BURMA
Report Card Sept.’00 ~ Jan.’01
Bumper Issue ‘Talks’ Special
Inside:
5 parter on the
Chronology
Printed in
ISBN 974
88306 – 4
CONTENTS
2 TENTATIVE STEPS TOWARDS DIALOGUE
• Expectations
• Outcomes
• The SPDC
• The NLD
• The Ethnic Nationalities
• “Concessions” to Asean
• Public Relations Rhetoric
• Role of Sanctions
• Where Do We Go From Here?
9 WOMEN & HEALTH
• 2nd
• Rohingya Women: Double Burden
• Women’s Reproductive Rights Infringed in
11 HIV/AIDS
• A Tragedy Unfolding
• Denial & Ignorance
• The Reality
• Geographical Mobility
• HIV PRevention
• Declining Health & Education Standards
16 DRUGS
• Drug Production
• Transmigration of the Wa Cont.
• UWSA & SSA (South)
• SPDC & Drugs
• Drug Eradication Measures
25 ECONOMIC SITUATION
• SPDC Growth Fantasies
• Foreign Investment Collapse
• Prices of Basic Items Will Rise Again
•
30 EDUCATION
• New Education Plan from SPDC
• Revolving Door of Closures
32 HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION
• The ILO Resolution
• Landmine Monitor Report 2000
•
36 RELATIONS WITH RELIGIOUS & ETHNIC GROUPS
• God’s Army Surrenders
38 RELATIONS WITH THE DEMOCRACY MOVEMENT
• Traveling in
• The Revolving Door of Arrests
• Homeless in
42 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
• ‘Mediation’ by Asean
• Mahathir Visits
• EU-Asean Meeting
• The Off/On EU Troika
• Changes in Foreign Policy:
• U N Special Rapporteur Resigns
50 REFUGEES & MIGRANT WORKERS
• Repatriation of Karen
• Repatriation of Rohingya
• Burmese Refugees in
• Migrant Labour in
55 CHRONOLOGY:
61 APPendix 1: Leadership Calls for NTl Reconciliation
64 APPendix 2: Intl Strategy Meeting on
66 APPendix 3:
70 APPendix 4: The Coming Transition & The Ntl Reconciliation Program
77 APPendix 5: ICFTU: Election of Burmese Official TO chair major U N C’tee
78 APPendix 6: Index of Economic Freedom for Burma 2001
TENTATIVE STEPS TOwards DIALOGUE
On January 9, a UN spokesperson announced that Lt.
General Khin Nyunt and Daw Aung San Suu Kyi had been engaged in a direct
‘dialogue’ since October. On the following day the NLD confirmed that it was
engaged in talks with the SPDC and that some progress had been achieved. Prior
to this, Lt. General Khin Nyunt met NLD Chairperson U Aung Shwe on September
14.
While the talks have been described by certain
quarters as a ‘dialogue’, it is important to note that the current
circumstances give no indication that these talks fulfil
the conditions needed for a genuine ‘dialogue’, for ‘dialogue’ is rarely
conducted between hostages and their captors.
Expectations
The talks raised expectations but very little is known
about its nature, extent and content. There are many reasons for caution about
the outcomes and the time frame for change. Comments have been made by a number
of important players who have indicated that change will come slowly and the
outcome will not be a “Western-style democracy”.
It is yet to be seen if the SPDC is attempting to
manipulate the international community for the removal of sanctions and the
resumption of aid and loans or if they are actually willing to engage in a
sincere discussion about the future welfare of the peoples of
While some exiled activists have hailed the talks as
“historic”, the NLD’s position appears to be one of cautious optimism. The NLD
has refrained from making public statements about the content or progress of
the talks apparently in order to build up goodwill and avoid offending the
regime. However, it is speculated that the NLD leadership has its own timetable
for outcomes, possibly focused on the release of political prisoners, ability
to exercise its rights as a legally registered political party, cessation of
human rights violations against ethnic nationalities and joint cooperation for
development projects.
The bizarre circumstances surrounding the talks – the
NLD leaders’ apparent acquiescence to SPDC-imposed house arrest, a “freak”
helicopter crash, rumours of coup attempts and lack of significant outcomes six
months into the talks – underline the uncertainty of where the talks may lead.
Outcomes
Despite the hype and excitement, the 6-month long
talks at this stage have not delivered any substantive outcomes apart from the
release of a limited number of political prisoners, all arrested shortly before
the dialogue process. The Central Executive Committee of the NLD (CEC) have
received particular attention being twice released from house arrest and
detention in government ‘guesthouses’.1
• The NLD has temporarily
stopped issuing statements that used to highlight economic, social and
political problems in the country
• NLD leaders have apparently
accepted conditions of house arrest, isolation and extreme secrecy over the
talks
• The SPDC released 6 elderly
political prisoners on October 16 however,
senior democracy leaders including U Win Tin U Win Htein and U Aye Thar Aung, plus over a thousand more NLD members and
supporters remain imprisoned under harsh conditions. Several more whose
sentences have been completed are yet to be released.
• The temporary withdrawal of
an eviction date for the NLD headquarters in
• The SPDC issued an ordinance
banning forced labor on November 1 in compliance with ILO demands, however this appears to have only
resulted in a few days “holiday” for forced laborers – the order only had temporary
effect at the local level. This is substantiated by subsequent reports that
forced labor continues.
• The December 1st release from house arrest of 6 members of the NLD
CEC, however Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, U
Aung Shwe and U Tin Oo are still under house arrest and have been able to
unable to consult directly with other colleagues, besides U Lwin.
• Eleven NLD members were
sentenced to between 7 – 21 years
jail on December 14 for issuing a statement on the
• Since January, the SPDC press
has stopped attacking Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD, and instead targets foreign and exiled
groups.
• Rangoon Court dismissed Daw
Aung San Suu Kyi’s brother’s petition for half her home on technical grounds on
January 22, however it is surprising
that the suit was lodged in the first place, since Aung San Oo is technically
ineligible to do so.
• Eighty-four NLD members were
released from detention on January 25, however
about 10 people who were violently arrested with them in September at the Rangoon
train station are still in detention as
are an estimated 29 others arrested at the same time in Mandalay.
• U Tin Oo was also released
from 4 months’ detention in a military camp, however he remains under house arrest.
• Some NLD offices have been permitted
to reinstall notcieboards on their premises, however NLD members continue to be
arrested and detained, albeit in small numbers.
The SPDC
The talks are presently not
official and many believe that only the Khin Nyunt faction is represented.There have been a number of unconfirmed rumours
that Senior General Than Shwe and General Maung Aye were involved in some of
the talks at the early stages. Later rumours suggest a split between the
factions, with Maung Aye opposed to the dialogue. These rumours increased after
the February 19 helicopter crash that killed Secretary No.2, Lt. General Tin Oo
who was in the Maung Aye faction, with many seeing the death as an
assassination by the Khin Nyunt faction.2 There have even been
speculations of a coup and arrests of high ranking military officers including
Maung Aye. The veracity of these reports or their relationship to the talks is
presently unknown. However, Khin Nyunt has publically
denied rumours of a split in the military.3 There is not just the issue
of splits in the upper echelons of the military structure but increasing
discontent in the lower ranks.4
The NLD
It is not clear at this
stage, which NLD representatives have been involved in the dialogue. There was
at least one meeting between U Aung Shwe (then under arrest in a ‘guest-house’)
and Lt. General Khin Nyunt. Accompanying Khin Nyunt at the September 14 meeting
was U Khin Maung Win, Deputy Foreign Minister. Aung San Suu Kyi is one of the
key protaganists in the talks, with perhaps NLD
chairperson U Aung Shwe and NLD Secretary U Lwin. The SPDC-imposed house
arrests on NLD leaders they are supposed to be in dialogue with has aroused suspicions of the true intentions of the regime.
While the NLD leaders have been allowed a few appointments with visiting
diplomats, free access to other democracy leaders and ethnic nationality groups
has yet to happen.
The ethnic nationality groups
Information is scant about
the possibility of other representatives involved in the talks. Comments from a
range of exiled groups suggest that ‘representatives’ of minority ethnic groups
are not involved at this stage. The perceived main initiator of the ‘dialogue’,
Razali Ismail has met with some SPDC-endorsed ‘representatives’ of minority
ethnic groups during his visits to Burma.
Rumors exist that some
‘representatives’ have been involved in discussions with SPDC officials outside
of
“Concessions” to Asean
The
ASEAN countries continue to maintain their public commitment to
non-interference but there seems to have been some behind-the-scenes diplomacy.
It is unlikely that the rest of ASEAN is interested in substantive moves
towards democracy but some must be harboring hopes that the governing skills
and the image of the SPDC can be improved. The appointment of a Malaysian,
Razali Ismail, as the UN’s Special Envoy to
During
the October visit he met with a range of officials from the SPDC including
Senior General Than Shwe and Lt-General Khin Nyunt.
Khin Nyunt apparently lectured him on the confrontational tactics of the NLD.
He also met with Aung Kham Htyi,
a Palaung leader, who heads an ethnic armed
opposition group. This group was one of nine armed groups that agreed to a
cease-fire with the military regime in 1989. The itinerary included a meeting
with two senior leaders of the National Unity Party; the military backed party
that badly lost the 1990 election. Razali met twice with Aung San Suu Kyi who
handed him a list of 67 political prisoners. After the visit, the SPDC
newspapers accused
In
September, Kofi Annan had
asked
The
Vietnamese diplomacy was overshadowed by the more public visit of Malaysian
Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamed that coincided with the January visit by
Razali. Mahathir unlike the Vietnamese, was more than
happy to comment on his trip. Mahathir said that Senior General Than Shwe is
willing to hold elections but they are not in the offing for another few years.7 The role and influence of the UN Special Envoy Razali
Ismail on the SPDC is as yet unclear. The visits by ASEAN dignitaries at
crucial moments in the dialogue suggest that even ASEAN is unhappy with the
crisis in
Public Relations Rhetoric
Even
though personal attacks on Daw Aung San Suu Kyi in the state press have been
stopped much of the old rhetoric continues. Senior General Than
Shwe on the day the EU delegation arrived in
Khin
Nyunt obviously has a particular version of a “peaceful, modern and democratic
state” in mind. Three days later he stated, “It should be witnessed that some big neo-colonialist countries are
interfering and applying pressure on
The
regime may be attempting to improve its public relations image. Cynics might
see Khin Nyunt’s recent statement that
Role of sanctions
A reason for the dialogue
is likely to be unprecedented criticism of the SPDC from a number of
international agencies and governments. The most significant of these is the
vote by the governing body of the ILO on 17 November for the full
implementation of the resolution adopted in June 2000 which recommended members
of the ILO and UN agencies review their relations with
Despite the protestations
of SPDC and their apologists, sanctions HAVE worked. The gradual accumulation of a range of sanctions in a situation of economic
ruin (with the kyat plummeting from 350 to 500 per US dollar) have
forced the SPDC to seriously re-evaluate their strategy on how to “handle” the
NLD.
These concerns merge with
an urgent need for the SPDC to regain its hold over regional commands. In
recent years, the SPDC’s declining resources have decreased the flow of
supplies to the regional commands. This seems to be one reason that the
regional commands appear to be growing more independent from the SPDC’s central
influence.12
The removal of sanctions
and the introduction of international aid may publicly emerge as a bargaining
point for any political changes. The international community has offered or
mooted in the past a connection between the resumption of aid and political
change.13 The Japanese
have been looking for an excuse to resume Overseas Development Assistance
(ODA).14 In addition,
the regime may be hoping that with a change in US administration, which is less
favorably disposed towards sanctions, minor or cosmetic changes will be enough
for sanctions to be removed.
Where do we go from here?
The talks may have been initiated by the SPDC as a
means to gain urgently needed loans, aid and investment. The regime or at least
the Khin Nyunt faction may have commenced the talks without a clear roadmap,
hoping that merely having talks and perhaps offering a few minor concessions to
the NLD would have the desired effect – the dismantling of sanctions.
It is not know how much the rumored power struggles
within the SPDC will affect the talks – clearly if one faction becomes more
powerful and secure than the other, it may lose motivation to move forward with
the talks. In another scenario, the SPDC may abandon talks once its pockets are
full from a hasty dismantling of sanctions.
While the NLD is committed so far to playing by the
rules set by the regime, the international community must actively support
positive outcomes to this process. It can do so by adopting a consistent
position that trade and aid will be forthcoming in installments upon
achievement of certain benchmarks, so that it is in the interest of the SPDC to
ensure positive and significant outcomes to the talks.
The international community should seek that the SPDC
deliver significant results before such key dates as the June meeting of the ILO’s International Labor Conference in
While the declaration of a democratic government (of any sort) by mid-year may be an
over-optimistic expectation, the basic benchmarks should include:
• cessation of hostilities and all forms of forced labor in ethnic nationality areas
• free access for ethnic nationality leaders to engage in informal and confidential talks with leaders of the SPDC and NLD
• the release of political prisoners, including those sentenced under ‘criminal’ charges, and improved conditions for those still jailed
• freedom for the NLD to go about its work as a legally registered political party
• the beginnings of tripartite efforts to deal with the country’s drug, HIV/AIDS and education crises.
The first tentative steps have been taken in
Note: MORE on the“talks” in
Appendixes 1, 2, 3 & 4
WOMEN AND HEALTH
___________________________________________________________________
*
Improving R
Stagnant *
Deteriorating
The issue of women’s rights
is a much-contested political terrain. The issue is one that the regime
attempts to appropriate in order to gain international acceptability. It is
telling to note that the regime’s dialogue with CEDAW (Committee on the
Elimination of Discrimination Against Women) and the
CRC (Committee on the Rights of the Child) is the only point that gained the
regime a positive response from the previous UN Special Rapporteur on Burma
Rajsoomer Lallah15. It is
crucial to note that women’s organizations are not by ‘nature’ progressive and
concerned for the welfare of all women. The major women’s organizations in
The 2nd “
A two-day conference held
on 26th January,
sponsored by the Myanmar National Committee for Women’s Affairs (MNCWA),
purportedly attempted to “lay down effective action plans for national women’s
development”. Lt.-Gen. Khin Nyunt, on a self-congratulatory note, spoke of
Burmese women’s equal status in society, ignoring the zero representation of
women at any level of the ruling military apparatus. He stated that, “…women have enjoyed their rights on par with
men and have been able to work in the national interest with their morale, valour and capabilities as a result of being given equal
roles and rights.”
Despite the
self-congratulatory rhetoric of the military, their morally bankrupt rule has
been responsible for the continuing decline of women’s status in what was once
a fairly egalitarian society. It is their economic and social misrule that has
led to growing numbers of women joining the burgeoning class of sex workers. It
is also the military’s economic misrule, which has forced women into illegal
work in foreign countries, such as
Rohingya Women: The Double Burden of Persecution and Displacement
A report by Images Asia
revealed a high incident of trafficking of Rohingya women to
Rohingya women face
oppression in their homeland,
For many Rohingya women,
the only option for survival is being trafficked to
Women’s Reproductive Rights Infringed in
Previously, reports had
exposed the forced sterilization by Thai doctors of Karen women in a Mae Sot
hospital16. More recent
reports, quoting Thai officials and doctors commenting on population growth
rates in the refugee camps, exposed the larger ideological forces behind such
infringement of women’s reproductive rights. 17 The comments by the officials over the relationship
between the conditions and the population growth of the refugee camps is
fundamentally flawed in its logic and reflects an attitude of racism rather
than concern over public health. In the report, the Thai Interior Ministry is
quoted as saying that the average population growth at the camps is 4%,
compared to
Clearly
it is in the interest of the Thai authorities to blame the overcrowded
conditions of the camps on the ‘uncontrollable’ reproductive activities of the
inhabitants, rather than the camp’s infrastructure or their raison d’etre.
Further, the Thai authority’s comments that the use of birth control is
contrary to the religious beliefs of the refugees is also misguided. The
primary flaw of this over-generalization is its inaccurate assumption of the
religious uniformity of the population in the camps. Further, regardless of
religious doctrine on contraception, like
The fundamental issue to be addressed is not that of
eugenics but rather the moral and political issue of the rights of a State to
create ghettos of marginalised peoples and to control
women’s reproduction according to who they deem as worthy of propagation.
HIV/AIDS
___________________________________________________________________
*
Improving *
Stagnant R
Deteriorating
A Tragedy Unfolding
There is a catastrophe in
Dr. Chris Beyrer,
Epidemiologist
Director of international AIDS
training
Johns Hopkins School of
Hygiene and Public Health.
Extramarital sex is rare here and for
women our cultural value is virginity ... There is no real sex industry but no
doubt there is some casual prostitution going on.
Dr. Mya Oo
Deputy Health Minister, SPDC
In
Burma HIV/AIDS is known among the general population as the “Na Wa Ta” disease, named after the SPDC’s previous incarnation,
as SLORC (known in Burmese as Na Wa Ta).
There are several reasons for the popular renaming of HIV/AIDS. Firstly,
post-1988, SLORC changed their economic policy from the “Burmese way to
Socialism” to the Burmese way to capitalism. Their new so-called ‘economic
policies’, including the encouragement of the drug trade, wreaked devastation
on the economic, environmental, social and cultural fabric of Burma, creating a
climate inducive to the spread of HIV/AIDS. Secondly,
“Na Wa Ta” makes reference to the promiscuous behavior
of General Ne Win, the great helmsman of the junta. Thirdly, “Na Wa Ta” refers to General Ne Win’s eugenics program with his
promotion of the ‘
The widespread availability
and low cost of heroin, geographical mobility, lack of access to condoms and
health-care in general has led to a mushrooming epidemic. Ethnic minorities
from
Denial and Ignorance
The HIV/AIDS crisis in
1. A military
regime that denies information to its people about the disease and also
destroys all traces of a civil society which could have mounted an organized
and informed response to the epidemic;
2. The
destruction of the healthcare system through years of underfunding.
The system now cannot respond in the most basic way to the health needs of the
people;
3. The regime’s
perpetuation of a drug based economy that encourages IDUs;
4. The
belligerent impoverishment of the general population, which has led to a
rapidly growing sex industry and labour mobility.
HIV/AIDS statistics on
The Reality
The
reality is that 1/5th of
|
REGIONS/COUNTRY |
%
HEROIN ABUSERS |
|
Global population |
0.22% |
|
|
0.24% |
|
|
4% men; 2% women |
|
INFECTION
RATES IN RISK GROUPS |
HIV
+ RATE |
|
Sex Workers |
47% |
|
Intravenous Drug
Users |
57-90% |
|
Soldiers |
8% |
|
Officer class |
15-20% |
|
Prisoners |
Unknown |
|
Buddhist monks |
Unknown |
|
Seasonal
Laborers (Gem mines) |
Unknown |
|
Migrant workers in
foreign countries |
Unknown |
The
virus is spreading in jails, where prisoners can obtain food (often, a single egg)
for a blood donation and where transfusion equipment is often reused without
cleaning. Further, the disease is also spreading in monasteries around
Many infected young men, shunned by their families, move
into monasteries to die. The doctor said he has treated a number of monks with
AIDS, several elderly. Before they died, some of the monks told him that they
contracted the disease by shaving their heads with razors shared inside the
monastery.
Geographical Mobility
The trafficking in women
for the sex industry across the Asian region has made HIV control a politically
sensitive and complex issue. Women and girls are trafficked from
HIV Prevention
A Burmese practice of
sharing needles in tea stalls has also contributed to the spread of HIV. Further “Paraphernalia” laws in
The ignorant and
belligerent response of the Generals in
The regime allows no school
classes on HIV/AIDS and prohibits condom education. People in the refugee camps
along
• 85%
of married women had never seen a condom;
• 13%
of men had never used a condom, not even once
• 50%
believed the contraceptive pill would protect against HIV
• 82%
could not identify the major risk factors for contracting HIV
• 73%
did not know a blood test would identify their HIV status
Declining Health and
Education Standards
Due
to a combination of ravaging infectious diseases, an atrocious health-care
system, and the military regime’s refusal to deal with the HIV crisis, public-
health officials fear that average life expectancy could fall as low as 45
years of age in the next two decades.
|
BUDGET
CATEGORY |
TOTAL
BUDGET |
PER
PERSON |
|
HIV prevention |
$50,000 (1998) |
1/10 of 1 cent |
|
|
|
(.001) per person |
Free HIV testing is rare, and most people cannot afford the US$10 test to
determine if they are HIV-positive. Virtually no HIV drugs exist in the
country. HIV positive patients usually die within 3 months of diagnosis. There
is an acute shortage of antibiotics for Tuberculosis, the biggest killer of HIV
positive people in
DRUGS
___________________________________________________________________
*
Improving *
Stagnant R
Deteriorating
Drug Production
The United Nations Drug Control Program (UNDCP)
released its latest report showing that
The recent increase in hectares under cultivation is
behind the prediction by narcotics intelligence officers based in
One of the principal
trafficking routes for opium, identified by the report was from
“Traditionally, the main outlet of heroin was the so called Golden
Triangle. Thailand accounted for almost 60% of all seizures of opiates in
South-East Asia in the late 1980s; by 1997/98 this proportion had fallen to
just 5%. In parallel, seizures in the People’s Republic of China rose from 4%
in 1987/88 to 77% in 1997/98, equivalent to 12% of global seizures.”26
The seizure of a large
quantity of heroin and methampetamines between
“Trafficking in amphetamine type stimulants (ATS) grew more strongly
than any other drug category over the last decade.” 29 41.9% of total seizures of ATS in 1997/98 occurred in
East and South East Asia.30 In Asia
the absolute amount of seizures in the last 10 years went from less than 1 tonne to more than 5 tonnes. In SouthEast Asia in 1997/98, Thailand reported the largest
amounts seized (19% of global seizures) followed by China (11%).31 However, despite Burma’s reputation as the major
producer of ATS in the region, it accounted for only 1% of total seizures.32 Targeting of drug production and trafficking in Burma
concentrates on individuals, with the SPDC ignoring the most powerful drug
trafficking groups, most of whom have cease-fire agreements with the regime.
This supports the argument forwarded by many critics of the regime that it is
not serious about drug eradication. The shift in drug trafficking routes
through
Transmigration
of the Wa Continues
The
SDPC and the UNDP in
Wa
soldiers continued to arrive in areas opposite Changmai
and Maehongson during November and December. SHAN
reported that their mission was to guard the border Border-Pass 1 (opposite Chiangmai Province) to Mae Aw (opposite Maehongson
Province).36 The UWSA is
also moving soldiers into Ho Mong town, a former stronghold of the Mong Tai
Army and presently controlled by Wa National Army, who are reputedly not
involved in the drug trade. About 800 UWSA soldiers have been moved into the
area reportedly as part of SPDC plans to increase their control over minority
groups, that though having cease-fire agreements continue to oppose SPDC.37
It
is not only the Wa involved in the transmigration
program. Eight hundred Kokang families, neighbours of
the Wa are also moving settlers from northern Shan State near the China border
to the South.38 The Kokang area is now supposed to be a drug free zone.39 The Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA
– Kokang Chinese) is another major drug trafficking
group that has a cease-fire agreement with the SPDC. There were other reports
of Chinese hill tribes coming alongside the Wa. Many
of the groups in
The resettlement of poppy
growers to non-poppy growing areas is part of the 1988 plan of SCOPE (Strategy
for Coca and Poppy Elimination) that aims to eradicate drug linked crops by
2008. The SPDC has agreed to participate in the UNDCP program where producer
countries commit themselves to the total elimination of production by 2008. The
program also calls for ‘significant and
measurable results’ in drug consumption by the same year. The Wa have also
pledged that areas under their control will be opium free by 2005.41 However, this massive transmigration program will
only encourage the growth of criminal groups and armies, enhanced corruption of
state institutions and the encouragement of conflict between ethnic
communities. These problems will long survive any military regime and pose long
term problems for human rights and the rule of law.
UWSA and SSA (South)
The SSA (South) has been
marketing itself since 1998 as an anti-drugs crusader after years of extensive
involvement in the drug trade, with their crusade focused on the destruction of
UWSA amphetamine factories. The income sources of the SSA (South) are not
public knowledge but it is a common practice for ‘insurgent groups’ or local
warlords to finance their operations through an opium tax. The U.S. State
Department believes that Yawd Serk
the leader of the SSA (South) is involved in the heroin and/or amphetamine
trade.42 However, there
is at least one example of an insurgent drug trafficker who became an effective
anti-drugs crusader.43
Recently Yawd Serk stated
that if international assistance is not received then they would probably join
hands with the SPDC. In an interview with DVB, SSA (South) spokesman U Sai Tun said, “at
this juncture we would be quite satisfied if we receive a little appreciation.
We do not want any assistance in the form of weapons and other equipment. But
instead of being appreciated we are being loathed which is not what we want. We
are doing it for the good of everybody. To engage in anti-drug activities is an
act despised by the people of the border region overwhelmed by various drug
groups. When we first settled at the border and engaged in drugs it was the
same thing.”44 There
have been a number of reports linking some elements of the UWSA with the SSA
but the origin and veracity of these reports is unclear.45
Not withstanding the
differing conjectures regarding the SSA (South), the UWSA has consolidated its
hold on a number of areas in the border region. The SSA (South) had controlled
the area inside Burma opposite Chiangmai and Maehongson provinces but their territory is now being
encroached on by the UWSA, where many new drug factories are being built. In
late October 1,500 well armed UWSA soldiers were resettled closer to the Thai
border near Chiang Rai and Chiang Mai down to Mae
Hong Son.46 According to
Thai officials, drug warlord Wei Hseuh-kang
with SPDC backing sent 5 UWSA battalions from Mong Yon to the South on 29
November with the aim of seizing the area under the control of SSA (South) led
by Yawd Serk. The soldiers
are now in areas opposite Chiang Rai’s Mae Fah Luang District, Chiang Mai’s Wiang Haeng District and Pai and Pang Ma Pa districts in Mae Hong Son.
The transmigration program
has not only caused problems for the SSA (South). The relocations are causing
local villagers, mostly Shan, to be dispossessed of their homes and land. “Some had only gone from their homes or
gardens to attend to some business and when they got back, these homes and
gardens were no longer theirs.” “Apart
from that they take everything they want pigs, chickens, ducks
and so on, saying, ‘Gen. Khin Nyunt has given us this country. If you want it
back, go and ask him’.”47 There
was also a threat by the UWSA to attack the Shan ethnic community in
Another defining factor in
the relationship between the groups is ethnic conflict. The Wa,
though having signed a cease-fire agreement with the SPDC are allies only as
long there is mutual self-interest. There have been reports of comments by SPDC
military personnel that the SPDC is interested in weakening the UWSA by
spreading their strength over a wider area.49 The veracity of the report
can not be ascertained but it at least reflects a lack of trust between groups
that will be reflected in future conflicts. Any plan by the SPDC to weaken the Wa through transmigration is unlikely to succeed as the UWSA
is actively recruiting from those newly relocated and from the locals.50
At the end of January a
report appeared that the UWSA and the SSA (South) were negotiating a “a deal acceptable
to both sides.”51 Any
deal between the armed groups may have little bearing on the well-being or
otherwise of ‘ordinary’ members of their ethnic groups. The nature and extent
of future conflict between the UWSA and the SSA (South) can not be predicted at
this stage with a number of reports that the UWSA and the SSA (South) will try
to avoid conflict.52 At
present the alliances between the groups may shift depending upon the
distribution of resources between the groups and historical animosity.
There is not only animosity
between the different armed groups but discrimination within these groups.
There are many deserters and problems with drug addiction within the UWSA.53 Not all members of the UWSA are Wa
and include Lahu, Shan and Chinese. There exists many problems with discrimination within the ranks,
most of the rank and file enduring rugged and spartan
lifestyles, compared to their officers. Those of Chinese origin are often
promoted over other ethnic groups.54
There are other armed
groups in
SPDC and Drugs
According to the U.S. State
Department, “there is no evidence that
the government, on an institutional level, is involved in the drug trade. There
are persistent and reliable reports, however, that officials,…,
are either directly involved in drug production and/or trafficking or are paid
to allow others to engage unhindered in drug activities. Army personnel wield
considerable political clout locally, and their involvement in trafficking is a
significant problem.”57 What
constitutes “ non-involvement in the drugs trade at an
institutional level” for the State Department is not clear. The SPDC and all
state authorities are at best ignoring the trade. Major drug traffickers are
public figures with extensive business interests, the banking system and much
foreign investment seemingly operating to launder drug money. The SPDC has
cease-fire agreements with major drug-trafficking groups and enacts policies that actively encourages the drug trade. At best
the SPDC has lost control of some sections of the Tatmadaw involved in the
drugs trade and is more interested in defeating armed opposition groups than
dealing effectively with the drugs trade.
There are more reports of
involvement in the drug trade, by individual representatives of the regime,
including high-ranking officials. An SPDC army officer, 4 members of the UWSA
along with 100,000 amphetamine pills was captured by the SSA (South) in a
village just inside Burma, where the UWSA stores amphetamines before moving
them into Thailand.58 Another
report stated that a LIB Commander in Southern Shan State called a meeting of
local village headmen to inform them that they were allowed to grow poppies and
those who did not have the necessary capital would be provided with a loan of
K5,000/acre. Farmers would have to sell their opium to
authorised buyers at the prevailing ‘market’ price.59
According to a report on
DVB Khin Nyunt has allowed the growing of opium in
The UWSA criminal network
continues to diversify into a ‘legitimate’ business, SPDC style. Recently it
made a donation to the newly established SEAMEO Regional Centre for History and
Tradition a ‘historical research institute.’61 The donations were made by
the Mongmao Special Region (K5m=US$12,500) and Kanbawza Bank (K1m=US$2,500). The Mongmao
Special Region is the administrative unit of the UWSA and the Kanbawza Bank is owned by the UWSA with the chairman of the
bank U Aung Ko Win wanted by the United States for drug trafficking.62 Donations to any such organisations are undertaken to
buy favours, influence and for the maintenance of friendly relations with the
SPDC rather than philanthropy. The diversification and infiltration of drug
networks into other institutional structures in
Drug Eradication Measures
Leading members of the SPDC, Sen. Gen. Than Shwe, Gen. Maung Aye and Lt. Gen. Khin Nyunt, in a
meeting with Thai military leaders said it has a 5 and 10 year drug suppression
plan. The plans concentrate on poppy cultivation, encouraging hilltribe people to grow substitute crops with assistance
from other countries but as
The drug control programs are UNDCP initiated - an
organisation that is seemingly intent on working with a regime that has at best
shown little serious commitment to working on drug problems. A drug enforcement
conference sponsored by the UNDCP was held in
The
There is an important need for all the sources of
criminal profits to be attacked including the need for money laundering
legislation. However, the recent attempts by the SPDC to draft money-laundering
legislation should be viewed with skepticism. The Burmese legal code was
brought into conformity with the 1988 UN Drug Convention, dealing with money
laundering, seizure of drug related assets and drug conspiracy cases, but the
law has not been implemented. The Deputy Home Minister Brigadier-General Thura Myint Maung, displaying
typical SPDC ministerial competence, said that
Even though US officials
were in non-attendance at the UNDCP sponsored conference, this should not be
read as a lack of concern. Admiral Dennis Blair Chief of the US Pacific Command
visited
There have been a number of
arrests of Khun Sa’s drug
trafficking associates in
ECONOMIC SITUATION
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SPDC Growth Fantasies
Another SPDC official, this time Brig. General David
Abel, a Minister from the Office of the Chairman of the SPDC, displayed a vivid
imagination by claiming that per capita income had grown by 2,700% since the
SLORC took power in 1989. “There is no
poverty, no starvation.” He also stated that there was no unemployment and
near universal provision of health care and education.75 Abel said the GDP growth in the fiscal year to March
2000 (sic) was 10.9% and forecast that growth would at least be equal in the
present fiscal year. He also said that inflation was only 7% when more
independent sources estimated inflation at around 40-45% last year. More recent
acts of economic mismanagement would have further fuelled the inflation rate.76 Abel also stated that there was enough foreign
exchange to cover six months of imports, whereas other reports suggest that the
regime usually has no more than enough to cover 2 months of imports.77
Another deluded SPDC official, Soe
Tha, the Planning and Development Minister, also claimed that
Foreign Investment Collapse
The IMF released its economic statistics for
To interpret the data, the difference between actual
and approved FDI must be noted. Approved FDI is the amount of investment
approved by the Myanmar Investment Commission, which is different from the
amount of investment that actually goes ahead. During the period from 1995/96
to 1999/00 only 60% of investment approved actually took place.80
Approved and Actual Foreign Direct
Investment Flows,
1995/96-1999/0081 (millions of U.S. dollars)
|
Approved Actual |
|
1995/96 668.2 317.6 |
|
1996/97 2,814.2 580.7 |
|
1997/98 1,012.9 878.8 |
|
1998/99 54.4 683.6 |
|
1999/00 58.1 304.2 |
Another
issue that needs to be noted is the time lapse from the time the investment is approved
to the time the investment actually occurs. This means that most of the
investment that actually takes place in a given year was approved up to several
years earlier. The Asian economic crisis that begins in late 1997 and early
1998 brought about the near collapse of approved FDI in
Total
Approved and Actual Foreign Direct Investment by Industry
(1995/96-1999/00/ USD millions)
|
|
Total Approved |
Total Actual |
|
Oil and Gas |
887.7 |
1,531.582 |
|
Hotels &
Tourism |
485.9 |
495.3 |
|
Manufacturing |
1,325.4 |
262.9 |
Another important characteristic of FDI in
The most important investors in
Approved
and Actual Foreign Direct Investment by Country,
1995/96-1999/00 (millions of U.S. dollars)
|
|
Total
Approved |
Total
Actual |
|
|
5.4 |
484.4 |
|
|
132.4 |
87.2 |
|
|
517.6 |
148.9 |
|
|
1,188.2 |
603.6 |
|
|
853.6 |
174.6 |
|
|
739.5 |
977.6 |
|
|
361.1 |
234.2 |
The
majority of the FDI from
Unlike Western countries,
investments from Asian countries are not dependent on one or two large
projects. FDI from
Prices of Basic Items will
Increase Again
The
subterfuge by the SPDC did not halt the continuing depreciation of the Kyat
against the US$ reaching a new low of more than 400K.87 The Kyat has continued to depreciate after a
five-fold increase in the pay of civil servants that did nothing but fuel
inflation.88 A shortage of
foreign exchange may be one of the motivations behind the SDPC’s
on/off policy of bans and quotas on imports.89 In late September another import quota was imposed.
The quota limits importers to K1m (US$ 2,500) worth of goods per month, which
will increase prices of basic items.90 This was coupled with the imposition of a ban on all
exports and imports at the checkpoint at Mae Sot on 24 November.91 The ban is a common practice imposed without notice.92 These policies coupled with higher inflation, a
depreciating currency, inept agricultural polices and a marauding army will
only make it more difficult for ordinary people to put food on the table. These
knee-jerk excuses for policy are just another display by the SPDC of its
inability to manage the economy.
Japan’s keenness to deliver loans and aid without any
real SPDC commitment to improve even their economic management let alone their
record on human rights abuses, may weaken international pressure for reform.95 A Japanese official commented that “Japan’s technical assistance for Burma’s
economic reforms does not run counter to the ILO decision, because the ILO
sanctions call on its member governments to stop any economic aid that may
encourage the use of forced labour in Burma.”96
EDUCATION
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“You can’t build a solid, substantial house
with decayed planks, no matter what kind of a veneer is put over their
rottenness.” (Benjamin Franklin)
New Education Plan from SPDC
Recently the education system has been the focus of
SPDC controlled media, with the authorities trying to convince the public that
it has developed new improved education policies. However, the initiatives of
the SPDC authorities seem to involve only changes in the education ministries
‘mission statement’ entitled the “Special
Four-Year Plan for the Promotion of Education.” The SPDC spends only 1.2%
of GDP on education, one of only 11 countries in the world to spend less than 2
per cent.97 “Although nominally available to all, public
education is costly in terms of school fees, books and classroom facilities.
Parents are often required to build or maintain school buildings. Moreover,
widespread reports allege that bribery is frequently required to be paid to
school authorities. Fees for the annual attendance of ordinary schools are said
to range from three to five months’ salary. Universities and the better schools
are only available to the wealthy ruling elite…Most children from poor families
drop out of school before completing the compulsory five-year cycle.”98 The most recent WHO report argued that the quality of
governance is important, alongside the amount of resources allocated to a
sector.
Despite the crisis the new policy of the regime seems
to centre on irrelevance and insular nationalism. According to the New Light of
Myanmar the new objectives of the education system are “to promote the efficiency of basic education schools with the aim of
nurturing and turning out stalwart sons and daughters of the nation who acquire
well-rounded education, to generate teaching and learning opportunities with the
use of modern information technologies, to further promote the quality of
teachers, to seek ways and means to enable every citizen to acquire basic
education, and to bring about education of international standard by facing
challenges of Knowledge Age and Learning Society.” Khin Nyunt acting out
the role of ‘social reformer’ said that extensive planning and expertise was
involved in the development of the new education plan, with seminars held for over a week. During
the seminar, decisions were made to change traditional teaching methods, the
examination system and the inclusion in the curriculum “such diverse subjects as national spirit, love of culture, civic duty
etc.”99
According to the state controlled newspapers, an
integral component of the new plan is the establishment of multimedia teaching centres at primary and high schools along with the
establishment of IT Learning Centres, Electronic
Resource Centres and Computer Training centres at universities and colleges.100 Even if these centres are
opened, which is highly unlikely due to a highly inefficient bureaucratic
apparatus, it would represent a severe misallocation of resources. Many people
in
Curriculum changes must be viewed as the panacea by
the regime, as the new SEAMEO Regional Centre for History and Tradition also
has plans for more curriculum changes.101 One of the objectives of the centre is “to develop educational curricula, programmes and personnel for making history and tradition
relevant to meeting the challenges of the contemporary situation…It is believed
that to commence on a sound footing, a review of The State of Southeast Asian
Historical Studies in secondary education will help to elucidate the current
situation.”102 The
centre is another example of a misallocation of resources. Given the extensive problems
within the education system these ‘initiatives’ will have little impact on an
education system in crisis. These new ‘policy initiatives’ only serve to again
illustrate the inability of the SPDC to govern.
Revolving Door of Closures
Poor policy is coupled with violations of basic human
rights with reports of closures of some recently ‘re-opened’
universities and colleges. In October,
Despite the extremely under funded and oppressive
civilian education system, the military education system continues to expand.
The country’s most prestigious
HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION
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“The suppression of all opposition political
activity, inhuman treatment towards members of the opposition and ethnic
minorities, and the absence of respect and protection for the liberty, health,
education and human development of its population remain matters of grave
concern, and urgent and meaningful measures to halt and reverse the downward
spiral of this situation are called for.” 107
The ILO Resolution
After more than 30 years of complaints to the ILO
about the practice of forced labour in
Even the threat of sanctions did not halt the
widespread and systematic use of forced labour by the SPDC. The Federation of
Trade Unions of Burma (FTUB) released another report alleging the use of forced
labour, to build roads, barracks and to work on army-owned farms. The report
alleges that the use of forced labour was still widespread and presented
evidence of abuses in the Shan, Mon, Karen, Chin and
Another ILO Mission went to
The following are the recommendations of the
Commission of Inquiry that the SPDC failed to implement to the satisfaction of
the ILO Governing Body:
• That legislation, in particular the Village and
Towns Acts, be brought into line with the terms of the Forced Labour Convention,
1930 (No.29) which
• That no more forced or compulsory labour be
imposed by the authorities, particularly by the military;
• That penalties imposed for the exaction of
forced labour be strictly enforced, with thorough
investigation, prosecution and punishment of those found guilty.110
The failure by the SPDC to effectively end the
practice opened the way for the full implementation of a resolution of the ILO
Conference adopted in June 2000. The unprecedented resolution is under the never before invoked article 33 of the
ILO Constitution that allows for a series of measures that took effect on 30
November. Some of the measures in question include:
• Recommending to the Organization’s constituents
that they review their relations with Burma and take appropriate measures to
ensure that such relations do not perpetuate or extend the system of forced or
compulsory labour in that country;
• Inviting the Director-General of the ILO to
inform international organizations working with the ILO to reconsider any
cooperation they may be engaged in with
• Inviting the Director-General to request the
United Nations’ Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) to place on the agenda of
its July 2001 session an item concerning the failure of Burma to implement the
recommendations of the Commission of Inquiry and seeking the adoption of
recommendations directed by ECOSOC or by the General Assembly, or by both, to
governments and other specialized agencies to ensure that by their involvement
they are not directly abetting the practice of forced labor;
• Requesting the Director-General to submit to
the Governing Body a periodic report on the outcome of measures directed by
international organizations and the United Nations and to inform those entities
of any developments in the implementation by
This
means that individual governments and organisations can implement the ILO
sanctions at their own discretion. The SPDC will have another opportunity to
take sufficient steps to end the practice, as the Director-General of the ILO
will report to the 280th
Governing Body meeting next March on any new measures taken by the SPDC to end
the practice.
The
SPDC responded with its predictable line to the decision of the ILO Governing
Body stating that it would no longer co-operate with the ILO. “The ILO decision to activate measures
against
Landmine Monitor Report 2000113
Landmine Monitor in its latest report cited Burma as
one of the world’s landmine blackspots with more than
1,500 new mine victims in 1999, the most victims in any country in Asia,
excepting Afghanistan. There are now more landmine victims in
Source:
Landmine Monitor Burma/Myanmar,
The SPDC has not signed the
Mine Ban Treaty, did not participate in the Ottawa Process and has rarely
participated in international forums directed to the banning of landmines. The
SPDC does not deny that it uses landmines but contrary to evidence, it denies
the systematic and extensive use of landmines in its war with armed groups
opposed to its rule. Landmines are used in the border areas particularly
Most of the armed
opposition groups are believed to have the capacity to manufacture ‘home-made’
landmines and the past conflicts in
The
A Federal US Judge cleared
Unocal of responsibility for human rights abuses along the Yadana and Yetagun
pipeline in a case brought by 15 anonymous Burmese villagers in 1996. The judge
found that Unocal did know of and benefit from atrocities including forced
labour, committed by the SPDC military in connection with the building of the
gas pipeline. However, the judge ruled that Unocal cannot be held liable and
dismissed the case because the plaintiffs had failed to prove that the
oil-company had conspired with the military or controlled the military or
controlled military decisions or sought to employ forced labour for the
project. Lawyers for the plaintiffs said, “We
are disappointed at the judge’s ruling but what was very heartening was the
judge’s finding that Unocal knew of these atrocities but continued to fund the
pipeline being very well aware that the foundation of this project was
terrorism.” The lawyers for the 15 Burmese villagers are appealing the
decision, a process that will take at least a year. Unocal having long denied
that there is any evidence of human right violations said after the court case
that the company did not dispute that it knew of human rights violations.
RELATIONS WITH RELIGIOUS & ETHNIC GROUPS114
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The
United Nations General Assembly, “Deplores
the continued violations of human rights in particular those directed against
persons belonging to ethnic and religious minorities, including summary
executions, rape, torture, forced labour, forced portering, forced relocations,
use of anti-personnel land mines, destruction of crops and fields, and disposession of land and property, which deprives these
persons of all means of subsistence and results in large-scale displacement of
persons and flows of refugees to neighbouring countries, thus causing negative
effects for these countries, and an increasing number of internally displaced
persons.”115
God’s Army
Surrenders
At
the beginning of November, SPDC soldiers launched attacks on two strongholds of
the KNU resulting in heavy fighting, causing increased suffering for people in
the State. The dry season offensive usually begins in November and is when the
less mobile conventional forces of the SPDC take advantage of the improved
weather conditions to launch offensives against opposition groups. Other events
apart from the dry season offensive may have serious ramifications for people
in Karen state. On January 16, 16 members of God’s Army were in the hands of
Thai authorities including the group’s so-called leaders, 13 year old twins
Luther and Johnny Htoo. The group included 9 boys and
2 girls.116 The Thai
police charged 2 members of God’s Army, aged 16 and 19, with the robbery and
murder of 6 Thai nationals. The remaining members were sent to refugee camps
along the border with the twins returning to their parents. One commentator has
suggested that some of the responses to God’s Army were determined by a planned
joint ‘development’ project.’117
On December 31, 6 members
of 2 Thai families, including 2 children were reportdly
killed by God’s Army after 8 heavily armed men looted a grocery store in Suan Pueng District. God’s Army
was blamed after Thai soldiers found a dead Karen man with a sack of rice who
appeared to have been killed by an accidental explosion from a grenade he was
carrying. The body was of a God’s Army soldier known as Rambo. Thai newspapers
initially quoted Thai authorities who said that a Thai patrol had stumbled upon
the group but later the same authorities stated that the group had given
themselves up voluntarily.
Not all Thai officials
believed that God’s Army was behind the killings, and expressed their doubts
accordingly.118 The
Vice-Chairman of the Thai Senate’s Foreign Affairs Commission and Forum-Asia
representatives said there was not enough evidence to support allegations that
God’s Army was behind the killings. The Vice-chairman Pensuk
Juksuchinda said it is uncommon for Burmese rebels to
kill innocent Thai villagers, adding that the closest witness was about 200 metres away.119
God’s
Army had been forced to live off the land and forage for food after the SPDC
overran their jungle headquarters in 2000. Thai army chief
General Surayud Chulanont
said that the guerillas had been encouraged through their relatives to
surrender to Thai authorities. The Thais threatened to seal the border which
would have made it difficult for many Karens, so the
KNU promised to help search for the 15 bandits.120 An SPDC battalion made an offer to God’s Army via
pamphlets that were scattered in the area of God’s Army bases, urging them to
exchange weapons for peace . They were promised the
return of their former base Kamerplaw and freedom to
engage in economic activities. DVB also claimed that the Thai army in the area
had been bribed to wipe out God’s Army.121 In contrast, local aid workers said that God’s Army
had actually disbanded in October and joined the KNU. Aid workers also said
that the border camps were sealed off a week before the ‘surrender’,
restricting food supplies. One report claimed that “the Htoo twins were basically starved out of
their hiding places.”122
One
report argued that a development project was behind the attention and the
sealing of the camps. The camps are located in Ratchaburi which,
has the potential to be developed into a major trade route, given its proximity
to
RELATIONS WITH THE DEMOCRACY MOVEMENT
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Travelling in
• Dala Township124
On September 2, after a standoff that lasted 9 days,
Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and U Tin Oo were handcuffed and forcibly returned to
their homes in
• The Train to
In the same month Daw Aung San Suu Kyi again attempted
to exercise her right to travel but was again prevented by SPDC authorities
when she tried to catch a train with U Tin Oo from
The pair tried for several hours to buy tickets for
the train journey but was continually told that none were available. At about
At
about
Before
Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and U Tin Oo arrived at the station, 21 supporters were
taken away in a truck.130 During the afternoon, shops and businesses around the
station were closed and riot police were used to keep journalists and diplomats
away. At about 8.00 p.m. the time of the arrival of the ‘cleaning crew’, 3
truckloads of supporters were dragged away and taken to Insein Prison with some
supporters seriously injured.131 The NLD listed 51 people known to have been placed
under arrest, though it is believed that more than 100 people were arrested at
the time.132
The
SPDC’s English language explanation was as usual idiosyncratic, arguing that
tickets to
The
Burmese language newspapers were as usual more vitriolic. One of the newspapers
launched a round of attacks on Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD comparing them
to poisonous snakes which had to be locked away for their own good and the good
of the community. “Thanks to the timely
intervention of the authorities concerned, the snakes were moved away and the
threat of poisonous snakes removed from the community...You can imagine how
much public hatred the NLD leadership is inviting upon themselves by their
antics at ferry crossings, railway stations and on the wayside”134
The Revolving
Door of Arrests
The
SPDC is operating a revolving door for political prisoners, arresting,
releasing and sometimes even re-arresting and releasing. This is particularly
the case for the CEC of the NLD. 135 All the NLD executive were arrested on 2 September,
released on 14 September and then re-arrested on 21 September. Most were then
released again on 1 December, but U Tin Oo was released later on 25 January,
into house arrest. Aung San Suu Kyi remains under house arrest.
Others arrested during the
Homeless in
The NLD was served an
eviction notice by their landlords on September 25, giving them until October
25 to vacate the building. The NLD has occupied the premises of their
headquarters on
The NLD headquarters was
not the only premises under threat. Aung San Suu Kyi’s house was subject to a
lawsuit from her estranged brother who is a
Her
brother filed a lawsuit for half ownership of the house, expressing his wish to
donate his share of the house to charity as his mother had intended.
Inheritance law in
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
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The most significant events
in the international arena for
‘Mediation’ by
ASEAN
ASEAN
had agreed in July 2000 to use a troika (consisting of immediate past and
future, as well as current chairs of Asean) formula
to help solve regional political and security problems, though the structure
and mandate has never been clarified. Kofi Annan tried to activate the body by asking
A
week after the comment by the Vietnamese spokesperson, the ASEAN secretary general Rodolfo Severino announced
that “At various levels, ASEAN members
are keeping an eye on what’s happening in
Mahathir Visits
Mahathir
made a more public visit to
His
official visit between the 3-4 January was followed by a “private holiday”until
9 January.142 Mahathir met
with SPDC officials including SPDC Chairman Senior General Than Shwe but with
no members of the NLD .
Official announcemens said that Mahathir visit to southern
On Mahathir’s
return to
Along with Mahathir’s announcements of further economic co-operation,
came pronouncements that elections will not be held in
EU-ASEAN Meeting
An EU-ASEAN ministerial
meeting had not occurred since
Prior to the December
EU-ASEAN meeting, the revolving door of arrests particularly of the CEC members
of the NLD, threw the meeting into doubt. The decision that the meeting would
proceed in
Many of the EU countries
did not send foreign ministers including Britian,
The Europeans had a good
diplomatic excuse as there was an EU Conference in Nice on December 8-9.
Prelimary meetings involving senior officials in
The
first commitment was to allow a European Mission into
The
EU only managed to secure from ASEAN a commitment to support national
reconciliation and the mediation mission of the UN Special Envoy. The joint
statement issued at the end of the meeting carried a rather weak reference to
the situation in Burma, “We committed
ourselves to promote and protect all human rights, including the right to
development and fundamental freedoms, bearing in mind their universal,
indivisible and interdependent character as expressed at the World Conference
on Human Rights in Vienna...We had a
frank discussion of developments in Burma, including the decision taken by the
Governing Body of the International Labour Office on 16 November 2000...We
expressed full support for the efforts made by Mr
Razali Ismail, the UN Secretary-General’s Special Envoy and hoped they would
contribute to a positive development in the process of national reconciliation
in Burma, including any early dialogue between the State Peace and Development
Council (SPDC), the NLD and other relevant parties.” The next EU-ASEAN
minister’s meeting was set for
The Off/On EU
Troika
The
planned October visit by EU delegation was cancelled on October 6 by the SPDC
in the midst of international protests after the latest round of arrests of NLD
members. The SPDC said it had not cancelled but postponed the visit because the
timing was wrong. “As the present
environment is not favourable for the meeting to be constructive,
The
date for the visit was set after the announcement of the ‘dialogue’. The EU
delegation included representatives from
On
the eve of the EU visit, editorials in SPDC newspapers showed little signs of a
change in outlook. “No foreign country or
foreigner has the right even to suggest who should or should not rule Myanmar
or which policy is to be followed and that no country or person has the right
to disturb and deter the endeavors of Myanmar...The act of invading other nations, interfering in the internal affairs
of other nations, practising various types of
colonialism and hegemonism are evil practices
unacceptable to the world.” The newspaper also warned, “that instability is occuring in various parts of
the world with many countries facing the evil consequences of war and civil
strife due to the political and economic conspiracies of greedy politicians and
entrepreneurs.”153
During
the visit the delegation held talks with Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, SPDC
representatives, various organisations and UN bodies. The delegation upon its
return to
Changes in
Foreign Policy:
The
election of a new President in the
•
The
election of Thai Rak Thai will entail a move away
from the more formalised foreign policy of the
Democrats, to a policy where high-level personal contacts are used to settle
problems. The Democrat administration tried to co-ordinate policy through the
Foreign Ministry. In particular, the Democract
Foreign Minister, Surin Pitsuwan,
attempted to direct relations with
The
coalition partners in the new Thai Government include Thai Rak
Thai, Chart Thai, and the New Aspiration party. Prominent figures in the new
Coalition, during and after the election campaign, indicated the likely
direction of foreign policy. The new Thai Prime Minister Thaksin
Shinawatra planned to personally visit
The
deputy leader of Thai Rak Thai, Pitak
Intrawithayanut said he was in favour of Ministry of
Foreign Affairs enhancing its economic role. He stated that the public expected
the foreign ministry to have economic interests. His comments were in response
to the permanent secretary of foreign affairs who had remarked “that the work of dipolomats
was to contribute to policy making and explore trade opportunities, rather than
compete with a ministry that had expertise in this field.”158
During
the election campaign former Army Chief Chetta Thanajaro visited
After
the election it was clear that, foreign policy was not being clearly defined
with the policy seemingly to “pursue a
good and close relationship with
Another
figure likely to be prominent in the foreign policy of the new administration
is the Defence Minister and Deputy Prime Minister - General Chavalit
Yongchaiyudh. Chavalit was
previously the foreign minister who was widely criticised for his visit to
The
new Aspiration Party (one of the coalition partners) plans to establish a
Thai-Burmese friendship association with Khin Nyunt and a key party official
co-chairing the organisation. Involved are party leader General Chavalit Yongchaiyudh and General
Pat Akanibut. The plan was formulated after a visit
by General Pat Akanibut to
•
The
election of a new President brings a new administration with Colin Powell as
the new Secretary of State. The specifics of foreign policy have not been
enunciated but there is speculation that criticisms of
UN Special
Rapporteur Resigns
The
UN Special Rapporteur on Burma, Rajsoomer Lallah, who held the mandate for just
over 4 years resigned in early November, citing lack of support from the Office
of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights.162 He said he did not feel he had “the kind of logistical and administrative support” he needed to
usefully contribute and was told by the Commissioner for Human Rights the
problems were due to a lack of resources.163 Lack of resources prevented him travelling
from Geneva to New York to present his human rights report to the UN General
Assembly and from conducting important meetings relating to his mandate. His
report served as the draft for the UN General Assembly report in November and
for another UN resolution condeming
REFUGEES & MIGRANT WORKERS
___________________________________________________________________
*
Improving *
Stagnant R
Deteriorating
Repatriation of
Karen
The
SPDC officials made several promises that they were willing to take back
refugees, though no-one seems to be bothering to ask the refugees if they want
to return under the present circumstances. The outgoing Thai Foreign Minister Surin Pitsuwan said the SPDC
Foreign Minister Win Aung claimed that the SPDC was willing to accept back
Burmese refugees in Thailand.165 The SPDC authorities also
informed the Thai Supreme Commander General Sampao Chusri that they were ready to take back war refugees on
the condition they were Burmese nationals.166
A
month later the SPDC accused Karen refugees of being fugitives and insurgents
who would not be allowed to return. Lt.Gen. Khin
Nyunt said, “If the insurgents (were)
to be repatriated and reintegrated as
refugees, it would be harmful to the peace and stability of the nation.”
The comments came during a speech to mark the UNHCR’s
50th anniversary
and in spite of talks between the UN High Commissioner for Refugees and the
SPDC on a possible repatriation.167 The lack of diplomatic
skills of Khin Nyunt exposes the position of the SPDC - that Karen cannot be
considered refugees but as insurgents.
However, it is not only the SPDC that is laying claim
to the identity and opinions of Karen refugees. The Democratic Karen Buddhist
Army (DKBA) stated that they wanted all Karen to return to “develop our Karen society” and that more
than 5,000 displaced Burmese would rather stay in a DKBA held area, than return
to
Repatriation of Rohingya
The slow repatriation of Rohingya refugees from
Burmese Refugees in
The problems for Chin
refugees in
About 700 Burmese, about half
of them Chin, arrived in the last few months of 2000, trying to seek asylum in
the US, often arranged through a broker.175 There are no asylum officials on the island, making
the asylum process very slow, with the problem exacerbated by the refugees being
unable to afford legal representation. The Burmese in
A number of asylum seekers
had been detained in the local detention centre for admitting on arrival that
they were going to seek asylum, rather than stating they only planned to stay
15 days and then return home. When
Migrant Labour in
• New Thai
Government
The close connections of
Thai Rak Thai and its coalition partners with Thai business
interests, has led them to publically acknowledge the
role of Burmese migrant labour in the Thai economy. Despite the nationalist
sentiment that has been on the increase with a number of high profile incidents
involving Burmese in
There are an estimated 1
million illegal workers from
The New Aspirtation
Party, one of the coalition partners in the new Thai government, during the
election campaign, acknowledged the role of Burmese migrant labour in the Thai
economy. One of the member’s of NAP’s economic team
said that they would not reduce the number of foreign workers, but would not
like companies to exclusively employ a foreign workforce. The same spokesman
added that there was also a need to crackdown on illegal workers. A
representative from Thai Rak Thai said the foreign
labour issue was complicated as there was a mix of local interests coupled with
legal and human rights issues. Thai Rak Thai’s policy
was not clearly enunciated so its policy on the level of migrant workers was
not stated. They tended to avoid the issue by putting forward economic
platitudes, stating that they planned to restructure industry to move away from
cheap labour to a highly productive, high skilled workforce by technology.
• Conditions
for Illegal Workers in
The Thai Action Committee
for a Democratic Burma (TACDB) released its survey on conditions for 60,000
Burmese workers in Samut Sakhon,
documenting their widespread mistreatment.179 Violence, physical punishment and fines are a common
mechanism of workplace control. Workers are beaten for not following directions
or when the pace of production is considered not fast enough. Health and safety
conditions are non-existent, contributing to the spread of disease, and
workplace death and injury are common. Even if workers are sick or injured,
fines are commonplace if workers fail to appear. Appalling conditions are
coupled with the extreme reluctance of illegal workers to seek medical
treatment for fear of repatriation. Women workers face additional problems with
sexual assualt by employers, senior workers and
police commonplace. There were reports of women disappearing after being arrested
by the police. Complaints and redress are virtually unknown for fear of job
loss and repatriation. The survey even found that some employers had their
employees arrested on the day before pay day. The report also noted that
corruption within the Thai authorities was a serious problem for illegal
workers. Arrests often involved beatings and demands for money. The amounts
varied but were often substantially more than a months
salary. Employers were also somewhat vulnerable with police demanding bribes
for the release of workers.180
• Repatriations
of Illegal Workers
Repatriations of illegal
Burmese workers across the Thai-Myanmar Friendship bridge
has again become a daily occurrence. During July and August there were
successive repatriations of Bumese workers in Mae Sot
until the systematic raids and repatriation suddenly stopped at the end of August. However, on December 1 the arrest and repatriation
process suddenly resumed. There are rumours that the Thai immigration police
have orders to arrests 70,000 illegal workers.181 The crackdown caused many
factory owners in the area to close down operations in December. Early in the
month some of the owners provided workers with enough money to return home to
avoid prosecution but a step up in the repatriation process meant that
financial assistance was no longer provided. The repatriation raids were still
continuing at the end of January.
The raids have serious
implications, not only because of the risk of deportation, but for the capacity
of illegal workers to provide for their basic needs. Illegal workers are
willing to risk illness and injury to escape deportation. During a factory raid
many of the workers jumped from the third floor, sustaining a range of
injuries. During another raid, a Burmese worker died from injuries. Many
workers hide from Thai police in paddy fields and forests and then become ill
due to weather exposure. At the end of January, 56 illegal migrants escaped
from the jail in Mae Sot. Most of them were quickly recaptured along with about
200 other Burmese when 100 Thai police were deployed in the small town.
• Fines and
Forced Labour on Repatriation
Illegal Burmese workers not
only have to face harrassment and fines in
CHRONOLOGY:
1st September 2000 ~ 31st January 2001
2 SEPTEMBER
• Aung San Suu Kyi and U Tin Oo
are handcuffed and returned to their homes in
• The NLD members from Dala township who are at the site
are arrested but released after few hours. They are arrested again in the
afternoon and imprisoned.
• All of the 10 CEC members of
NLD are placed under house arrest, telephone lines are cut off and no one is
allowed to enter or leave.
• NLD Headquarters is raided.
Everyone visiting the headquarters is arrested.
3 SEPTEMBER
• John Jenkins, the British
ambassador to
4 SEPTEMBER
• A joint SPDC army, navy and air force exercise
begins near the Thai-Burma border.
5 SEPTEMBER
• The Burmese Ambassador to
6 SEPTEMBER
•
7 SEPTEMBER
• The Landmine Monitor Report
2000 is released.
• The European Parliament calls
on the SPDC to grant freedom of movement to Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and all
citizens of the country.
13 SEPTEMBER
• Chein Poe, a
77-year old lawyer was sentenced to 14 years for distributing foreign press
clippings with anti-government slogans written on the back.
14 SEPTEMBER
• Lt-General Khin Nyunt and U
Khin Maung Win, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs meet with U Aung Shwe,
Chairman of the NLD while he is under arrest in a government “guest-house.”
• Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, U Tin Oo
and the other 7 members of the CEC are released from house arrest. The
authorities also leave NLD headquarters.
15 SEPTEMBER
• The NLD issues a statement
stating that 11 party members had been arrested during the week in
16 SEPTEMBER
• Military authorities block the
road to NLD headquarters where a celebration is held for the 2nd anniversary of
the formation of the CRPP.
17 SEPTEMBER
• The 12th anniversary of rule
by
•
21 SEPTEMBER
• Aung San Suu Kyi and U Tin Oo
are prevented from catching a train to
22 SEPTEMBER
• Restrictions are placed on the
7 other members of the CEC of the NLD. Ten more NLD members in
23 SEPTEMBER
• Thai soldiers kill four armed
intruders from
25 SEPTEMBER
• The British ambassador to
• The NLD is served with an
eviction notice for its headquarters in
27 SEPTEMBER
• The NLD does not mark the 12th
anniversary of its founding in protest against the confinement and imprisonment
of its CEC members.
OCTOBER
• Dialogue between Lt. General
Khin Nyunt and Aung San Suu Kyi begins sometime during the month.
2 OCTOBER
• The Swiss and
4 OCTOBER
•
6
OCTOBER
• SPDC cancels a visit by the EU foreign policy
troika.
9-12 OCTOBER
• UN Special Envoy Razali Ismail’s second mission to
16 OCTOBER
•
18 OCTOBER
• SPDC releases 6 elderly political prisoners who are members of the NLD after a special request by UN special envoy Razali Ismail.
20 OCTOBER
• The French Foreign Minister announces that the EU will
resume talks with ASEAN in December after a break of 3 years.
20-26 OCTOBER
• An ILO technical mission visits
25 OCTOBER
• Eviction date for NLD HQ in
1 NOVEMBER
• FTUB releases a report that
shows civilians are still being used as forced labour
2 NOVEMBER
• SPDC authorities announce that
a government ordinance banning forced labor in compliance with demands for reform
made by the ILO has been issued.
8 NOVEMBER
• An ILO technical mission to
• The UNGA at its 55th
Session adopts another resolution condemning human rights violations in
10 NOVEMBER
• The United Nations Human Rights
Committee adopts a draft resolution condemning
14 NOVEMBER
• Aung San Suu Kyi’s US-based
brother Aung San Oo’s legal representative in
17
NOVEMBER
• The ILO votes for the full
implementation of a resolution aimed at compelling the SPDC to comply with
Convention No.29 on forced labour.
• SPDC says it will stop
cooperating with the ILO on forced labor issues.
20 NOVEMBER
• 28 independence veterans send
a letter to the SPDC urging them to lift restrictions imposed on NLD leaders.
The letter is made public on 5 December.
22 NOVEMBER
• Eight Burmese and one Thai
prisoner, holding the prison’s governor and six of his staff hostage, break out
of a Thai jail. A religious teacher is killed in the prison before the
breakout.
23 NOVEMBER
• Thai commandos kill the 9
prison escapees and seriously injure the prison governor who later dies.
28 NOVEMBER
• San San
Nweh and U Win Tin are awarded the Golden Pen of
Freedom award for their devotion to press freedom and democracy. Both editors
are serving long prison sentences. The SPDC had offered to release them if they
renounce all political activity but both had refused.
1 DECEMBER
• 6 members of the CEC of the NLD
are released from house arrest, except for Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, U Aung Shwe
and U Tin Oo.
3 DECEMBER
• A group of former NLD members who
were dismissed from the party send a letter to the SPDC asking them to step up
dialogue with opposition parties.
10 DECEMBER
• SPDC agrees to allow an EU delegation to visit
• U Lwin, secretary of the NLD,
is allowed to visit Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. This is her first visitor (apart from
Razali) since she was placed under house arrest on Sept. 22.
11-12 DECEMBER
• ASEAN-EU meeting held in
14 DECEMBER
• 11 NLD arrested between September 13-14 for issuing a statement on the
forcible return of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi from
27 DECEMBER
• Reporters Sans Frontieres condemns the 21 year prison sentence given to
Aung Myint on the December 14 for distributing
information to the international press about Aung San Suu Kyi’s attempts to
travel outside of
2001
JANUARY
• During the month the SPDC press
stops attacking Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD, and instead targets foreign
and exiled groups.
3 JANUARY
• The Malaysian Prime Minister arrives in
5 JANUARY - 9 JANUARY
• Razali Ismail begins his third
visit to
9 JANUARY
• A UN spokesman announces that
Lt.-Gen. Khin Nyunt and Daw Aung San Suu Kyi had been engaged in a direct
‘dialogue’ since October.
10 JANUARY
• The NLD confirms that it had been in secret talks with SPDC.
15 JANUARY
• SPDC officials visit NLD headquarters stating that 86 members of the NLD imprisoned since September would be allowed to receive food parcels and letters.
16 JANUARY
• Lt. General Khin Nyunt says that the international community must remove sanctions if it wants to see “the emergence of a peaceful, modern and democratic state.”
• The EU announces that a delegation will visit
• 14 members of God’s Army surrender to Thai
authorities.
16-19 JANUARY
• The UNLD, an umbrella organisation for non-Burman
political parties is resurrected.
18 JANUARY
• Burmese language newspapers
quote Lt. General Khin Nyunt, saying
22 JANUARY
• Rangoon Court dismisses Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s brother’s
petition for half her home, citing technical problems with the way it was
filed.
25 JANUARY
• U Tin Oo the Vice-Chairman of the NLD along with 83
members of the NLD are released. U Tin Oo is
‘released’ from a military camp to house arrest.
• Norwegian Student Peace Prize awarded to Min Ko Naing.
29 JANUARY
• Gen.
Than Shwe warns against outside interference by “neocolonial’’
states trying to cause disunity in the country on the day the EU delegation
arrives.
29-31 JANUARY
• EU delegation visits
30 JANUARY
• The ICFTU sends a briefing to
221 affiliated national unions in 148 countries calling on trade union to press
their governments to impose a ban on investment and trade with
Appendix
1
LEADERSHIP CALLS FOR NATIONAL RECONCILIATION
The leadership of
non-Burman ethnic and democracy forces opposing military-rule in
meeting on 06-07 March 2001 in
1. Welcome the talks between the State Peace and
Development Council and Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, and the cessation of personal
attacks against her in the official media,
2. Welcome the involvement of the United Nations,
the Association of South East Asian Nations, the
3. Have full confidence in Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s
integrity and her commitment to the establishment of a truly democratic
political system in
4. In the interest of national reconciliation,
urge the SPDC and Daw Aung San Suu Kyi to make the substance of their talks
known to the people of
5. Urge SPDC to take additional steps to build
confidence in the current talks by relaxing further the restrictions placed on
the people of
6. Encourage SPDC and Daw Aung San Suu Kyi to
broaden and deepen the current talks to include a time frame and general
framework within which the role in a future
7. Note that United Nations General Assembly
resolutions affirm that the best means of promoting national reconciliation and
the full and early restoration of democracy in Burma is a Tripartite Dialogue -
the SPDC, democracy forces led by Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, and true
representatives of the non-Burman ethnic peoples,
8. Urge all political actors in
9. Call on all political actors in Burma to
explore ways and means to enable humanitarian aid to be delivered directly
without political interference to those in most urgent need, especially in the
non-Burman ethnic states,
10. To build further confidence in the current talks
and enable the suffering of the people to be alleviated, urge SPDC to cease all
hostilities, all anti-religious activities, and human rights abuses including
forced relocations and forced labour, in non-Burman ethnic states.
11. Welcome the efforts of the International Labour
Organization to end forced labour in
12. Welcome the continued efforts of the UN
Commission on Human Rights to end human rights abuses in
13. Welcome the continued support and activities of
non-government organizations and activists to highlight injustices in
14. Appreciate the consistent efforts of those
engaged in the struggle for democracy, human rights, and equality in
15. Call on the international community, especially
our neighbours, to support the dialogue process by encouraging all parties
involved to resolve
16. In the interest of keeping the dialogue process
alive, urge the international community to maintain
their current positions until substantive political agreements are reached,
17. Strongly urge the international community not
to take precipitous unilateral action such as providing aid without proper
consultation, which could endanger the dialogue process,
18. Call on the United Nations and the
international community to continue to closely monitor the situation and to
facilitate the talks,
19. Affirm that the National Coalition Government,
the National Council of the Union of Burma and allied forces will work together
to facilitate the dialogue process in
Participants:
1. NATIONAL COALITION GOVERNMENT OF THE
2. NATIONAL
COUNCIL OF THE
• Members of Parliament
• National League for Democracy (Liberated Area)
3. DEMOCRATIC
• All
• All
• All
• Democratic Party for New
Society
• Muslim Liberation Organization
• Overseas Burmese Liberation
Front
• People’s Defence Force
• People’s Liberation Front
• People’s Patriotic Front
• People’s Patriotic Party
4. NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC FRONT
• Arakan Liberation Party
• Democratic Party of Arakan
• Chin National Front
• Karen National
• Arakan League for Democracy
• Karenni National Progressive
Party
• Network for Democracy and
Development
• Shan Democratic
• Pa-o People’s Liberation
organization
• Zomi
National Congress
Information:
NCGUB: Dr Thaung Htun 66 (01) 859-5193 <[email protected]>
NCUB: U Maung Maung Aye 66 (01)
885-944 <[email protected]>
KNPP: Rimon Htoo 66 (01) 869-1567 <[email protected]>
KNU: Phado Mahn Sha 66 (01) 886-7467 <[email protected]>
Appendix 2
STATEMENT:
the INTERNATIONAL STRATEGY
MEETING ON BURMA
17-19 MARCH 2001, THAILAND
We, the
participants of an International Strategy Meeting representing 53 organizations
from 28 countries, support the current talks between Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and
the SPDC. We are committed to ensure that these talks progress into a genuine
tripartite dialogue. Only through this tripartite dialogue can real peace be
brought to
Despite
these talks, the results of the 1990 elections have not been recognized.
Furthermore, serious human rights violations and humanitarian crises continue
unabated in
We
demand that as an initial show of good faith and sincerity, the SPDC must
immediately:
1. Release all political prisoners
2. Allow the NLD and all political parties to
function freely
3. Cease all military hostilities
4. Cease all forms of forced labor
Acknowledging
the role of economic and political pressure in pushing the SPDC toward the
initial talks with Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, we call on the international community
to escalate action at this critical time to support the transformation of talks
into tripartite dialogue. We appeal for:
1. Governments, trade unions, and employers
organizations world-wide to take concrete action to implement the ILO
resolution.
2. The
3. Governments to refrain from providing any
form of official economic or development assistance until a genuine tripartite
agreement to allow such assistance can be reached. There must be a transparent
and accountable process for this assistance to be effective.
4. ASEAN to officially support the talks process and urge the SPDC to commit to a genuine
tripartite dialogue.
5. Civil society organizations and other
sectors of society, including women’s organizations, human rights and
environmental groups, religious groups, and students in all countries to step
up the momentum to achieve human rights and justice in Burma.
We
reaffirm our confidence in Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s leadership and commitment to
tripartite dialogue, and support the ethnic nationalities in the efforts for
national reconciliation. We commit ourselves to strengthening the call for
democracy and human rights which has consistently been articulated by the NLD,
other political parties, and the ethnic nationality groups in
We are
united in launching a new wave of international activism and political action.
We will not stop until all the peoples of
On
behalf of the participants:
(
(
(
(
(
Released by Altsean-Burma. Tel: 66 1 8509008. <[email protected]>
(The International Strategy Meeting was held at an
undisclosed location in
Appendix
3
Prospect for a political change
by Dr. Thaung Htun, Representative for
UN Affairs, NCGUB
for the
International Strategy Meeting on
The recent news about talks between Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and the
SPDC, which was revealed to the media after the visit of the UN Special Envoy
at the beginning of the year, has presented us with a great puzzle. The news
has filled our minds with questions. What are the substance and direction of
these talks?
Is this a real breakthrough that will lead to a democratic transition
in
We have seen the regime moving from a position at the beginning of
the year 2000 of trying to crush the NLD to an approach at the end of the year
of actually talking with the NLD. This movement indicates that the regime has
decided it cannot crush the NLD and must therefore find another way to deal
with the problems it is facing.
As far as we know, talks in
We have witnessed the regime exhibit some positive gestures since the
start of the talks. On Jan 25, U Tin Oo, Vice-Chairman of the NLD, was released
from detention after four months in the Ye Mon interrogation Centre. Nineteen NLD
Youth members who were arrested along with U Tin Oo were also released on that
day. Other NLD Youth members, who were arrested at the Rangoon Central Railway
Station when Daw Suu was obstructed from traveling to
Although the NCGUB perceives these developments to be positive, we also believe that we need to be cautious. This is not the first time the Burmese military has entered into dialogue with its political opponents. In 1962, the Revolutionary Council, which was the first generation of the current military regime, entered into dialogue with all of the country’s armed resistance groups. In 1994, Gen. Than Shwe and Gen Khin Nyunt met Daw Aung San Suu Kyi while she was under house arrest. Most of us are well aware of the failure of previous peace negotiations.
In conjunction with its provision of partial gestures, we
should be careful not to miss the fact that the military wooed the
international community into lifting sanctions that had been imposed on
• No one knows the substance of the talks in
• No official announcement regarding the talks has
been made in the Burmese media.
• The talks are limited - only Daw Aung San Suu Kyi
is involved. This is a cause for concern.
• No substantive political agreements have been
reached.
• No laws have been repealed to ensure that those
recently released will not be rearrested.
• No laws have been enacted to ensure democracy and
human rights.
• Forced labor and forced relocations, with
attendant human rights abuses, continue unabated.
• More than one thousand political prisoners,
including elected MPs, continue to languish in jail.
• The military offensive against
ethnic peoples is continuing.
Given these considerations, the international community must be careful not to prematurely relax the existing pressure mechanisms before talks have reached the stage where they become irreversible and have developed into a process of genuine dialogue. The talks cannot be deemed a “dialogue” until the following conditions are fulfilled:
• The parties are able to talk in freedom as equals;
• The parties can select their own representatives
at the same level;
• The talks deal with political issues and are not
one-sided;
• There is a facilitator or mediator (ASEAN, UN or
otherwise) involved; and
• The parties make joint statements/declarations.
Given
the strengths and weaknesses of key players in
I. A deepening dialogue
process and a negotiated political settlement: This is possible if both the
military regime and the NLD agree to start substantive negotiations to end the
crisis in
II. Collapse of talks and
return to protracted status quo: Conditions surrounding the current talks
are fragile, and the possibility of the military retreating to the status quo
is very real. This could happen if the military believes that they can recover
from the current economic decline if some donors prematurely decide to resume
development aid and the generals regain enough confidence to institutionalize
military rule.
III. Peoples’ uprising and
chaotic violence: This is possible if the SPDC fails to provide basic needs
for the people, especially the urban population. Urban rioting will provoke
massive suppression by the military.
Violent chaos could follow such uprisings and, in turn, bring about
international condemnation of the SPDC. At this point, the general public may
wait for the progress of dialogue between the NLD and military authorities, and
the breakdown of talks could ignite a public backlash.
Given these possible scenarios, the NCGUB believes that strengthening
the current talks is the only desirable scenario for the future of
In order to attain the goal of enhancing the dialogue process in
We also need to promote public visibility,
recognition, and support of the dialogue process in
Before I conclude, let me express my appreciation and gratitude to
all
Thank you.
Appendix 4
The Coming Transition and the National Reconciliation Program/NRP
by Chao-Tzang Yawnghwe
for the International
Strategy Meeting on Burma March 17-19, 2001 , Thailand
The
Politics of Identity and the Problem of Reconciliation
The problem of how to reconcile parties in conflict is a most
difficult task in politics. This is all the more so when, as in
The problem is further compounded when the state’s unity ideology –
its unity formula — is based on the promotion and imposition by the state, as
in Burma, of the ethnicity or core identity of one ethnic group – the group’s
version of history, its claims of greatness, its culture, religion, language,
and so on. Such a unity formula will necessarily de-legitimize, marginalize,
and repress the very identity of other ethnic segments, and arouse much anger and
resentment. Ethnic segments thus deprived of their rights to “being” as a
people or nation will respond to the identity-destroying, destructive state in
various ways, including resorting to arms. And what invariably follows is there
emerges a culture and “history” of resistance that demonizes the ethnic group
whose core values and identity is promoted by the ethnic or ethno-national
state, and imposed on other ethnic segments.
In
such a conflict situation focused almost exclusively on ethnic identity – the
armed or coercive suppression of ethnic identity and the armed assertion of
identity – what transpires is that there is extreme polarization. A hard “them
against us” mind-frame is established in a zero-sum conflict environment.
Generally speaking, the fact that all members of the dominant ethnic segment do
not benefit from the ethnic-domination agenda of the ethnic or
ethno-nationalistic state, is not recognized. For example, in the
To make things more complex – and more difficult in terms of
affecting reconciliation — when the struggle (or conflict) is protracted, there
develops within ethnic resistance movements fissures, brought about by
leadership contests or fights over territory. Mainly, however, intra-ethnic
fights are about unity. Unity is defined by ethnic resistance movements or its
leaders as all, i.e., everyone, being united under (or submitting to) one
leader or to one vanguard organization. Hence, there is an
built-in pull toward authoritarianism and a totalizing mind-set, and an
intolerance of diversity, which often gives rise to intra-ethnic fights which
can be, and often are, brutal and merciless.
The dynamics and imperatives of identity politics is that such
politics, one, promote the idea of a nation as a monolithic entity, a view that
de-legitimize the natural diversity and plurality of human beings and society.
And two, they obscure the reality of politics, what politics is all about —
i.e., that at the core of politics is power. That is, that the ethnic domination
formula is but one means by which power is maintained by state power-holders is
obscured by highly charged and powerful ethno-nationalist sentiments,
grievances, fear, and ethnic ambitions and aspirations.
The masking of what politics is all about – that it is about power –
in effect makes it easier for those who hold power to divert the attention of
their opponents away from the politics of power, and as well to use the
preoccupation of the opposition with ethnic identity and the politics of identity,
to sow confusion and discord. Also, the cloaking of power and power interest in
an ethno-nationalist mantle also enables power-holders to manipulate the
emotions of members of the dominant ethnic group, even provide them with a
sense of superiority, or false, jingoistic pride.
The Panglong Spirit and the National Reconciliation
Prospects
It can be said that the protagonists in
Nonetheless, the chances for ethnic reconciliation
in
That is – to clarify – although the military has, since 1962, been
able to impose its ethno-Burman national unity formula and agenda in Burma by
brutally repressing and marginalizing non-Burman ethnic segments — i.e., the
ethnic nationalities — it has never been able however to totally ignore a
factor which is powerful, even — it might be said — politically hegemonic.
Successive military regimes and ruling ethno-Burman generals, including the
pre-1988 military dictator, General Ne Win, have been compelled to proclaim
especially on Union day – 12th
February, the day the Panglong Accord was signed (in 1947) – that Burma is a
union of “national races”, founded on the principle of equality and fraternity.
In fact, the term in the Burmese language for the nation-state of
The Panglong Accord signed eleven months before independence was
proclaimed, on
Such being the founding creed of the Union of Burma (or Burma), the
1947 Panglong Accord and the Panglong Spirit still remains for the people of
Burma – ethnic Burmese and especially the non-Burman — a powerful ideal, a
historically defining goal to strive for. And this is so despite the violence
done to the Panglong Spirit by the ethno-Burman militarized state and the rise
of strong anti-Burman sentiments on the part of the ethnic nationalities,
rooted in their suffering at the hands of the ethno-Burman state and military.
The above is not to say, however, that national reconciliation can be
affected effortlessly, or that it is not problematic. Ethnic distrust and
resentment and the wrenchingly bitter experience of conflict – a protracted war
fuelled by highly charged and narrowly focused ethnonational
sentiments of anger and pain cannot be turned off at will like water from a
tap.
Ethno-nationalist anger, resentment, fear, and aspirations, born out
of a violent and protracted conflict and fuelled by brutal military repression,
is a very powerful force, and induces in the oppressed a will to fight, to keep
on fighting, no matter how non viable such a course may be.
In the
The world where authoritarian rulers and dictators
are needed and nutured by superpower patrons has
ended. Those days are gone.
Today, the world is ruled by market forces, guided by elements that
are only marginally concerned with the interests of states and nations, and to
whom political boundaries are not very meaningful. The need or preference of
powerful global players nowadays is for governments that will not obstruct, but
promote the free flow across national borders of capital, trade, information,
and skills.
With the military greatly discredited and probably in increasing disarray, and the likelihood that it will return to the
barracks sooner or later, a question that must be seriously pondered is whether
To be frank, neighboring states – ASEAN governments especially,
including Thailand, perhaps – do not think that Burma can survive without the
iron hands of the military, no matter how brutal, at the helm. Because of the
pervasiveness – as perceived by neighboring leaders — of irreconcilable
“ethnic” conflict in Burma, and the dynamics of “ethnic” wars and “ethnic”
hatred, there is very little faith placed in the ability of the people of Burma
to govern themselves democratically and peacefully, or importantly, to “keep
the country together”, or prevent the disintegration of the nation.
The NRP/National Reconciliation Program
There is indeed much reason for deep pessimism regarding
It is with above problem in mind that the National Reconciliation
Program/NRP was created in 1999 by independent pro-democracy organizations —
like, for example, the Euro-Burma Office and The Burma Fund, with strong
support from the National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma/NCGUB.
The NRP’s central task is to prepare
pro-democracy opposition groups, both the ethnic nationalities and ethnic
Burmese (Burman), for a democratic transition through dialogue, and for life
after years of long military rule and control. The program is focused composed
has three inter-connected and related components: consultation,
capacity-building, and conflict resolution.
Operation-wise, the NRP’s task is to,
• ONE,
facilitate the implementation of the United Nations General Assembly
resolutions which call for a Tripartite Dialogue;
• TWO,
facilitate the empowerment of the ethnic nationalities to decide their own
future;
• THREE,
facilitate inter-ethnic and intra-ethnic consultations on wide-ranging issues
and problems;
• FOUR,
facilitate preparations to achieve the political structures desired by the
people;
• FIVE,
create conditions that will safeguard future democratic structures and build
sustainable democracy; and
• SIX,
link available resources, in terms of expertise and fund (from interested
institutions), with the needs in the field.
As the name implies the NRP is a program, not an organization. It is
a facilitating body. Structurally, it is composed of three bodies: a
Secretariat (a clearing house), an Advisory team, and a Facilitating team/FT
made up of individual leaders possessing a good track record and a wide network
of contacts within the democracy movement.
The achievements of the NRP within a short span of one year are as
below: :
• facilitating
political consultations among and between ethnic nationalities leaders and
organizations (i.e., the Chin, Karen, Shan, Mon Karenni, Chin, and ethnic
Burmese consultations);
• assisting
ethnic nationalities in consulting about and discussing state constitutions and
in the formation of constitution drafting commissions (namely, for the Shan,
Mon, Karen, Chin, and
• assisting
in the establishment of women and youth groups and organizations and
facilitating workshops and relevant activities on a multi-ethnic basis, geared
to building capacity and resolving conflicts;
• organizing
transition-dialogue workshops and seminars for top ethnic nationalities leaders
and top cadres in conjunction with international bodies like Sweden-based IDEA;
• assisting
in the publication of papers and booklets on constitutional matters and related
issues, and important political events in
• assisting
in the re-formation of the United Nationalities League for Democracy/UNLD, a
front of ethnic nationalities political parties which participated in the 1990
elections, and together with the Shan Nationalities League for Democracy/ SNLD,
won 67 parliamentary seats.
It might therefore be said that a step in the right direction has
been taken to affect reconcilation and resolve
political conflict in
The Role of the friends of Democratic Burma
It might at this juncture be said that basic, perhaps very
rudimentary, preparations have been in made to affect ethnic reconciliation in
As such, the democracy movement needs as much help it can get from
friends of democracy, activists, support groups, pro-democracy grassroots
movements, international and national institutions, humanitarian and human
development foundations, sympathetic national leaders, and democratic
governments.
As stated earlier, there is much to hope for, and to be optimistic
about although the conflict in
Now that talks – presumably very serious talks — have been initiated
in
If there is a dialogue, a genuine one, leading to the full and free
participation of all stakeholders in a democratic and united multi-ethnic Union
of Burma, it is quite likely that common sense will prevail since this mental
quality is possessed in abundance, not by the elites and the privileged, but by
ordinary men and women, who desire nothing more than to lead ordinary, mundane
lives. It is also likely that ethnic nationalities leaders have acquired the
patience and enough skills to negotiate the legitimate rights of their
respective nations and to participate positively and fruitfully in a democratic
arena.
Importantly, however, in a period of transition, when ordinary men
and women are faced with the very daunting, seemingly hopeless, task of picking
up the shattered pieces of their broken lives, this is precisely the time for
international friends of
The empowerment of the people is vital for the sustainability of
democracy. Democratic empowerment of the people is as well vital to the burial
of the violent, demented ghost of ethno-national sentiments and the conflicts
they induce, and to putting an end to the divisive, irrational, and totalizing ethnopolitics of identity. The reason for saying this is
that power, if it is concentrated in the hands of the state, or “belongs” only
to the privileged, it becomes a poisonous substance that kills the people
rendered powerless and voiceless by a political power which is lawless and
unaccountable. And in a situation where the people are without power, the games
played by the powerful to maintain and keep power can be, and is, obscured from
view, and they – the ordinary folks — are thus misled into fighting, dying, and
suffering for goals that are long on promise and short on delivery.
There are certainly a lot of ways the international community and
world-wide supporters of democracy can do to help the people of
END
Appendix 5
ICFTU:
Election of Burmese official as Chair of Major UN Committee
The rewarding of
The election of Mya Than, Burma’s Permanent Representative to the UN
in Geneva, as Chairperson of the UN General Assembly’s First Committee (of
Disarmament and international Security) sends a message to the world that
despite the condemnation by UN bodies, including the UN Commission on Human
Rights and the International Labor Organization (ILO) because of its violations
of international human rights standards, Burma has received the UN’s official
blessing.
We find it extraordinary that while on the one hand a number of UN
bodies adopt strongly-worded Resolutions condemning
After strong condemnation of Burma’s military regime at the
International Labor Conference in June, the ILO governing body is expected to
adopt a series of measures this November towards Burma, including calling on
all relevant UN agencies to reconsider, within their terms of reference and, if
appropriate, to cease as soon as possible any activity that could have the
effect of directly or indirectly abetting the practice of forced or compulsory
labour.
The election of the Burmese representative in the same week that the
Burmese military government has been condemned internationally for its
continual harassment of The National League for Democracy, and its leader Aung
San Suu Kyi is all the more bizarre.
In addition, Mya Than cannot be considered blameless
in the military regime’s history of enslaving the population, as he has held a
number of senior positions in his country’s government.
Appendix 6
Index of Economic Freedom for Burma 2001
Each
year, based on libertarian ideological premises, the Heritage Foundation
calculates an index of economic freedom for each country.1 Each county
is accorded a score from 1 to 5, with 5 being the least free economic system.
Categories Used to Calculate Index of
Economic Freedom
|
|
Trade Policy 5 – Stable (Very high level of
protectionism) |
|
Fiscal Burden of |
|
Govt. Intervention in |
|
Monetary Policy 5 – Stable (Very high level of
inflation) |
|
Capital Flows & |
|
Banking and Finance 4 – Stable (High level of restrictions) |
|
Wages and Prices 4 – Stable (High level of intervention) |
|
Property Rights 4 – Stable (Low level of protection) |
|
Regulation 5 – Stable (Very high level) |
|
Black Market 5 – Stable (Very high level of activity) |
The assessment of the fiscal
burden of the government is based on a number of sub-categories including:
• Government
expenditures: 1 Stable (very low level of government expenditure)
• Income
and corporate taxation: 2.5 Stable (moderate tax rates)
Even if
we leave aside issues of limited government expenditure being a reflection of
economic freedom, an important oversight of the foundation is the real
expenditure on the military as a percentage of GDP. An inclusion of the real
expenditure of the regime on this sector would provide a more realistic
assessment of the fiscal burden. The moderate rating for taxation ignores the
‘tax’ collection methods of the SPDC, which includes the arbitrary collection
of taxation by military units. This includes the direct theft of property,
livestock, money and food. The other most important form of ‘taxation’ imposed
to support the state centred development projects of
the regime is forced labour. If the monetary value of forced labour was
included in the calculation of taxation then real tax rates would be much
higher. The exclusion of these hidden expenditures and taxes means that the
Heritage Foundation fails to note some of real fiscal burdens imposed on the people
of
The
other criticism centres on the assessment of
government intervention in the economy. The heritage foundation seems to be
more interested in measures of government expenditure, consumption and revenues
from state-owned enterprises than in the reality of intervention. The
widespread theft, appropriation of land and livelihood should count as greater
measures of economic intervention than government expenditure as a percentage
of GDP. A fuller account of government intervention would hardly score
Footnotes
1 Note you have
to be arrested before you can be released.
2The helicopter
crash occurred in February, which is after the period covered by this report.
3 Myanmar Times
January 2001
4 The five-fold
pay increase in July for military personnel and civil servants was amended for
junior officers so that at least half their ‘increased’ salary is tied up in
bank accounts as forced savings.
5 DVB 18
January
6 The first visit by Razali Ismail was in July 2000 not long
after his appointment.
7 New Straits
Times 29th January.
8 Kyemon 18 January - Burmese language newspaper.
9 Kyemon 18 January - Burmese language newspaper.
10 Agence France Presse 14 December
11 Trade unions
are more likely to respond to the call with the UN agencies continuing to
pursue their own organisational agendas with limited accountability.
12 This could
also be the reason that the central command’s forced labour ban has not taken
root at the regional level. In addition, there are indications that some of the
local military commanders are no longer keen to take orders from central
command, as they are eager to protect growing business interests including
drugs.
13 Chilston I
& II. Despite the belief that aid will have a positive impact on the
economy, health and education that is held by both sides of Burma’s political
divide, evidence suggests a more cautious assessment.
14
15 Rajsoomer Lallah, “Situation of human rights in
16 Report Card: Burma Consequences of Violence,
May 2000. ALTSEAN-Burma
17 “Overcrowded Camps Worsen with Baby Boom” Nov 1, 2000
18 UNDCP “World Drug Report 2000” UNDCP, January 2001, p76
19 233 men and 492 women were asked a variety of questions
concerning prevention and transmission of HIV.
20 UNDCP “World
Drug Report 2000”, UNDCP, January 20001, p.27.
21 ibid
22 U.S.
Department of State “Narcotics Control Report: Burma” Bureau for International
Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, March 1 2001.
23 SHAN 21
December
24 According to the UNDCP report there was approximately 89,500
hectares under cultivation in 1999 a decline from 130,000 hectares the previous
year. The decline in areas under cultivation was due to weather conditions
rather than drug eradication policy. The US State Department’s Bureau for
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement states that area under cultivation
has increased in 2000. The UNDCP has not published figures for this year.
25 ibid, p.35
26 ibid, p.41
27 The triad
reputably involved with the UWSA is the 14K whose leaders are Ma “White Powder”
Sik-yu and Ng “Limpy Ho” Shek-ho.
28 Bangkok Post
22 December
29 ibid, p.51.
This category excludes ecstasy of which Burma is not a major producer.
30 The second
largest region for seizures was Europe, with 39.5% of total seizures.
31 ibid, p.54
32 ibid, p.54. Figures for the
production of ATS are not available but
33 SHAN 12-19
December. The Shan Herald Agency for News states that it is independent and is
not aligned to any military or political group.
34 SHAN 12-19
December
35 The village Nawngwaen is about 4 km northwest of Border Pass-1 and of Loihtwe (Doithuay in Thai)
opposite Chiangdao District.
36 SHAN 14
December
37 Bangkok Post
16 December
38 SHAN 7
September
39 NLM 23 July
40 SHAN 13 December
41 The UNDCP
with support from the USA and Japan has implemented a ‘development’ project in
Wa controlled areas in Northern Shan State.
42 Narcotics
Control Report: Burma, 2001.
43 U Sai Lin of the Eastern Shan State Army (ESSA) was listed by
the U.S. State Department as a major drug trafficker, but who has now
successfully rid the area under his command of opium cultivation. There are no new
reports of the ESSA being involved in drug trafficking but their territory is a
major drug trafficking route. (See Narcotics Control Report: Burma, 2001)
44 (DVB 27 Dec)
45
46 (Bangkok Post
24 December)
47 SHAN 29
December
48 Bangkok Post
15 December
49 SHAN No.12-25
50 SHAN 24
January
51 SHAN 24 January
52 SHAN 29
December
53 These
problems are obviously not confined to the UWSA.
54 SHAN 29
December
55 A pledge was
made also made to establish an opium free zone by 2000.
56 DVB 16
November
57 opcit.
58 Bangkok Post
30 November
59 Lt-Col Tin
Maung Commander LIB 513, Panglong, Loilem District,
Southern Shan State. SHAN 13 Dec
60 DVB 27
November
61 Obviously,
there are no independent research institutes in Burma. The historical research
institute is part of a series of centres set up by
South East Asian Ministers of Education (SEAMEO) whose mandate is to present
the history and traditions of SE Asia from a ‘regional’ perspective and develop
educational curricula reflecting this perspective.
62 U Aung Ko Win is the alias of Saya Kyaung.
63 Bangkok Post
18 December
64 AP 14
November
65 Reuters 11
December
66 NLM 22
December
67 Le Courrier/Liberte (
68 Bangkok Post
24 December
69 FEER 7
December
70 Bangkok Post
24 December
71 Thai
officials have accused China of also being behind the relocation of the Wa from
the Chinese border to the Thai border. They were accused of trying to shift the
drug problem away from China. See previous Report Card.
72 AP 11 Jan;
AFP 12 January
73 Nation 13
January. Tachilek is a border town located inside
Burma.
74 AP 11 January
75 For
alternative perspectives that are supported by analysis and evidence – Food
Scarcity in Burma, World Bank Report on Burma, WHO World Health Report 2000.
There are many other publications by reputable organisations and individuals
that provide similar assessments that Abel’s comments are almost delusionary.
76 US Commercial
Service Report, September 2000.
77 AP 30
September and ibid.
78 “Minister
claims 11% growth” Myanmar Times, 12 January.
79 International
Monetary Fund, Myanmar Statistical Appendix, IMF Country Report No. 01/18,
January 2001.
80 This data is from official SPDC figures.
81 Total
Approved = USD 4,607.8m; Total Actual = USD 2,764.9 m
82 In the previous 5 years total actual FDI is larger than
total approved. This shows that much of the actual investment that has taken
place in the last 5 years was approved prior to 1995/96. This reflects the
completion of the gas pipeline projects.
83 In 1997/98
274.9m was approved compared with 15.5m in 1999/00. The amount disbursed in
1997/98 was 172m compared with 10.5m in 1999/00.
84 Unocal is a
partner in the Yadana project (28.26% equity) along with Total (31.4%), PTTEP
(25.5%) and MOGE (15%). Premier Oil is the operator and largest shareholder in
the Yetagun pipeline.
85 Sanctions applied by the
86 In the last 5 years only
28.8% of approved FDI from Malaysia has been disbursed. Only 20.45% of approved
FDI from Thailand has been disbursed.
87 In September the Kyat was
about 400 to the US$ but by December was more than K435 to the USD. By March
2001, it had reached 500.
88 See previous Report Card.
89 An import quota is either a
monetary limit or quantity limit on the amount of imports.
90 DVB 14 September.
91 “Trade plummets at key
checkpoint on Thai-Myanmar Border” 12 December, AP.
92 The average tariff is already
estimated at around 50.7%. The usual argument for tariffs is the protection of
local industries or their promotion. Tariffs in Burma’s context are useless as
there are virtually no local industries and promotion of local industry is
impossible in the current state of crisis. The only impact of tariffs is an
increase in the prices of all goods and services, further fuelling inflation.
The average tariff rate is calculated as total tax on international trade as a
percentage of total imports. The measure of taxes includes a calculation for licences, bans and quotas.
93 As this report goes to print
an announcement was made that Japan is to recommence ODA loans.
94 “Japan to work out Myanmar
reforms within two years” Agence France Presse, 5 December 2000.
95 Japan’s overseas aid program
rarely even bothers to pay lip service to issues of development in the
recipient countries being directed at furthering Japanese foreign policy and
business interests. Its aid program is directed towards the SE Asian region.
This is not to say that Western countries aid program is not based on
self-interest but in Burma’s case some of these countries have displayed some
concern for human rights abuses. This is may be because of Burma’s lack of
economic and strategic importance for these countries.
96 “Tokyo slates meeting with
Burma” The Japan Times, 1 December 2000.
97 UNDP, “Human Development
Report 2000”
98 Rajsoomer Lallah, op cit.
99 “Interview with the Secretary
No.1 of the State Peace and Development Council Lt-General Khin Nyunt” Myanmar
Times 15-21 January 2001.
100 Information Sheet,
“E-Education System Launched in Myanmar” No. B-1664 (I) 1 Jan 2001
101 This is the historical
institute that recently received donations from the UWSA.
102 New Light of Myanmar, 14
December.
103 DVB October
104 Nation 17 October
105 NCGUB News Desk 23 October
106 Jane’s Defence Weekly,
“Myanmar academy triples cadet intake” 22 November 2000.
107 Special Rapporteur on
Myanmar: Report to UNGA 2000
108 Compiled by the Federation
of Trade Unions- Burma, “Forced Labour in Burma (Myanmar): Violations after the
88th International Labour Conference Geneva, June 2000.
109 SHAN 9 November
110 ILO Press Release, Thursday
19 October 2000.
111 ILO Press Release, Friday 17
November 2000.
112 Agence
France 17 November
113 See Landmine Monitor
Burma/Myanmar, Burma: Landmine Monitor Report 2000, International Campaign to
Ban Landmines.
114 See the drugs section for coverage of events in
115 UNGA, “UNGA Resolution 2000” 55th
Session, Third Committee, Agenda Item 114 (c).
116 AP 16 Jan
117 FEER 1 February
118 AFP 3 January
119
120
121 DVB 1 January
122 FEER 1 February
123 ibid.
124 For a report on the incident at
125 Dr. Myo Aung is Daw Aung San Suu
Kyi physician and U Soe Myint
is a Central Executive Member of the NLD.
126
127 These organisations include the Union Solidarity and
Development Association, the Myanmar Red Cross, Fire Brigade, military
intelligence and the police.
128
129 SMH 28 September
130 SMH 28 September
131
132 SMH 28 September
133 NLM/Information Sheet, 25 September
134 The Mirror 25 September
135 At least the CEC have the ‘privilege of being regularly
released unlike most of the other political prisoners.
136 Note this is the same day that U Tin Oo is released from
house arrest.
137 The visits by the UN Special Envoy Razali Ismail are
discussed in the first section entitled, ‘Dialogue.’
138 In early October following the European Union, both
139 Reuters 16 October
140 AFP 16 January
141 Mahathir has also lost international credibility with his
handling of criticism that emanated from his former deputy Anwair
Ibrahim.
142 Mahathir is one of the few world leaders who would vacation
in
143 Malaysian entrepreneurs are already renting agricultural
land from the SPDC for agricultural plantations.
144 New Straits Times, 29 January
145 New Straits Times, 29 January
146 It is not clear, if the EU had been informed of the
‘dialogue’, prior to the meeting. Dialogue began sometime in October but an
official announcement was not made until the 9 January.
147 The last EU mission went to
148 AP 12 December
149 ibid
150 ibid
151 AFP 10 October
152 AFP 16 January
153 New Light of
154 An important development in relations between
155 Often these are the same people.
156
157 ibid
158 He was a contender for the post of Foreign Minister.
159 FEER 22 February
160
161 The Vice-president, Dick Cheney was once the CEO of
Halliburton, which has subsidiaries that were involved in the construction of
the Yadana and Yetagun pipelines.
162 Special Rapporteurs are
independent experts whose mandate is to present reports to the UN Commission on
Human Rights which then decides to take further action.
163 “UN special rapporteur on
164 AFP 3 November
165 Zhong Hua
Ribao 27 November - A Chinese language newspaper
published in
166
167 AP 14 December
168
169 Maybe the DKBA has been recently reading William Morris
with their visions of a collectivist utopia.
170
171 ibid
172 Muslim Information Centre of
173 Mizzima New Group 9 December
174 The previous report card noted the forced repatriation of
Chin refugees back to
175 AFP 14 December
176 Mercury News 23 January
177There is widespread unemployment and underemployment in
178 162 baht per day
179 Samut Sakhon
is a province next to
180 TACDB November 2000
181 Most of this section is based on a press release by the
Burma Labour Solidarity Organization 19 December 2000.
182 DVB 25 November
183 BLSO 19 December
184 Muslim Information Centre 13 Jan.
185 This is not the place for a fuller assessment of the
philosophical premises of the
186 These comments do not imply that