SALWEEN WATCH UPDATE

 

 

AUGUST - OCTOBER 2000, VOL. 8.

 

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Contents:

1.      CONTROVERSY DOGS BURMA’S SALWEEN DAM.  Mainichi Daily News, Asia Focus Section, Thursday, August 3, 2000. By Richard Humphries, Contributing Writer

2.      ARMY WIPING OUT POPULATION IN THE FLOOD AREA OF THE DAM PROJECT, SAY VILLAGERS.  Shan Herald Agency for News,   6 September 2000,  No: 9-4

3.      WAS APPLYING FOR LOGGING CONCESSION IN THE SALWEEN DAM AREA. Shan Herald Agency for News,  17 March 2000;  No: 3 – 13

4.      CHINA EXIMBANK HELPS FUND MYANMAR POWER STATION.  Xinhua News Agency: 19 September 2000.

5.      JAPAN AND PLANS FOR THE TASANG DAM ON BURMA’S SALWEEN RIVER.  Anonymous

6.      IRRIGATION DAM CAUSES DISPOSSESSION OF MONS.  Reported as “Breaking Human Rights in Mon State, Burma!” by the Yoma3 group, [email protected],  August 30, 2000

7.      PAK MOOL COST MORE THAN IT'S WORTH,  The Nation -June 10, 2000. By Gráinne Ryder and Wayne White.

 

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1. CONTROVERSY DOGS BURMA’S SALWEEN DAM

 

Mainichi Daily News, Asia Focus Section, Thursday, August 3, 2000. 

 

By Richard Humphries, Contributing Writer

 

In the First World, they’re being de-commissioned, blown up. The fact that they do more harm than good is no longer just conjecture. Big dams are obsolete. They’re uncool. They’re undemocratic.

 

 — Indian author Arundhati Roy.

 

Harn Yawnghwe was just 13 when the soldiers came to his house. It was Rangoon, March 2, 1962, and Gen. Ne Win had just launched the coup that would begin military rule --- which continues to this day. Harn’s brother Myee was killed in cold blood but it was their father the soldiers had come for it. That man, Sao Shwe Thaike, had been saopha (prince) of Yawnghwe, a Shan state principality. More importantly, he had also been independent Burma’s first president. Eight months later he died in jail under mysterious circumstances.

 

Harn and his surviving family members had to flee their homeland. Nonetheless, he remains deeply committed to Burma and all its peoples. Today, Harn Yawnghwe live s in Brussels and is program director for Euro-Burma Office, an EU-funded prodemocracy organization.

 

On May 30, Harn accompanied Dr. Thaung Htun, the prodemocracy movement’s U.N. representative, to Tokyo to visit Japanese government officials. Their purpose was to express their deep concern about Japanese aid and investment, which they felt was benefitting Burma’s military clique and not its long-suffering peoples.

 

At a subsequent professional dinner in Tokyo with correspondents and embassy officials, Harn emphasized one particular project. “We believe there is a plan to dam the Salween River,” he said. “The Salween is one of the last river left in its natural state. The Japanese government is involved in the sense that the Electric Power and Development Corp., Ltd. (EPDC), which is 67 percent owned by the Ministry of Finance, has done a feasibility study for this dam.”

 

The Salween is a 2,400-kilometer long waterway that begins life in China’s Tibetan plateau, and travels through Burma before entering the Gulf of Martaban near Moulmein. It drains some 320,000 square kilometers of the land.

 

The project dam site is at Ta Sarng, a river crossing in southern Shan state, some 80 kilometers north from Thai border. As Burma is ruled by an unpopular and surreally brutal dictatorship, and Shan State is, if anything, turbulent, it would seem at first glance unusual that foreign governments and companies would want to become involved in at all.

 

Greed is paramount but regional politics and the role of environmental activism have played some role. In the developed world, with a few exceptions, large dam building has declined. There has been more transparency and debate about hypothetical projects and sometimes even

ridicule (“a boondoggle visible from Mars”) has been enough to stifle the more absurd notions. Dam builders have shifted their attention to the developing world.

 

Even there, resistance has flared. Attempts in the 1980s to build a dam at Nam Choan on Thailand’s river Kwai were eventually defeated, despite official sanction, by vehement public opposition. Thai authorities then looked to that countryÆs neighbors where, it was thought, the rulers would be less discerning and public opinion more easily manipulated or ignored. Thailand wanted more electricity for its industries as well as diverted water to fill its reservoirs and flush out its river.

 

INVESTORS LONG FOR SALWEEN

 

For years potential builders and founders have eyed the Salween the same way hungry wolves might gaze upon a stray lamb, frolicking in a distant meadow. Various Thai, German and Japanese concerns have carried out a series of feasibility studies since 1979. The recently completed EPDC one is only the latest but, it is believed, the definitive one that will lead to final design and construction. In this sense the term feasibility can be taken to mean not whether but how.

 

On its English Internet site, the EPDC announced that it “will give great respect to the natural environment and regional communities and strive to construct and operate power generation facilities in a manner that harmonizes with the natural environment and communities”.

 

Boilerplate statements such as those can ring hollow. When asked if the EPDC had spoken with him or with local communities in Shan State, Harn was emphatic. “No, we’ve had no contact. We believe they only talk with the SPDC (Burmese junta). There’s been no discussion with the local population. Nothing.”

 

A response was sought from the EPDC but it was not able to provide a comment as of the time of the story going to print.

 

As for the company’s communications with the people at the dam site, not just the EPDC but of all companies involved there seem to avoid the locals. According to monitoring groups such as Salween Watch, the Shan Herald Agency for News, and TERRA (Towards Ecological Recovery and Regional Alliance), a Thai environmental nongovernmental organization, some 400 to 500 Burmese troops are along the Salween “protect” those companies involved in preparatory work on the dam. 

 

The main company involved is Thai, the GMS public Power Co. Ltd. It hopes to sell the electricity to EGAT, the Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand. GMS is part of Thailand’s MDX group of companies and has been involved in dam projects in Laos, Cambodia, and in China’s Yunnan province. The plan for the Salween is thought to call for a concrete-faced rockfill dam, 188 meters in height. That would make it mainland Southeast Asia’s highest dam. A 230-kilometer long reservoir would flood an area of at least 640 square kilometers. It would store about one-third of the Salween’s annual flow.

 

The logistics of such a project would be immense, as would the cost, at least 3 billion dollars by one estimate. By no means does GMS have the financial wherewithal to undertake the project. It is effectively bankrupt, but no without influential friends on its board and abroad. Rumors abound of funding interests from Japanese sources, perhaps via a third country, but they are as yet unconfirmed.

 

Proponents of big dams will of course point to their benefits. It can’t be denied that dams supply a significant amount of the world’s present energy needs --- 20 percent by some accounts. Large dams typically generate far more electricity than nuclear or coal-fired plants. Dams can also be used to regulate river flow, divert that flow

elsewhere, manage water demand, and by dampening rapids they can assist navigation.

 

But, like the pawn taken without sufficient forethought in a chess match, disadvantages have proved overwhelming with the passage of time. Frequent cost overruns detract from energy savings and sedimentation can ruin efficiency. Worse, tens of millions of people worldwide, very often helpless indigenous minorities, have been forced off their lands.

 

The Salween project would be no different. Ethnic conflict still ranges in Shan State and an estimated 300,000 Shan have been forcibly displacement is also occurring in the dam site/ projected reservoir area. “What typically happens is that you’re given three days notice to leave and if you are found in that area after three days, you are shot,” explained Harn.

 

Ironically, some members of those regional communities have managed to escape the terror by rafting down the Salween to exile. One Shan man reported to human rights monitors that, “I saw drilling machines on both sides of the bank and some were sucking water and drilling. Three machines on each bank.” Should the reservoir be built he, and thousands others, would likely have no homes to dream of returning to.

 

DISEASE THREAT

 

In tropical area, dams can increase the outbreak of deadly disease. Shan State already lies within an endemic malarial zone. Areas of stagnant water along the edges of the reservoir would be an ideal breeding ground. And, according to TERRA, other ecological disasters would ensue.

 

“The fishes of the Salween River Basin have evolved in a riverine system. If the river were transformed into a reservoir, most of these fish species would be extirpated by the reservoir, as will many of the fish species living downstream of the dam due to the ecological impacts of altered water flow and the poor quality of water released from the reservoir.”

 

Building the dam itself would probably add to Burma’s appalling human right’s record. Large infrastructure projects have typically involved the massive use of forced labor. Complicity does not end with the junta though, and prodemocracy groups are well aware of this. “We would caution the Japanese government for its involvement here,”Harn says. “If the dam is ever built, you can be very sure forced labor would be used.”

 

When Arundhati Roy made her quote on big dam, she was speaking about the furor surrounding India’s Sardar Sarovar dam project. Public displeasure over that project was so vehement that even the Japanese government got cold feet, withdrawing from funding part of it in 1900.

 

Opponents of the Salween project hope that Japan will again see the light and not play any further role in helping to build the dam.

 

There may be a further incentive for companies and governments to rethink investing Burma, as Dr. Thaung Htun has pointed out. “Yes, we clearly say the Burmese regime is illegitimate. They have no authority to manage the resources of the country. Based on this we clearly mention that all contracts which have been done with the military government will be reviewed by the next democratic government.”

 

(Richard Humphries is a free-lance journalist living in Japan and regular Asia Focus contributor)

 

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2.  ARMY WIPING OUT POPULATION IN THE FLOOD AREA OF THE DAM PROJECT, SAY VILLAGERS

 

Shan Herald Agency for News,   6 September 2000,  No: 9-4

 

Villagers in southern Shan State, in a letter to S.H.A.N., have accused Rangoon of exterminating the population in the flood areas of the projected dam on the Salween.

 

The letter, written on 10 July, that took more than a month to reach S.H.A.N, said that since 1997, villages in Kunhing Township, along the banks of the Salween and its tributary, Nam Pang, have been depopulated and relocated. And since 9 May, when the Shan State Army "South" of Yawdserk and the SPDC army clashed between Kali and Hpanglang (east of Kunhing), the offensive launched by the LID 99 has not let up.

 

Altogether 12 tracts consisting of 175 villages, 4,018 households and 3,312 acres of fields in Kunhing township alone are in fear of inundation when the dam is being built, According to the list provided, they are Hsai Mong, Wan Hpai, Wan Tong, Kenglom, Wianghpui, Hoyarn, Keng Kham, Nawng Kham, Mong Khong, Pakuey, Takaw and Hsenmawng.

 

Altogether, 11 townships are reported to be in the flood area, namely, Kunhing, Mong Hsu (Gemland), Mong Pan, Tangyan, Mong Yai and Hsenwi on the west bank, and Kunlong, Man Hpang, Pangyang, Mong Piang and Mong Ton on the east bank.

 

The dam site is in Ta Sang, north of the newly inaugurated Ta Sang Bridge, between Mong Ton and Mong Ton and Mong Pan townships. "Final studies" are being conducted by the GMS Power, a Thai company.

///END\\\

 

For further information, please contact S.H.A.N. at:

Shan Herald Agency for News, P.O. Box. 15, Nonghoi P.O., 50007, Chiangmai, Thailand

e-mail: [email protected]  Website: http://www.shanland.org

 

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3.  WAS APPLYING FOR LOGGING CONCESSION IN THE SALWEEN DAM AREA

 

Shan Herald Agency for News,  17 March 2000;  No: 3 - 13

 

It was learned recently that the "Red Was" had applied for logging concession in the Ta Sang dam project area in return for the cost incurred in road construction in eastern Shan State.

 

Wei Hsaitang, the commander of the Wa Special Brigade in Mong Hsat, had, on 25 November 1999, applied to Major General Thein Sein, Triangle Regional Command (Keng Tung), for permission to log the forest in Mong Pulong, north of Ta Sang, the projected Salween dam site, according to a source close to the United Wa State Army.

 

In his application, Wei stated that his brigade had been spending "considerable amount of funds" for the construction of Hsaikhao and Mongkied concrete bridges, the rehabilitation of the Mong Hsat – Mong Yang -- Nawng Khio – Mong Piang road and the preparation to build the Loikha – Mong Pulong road.

 

He also stated that the brigade would need to get back some of the funds in order to use in the development of Loisarmsao (headquarters of the southern command) and Banhoong (Wei Xuegarg's HQ) in Mong Hsat.

 

Accordingly, he asked Gen Thein Sein to approve the logging of 10,000 tons of hard wood in Mong Pulong.

 

According to the documents in possession of S.H.A.N., the UWSA received permission on 20 February to cut 500 tons of hard wood.

 

Both the local people and the environmentalists fear destruction of the remaining forests and more forced relocations of the people in the area.

 

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4. CHINA EXIMBANK HELPS FUND MYANMAR POWER STATION

 

Xinhua News Agency: 19 September 2000.

 

KUNMING.  The Export-Import Bank of China (Eximbank) has signed an agreement with Myanmar's state-run electric power company to approve 1 billion yuan (120 million US dollars) worth of export seller's loan to help it build a gigantic power station.

 

The loan undertaken between the Myanmar Electric Power Enterprise and the Yunnan Machinery and Equipment Import and Export Co. (YMEC) in southwest China's Yunnan Province is the largest export seller's credit the Eximbank has issued to the midwest region. Yang Zilin, governor of the bank, said the loan was approved to support Yunnan's exports. YMEC is a supplier of power-generating equipment for the Panglang Hydro-electric Station, which is the largest hydro-power project in Myanmar.

 

Prior to this, Eximbank has approved 60 million yuan (7.2 million US dollars) of loans for the project. To be installed with 280,000 kilowatts of generating capacity, the Panglang power station will be responsible for one-third of the electricity supplied to Myanmar when it is commissioned in 2003.

 

A 160 million-US dollar contract was clinched by the YMEC with the Myanmar power enterprise in 1998 to become its machinery supplier. It was China's largest export of complete sets of hydro-power equipment to southeast Asian countries, and also Yunnan's largest foreign trade project.

 

[Salween Watch note: Panglang is more commonly spelt Paung Laung. The Paung Laung Dam is located on the river of the same name that flows out of south-western Shan State into the Sittaung River near Pyinmana. Until other projects which have not yet begun construction such as the Yeywa and Tasang dams are completed, the dam will be by far the largest single electricity provider in Burma.]

 

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5.  JAPAN AND PLANS FOR THE TASANG DAM ON BURMA’S SALWEEN RIVER

Introduction

The Japanese government may become the main source of funds for the construction of a highly controversial dam on Burma’s Salween River.  This may be done directly, but more likely indirectly through the Asian Development Bank (ADB) to which Japan is the largest contributor.  The dam’s feasibility study was completed by Japan’s Electric Power Development Corporation (EPDC), a quasi-governmental corporation, and hydropower development of the Salween River has been discussed extensively by the Asian Development Bank (ADB).  This estimated US$3 billion dam would require government support in order to be sufficiently financed.  Western governments are using economic pressure to push for political transition in Burma, and the World Bank is also in no position to provide funding for this dam.  The Japanese government has thus far denied any intention of funding the dam, but the EPDC’s involvement, among other factors, indicates other possibilities.

 

Development Plans for Salween River

Thailand is in great need of water, and Burma needs electricity and hard currency.  Harnessing the potential of the Salween River is seen by some to be an effective way to meet these needs, and plans for the river presently include both hydropower development and water diversion to Thailand.  At present, the most advanced project is the Tasang dam in southern Shan State.  If carried out, a concrete-faced rockfill dam of a height up to 188 meters would be built with an installed capacity of 3,300 MW.  Three quarters of this electricity would be sold to Thailand.

 

MAIN CORPORATE ACTORS

Þ    Thailand’s GMS Power Corporation created the Siam Power and Electric Company which signed a development agreement with Burma’s military regime.

Þ    Lahmeyer International (Germany) was contracted for the pre-feasibility study.

Þ    Japan’s Electric Power Development Corporation was subcontracted for 94 million yen by GMS Power to carry out the feasibility study.  EPDC’s contract began in November 1998 and the study was scheduled to be completed by December 1999.

 

Why the controversy?

The potential political, environmental, and social consequences of building the Tasang Dam make it extremely controversial.  The military regime also makes it impossible for populations to be affected by the dam to be consulted.  Local participation and contribution to any stage of planning is limited to what is forced upon them by the military, such as provision of labor and supplies.

 

Political Factors:  The military regime refuses to dialogue with the National League for Democracy (which won 81% of seats in parliament during general elections in 1990), and has not taken necessary steps towards democratization.  The regime has continually failed to heed recommendations from the international community, including Japan.  In order to support political reform, the United States has imposed economic sanctions, and the E.U. is also applying economic pressure.  If the Tasang Dam were to be completed, benefits would not be distributed equally among the people, but profits would instead provide the military regime with desperately needed hard currency enabling it to continue its reign and disregard international pressure.

 

Environmental Impacts: The dam’s construction could result in a significant change in river flow and ecological balance, leading to possible extinction of species downstream and in the reservoir area.  It is also possible that increased salinity in the delta region would result from a greater inflow of sea water due to the decreased intensity of the river’s current.  Fertility of the soil in the delta region would therefore be affected. An environmental impact assessment has yet to be done, but environmental impacts of a dam of the scale of the Tasang, with an anticipated reservoir of 530 square kilometers (80% the size of Lake Biwa) are sure to be extensive.

 

Social Consequences: Social impacts of the Tasang Dam can already be seen. Even preliminary and feasibility studies required an increased military presence at and around the proposed dam site.  Examination of past development projects in Burma show that increased militarization also leads to increased instances of human rights violations.  Military operations in Shan State have already been intensified, and in 1999, troops from four Burmese army battalions took up positions to guard Japanese EPDC workers from perceived or real threat by ethnic insurgents.

 

Forced Labor is routine in militarized areas, as villagers are required to become porters, build barracks for soldiers or perform other related tasks.  There have already been reports, for

example, of people from four villages being forced to split rocks near the Tasang crossing of the Salween River for up to two weeks at a time.[1]  During periods of forced labor, violence by soldiers is commonplace, often resulting in injury, sometimes death. 

 

Forced Relocation:  Forced relocation is also already occurring in areas where feasibility studies have begun.  Compensation is insufficient if given at all.  Villages are usually looted and torched after their residents have been forced to leave.  This provides food and other goods for the often ill-equipped soldiers as well as acts as a deterrent against villagers returning to their homes.  Since 1996, up to 761 villages from six townships around the dam’s projected flood area have already been subject to forced relocation, affecting up to 28,097 households.[2]

 

Other Human Rights Violations: Relocated areas often become free-fire zones, putting any villager who attempts to return home at risk of being shot, with or without questioning.  Even before or during relocation, villagers may be arbitrarily killed to “become examples” of what happens to those who do not follow orders.  Torture often comes before the extrajudicial killing.  Women are also vulnerable to rape by soldiers.  Villagers’ belongings are often taken or destroyed by soldiers.  When communities are as highly disrupted as those which are relocated, fundamental human rights including adequate food, housing and education are essentially impossible to fulfill.  In Kun Hing township, which is within the projected flood area, nearly 400 people have been recorded as victims of extrajudicial killing between the years 1996 and 1998.[3]

 

Will Japan Finance the Dam?

Reasons to believe Japan may become a financier of the dam include:

1.        Japan’s EPDC completed the dam’s feasibility study.

2.        The Asian Development Bank continues to include development of the Salween River as a priority in its plans for the Greater Mekong Subregion.  Japan is the largest contributor to the ADB and the Bank’s president is also Japanese. 

3.        In September 1999, plans for the Salween, including the Ta Sang Dam, were discussed at an international workshop regarding the Salween Basin in Chiang Mai, Thailand.  In addition to a few experts on Thai and Burmese issues, Japanese scholars and representatives from the ADB and the United Nations University (Tokyo) participated in the meeting.

4.        At present, most industrialized nations and international organizations are limiting any assistance to Burma to a small scale.  In the case of the Ta Sang Dam, however, the main contractor is a Thai company, and Thailand would be the main beneficiary of resulting electricity and water resources.  It is therefore possible that this project would be categorized as either a Thai or a transborder project.  With such categorization, it is possible that the Ta Sang Dam, while physically located in Burma, would be given “special” treatment.  Conceivably, Japan could discretely channel funds through the ADB, an indirect and multinational route. 

5.        Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs claims to have no intention of funding the dam, but upon examination of the situation on the ground, there is no indication that the project has been stopped.

6.        This past year, there have been several high level exchanges between Japan and Burma.  In November of last year, then Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi and Burma’s Senior General Than Shwe met at the ASEAN Special Summit in Manila.  Immediately after, then Minister of International Trade and Industry Mr. Fukaya went to Rangoon to become the first member of the Cabinet to visit Burma since 1990.  Former Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto also paid a visit to Burma as part of a delegation organized by the Nippon Foundation.  Finally, it was reported that current Prime Minister Mori had contact with Lieutenant-General Khin Nyunt while attending former PM Obuchi’s funeral.  At present, there is also a new economic cooperation project being initiated by the Japanese Development Cooperation Division of the Economic Cooperation Bureau in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.  This initiative involves regular meetings between economic experts from Japan and Burma.  While it is not clear what results such developments will bring, if one compares these actions to movements within the international community, it does appear that the Japan and Burma’s governmental relations are increasingly close.

 

Should Japan be Involved in the Ta Sang Project?

Japan should not provide funding for the Ta Sang Dam.  Reasons include the following:

1.        There is insufficient transparency and accountability in the Burmese military regime, making it impossible to guarantee that funds from Japan will not be used for military purposes.

2.        Under the Burmese military regime, there is no mechanism by which populations affected by development plans can voice concerns or demand compensation.  It is therefore impossible to adequately monitor the project for environmental impacts or human rights violations.

3.        Even prior to the completion of the feasibility study, various human rights violations have been attributed to the Ta Sang Dam project.

4.        If construction of the Ta Sang Dam were to commence, it is clearly foreseeable that the human rights situation, including forced labor and forced relocation, would become even more severe.

5.        Dams of the scale of the Ta Sang are fundamentally environmentally unsound.

 

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6. IRRIGATION DAM CAUSES DISPOSSESSION OF MONS

 

Reported as “Breaking Human Rights in Mon State, Burma!” by the Yoma3 group <[email protected]>

 

Date:August 30, 2000

 

The farmers in Setthwal village lost their paddy fields because of Winphanon Dam and its canals. Winphanon Dam Project was accomplished in Mudon Township, Mon State and also its canals were made across the paddy fields of Setthwal village. As a result, some farmers lost their paddy fields, but they did not receive any compensation from the government. Moreover, the house of U Chit Thein and Daw Toke was also destroyed. There was no compensation for that house. According to the information, 79 acres of paddy fields were ruined including 14 acres of cultivated fields.

 

Yoma3 Information Service

 

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7. PAK MOOL COST MORE THAN IT'S WORTH

 

The Nation -June 10, 2000

 

By Gráinne Ryder and Wayne White.

 

EARLIER this year, the World Commission on Dams (WCD) published its performance review of Thailand's most controversial hydro scheme, the World Bank-financed Pak Mool dam, confirming what observers have long suspected: The project is an economic failure and a growing financial liability to Thailand's electricity ratepayers.

 

A central question now, and one that the WCD sidesteps: Is it even worth operating the dam for electricity production? Or, would electricity ratepayers - not to mention the dam's countless victims - be better off if the dam's turbines were shut down and the gates opened so that fish could return to the Mool River?

 

As part of the commission's global review of dams, the study found that the 136-megawatt Pak Mool dam is barely generating 40 megawatts in the high-demand months of April and May.

 

Even in the rainy season, when water levels are very high, the dam's owner, the Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand (EGAT), has to shut the power plant down because there isn't enough head to drive the turbines.

 

Completed in 1994, the dam cost US$233 million (Bt8.85 billion), almost twice as much as originally estimated. Today it isn't generating enough electricity to recover its investment costs. The dam was supposed to have a return on investment of 12 per cent, but the actual return is closer to 4 per cent, WCD reports.

 

As for irrigation - EGAT initially claimed that the dam's reservoir could irrigate up to 25,000 hectares of farmland in the dry season - the WCD found that the dam is useless, its "actual benefits are zero".

 

Meanwhile, the cost of maintenance, mitigating damage to fisheries, and compensation awarded to people suffering economic losses keeps going up. The WCD study found that "the total annual income from fisheries over the long-term is worth more than the cash and credit compensation" provided to affected households by EGAT. Efforts to mitigate damages to fisheries haven't succeeded and, as a result, the government is "saddled with ever-increasing claims for compensation".

 

Had EGAT done an honest cost-benefit calculation, based on the dam's actual benefits and costs, the WCD concludes "it is unlikely that the project would have been built".

 

The extent of the utility's financial miscalculation is evident in the full report that was produced for the WCD by the Bangkok-based Thai Development Research Institute. For example, if the Pak Mool dam's dependable capacity is 16 MW, as cited by the institute, the dam earned an average of about $7 million in the last two years. This figure could be even lower still, depending on when the dam generates electricity.

 

Assuming the dam generates $7 million annually over its 25-year life, then its present worth is only $56 million. For Pak Mool to be a viable investment, it would have had to generate $28 million (12 per cent of $233 million) annually in electricity sales. As it is, EGAT has lost $177 million on its investment. Put another way, EGAT has spent roughly four times more on the Pak Mool dam than it can ever earn in electricity sales. This cost will likely get passed on to electricity ratepayers in their electricity bill.

 

If the dam is kept in operation, EGAT will also have to pay the rising cost of maintenance and long-term compensation for damages.

 

Thousands of uncompensated families would continue to face economic hardship, even hunger and malnutrition, having lost their daily source of food and income.

 

Fish migrations would stay blocked and, with every passing year, the potential for recovering the river's fish species and habitat would diminish.

 

A decision to shut down the turbines and open the gates, on the other hand, would spare ratepayers the dam's future operating expenses as well as the cost of unpaid compensation provided that fisheries and fishing livelihoods are restored.

 

The idea isn't as radical as some people might think. A growing number of uneconomic dams are successfully retired each year in North America, in order to restore once-productive fisheries and revitalise local economies.

 

Now that the WDC has exposed Pak Mool as a money-losing and unreliable power provider, people harmed by the dam are owed a fair chance at economic recovery.

 

GRÁINNE RYDER investigates the impact of aid-financed development projects with Canada's Probe International.

Wayne White is a US-based power and infrastructure economist.

 

 

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[1]  January 1999 report submitted to the UN Commission on Human Rights by Special Rapporteur, Mr. Rajsoomer Lallah.

[2] Data from Salween Watch and the Shan Human Rights Foundation, both based in Thailand.

[3] Salween Watch submission to the World Commission on Dams, “From Scorched Earth to Flooded Earth: The Generals’ Dam on Burma’s Salween River.”