burmese to retire in Burma, the Government announced in May that
Burmese abroad would have 2 years to reapply for citizenship lost
through naturalization in another country.
At about the same time, the
Ministry of Home Affairs
announced that Burmese abroad holding expired
travel documents
could obtain new passports or an extension of their
old ones.
Obtaining these benefits, however, remained subject
to government approval on a case-by-case
basis. Moreover, some Burmese living abroad, particularly those who
had traveled or remained abroad
illegally, continued to fear subjecting
themselves to potential punitive action by Burmese
authorities if they
should return to Burma.
By September, 14 persons had been
allowed to
resettle in Burma, and another 14 had had their Burmese passort
extended or replaced.
In 1993 foreigners were allowed into the country in
increasing numbers
on an individual, rather than only on a tour group, basis.
The
authorities also took several steps to liberalize travel for foreigners
within Burma, though large areas of the country remained off limits on
security grounds.
Tourist and family visit visas
are routinely granted
for 2 to 4 weeks, and
can be extended on a case-by-case basis.
However, select
foreigners, such as human rights advocates and
political figures,
continued to be denied entry visas unless traveling under the
aegis of a sponsor acceptable to the Government. A
private voluntary
organization, Medecins Sans Frontieres/Holland, is now
operating in Burma and has foreign personnel
assigned to Rangoon on a permanent basis.
In April 1992, following the flight into Bangladesh of
an estimated
265,000 Muslims from Arakan State in order to escape military
repression, the Governments of Bangladesh and Burma signed a Memoradum
of Understanding providing for the voluntary repatriation
of the refugees. However, Burma, unlike
Bangladesh, did not accept a role for UNHCR in the repatriation process at that time. In the absence of an adequate
international monitoring presence in Burma, most
Rohingyas were
reluctant to return to Arakan. After a private visit by High Commissioner Sadako Ogata to Burma in late
July and subsequent talks between the
Burmese authorities and UNHCR representatives, the Government of Burma signed a
Memorandum of Understanding with the
UNHCR in November which provides that the UNHCR will have a presence in Arakan State and will have
access to all returnees. The agreement is intended to cover the
monitoring and administration of the
return to Burma in safety and dignity of
about 200,000 Rohingyas who remain in refugee camps in Bangladesh.
Of those who fled between late 1991 and mid-1992, some 50,000 were repatriated to Burma in
1993.
Foreign refugees or displaced persons may not resettle or
seek safe
haven in Burma.
The Government treats people claiming to
be refugees
as illegal immigrants and expels or imprisons them.
Section 3 Respect
for Political Rights: The Right of
Citizens
to Change Their
Government
Burma is governed solely by the military, and the
Burmese people do not
have the right or the ability peacefully to change their government.
Since 1988 active duty military officers have occupied many important
positions throughout the
bureaucracy, particularly at the policymaking
level.
Despite the appointment of
several civilians to the Cabinet in
1992, military or
recently retired military officers have continued to
occupy most cabinet-level positions, numerous
director general and
subordinate posts, and key positions once held by technocrats in the
economic ministries.
In the 1990 election the NLD and associated parties
achieved an
overwhelming victory.
The SLORC subsequently set aside the
results and
disqualified, detained, arrested, or drove into exile many successful
candidates, including most of the NLD leadership.
By the end of 1993,
174 of the 485 deputies elected had either been
disqualified, resigned under pressure,
gone into exile, been detained, or died.
At least 46
successful candidates from the election or prominent
NLD activists were serving prison
sentences. In 1992 the SLORC held discussions with selected
representatives of the few political
parties which had not been banned outright, with a view to staging a national convention to
write a new constitution without the
participation of most leading members of
the democratic opposition. The national
convention finally opened on January 9
and continued intermittently throughout the
year until September 16, when it finally adjourned until the following January.
Of the approximately 700 delegates attending, only about 150 held mandates from
the 1990 elections. Members of six of the eight interest groups
represented were selected by the SLORC. Using these groups as a
majority, the Government forced through its own rules,
its own agenda,
and finally its own principles for a new constitution, guaranteeing continued military
control of the Government. During an intermediate stage, representatives
of the NLD and minority groups were able
to put forward some proposals clearly at
odds with government preferences. But
the authorities carefully
controlled the level of visible opposition by censoring presentations,
declaring unwelcome documents off-limits
to the public, forbidding discussion from
the floor, and intimidating individual delegates behind the scenes.
There has been no
genuine public discussion of the process that will be used to arrive at
a new constitution.
One NLD victor in the 1990 election and national
convention delegate,
Dr. Aung Khin Sint, was convicted and sentenced to
20 years' imprisonment for distributing
opposition literature to his fellow
delegates.
In some reios where government forces exercise limited or
no control,
including in cases where the Government has reached
an accommodation
with former insurgent groups, indigenous populations have
considerable autonomy in running their own
political and economic affairs.
Even in government-controlled
areas, they generally retain their social and cultural institutions.
Section 4
Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of
Human
Rights
No internal human rights organizations are allowed to
exist. The Government continued to oppose outside scrutiny of its human rights record but permitted somewhat
greater access in 1993 for some
journalists, nongovernmental organizations, and
foreign government officials wishing to examine the country's human rights situation. Burmese authorities
allowed UNHRC Special Rapporteur
Professor Yokota to conduct another fact-finding
mission in the country in November 1993.
In 1991, 1992,and again in 1993, the U.N. General
Assembly (UNGA)
adopted increasingly strong resolutions urging the Burmese Government
to end human rights abuses and undertake genuine democratic reform.
The 1993 UNGA resolution called on the Government to release
unconditionally Aung San Suu Kyi and other detained political leaders
and to respect the expressed will of the Burmese people by implementing
the results of the
1990 elections.
The UNHRC Special Rapporteur appointed in March 1992,
Professor Yozo
Yokota, visited Burma in December 1992 and presented
his report in
February 1993. He
returned to Burma in November 1993 to
fulfill his
mandate as Special Rapporteur. The report
offered a harsh catalog of
human rights abuses in Burma and called for far-reaching remedial
action. In later reviewing the report, the UNHRC took special aim at
the refusal of
Burmese authorities to accord Dr. Yokota the "full and
unreserved cooperation" and access to persons of his
choice that had
beencoditions of his mission. The Government, for its part, disputed
the Special Rapporteur's mandate and rejected many of his
findings.
Section 5
Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Disability, Language, or Social Status
Women
Women in Burma in general have traditionally enjoyed a
high status,
exercising most of the same basic rights as men and taking an active
role in business.
Consistent with traditional
culture, they keep their
own names after marriage and often control family finances. However,
participation of women
remained low in the minuscule industrial sector
and in the
bureaucracy; a few professions, such as forestry and
geology, are
entirely barred to women. Women do not
consistently
receive equal pay for equal work. There continued to be no women's
rights organizations in Burma or government agency specifically devoted
to safeguarding women's interests.
There was no nationwide pattern of violence directed
specifically against women. However, reliable reports
continued t idicate that many Burmese women and children
in the border
areas were forced or lured into serving as
prostitutes in Thailand by criminals and criminal
organizations.
Recruitment of these women generally occurred in remote
areas where Burmese officials were unable to prevent the practice.
In
1993, impressment, including of women, for military porterage duties
continued, with attendant casualties.
Although Burmese culturally view rape with great
abhorrence, in 1993
there continued to be a consistent pattern of
reports alleging rapes of
ethnic minority women in border areas by Burmese soldiers.
Children
In mid-July the Government issued a law stipulating
children's rights
and containing provisions covering their protection
and custody,
education, employment, and judicial treatment.
Burmese authorities also adopted in September a
"National Program of
Action" for the survival, protection, and
development of the country's children. By year's end it
remained unler whether the Government intended to give
the program the
political impetus needed to ensure the
interministerial cooperation and resource allocation
required to make
it a success.
Government and UNICEF figures indicated the plight of
children to be
worse than was earlier realized. Infant mortality is high (94 per
1000); 37 percent of children under 3 are severely or moderately
malnourished; 31 percent of children aged 5 through 14 suffer from
iodine deficiency; only 62 percent of children enroll in primary
school; and only 25 percent of children complete the prescribed 5-year
course.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities
Burma's numerous ethnic minorities, which have their own
distinct cultures and languages, have been
underrepresented in the
Government and largely excluded from the military
leadership.
Despite recently increased government investment in the
border areas in road, hospital, and school
construction, economic
deveopent among minorities continued to lag and many still live at the
subsistence level.
Since only people who can prove long familial links to
Burma are
accorded full citizenship, some people not of ethnic
Burmese ancestry, primarily Indians and Chinese,
continued to be denied
full citizenship and to be excluded from government positions.
Individuals without full citizenship are also barred from certain
advanced university programs in medicine and technological fields and
are often the object of
prejudice.
However, Indian and Chinese minorities continued to play an
important role in the economy--a situation resented
by many Burmans.
In Arakan State, some Rohingyas, who in general do not
enjoy full
citizenship, have also have been denied national
identity cards.
Though a limited number of outside observers were
able to visit Arakan
State, albeit on a government-controlled basis, credible reports
continued to emerge of discrimination and travel restrictions for
Muslims in the area.
The
well-documentd hman rights abuses which precipitated the
original Rohingya exodus, however, appeared to have
largely subsided.
At the same time, claims that Buddhists from
elsewhere in Arakan State were being resettled nearer
the border in
previously Muslim areas were reliably confirmed.
Multiple, reliable sources indicated that the military
occasionally required minority populations in the border
regions to provide without compensation vehicles,
equipment, and
lodging for soldiers.
Religious
Minorities
The SLORC continued to associate itself closely with the
majority Buddhist religion, giving wide publicity to the
participation by its members in various Buddhist rites
and ceremonies.
While this reportedly was a cause of concern among some members of
other religions, the Government in fact
continued to permit members of the major non-Buddhist
faiths to
practice their religion.
Religious organizations, however,
remained
subject to registration and censorship controls
applicable o he entire population. Restrictions on Muslims in Arakan
State appear to be result primarily from their lack of full citizenship
and to discrimination on ethnic grounds.
People with
Disabilities
Official assistance to persons with disabilities is
extremely limited.
There is no law mandating accessibility to
government facilities for
those with disabilities.
A small number benefit from the
services of
the Mary Chapman School for the Deaf in Rangoon, which recently began
receiving government patronage, or from modest religious-associated
assistance programs funded through private donations. Most disabled
persons, however,
must rely on traditional family structures to provide
for their welfare,
and many become destitute. The principal
exception
is disabled
members of the military, who receive medical
attention, rehabilitation, and financial assistance,
though most
veterans receive such benefits only for a few years
after discharge.
Reliable reports indicate that high-ranking
officers receive better treatmet han the rank and
file.
Since 1986 Burmese authorities have permitted
representatives of the
ICRC to work in Burma to upgrade provision of
orthopedic prostheses.
Because of both landmines and train-related
accidents, Burma has one of the highest rates of amputees
in the world.
Section 6 Worker
Rights
a. The Right of Association
In 1993 there continued to be no right of association
among workers in
Burma. Workers
were not free to form or join trade
unions of their own
choosing, and leaders of unofficial labor associations, such as youth
organizer Nay Lin of the Federation of Trade Unions of Burma, were
subject to arrest.
A new labor law was promised in
connection with the
drafting of a new
constitution, but it is doubtful the document will
ensure the right
of workers to organize freely. At a
minimum, any
trade unions which
might form are expected to be firmly under
government control.
Workers are not permitted to strike, and
there
were no reported instances in 1993 of attempts to do so.
In July 1989, the United States suspended Burma's
eligibility for trade
concessions under the Generalized System of
Preferences program, pending steps to afford its labor
force
internationally recognized worker rights. In 1990 the U.S. Government
declined a formal request to reconsider the
suspension.
In June 1993, the International Labor Organization (ILO)
Conference cited Burma in a "special
paragraph", its strongest form of
censure, for its longstanding failure to take
"the necessary measures
in legislation and practice to guarantee to all workers and all
employers without any distinction and without prior authorization the
right to organize even outside the existing trade union structure
should they so wish."
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain
Collectively
Workers continued not to have the right to organize and
bargain
collectively.
Government arbitration boards, which once
theoretically provided a means for airing labor disputes,
were
abolished in 1988.
The Government unilaterally sets wages in the
public sector. In
the private sector, wages are set by
market forces.
In a job-scarce economy, this means employers determine wage levels.
The Government pressures joint ventures not to pay salaries greater
than those of ministers or other high-level employees. Joint ventures
circumvent this via
supplemental pay, including remuneration paid in
foreign
exchange certificates, as well as through incentive and
overtime pay and other fringe benefits. Foreign firms
generally set wages near those of the domestic private
sector but
follow the practice of joint ventures in awarding
supplemental wages and benefits.
No special export processing zones exist.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Burma's legal code does not prohibit forced labor. The
military routinely employed corvee labor on its myriad
building
projects and,acording to credible reports, officials
accepted bribes to
excuse some people from work. Forced labor was used in constructing
the railroad line opened in 1993 to Loikaw, capital of Burma's Kayah
State.
The Burmese Army has for decades impressed civilian males
to serve as
porters. According
to reliable reports, in 1993 the army
continued to
abduct youths off the streets, chiefly in minority areas but also in
some urban areas of central Burma. Women were also occasionally
impressed as porters, cooks, and laundresses for soldiers in frontline
areas, according to
credible reports. Military
authorities commonly
permitted
conscripts and their families to pay them money in lieu of
porter duty.
In June a Burmese diplomat in Singapore organized the
confinement and forced return to Burma of a group of 11
Burmese seamen
transiting Singapore en route from Australia to
Thailand after the men
prevailed in a wage dispute with the help of the International
Transport Federation.
All remained free in 1993 but are
unabe o regain
employment abroad.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
Children aged 13 to 15 may work 4 hours a day. The "Child Law" of July
14, 1993, governs most matters concerning children under the age of 16.
It gives each such child the right to "engage in work in accordance
with law and its own volition." To date, the "law" referred to
includes both the Factories Act of 1951 and the Children Pledging of
Labor Act, this latter
being an Indian law from 1933 still on the
books. In
theory, the penalty for employers
disregarding this
regulation was 2
years in prison, but there were no reports of any
prosecutions in
1993 for illegally employing children, despite the fact
that, in cities, working children were highly
visible. They were hired
at lower pay rates than adults for the same kind of work, and economic
pressure forced them to work not only for their survival but also to
support their families.
Burmese law requires chidre to
attend school
through the fourth standard, usually reached between the ages of 12 and
15. The
Department of Basic Education estimated,
however, that 38
percent of
children aged 5 to 9 never enroll in school. Of those who
do, less than 30
percent complete the fourth grade.
Two-thirds of
Burma's primary schoolchildren, principally in rural
areas, leave
school for economic reasons. In the higher grades, the drop-out rate
for girls is double that for boys.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
Depressed economic conditions and lack of attention by
government authorities continued to dictate substandard
conditions for workers.
The Law on Fundamental Workers Rights
of 1964
and the Factories Act of 1951 regulate working
conditions. There
is a legally prescribed 5-day, 35-hour
workweek for
employees in the public sector and a 6-day,
44-hour workweek for private and parastatal sector
employees, with
overtime paid for additional work. Workers have 21 paid holidays a
yar.
Only government employees are protected by minimum wage
provisions. The
minimum wage was raised in March to $3 per day
(20
kyats) at the official exchange rate, but less than
$0.20 at the
unofficial, free market rate. The Government raised wages for public
employees by 25 percent in March, but pay in the state sector remained
far below the amount needed to provide a decent standard
of living or
counter the practice of
taking bribes. The actual average
wage rate
for casual laborers in Rangoon was about twice the
official minimum.
Wages continued to lag far behind inflation.
To protect health and safety at workplaces, there are
numerous
regulations pertaining to room size, ventilation, fire
hazards, and the
availability of latrines and drinking water. In
practice, these were seldom enforced, particularly in
the private
sector. (###)
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