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UNITED NATIONS |
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Economic
and Social Council |
Distr. GENERAL E/CN.4/2003/41 27 December 2002 Original: ENGLISH |
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS
Fifty-ninth session
Item 9 of the provisional agenda
QUESTION OF THE VIOLATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL
FREEDOMS IN ANY PART OF THE WORLD
Report on the situation of human rights in Myanmar
Mr. Paulo Sérgio Pinheiro, Special Rapporteur, in accordance with
Commission resolution 2002/67
GE.02-16169 (E) 220103
Executive summary
The
mandate of the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights on the
situation of human rights in
The assessment of the Special Rapporteur is that:
(a) The political space is being gradually reopened for the National League for Democracy (NLD) to resume its activities. This should presumably, also be valid for other legal political parties, which have yet to resume their activities. Restrictions on the freedom of expression, information and the press are, however, still in place;
(b) There is now an apparent consensus within the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) regarding the numbers and categories of political detainees and they have continued to be released. In general detention conditions have improved, although incrementally, in recent years. Physical ill-treatment of political prisoners, such as beatings, stopped where it had previously occurred and elderly prisoners have received regular medical attention; however, in several areas, political prisoners continue to be worse off than criminal offenders. Areas where further attention are required include the quality of food, the reported beating of common prisoners, and access to qualified medical attention and treatment, especially in emergencies;
(c) Political arrests since July 2002 have followed the pattern of “un-rule of law”, including arbitrary arrest, prolonged incommunicado detention and interrogation by military intelligence personnel, extraction of confessions of guilt or of information, very often under duress or torture, followed by summary trials, sentencing and imprisonment;
(d) Against the background of general respect for the practice of religion, there are local or regional variations. Respect for religious freedom appears to be better in places closer to central authorities than in remote or counter-insurgency areas;
(e) The voluntary and/or forced conscription
of children into the armed forces and the various ways in which they are used
by these forces is an issue in
(f) There appear to be serious problems with
the way the army and armed groups treat civilians in ethnic counter-insurgency
areas. These problems will not disappear
by denying them and they should be recognized and addressed properly if they
are to be resolved. Allegations will
continue to be made as long as violations continue to occur. The way to address this issue would be to
investigate allegations in a credible manner, to establish the facts, to take
action against the perpetrators, to establish procedures to prevent their
recurrence, to ensure control over army units and to compensate the
victims. The Special Rapporteur took
note of a communiqué issued on 4 November by the SPDC giving an initial
positive reaction to his proposals regarding the investigation of allegations
of human rights violations in ethnic areas, including allegations of rape in
(g) In response to the precarious
humanitarian conditions in
Principled
engagement should remain the policy option concerning
CONTENTS
Paragraphs Page
Introduction ........................................................................................... 1 – 2 5
I. ACTIVITIES OF THE SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR ....................... 3 – 11 5
A. Fact-finding mission ......................................................... 3 – 7 5
B. Other activities ................................................................. 8 – 11 6
II. ENJOYMENT OF BASIC FREEDOMS AND
HUMAN RIGHTS ........................................................................ 12 – 34 7
A. Freedoms of association ................................................... 12 – 14 7
B. Freedom of expression, information and press ................. 15 – 16 7
C. Political prisoners ............................................................ 17 – 20 8
D. Conditions in prisons ........................................................ 21 – 24 9
E. Recent political arrests ..................................................... 25 – 28 10
F. Freedom of religion .......................................................... 29 – 30 11
G. Child soldiers ................................................................... 31 – 34 11
III. INDEPENDENT INVESTIGATION OF ALLEGATIONS OF
HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN ETHNIC AREAS .............. 35 – 46 12
IV. OTHER ISSUES ........................................................................... 47 – 50 16
A. Challenges of transition and development ......................... 47 – 48 16
B. Humanitarian aid ............................................................... 49 – 50 16
V. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS .............................................. 51 – 58 17
Introduction
1. The
mandate of the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights on the
situation of human rights in
2. In
its resolution 2002/67, the Commission requested the Special Rapporteur to
report to the General Assembly at its fifty-seventh session and to the
Commission at its fifty-ninth session, keeping a gender perspective in mind
when seeking and analysing information (para. 8 (a)). The Special Rapporteur accordingly submitted
an interim report to the General Assembly (A/57/290 and Corr.1). The present report is based upon the findings
of his third fact-finding mission to
I. ACTIVITIES OF THE SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR
A. Fact-finding mission
3. The
Special Rapporteur conducted his third fact-finding mission to
4. While in Yangon, the Special Rapporteur met with the Secretary 1 of the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC); the Foreign Minister and his Deputy; the Home Minister; the Head of Department of the Office of Military Intelligence; the Chief of the Bureau of Special Investigation; the Directors-General of the Prisons and the Police Departments; the Chiefs of the Special Branch and the Criminal Investigation Departments; and members of the governmental Human Rights Committee. The Special Rapporteur visited Insein Central Prison, where he interviewed confidentially 16 prisoners, including recent political prisoners and those whom he had met during his previous visit in February 2002. He also had meetings with the General Secretary and members of the Central Executive Committee of the National League for Democracy (NLD), representatives of ethnic and other political parties, the United Nations country team, the diplomatic community, international civil society organizations, members of the international and local business community, as well as religious leaders and recently released political prisoners.
5. The
Special Rapporteur travelled to Hpa-an (capital) and Kya-in-seikkyi township in
Kayin (Karen) State from 23 to 25 October, where he met with local civilian and
military authorities and visited the state court and district- and
township-level police offices, including lock-ups. He also met with representatives of two
ceasefire groups, and Buddhist and Christian religious leaders. On his way to
capital of Mon State, where he met with the Commander of the South-Eastern Command responsible for Mon and Kayin States and visited the local NLD office. Finally, on 27 October, he also travelled to Bago Division to visit Thayarwaddy prison where he interviewed 11 prisoners.
6. The Special Rapporteur followed his mission to Myanmar with a four-day visit to Thailand (29 October-1 November), during which he had meetings with the Deputy Permanent Secretary of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, United Nations officials, and representatives of the diplomatic community, the media and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). He also travelled to Chiang Mai to hear the preliminary results of research developed by his team in the context of his mission to gather directly, and in a systematic manner, first hand testimonies from victims of, and witnesses to, human rights violations, and other persons who may have direct knowledge of the circumstances or context of such violations in the Shan, Kayin (Karen), Kayah (Karenni) and Mon ethnic areas of Myanmar. The purpose of this research project was to provide a solid background based on first-hand empirical survey to enable the Special Rapporteur to build up his own knowledge and understanding of the situation in these areas.
7. On
his way to and from
B. Other activities
8. After
his mission, the Special Rapporteur travelled to
9. While
at United Nations Headquarters, the Special Rapporteur met with several
representatives of the
10. The Special Rapporteur wrote four follow-up letters to Myanmar authorities (on 13, 19 and 28 November and 10 December) regarding his cooperation with them in the implementation of his mandate, including on the issues relating to the proposed investigation under his mandate of allegations of sexual violence against women in Shan State and on conditions of arrest, detention and release of detainees, including the recent instances of political arrests and imprisonment.
11. During the reporting period, the Special Rapporteur sent five urgent appeals (including two jointly with the Special Rapporteurs on torture and on freedom of opinion and expression) and two allegation letters jointly with the Special Rapporteurs on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, on the human rights of migrants, and on the right to food.
II. ENJOYMENT OF BASIC FREEDOMS AND HUMAN RIGHTS
A. Freedoms of association
12. A
very important step by the SPDC was the release of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, which,
according to her, has been unconditional.
Following her release on
13. While it is clear that the political space is being gradually reopened for the NLD to revive its activities, the extent to which it will be opened remains to be seen. The Special Rapporteur presumes that the regime that applies to the NLD is also valid for the eight other political parties which, in addition to the pro-Government National Unity Party, were not deregistered after the 1990 elections. The Special Rapporteur met representatives of several of these parties, none of which has resumed its legitimate activities, citing fear as the reason.
14. The Special Rapporteur also met representatives of parties that were deregistered and that refer to themselves as “national politicians” in order to be allowed to participate in what the SPDC calls “national politics”. This term seems to refer to political activities sanctioned by the SPDC, in contrast to “party politics” which contest its legitimacy. The Special Rapporteur also met with the United Nationalities Alliance, an informal umbrella organization founded in July 2002 by eight nationality parties that participated in the 1990 election.[1]
B. Freedom of expression, information and the press
15. Restrictions
on the freedom of expression and information are still in place. The NLD has yet to receive a licence for a
printing equipment to publish and disseminate party or political information,
for which it applied in May 2002. For
the time being, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi only holds a licence, renewable every six
months, to operate the two computer printers to which she has access at the NLD
central office. In Mawlawmyine (capital
of
16. A
free press has yet to become a social reality in
C. Political prisoners
17. The
SPDC appears to have accepted the figure established by the International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) of 1,448 “security detainees” (as of
18. On
19. The release of all political prisoners is one of the criterion by which the seriousness of the process of political transition and national reconciliation will be measured. At the current rate of an average of 27 releases per month, it will take about four years to release the remaining prisoners. The Special Rapporteur is aware of one interpretation according to which the slow pace of releases reflects the fact that political prisoners are hostages of political dialogue and their release is being used as a bargaining chip to delay the process of national reconciliation. This may well be. But in spite of the continuing contacts between the SPDC and the NLD, no structured substantive political dialogue has started yet. So what purpose does their detention serve? Such interpretations, if wrong, can only be disproved by convincing action - by further mass releases in the near future, contributing to the process of credible change in the political and human rights climate in the country which is essential for national reconciliation to take place.
20. These releases should also be unconditional. At present, political prisoners are released conditionally under section 401 (1) of the Criminal Procedure Code providing for the suspension of their sentence to the extent that they agree not to engage in activities construed as threatening “public order”. Several prisoners whom the Special Rapporteur met have declined to be released under these conditions. He was also informed that prior to their release, several NLD members were advised by military intelligence personnel that they could resume their party activities if they wished but that they were obliged to report any contact by or knowledge of activities of “underground”, that is illegal, opposition movements; should they fail to do so, they would have to serve their remaining term in addition to a new sentence. This practice is contrary to human rights standards and undermines the spirit of political détente that the SPDC is seeking to promote.
D. Conditions in prisons
21. As during previous missions, all the prisoners interviewed by the Special Rapporteur (see annex) confirmed that their general detention conditions had improved in recent years. This reflects the positive commitment of the authorities and the constructive cooperation with the ICRC since May 1999. The Special Rapporteur was pleased to learn from prisoners themselves that there had been no retaliation against persons interviewed during his previous missions, in accordance with the assurances received from the SPDC. He is only concerned that some of those interviewed persons were questioned by military intelligence personnel afterwards about the reason and content of his discussion with them. This practice may be perceived as an attempt to intimidate them and discourage some of them, or others, from further cooperation with him.
22. The Special Rapporteur also welcomes the fact that physical ill-treatment of political prisoners, such as beatings, had stopped where it previously occurred, and that elderly prisoners, such as U Win Tin and Dr. Salai Than Tun, have received regular medical attention and daily doctor’s visits. The Special Rapporteur took note that the Prison Department is seriously considering giving political prisoners access to writing and reading materials other than religious books and to facilitate access to educational materials for those who wish to pursue their studies. Obviously, their release would resolve these problems.
23. Several areas where further attention would be required include the quality of food, the reported beating of common prisoners and the access to qualified medical attention and treatment, especially in cases of emergency. Since July 2002, four political prisoners have died in detention (Mai Aik Pan, U Aung May Thu, U Sai Pa and U Maung Ko). These deaths were allegedly due to delays in getting clearance from authorities regarding access to urgent medical assistance. This brings to 74 the total number of deaths in detention of political prisoners since 1988. The Special Rapporteur understands that in the case of common prisoners, the situation is worse and that their death rate in prison and labour camps is abnormally high. This is an issue which he intends to follow up on during his next mission. He was also informed that, on several occasions, very sick common criminals had been temporarily taken out of prison just prior to his visit or a visit by the ICRC, so that their poor state of health would not be noticed. This reportedly took place in Myitkyina, Insein and Thayarwaddy prisons.
24. In
several areas, political prisoners continue to be worse off than criminal
offenders. For instance, they appear to
be often deliberately sent to prisons far from their homes. This makes family visits very difficult or
impossible and adversely affects their conditions of detention since prisoners
largely depend on family support to sustain themselves in prison. Also, several of them continue to be held in
solitary confinement which undoubtedly has adverse implications for their
health. Further, they are not permitted
privacy during family visits and cannot benefit from sentence remissions under
existing law. Another source of serious
concern is the continued practice of indefinite administrative detention of
political prisoners beyond the term of their sentence under section 10 (a) of
the 1975 State Protection Act. To the
Special Rapporteur’s knowledge, as of
E. Recent political arrests
25. The
limited number of political arrests between October 2000 and June 2002 had
given the impression that the repression of peaceful political activities had
somewhat softened. This seems to have
been due to a large extent to the climate of political expectancy generated by
the process initiated two years ago. It
was also due to the efficiency of the system of surveillance, the related
widespread fear this instilled in people and their caution in exercising their
limited rights to undertake political activities. The
26. The Special Rapporteur has already expressed his surprise and concern to the SPDC in relation to the renewed political arrests and detentions which followed the pattern which was described in his report to the General Assembly (A/57/290), including arbitrary arrest, prolonged incommunicado detention and interrogation by military intelligence personnel, extraction of confessions of guilt or information, very often under duress, followed by summary trials, sentencing and imprisonment. Several of those arrested since July were subjected to diverse
forms of ill-treatment at the time of arrest or during interrogation. These practices constitute torture because they contain three key definitional elements: severe suffering, committed with the intent to extract information or confession or to punish, by a State agent acting in official capacity.
27. All but five were released after several days in police custody during which military or police intelligence officers questioned them about their activities, contacts and suspected connections. They were discouraged from pursuing these activities under the threat of imprisonment and made to sign pledges that they would not engage in activities deemed to be detrimental to public order and stability. Among the five, who were charged under section 5 (j) of the Emergency Provisions Act, are students Thet Naung Soe and Khin Maung Win. They were arrested last August for having distributed leaflets calling for the release of fellow students detained earlier and expressing support for the process of political transition and national reconciliation. Thet Naung Soe also staged an individual and silent demonstration. They and others undertook these peaceful activities after they listened to the 6 May statement by the SPDC. The Special Rapporteur has repeatedly raised their and other cases with the SPDC since his urgent appeal of 2 September and he interviewed them in prison on 20 October. He was shocked to learn that they had been sentenced to 14 and 7 years of imprisonment, respectively.
28. These arrests violate the peaceful exercise of fundamental human rights, which is indispensable to a successful transition. Transition requires domestic and international support, which in turn requires confidence. These arrests undermine confidence in the process that has been embarked upon. They cast serious doubts about the SPDC’s intention to “turn a new page”.
E. Freedom of religion
29. The
Special Rapporteur has the impression that against the background of a general
respect the practice of religion, there are local or regional variations. Respect for religious freedom appears to be
better in places closer to central authorities than in remote or counter‑insurgency
areas. He has no clear answer why. Perhaps it is because of insufficient control
by the central Government of local authorities or neglect with regard to the
respect due certain faiths. Chronic
problems involving Muslims, especially but not only in
30. During his mission the Special Rapporteur met with ministers and community leaders of several Christian churches as well as with Buddhist monks. He heard that to build a church or a community centre Christians need to get permission from the authorities. It appears that even if they are authorized to do so by central authorities, they must still go through all the administrative levels down to township where difficulties are frequent; in case of refusal they have to follow their complaint all the way up again through the same levels.
G. Child soldiers
31. After
the debate on children and armed conflict on 20 November 2001, the
United Nations Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 1379 (2001)
which contains clear provisions concerning the inclusion of child protection in
the work of treaty bodies and United Nations mechanisms. The Special Rapporteur thinks that it is
necessary that his mandate should begin to examine the question of the
recruitment and use of children in
32. In
the Special Rapporteur’s view the voluntary and/or forced conscription of
children into the armed forces and the various ways in which they are used
by these forces is an issue in
33. The
Special Rapporteur was able to collect some information during the mission
reflecting the existence of child soldiers in
34. He believes it is important that the SPDC recognize the issue and start working towards addressing it, including through acceding to the relevant Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention 1999 of the International Labour Organization, which defines the forced or compulsory recruitment of children as one of these. At the same time, the SPDC could engage in constructive discussion with the Committee on the Rights of the Child in the context of the examination of its second periodic report on the implementation of the Convention and consider any other measures as may be necessary.
III. INDEPENDENT INVESTIGATION OF ALLEGATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN ETHNIC AREAS
35. One
of the major consequences of insurgency on the border between
their individual choices, are inevitably drawn in to the conflict. The army tends to see the refugees/IDPs as enemies and the refugee camps as rear-guard from which to attack the country. In consequence, every investigation of human rights violations in the war zones is considered as a war of wards against the SPDC.
36. The Special Rapporteur thinks that it is time to overcome this impasse whereby any consideration of well-founded allegations of human rights violations automatically is seen with suspicion as an accusation against the SPDC. He thinks that the peaceful exposure of violations will be a contribution to national reconciliation and peace that may open the path to accountability, a basic requirement for building the rule of law.
37. Serious human rights violations have undoubtedly occurred and continue to occur in the areas where armed groups operate. These violations have been primarily attributed to the army. There is also evidence that groups operating from neighbouring countries and with outside support show little regard for the life and security of civilians. Their continued armed activities in these areas provoked counter-insurgency measures by the army, which has had devastating consequences for the local population.
38. The
question of independent investigation of allegations of human rights violations
in the ethnic counter-insurgency areas was one of the specific issues addressed
by the Special Rapporteur during the reporting period. Special attention was paid to the issue of
investigating allegations that Shan women had been systematically raped by
Myanmar military personnel in the report “Licence to Rape”, published by the
Shan Human Rights Foundation (SHRF) and the Shan Women’s Action Network (SWAN)
in May 2002. In this regard, during his
last mission, he received detailed briefings on three investigations into the recent
allegations of rape in
39. In preparing for his mission, the Special Rapporteur had followed the matter closely. He first noted that the SPDC rejected the allegations as fabrications without looking into them at press conferences held on 12 and 30 July; a press briefing on 23 August was an example of “double thinking” in the sense that the Deputy Foreign Minister concluded that “preliminary” findings had shown that the allegations had been fabricated by the authors of the report in connivance with the Shan United Revolutionary Army (SURA), at the same time pledging to “leave no stone unturned” in the investigation; and lastly, the two members of the National Working Group on Women’s Affairs who visited OHCHR on 11 October stated that they had not seen the original Shan rape report.
40. The details of the three investigations given to the Special Rapporteur during his mission were as follows:
(a) The first investigation report (by a “special team of security personnel”) concluded (after meeting 94 officers and soldiers from 24 battalions, 27 members of the judiciary, police and hospital staff, 6 NGOs and 195 villagers) that “preliminary investigations and findings show that almost all of the allegations were highly exaggerated and their main purpose was to hurt the prestige of Myanmar and the Myanmar Armed Forces”;
(b) The second report (by the Chairman of the “Myanmar National Women Committee to Combat Trafficking” (the Deputy Minister for Home Affairs) under “the guidance of Gen. Khin Nyunt”) concluded that “there is no proof” to support the “allegation of the SURA narco-terrorists” after a five-day investigation mission in “43 localities”;
(c) The third report (by a team of the
Myanmar National Working Committee on Women’s Affairs led by Dr. Daw Khin Win
Shwe (Gen. Khin Nyunt’s wife)) concluded after a five‑day visit during
which it met 650 government officials in two districts and 250-300 village
elders in two village tracts, that “it is clear that the accusations are
unfounded”. There were “no rape cases
committed by military personnel between 1996 and 1999 and in 2002”, but there
were “three cases in 2000 and 2001” the perpetrators of which were sentenced to
41. The
Special Rapporteur also received briefings regarding two specific allegations,
namely, the execution of five villagers in Kalein Padaw village, Thanbyuzayat
township,
42. While recognizing these important efforts, the Special Rapporteur explained to the SPDC that, having been undertaken by military and other SPDC personnel, the investigations lacked the independence required to be convincing and credible. The actual investigations were apparently conducted by personnel with no special skills or experience in investigating human rights allegations, and who were probably unaware of the minimum standards required for a credible inquiry. From the reports, one can assume that they were conducted in such manner that very few people would probably dare to testify out of fear of reprisals against them or their families (prearranged, large, collective and public meetings with local officials, village elders and villagers, organized by security/military personnel with military escorts; village elders were allegedly requested to gather villagers or risk being fined; villagers were asked to sign a document denying the allegations of rape). To the Special Rapporteur’s knowledge, very few efforts were made to interview individual villagers in a manner that would ensure the confidentiality of the interview and the protection of the witnesses afterwards. It is not clear - except in one case - whether effective interpretation was provided to ensure proper communication. Language problems, including translation of names of places and individuals (both victims and soldiers), may have been a complicating factor. The implied methodology and the factual evidence described do not support the conclusions of the investigations.
43. Having explained that, the Special Rapporteur proposed that the SPDC explore several options to establish a credible mechanism for investigating these and numerous other allegations of violations in ethnic minority areas and underlined the importance of making an early commitment to that effect. These options are the following, in order of preference:
(a) An independent assessment team under his mandate, the precise terms of reference of which would need to be thoroughly discussed and agreed upon. This team would look into the recent allegations of human rights violations against Shan women. It could also look into the recruitment and use of children as soldiers as well as other allegations of human rights in ethnic minority areas;
(b) An international commission of inquiry, which would require a new mandate from the United Nations;
(c) A balanced national inquiry mechanism
which would involve the SPDC and other interested parties in
44. As
a matter of priority, besides the need for an independent assessment of the
allegations of human rights violations in ethnic minority areas, the Special
Rapporteur proposed that the SPDC consider allowing an adequate International
Committee of the Red Cross presence in all conflict areas of the country. The ICRC could then assess the situation on
an ongoing basis, report confidentially to the authorities and work out with
them appropriate measures to ensure the security and protection of the civilian
population, wherever needed. Access by
the ICRC to detention facilities has helped to improve conditions in prisons
and the treatment of prisoners. The ICRC
presence in conflict areas would help address issues of the kind raised in the
recent and other allegations of serious human rights violations and it could
also start disseminating international humanitarian law to combatants. The ICRC has both the mandate and adequate
capacity in
45. The
Special Rapporteur took note of a communiqué issued on 4 November by the SPDC
giving an initial positive reaction to these proposals. He welcomed the SPDC’s invitation to the ICRC
“to visit with an adequate presence the Shan State Region”. He hopes that the initial contacts made by
the ICRC with local authorities and people in these areas following this
invitation will pave the way for developing cooperation and implementing its
humanitarian mandate there. He also
wrote two letters to
46. As he stated in his presentation at the General Assembly last November, and based on his own research into the situation of human rights in ethnic areas, there appear to be serious problems with the way the army treats civilians in ethnic counter-insurgency areas. This problem will not disappear by denying its existence and should be recognized and addressed properly. Allegations will be made as violations continue to occur. The most reasonable way to address this issue would be to investigate these allegations in a credible manner, to establish the facts, to take action against the perpetrators, to establish procedures to prevent their recurrence, to ensure control over army units and to compensate the victims. The Special Rapporteur requests that the SPDC cooperate with him in conducting an independent assessment under his mandate. He reiterates his readiness to discuss the terms of reference concerning independence, timing, composition of the team, transparency of procedures, investigating methods, and protection of witnesses during the investigation. It is essential that there be a clear acceptance by
the SPDC of a modus operandi based on
international standards and including sexual violence against Shan women in the
terms of reference, and possibly including a review of the findings by the
Special Rapporteur’s team in
IV. OTHER ISSUES
A. Challenges of transition and development
47. It
is essential to understand the pyramid-shaped structure of the military
hierarchy in
48. The
Special Rapporteur believes that the international community, especially those
Member States that have historic ties with
“… the aim should be to unlock frozen patterns of behaviour and thinking inside the country by encouraging new actors, policies and ideas - and paths to democracy, military professionalism, a strong market economy and broader social development that can actually reach this destination. There is a need to abandon the kind of thinking that sees any progress achieved under the military government as an obstacle to democratization and therefore something to be neither supported nor encouraged or even acknowledged. The reality, whether Western policymakers feel comfortable with it or not, is that the military leadership is more likely to compromise in an atmosphere of progress than it is under siege. It is, after all, five decades of self-imposed isolation that has created the mindset against which the domestic opposition and international supporters are now struggling”.
B. Humanitarian aid
49. In
response to the precarious humanitarian conditions in
50. On
the issue of HIV/AIDS,
V. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
51. The
Special Rapporteur is convinced that to help enhance the dialogue between all
political actors in Myanmar with a view to speeding up progress towards peace,
it is necessary more than ever to build a rational discourse on policy and
strategy alternatives that are effectively possible. It is perhaps necessary to bear in mind that
to create international policies conducive to change in a world where human
rights after 11 September 2001 tend to be given a back seat, it must be
recognized that the willingness and the capacity of the international community
are very limited indeed.
52. It
is high time to replace the high expectations of the ideal game scenario and
the writing of constitutional models with a down-to-earth discussion of less
prescriptive requirements which will be able to stimulate a real process of
change. It is crucial to follow,
understand and strengthen the internal forces within
53. The
international community must have its eyes wide open to see the nuclei of
change. It should continue its dialogue
with all sides - the SPDC, the NLD, other parties and ceasefire groups. Its influence will be greatly determined by
domestic factors and it must make every effort to establish an “enabling
environment”.
to operate, it is of fundamental
importance to be pragmatic and to work within the compromises and negotiations
defined by the NLD with other political parties, ethnic groups and civil
groups. Even if at first sight these
arrangements will not yet be able to fulfil the basic requirements of
consolidated democracies, this has also happened in the democratization process
of many new democracies in the world.
Let us not refuse to acknowledge progress because the changes do not
fulfil a maximalist scenario.
54. On
the other hand, it is time to leave behind the illusion that after the
political transition the apparatus and agents of the State will magically
disappear. As in any democratic transition
in the twentieth century, even after authoritarian regimes, many of the
bureaucrats running the country such as judges, public prosecutors and army
officials will stay in place. There were
many political dialogues in other South-East Asian countries that were
completed before they faced the demands for participatory democracy, namely
elections, labour standards and human rights.
Accordingly, the Special Rapporteur is of the view that the sooner the
international community is ready to assist, the better and smoother the change
will be in
55. The
policy option now should be engagement, not isolation. By principled engagement - as he has
indicated many times before - the Special Rapporteur understands, among other
elements, a dialogue, support for change, empowerment of community,
strengthening of autonomous civil society elements, and the enlargement of the
presence and the capacity of United Nations agencies. By insisting on the need for greater
engagement of the international community, he is not urging it to step up
financial support to the SPDC or to consider the suspension of economic or political
sanctions; it is not part of his mandate to advise Member States on this
matter.
56. With
regard to allegations of the rape of women in
that the United Nations and the
international community be consistent in dealing with human rights
violations: there cannot be one set of
standards or requirements for the SPDC and another for armed groups.
57. The
Special Rapporteur acknowledges as an important development the opening of
an ILO Office in
58. It
is past time for the apparent stalemate that has so far characterized the
contacts between the SPDC and the NLD to end.
The Special Rapporteur is convinced that greater progress in the
promotion and protection of human rights will be conducive to the creation of an
atmosphere that will break the impasse.
As he has said in his previous reports, there can be no credible
political transition in
Annex
List of persons interviewed by the Special Rapporteur
during his visits to Insein and Thayarwaddy prisons
Interviews with the following persons were conducted confidentially (i.e. without the presence of a prison guard or official):
Detainees in Insein prison (interviewed
on
Recent cases [since February 2002 visit]
1. Aung Thein
2. Kyaw Naing Oo
3. Thet Naung Soe
4. Khin Maung Win
5. Ko Hla Htut Soe
6. Maung Maung Aye aka Ko Baydar
7. U Aye Zaw Win
8. Aye Ne Win
9. Kyaw Ne Win
10. Zwe Ne Win
Interviewed during February 2002 visit
11. Dr. Salai Tun Than
12. U Win Tin
13. Daw May Win Myint
Other political prisoners
14. U Naing Naing
15. Ma Khin Khin Leh
16. U Aung Myint
Detainees in Thayarwaddy prison
(interviewed on
1. Iqbal
2. Zaw Thet Tun
3. Kyaw San (aka Cho Sein)
4. Jimmy (Kyaw Nain Min Yu)
5. Pyinnyar Zaw Ta (Myint Maung Maung)
6. Soe Moe Maung
7. Htay Kywe
8. Soe Moe Hlaing
9. Ma Nilar Thein
10. U Win Myint
11. Lay Mon Mon
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