BACKGROUND DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE SALWEEN MEGADAM


Salween Watch

24th February 1999

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                                                      CONTENTS

 

1.  SALWEEN ACTION ALERT, slightly revised from original sent out on 1st Febuary 1999 

2.  OVERVIEW OF THE SALWEEN DAM PLANS,  7th February 1999

3.  EMAIL NOTE: From an anonymous Shan source,   13 January 1999

4.  UPDATE ON THE SALWEEN DAM PROJECT IN SHAN STATE,  BurmaNet News, January 1999

5.  3D VISION: THE SALWEEN UNDER ATTACK AGAIN, James Fahn, The Nation, 26/1/99

6.  FREE BURMA COALITION TO LAUNCH A CAMPAIGN IN PROTEST OF JAPAN'S  RESUMPTION OF ODA TO BURMA,  Free Burma Coalition <[email protected]>, 4/3/98

 

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1. SALWEEN ACTION ALERT

 

Source:   Salween Watch Consortium

Date:       3rd February 1999

 

After years of talk but little action, there are now strong indications of serious efforts on behalf of Thai, Burmese and Japanese companies to gain approval and funds for damming the mighty Salween River in Burma.

 

The dam would be both for electricity generation plus large-scale diversion of water from the Salween and into Thailand's perennially depleted dams and its polluted Chaophraya River.

 

If built, the dam - or dams - would have far greater environmental impacts than the controversial Burma -Thailand Yadana gas pipeline. It would also have many of the same negative human rights, political and economic consequences.

 

These moves come in the wake of the announcement of the US$ 30 billion Japanese economic recovery plan by the conservative LDP government, and talk of resumed humanitarian and technical aid by the UN and World Bank.

 

We ask your help in opposing this unacceptable project and the corruption-ridden, socially and environmentally unsound development ideology that it is a part of.

 

On the 2nd of February the Thai Government decided to approve a proposal by the Science, Technology and Environment Ministry to carry out a feasibility study on what it calls the Salween Water Diversion Project.

 

According to Science, Technology and Environment Minister Suwit Khunkitti, the feasibility study will be carried out as quickly as possible. The Ministry is seeking 185 million Thai Baht (approximately US $ 5.5 million) for the study, a notably large budget for a feasibility study.

 

The Salween River is one of the great rivers of South East Asia. It is a cold, fast flowing river that runs through earthquake-prone, lightly populated and steep mountainous areas for most of its course. In Burma it flows through the Shan, Karenni, Karen and Mon states, areas torn by decades of war. Its rapid fall, high gorges and the relatively sparse adjacent population make it attractive to dam builders.

 

Although different official sources state different things, the justification for the dam will be twofold. The dam is being planned to divert water from the Salween into Thailand, as well as to produce an estimated 3,300 to 3,600 megawatts of electricity for Thailand and Burma.

 

The proposed dam would enable Burma to exploit the Salween's large potential to generate electrical energy. For years Burma has suffered daily blackouts even in its major cities, a problem to which there is little relief in sight.

 

For Thailand the dam could replenish its dwindling water supplies. Parts of the country have faced severe water shortages in 1992, 1995, and 1998 / 99 due to degradation of the watershed forests, climate change and conflicting water management objectives. Competition between farm irrigation requirements on one side and hydropower, industrial and city requirements on the other has contributed to the shortages. The two largest dams in Thailand, the Bhumiphol and Sirikit dams, frequently do not have enough water for irrigation, let alone water for the government prioritized "cheap" hydro-electricity. Currently the country is in the throes of a drought year so officials are actively promoting water supply projects for all they are worth.

 

Thailand does not now need hydro-power as it is suddenly faced with an energy glut due to contraction of the market following its economic crash. Nevertheless its politicians and the vested interest groups behind them, like consultants and big construction companies, are still pushing for the creation of more large power plants.

 

Successive Thai governments and officials have long been talking about water from the Salween being channeled to the Bhumiphol and Sirikit reservoirs hundreds of kilometers away. The Thai government, in the context of the "constructive engagement" approach to relations with its aggressive Burmese neighbours, has frequently raised with them the subject of joint development of a dam. The ruling Burmese State Peace and Development Council has in more recent years begun reciprocating, and has suggested its own sites.

 

These negotiations resulted in a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) for Thailand to buy 1,500 megawatts of electricity from Burma by the year 2010 being signed in August 1997. An MoU on the supply of water to Thailand from the Salween had nevertheless proven elusive. The Burmese in late 1993 disagreed on the content of the draft MoU proposed by Thailand. However in the article on the 20th January 1999 the Thai Science, Technology and Environment Minister stated that the MoU with the Burmese government for the use of water from the Salween River has already been signed. If so, the agreement has been signed in secret and without the public having an opportunity to evaluate or comment upon the many implications of such an agreement.

 

Previously, the economic cost of the dam, combined with its intense political sensitivity and the inevitable environmental and social issues would have rendered its construction impossible. Figures for the price tag on the dam quoted by local sources familiar with the current feasibility project range from US$4 billion up to $7 billion. Now however there are indicators that the Japanese government may under certain circumstances be more inclined to accommodate the request. A recent UN / World Bank offer of US $ 1 billion in conditional assistance may also indicate that Western countries may not oppose such a move strongly enough to prevent it.

 

The Japanese government has been criticized in recent years for resuming some aid payments to the Burmese regime. It has however been noted that the Japanese are concerned about greatly increasing Chinese influence, presence, money and technology in Burma. There is strong lobbying in Japan for further resumption of financial assistance to Burma to pre-empt the loss to China of opportunity in Burma.

 

The conservative Japanese government has recently introduced a US $ 30 billion fund called the Miyazawa fund. The fund is to give a boost to regional governments but has been made subject to the condition that funded projects utilise Japanese expertise and technology. Japan has supported many dam projects in the past, and Japanese consultants from the quasi-governmental Electric Power Development Corporation (EPDC) have been active in the preliminary studies for damming the Salween. One source alleges that EPDC has now signed a 94 million yen (US$796,000) contract to do a feasibility study on the Salween. It is therefore possible that the Japanese Government - and other governments and institutions - may decide to support their political agendas in Burma through support for the dam via the Thai government. 

 

The Thai Science, Technology and Environment Minister and his Deputy Minister have both announced the intention to seek from Japan for the Salween Water Diversion Project. As reported by the English language daily The Nation (21/1/99) "the project needs about Bt 5.5 billion, which (he) plans to get from the Miyazawa Plan". With Japanese funding as an engine, the project may in time become a serious possibility if people's opposition is not convincing enough.

 

Towards implementing the dam project on the ground, there have been a number of preliminary studies done on damming or diverting the Salween River. Tentative plans for no less than 6 different sites have been mentioned in various contexts and publications. However until recent moves became evident there had been no detailed studies, and no planning up to even the pre-feasibility study stage.

 

Survey work is being conducted in the Shan State at a site 200 kilometers north of Chiang Mai. Work is being done by multinational survey teams that include Japanese, Burmese and Thais. Surveying work reportedly includes drilling and blasting deep holes in the Salween riverbank and elaborate streamflow measurements. People close to the project say that the full feasibility study was to begin on 1st January 1999, although detailed fieldwork was already underway in October.

 

The work is being done at a steep gorge an hour upstream of a major river crossing point called Ta Hsang on the road between Mong Pan and Mong Ton The gorge is a little distance south of the confluence of the Salween and the Nam Hsim River, one of the larger tributaries.

 

Ta Hsang is of relatively high elevation, a most important factor if large amounts of water are to be diverted and made to flow by gravity into Thailand. The chosen survey site is also close to both of Thailand's Ping and Kok Rivers. It is along these watercourses that water may be diverted through a long system of tunnels and canals into the Bhumiphol and Sirikit dams, Thailand's two largest.

 

The main visible company involved in the survey work is MDX Power Plc., a Thai development company specialising in dam consultancy and construction. An MDX company representative claims it has signed a contract with the Burmese government to do the feasibility study. It also claims to be putting up the money itself to do the work, despite rumours that the company and its partner Italian - Thai Development Plc. are both currently financially weak. It is not currently clear or confirmed as to the level of EPDC involvement in the surveying, or if they are channeling funds to MDX to do the groundwork and to employ local contractors.

 

In the context of the Ta Hsang site the involvement of MDX Power Plc. is especially significant. This is because the company for the past 2 years has been involved in surveying a potential dam site on the Kok River, along with Italian-Thai and the large Japanese Marubeni Corporation. The 150 MW dam on the Burmese section of the Kok River would be no more than 25 kilometers from the floodwaters of a Salween Dam. It is less implausible than most of the other proposed water diversion schemes to assume that that the Salween would be diverted into the Kok river.

 

Not least of the reasons why is that another controversial scheme is in the last planning stages, the Kok -Ing -Nan Water Diversion Project. The Kok - Ing - Nan Water Diversion Project aims to send water from the Kok and Ing Rivers, both tributaries of the Mekong, into the Nan River which flows into the Sirikit Dam and ultimately into the Chaophraya River. It would involve 117 kilometres of canals and tunnels and a blocking dam on the Ing River. The final feasibility study of this powerfully backed project is to be completed in February 1999.

 

In regard to the Salween dam, a senior MDX advisor, ex-Democrat MP and government minister named Dr. Subin Pinkayan has reportedly approached the Shan armed resistance through intermediaries to persuade them not to obstruct the surveying of the dam. The Shan State Army (South) is believed to have said they will not oppose the survey but said that the dam must not be built without consultation with the people and NGO's.

 

A logging company called Thai Sawat has reportedly been closely involved in the facilitation of these negotiations. The company, which jointly holds a concession with B & F Goodrich Co. Ltd. has been deforesting the area under concession arrangements with both the Burmese military and Khun Sa's MTA since 1989. The company has been building roads throughout the area in cooperation with the Burmese government and groups such as the southern Wa faction. of the United Wa State Party. It is believed to be seeking a concession to log the areas to be flooded by the dam.

 

Despite the ample evidence that serious studies have been underway since at least October 1998 the Thai government did not announce any plans for damming the Salween until mid-January, after articles appeared in the South China Morning Post and local newspapers. Even then the government ministers studiously avoided mentioning the project in the context of the Sirikit Dam or the Kok- Ing - Nan Water Diversion Project, despite the logical connection between the two, and despite statements of intent by previous governments. The omission is almost certainly due to the fact that both projects are controversial and that the Thai government wishes to avoid the early linking up of the Thai anti-dam movement and the numerous groups opposing the numerous abuses of the Burmese regime.

 

Reasons to oppose the dam abound. Its construction would have very serious environmental impacts. To raise the water level to the point where 10 percent (or more) of the Salween's flow could be pumped up to divert it into Thailand's rivers the dam would have to be a high dam. Such a dam would have a very large and long reservoir, and would flood a considerable area of forest and rice terraces up the valleys of its tributaries. For water to flow by gravity into Thailand the dam would have to be extraordinarily high and would have a massive reservoir and even greater impacts.

 

There would be a much greater earthquake hazard in a quake prone area. Deforestation would be serious both from resettlement or illegal subsistence farming by displaced people and by logging companies that would be granted concessions in the area to be flooded. Water borne diseases such as malaria and schistosomiasis would increase or be introduced. Indigenous fish populations and land-based wildlife would be radically affected or annihilated. Riversides would be completely changed all the way down to the delta, with riverbank erosion and possible disappearance of islands in the delta. Well water supplies in the city of Moulmein would likely be affected with saltwater intrusion. Deprived of fertility from the river-borne silt, farming in the highly productive Salween floodplains would come to rely increasingly on scarce and expensive chemical inputs. Fish reproduction in the river, delta and along the coast, already affected by heavy fishing by foreign trawlers and clearance of mangrove forests would be further affected. There would be numerous impacts on the environment from the infrastructure that would be built to serve the dam. Yet more impacts would accrue from the uses to which the energy from the dam is put, such as large-scale mining and polluting industries.

 

None of the previous dams built or planned by the Burmese government have had environmental impact assessments done for them. Even if an EIA was to be conducted it seems highly unlikely that it would be made public or given any serious attention by the authorities on  either side of the border. There is little evidence that a proper environmental assessment (EIA) will be done.

 

The project is questionable from an economic point of view due to the predictable short life of the dam due to the very high silt levels carried by the river from the increasingly deforested hills. Very long power transmission lines would need to be installed to deliver the power to Thailand and to central Burma. Similarly, very long and expensive tunnels, canals and riverbank alterations would be needed to deliver water to the dams.

 

There is little evidence to show that a proper social impact assessment (SIA) will be done either. Given the extreme human rights violations that continue to take place in the Shan State and elsewhere in Burma it would be totally unrealistic to expect compensation to be given to those affected by the dam, let alone much improvement in their lives. The people in the region where the dam is being planned have already been subjected to 3 years of especially intense military suppression. The area to the west of the dam survey site has been the focus of the Burmese military's forced relocation program that has resulted in large-scale depopulation. According to the Shan Human Rights Foundation over 1400 small and large villages with an estimated population of 300,000 people have been affected by the forced moves. The site of the dam survey and a substantial part of the area that would be flooded by any dam built on the river is land that has seen recent forced relocations.

 

The Burmese government does not have a good social record. It has been waging brutal war against the Shan and other indigenous populations in the area for the past 37 years. It is widely accused of profiting from and controlling much of the drug trade from the region, which is among the worst in the world. Furthermore, its past history with development projects such as the Burma to Thailand Yadana gas pipeline is fraught with human rights abuses, the subject of a major law suit in the US courts.

 

The Burmese government and its army would be key participants in the project. Burmese army engineers are reportedly involved in the surveying work. They are also in the process of building a bridge over the Salween at Ta Hsang, a piece of infrastructure that would be used in the servicing of the dam construction. Roads into the area have been upgraded with the help of the Thai Sawat logging company. There are allegations of forced labour on the road and bridge construction. Both the construction and surveying work is taking place under heavy Burmese Army protection.

 

Aside from the surveying at Ta Hsang there is also mention of interest in another site lower on the Salween in the Karen State. This location, close to where the Salween empties out into its floodplain, is called Hat Gyi. It is evidently preferred by Burma's ruling State Peace and Development Council due to its being closest to three major centres in Burma that would use electricity generated by a dam, and is most within the military's tenuous sphere of control.

 

Although improbable due to its relatively low elevation, Hat Gyi has also been mentioned in the context of water diversion. A Thai study made during another long drought in 1995 postulated the siphoning off of Salween water from where the Moei and Salween Rivers meet and pumping it into a dam on another Salween tributary, further up into yet another dam, and from there along a long tunnel from whence it would flow into the Bhumiphol Dam. Construction of a dam at Hat Gyi would mean the lower dam at Mae Lama Luang, next to the large Karen refugee camp called Mae Ramu Klo, would not need to be built as the area would be inundated by the larger dam. This idea has again been raised by the Thai Science, Technology and Environment Minister as one of two of the alternatives put forward for public display in the context of the Salween Water Diversion Project.

 

Whilst nothing is certain in regard to the ultimate decision on whether to build the dam or not, when to build it, and where the very large amounts of capital would be found for the project, there is still reason for more than passing concern that a large multipurpose dam is to be built. The Thai Cabinet approval of the US $ 5.5 million feasibility study represents a large step towards its final approval. It is highly unlikely that the would-be dam builders will turn aside from the project on the grounds of later information about the environmental, social and economic costs of the proposed dam after having spent such an amount of money on it.

 

It is all too evident that the successive governments of Thailand are intent on large scale, ecologically devastating, inequitable development projects that benefit construction companies, industrialists, loggers and officials that approve the projects. While acknowledging that the problem is due to the destruction of the watersheds, little effort is put into addressing the inequitable land tenure or prevention of the forest fires and illegal logging that are the primary causes of this destruction. It is doubtful that most farmers in Thailand would be able to afford water from the 4-7 billion dollar project. The users will almost certainly be limited to city dwellers, electricity producers, wealthy farmers and industries who can afford to pay for the water.

 

On the part of the Burmese government, it is equally evident that making a huge dam in the land of the Shan people is an act of neo-colonial occupation, if not an act of war. Such natural resource exploitation as the dam, mining concessions, logging and fisheries concessions and the Yadana gas pipeline has been done in the interest of securing cooperation against its ethnic and political opponents in the border states, or to gain revenue for the military. The military government has repeatedly demonstrated its lack of concern for civilized norms - such as respecting the basic rights of their own nationals, the borders of other countries, or the environment.

 

Such a dam would not serve as a "peace keeping dam" as was suggested during the period of dictatorship in Thailand - instead it would add to the burden of human suffering by strengthening the Burmese military dictatorship.

 

All factors considered, the construction of dams and related infrastructure that would significantly alter the 3 major watersheds of South East Asia is an example of an unsound development that should be opposed.

 

Since the Royal Thai Government has decided in favour of carrying out the study, it is time for action. It is necessary to ensure that the many social, economic, political and environmental concerns are adequately addressed, and not glossed over. There is a great need to ensure that the wrong-doings of those who would like to profit from the making of this dam at the expense of the people and their environment will be exposed.

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2. OVERVIEW OF THE
SALWEEN DAM PLANS

 

Source:   Salween Watch  Consortium

Date:      7th February 1999

 

Up to December 1998 it appears that studies exist for 5 dam sites on the Salween. A few other earlier and less serious studies have also been done. In addition at least 16 studies have been done to dam the smaller rivers that flow into it.

 

Despite -- indeed because of -- the number of plans nothing is particularly certain as to what will be done where, or when - if ever - it would be done. Some of the uncertainty comes from the many different interest groups:- different Thai politicians, the SPDC, foreign and local business and industrial groups. These compete on the national and local levels for projects and locations that most benefit themselves. However it also appears that to a degree the dam planners create this uncertainly deliberately so as to prevent opposition from becoming too organised. A similar pattern of dissembling and concealment was evident also in the gas pipeline preparations.

 

Few of the dam plans go beyond preliminary or even reconnaissance study stage. All would need pre-feasibility and feasibility studies. Most of the dams would be impossible to build. Obviously the costs of constructing the dams and related infrastructure would be very high, and some of the plans are simply too impractical.

 

Many of the potential dam sites overlap each other. Flood waters from some sites would inundate areas where other dam sites have been suggested.

 

In 1994 the ADB employed the Norwegian consultancy company Norconsult to evaluate energy projects in the Greater Mekong Subregion. Norconsult recommended that a study should be done of the whole Salween river basin to choose the most logical sites to develop. This would be called the "Thanlwin Basin Hydropower Development Study". Without access to internal ADB information it appears that either the study has not yet been performed, or the study currently begun by the Thai Government is actually it.

 

 It's aim would be to look at all the plans to make dams on the Salween and the small rivers that run into it. The Thanlwin Basin Study would aim to identify the places along the river where dams could be made. It would look at where, how high, how many, how big the dams might be, and at some of their impacts (sic). It would then possibly recommend not just one but a whole series of dams on the Salween. It would suggest which dams would be made first. If approved, these would then be built one after another as funds became available. The whole Salween River and its large tributaries might one day be dammed.

 

Some of the dams planned for the Salween River are very big, the biggest in South East Asia. The area flooded by the dam's waters would cover many of the fertile low-lying areas of the upper Salween Valley. A large dam on the Salween in the Shan State could cover between 100 to 1,000 square kilometres of riverbank, forest and farmland. 

 

Tunnels and canals many kilometres long might also be built to take water out of the Salween and put it into the Chaophraya River. If earlier ministerial statements are followed up on some 10 percent of all the water that goes down the river could be pumped out and into other rivers altogether. The average annual river flow of the Salween is said to be 124,000,000,000 cubic metres per year. Ten percent of this would therefore be around 12 billion cubic metres of water. One engineer source, although unverifiable, even mentions a remarkable 30 -40 percent of all the Salween River's flow being diverted to Thailand over 40 billion cubic meters of water.

 

 

RECENT DAM PLANS FOR THE MAIN FLOW OF THE SALWEEN RIVER

 

The 5 potential dam sites on the Salween that have been mentioned within the past 10 years, from closest to the Chinese border to where the river meets the sea the sites are as follows:

 

1. TA HSANG:    The most recent of the dam plans concerns an area in the south central Shan State apparently some 40 kilometres north of the Ta Hsang river crossing. A study of the stretch of river lasting 3 weeks was completed in November by a group apparently including Thai company personnel, Burmese and Thai officials and 3 Japanese.

 

It is possible that the survey is part of the study called for by the Asian Development Bank in 1994. Until the recent activities, since 1994 no known field study of the river has been done.

 

It is not immediately obvious why the latest site to be studied is considered to be of interest unless it's altitude and its proximity to the Nam Kok River in the Shan State are the deciding factors. The Nam Kok, as mentioned in the previous paper is to be part of the KokIng – Nan Water Diversion Project, aimed at filling the Sirikit Dam. The relatively high altitude may help reduce the height the Salween's water may have to be raised artificially for diversion. This could mean that although very high, the dam would not be quite high as it would be if made lower down on the river valley. However, the location is far from the border and there is still no obvious way to bring water from such a site to Thailand other than by pumping it up and through a large mountain. Pumping would make water diversion more expensive and difficult. The Ta Hsang site is also very far from the industrial centres that could use the electricity. It is also an area of active and persistent conflict.

 

[Note:  Any really large diversion of water is likely to simply be too costly to be pumped. A volume of 10 – 30 billion cubic feet of water is an enormous amount, requiring an enormous amount of energy to lift over a very long period of time. To be feasible such a large amount of water would have to be able to flow mostly or completely by gravity down from the Ta Hsang site. The altitude of the Kok River and Ping River at the places into which the water is most likely to be sent are at, or are higher than 1,500 feet. The bottom of the Salween River at Ta Hsang, the highest site on the river that has been examined, is roughly calculated at being no higher than 800 feet (244 metres) above sea level, and are probably closer to 700 feet above sea level. For water to flow by gravity down to the Ping and Kok Rivers a dam wall of no less than 730 feet (222 metres) high would have to be built. It may need to be up to 100 feet higher. The cost of such an undertaking would be exceptional.

 

Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand documentary sources state that the dam would aim to produce 3,300 megawatts of electricity, while the Japanese Electric Power Development Corporation says 3,600 megawatts.

 

2.  MONG HTA – HOMONG:    North west of Mong Hta and Mong Kyawt, and north east of Homong in the Shan State, at a place where water would be backed up to near Piang Luang and sent through tunnels into the Mae Taeng stream and thence into the Ping and Chaophraya Rivers. The site of the 6,000 megawatt dam would be completely in Burma. It would be at least 200 meters high to raise the water level as high as possible.  Diverted water would have to be pumped up at very high cost. The site is also far from industrial areas and existing power transmission lines. The flood area would stretch far up into the Shan State cutting it in two. No figures are available as to the cost. Two options were initially considered but one, that of pumping the water up to a shorter tunnel through the mountains, would have required over 1,200 megawatts of electricity, nearly twice the peak capacity of the Bhumiphol Dam.

 

3. WEI GYI:   The site at Wei Gyi on the Thai Burma border section of the Salween. According to the Japanese Electric Power Development Corporation study the dam would be 4,540 megawatts. It is far from watersheds that flow into the Chaophraya River. Because it is separated by 2 mountain ranges and a wide valley the diversion of water into the other watershed is simply not practical. It would require 300 kilometres of high voltage transmission line to be put in place, but is not so far from Rangoon or Chiang Mai. It could flood 700 square kilometres – possibly even up to 1000 km2 of forest, riverine and farm land. This dam cost was estimated at US$3 billion. Another earlier estimate which is thought to be for the same area priced the dam at US$5.85 billion. The Norwegian dam building consultancy company Norconsult, in their Greater Mekong Subregional Development Programme study for the Asian Development Bank estimated that it would be possible to build a dam on the same site to produce 7,800 megawatts of electricity. It would presumably cost far more than US$3 billion to make.

 

4. DAGWIN:    The smaller lower Salween dam at Dagwin, a short distance down from the Weigyi dam on the same stretch of the Thai-Burma border. According to the EPDC study the dam would complement the Weigyi dam as a pumped storage facility. It could produce up to 792 megawatts of electricity but would basically serve to trap the water released by the Weigyi dam and would use off-peak power to pump water back up into the Weigyi dam to produce more reliable peak time power. It's flood area would not be so large, but its estimated US$900 million cost is high for the amount of usable power it would produce. Also no water diversion would be practical.

 

5. HAT GYI:    Near to Myaingyingu, at a place called Hat Gyi (also called Hutgyi). This is where there is a particularly powerful rapid that becomes a waterfall when the water flow is reduced in the dry season. It is beside and part of the Kahilu Wildlife Sanctuary. The Burmese Generals favour this site although Thai officials have not favoured this site at all. It is completely in Burma, and is the closest to Rangoon and Mandalay. A very significant amount of Karen and Thai soil would be flooded by this dam if built, unless it was made very low. Because of its low elevation the cost of pumping water into the Chaophraya would be very high. However its flood waters could be pumped up to one of the 2 planned diversion dams at Nam Ngao and thence into the Teun River and the Bhumipol Dam. (Note:  If the Hat Gyi site is "developed" the diversion dam at Mae Lama Luang / Mae Ramu Klo may be unnecessary as the area would be flooded by the Hat Gyi Dam. According to EGAT documents the Hat Gyi site is intended to produce only 400 megawatts of electricity.

 

 

SOME LIKELY IMPACTS OF THE SALWEEN DAM

 

There would be many environmental, social and cultural impacts resulting from the dam. Some of these would be minor and some major - but altogether they would add up to a large set of very severe negative impacts.

 

Some of the impacts will be felt quickly, others in the coming years. Many will be felt a long time into the future. Furthermore, it can be said that the bigger the dam, the more the impact. The Salween Dam will be a very large dam - possibly the largest in the whole of South East Asia.

 

Most of the environmental and social impacts will be on the peoples on Shan, Karenni, Karen and Mon States.

These ethnic people will be the ones who will loose their land to the dam.

They will be the people who will loose their sources of income because of the dam.

They will be the people who become sick from the diseases that come with big dams.

If anyone is killed by an earthquake caused, or partly caused by the dam it is most likely to be ethnic people from these areas.

 

ECONOMIC COSTS:  

 

All of these dams would have enormous financial costs and risks, including greatly increased national debt. Big dams are very expensive to make. The Thai National Energy Agency earlier estimated that a 6,400 megawatt dam on the Salween would cost US$5.85 billion dollars. The Japanese Electric Power Development Corporation estimated a 4,540 megawatt dam would cost US$3 billion dollars. Not infrequently big dams cost more than double what is initially estimated.

 

The dam would need very sizable loans to construct it. This would naturally add greatly to the already unsustainable national debts of both Burma and Thailand. Generally countries go deep into debt when they take the loans from the foreign banks. Countries like Burma and Thailand already can not repay their debts. The IMF squeezes the governments to pay back the money. To get money to repay the debt the governments tax the people, raise utility service costs, encourage industries which are often polluting and socially hostile, or they try to sell more natural resources. Mostly governments squeeze the people they control. If they are a government like the SLORC / SPDC they don't only squeeze their own people. They try even harder to milk the resources and money from the ethnic homelands they have all but colonized. Dams are a very major way of exploiting resources from the environment in remote areas.

 

Both countries suffer massive problems with corruption. It is highly likely that both the feasibility study funding and any subsequent dam financing would be heavily depleted through corruption.

 

Economic life of the dam limited, especially by the heavy siltation caused by deforestation in China and Shan side. Probably getting worse

 

Cost of the dam especially high because of high earthquake risk (also military and social hazards)

 

POLITICAL IMPACTS:   

 

The dams represent the latest component of the controversial Constructive Engagement policy.  Cordial relations between the Thais and the Burmese are often maintained through discussion of and joining in big money making projects such as the logging, fishing and the gas pipeline. This is especially the case in times of heightened tension between the two countries. The dams also have been presented as a form of "peacemaking", despite the atrocities being perpetrated on the peoples in the areas to be flooded by the dams. The idea, promoted in the discussions on the Greater Mekong Subregion is to create peace through "interdependency". This is Asian Development Bank style diplomacy. It is possible that other nations and the UN also endorse this kind of "peacemaking", and will promote it with added components such as Crop Substitution programmes and transport infrastructure development. The Burmese military government is likely to promote the project as bringing the benefits of development to the border areas. In the interest of "peace" the Thai government will to try to find large amounts of funding from overseas and possibly try to find international support for the SPDC. This intent has already been more or less stated by the Ministers of Science, Technology and Environment. 

 

INTENSIFICATION OF MILITARY PRESSURE:  

 

The construction of any dam on the Salween has distinct and ominous military connotations. The dam would definitely mean occupation, or consolidation of occupation of the contested ethnic lands. The projects would therefore lead to further military oppression and permanent dislocation of indigenous peoples, many thousands of whom are already refugees.

 

If a government or a company wants to make a big development project like a dam the first thing it has to do is secure the area where the dam will be made. The government can not easily make a big dam in a war zone. Any delay costs millions of dollars a day. If there is serious fighting it can cause big and expensive delays. People who will make the dam are mostly civilians who won't want to be in danger. If many of the trucks, bulldozers, buildings, power lines and roads that serve the dam builders are being destroyed it can cause both delays and more expensive security measures. High security and political costs could make the dam economically unfeasible. It may be more difficult to get financing for the dam from overseas investors. However, as can be seen from the Yadana Gas pipeline, it might still be possible if the dam is seen as a 'peacemaking' effort.

 

While some ethnic leaders have been led to believe that their revolutionary movements will be strengthened by cash infusions by people encouraging them to not interfere with the dam, the opposite is certainly the case. The dam promoters most surely do not mean to strengthen the groups that oppose Burmese control with supplies of money and arms. The last thing the dam builders need is to prolong the conflict by strengthening the weaker group. dam construction requires "peace", stability and smooth uninterrupted work.

 

Another military (and environmental) impact will be the construction of more roads. These will open up the more remote areas and allow the easier movement of troops and supplies. There will inevitably be more security measures to protect the roads. Additionally, it is highly likely that the forced labour and other human rights violations commonly associated with road construction in Burma will be replicated in these areas.

 

A completed dam on the Salween would completely change the nature of the river. In its natural state it is turbulent and strong, greatly limiting movement across it to a few points. Tamed, it would presumably carry gunboats and soldiers into what are currently some of the most remote corners of the Shan State.

 

By the time the dam is nearing construction power transmission lines would have to be installed. As with roads these would have to go through militarily secured areas.

 

Any increased military presence in the areas would involve high costs. The day to day expenses of maintaining security forces are very high, as the ethnic peoples have recently experienced to an even greater degree. The Burmese central command has recently ordered its field commanders to provide for the needs of their troops from local resources, and has stopped supplying many items that had previously been given as a subsidy. While this indicates the extreme weakness of the regime and could presage its downfall, the immediate effect is to place the added burden of supplying the troops on the local communities.

 

SOCIAL IMPACTS:   

 

The dams would also affect the other nationality peoples all the way down and up the river. The people who benefit will be the relatively well-off Burmese, some big foreign companies and powerful groups in Thailand. Those who are rich and powerful are likely to become richer and more powerful. Those who are poor and oppressed are likely to become more poor and oppressed.

 

Local communities would be severely unbalanced by the influx of alien workers, the influx of cash, rapid local inflation, and a rise in social ills. Forced relocations will tend to become more permanent. The Burmese government has already confiscated large tracts of land, much of which has reportedly been given to soldiers or families of soldiers, or has been sold to relatively wealthy Chinese immigrants.

 

Who will use the electricity? Foreign industries in Thailand and wasteful consumers. These pay workers the minimum wages, and many of them pollute, and exploit. Villagers in the Shan State are not likely to gain many benefits at all, and are not even sure to get electricity. The benefits would largely be confined to industrialists and the richer people who could afford to use the energy.

 

ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS:

 

·        The dam (s) would flood very large areas of land. Very significant amounts of forest and lowland farm areas would be destroyed by flooding.

·        Large amounts of decomposing vegetation in the flood areas would produce very significant amounts of greenhouse gases.

·        Wildlife, especially the many unique and little known fish species of the Salween, would be severely impacted, and some driven to extinction.

·        Further resettlement of populations would force people to clear large areas of new and inappropriate land for subsistence agriculture.

·        Construction of roads, power lines, channels, accommodation and other infrastructure for the dams would change the local environment completely. The channeling and tunneling work would continue all the way down the Kok - Ing - Nan and Ping Rivers to the dams in Thailand. Thai farmers as well as Shan peoples would be displaced and dispossessed.

·        Quarrying, blasting, transport of cement and other goods would create noise, dust, exhaust gases and other pollution and annoyance.

·        The weight of water, silt and rock carried into the dam, added to the weight of the dam wall itself could start earthquakes. A major earthquake could rupture the dam with. The area of the Yunnan - Shan State border was affected by an earthquake registering 6 on the Richter Scale in either 1993 or 1994. There have been several other small earthquakes even more recently.

·        Riverbanks downstream, especially in the rice producing floodplains would be severely eroded

·        Little more sand and silt would come to the delta areas, so islands and newly formed land would disappear or be flooded with sea water

·        Well water supplies in areas near the sea are likely to become salty

·        Important fish breeding areas in the Salween Delta, including mangrove forests, would be radically changed or disappear. This would further affect fisheries in the Andaman Sea

 

There would be many other severe problems that are beyond the scope of this short briefing paper to cover.

 

SOME DAM INTEREST GROUP CRITERIA:

 

Thailand's Perceived Needs;

 

·        Water for industry, for flushing the polluted Chaophraya River, for city use, and possibly for sale to those plantations and farmers who can afford to pay for it  (Note:  Water from the hugely expensive Salween would be too expensive for most farm use, especially if it is  pumped up from the Salween....)

·        Relatively low cost electric power  (Note:  Thai authorities evidently still think they need more electricity, despite their current huge oversupply, their reneging on a purchase deal of hydropower from Laos and their recently stated interest in selling their excess power production to Vietnam and Burma)

·        Construction contracts for Thai companies, with the associated signing bonuses and outright bribery and corruption

·        Preferably, for the dam to be in an area they can at least partly control

·        For the environmental and social impacts to be in another country

·        To use the dam issue as a means of placating the Burmese military and as a way to persuade them to cooperate more

·        To avoid and as much as possible break the Thai anti-dam movement

 

The Burmese SPDC's Needs

 

·        To control and dominate the ethnic and opposition groups

·        To urgently supply electricity for Burma's cities and elsewhere

·        To get money, as much and as quickly as possible

·        To control the power supply to Thailand and gain other power over Thais

·        To spend as little money as possible

·        To be able to securely protect the power lines, roads and other infrastructure

·        To have some amount of instability in the Shan State to justify the existence of it's overlarge standing army while providing an excuse for the country's massive  drug production

 

Other Interest Groups, Especially Financiers, Consultants, Construction Companies, the ADB, UN, and other Governments

 

·        To show some progress in the so-called drug war / reduction of drugs

·        To provide energy for foreign industry

·        To show that dams are still a viable form of energy

·        To get their money back - or to use the debt / obligation to gain extra influence

·        To get big contracts for construction, for consultancy work, and for the supply of equipment for dam making

·        To invest in projects that will keep them employed and well paid, and for some companies,  to be reasonably profitable over the long term

·        For countries to spend their ODA on projects that benefit their national industries

 

_____________________________________________________________________________


3.
Email Note:

 

Source:    An anonymous Shan source:  

Date:       13 January 1999

 

"I have just talked to a guy who just came back from the Salween. According

to him:

 

"Different contractors are drilling the rocks on both banks of the river.

One of them is the GMT company which was engaged by the GMS Power Public Co.Ltd.

that won the contract from the MDX. The location is approximately 10 km

from Tasang, not 40 km. Going upstream takes time about 1 hour, but of course coming

back is faster. The company is being supplied by the Thai Sawat

Company, a logging company that is expecting a concession to cut down the trees when the dam

is built. There are about 23 Thais working there. The Japanese only went

once. There were 3 of them and they did not stay long."

 

"Apparently, nobody there on site is sure whether it's going to be built or not."

 

If you are interested, have someone call the GMS:

 

Tel.      (02) 253-0428

            (02) 253-0436

 

"Fax.   (02) 267-9094 "

 

_____________________________________________________________________________


4. Update on the
Salween Dam project in Shan State

 

Source:   BurmaNet News, 

Date:      Early January 1999

 

Surveying for the dam on the Salween River in Shan State is now seriously underway, according to inside sources.

 

The first serious reports of the surveying on the main body of the Salween started coming out in October 1998. These mentioned the main company involved as MDX Power Co., whose staff were crossing the Thai border at Nong Ook (up from Chiang Dao in northern Chiang Mai province) and travelling up by road to the Salween River northwest of Murng Ton. The site being surveyed was reported to be in the region of the Ta Sang / Wan Hsa La river crossing that links the roads between Murng Pan and Murng Ton in southern Shan State.

 

Further reports received in December '98 and early January '99 have confirmed that the dam is being planned in the Ta Sang area. There is currently a major bridge being built across the river at Ta Sang. According to Shan sources, forced labour is being used to do some of the work, and there is a heavy Burmese military presence in the area.

 

Surveying for the dam is being conducted at a site that lies one and a half hours by boat upstream from the bridge site, in an area south of the Nam Hsim River, a large tributary of the Salween and north of the village of Ta Sala.

 

The site where most of the observed survey activities are being carried out is where the Salween passes through a steep gorge. The surveyors, assisted by Burmese army engineers have reportedly begun dynamiting and drilling a number of deep holes into the rocks at the base of the gorge and along the river.

 

According to the reports, a series of teams including about 20 Japanese have been travelling together with Thai staff from MDX up from Nong Ook in Thailand up by road and boat to the dam site. SPDC troops have been providing security.

 

The dam is ostensibly being planned to divert water from the Salween into Thailand, as well as to produce electricity for Thailand and Burma. It is said that it would produce an estimated 3,700 megawatts of electricity.

 

Sources from inside Shan State have mentioned that the water diversion scheme will bring the water through Murng Paeng east of the Salween and across 300 km into Thailand. It is unsure whether the water will be brought into the River Kok (in Chiang Rai province) or the River Ping (in Chiang Mai province) or, as some opponents of the dam speculate, into both river systems.

 

The studies of the dam projects are reported to have received funding through the Electric Power Development Co. a large Japanese quasi-governmental institution involved in previous surveys of the Salween.

 

The dam is being planned to divert water from the Salween into Thailand, as well as to produce an estimated 3,700 megawatts of electricity for Thailand and Burma.

 

One report from local sources mentioned that the water diversion scheme will bring the water through Murng Paeng east of the Salween and across 300 km into Thailand. It is unsure whether the water will be brought into the River Kok (in Chiang Rai province) or the River Ping (in Chiang Mai province) - or as speculated by some dam opponents, into both river systems.

 

Grand but controversial plans are simultaneously being drawn up by Thai government agencies and Japanese consultants for a three river water diversion system for the Kok, Ing and Nan rivers that would supply water to the depleted Queen Sirikit Dam on a tributary of the Chaophraya River. Previous tentative plans exist for another dam diverting water into the Ping River that supplies Thailand's largest dam, named after King Bhumipol which is on another major tributary.

 

A dam high enough to raise the water level to the point where 10 percent or more of the Salween's flow could be diverted into Thailand's rivers would have to be extraordinarily high. Such a dam would have a massive reservoir, and many serious environmental impacts.

 

Even the most modest version of such a scheme would involve a very high dam wall, elaborate canals and tunnels, and may also require pumping of the water. The cost would be very high.

 

Figures quoted by local sources familiar with the project for the cost of the planned dam range widely from 4 billion to 7 billion US dollars.

 

Under normal economic circumstances the cost of building such a project would make it unthinkable. However it is thought that some of the US$30 billion provided under the Miyazawa Fund initiative of the Japanese government is the driving motivation for the potential dam builders.

 

The people in the region where the dam is being planned are already paying a high cost for the dam project. The area has been the focus of the Burmese military's forced relocation program that has driven over 300,000 Shan villagers from their homes during the last 3 years.

 

The area where the dam is being planned is in the heart of the operating area of the Shan States Army-South, the main active Shan resistance group. There are obviously considerable strategic benefits for the SPDC in building the dam, similar to those gained by the activities of the Thai and Chinese loggers and the builders of the Yadana gas pipeline.

 

A senior MDX advisor, ex-Democrat MP and government minister named Dr. Subin Pinkayan has

approached the Shan opposition and cautioned them not to obstruct the surveying of the dam. The logging company Thai Sawat, who have held concessions in the area since the late '80's, are

closely cooperating with MDX to conduct the surveying.

 

_______________________________________________________________________________

 

5. 3D VISION: THE SALWEEN UNDER ATTACK AGAIN

 

Publication:   The Nation

Section:        Editorial & Opinion

Date:            26th January 1999

 

By James Fahn

 

Surrounded by war and shrouded in mystery, the Salween River is nevertheless being targeted by dam-builders.

 

Considering its size, the Salween must be one of the most mysterious rivers in the world. From

its origins in Tibet, it flows for nearly 3,000 km through isolated provinces in China and Burma,

 barely skimming Thailand's border before it reaches the sea at Moulmein.

 

Most of the scanty scientific information we have about the Burmese portion of the Salween

dates back more than 50 years to British colonial days. But now a group of engineers and

consultants have recently begun studying the mighty river with the eventual aim of damming it.

 

There has long been talk of Burma tapping the Salween's hydroelectric potential, and then

exporting the electricity to energy-hungry Thailand. The last time the issue popped up -- roughly

five years ago -- there were rumours a 4,500-MW dam would be built at Wei Gyi, on the

Thai-Burma border in Mae Hong Son province. The resultant reservoir could have extended up

through Burma's Kayah State into Shan State, forcing the relocation of thousands of ethnic

Karen, Karenni and Shan villagers.

 

Since then, the financial crisis had seemingly put the project on a distant back burner. Even if

the funds were available to finance a large dam on the Salween, electricity consumption in

Thailand has dropped so dramatically that supply now far exceeds demand.

 

So it came as quite a surprise last November when several NGOs based in the North learned

that a team of Thai and Japanese consultants had entered Shan State at the Nong Ook border

checkpoint in Chiang Mai province to survey a possible dam site on the Salween. It turns out

that a feasibility study is indeed being conducted at a site located on the Salween roughly 10

km north of Ta Hsang, where a bridge is being built across the river. The study is being carried

out by consultants from Thailand-based MDX Power through its subsidiary GMS Power, along

with experts from a Japanese utility, the Electric Power Development Corporation (EPDC).

 

The question most observers are asking is why look at building a dam now? There was some

speculation that since Thailand is currently facing a water crisis rather than an electricity

shortage, the project would be used to divert water from the Salween into the Chao Phraya

River basin. But according to a source at MDX, the project at Ta Hsang would be solely for

hydro-electric power.

 

''While anything is possible,'' added an Egat official, ''the cost of pumping the water into

Thailand would be incredibly expensive.''

 

Both sources explained that a Salween dam is a long-term project, one that will take at least a

decade to complete, if it goes ahead at all. Thailand has signed a memorandum of

understanding with Burma to import 1,500 MW of power by the year 2010, they noted, although

a dam at Ta Hsang would probably generate more than 3,000 MW.

 

Some NGOs suspect the project may be a Japanese initiative, or is designed to get financing

 from the so-called Miyazawa Plan, which aims to invest US$30 billion in Southeast Asia to help

 kick-start the regional economy. But the MDX source denies seeking any money from the

Miyazawa Plan, claiming his company is funding the feasibility study itself.

 

''Working with the EPDC might help bring in other Japanese partners, including eventually the

Japanese government, but things have to improve in Burma to get that kind of financing,'' he

explains. ''There is no special reason why this project should be in the news now. We signed

the agreement [to do the feasibility study] with the Burmese government about a year ago.''

 

The Egat official added that the Japanese firm Marubeni is keen on developing hydropower

facilities in Burma in much the same way that Korea's Daewoo has been active in building

dams in Laos and Vietnam. Marubeni and Ital-Thai have almost completed a feasibility study

for a dam on the Burmese portion of the Kok River near Chiang Rai.

 

Meanwhile, the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), Burma's ruling military junta, is

reportedly eager to see a dam built on the Salween at Hat Gyi, across the border from Tak

province. The site is relatively close to Rangoon and Mandalay, and water from a reservoir

there could also be diverted into Thailand.

 

But why build a dam at Ta Hsang, way up in Shan State? The MDX official explains that the site

is ''technically promising'' -- a large volume of water flows through a narrow gorge -- and that it

is a good location in terms of hooking up with the Thai electricity grid. ''The transmission lines

wouldn't have to go through a national park,'' he says.

 

''There is also the issue of security,'' he adds. ''One advantage of this site is that it appears to

 be slightly more, um, sedate.''

 

But ''sedate'' is a relative concept in strife-torn Burma. The surveyors were reportedly escorted

by heavily-armed Burmese government troops, who are currently carrying out their annual

dry-season offensive against Shan and other ethnic minorities fighting for autonomy. The

fighting, combined with SPDC relocation programmes, have reportedly displaced hundreds of

thousands of people in Shan State, forcing many to flee into Thailand as refugees.

 

The SPDC also probably sees a dam on the Salween as a way to neutralise the Shan military

opposition by cutting off support from Thailand. It is a strategy that worked well against the Mon,

who were forced to sign a ceasefire agreement when the Yadana pipeline was built through

their territory, government troops moved in to defend it, and Thai authorities -- who had hitherto

allowed the Mon to move back and forth across the border -- warned them against sabotaging

the project.

 

According to one report, MDX advisor Dr Subin Pinkayan, a former Democrat MP and

government minister, has already contacted the Shan opposition through intermediaries and

asked that they not interfere with the project. The Shan States Army has allowed the survey to

go ahead but warned that actual construction might be opposed.

 

Tainted by their association with the narcotics trade, the Shan have often found it difficult to

gain allies, but they might be able to team up with environmentalists in opposing a dam on the

Salween. The MDX source says it would be a run-of-the-river project in order to minimise the

social and environmental impacts, but he also admits that he doesn't know how many people it

would dislocate, or how much forest it would destroy.

 

''That's what we aim to find out with the study,'' he says.

 

We do know that in China, the valley of the Salween -- or the Nu Jiang, as it is known there -- is

incredibly abundant, home to several unique indigenous groups, along with tigers, leopards,

bears, deer, giant hawks and rare pheasants. The Nu Jiang River Project claims that 314

different medicinal plants have been discovered there, along with hundreds of different orchids.

 

Who knows what wonders will be revealed along the Burmese portion of the river. The irony is

that we may find out just in time to see it destroyed.

 

 

                                                  ------------------------

 

James Fahn is a journalist currently working on the TV show Rayngan Si-khiow, which can be seen every Sunday at 14:00 on iTV. He can be reached via e-mail at <[email protected]>

 

 

_______________________________________________________________________________

 

6. FREE BURMA COALITION TO LAUNCH A CAMPAIGN
IN PROTEST OF
JAPAN'S RESUMPTION OF ODA TO BURMA

 

From:        Free Burma Coalition <[email protected]>

Date:          Wed, 4 Mar 1998

To:            Multiple recipients of List

                 <[email protected]>

 

Dear All,

The FBC is planning an international campaign in protest of the resumption of Japan's Aid to Burma--the so-called Overseas Development Aid (ODA).  We will be sending out an email campaign package which is being put together by Free Burma folks in Japan and the US.  The package will include:

 

1)  a generic press release which local groups can tailor and send them

to various media;

 

2)  a sample letter which can be emailed or faxed to Japanese consulates/embassies in your country, foreign ministry in Japan, and some Japanese Members of the Parliament;

 

3)  talking points for those who wish to just call the Japanese embassies and consulates (or foreign ministry in Tokyo) and register their opposition to ODA resumption;

 

4)  various email and contact addresses of these targeted officials and politicians;

 

5)  suggested actions for those who live in urban areas where Japanese consulates and embassies are located (for instance, leafleting in front of the embassies, staging demonstrations, etc.); and

 

6)  background information and rationale for the campaign.

 

Since during the anti-colonial, nationalist movement in the late 1930's, Japan has played a very significant role in Burma's politics.  Even during the 26 years self-imposed isolation (1962-88), Burma's military/ socialist dictatorship kept a very close tie, both economically and politically with Japan.  Japan (and China) play a major role in Burma's post-1988 politics.

 

We really believe this campaign to stop resumption of ODA is a very important action. And we urge you all to join in sending a strong message to Japanese government that the international Free Burma community finds it morally unacceptable that Japanese government would provide much-needed foreign aid and hence legitimacy to the military junta in Burma, without any indication of democratic transition there.

 

For further information about the ODA, please visit the following

websites:

 

For Japan's history of ODA toward Burma, see:

http://www2.nttca.com:8010/infomofa/ja/myanmar.html

 

Japan's ODA Charter can be found at:

http://www2.nttca.com:8010/infomofa/oda/official.html

 

If you want to help us out with this campaign, please email us at

<[email protected]> or <[email protected]>

 

Thank you.

 

peace, love, and hope,    FBC

****************************

 

U.S. SAYS AID TO MYANMAR WOULD BE INAPPROPRIATE

 

10:54 p.m. Feb 27, 1998 Eastern

 

WASHINGTON, Feb 27 (Reuters) - The United States said Friday it would be inappropriate for Japan to resume at this time non-humanitarian aid to Myanmar.

 

``We've discussed this matter with the government of Japan. And we, for our part, do not support the resumption of large scale aid projects to Burma at this time,'' State Department deputy spokesman James Foley told reporters.

 

``The U.S. government continues to believe that non-humanitarian bilateral assistance to the government of Burma, absent significant improvements in the human rights situation is inappropriate,'' he added.

 

Foley addressed the issue in response to a question from a reporter who said Japan had made a decision to resume aid to Burma, which is ruled by a military junta.

 

A U.S. official who spoke on condition of anonymity described the Tokyo government as ``thinking of'' resuming aid in connection with an airport in Yangon, the capital.

 

The United States has criticized the Myanmar government for violating human rights and for not doing enough to stem the flow of illegal narcotics.

 

President Bill Clinton in April 1997 imposed new sanctions on the country and U.S. officials said the action was warranted because Myanmar's military rulers not only rejected U.S. appeals and threats but also stepped up repression of political dissidents.

 

_____________________________________________________________________________________

 

For further information, or to be taken off the mailing list, please contact:

                        <[email protected]>

______________________________________________________________________________