Introduction

‘Secret Talks’ between Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, the leader of the National League for Democracy (NLD), and the generals of the State peace and Development Council (SPDC) began in October 2000, and is still on-going.

To date, no substantive matters have been discussed. Daw Aung San Suu Kyi has in the past said that she will not make decisions without broader consultations and that she supports United Nations General Assembly resolutions calling for a ‘Tripartite Dialogue’ involving the military, the democracy forces and the non-Burman ethnic peoples.¹

The international community very much wants the ‘Secret Talks’ to succeed and develop further into a political dialogue, which will bring about change in Burma. The UN Special Envoy has visited Burma four times since mid-2000 and is about to make another visit in August 2001. Most countries agree that a ‘Tripartite Dialogue’ is needed.

However, there is the possibility that the ‘Secret Talks’ could break down. The fact that Daw Aung San Suu Kyi did not attend the 19 July Martyrs’ Day Ceremony signals that all is not well despite the SPDC’s assurances to the contrary.

Is a ‘Tripartite Dialogue’ Likely?

But even if the ‘Secret Talks’ do not fail and it develops into a political dialogue, there is no guarantee that a ‘Tripartite Dialogue’ will actually take place. As long as the military can reach an agreement with Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, what reason would they have to include non-Burmans in the dialogue process?

As far as the military is concerned, including the non-Burmans would only complicate matters. Why allow them to have a political platform?

After all, in the military’s opinion, they already have a winning formula – non-political ceasefires with some non-Burman ethnic armies, and the isolation and suppression of those that will not sign ceasefires. Why should they change their formula?

It is true that Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and the international community agree to a ‘Tripartite Dialogue’, but what if the military will not agree? How much pressure can be brought to bear? And even if enough pressure could be brought to bear to make the military accept a ‘Tripartite Dialogue’, what kind of a ‘Tripartite’ will it be?

Possible ‘Tripartite’ Scenarios

The ideal ‘Tripartite’ would include the military under the SPDC, the democratic forces under the leadership of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and all the non-Burman ethnic peoples under one umbrella. The National Reconciliation Programme currently being developed is designed to enable the non-Burmans to agree to a common political platform.

A possible ‘Tripartite’ scenario based on the 1990 elections could have the SPDC and the military-backed National Unity Party (NUP) representing the military; the NLD representing the democracy forces; and the non-Burman ethnic-based political alliance, the United Nationalities League for Democracy (UNLD) representing the non-Burman ethnic peoples. This configuration would exclude the non-ceasefire ethnic armies.

If it became inevitable that a ‘Tripartite Dialogue’ has to take place, the SPDC might opt for their National Convention scenario that would have the ethnic armies that have signed ceasefires with the military representing the non-Burmans. This configuration would exclude both the UNLD and the non-ceasefire ethnic armies.

Another possible ‘Tripartite’ scenario is a combination of the above two. This configuration would also exclude the non-ceasefire ethnic armies.

From these speculations it is clear that even if the SPDC is forced into a ‘Tripartite Dialogue’, there is a strong possibility that the non-ceasefire armies could be excluded.

Of course, the international community is committed to the principle of inclusiveness. And of course, if the non-ceasefire armies are excluded, there will never be peace but what if the military is prepared to live with a simmering low-intensity war? In fact, it would be to the military’s advantage to continue to have a war to fight.

What Can Induce the Military to Agree to an Inclusive ‘Tripartite Dialogue’?

Another factor to consider is that there is no incentive for the SPDC to include the non-ceasefire armies. The non-ceasefire armies are closely associated with the exile National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma (NCGUB), which is linked to the NLD. The SPDC may feel that including the non-ceasefire armies will strengthen the NLD’s hand in any future negotiations.

The non-ceasefire armies have three options: one is to concede and sign a ceasefire with the SPDC in the hope that by doing so they will be included in any future ‘Tripartite Dialogue’. This will increase their chances of being included but there is no guarantee and the SPDC may also require that they lay down their arms and surrender.

Another option is for the non-ceasefire armies to openly break with the NCGUB and the NLD. But while it may increase their chances to be included, there is still no guarantee and it would be self-defeating since it is ultimately only Daw Aung San Suu Kyi that can ensure that the rights of the non-Burmans are respected.

The third option is for the non-ceasefire armies to adopt a strategy that will make it attractive for the SPDC to include them in a ‘Tripartite Dialogue’.

What does the SPDC want?

It is very clear that the SPDC wants legitimacy; international pressure to be reduced; increased aid; and a guarantee that they will not be punished for their past deeds. Can the non-ceasefire armies offer these in exchange for being included in a ‘Dialogue’?

The ideal is in order to be included, the non-ceasefire armies could launch a ‘Dialogue Initiative’ that will not only offer the SPDC what it wants but also act as a catalyst to accelerate the pace of the ‘Secret Talks’ and transform it into a dialogue.

It is not sufficient for the non-ceasefire armies to just keep on demanding a ‘Tripartite Dialogue’ and to be included based on the UNGA resolutions.

LEGITIMACY – The SPDC has gained a measure of legitimacy by beginning the ‘Secret Talks’ with Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. It will gain more legitimacy when the ‘Talks’ develop into a political ‘Dialogue’. It will even gain more legitimacy if it is included in a power-sharing agreement with the NLD. The non-ceasefire groups can add to the SPDC’s legitimacy if they can help develop a ‘Dialogue’ process in which the role of the military in politics or a transition government is recognized as legitimate. This initiative could be used to make it attractive for the SPDC to include non-ceasefire armies in the ‘Dialogue’.

AID – The SPDC has also received increased aid for talking with Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. Most countries are willing to give humanitarian aid to Burma if the ‘Talks’ develop into a ‘Dialogue’. Again, if the non-ceasefire armies can help develop a ‘Dialogue’ process that calls for an early resumption of humanitarian aid in exchange for their inclusion, the SPDC might be find it useful to include the non-ceasefire armies.

RETRIBUTION or ACCOUNTABILTY FOR PAST ACTIONS – This is a very sensitive subject, which no one will admit to being worried about. In any war situation, atrocities are committed. Those who commit atrocities feel there are justified because of security concerns. The victims strongly feel that the perpetrators need to be brought to justice. The question is, can the non-ceasefire armies provide a way out of this dilemma?

INTERNATIONAL PRESSURE – is linked to all the above. If the above key issues can be dealt with in a sensitive way by the non-ceasefire armies in their ‘Dialogue Initiative’ so as to achieve their objective of being included in a ‘Tripartite Dialogue’, international pressure on the SPDC could be reduced.

The key then, is for the non-Burman non-ceasefire ethnic armies to develop a strategy for ‘Dialogue Process’ that will meet all the above requirements and at the same time ensure that they are included in a ‘Tripartite Dialogue’ to resolve Burma’s political future.

It must be stated here that the ‘Dialogue Initiative’ must be realistic and acceptable to all parties. Otherwise, either the SPDC or the NLD could reject the ‘Initiative’.

A Proposed Dialogue Initiative

The proposed ‘Dialogue Initiative’ from the non-Burman non-ceasefire armies must be built upon a foundation that is acceptable to the non-Burmans, the NLD and the SPDC. To do so, it is important to find a point in history or an issue where all parties were in agreement and can continue to be in positive agreement about. The following are some key issues to be considered and included in the ‘Dialogue Initiative’.

THE 1947 PANGLONG AGREEMENT – Panglong represents the time when non-Burmans and Burmans voluntarily agreed to work together as equals, voluntarily join their territories together to form the Union of Burma, and jointly sought early independence from Britain. Although the Arakan, Mon, Karen and Karenni did not officially sign the Agreement, their historic homelands were later recognized in the Union Constitution. The ‘spirit’ of Panglong, the spirit of equal partners working voluntarily together to build a nation could be used in the non-Burman ‘Dialogue Initiative’. The advantage of this approach is that it will deal directly with the root of the current problems in Burma – a new constitutional arrangement. It will also remove all the artificial barriers – participation in the 1990 elections, ceasefires agreements and no ceasefire agreements. All eight constituent states will select their own representatives taking into account all parties and all ethnic groups within their own states.

THE NON-DISINTEGRATION OF THE UNION – This is one of the key tasks of the Burmese military. If the ‘spirit’ of Panglong is adopted, the emphasis is on the building or rebuilding of a nation, not its disintegration. The military and the non-Burmans can then have a common basis. The concern of the non-Burmans for ‘self determination’ and ‘independence’ can be addressed by the fact that they are voluntarily putting forward this ‘Initiative’. It is their ‘self-determination’. The next item will also address their concerns.

DEMOCRACY – The principle that the power to rule shall be derived from the will of the people. The military accepts this although in a gradual and ‘guided’ form. The principle of democracy includes the safeguard that the rights of an individual or group shall not infringe on the rights of other individuals or groups. If the power of state really resides in the people, the people of the various states can later decide whether they want a unitary state, a federal union, a confederation of states or independence. If the power of state does not reside in the people, it is meaningless to call for self-determination or a secession clause in the constitution. It will not happen.

BASIC RIGHTS – Another principle that can be accepted by non-Burmans and Burmans alike is that all citizens of the Union regardless of their ethnic or social background, religion or state of residence, should have the same basic human and democratic rights. This will partially solve the problem of the multiplicity of different ethnic groups living in any one state.

A ‘Dialogue Initiative’ that is based on these common principles and can provide the military with what it wants, is at the same time acceptable to the democratic movement, and can provide a catalyst for change in the current ‘Secret Talks’ would be beneficial not only to the non-Burman non-ceasefire armies but to the nation as a whole.

No Secret Deal

In response to concerns expressed by non-Burman ethnic leaders about the secret meetings held between the leader of the National League for Democracy Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and Senior General Than Shwe, Chairman of the State Law and Order Restoration Council, and Secretary 1 Lieut-General Khin Nyunt in September and again with Khin Nyunt in October 1994, Dr Michael Aris released the following statement in Bangkok on 23 January 1995:

“It has always been the firm conviction of those working for democracy in Burma that it is only through meaningful dialogue between diverse political forces that we can achieve national reconciliation, which is the first and most vital requisite for a united and prosperous country.

That the international community shares this view is evident from clause 5 of the General Assembly resolution of December 1994 which encourages the Government of Burma to engage ‘in a substantive political dialogue with Aung San Suu Kyi and other political leaders, including representatives from ethnic groups, as the best means of promoting national reconciliation and the full and early restoration of democracy.’

It was in full acceptance of this view and with genuine good will that I approached the meeting with members of the State Law and Order Restoration Council on 20 September and 28 October 1994.

There have not been and there will not be any secret deals with regard either to my release or to any other issue. I adhere to the principle of accountability and consider myself at all times bound by the democratic duty to act in consultation with colleagues and to be guided by the aspirations of those engaged in the movement to establish a truly democratic political system in Burma. I remain dedicated to an active participation in this movement.”

                                                                                                   Aung San Suu Kyi

                                                                                                     22 January 1995

                                                                                                     Rangoon, Burma.

Note: As a result of Dr Michael Aris’ role in publicizing Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s position regarding the 1994 talks with SLORC, he was barred from visiting his wife. Dr Aris died on 27 March 1999 in England of cancer without ever seeing her again.                                               End