SALWEEN WATCH UPDATE

 

 

November 2000 - January 2001, Vol. 9.

 

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Contents:

1. “STOP JAPANESE INVOLVEMENT IN THE TASANG DAM PROJECT”-

 Mekong Watch (Japan) 8th December 2000; Urgent Action Alert

2.  TASANG DAM PROJECT IN BURMA  (Myanmar) Project Overview

Mekong Watch, Japan; 19 December 2000

3. APPEAL FOR ELECTRIC POWER DEVELOPMENT COMPANY LTD.’S WITHDRAWAL FROM TASANG HYDROELECTRIC POWER GENERATION PROJECT (SHAN STATE, BURMA)

Mekong Watch (Japan)  21 December 2000

4. “REGIONAL COOPERATIVE DEVELOPMENT FOR THE SALWEEN RIVER” - Tsuyoshi Hashimoto: Paper presented in 1995 at the Asian Water Forum, Bangkok, Thailand

5. “JAPAN’S “BURMA LOVERS” AND THE MILITARY REGIME”.

Japan Policy Research Institute (JPRI). [Summarised by Salween Watch]

 

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1. STOP JAPANESE GOVERNMENT INVOLVEMENT IN THE TASANG DAM PROJECT (SALWEEN RIVER, BURMA)

 

MEKONG WATCH (Japan), 8th December 2000:          Urgent Action Alert

 

The Japanese government may become the main financier of the highly controversial Tasang Dam, to be built on the Salween River in Burma’s southern Shan State.  Even before construction has begun, the area around the site has been increasingly militarized, also resulting in increased forced labor and forced relocation.  If constructed, in addition to the severe social impacts, the damage to the environment will be immense.  The International Labor Organization has recently passed a resolution urging its members to re-evaluate relations with the military regime in Burma to ensure that nothing in the relationship contributes to the use of forced labor in Burma.  This project will undoubtedly involve forced labor, and as a state member, the Japanese government should refrain from any involvement in the Tasang Dam. 

 

Please send polite but strong letters to the Electric Power Development Corporation as well as Japan’s Ministry of International Trade and Industry and the Ministry of Finance (CC to Ministry of Foreign Affairs) protesting Japan’s involvement.  Please do so now before decisions are made which will make the dam even more difficult to fight.  Necessary information regarding the dam project and guidelines for the letters is provided below.  If you could also please send copies of your letters to us at Mekong Watch so we can keep track of this campaign, it would be greatly appreciated.

 

For more information, feel free to contact:

 

Tamaki Ohashi,   Mekong Watch, Japan

e-mail:  [email protected] or [email protected]

Tel:  +81 3 3832 5034; Fax:  +81 3 5818 0520; Mobile phone:  +81 70 5008 6864

Address:  Maruko Bldg 5F, 1-20-6 Higashi-Ueno, Taito-ku, Tokyo 100-8605  JAPAN

 

 

Basic Background on Tasang Dam

 

Main developer:   Thailand’s GMS Power

Financier:  Not yet known. The Japan Bank for International Cooperation has been approached but no commitments have yet been made. 

Location:       Southern Shan State on Burma’s Salween River.

 

Purposes for building the dam: 

Hard currency for the military regime in Burma (through sale of electricity to Thailand). 

Electricity for Thailand and Burma.  At least 66% of the electricity will be sold to Thailand.  It is believed that in reality, much more than 66% will be sold to Thailand due to the location of the dam.  Being far from the major cities in Burma and so close to the Thai border, it is not practical for this dam to be an energy source for Burma.

 

Scale of project: 

Three billion US dollars is a rough estimate for technical aspects only.  This does not include environmental or social impact mitigation measures.  This project will require public funds from either Japan or a multilateral development bank.

6,400 megawatts.  Among the top five largest hydropower dams in the world.

530 square kilometer reservoir.

200 meters tall. Will be the tallest in Southeast Asia

 

Problems: 

·        Forced relocations of villages around the dam site and in the projected 530 square kilometer reservoir area have already begun.

·        Forced labor is being used by Burmese battalions brought into the area surrounding the proposed Tasang Dam site.   

·        Forced relocation and forced labor are almost always accompanied by violence, including beatings, rape, and extrajudicial killing.

·        Local communities have no right to participate in decision-making processes, making meaningful local consultations impossible in the current situation.

·        A complete environmental impact assessment is probably impossible (it is conceivable that battalions would be used to protect those doing the environmental impact assessment as well, also leading to further human rights violations).

·        Foreseeable environmental impacts include a significant change in river flow and ecological balance, leading to the possible extinction of species downstream and in the reservoir area; increased salinity in the delta region; deterioration of soil in delta region due to increased salinity.

·        Even if agreements were made with the military regime in Burma regarding environment and human rights concerns, sufficient monitoring could not be guaranteed.

 

Basic Facts Regarding Electric Power Development Corporation (EPDC)

·        EPDC was formed as a result of legislation, and 66% of its stocks are owned by the Ministry of Finance (MOF).  In order to do any activity overseas, it is required to obtain permission from the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) in consultation with MOF.

·        EPDC was subcontracted by Thailand’s GMS Power, the main developer, to do the feasibility study for the Tasang Dam

·        EPDC has submitted its feasibility study report to GMS Power, and it is now in the final stages of revision.  Whether or not it will be made public is up to GMS Power.

·        EPDC claims its engineers were not able to tell if there were human rights violations occurring in connection to the project when they conducted the feasibility study, though they were aware that the military had been brought in to secure the area. 

·        EPDC claims no responsibility for the human rights abuses, as it was “only a subcontractor.”  Their intention is only to provide a technically accurate feasibility study as agreed with their client, GMS Power. 

 

EPDC has put in a bid to conduct the detailed design (D/D) for the Tasang Dam.

If EPDC is contracted to do the D/D, it is an indication that further funding for the project could come from Japan, either through the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC) or MITI's trade insurance; both means are outside (and thus avoid) the ODA framework. 

 

MITI has not yet given permission for EPDC to conduct the D/D. 

EPDC is planning to privatize by the year 2002, and its international activities are part of broadening its capacity to make it more competitive in the international arena.

 

HOW YOU CAN HELP: 

Contact your networks and write polite but strongly worded letters to EPDC, MITI, and MOF.  Please send copies of the letters to MOFA and Mekong Watch Japan.  Contact information and guidelines for letters are provided below.

 

Basically, the letter to EPDC should strongly encourage them to withdraw from the bid for the D/D and refrain from any further involvement in the Tasang Dam project.  The basic message in the letters to the ministries should urge them to have EPDC withdraw from the bid for the D/D, and if it does not, to refrain from giving permission for it to conduct the D/D even if it wins the contract.  The ministries should also be reminded of the ILO resolution and emphasize that Japan should not provide financial assistance for this project with neither bilateral nor multilateral means.  

 

SUGGESTED POINTS TO INCLUDE IN LETTERS:

Any specific and persuasive additional information or remarks are useful, but if the basic elements listed below are included, it is sufficient.

 

To EPDC: 

You realize that EPDC has done the feasibility study and is bidding for the D/D.

Strongly encourage EPDC to withdraw from the process.

Reasons for withdraw: 

·        Further participation in this project will damage EPDC’s international reputation.

·        Forced labor and forced relocation in the area around the Tasang Dam project site have already been documented (do NOT accuse EPDC of directly using forced labor themselves.  There is no evidence of this whatsoever).

·        By knowingly participating in a project which clearly involves severe abuses of human rights, EPDC cannot sever itself from responsibility.

·        Due to the recent ILO decision, to continue involvement would violate the resolution since it is clear that forced labor, as well as other human rights violations, are linked to this project.

 

To Ministry of International Trade and Industry and Ministry Of Finance:

Express grave concern regarding Japanese government involvement in the Tasang Dam project, both as a potential financier and by allowing EPDC to conduct the feasibility study.

·        To allow the EPDC to go forward with the D/D would invite international criticism as well as violate the ILO resolution.

·        In light of the ILO resolution, to allow EPDC to conduct the D/D, or to provide finances for the Tasang Dam (multilaterally or bilaterally) would automatically link Japan to the use of forced labor in Burma.

·        Urge the ministries to communicate to EPDC the necessity to withdraw its bid for the D/D.

·        Insist that Japan refrain from providing any finances or assistance for the Tasang Dam.

 

CONTACT INFORMATION FOR LETTERS:

 

EPDC:

Mr. Hiroshi Sugiyama

President

Electric Power Development Corporation

6-15-1 Ginza, Chuo-ku, Tokyo 104-8165  JAPAN

 

Ministry of International Trade and Industry:

Mr. Takeo Hiranuma

Minister of International Trade and Industry

Ministry of International Trade and Industry

1-3-1 Kasumigaseki

Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo 100-8901  JAPAN

 

Ministry of Finance:

Mr. Kiichi Miyazawa

Minister of Finance

Ministry of Finance

3-1-1 Kasumigaseki

Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo 100-8940  JAPAN

 

Ministry of Foreign Affairs:

Mr. Yohei Kono

Minister of Foreign Affairs

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

2-2-1 Kasumigaseki

Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo 100-8919  JAPAN

 

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2.  TASANG DAM PROJECT IN BURMA  (Myanmar)

 

Mekong Watch, Japan

19 December 2000

 

<Project Overview>

 

Name: Tasang Hydroelectric Power Generation Project (Salween River, Shan State, Burma)

Output Capacity: 6,400 Megawatts

Height:  Approximately 200 meters (will be tallest in Southeast Asia)

Flood Area:  At least 530 square kilometers

Cost:  Approximately US$3 billion (does not include environmental or social impact mitigation measures)

Current Status:  Feasibility Study (F/S) has been completed. Detail Design (D/D) bid in process.

Details:  At least 66% of the electricity produced is to be exported to Thailand.

 

<Japanese Involvement>

 

·        Electric Power Development Company Ltd. (EPDC), a quasi-governmental Japanese corporation, was subcontracted by Siam Power and Electric of Thailand to conduct the engineering F/S (does not include environmental assessment) for the Tasang Dam.  (Siam Power is a subsidiary of GMS Power Public Co. Ltd.)

·        EPDC has submitted its F/S report and has bid for the D/D.  The result of the bid is still unknown.

·        In order for EPDC to conduct projects outside of Japan, the Electric Power Development Promotion Law requires that it obtain permission to do so from the Ministry of International Trade and Industry.

·        In order for MITI to give permission, it is required by law to consult with the Ministry of Finance.

·        Who will finance the Tasang Dam is yet unclear.  The World Bank, U.S., or EU are unlikely sources.

 

<Human Rights Abuses>

 

People who have fled from areas to be affected by the dam have already spoken of various human rights violations occurring in the area including: 

·        Forced labor (especially forced portering)

·        Militarization (villages are often put under direct military control in the name of security for overseas experts)

·        Forced relocation of villagers

 

Other related issues in Burma include:

·        No freedom of expression

·        No participation by populations affected by infrastructure projects

·        Continued armed conflict between Shan resistance groups and the military regime.

·        Disregard by the military regime of the 1990 democratic election where the National League for Democracy and leader, Aung San Suu Kyi, would have gained control of the government

 

<EPDC’s Position>

 

·        EPDC engineers at the project site were unable to determine if forced labor or other human rights abuses occurred at the F/S stage of the project.

·        EPDC was involved in this project simply to conduct the F/S.

·        Facing privatization, it is necessary for EPDC to promote its technical capabilities in the international market. 

·        Involvement in the Tasang project does not violate the law upon which EPDC was founded.

 

<International Factors>

 

World Commission on Dams (WCD) and EPDC:  According to guidelines issued towards the end of the Final Report by the WCD released in London on 16 Nov 2000, stakeholders must be able to participate in decision making at all stages of dam development.  EPDC is a member of the WDC Forum (the advisory group to the WCD), and should therefore respect the guidelines issued by the WDC.

 

International Labor Organization:  All members of the ILO are urged to re-evaluate their relationships with the military regime in Burma to ensure that it in no way contributes to forced labor in Burma.

 

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3. APPEAL FOR ELECTRIC POWER DEVELOPMENT COMPANY LTD.’S WITHDRAWAL FROM TASANG HYDROELECTRIC POWER GENERATION PROJECT (SHAN STATE, BURMA)

 

Mekong Watch (Japan)  21 December 2000

 

To:

Mr. Takeo Hiranuma, Minister of International Trade and Industry

Mr. Youichi Miyazawa, Minister of Finance

Cc: Mr. Yohei Kono, Minister of Foreign Affairs

 

As you are aware, human rights abuses ranging from forced labor to extrajudicial killings are currently occurring in Burma (Myanmar).  Such abuses stem from structural and systemic causes, and to conduct large scale infrastructure projects in such conditions can only exacerbate the abuses.  It becomes impossible to prevent the project from itself becoming a cause of such violations.  We are very concerned about a company under MITI’s supervision, the Electric Power Development Company (EPDC), and its involvement in the Tasang Dam project (Salween River, Burma).  According to the Electric Power Development Promotion Law, for projects to be done overseas, EPDC is required to obtain permission to do so from the Minister of International Trade and Industry, who in turn is to consult with the Minister of Finance before giving such permission.  This is to appeal to both ministries to refrain from allowing EPDC to be further involved in the Tasang Dam project.

 

The planned Tasang hydroelectric power dam is to be approximately 200 meters tall, and a reservoir will flood an estimated 530 square kilometers (80% of Lake Biwa).  If the output capacity is 6,400 megawatts as currently planned, the dam will be among the largest five in the world, and the largest in Southeast Asia.  Of the 6,400 megawatts, at least 66% is to be exported to Thailand, but considering that the dam is near the Thai border and far from major cities in Burma, it is anticipated that most of the generated electricity will be for export.

 

It is internationally recognized that human rights abuse and environmental destruction in relation to infrastructure projects in Burma are systemic problems.  For example, enough evidence of human rights abuse along the Yadana Gas Pipeline in the southern part of Burma was collected to file a suit in the United States.  The International Labor Organization (ILO) has also found forced labor to be widespread and systematic in Burma.  The Tasang Dam project is no exception.  Refugees who have fled from the areas in Shan State which will be affected by the construction of the dam have already cited wanting to escape from forced labor and forced relocation orders as reasons for fleeing their villages.  Significant numbers have already fled from areas around what will become the construction site and projected flood zone.

 

Following is a basic explanation of forced labor and forced relocation in Burma:

 

Forced Labor: Types of forced labor may range from a day of cutting grass to weeks of hard physical labor such as road construction or forced portering. Many of those forced to porter for the military suffer violence at the hands of soldiers, and it is not unusual for them to sustain serious injuries or even to be killed.  Being taken away for portering understandably raises great fears.  Forced portering in border areas, such as the Tasang area, has been widely reported.  Orders sent to village heads demanding that a certain number of villagers be brought forward for forced labor is just one example of how forced laborers are collected.  If a fee is paid, one can avoid forced labor orders.  As a result, many young women cross borders to find work in order to earn enough to send home so that their brothers and fathers do not need to serve as forced laborers.  But among the majority who do not have enough money, some hide in the jungles while others flee to neighboring countries.

 

When forced to be a porter, it is necessary to bring one’s own food, and not enough drinking water is provided. Loads may weigh 30-50 kilograms, and in areas thought to contain land mines, porters are made to walk in front of soldiers as “human minesweepers.”  Women are also sometimes forced to become porters, and at night, soldiers often rape them.  Due to the harsh and inhumane conditions in which they are forced to work, porters quickly become weak.  Rather than be sent home to rest and recover, they are often subject to violence and are sometimes killed.

 

Including the area around the Tasang Dam site, when an area is militarized, human rights abuses are committed.  In order to strengthen the rule of the military regime, forced labor is used as a strategy to make it very clear that anti-junta activity will not be tolerated; forced labor, rape, violence, and pillage are also used.  For villagers to provide any kind of support for armed resistance groups becomes impossible, as forced labor severely disrupts their livelihood. 

 

Forced Relocation:  Forced relocation is also used as a military strategy.  In Shan State, where the Tasang Dam is to be constructed, there are still areas of armed conflict with forced relocation.  When used as a military strategy, this is called the “four cuts” strategy.  This strategy involves “cutting” lines of food, information, resources, and recruits by disrupting and relocating villagers.  This is usually done by military order sent to the village head, giving a mere 5 to 14 days for the village to move to a designated area.  Those who remain after the deadline are assumed to belong to resistance forces and are liable to be shot without questioning.  After relocation, to prevent villagers from returning, villagers are completely burned, and landmines are sometimes placed where houses or markets once stood.

 

Forced relocation connected to development projects has also been documented.  Forced relocation occurred, for example, in the Yadana Gas Pipeline project, or even in the renovation and “beautification” of Bagan, famous for its many pagodas, in preparation for “Visit Myanmar Year” (1996).  Forced relocation has also been reported in areas around the Tasang Dam site.

 

For details of forced relocation in Shan State, please refer to a report entitled “Dispossessed.”  The Japanese translation is available on the internet at http://www.jca.apc.org/~kotetu/burma/

 

There are other issues to consider in relation to the Tasang dam project.  The end of the report by the World Commission on Dams, in which the Japanese government was also involved, cites that decision-making based on consideration of the rights of and risks faced by stakeholders must be a basic principle for dam development.  However, if one examines the reality in Burma, one cannot expect the Tasang Dam project to respect this principle.   Under the current military regime in Burma, to carry out the basic principles of development such as public participation and sufficient environmental impact assessment is impossible.  EPDC states that as far as this project is concerned, it is simply a subcontractor of a Thai power corporation.  It can easily be argued with the reasons above, however, that even conducting initial studies is playing a significant role.  We therefore strongly urge that EPDC refrains from any further involvement in the Tasang Hydroelectric Power Generation Project. We urge MITI and the Ministry of Finance to withhold permission for further involvement in the project should EPDC so request.

 

EPDC also states that its engineers were not able to tell if human rights abuses were occurring in the area at the study stage, but this is unconvincing.  When one considers the routine nature of the use of forced labor by the military, it is a mistake to think that the battalions dispatched to escort EPDC engineers to the project site did not use forced labor. 

 

We believe that EPDC, MITI, and the Ministry of Finance did not intend to create a cause for the expansion and continuation of human rights abuses in Burma.  However, when one considers the fact that forced labor and other human rights abuses are daily occurrences, even if there is no intention, it is unfortunate that the Tasang Dam project unavoidably is a cause of human rights abuse.

 

As you may be aware, UNOCAL, the American company involved in the Yadana Gas Pipeline project, is now facing a suit regarding its responsibility for human rights violations connected to the project.  Premier Oil, a British firm involved in the Yetagun Pipeline project, has been urged by the UK government to withdraw.  Due to its activity in Burma, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries lost a US$1 billion contract for work at the San Francisco International Airport.  It is internationally recognized that to do business in Burma at this stage goes against fundamental business ethics.  There are many problems with the Tasang Dam project as well, and further involvement will only invite international criticism.

 

In November 2000, the International Labor Organization put into force a resolution on Burma.  In this resolution, all members of the ILO are recommended to re-evaluate their relationships with the military regime in order to ensure that nothing in that relationship contributes to the continuation or expansion of forced labor in Burma.  There is a very close connection between the Tasang Dam project and forced labor.  If the Japanese government were to give EPDC permission to conduct the Detailed Design for this dam project, it would clearly go against the spirit of the ILO resolution. 

 

Based on the above, we appeal to EPDC’s supervising Ministry, MITI, and to the Ministry of Finance which is also involved in the permission-granting process for the following points:

1.      To refrain from granting permission to carry out the Detailed Design, if EPDC is granted the bid,

2.      To refrain from involvement in this project, be it through ODA, OOF, or executive agencies and public corporations.

 

With an understanding of Burma’s human rights situation, if the Japanese government continues involvement in the Tasang dam project, its responsibility for related human rights abuses must be called into question.  Such involvement in such large infrastructure projects also seems to conflict with Japan’s foreign policy which does not allow for yen loans and gives only humanitarian assistance to Burma.  Involvement also sends a message to the military regime that factors such as participation by local communities and human rights do not necessarily need to be considered, and we assume this is not the Japanese government’s intention.

 

In normal circumstances, local NGO’s and grassroots organizations would be sending a letter of their own directly, but due to the repression in Burma and the political sensitivity of Thailand, it is dangerous for local groups to directly voice their opposition to this project. Therefore, we hope to convey their concerns to you.

 

This letter is endorsed by the following organizations:

 

 

ADB Fukuoka NGO Forum

Burmese Relief Center—Japan

Friends of the Earth, Japan

Jirai wo Nakusu Onnatachi no Kai (Women for the Eradication of Landmines)

Mekong Watch, Japan

Nihon Shohisha Renmei (Japan Consumers Union)

ODA Kaikaku Network (ODA Reform Network)

People’s Forum on Burma

Rivers! Japan

Shinshutsu Kigyou wo Kangaeru Kai (Transnational Corporation Monitor)

 

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4. “REGIONAL COOPERATIVE DEVELOPMENT FOR THE SALWEEN RIVER

 

Tsuyoshi Hashimoto.  Summary of a paper presented in 1995 at the Asian Water Forum, Bangkok, Thailand

 

[Salween Watch note: The following paper is included to show the early thinking on the development of the plans for the Salween River. It also clearly shows the high priority given to water diversion in the Tasang dam plans (the middle reach dam planned by Nippon Koei in 1993 refers to the Tasang dam.). In recent years Thai officials have studiously avoided mention of water diversion from the Tasang area, probably due to the controversial nature of the proposed Kok-Ing-Nan Water Diversion Project currently being investigated.] 

 

 

Plans in progress

Development of the Salween River started in the 1950’s with plans for the Baluchaung dam and three successive hydropower stations to develop a total power of 244 MW, with annual energy generation of 1682 GW… with three power stations harnessing the total water head of 654 m available at the Lawpita Falls.  The Baluchaung No. 2 power station was implemented in two stages: the first stage was completed in 1960, and the second stage was completed in 1974; each with a capacity of 84 MW.  Much later in 1987, the construction work for the No. 1 power station started upstream [and]… is now at an advanced stage of pre-construction work.” 

 

Who is doing this development

The main stream of the Salween River is to be developed with the Myanmar Electric Power Enterprise (MEPE) and the Department of Energy Affairs (the former National Energy Administration, NEA) of Thailand constituting “the principal working groups… Two dams and hydropower schemes on the Salween mainstream were studied among others by the NEA and the Electric Power Development Company (EPDC) of Japan at a preliminary level” and also by Nippon Koei of Japan.

 

Physical Characteristics

The Salween River drains a total basin area of about 320,000 km2 and is 2400 km long.  A unique aspect is that it has a length-width ratio of 18.0, among the highest in the world.  Due to the relatively small run-off ratio, “the specific discharge is not so large”.  “The long and narrow catchment tends to make flood peaks higher and travel time of flood water from the upstream longer.  The narrow catchment makes the diversion work for dam construction more difficult, and diversion by tunnels may be an inevitable option.  High flood peaks would require a large tunnel capacity.  All in all, the diversion work could become quite costly.  The narrow catchment, on the other hand, may make trans-basin water diversion a more attractive option”.  The dry season and the “relatively undisturbed upper catchment areas” are factors influencing the low run-off ratio.  “Reflecting this, past studies assumed low sediment yield, typically at 0.22 mm/year or 286 ton/km2 at 1.30 ton/m3…” (Salween Watch note: currently there is a lot of disturbance due to excessive logging and mining so silt levels are actually quite high).  “The river profile affects the storage efficiency of dams and the developable hydropower potential as well as flow rate.  In this respect, the Salween River seems to be more favourable than other rivers of comparable basin area and flow.”

 

Geo-political Characteristics

According to some rough estimates, there are approximately 2 million people living in the Myanmar portion of the catchment.  “The average population density seems to be around 15/km2.  Almost all of the people living in these areas are of minority groups such as Shan and Kayan. 

“Of the total catchment area of 320,000 km2, 53% is in China, 42% is in Myanmar, and only 5% in Thailand.  Of the total length of 2400 km, the upper-most portion of 1370 km up to the China-Myanmar border flows through the Yunnan province of the People’s Republic of China (PRC).  The midstream portion is entirely in Myanmar.  Only a small portion of the lower reaches is in Thailand: the main stream of the Salween constitutes the Myanmar-Thai border for a stretch of just 120km downstream, before entering Myanmar once again and finally flowing into the Gulf of Martaban.

 

Hydropower Potential

“Hydropower potential in Myanmar was comprehensively studied first for the Burma Umbrella Project financed by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD).  The Power Development Survey for the project was conducted by NEWJEC, a Japanese firm, covering eight rivers… More plausible estimates …are the gross hydropower potential of 366,000 GWh and the technically feasible hydropower capability of 160,000 GWh.  …A reasonable estimate of theoretical hydropower potential on the Salween river is 27,670 MW with 242,000 GWh annual energy.”  Of this total, 27.6% of the total is in Myanmar (11,570 MW with 101,000 GWh). 

 

Developable Potential

“…Nippon Koei- conducted series of independent studies for and in cooperation with Myanmar Electric Power Enterprises (MEPE). “Another line of development is a series of studies carried out by or for power generating agencies NEA and EGAT) of Thailand.”

“A Nippon Koei study in 1981 identified three potential dam sites in the Myanmar portion of the Salween mainstream. …[In 1993, they] reviewed the 1981 study and then further elaborated the middle reach scheme.  Limited site investigations were conducted in cooperation with MEPE, and reservoir operation was simulated… With the optimal plan, the installed capacity remains the same at 3600 MW, but the total annual energy is [higher than before at] 22,100 GWh with a plant factor of 70%.

A Thai version of the Salween project was initiated by NEA in 1979.  Although several variants have been studied since then, it is a multi-purpose dam project in the reach along the border between Myanmar and Thailand.  …The Snowy Mountain Engineering Corporation (SMEC) of Australia presented an alternative plan in 1980…An alternative dam site was proposed by EGAT in 1981…At the third meeting of the Myanmar-Thai joint working group held in Yangon in March 1991, it was agreed that NEA should request EPDC to undertake a preliminary study of the five hydropower schemes on the rivers bordering the two countries… Along the lower reaches of the Salween River, the combination of the Upper Salween and the Lower Salween schemes proposed by EGAT/EPDC may generate slightly larger annual energy than the lowermost dam proposed by Nippon Koei [4540 MW, 29,300 GWh and 792 MW, 5400 GWh respectively].  In the midstream, two other dams proposed by Nippon Koei would allow utilization of almost the full hydropower potential...

 

Conditions for Water Diversion from Salween

...There exist at least two broad opportunities for trans-basin diversion from the Salween river: one upstream to the Mekong river basin in the PRC, and the other midstream to the Chao Phraya river basin in Thailand... Water diversion to the Chao Phraya from the midstream of the Salween appears to be more meaningful in view of the high water demand in the Chao Phraya river basin.  There are two major EGAT dams and hydropower plants on the tributaries of the Chao Phraya river: Bhumbibol and Sirikit..." The water storage capacity of these dams is not fully utilized which "...affects not only the regulation and availability of water for irrigation systems but also navigation channels in the central plain and water supply system for Bangkok.  The Chao Phraya flows fall so low that river pollution and seawater intrusion upstream towards the capital's potable water supply pose growing problems.

 

Possible Scheme for Diversion to Chao Phraya

Diversion of water in the Salween River to Thailand has been discussed for several years, but a specific proposal was recently presented by the World Impex Co. Ltd. of Myanmar (April 1992)... The water diversion was proposed only as an option to provide further incentive for the Thai government to participate in the project...To justify it from the Myanmar point of view, reduction of flow rate is stated to make river navigation easier.

            The proposal led to the Nippon Koei study in 1993 to elaborate the idea and formulate a specific plan with preliminary engineering... Although this diversion option was 'abandoned' later due to insufficiency of data and information, results of the study are useful to indicate the possibilities of this option... The total construction cost was estimated to be US $1858 million at mid-1993 prices... The unit cost of water to be diverted was calculated at US cent 18/m3, based on amortized construction costs and annual operation and maintenance costs.  This unit cost is still relatively low, compared with current water charges in ASEAN countries.

 

Irrigation Potential

...In Myanmar... the potential irrigation area is found along the lower reaches of the Salween but mostly outside its basin: large plains in Kya-in, Shwebun, Hlaingbwe, Thaton and Martaban.  The EGAT study in 1981 further elaborated the irrigation component of the Salween multipurpose project... A more realistic estimate of irrigable area may be 1.6 million ha as presented recently by NEA...

            In Thailand... additional irrigation areas may be developed along the Mae Ping river, or the diverted water may benefit the existing irrigation system in the central plains along the Chao Phraya river by assuring the second rice crop which is presently under threat... the diversion from Salween at 100 m3/sec during the dry season or 1564 million m3 annually would be a significant contribution to assuring the second rice crop in the Chao Phraya irrigation system.

 

Regional Development Opportunities

... The technical assistance (TA) project by the Asian Development Bank for Subregional Economic Cooperation among Cambodia, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Myanmar, Thailand, Vietnam and the Yunnan province of the PRC has identified important transportation links to promote economic cooperation among these countries (ADB, August 1993).  Of particular relevance to the Salween River development are the Kunming-Ruili-Lashio system and the Kunming-Keng Tung link identified during phase I of the TA...  From a broad regional development point of view, the Kunming -Keng Tung Meiktila link seems to be superior to the first alternative for the following reasons: it would be conducive to more active interactions between Myanmar, Laos, Thailand and Yunnan province of the PRC; it would not encourage the development of the Salween upstream; and it would serve the more productive midstream areas of the Salween rather than the upper tributary areas of the Irrawaddy served by the first alternative...

 

Opportunities for Benefit Sharing

... Power benefits alone would justify the active participation of Thailand in the joint development...Water to be diverted to the Chao Phraya river system… would certainly increase the output of existing hydropower plants and allow the second rice crop in the existing Chao Phraya irrigation system.  It may improve navigation conditions in the central plain and also the water supply system for Bangkok through the alleviation of water pollution and seawater intrusion caused by the drawdowns of the Chao Phraya flow levels...

            The middle-reach dam planned by Nippon Koei would increase the dry season discharge of the Salween by some 500 m3/sec.  The lowest natural discharge of 760 m3/sec at this dam site can be increased to 1260 m3/sec.  The increased discharge can benefit Myanmar in different ways.  It would improve navigation conditions on the Salween River.  If the increased discharge is devoted entirely to irrigation, some 500,000 ha may be irrigated in the Moulmein plain.  The increased discharge would make the trans- basin water transfer a realistic option from the Myanmar point of view as well...

            Another potential benefit of the middle-reach dam is flood control... The basic idea of the trans-basin diversion is to store floodwater during the wet season for use during the dry season.  Therefore, the amount of water diverted should not affect the reduction of flood peaks or volume of floodwater discharged downstream.  If water diversion is also allowed during the wet season, however, flood peaks and volume of flood water may be further reduced and additional benefits derived for Myanmar...”

 

Proposals for Subsequent Actions

Included in the proposals are technical options for water diversion. This will be very costly, due to the long distance over which water has to be conveyed and pumped up over hilly terrain (which would demand large electricity costs during operation). An option is to use more extensive tunnel sections for conveyance.

Regards possible stage-wise development, it was suggested that the scale of the initial development could be reduced, and then the reduced output could be compensated partially by development at a later stage.

 

This article concludes by saying that “development of the Salween is a realistic project and that it would benefit economic interests of the different countries involved”.  It does point out that environmental and social concerns must also be addressed before the dam is built, and highly recommends a participatory approach to address them.

 

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5. JAPAN’S “BURMA LOVERS” AND THE MILITARY REGIME”.   

 

By Donald M Seekins, Japan Policy Research Institute (JPRI).

Working Paper #60 Sept. 1999.

 

[Summarised by Salween Watch]

 

“Japanese people often claim that their nation has a “special relationship” with Burma…”

 

1940- Aung San (father of pro-democracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi), fled the country with the colonial police hot on his trail in the summer… making contact with Japanese agents on the China coast.  He was brought to Japan… to organize local armed resistance against the British.  The prewar Japanese military was interested in Burma because it needed the region’s natural resources, especially oil, and wanted to cut the Burma Road through which Britain and the United States supplied the beleaguered Chiang Kai-shek government in Chongqing.

 

1940-41- Aung San returned to Burma and recruited other young nationalists who became the “Thirty Comrades,” a pantheon of heroes who were given military training by the Minami Kikan in the Japanese-occupied island of Hainan. 

 

1942- The Thirty Comrades became the nucleus of the Burma Independence Army (BIA), fighting alongside the Japanese army in its conquest of the country.  The most important legacy of the Japanese occupation was the establishment of a powerful national army, Tatmadaw in Burmese, which grew out of the BIA and was largely modeled on Japanese rather than British lines.  Many of its officers studied at Japanese military academies during the war…”

 

1945 (March 27)-  Aung San and his men rose up against the Japanese and joined forces with the Allies.

 

1941-45- As many as 190,000 Japanese soldiers died in Burma.

 

1954- Tokyo and the U Nu government signed a peace treaty and a war reparations agreement, bringing… some US$250 million in Japanese goods and services.

 

1965-72- “Quasi reparations” from Tokyo of US$132 million

 

1976- Burma Aid Group of bilateral and multilateral donors holds its first meeting in Tokyo, after which the Ne Win regime began to receive substantial amounts of official developmental assistance (ODA).  Japan was by far the largest donor of this aid.

 

1973-88 According to OECD, Japan loaned or gave US$1.87 billion to Burma constituting 2/3 of al bilateral aid disbursements to Burma. (“The quantity of Japanese ODA to Burma is perhaps best appreciated by comparing it with funds allocated to other Asian recipients during 1980-1988.  Burma received the equivalent of US$1.42 billion, or 63% of the amount given to Thailand (US$2.24 billion)… and 42% of the amount given to Indonesia (US$3.36 billion)…)

 

1988 (Sept)- 1989 (Feb)- As a response to the violent reaction of the junta to the protesters in Rangoon, Japan suspends aid disbursements creating “critical distance”.

 

1989 (Feb. 17)- Japanese government works up a consensus for “limited engagement” with Burma, reflecting a “normalization” of relations between the two countries.  This move was probably due to pressure from Japanese business groups although Japan claimed that “limited engagement” would encourage the junta to make good on its Sept. 18 promise to hold “multi-party democratic elections”.  For business interests the bottom line of normalization was that some funds for ODA projects which had been approved before 1988 were now released, pending case- by case approval by the Japanese government.  No new aid was to be given apart from humanitarian aid.

 

1989- 93- during which an average of $US 71.6 million was transferred annually (OECD) On top of this, the Japanese government gave debt relief grants totaling tens of billion of yen and continued to provide technical advisors and accept Burmese trainees in Japan.

 

1994- Khin Nyunt establishes an Office of Strategic Studies (OSS) to establish contact with foreign opinion leaders, hiring Washington public relations firms to refurbish Burma’s image in the West, and establishing on line information services to battle anti-regime dissidents in cyberspace.

 

1994- Keidanren, the powerful Federation of Economic Organizations, sent a special fifty-man mission headed by Marubeni chairman, Kazuo Haruna to Rangoon to meet with the junta’s top brass.  In the wake of the mission, many Japanese companies, especially banks, opened branch offices in Rangoon.

 

1996- Keidanren upgraded its informal study group in Burma to a “Japan-Myanmar Economic Committee.” (the timing was less than opportune, for SLORC was then in the middle of a crackdown on the NLD about which the Japanese government expressed great concern). 

 

1998- “Parliamentarians’ League to Support the Myanmar Government” formed by a group of Japanese Diet members led by Kabun Muto.

 

1998- almost US$20 million was given as “humanitarian aid” for renovating Rangoon’s Mingaladon International Airport that Japan justified as a “carrot” to encourage the regime to go easy on the political opposition.  However, in 1998, Japan is only the 9th biggest lender in Burma after Singapore, France, Britain, and even the U.S.

 

1999- Director and some members of OSS are invited to Japan for a low- profile visit that the Japanese foreign ministry described as an ongoing policy of “quiet dialogue” urging the junta to democratize.  This ten-day visit was cut short for unexplained reasons (possibly due to protests by Burmese and their Japanese supporters?)

 

“…Foreign aid served as the regime’s life-raft, keeping it afloat as the economy began to founder once again in the mid-1980’s.  The impact of aid on the people’s standard of living was minimal…

 

But the bottom line…explains Tokyo’s large aid outlays.  Four important factors were

(1)  Burma’s reputation as a country rich in natural resources, especially oil and natural gas;

(2)  future investment possibilities in a country with a low-wage and literate labor force;

(3)  the interests of major Japanese companies, especially general trading companies, which stood to benefit from aid contracts;

(4)  Japan’s practice of tying its aid to purchases by the recipient countries of expensive Japanese “hardware” rather than small-scale indigenous or human-capital projects, which makes these contracts especially profitable to Japanese exporters…

 

Two factors seem to account for Japan’s ambiguous Burma policy.  One is the strength of its business interests counterbalanced by pressure from Japan’s Western trading partners who take a less indulgent stance toward the junta…

 

Japanese elites are not used to and do not like open debate, especially on foreign policy.  Some members of the Diet are interested in Burma, both pro- and anti- junta, but the issues are rarely discussed, even the junta’s misuse of debt relief funds for the procurement of weapons.  Bureaucrats and LDP bigwigs keep policy initiatives to themselves, which means that their actions often appear incomprehensible or arbitrary to outsiders, including Japanese citizens.  The flap over so-called humanitarian aid for Rangoon’s airport is an example of this.   In a way, Tokyo’s Burma policy, deeply influenced by sentimental Orientalism of the business world and its allies, says as much about the limitations of Japanese-style democracy as it does about the lack of democracy in Burma.”

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