includes
“coup plot” & chronology
ALTSEAN
Published
July 2002
CONTENTS ISBN:974-90486-0-1,
2
3 DEMOCRACY
The
Talks, Political Prisoners, Political Freedom
8 INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS
Theme:
‘Democracy’,
9 INTERNATIONAL
AID, UPDATE
11 ECONOMIC
SITUATION
Heading
for Economic Collapse, The Kyat: Downhill all the way,
International Trade, Pressure, Foreign Direct Investment
19 DRUGS
Production,
UWSA, Eradication & Prevention, Regional Problem,
UNDCP & Funds
24 THAI
– BURMESE RELATIONS
Drugs,
Fighting on the Border, Aiding Rebels, People from
27 MILITARY
REGIME
The
‘Coup Plot’, USDA, Police, The Weapons
Keep Coming, Regional Security
The Nuclear Reactor
31 WOMEN
& CHILDREN
Women award, violence, Children sex work, violence
33 HUMAN
RIGHTS
Prof.
Pinheiro’s 2nd Trip to
Freedom of Expression, Labour Rights
39 ETHNIC
Chavalit’s
Intervention, Karen, Shan, Karenni, Lahu, Mon
42 RELIGION
43 HEALTH
Prosthesis,
HIV/AIDS,
45 EDUCATION
Monastic
Education, Study Abroad, Closure
47 DISPLACEMENT
IDPs,
REFUGEES
MIGRANT
WORKERS,
50 ENVIRONMENT
Ivory,
Logging & Furniture Smuggling
51 CHRONOLOGY
55 APPENDIX 1: INTERVIEW WITH DR. CHAO TZANG YANGHWE
59 BIBLIOGRAPHY
60 ERRATA
A new thriller hits the
international press. Daughter of former dictator Ne Win, plots a coup to
over-throw the military government in
Meanwhile, at the other end of the street, another woman unappreciative of the government’s ‘good intentions’ is also under house arrest. The military regime of course insists Daw Aung San Suu Kyi remains housebound in the interests of security.
The two women are in different
ways, threats to the ‘men-only’ boat of
Has
The answer, simply: Yes.
The people of
If the regime was truly determined to act in the best interests of the people of Burma its tactics would be radically different. Soap operas like this ‘coup plot’ would not be the focus of attention.
The real suspense gripping the international community should be focused on matters that would improve the daily lives of the peoples of Burma: When and how will talks with Daw Aung San Suu Kyi progress beyond the confidence-building stage? When talks would be announced to the Burmese public and would be extended to involve ethnic nationalities? Will an unconditional national cease-fire be called to halt the killings and decrease the sufferings of the people? When will all political prisoners be released?
We are still waiting.
DEMOCRACY
*
Improving R Stagnant * Deteriorating
The national reconciliation process in Myanmar is at a delicate
stage… [E]fforts to build confidence have not progressed as quickly as many had
hoped or expected. Therefore, much more needs to be done over the next 12
months to make the process irreversible. Specifically… there is a clear need to
move the national reconciliation process from the present confidence-building
stage and to begin dialogue on substantative political issues. – UN Secretary
General, Kofi Annan, 18 Mar 02
The Talks
The
talks are not going as fast as they should. – UN Special Envoy, Razali, Feb 02 [01]
Unfortunately,
but unsurprisingly, the talks continued to lack any real substance. Although U
Lwin commented in February that the talks were “very much alive,” the alleged March 2002 ‘coup-plot’ [see Military] has posed problems.
Despite assurances by Maj-Gen. Kyaw Win that the talks would not be affected,
the political changes that have transpired in its aftermath must have implications for the talks. To
quote UN Special Envoy Razali, “Obviously,
all events like this are serious. They have a direct impact.”[1]
The 1st direct impact has been the postponement of Razali’s 7th trip, from 19 March until 22 April (the trip was earlier postponed in February), the official reason being that officials were too busy dealing with the ‘coup attempt’. (An earlier report held the deputy Foreign Minister’s health responsible.) As the US stated, Razali’s delayed visit casts doubt over the regime’s commitment to dialogue.[2]
Hopes for genuine progress were earlier
dashed on Independence Day (4 Jan). On 13 December U Lwin, NLD spokesperson and
Secretary, spoke in anticipation of the release and amnesty of political
prisoners and/or the start of substantive dialogue towards national
reconciliation. U Lwin was encouraged by greater political freedoms that he
said constituted confidence-building measures. Razali’s positive comments of
were also reason for optimism.[3]
As is too often the case in Burma however, those who held hope were disappointed. Independence Day came and went, the only mention of the talks being in the NLD statement which reiterated calls for greater speed, the start of meaningful tripartite dialogue, release of Aung San Suu Kyi and all other political prisoners and political freedom. NLD Chairperson, U Aung Shwe, urged Burma to unite and strive for a “genuine democracy that everyone long desired.” This is the first formal statement the NLD has issued since the talks began. This breaking of silence signifies extreme discontent with the progress of the talks and release of prisoners.[4]
On 22 January, expectations and rumours again
ran rife as Daw Aung San Suu Kyi left her home for the 1st time
since her house arrest began in Sept ’00. Escorted by military personnel, it
was suspected that Suu Kyi was taken to meet a top Burmese official, possibly
even Sr-Gen Than Shwe, to discuss the talks. The regime denied such a meeting
and it remains unknown where Daw Suu Kyi was taken that day.
The only thing that is clear is that Suu Kyi expressed frustration over the talks to former Japanese foreign minister, Kabun Muto, in December. Suu Kyi reportedly stated that real dialogue has not yet started and that “it is necessary to pursue dialogue at high level by restoring confidence soon.”[5]
Ongoing conflicts and uncertain movements within the regime apparatus, most recently visualised by the follow-up to the ‘coup attempt’, do not inspire confidence for the talks but merely increase the unpredictable and vague climate within which they are occurring. It was strongly hoped and rumoured that Daw Aung San Suu Kyi would be released from house arrest in time to celebrate Thinjan (Burmese New Year) in mid-April. It is vital that the international community insists that the talks go on and develop into dialogue as, to quote a UN spokesperson, “The process must continue.”[6]
tripartite talks
In the spirit of the 1947 Union Day (12 Feb) agreement between ethnic groups and General Aung San, 6 ethnic political parties released a joint statement urging the talks become tripartite so that a federal system of democratic government may evolve. They continue to stress there cannot be peace unless ethnic groups are included on an equal playing field.
The NLD Union Day statement called for
national unity and urged the regime to declare cease-fires and amnesties to
armed ethnic groups. Over 500 opposition members, UN Special Rapporteur
Pinheiro, and diplomats from Britain, France, USA, Japan and South Korea
attended the Union Day ceremony.[7]
[see ‘Ethnic’ for further discussion on
relations between the junta & ethnic groups]
SPDC talk
If the regime is to be believed, the talks are progressing well. ‘Imminent success’, ‘positive direction’, ‘steady progress’ and other such encouraging catch-phrases all have a place in the regime’s vocabulary. Other popular lines excusing the lack of concrete progress include: opposition groups need to be ‘patient’ and ‘understanding’, ‘the time must be right’ for the release of political prisoners, Burma will not be ‘kicked from behind’, Burma will develop its own ‘functioning democracy’ and it ‘cannot be rushed’.[8]
international response
Many players
in the international community have met the regime’s enthusiastic talk with
scepticism. In its February report to congress, the US government stressed it
is time the talks moved beyond the confidence-building stage, to “genuine political dialogue [...] aimed at
returning the country to democracy and civilian rule.” The US has warned
that it is growing increasingly impatient over the lack of progress. While the
regime tried to dismiss this criticism, they cannot be too aware that tangible
progress could mean an easing of US-led sanctions.[9] [see p8 for further discussion]
Political Prisoners [see chronology for release dates of political prisoners]
The fact is that those persons [Pinheiro] refers to [as
political prisoners] are the offenders who are serving their respective
sentences for their infringement of the existing laws and not for their
political beliefs or activities.
–
U Mya Than, 28 Mar 02, response to
Pinheiro’s statement
All indicators suggest the talks have not moved beyond the confidence-building stage because, to quote U Lwin (Dec 01), “there are many prisoners still waiting to be released.”[10] Even Razali, who has become less encouraged with the progress of the talks since the new year,[11] has stressed that all remaining political prisoners must be released to create a space for political dialogue[z2]. Similar requests have been, and continue to be, consistently made by U Lwin[z3], pro-democracy activists, retired politicians on National Day[z4], 28 Nobel Peace laureates as part of an international campaign for freedom in Burma,[12] and the UN Special Rapporteur on human rights in Myanmar, most recently in March 2002[05].
sentenced: 4 July 1989, 20 years
crime: sent document
on prison conditions & mistreatment to UN Special Rapporteur
campaign: petition
carrying 2,500 signatures presented to Burmese embassy, launched 12 March 2002
(72nd birthday)
grounds of release: medical;
ailments have included hernia[z7], high blood pressure, diabetes & inflammation of the
vertebra.
occupation: journalist
At the end of January there were 52 prisoners, including Min Ko Naing (student democracy leader), who had served their original sentences but remained detained under State Protection Law 10(A).[13] U Lwin claimed in December that there were still 822 NLD members incarcerated,[14] almost ½ the total number of political prisoners. The regime disputes this, categorically refusing the existence of political prisoners in Burma at the UN Human Rights Commission in March. [z8]In summation, releases have been pitiful and large numbers of people continue to be unlawfully detained according to international standards.
Only when prisoners are released en masse, rather than strategically
coinciding with visits by UN officials, will
a genuine commitment to political change begin to be proven. Upon such a move,
Suu Kyi has reportedly vowed to push for the start of political dialogue.[15]
Political Freedom
There's no climate of
change. It's just wishful thinking.
- Aung Zaw, Irrawaddy editor
I think that
Myanmar is destined to change… I continue to believe that there is a will
within the State Peace and Development Council to pursue a transition from
political exclusion to cooperation with the National League for Democracy and
other components of society.
- Pinheiro, UN
Special Rapporteur on human rights in
The NLD has received authorisation to reopen
offices in Mandalay, Mergui and Irrawaddy divisions, in addition to their 39 township
offices in Rangoon division. (As of the end of January 8 offices in Rangoon
division remained unopened.) While important gestures are being made and some
NLD members have greater freedom of movement,[16]
the wider picture is still one of political oppression with strict MI (military
intelligence) surveillance and in which people can be, and are, arrested for
peaceful political dissent.
Human Right’s Watch’s response to the sentence of Dr. Salai Tun Than [09]was justly harsh: “With this sentence, the Burmese government is making it clear that it will crush any and all dissent… The harshness of the sentence suggests that, political dialogue notwithstanding, the Rangoon regime is fundamentally unchanged.”[17] Similar statements ring through the networks of Burma observers, claiming that this highlights the regime’s non-commitment to political change.
It is discouraging that Pinheiro reads the signs so differently as it suggests that the regime have proved their commitment. They have done nothing of the kind.
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
*
Improving R Stagnant * Deteriorating
Theme: ‘Democracy’
The US and European Union (EU) will only reassess their foreign policies towards Burma when there has been a genuine commitment to change by the regime.
Should there be
significant progress toward [democratic] goals, the US would look seriously at
measures to support a process of constructive change.
- US Department
of State, 11 Feb
Anything which would advance the situation in Burma promoted through Bangkok, through specific co-operation or specific input... will be of course supported.
– Spanish ambassador, EU, 23 Jan
Senior members of the Burmese regime have said that a return to democracy is planned. But we now need unmistakable evidence that change is underway… I urge the regime not to let this opportunity pass them by… The United Kingdom stands ready to respond to any such positive developments.
- Jack Straw,
UK foreign minister, 8 Dec[T10]
Immediate indicators of positive development include Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s release from house arrest, release of all political prisoners, an end to forced labour, an unconditional cease-fire, and open discussion of the talks in the Burmese media. The EU has offered incentives for change, including assistance for HIV/AIDS and a promised invitation for the Burmese foreign minister to the ASEAN-EU meeting in Europe later this year.[18]
UK Foreign Minister Jack Straw spoke with Thai Prime Minister Thaksin, expressing the EU position that active international cohesiveness is vital in supporting the dialogue.[19]
Also making their support for a democratic Burma clear, 16 Philippines congressmen crossed party lines to sign a manifesto of support for the NLD[T11].
China v. India
Tensions abound between China and India in their missions to dominate Burmese markets, particularly in the supply of military hardware and expertise, and trade. Rangoon hopes to exploit the growing rivalry between India and China (along with Japan, Russia and other smaller players) to its own advantage.
China: President Jiang Zemin’s 12-15 December visit to Burma was clearly highly regarded by the regime, welcoming him with a red carpet, rows of flag-waving students along roadsides and the release of 200 Chinese prisoners[z12].
Such a high-level and unprecedented
visit indicates China is eager to remain Burma’s most influential international
ally. To cement its influence and business relationships, China promised
US$100million in investment to fund 12 projects and signed several pacts on
co-operation and border security.[20]
China also reiterated Burma’s right to “be
allowed to choose its own development path suited to its own conditions.”[21]
China must now compete for Burmese markets
and good relations as others also want a piece of the pie. As one Rangoon-based
analyst said, “Before, Burma had only one
friend. Now it has more and this makes the Chinese nervous… (Burma) had little choice but to
embrace the Chinese. Now they have more options.”[22]
India: While consulates in Calcutta and Mandalay re-open after closing in 1988[T13], military links between India and Burma strengthen. Director-General of Indian Armed Forces Training Maj-Gen Ashok Vasudeva visited Rangoon for a study tour representing the army, navy and airforce. Analysts consider this a high-level visit reflecting increasing co-operation. Outside intelligence and analysts believe Burma wishes to benefit from India’s knowledge of handling Russian MiG fighters.[23]
Despite agreements to coordinate activities on rebel groups, India announced Burma’s release of almost 200 Manipuri rebels arrested in November 2001. It is thought this will create distrust between the 2 countries.[24]
INTERNATIONAL AID, update
Japan
Baluchaung ODA
The Japanese government was expected to approve an Official Development Assistance (ODA) grant of approximately 3billion yen (US$26million) to repair Baluchaung Hydroelectric Power Plant by the end of 2001. Legislature on this ODA has been stalled, but the project has not been abandoned.
MP Nobuhiko Suto stated at a symposium in December that he generally did not forsee any problems with the project. He did however note that it is necessary to monitor the situation to ensure problems do not arise. (Note: when the MP visited Burma he was guided by Burmese officials.) Officials eager to push the project say, “This is not a simple ODA project… it is a emergency humanitarian project because any halt to power supplies from the Baluchaung plant would cause great troubles for many Myanmar citizens. But at the same time, it has a strategic significance. We want to encourage dialogue between Suu Kyi's NLD and the SPDC through ODA like this.” [25]
However, Japan’s resumption of ODA continues
to attract widespread condemnation for being irresponsible, including from the
KNPP.[26]
It is widely seen as a premature ‘reward’ to the regime at a time when
commitment to political change is far from concrete. Many [T14]fear
that the ODA will undermine commitment to the talks and that it will benefit
the military at the expense of local communities, and intensify conflict.
figures
ODA: The Japanese embassy announced in December that Japan is extending its
programme and providing grant aid totaling 800million yen (US$6.5 million) for
road construction and electrification projects in Kokang, northern Shan State.[27]
Japanese embassy figures show that in 2001 Japan provided 1.689billion yen
(US$13.8 million) in ODA with similar aid of 203 million yen (US$1.65million),
for a human resources development scholarship project, extended in January.[28]
grassroots grant: The Japanese government provided US$331,184 ‘grassroots’ grant assistance for 13 projects from December 1, 2001 to February 1, 2002[29], another US$317,940 in February and a further US$612,267 for 15 more projects in early March[30] (including construction of schools, vocational training centers, water supplies and medical equipment supplies). The total amount of grassroots grant in 2001-02 was US$3,072,420.[31]
technical aid: Japan provided about US$20million of technical aid in the fiscal year ending Mar ’02. (Japan International Cooperation Agency[T15])
While many observers and INGO workers in Burma are highly critical of the Japanese setting bad and dangerous precedents in assistance allocation,[32] UN Special Envoy Razali has praised the Japanese government for its assistance to Burma. Razali has urged the government to continue with such assistance, saying that stability must be supported in parallel to efforts for democracy.[33]
Burma activists agree with the need for stability and sustained support but oppose the view that stability can be supported by granting money to a dictatorial regime that has proven time and time again to be abusive and unreliable.
South Korea
The Republic of Korea (ROK) International
Cooperation Agency is training 100 people from Burma in agriculture, economic
and industrial development. The agency comes under the ROK Foreign Ministry and
people from Burma have been trained in recent years under an aid programme. The
programme will reportedly be broadened.[34]
ECONOMIC SITUATION
*
Improving * Stagnant R Deteriorating
Improvement has been seen in the country's economic sector
every year. An economic growth rate of between 5.1 per cent and 7.5 per cent
was achieved during the short-term 4-year economic plan for the 1992-93 to
1995-96 period. An economic growth rate of 6 per cent was targeted for the
1996-97 to 2000-01 period, but the economic growth rate reached 8.4 per cent.
The third five-year plan for 2001-02 to 2005-06 period is being implemented.
– Sr-Gen Than Shwe,
Armed Forces Day (27 Mar[z16] 02)
This is the worst of all times; we have hit the
bottom.
-
Rangoon based journalist
(quoted Feb 02)[35]
Heading for Economic Collapse
Just about the only
piece of good news in Burma is in its reported GDP growth
rates. The official figures provided by Burma’s Central Statistical
Organisation and published by the International Monetary Fund[36]
report GDP growth for Burma at 10.9% in 2000. This makes Burma the fastest
growing economy in Asean, and among the fastest growing in the world. How this
reported growth can be reconciled with the reality in Burma is however, a
complete mystery.
For a start, all other
economic indicators in Burma (such as public sector borrowing, foreign debt and
reserves, foreign exchange rates, and inflation) show sharply contradictory
figures. There is virtually no evidence that economic growth has led to any of
the positive signs of wealth normally associated with a growing country –
rather, these indicators point to an economy on the verge of collapse.
Secondly, assessments by international
agencies continue to place Burma at the bottom of their list. The Heritage
Foundation, which classified Burma as ‘repressed’ in their 2002 Index of
Economic Freedom[37], says
that the SPDC has ‘done little to advance
the cause of development during the past year’. The World Health
Organisation ranks the efficacy of Burma’s health system at 190 out of 191
countries.
Thirdly, and perhaps
most urgently critical, the social impact of what a foreign diplomat in Rangoon
calls a ‘shrinking economy’ is disastrous, with more people than ever living in
or at the edge of poverty. Food and fuel prices have skyrocketed, public
services – sanitation, public transport, and water - are collapsing, and power
blackouts regularly engulf Rangoon for 20 hours at a time.[38]
Perhaps the only reason
why a total collapse of the Burmese economy has not happened is due to the existence
of an unrecorded parallel black economy, estimated to account for more than 50%
of the country’s trade and finance, and which is fuelled by smuggling and
drugs.
The Kyat: downhill all the way
The level of confidence in the SPDC’s
handling of the Burmese economy is well represented by its long-suffering
currency, the kyat. At the beginning of 2001, the open market
rate of exchange between the kyat and US Dollar stood at Kt430. By the end of
the year, one dollar could have been exchanged for 725 kyat on the streets of
Rangoon – representing a massive discount of 69% on the year. As the trend-line
in Figure 1 shows, the kyat’s value has been on a general downward slide all
year. Attempts by the SPDC to stem the fall of the kyat by various means ranging
from the revocation of FEC currency licences to import restrictions have had
little effect, except for brief respites of stability before plunging to a new
low. The ridiculously unrealistic official rate of exchange of approximately
6.3 kyat to the dollar is still maintained.
Over the 2-year period
from 1999-2001, the kyat has more than halved its value in US$ terms.
Although all Asean currencies depreciated against the US$ during the
period, none fell as dramatically as the kyat whose value
plummeted by nearly 120%. [see
Figure 2]. The kyat resumed
its fall in the new-year, reaching a low of 750 kyat
against
the US$ in January 2002. [see Figure 3]
In early March,
Major General Kyaw Win denied the SPDC will introduce 5,000 and 10,000 kyat
notes and withdraw all others in circulation. This is the 2nd time
in 5 months the regime has had to make such an announcement, indicating lack of
public confidence in the kyat.[39]
One major impact of the depreciation of Burma’s
currency over the last 2 years has been inflation, now
spiralling out of control. Prices of basic foods and fuel have risen by more than
50% during 2001, and the black market price of
petrol has increased by 600% in less than 1 year.[40]
The situation has deteriorated further
since the ‘coup plot’, with both commodities and consumer goods
rising in price,[41]
particularly dairy products and medicines. According to a doctor in Rangoon, “The cost of medicines are so prohibitive now that many people are not seeking
medical attention because they know they can't afford the prescriptions.”[42]
Even the price of rice is increasing, 20% between mid-February to
mid-March in
Rangoon, and up to 300% in some rural areas.[43]
Continually escalating prices of basic goods are leading many,
including UN officials, to fear that Burma will soon face a widespread
humanitarian
crisis.
In response to spiraling prices of essential goods, the regime established tax-free markets and forced private firms to provide products to government-run markets. However, demand and supply remain largely out of sync and residents in Rangoon are still forced to queue at the markets as early as 5am in order to purchase rationed basic goods, such as eggs, before stocks run out and are reportedly sold at inflated prices elsewhere. An article in the Irrawaddy suggested the regime must open more tax-free markets with greater supplies in order to properly tackle the problem of runaway inflation.[44]
International Trade
In a country where the government is not answerable to a
democratic constituency, it is capable of making somewhat arbitrary decisions…
- John Bray of Control Risks, on the
8 Investment Funds who warn against trading with
Burma’s foreign trade
increased for the first 10 months of 2001 as compared with the same period of
2000.[45]
Exports increased by 41% to US$1,889 million (primarily due to larger exports
of rice,[46] beans and
pulses, jute and other agricultural products). Imports
increased by 21% to US$2,416 million, despite the introduction of import
restrictions. The resultant trade deficit of US$527 million – despite
being an
improvement over the deficit of $1,408 million in the previous year - will
continue to put a strain on the country’s dwindling foreign reserves.
The SPDC are therefore
looking at alternative means of paying for imports, and plans are afoot for the
introduction of a formalised account trade system – or barter trade – between
Burma and Thailand, and Burma and Malaysia.[47]
(The barter trade system is already in effect at an informal level due
to skewed exchange rates.) A formalised account trade system is
particularly crucial for Burma as inter-Asean trade, comprising 46% of Burma’s
total foreign trade during the first ten months of 2001, is likely to increase
in the coming years.
Pressure
Burma continued to receive bad news on the economic front when eight of the world’s largest investment funds[48] warned against investing in and trading with Burma.[49] Although not an outright call for companies to withdraw from Burma, the wording of the statement which asks companies to think before they invest “in the light of the risks that such activity poses to shareholders” effectively puts any company with investments in or trading links with Burma in a position of disadvantage. The statement also calls for firms to “justify their involvement” with Burma, adding that by operating in a “politically unstable” environment, companies run the risk of “loss of shareholder confidence”. In other words, companies operating in or trading with Burma are likely to be excluded from these funds’ investment portfolios. In a related move, a petition was filed in late March calling on Dutch authorities to refuse to do business with IHC Caland – a construction company, unless it agrees to stop doing business in Burma[z17].
Already, pressure from consumers and investors for companies to adopt greater corporate responsibility and to pursue ‘ethical’ investments has made some companies realise that engaging with Burma is more trouble than it is worth. Some of the biggest names in United States – including Pepsi, Wal-Mart, Tommy Hilfiger, The Spiegel Group, Ames Department Stores, Jones Apparel Group, Phillips Van Heusen Triumph and Texaco - have already chosen to withdraw and/or not buy merchandise from Burma. Major apparel makers including Liz Claiborne Inc. and Levi Strauss & Co. pulled out of Burma a decade ago.
However, some existing corporate supporters of the junta remain, outwardly at least, undeterred by this statement from the investment funds. Oslo-based Searunner Shipping continues to transport imports from Burma and has commented it does not “feel any pressure towards closing down.”[50] The Norwegian Oil Fund has increased investments in corporations with interests in Burma and the Norwegian Smedvig Group recently entered a 5-year contract with UNOCAL.[51]
In an interview with London-based Guardian newspaper, Premier Oil’s chief executive Charles Jamieson commented that the oil company already had a strategy for managing risk in Burma.[52] This strategy apparently includes Premier giving human rights training to Burma’s military, police and home affairs ministry, adding that the company is “at the forefront of corporate social responsibility”.
Foreign Direct Investment
What investors cannot and will not deal with is a government
that summarily disregards contracts when it is expedient to do so. -
The Economist Intelligence Unit
The SPDC, who sees every dollar invested in Burma as a proxy vote for the regime, like to trumpet their successes in attracting foreign direct investment (FDI). According to the latest official report[53], a total of US$7.39 billion worth of FDI have been contracted since 1988. Although 25 countries are reported to have invested in Burma, the three largest investing countries - Singapore, Britain and Thailand – have each contributed approximately a fifth of all investments into Burma since 1988. FDI is also concentrated in a few select areas: nearly 70% of all investments are in 3 sectors, namely oil and gas, manufacturing, and tourism. [see Table 1]
Table 1: FDI Top Three Source: CSO, Xinhua
|
By Sector |
|
|
By Country |
|
|
|
Sector: |
US$ bn |
% of total |
Country: |
US$ bn |
% of total |
|
Oil and gas |
32 |
Singapore |
1.5 |
20 |
|
|
Manufacturing |
1.6 |
22 |
Britain |
1.4 |
19 |
|
Tourism |
1.1 |
15 |
Thailand |
1.3 |
18 |
What the SPDC report fails to mention is that both approved and actual FDI into Burma have been on a declining trend since 1997. In fact, the SPDC have done much to scare away potential investors who see Burma’s bureaucratic systems, inconsistent application of rules, regulations and policies, and institutionalised corruption as a major deterrent to doing business there.
The Heritage Foundation, which ranks Burma among the least (economically) free countries[54], says that “government policies actively, if not officially, deter foreign investment.” Although the SPDC state that Burma’s Foreign Investment Law protects “the rights and interests of investors…creating an indispensable condition for foreign entrepreneurs”, the experience of these investors suggest otherwise.
The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) reports that the actions of pro-democracy activists to dissuade investors from Burma “have not done nearly as much damage as have the unpredictable, sometimes bizarre, policies of the junta itself.”[55] Perhaps this
brewing up a storm[56]
In
November 1998, sixty fully armed soldiers stormed the premises of the
profitable and 45% foreign-owned Mandalay Brewery on direct orders of Sr-Gen
Than Shwe. The soldiers then ordered Win Win Nu, whose Singapore-based company
paid US$6.3 million and Kt8 million for its 45% stake, out of the factory on
tenuous charges that she had been misappropriating funds. Ignoring its own
Foreign Investment Law[57], the
SPDC then terminated the joint venture, nationalised and later dissolved the
profitable company. At the time, Mandalay Beer was the strongest competitor to
Myanmar Beer – a product of Myanmar Brewery, the newly established joint
venture between the junta-owned UMEH and Singapore-based Tiger Beer. After the
demise of Mandalay Brewery, Myanmar Beer has been able to assume an almost
monopolistic position in Burma: prompting the SPDC to showcase Myanmar Brewery
as a foreign investment ‘success’[58].
After
2 years of trying unsuccessfully to recoup her lost investment through Burmese
courts, Win Win Nu has taken the case against the SPDC to the International
Court of Justice in The Hague. The SPDC - furious with Win Win Nu for exposing
this story - is now also taking her to court: She is being blamed for the
dearth of FDI’s into Burma!
explains Indonesian company Medco Energi International’s withdrawal from Burma this year – an oil venture valued at US$12.8 million.[59]
The seizure of profitable foreign-owned businesses like Mandalay Brewery [see text box] have done little to instill confidence in the junta. To quote the EIU, “widespread corruption, heavy taxes, poor infrastructure, and policies forcing foreign firms to repatriate profits only at the skewed official exchange rate” make profitable operations, for most companies, almost impossible.
DRUGS
*
Improving * Stagnant R Deteriorating
Production
Instead of addressing widespread malnutrition and starvation, Burma continues to devote its productive capacity to drugs. Burma is the largest global opium producer - overtaking Afghanistan. In 2001, Burma produced 68% (865 tonnes[019]) of global opium Burma (thought to be enough to make over 80 tons of heroin[T20]), while Afghanistan produced only 23%, reversing 2000 production (UNDCP[021]).
Meanwhile, the estimated 60 amphetamine laboratories along the Burmese side of the border with Thailand are rapidly increasing production.[60] Total production in Burma now stands at 800million - compared to 100million 2 years ago[61] - with 600million thought to be produced by Wei Hsueh Kang and those under his command in the UWSA.[62]
Drug production looks set to increase further. Drug lords in the ‘Golden Triangle’ are supplying growers with new technology[022],[63] more land is being cleared for poppy cultivation – including areas opposite Chiang Mai, Chiang Rai and Mae Hong Son[023]. A further incentive is the rising price of opium and heroin – raw opium has more than doubled from US$450 to over $900 per kilo in approximately 6 months[z24].[64] At the same time, most of Khun Sa associates arrested in the 1994 Thai-American drug operation ‘Tiger Trap’ have been released early and are thought to have returned to Burma.[65]
Even the United Nations International Drug Control Program (UNDCP) is concerned that drug production may escalate. This is highly significant as the UN body is widely considered overly optimistic about reduction rates and the regime’s commitment to drug eradication – the office in Bangkok recently naming Burma as one of the most committed states in the fight against drugs.[66]
UWSA
Wei Hsueh Kang, the rumoured appointed chair of United
Wa State Army (UWSA), is a drug fugitive and friend of SPDC intelligence chief
Lt-Gen Khin Nyunt. Khin Nyunt is well known for his relationships with drug
lords and it was reported that the 2 met as Wei Hsueh Kang’s rival, Wei
Hsaitang, was ordered out of Mongyawn and dismissed as leader of the 894th
Brigade.
An alliance between Wei Hsueh Kang and Khin Nyunt is
mutually advantageous. If Khin Nyunt is directing structures and relations in
the UWSA, the group is weakened as an ‘autonomous’ army. Rangoon’s growing
influence and deployment of troops in Mongyawn (absent since 1996) will enable
Rangoon to launch a stronger attack on the Shan State Army (SSA). Predecessor
Wei Hsaitang was known for not wanting the UWSA to fight the SSA.[67]
If Khin Nyunt emerges as a key protagonist in Rangoon’s war against the SSA it
will be a significant notch on his belt, particularly as he lacking in army
credits when compared to Maung Aye. [see
p28 for brief discussion on rivalry between Khin Nyunt & Maung Aye]
As for Wei Hsueh Kang, there are indications that his
sphere of influence has been widened as the UWSA desperately need his
dirty-money to help them during a period of financial difficulty.[68]
Meanwhile, a rumour circulated at the end of March
spoke of a drug pact between Wei Hsaitang and the SSA. While the SSA denies the
alliance[69] recent
events make it clear that there remains a role for the illegal drug trade and
its lords.
Wei Hsueh Kang’s emerging role in the area at the
expense of Wei Hsaitang has intensified the rivalry between the 2 men.
Intensified rivalry, drug deals and increased troops can only have disastrous
implications for peace and civilian well-being in the area. Power dynamics
already appear to have culminated in a shootout (10 February) which killed 7
Burmese soldiers and wounded 3 others, seemingly Wei Hsaitang’s revenge.
how clean are the Wa?
There are numerous well-documented connections between the regime and the Wa, with many observers unconvinced by the anti-narcotics commitments of both. To quote from the Bangkok Post, 10 Dec 01:
The powerful Wa drug
cartel of northern Burma continues to expand and refine its extensive heroin
and methamphetamine industries[T25].
For this reason, US officials have recently listed the UWSA as a major drug cartel and clearly stated that drug trafficking is a source of terrorist funds[T26].
Burmese Foreign Minister Win Aung claims the money
behind drugs comes from Chinese, not Wa. Win Aung appears to be contradicting
himself as notorious drug lord and UWSA faction leader Wei Hsueh Kang is
Chinese[027]. Win Aung did not specify whether he was talking
about Chinese nationals or ethnic Chinese. It would appear his intention is to
blame the drug problem on an ‘other’, and capitalise on the history of racism
towards ethnic Chinese. This tendency to blame ‘foreigners’ is consistent with
previous attempts to put the blame on Thais.
The Wa and their supporters portray Kokang as the real problem area in Burma in an attempt to divert attention away from Wa areas. Collaboration with the Chinese government has served to refine this twisted view.[70]
UNDCP appears convinced the Wa anti-drug position is genuine, with Dr Calvoni (head of UNDCP, Bangkok) stating “the Wa have honoured every agreement they have ever made.”[71] In this context, the report of the UNDCP inspection of Wa Special Region-2 (Feb-Apr[z28] 02) is unlikely to be truly reflective.
Thailand’s position has been inconsistent. On the one hand, Foreign Minister Surakiat Sathirathai has praised Burma for increased cooperation[72] and Prime Minister Thaksin, on behalf of the Office of Narcotics Control Board, has pledged Burmese authorities and the Wa 20million baht (and further non-monetary assistance) to help fund a crop-substitution programme.[73]
On the other hand, deputy Secretary-General of the Office of the Narcotics Control Board Mrs Rassamee Witthaves holds the Wa responsible for smuggling in millions of amphetamines. (see below) Continued drug-related activity has led the vice-chairman of the Lower House Foreign Affairs Committee to urge the US to consider military action against the Wa if they do not end narcotics activities by 2005.[74] Even comments by Prime Minister Thaksin at the beginning of 2002 suggest the Thai government does not truly believe the regime is serious.[75]
Eradication & Prevention
Of course, the military regime continues to speak loudly of its drug eradication exercises and commitment. In January, for example, the regime reported seizing 157 kilos of ephedrine powder in Mandalay and arresting the owners,[76] and the Myanmar Central Committee for Drug Abuse Control stated that between 23 Jan-5 Feb they destroyed 661 hectares of poppy fields in northern Shan state. Seizures of poppy fields in the fiscal year 2000-2001 reportedly came to 9,317 hectares.[77]
Poster 1:
Avoid drugs if you want a better life A
genuine and concerted commitment to effective resolution of the dug problem in
Burma remains far from proven. Seizures remain a small fraction of drug
production and there is no real education programme, only scare tactics and
orders (for example see Poster 1[029]).
8 civil society groups based in Burma - including the Association of Medical Doctors of Asia, Border Areas Development Association, Myanmar Anti-Narcotic Association, Myanmar Council of Churches and Young Men's Buddhist Association - signed an MOU with UNDCP to work in cooperation on the drug problem as part of UNDCP’s Civil Society Initiative. [030]
Regional Problem
Increase
in seizure of drugs and arms smuggled from Myanmar is a clear sign of an
increase in narco-terrorism through the state, and it has become a major
concern of law enforcement agencies in the state and the whole region.
- Indian official, Jan
02[78]
The drugs industry poses a threat to regional stability and peace. Drug related crimes and deaths in the region are common, in both smuggling and drug-related crime[79] and by capital punishment.[80]
Regional and international networks such as the Joint Special Task Unit 2002 (Thailand, Burma, Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam and China)[81] may ultimately be doomed by a failure to systematically deal with the obvious conflicts of interest surrounding
Table 1: 2001
reported statistics, released in this period
|
Country |
Arrests
|
Seizures
|
Comments |
||
|
|
|
Opium |
Heroin |
Pills |
|
|
Burma (1st 6 months)[82] |
2,187
(punished) |
474.91 kg |
27.89
kg |
6.14m |
also
seized: 1,889 kg ephedrine, 269.28 litres phensedyl |
|
Thailand[83] |
3,115 |
?? |
?? |
7
m |
pills sold: 400 million (Bt50 billion); total drugs seized ~15%
market[84] |
|
China[85] |
1,574[86] |
2.8
tons |
13.2
tons |
2.07m |
record high seizures; also seized:
4.8 tons ice |
|
Mizoram State, India[87] |
?? |
?? |
3
kg |
670 |
heroin
worth over 30million rupees |
Burma. While Thai seizure of assets worth hundreds of millions of baht from Wei Hsueh Kang’s wife[031], and China making the largest reported drug seizure in Asia[88] are positive results, there remains much to be done.
Regional stability remains unachievable until the Burmese regime makes firm and comprehensive anti-narcotic commitments at all levels – in terms of finance, accountability, democratic participation and clearly breaking all ties with the drug industry. It is important to note that Wei Hsueh Kang is still a free man and is believed to be hiding in Burma.
Thailand
Thai deputy secretary-general of the Office of the Narcotics Control Board Mrs Rassamee Witthaves, said Thailand was being ‘flooded’ with methamphetamines from Burma to such an extent that it has become a ‘major security threat’.[89] According to Internal Security Operations Command, 700million tablets are expected to be sold in Thailand this year to 2,411,500 people (this is 91% of the total reported drug ‘addicts’ who allegedly constitute 4.3% of the population).
As part of its campaign to enforce social order the Thai government was considering making all school and university students undergo urine tests to check for drug use, as the average age of first-time users is 13.[90]
To motivate Thai police to be vigilant in anti-narcotics activities, officers receive Bt2 (US5 cents) per methamphetamine pill seized, reportedly to compensate for their ‘high risk’ activities.[91]
UNDCP & Funds
Despite its fears, UNDCP say the international policy of isolating Burma should be reversed to allow more humanitarian funds to areas undergoing opium crop reduction programs. Resident representative in Burma, Jean Luc Lemahieu, said the reduction of about 40% of drug production since 1996 cannot be sustained without a three to fourfold increase in funds. (The US and Japan currently contribute US$12million and Australia contributes $US400,000.)[92] His bottom line is that without an increase in funds the Wa region will not be drug-free by 2005 as planned.
European states and human rights groups are however calling for severe limits on aid to the regime until real improvements are made in its human rights record. The direction of US funds to support Thai efforts (such as Taskforce 399[032]) is perhaps indicative of the over-riding distrust felt towards the military regime in Burma.[93]
THAI-BURMESE RELATIONS
*
Improving R Stagnant * Deteriorating
Thai Foreign Minister Surakiat Sathirathai and armed
forces supreme commander Adm. Narong Yutthawong both visited Rangoon on
separate trips in February. It was Surakiat’s 2nd visit and was at
the invitation of Burmese counterpart Win Aung while Narong met with Generals
Than Shwe and Maung Aye. Both trips were part of a mutually ochestrated effort
to rebuild relations[T33].
The Thai-Burma Joint Commission, the highest institutionalised level of working relationship between the 2 governments, was re-established after 2 years for its 6th meeting on 7-9 January. Areas of mutual concern were discussed, including repatriation of refugees, joint anti-narcotics efforts, fishing and economic cooperation.
Despite these seeming advancements however, an article in The Nation tells of Thai army and government officials and Bangkok-based diplomats who believe hard feelings, tensions and deep-rooted suspicions remain prominent. One expressed his sentiments by saying: “It will take more than just a few official visits and handshakes to close this extraordinarily complex chapter in Thai-Burmese history.”[94] Former deputy Foreign Minister Sukhumbhand Paribatra openly challenged ‘improved relations’, condemning it a façade that merely benefits specific personal interests.[95]
Even Surakiat admitted in January there was “still have a long way to go in the building of resilient, strong and enduring relations… which would enable [the 2 countries] to withstand frictions and pressure that may arise naturally from time to time between neighbours all over the world.”[96]
The point is of course that Thailand and Burma are not like most neighbours. While drugs remain the most serious problem between the 2 countries, border fighting has routinely spilled into Thailand, Rangoon charges Thailand with aiding rebels, and repatriation is still a contentious issue. [see p47,49] These are only some of the issues that continue to be thorns in the side of good relations.
Drugs
Despite
ongoing frictions between the 2 countries - one is the biggest drug producer in
the world, with millions of methamphetamines flooding the others market and
drug addiction levels increasing - Thailand is hedging its bets and offering
Burmese and Wa authorities US$2m and other non-monetary assistance for a
crop-substitution programme[T34].
[see p21 for further discussion]
Fighting on the Border
Reports Rangoon urgently ordered military
outposts along the border to build heavy artillery batteries, missile launching
pads, bunkers and bomb shelters by March 25[97]
to prepare for attacks on the Shan State Army (SSA) [see p40] is straining good relations as fighting is sure to spill
over into Thailand. Rangoon even requested that the Burmese army be permitted
to use Thai territory as a springboard to attack the SSA[T35].[98]
When permission was refused, Lt-Col Tun Aung requested Thai understanding and
‘leniency’ if artillery shells stray
into Thailand. [99]
Thailand made it clear it would not tolerate fighting on Thai soil and stated warning shots would be fired if armed fire crossed the border. While Thai troops were ordered to avoid all unnecessary conflict in the interest of good relations, tough retaliation for serious damage in Thailand has not been ruled out and Burmese troops have been warned not to damage Thai property.[100]
A Wa commander (Battalion 616) reportedly apologised over a late March clash with Thai soldiers in Wiang Haeng district. Apologies do not go far in rectifying conflict however and Thai security measures were increased with plans to evacuate 3 villages if fighting resumed. Thai cavalry refused to open talks with the Wa battalion.[101]
Aiding Rebels
In November Burmese authorities asked Thailand to hand over rebel leaders they say live in Thailand, specifically Karen National Union (KNU) President Pado U Ba Thin Sein and military leaders Gen Bo Mya and Col Saw Soe. The regime claims the KNU launched attacks from Thailand and warned this could jeopardise Thai-Burmese relations.[102]
More virulent accusations of support came in December when the SPDC’s ally, the Democratic Karen Buddhist Association (DKBA), accused the Thai military of helping the KNU attack them. The Thai army denies ever supporting KNU attacks in Burma.[103]
People from Burma in Thailand
Burmese nationals no longer receive a 30-day visa upon entry into Thailand. Burma was among a number of countries to have this privilege removed, for the reason that some people were “commit[ing] crimes, such as prostitution, trafficking narcotics and humans, as well as overstaying their visas to seek jobs.”[104]
[for
discussion of refugees, irregular migrants & repatriation see
‘Displacement’]
MILITARY REGIME
*
Improving * Stagnant R Deteriorating
An
army that thinks of itself as a national vanguard, as the savior of the nation,
as more patriotic than anyone - this kind of army is a threat to everyone.
- Dr. Chao
Tzang Yawnghwe[036], Feb 02
The ‘Coup Plot’
In early March, the authorities detained Sandar Win
(former dictator Ne Win’s favourite daughter), her husband Aye Zaw Win and
their 3 sons for allegedly plotting a coup. It has been announced that they
will be tried for high treason, with Sandar Win the alleged mastermind.
Four high-ranking officials were arrested and
dismissed from their posts for being part of the plot: Air Commander in Chief
Maj-Gen Myint Swe, Golden Triangle Region Commander Brig-Gen Chit Than, Coastal
Region Commander Maj-Gen Aye Kyway and Police-Chief Maj-Gen Soe Win. A
significant number of other senior officers, both serving and retired, have
also been detained and interrogated. Officers of mid-rank and above in Rangoon
and Pegu Divisions were ordered to cancel any leave and return to their units,
pending investigation.
The SPDC has held an unusual number of press conferences about this ‘coup plot’. If the regime is perceived to be able to clamp down on a violent coup (numerous weapons were reported confiscated) and protect Burma’s security, then perhaps it is hoping its popularity may grow.
Maj-Gen Kyaw Win was very quick to (erroneously) guarantee that the ‘coup plot’ was not motivated by the talks, nor would it impede their progress.[105] Of course, the talks have been adversely affected, most clearly by UN Special Envoy Razali’s trip being postponed. Razali has stressed his concerns, publicly stating “I hope the events surrounding the coup plot don’t derail the reconciliation process.”[106] [see p3 for further details] It is feared the regime may invest all its energy into ‘internal matters’, to the detriment of the talks. There is sound basis for such anxiety as the talks stalled and nearly collapsed after Secretary-2 Lt-Gen Tin Oo’s death in the February 2001 helicopter crash.
The people of Burma are not convinced by this alleged conspiracy. Ne Win’s family may well be guilty of crimes including corruption and unlawful bids for power, but a coup-plot is widely considered unstrategic and unfeasible. Deeper reasoning suggests the arrests are more likely connected to the regime’s dislike of Ne Win clan’s business deals and political exercises aimed at increasing their influence. This has included Sandar Win’s active cultivation of friendships with various diplomats.
The family’s attempts at being more prominent players in the power game have been deal a raw and sweeping hand by the regime. Their moves have been brought to a halting stop with charges of treason. In dubbing the scenario a ‘coup conspiracy’, the regime is claiming ‘legitimate’ space to exert influence, increase security measures and modifying power structures as it desires.[107]
It is unclear who is the primary benefactor of this ‘coup-plot’ label. Lt-Gen Khin Nyunt heads the MI (military intelligence) which has undertaken numerous interrogations and arrests. It is suggested that up to 1,000 soldiers, police and civilians have been questioned.[108] The junta confirmed sacking 4 top soldiers (among others), including 2 regional commanders. (Khin Nyunt gained in power in the November 2001 reshuffles, notably dismissing 2 top generals and allies of Gen. Maung Aye.)
While observers remain convinced of a power struggle between Khin Nyunt and Maung Aye (head of army), reports in the Burmese media portray the top powers as united.[109] Establishment of the Bureau of Special Operations in November 2001 was thought to strengthen power at the regime’s centre,[110] while intelligence battalions have reduced from 27 to 12, perhaps to reduce tensions between Khin Nyunt and Maung Aye.[111]
BBC Correspondent Larry Jagan suggests that rather than extending Khin Nyunt’s influence, the ‘coup-attempt’ has cast shadows of doubt over his future. Khin Nyunt rose to power through his connection with Gen. Ne Win and used to be close to Sandar Win. Jagan comments that events surrounding the ‘coup plot’ will make his position “increasingly untenable” and that “Gen Than Shwe has now emerged as the unchallenged power,”[112] consolidating his strength as the premier and reigning the factions in.
USDA
The Union Solidarity and Development Association (USDA) have been engaging in community development activities. Dubbed kyant phont (literally meaning monitor lizard; in this context ‘stupid creature’) in a DVB February report, the USDA received money from authorities in Kawthaung District, Tenasserim Division for border development activities including primary school, health facilities, agriculture and water.[113] (Note that development activities have proved damaging and politically charged in many cases.) It has been suggested that this is part of a wider campaign to improve the group’s image. Any gains in USDA influence should be taken seriously as, set up under Sr-GenThan Shwe, it is ultimately an increase in military influence.
USDA money-raising activities are cause for concern in themselves. Additional funds in Kawthaung District are raised through selling confiscated poached fish, imposing ‘illegal’ border, traffic and visitor registration fines. Similar strategies are employed in Tachilek district where over 140 vehicles and 100 drivers were reportedly fined 500 and 100 baht each, respectively, raising over 80,000 baht.[114]
Police
Khin Nyunt issued an order that from the new year all Defence Services personnel transferred to the police force should wear police and not military uniforms. It is thought this is to ‘prove’ the police force is united, not split into 2 sections - military and civilian, as an internal rift would indicate.[115]
The Weapons Keep Coming
On 15 Dec, China sent another military shipment into Burma at Lashio; a 40-vehicle convoy carrying an artillery battery, gun carriages and communication equipment,[116] with 5 sophisticated radar warships, guided missile launchers and anti-aircraft guns arriving in February.[117] The 10 MIG-29 fighters purchased from Russia in 2001 were welcomed with an expanded runway at Meiktila Air Base.[118] Guns on the ground have been upgraded,[119] a 4th mobile surface to air missile system battalion is being established[120] and machinery used in ammunition production on its way to Burma was confiscated in Slovakia.[121]
New artillery and light infantry battalions are planned for Putao Township, Kachin State[122] and Thai intelligence believe Burma desire helicopters and training from India.[123]
Regional Security
Increasing militarisation in Burma and the regime’s
continual support for armed conflict is both a national and regional concern.
The entire military and their allies are involved, with DVB reporting military officers and Wa groups are involved in the
gun running business into India. Kokang
groups are also implicated.[124]
In January the US Department of
Defence was ordered to submit a report to Congress by April 2002 on Thailand’s
security needs in reaction to Burma’s increasing weapon accumulation.[125]
It is clear where US sympathies lie.
Burma
is a hub for armed activity, not only hosting its own battles but also the
recipient of neighbouring battles, something that such internal chaos cannot
prevent. The United Liberation Front of Asom are reportedly consolidating their
bases in Burma with the active support of the Chin Independence Army and the
National Socialist Council Of Nagaland.[126]
More alarming is the claim of 52 surrendered members
of the Naga armed group who claim they have “cordial
relations with the Burmese army […who] often supply arms and ammunition.”[127]
If
this is true, the military really are intent on causing chaos and destruction
to any extent in order to maintain what can loosely be termed ‘control’.
The Nuclear Reactor
Observers have doubts that Burma can maintain the nuclear reactor due to be delivered from Russia in 2003 at a cost of US$25million,[128] particularly after the International Atomic Energy Agency rendered safety standards unacceptable. To quote British nuclear expert John Large, “There is little evidence that the Myanmar authorities understand, let alone would be able to implement, the necessary safety regime to be able to prevent the dangerous accumulation of radioactive material.”[129] The European Commission has spelt out that without an independent regulatory body to ensure standards, radioactive leaks may occur.[130]
The Deputy Foreign Minister has said the reactor (due to be delivered in 2003) will be used “for the peaceful intention of acquiring modern technology for the country, radio isotopes for peaceful use, training and production of experts, and studying the prospects of producing electricity from nuclear energy.”[131] A statement by Russia declared the reactor incapable of making nuclear weapons.[132] and reports of Pakistani nuclear scientists seeking refuge in Burma after September 11, 2001 were probably coincidental and not linked to Burma increasing its nuclear capacity.
However, the acquisition
has raised concerns of what the future holds with a nuclear Burma under
military control. The US specifically addressed these concerns on January 22 by
warning Burma it must honour obligations under the
Non-Proliferation Treaty and not pursue production of nuclear weapons.[133]
WOMEN & CHILDREN
* Improving R Stagnant * Deteriorating
Women
award
Dr Cynthia Maung, director of Mae Tao clinic, was the recipient of the 6th annual Female Human Rights Award at a ceremony held by the Foundation for Human Rights in Asia, Tokyo, on 7 Dec.
violence
Violence against women continues unabated; both gender specific torture and violence - such as rape, and non-gender specific –such as forced labour. (Note: many women forced labourers do suffer gender specific violence on top of the humiliations and abuses of forced labour itself.) Women continue to be conscripted as forced labourers with reports from this period highlighting 37 women in Hsihseng, 36 in Mawkmai, 40 in Langkher and 38 in Mongpan; 151 in total.[134]
Children
sex work
Mae Sai focused in the 2nd World Congress against Commercial Sexual Exploitation of Children (18 Dec 01). The border town is a prominent trading centre for child sex workers, an estimated 1/3 of whom are between 12 and 17.
Many of the children sold are from Pa Tek, a Thai village with a large immigrant community from Burma. Most have no legal status and live in poverty and are therefore extremely vulnerable. Child trafficking is so established in Pa Tek that it is a ‘cottage industry’ – to coin Phil Marshall’s phrase (UN) - most agents are friends or relatives of the children’s families. An estimated 70% of the 800 families in the village have sold at least 1 daughter, with prices ranging from 5,000 - 40,000 baht (US$110-900).[135]
The demand for virginity means that HIV/AIDS is a desperate problem for these children (and their clients). The coordinator of the Child Protection and Rights Center (Mae Sai) said that 50 girls from Pa Tek village have died this year from AIDS.[136]
violence
An interesting article appeared in Burma Issues (Mar ‘02) about the socialisation of children to embrace violence, and the role games play in this. To quote from the article (drawn from the reflections of 2 Karennis), “Whenever they play games, they usually divide into 2 groups, Burmese and Karenni, and then they fight each other.” Replace ‘Karenni’ with any ethnic group from Burma and the situation is sure to be similar. Play with guns made of bamboo and dried gourd ‘bombs’ are common in areas where the sound of gunfire and bombs can be heard by villagers, young and old.[137]
Whether there is a direct causal link between these games and violence in communities is a contentious issue, but for many the limited scope of children’s play is disturbing. Children who live through conflict are intimately aware of abuse, death and destruction, usually of one group by another. As the author highlighted, this in itself is severely problematic as ethnic tensions become internalised at a young age.
HUMAN RIGHTS
* Improving R Stagnant * Deteriorating
The overall human
rights situation in Burma remains deplorable, and widespread human rights
abuses continue. - US Department of State (11
Feb 02)
The UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights in Myanmar Professor Pinheiro’s2nd report to the UN Commission on Human Rights (Mar 02) is based upon the information of his fact-finding mission in October and information received until December15, 2001. The report comes at a time when the SPDC and high-level envoys are under pressure from the international community and opposition groups to demonstrate progress.
Pinheiro again showed his eagerness to commend the military on its supposed advancements, and gradual improvement of the situation[037]. Pinheiro comments that progress is fragile which is in line with his delicate criticism of the regime and widespread abuses still occurring. In Pinheiro’s 1st public statement he said, “I saw everyone I wanted to and I am satisfied with the government’s cooperation.”[138]
Prof. Pinheiro’s second trip to Burma
Pinheiro’s Itinerary:
10 Feb Rangoon Meetings: Lt-Gen Khin Nyunt, Foreign Minister Win Aung,
Home Ministry officials, other Government officials, UN country team
12 Feb Kachin State: Ethnic leaders & Kachin prison
17 Feb Insein Prison: NLD political prisoner Win Tin
18 Feb Rangoon Meetings: Daw Aung San Suu Kyi & top NLD aides,
NLD Central Executive Committee, Human Rights Committee, Home Minister Col Tin
Hlaing, Police Director Maj-Gen Soe Win.
Agenda focus: political prisoners, conditions in the jails, child
soldiers & forced labour[038].
political prisoners & prison conditions
Consistent with SPDC maneuvers of taking action surrounding the visit of a high-level official, 41 political prisoners and a further 318 female detainees were released from prison in honour of Pinheiro’s arrival in February.[139] Following Pinheiro’s criticism of the military not releasing any students or activists, Yin Htwe - whose sentence expired in 1999 - was released[039]. UN officials are not convinced this reflects any commitment of the military to speed up the release of remaining political prisoners – currently averaging 10 releases a month.[140]
Pinheiro neglected to try and devise a schedule for prisoner releases, but he did present the idea of using amnesty. However, this will entail revoking laws that prohibit released prisoners to engage in politics.
Pinheiro congratulated the military for “dramatically declining” political arrests.[141] With talks beyond the 18-month mark and over 1,500 political prisoners, this is not an improvement but rather a crisis these arrests are still occurring.
Pinheiro spent 9 hours at Insein Prison and visited another prison in Kachin State. He reports speaking to NLD prisoners, including Win Tin, a renowned journalist currently in hospital, as well as Dr. Salai Tun Than. Pinheiro reports an improvement in prison conditions, but Myo Myint Nyein, a magazine editor recently released, says prison restrictions are relaxed when such inspections take place with harsh conditions reimposed after.[142]
Likewise, Pinheiro reported improvements in labour-camps conditions but failed to denounce them as institutions. Pinheiro disregarded allegations of corruption and physical abuse of prisoners by saying he was “not in a position to assess their extent.”[143]
human rights developments
Since Pinheiro’s last visit, the SPDC sponsored Human Rights Committee has done a few things. There was preparation of human rights books, manuals for policy makers and 11 human rights workshops, predominately funded and orchestrated by the Australian Government and corporate oil companies[040]. It is assumed the attendees were junta officials, and there are no known plans to include members of the public or human rights defenders in such workshops. Pinheiro called for prevention and monitoring of human rights violations, as well as holding State agents accountable.
political rights
Pinheiro acknowledged that only 10 parties, about 5% of those registered in the 1990 elections, are legal under the SPDC rule. (8 of these parties represent ethnic nationalities[041], although their ability to operate is effectively curtailed.) Some NLD offices have re-opened but Pinheiro is concerned that “stringent restrictions”[144] hamper their functioning. Pinheiro did not report on the state of Aung San Suu Kyi’s house arrest other then repeating she should be released.
forced labour
Contradictorily, Pinheiro asserts the ‘government’ is committed to eradicate forced labour but says the greatest violations are where the military is active. He declared “forced labour on civil infrastructure appears to have ceased,”[145] although he offers no firm evidence to support his statement.
The ‘government’ has not used the media or translations into ethnic languages to publicise information or Order No. 1/99 against forced labour, nor has it prosecuted any cases of forced labour although it has supposedly taken “administrative action” on 38 cases.[146]
Pinheiro asserts “people have no faith in the effectiveness of the courts or police, or they are afraid of the consequences.”[147] This comes at a time when 7 Shan villagers are reported to have been killed after complaining about forced labour in September last year.[148] (Followed up by the ILO team in their Feb 02 visit, see below.)
humanitarian aid
Pinheiro is encouraging international humanitarian aid to help combat great concerns about HIV/AIDS and basic medical functioning. He also said the international community should help “strengthen the fiscal and administrative capacities of the Government… to maintain momentum,”[149] a position that seems premature and unsubstantiated. Pinheiro seems to disregard the regime’s culpability in this crisis, in that less than 1% of GDP is reportedly devoted to health expenditures[042].
conclusion
Overall, Pinheiro’s report was slightly more critical then his last, but he repeatedly comments on commitment and change by the ‘government’ without much evidence to substantiate his claim. While the regime may call the most recent US human rights reports “incorrect and outlandish… based again on repeatedly incorrect and outlandishly disoriented information,”[150] there has not been a truly significant commitment made by the regime to improve the human rights situation.
Pinheiro appears to be advocating for the regime when he says, “If the international community wants to see political and human rights progress, it should support their efforts in a spirit of principled engagement.”[151] Finally, while Pinheiro has lavishly praised the regime for its cooperation and supposed developments, he has largely ignored the efforts and cooperation of the NLD and other opposition groups.
Forced Labour
It
is very difficult to make a living here. We spend most of our labour working
for the army. – Chin State villager (CHRO, 15
Dec 01)
Reports of forced labour continue,
both among civilian and convict[152]
populations, and are one of the underlying factors of increasing numbers of
displaced persons – both IDPs and in other countries. [see ‘Displacement’]
Reports by Chin Human Rights Organisation (CHRO), and Karen Human Rights Group (KHRG), show despite an order issued by the home ministry prohibiting the use of forced labour, the army was still using forced labour and civilian porters. Examples of forced labour reported in this period include:[153]
·In remote areas of Chin State, 10 villages in were forced to
construct a 20-mile motor road linking Vuangtu and Ngaphaipi villages in
February. CHRO (3 Mar 02[043])
·Reports from Arakan State claim villagers from areas surrounding
Ponnagyun township are again being used as forced labour in military rubber
plantations, after a break during the ILO visit to Burma in September 2001.
Villagers had been threatened against telling ILO delegates anything about
forced labour should they visit the area.
Narinjara (2 Mar 02)
·Over 100 military porters, men and women, conscripted by the
growing numbers of troops deployed near the Thai-Burma border in anticipation
of an offensive against the Shan State Army (SSA). A further 150 civilians were
reportedly conscripted as porters (50 each from Maeken, Mongharng and
Poongpakhem tracts) between 15-25 February. SHAN (25 Feb 02[044])
International Labour Organization (ILO) returns
A 4-member ILO delegation, led by Francis Maupain, Special Adviser to the ILO Director-General, returned to Burma (19-25 Feb 02) with the primary purpose of trying to establish a permanent presence in Rangoon and evaluating the SPDC’s progress in eradicating forced labour[045].
An agreement was reached, however it was not of the scope ILO officials had hoped for.[154] There will be an appointment of an ILO liaison officer instead of an appointed ombudsman; the regime reportedly said the liaison officer could lead to an ombudsman at a “later time.” Maupain was disappointed with the regime’s lack of cooperation and said “there was no basis to pursue a dialogue.”[155] The provisions for the liaison must be put in place by June 2002 when the ILO will reevaluate its position on Burma.
The team reported the military was
unwilling to accept assistance to end forced labour[046]. While
the junta has declared forced labour illegal for the 1st time, it is
unclear how and if it is enforced. The team identified 2 major obstacles to the
end of forced labour.[047] Firstly, the military’s de facto
immunity from persecution. Secondly, the lack of ‘government’ funding for
unskilled manual labour on public work projects as an alternative to forced,
cost-free labour.
Although the team found that a “certain decrease in the imposition of
forced labor had taken place,” it
was unconvinced that this could be sustained.[156]
None of the 3 recommendations made by the Commission of Inquiry, and accepted
by the Government, have been
met in reality.[157]
The regime’s lack of cooperation during the team’s mission (including preventing them from meeting Daw Aung San Suu Kyi[048]) and its apparent unwillingness to make a firm commitment towards eradicating forced labour, may suggest the visit was nothing more than a public relations exercise. If the regime is seen to be engaging with the ILO over this controversial issue then it hopes the international community may be placated and pressure will ease.
However, observed non-cooperation is unlikely to favor well with the ILO in June 2002 when they reevaluate their sanctions on Burma.
Extortion
Lt-Gen Khin Nyunt visited Maungdaw, a town in Arakan State, on 29th December to open the new annexe of Basic Education Secondary School and receive donations from what the junta described as ‘philanthropists’ of the locality. The philanthropists were actually bullied business people and households - each household had to give 1,000 kyat to bear the cost of Khin Nyunt’s reception.[158]
In late January, villagers in Ponnagyun township (near Sittwe) were fined for not attending a ‘meeting’ for what the junta call ‘collection of purchased rice’. 12 villagers were fined 3,000 kyat each, while other villagers were charged with ‘open disobedience to the state order’. As a result of fear, it is reported that 4 families have moved from a village that is currently home to 40 families.[159]
Freedom of Expression
If you haven't been in jail you haven't been a reporter
here.
- retired
Burmese newspaper-editor [049]
Journalist Myo Myint Nyein was freed after 12 years in prison on 13 February, coinciding with Pinheiro’s visit. Although released 2 years before the end of his sentence, his arrest contravened his right to freedom of expression. Reporters Sans Frontiers and Burma Media Association voiced the regret of many that he was not released long ago in view of his poor health[z50].
Reflective of ongoing political censorship in
Burma, the Committee to Protect Journalists issued a report in February 2002
condemning the “harsh regime of
censorship, licensing, and threats” forcing journalists to apply
clandestine techniques, with many ultimately harassed, imprisoned and forced
into exile.[160]
Meanwhile, on the Indo-Burma border, Chin youths have established the 1st independent Chin media group Khawnutum. [051]
Labour Rights
The Seafarers’ Union of
Burma (SUB) demanded the Burmese Marine authority immediately revoke reprisal
action - including a ban from maritime employment - on seafarers seeking
assistance from the International Transport Workers’ Federation (ITF) and
affiliated unions. The regime provides little to no protection to Burmese
seafarers and, to quote Ko Ko Khaing General Secretary of the SUB, “seeking trade union or ITF help is the last
desperate option for Burmese seafarers abandoned in foreign ports.”[161]
The regime’s assurances of no reprisal against seafarers contacting ITF have
not been upheld.
SUB, operating in exile since 1991, also demanded Burmese authorities observe and implement ILO convention No 87, ratified in 1955, guaranteeing Freedom of Association and protection of the Right to Organise.
ETHNIC
* Improving R Stagnant * Deteriorating
Military rule is a
cancer.… It is the responsibility of everyone - every good sons and daughters of
all ethnic segments in Burma - to remove this cancer from the body of our
politics and our society. - Dr. Chao Tzang Yawnghwe, Feb 02 [052]
In an interview in February, Dr. Chao
Tzang Yawnghwe spoke of how ethnic racism, or ‘ethnic chauvinism’ is an
integral part of the suffering in Burma. He discussed the politics of ethnicity
and identity and stressed that ethnic identity must be used strategically, in
such a manner as to foster co-opertaion and support as opposed to intensified
chaos and conflict. He reminded his audience that the military regime is Burma
is keen on intensifying ethnic conflict as it is an ideological weapon that
helps them further their power over the ethnic nationalities of Burma.[162] [see Appendix 1 for full transcript of
interview]
Chavalit’s Intervention
In late March it was reported that Thai Deputy Prime Minister and Defence Minister Chavalit has been mediating truce talks between Rangoon and the Karen National Union (KNU) and Shan State Army (SSA). This procedure is questionable as in public statements Chavalit not only accepts, but extends, the regime’s theory that peace is unattainable because of unreasonable demands by the KNU and SSA.[163] There has been no report on solid progress.
Karen
Despite Chavalit’s ‘mediating’, conflict continues. In
mid-March the KNU attacked a military camp, killing 6 soldiers. Civilian life
remains full of uncertainty and fear, with 1 attack alone causing 300 villagers
to temporarily flee to Myawaddy.[164]
In January, at a secret ceremony held for Karen New Year (14 Jan), the KNU urged the SPDC to begin peace talks.[165] A similar report a few months earlier was denied by KNU leadership.[166]
In the context of continued and deadly armed conflict between
the KNU and the SPDC and its ally the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA),
the KNU extended a brave hand. As recently as January, the regime publicly
accused the KNU, on scant evidence, of planning a terrorist plot to destroy
Mingaladon Airport, Rangoon.[167]
A couple of days later, Radio Myanmar
held the KNU responsible for killing a family in Kaleinmadaw village, Mon State
on 22 December. The transmission was explicit in its contempt for the KNU.[168]
Shan
While the SSA has been receptive to Thai officials mediating peace talks between rebel leaders and Rangoon, the latter has not publicly responded.[169]
Tensions and fighting continue with large numbers of Burmese troops being deployed along the border. By December 9 approximately 1,000 Burmese and Wa were present along the Thai-Burma border[053] in advance of attacks on the SSA.with thousands of troops deployed by the beginning of February. [054]
The large number is unusual, according to a military observer, as only a few hundred Shan troops have been operating in the area. It is thought the target may be the Gor Wan headquarters, a failed target last year.[170]
Removal of Wei Hsaitang from Mongyawn [see p20,21] may adversely affect relations between theWa and the Shan State Army (SSA) as Wei Hsaitang has generally opposed Wa troops fighting the Shan. With Rangoon’s control and Wei Hsuehying (drug fugitive Wei Hsuehkang’s brother) handling 171st division, a fiercer fighting force appears to be exerting itself.[171]
Ramifications of the ongoing conflict are great. Not only is loss of life continuing between armed factions, but civilians remain extremely vulnerable, particularly as conflict areas are inaccessible. (Loi Kawwan was closed off – especially to media – on 25 February amid speculation of an imminent attack.[172]) The implication is that conditions for survival become increasingly tenuous. With battalions and headquarters very close to the border, Thai villagers and officials continue to fear the conflict will spread into Thailand. [see p25]
Karenni
A 36-person
negotiation team (made up of township representatives) has been established to
provide space for negotiations between the Karenni National Progressive Party
(KNPP) and the regime. This team was barred from entering
The SPDC issued a statement on 10
January alleging that the KNPP murdered 7 villagers from villages near the
Lawpita hydroelectric power plant,
Lahu
The Lahu National Democratic Front (LNDF) issued a statement on 10 January (29th Anniversary of Lahu Revolutionary Day) urging the SPDC to stop committing human rights violations against national races, including the use of landmines. The statement also stated that LNDF will continue its armed struggle to achieve a genuine federal union.[175]
Mon
SPDC troops continue their aggressive search for the armed and active Mon splinter group, led by Col. Pan Nyunt. On November 27, Htee Wah Doe Karen village was burnt down for allegedly supporting the group. In early December, 200 SPDC troops entered cease-fire areas, one near Halockhanee Mon refugee camp. This move has deeply concerned villagers and the New Mon State Party and makes the cease-fire increasingly tenuous.
While some villagers have expressed their support for the splinter group, they are reportedly ‘collecting taxes’ and have held a village headman as a hostage to raise revenue. Generally life is becoming increasingly hard and travel is more dangerous.[176]
RELIGION
* Improving R Stagnant * Deteriorating
Lt-Gen Khin Nyunt and other SPDC officials attended the Catholic Bishops Conference of Myanmar on January 11. No details were given about the conference proceedings and it is unlikely any controversial issues were raised. The press release by the Myanmar Information Committee merely reiterated the familiar propaganda of “over 100 national races living in unity. Although it is a predominantly Buddhist country, all the people have freedom of faith.”[177]
Time and time again in
Democratic Voice of Burma radio reported in December that 11 Buddhist leaders were arrested in May 2001 for distributing copied photos of the Buddha images destroyed by the Taleban. Clearly the regime is primarily concerned with reining in those commanding respect and amputating their influence.[178]
An abbot in Sittwe who forbids student monks from listening to radio broadcasts further illustrates this point. The abbot used to be engaged in political activities and following the Buddhist-Muslim riots in 1994 the MI (military intelligence) forced him to sign a paper declaring abstention from political activity.[179]
HEALTH
* Improving R Stagnant * Deteriorating
The Burmese Medical Association’s 48th conference reported an increase in health services and doctors since 1988, and US$12 million state funds used to purchase modern equipment.[180] According to the report there are currently:
· 14,893 doctors
· 750 hospitals (including 13 township hospitals & 37
station hospitals in the border areas)
· 346 dispensaries
· 1,402 rural health centers & 64 regional health centers
· 13 institutes of medicine & other health sector
universities
These statistics do not alter the
glaring reality that
Prosthesis
A new International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) limb-production and fitting center to assist landmine victims in Hpa-An, capital of Karen State, will be completed by May and fully operational by July. It is expected that after one year the centre will rehabilitate 40 amputees a month – free of charge. According to a statement put out by the ICRC, prosthesis production in 2001 was 2,150.[182]
HIV/AIDS
There
continues to be severe lack of information and subsequently ignorance about the
Burmese AIDS epidemic. Illustrative is the absence of details released about
the AIDS advocacy/prevention meeting held by the Myanmar Maternal and Child
Welfare Association (1 Feb). In the name of ‘cultural sensitivity’, there
remains an effective ban on reporting on HIV/AIDS.
![Text Box: Over 80% of people in Thakata [in Rangoon division] do not know how HIV is transmitted.
– health worker in Burma](Rangoon_suspense_files/image023.gif)
Health workers complain HIV/AIDS education
pamphlets are outdated, insufficient, confusing and ostracising. Sex and
condoms remain taboo, men who have sex with men and intravenous drug users are
not mentioned in education programmes[T55].
Unsurprisingly therefore, knowledge regarding transmission remains dangerously
low.[183]
Unfortunately, as the Irrawaddy (Jan 01) reported, the Burmese
community in Thailand are also unhealthily quiet about HIV/AIDS. To quote
directly from the report:
Little knowledge and widespread
misconceptions about HIV/AIDS afflict migrant workers. Many believe that HIV
can be contracted from toilet seats, mosquito bites, kissing or coughing… Some
worry that releasing precise figures could further damage the already negative
image of Burmese migrant workers and lead the Thai authorities, who attribute
soaring health problems largely to the migrants, to intensify their crackdown
on them.
Thailand & the Health of People from Burma
The Thai Public Health Ministry has warned people to “exercise extreme caution” around migrant workers in order to prevent the spread of communicable diseases. The call came after a random survey reportedly found 89.5% of 567 workers from Burma in Rayong had hepatitis of some type. The health of workers under 15 was found to be particularly fragile.[184]
While the survey may have highlighted an important health issue, urging “extreme caution” around migrant workers will only exacerbate racial tensions and xenophobia. It is important that the Thai health authorities make a positive response.
Thai-Burma cooperation along the border (in Chiang
Rai, Tak, Kanchanaburi and Ranong provinces) to control the spread of AIDS (by
encouraging 100% condom usage), malaria (5% caseload reduction per annum) and
tuberculosis (TB) (caseload reduction of 85%) has enjoyed “satisfactory results” over the past year according to the Thai Public
Health Minister. While malaria has reportedly been reduced by 25%, the decrease
TB caseloads has only been slight.
The joint-initiative will continue, seeking
approximately US$3million from international organisations to supplement Thai
and Burmese funds.[185]
EDUCATION
* Improving R Stagnant * Deteriorating
The government has neglected to
provide the essentials of modern textbooks and school equipment, and has more
significantly failed to bring about the necessary changes in the political and
social conditions of Burma that would allow for true educational improvement…
Burma’s education system is seriously damaged and the future for the students
and the country is terrifying. - ABFSU ‘01, p12
In December 2001, the All Burma Federation of Student Unions’ Foreign Affairs Committee (ABFSU-FAC) released an education report, The Current Education Situation in Burma: Education Report Year 2000, documenting the deterioration of the Burmese education system since 1988 within a wide political and social context. Some highlights include:
·
universities
& colleges have only been open for 40 months since 1988.
·
illiteracy is
increasing from the 1990’s rate of 23%.
·
textbooks are
outdated & strictly censored to promote military ideology
·
“Corruption is
commonplace at the university level for passing grades.” (p11-12)
·
universities
relocated out of towns makes education both harder to access and afford.
·
education
& health are only 7.7% of national budget; military spending is over 40%.
·
disproportionate
funds & energies are channeled into military education, compared to
civilian education. The Maritime
University, due to open in August 2002 with 300 students, is an example of
this.[186]
·
9.5million children
cannot access basic education, many because of the expense; only 37% enrolled
complete primary school with only 24.59% proceeding to middle level.
In contrast, official statistics boast Burmese authorities
have built 110 universities and colleges since 1988, totaling 142 with student
numbers increasing by 416,719 to 556,456.[187]
However, ABFSU states that nearly 2/3 of university
students are actually enrolled in the University of Distant Education (UDE),[188]
as a result of disruptions, closures and other factors. As ABFSU note, “The UDE programs sorely lack in opportunity
for students to actively learn.”[189]
Monastic Education
Monastic education is reportedly becoming increasingly popular in Arakan State, as the quality is thought to be superior to State schooling and less costly. According to the report there are about 500 students enrolled in just one monastery near Wingaba ground in Sittwe.[190]
Study Abroad
In January, Japan announced it will provide 203million yen under its ODA programme for a scholarship fund - The Human Resources Development Scholarship - enabling students from Burma to study a wide range of Master’s degrees in Japan. A statement released by the Japanese embassy in Rangoon stated the intention is to further Burma’s development through increased knowledge.[191]
Three hundred students from Burma currently study in Russia and the ambassador has expressed eagerness in granting further assistance to the regime, especially in the fields of science and technology and the Aerospace Engineering and Maritime Universities.[192]
It is not known at this time whether either country intends to support the ‘government’s’ skill building, as is the case in Japan’s Cambodia programme (implemented in 2000).[193] If so then it is predictable the regime will siphon their own and particularly chosen children into these much-desired courses while excluding the wider community and further widening the gap between military and civilian education.
It is vital that countries wishing to provide similar ‘assistance’ assess programmes within the wider educational and political context.
Closure
After fights in mid-February, thought to be between the Scorpion Gang (led by Kyaw Ne Win, Ne Wins’ grandson currently under arrest after the alleged ‘coup plot’) and the White Snake Gang, the Institute of Economics and the Culture University (Ywarthargyi, South. Dagon) were raided by War Office troops and closed. The fights reportedly involved over 200 students and were labeled a riot.[194] (It is unknown by Altsean at the time of publishing if/when the universities were reopened and what the details of arrests were.)
DISPLACEMENT
*
Improving * Stagnant R Deteriorating
IDPs (Internally Displaced Persons)
The use of forced
labour, forced relocations and other human rights abuses continues to result in
large numbers of IDPs in ethnic nationality areas such as the Karen, Karenni,
Shan and
In
According to
a Shan relief worker in Mae Sai, the population of the IDP
REFUGEES
Thailand
The position of refugees and
asylum seekers from
Royal Thai
government (RTG) statements in December clearly indicated a populist desire to
close refugee camps and work towards the eventual repatriation of all Burmese
refugees. One spokesperson set a 3-year time-limit for complete repatriation.
(Note: there have been similar timeframes set in the past. It has been
impossible to meet them, one of the main obstacles continuing to be
Also in
December, the RTG refused asylum to approximately 700 Karen villagers fleeing
from Burmese military attacks on the
The UK
Foreign Ministry has urged
Maneeloy
Maneeloy camp, a
holding-centre for student dissidents and political refugees, was closed by the
RTG on
Several hundred refugees were taken from Maneeloy Centre to Tham Hin, a border camp dangerously close to Burmese forces, under over-crowded conditions and lacking previously accessible facilities. Most of these politically sensitive refugees are awaiting resettlement in third countries.[200]
Rohingya
In early
2002, the Burmese government verbally agreed with the government of
Rohingya
refugees living in camps in
28 Rohingyas
were arrested in January by the Malaysian police after seeking asylum from
religious persecution in
MIGRANT WORKERS, THAILAND
Highly Vulnerable
People from
Some migrants from
It is reasonable to believe that many similar deaths are never discovered and reported, along with other forms of oppression and abuse.
Registration
The Royal
Government of Thailand (RTG) completed its 1st round of registration
for migrant workers in October 2001, and announced in January 2002 that those
migrant workers who had not registered within the allotted timeframe would be
deported. The RTG came to an agreement with the Burmese Government during the
Thai-Burma Joint Committee on 7 January regarding the return of illegal migrant
workers to
After Foreign
Minister Surakiat’s February 6 visit to
The RTG set-up another round of migrant worker
registrations with 25 March as the new cut-off date, announcing that
The registration system for migrant workers in
ENVIRONMENT
* Improving R Stagnant * Deteriorating
As a
result of ongoing protests by residents in Mae Sai concerned about pollution,
work on a power plant in Tachilek has been suspended[056].
Ivory
Tourists’ desire for ivory souvenirs is decimating the
Asian elephant population. The number of wild elephants in
Logging & Furniture Smuggling
Illegal logging and furniture
smuggling continues along the Thai-Burmese border with groups in
This has officially constituted a threat to Thai
national security and imports, other than those via the
In mid-December over 200 Thai furniture merchants
protested, claiming the closed checkpoints mean many merchants lose hundreds of
millions of baht (tens of thousands
of US$).[213] Around
the same time Burmese soldiers arrested 7 Thais (including a pregnant woman)
and 4 Karens from
CHRONOLOGY
3 Dec 01 Razali ends 6th visit to
29 Nov 01 Prof Salai Tun Than arrested for peaceful
demonstration at City Hall
30 Nov 01 UNGA adopts human rights resolution on
Dec 01 National Day NLD statement: talks must start
yielding more tangible results Reuters,
10 Dec
1 Dec 01
6 Dec 01 President Bush,
7
Thai villagers & 4 Karen villagers arrested by Burmese soldiers for illegal
logging BP, 10 Dec
8 Dec 01 Launch of Nobel Peace campaign for release of
ASSK AFP, 4 Dec; AP 8 Dec
Indian MPs sign for release of ASSK Mizzima, 8 Dec
About 1,500 attend concert in
An
NLD office reopens in Kamayut
township,
9 Dec 01 Sources at Myanmar Ministry of Transport
announces plans for
Burmese soldiers arrest 7 Thais & 4 Karens for illegal
logging BP, 10 Dec
10 Dec 01 AAPPB launches website with detailed
information on political prisoners
10th Anniversary of ASSK receiving Nobel Peace
Prize & prize centenial
14
Burmese dissidents hold 36-hour hunger strike for release of ASSK Kyodo, 10 Dec
SPDC
says working towards ‘functional democracy’ with ASSK AFP, BBC 10 Dec
11 Dec 01 Former Japanese foreign affairs minister
reports Aung San Suu Kyi said dialogue has not started but is only at stage of
overcoming mutual distrust AFP, 11 Dec
Churches
around
Desmond
Tutu, Nobel Laureate, calls for release of ASSK & democracy 11 Dec
12-15 Dec 01 President Jiang Zemin is 1st
Chinese President to visit
13 Dec 01 4 NLD members released AFP, 13 Dec
18 Dec 01 Ethnic groups warn talks will fail if not
tripartite
Mae Sai focuses on agenda of 2nd World Congress
against Commercial Sexual Exploitation of Children (
19 Dec 01 U Lwin makes statement 194 NLD-affiliated
political prisoners have been released since Jan 01, but 822 still incarcerated
Kyodo, 19 Dec
25 Dec 01 1.3 million methamphetamines seized in Chiang
Rai BP, 26 Dec
26 Dec – 2 Jan Kachin Manau
festival
27 Dec 01 Bangkok Post reports seizure of over US$2.3 million worth of assets linked to
Wei Xieu-Kang
28 Dec 01 UNDCP receives permission to inspect Wa
region
29 Dec 01 Report that Khin Nyunt visits Maungdaw,
30 Dec 01 Regime posts interview of role of National
Convention & military in future politics & asks for patience Channel-J News Agency, Japan
1 Jan 02 Khin Nyunt order that all Defence personnel transferred
to police should only wear police uniform, not military uniforms, comes into
force DVB, 2 Jan
4 Jan 02 Independence
Day expectations for ‘breakthrough’ in the talks are dashed
NLD
make 1st formal statement calling on talks faster progress AFP, BBC 4 Jan
52 members of Naga armed group surrender to
7 Jan 02 SPDC Defence Services team choose sites for
new artillery & light infantry battalions in
50
forestry officers & soldiers raid illegal sawmill & furniture factory
in Tha Song Yang district BP, 10 Jan
Former Thai deputy foreign minister
challenges RTG’s warm ties with
7-9 Jan 02 Thai-Burma Joint Commission, Phuket Nation, 5 Jan
8 Jan 02 Start of USDA rallies in
9 Jan 02 5 political prisoners released; Cho Aung
Than, Tin Maung Kyi, Kyaw Min, Kyi Lwin, Tin Maung BBC 9 Jan
Foreign Minister says force will not be used against Wa in
fight against drugs Nation 10 Jan
10 Jan 02 29th
Anniversary of Lahu Revolutionary Day Lahu National Democratic Front issues
statement urging SPDC to stop oppression against national races DVB, 11 Jan
Razali
meets Japanese PM in
SPDC statement alleges KNPP murdered 7 villagers from
villages near Lawpita hydroelectric power plant, Karenni State DVB, 10 Jan
11 Jan 02 Radio
11-14 Jan 02 WHO Board of Executives Meeting (
14 Jan 02 Karen
New Year KNU urge SPDC to begin peace talks AP, 14 Jan
ICRC launch construction of new limb-production &
fitting center to assist landmine victims (Hpa-An,
14-16 Jan 02
15 Jan 02 Hearing of Aung San property case, to be
continued
16 Jan 02 USDA organise rallies in cities AFP, 16 Jan
17-20 Jan 02 4 country (TH,
22 Jan 02 Former university professor, Dr. Salai Tun
Than, arrested for handing out brochures asking for monitored elections within
a year, sent to Insein prison
23 Jan 02 8 NGOs based in Burma & UNDCP sign
memorandum to cooperate on drug problem Xinhua,
23 Jan
25 Jan 02 Report that Min Ko Naing has had another year
added onto sentence
29 Jan 02 Latha township allowed to open NLD branch DVB, 29 Jan
30 Jan 02 Rumour ASSK has met with top army general,
she left home escorted for about 2 hours BBC,
30 Jan
Razali’s 7th trip postponed until March DVB, 30 Jan
31 Jan 02 U Lwin says talks still in confidence
building stage, although there have been some positive changes DVB, 31 Jan
Than
Shwe denies meeting ASSK AFP, 31 Jan
KNU
leader, Saw Ba Thin Sein, renews calls for tripartite dialogue Kyodo, 31 Jan
PRC
announces nationwide anti-drug campaign 12 Feb-July Xinhua, 31 Jan
1 Feb 02 Myanmar Maternal and Child Welfare
Association holds HIV/AIDS advocacy meeting
5 Feb 02 Meeting for USDA development projects in
Kawthaung District DVB, 9 Feb
7-8 Feb 02 Thai army supreme commander visits
6-9 Feb 02 Thai Foreign Minister visits
8 Feb 02 Dr Salai Tun Than, democratic protester,
(arrested Nov 01) sentenced for 7 years under Article 5(J), Insein prison AHRC 20 Mar
10-19 Feb 02 Pinheiro visits Burma, meets Aung San Suu Kyi
& Dr Salai Tun Than, visits Kachin State & Insein prison & 11
political prisoners released during stay AHRC,
20 Mar; Reuters, 19 Feb
11 Feb 02 US State Dept. delivered Conditions in Burma
and US Policy toward Burma for the period 28 Mar 01 – 27 Sept 01 to Congress
12 Feb 02 Union
Day & Lahu New Year NLD calls for national unity & 6 ethnic
political party representatives make joint statement for tripartite dialogue AP, 12 Feb
PRC nationwide anti-drug campaign starts Xinhua, 31 Jan
U Win Tin’s 72nd birthday, RSF & BMA campaign
for his release AFP, 11 Mar
13 Feb 02 5 political prisoners released, incl. Myo
Mying Nyein – incarcerated for 12 years, coincides
with Pinheiro’s visit RSF & AFP, 13
Feb
SPDC
representative states success in talks is ‘imminent’ AFP, 13 Feb
Indonesian
defence ministry visit’s Burma AFP, 13
Feb
14 Feb 02 Myo Myint Nyein says prison conditions are
improved only during Pinheiro’s visits Radio
Burma, 14 Feb
CPJ issues ‘Under Pressure: How Burmese journalism survives
in one of the world’s most repressive regimes’ OneWorld.net, 15 Feb
18-19 Feb 02 ICRC visit Tavoy prison, recommend a day off
from hard labour, Network Media Group, 24
Feb
19 Feb 02 Junta says sanctions are slowing
democratisation process Reuters, 19 Feb,
Morning Star, 20 Feb
Aung
San property case continues,
19-25 Feb 02 ILO HLT returns to
21 Feb 02 13 Sri Lankan MPs express solidarity with
NLD, call for release of political prisoners, tripartite dialogue &
recognition of 1990 general election Mizzima,
21 Feb
22 Feb 02 Burmese Foreign Minister says
22-27 Feb 02 ILO team to
25 Feb 02 Save the Elephants report on dwindling
elephant population Reuters, 25 Jan
5 Mar 02 Regime rejects
6 Mar 02 Kyaw Win denies SPDC will demonetarise kyat
7 Mar 02 Ne Win’s son-in-law & 3 grandsons
arrested for ‘coup plot’ FEER, 21 Mar
8 Mar 02 3 political prisoners released & 20 women
prisoners AFP, 8 Mar
9 Mar 02
13 Mar 02 EU delegation to
KNU attack military base, killing 6 soldiers Kyodo, 14 Mar
Thai Public Health Ministry warns extreme caution should be
taken around migrant workers to prevent spread of communicable diseases Nation, 14 Mar
19 Mar 02 Razali’s 7th trip to Burma
postponed until 22 Apr due to ‘coup plot’
ILO
& SPDC sign document for “Liaison Officer” in
UN
Human Rights Commission session starts, Pinheiro to give report on Feb 02 visit
to
21-22 Mar 02 Thaksin cancels trip to Burma
25 Mar 02 Wa battalion clashes with Thai soldiers &
refuses to return belongings of dead soldier BP, 31 Mar
Reported deadline for Burmese outposts along Thai border to
build heavy artillery batteries & missile launching pads DVB, 7 Feb
27 Mar 02 Armed Forces Day, unprecedented security
28 Mar 02 Piheiro presents to UNCHR,
29 Mar 02 Release of 7 NLD members; Thein Zaw, Than
Swe, Tin Myaing, Khin Mg Lin, Win Ni Oo, Thein Htay & Aung Kyi Myint AFP, 29 Mar
30 Mar 02 Thai
cavalry task force refuses to talk with Wa battalion BP, 31 Mar
APPENDIX 1
AN EVENING WITH DR. CHAO TZANG
YAWNGWE
Interview
conducted by Kao-Wao News,
Son of the former President of the Union of Burma, Sao Shwe Thaike,
Dr. Chao Tzang became one of the leading founders and served in the Shan
resistance movement of the Shan State Army from 1963-1977, after Gen Ne Win’s
military coup.
A Bachelor’s Degree graduate from Rangoon University, Chao
Tzang completed a Master’s degree and Ph.D. in political science at the
University of British Columbia, Canada.
Chao Tzang is committed to social justice, democracy and
freedom for Shan State and Burma and has years of hands-on experience in the
political arena. Today he works with the Ethnic Nationalities Solidarity and
Cooperation Committee (ENSCC), the Strategy Consultation Committee (SCC), heads
the Program Team of the NRP (National Reconciliation Program), and is an
Advisory Board member of the United Nationalities League for
Democracy-Liberated Area.
Question: Your Experience Being
An Ethnic Nationality In Burma?
CTY: Personally I have had no problem. I am not obsessed with ethnic identity although I am a Shan nationalist in the sense that I consider it my duty to fight for the Shan people. The Shan people are cultured, peaceful, pious, humble, and aspire only to live quietly as dignified human beings, not subject to oppression by anyone. They have been unable to do so for more than fifty years.
Ethnic nationalism is by definition narrow. It is like racism. It is ugly. I believe that everyone must fight against ethnic nationalism, especially chauvinism or ethnic-racism. The Burma Army and its leaders are ethnic-chauvinists. This is why the whole country is suffering in so many ways for so many years.
Some of us choose to fight Burman ethnic-chauvinism with ethnic-patriotism. It is necessary to do so. But one must be careful because the politics of ethnicity can lead to confusion and result in chaotic conflict - and when this happens, the ordinary and decent folks suffer. In chaotic conflict, the people do not win. Most likely the oppressor regime will win because it will manipulate all the chaos and confusion, and it will create and encourage conflicts, the more the better.
It is a duty of everyone to love his people, to treasure his ethnic identity. But one should be able to think strategically, to see the big picture of any situation and/or the struggle. It is not useful in any way to be obsessed only with ethnic patriotism.
In addition, one has to consider
the fact that ethnic patriotism is a useful ideological weapon for politicians
and leaders aspiring to be an autocrat or dictator. Slobodan Milosovik was such
a leader, as was Adolf Hitler. Ne Win is also of this type. He used Burman
ethnic chauvinism to take away the rights and freedom of everyone and to make
himself an autocratic de-facto king - thereon destroying the lives of the
people of
Burma.
Q: Your Experiences In The Shan
Armed Movement?
CTY: My experience in the Shan State Army/SSA was very eventful. This is more so because we operated in the interior, in the frontlines - far away from all borders. The SSA did not have any border bases, unlike other resistance armies. We were always surrounded by the enemy.
We - I and my comrades - built up quite successfully an armed movement and organization that was not wholly dominated by military officers and men. They had to respect those serving in the civil administrative capacity, and were not allowed to interfere in administrative matters. Also, the people were organized into political, youth, women, self-help groups and organizations, and they were also responsible for local security.
Discipline in the SSA at that time was very strict. Soldiers and officers were not regarded as superior to the people, or as more patriotic than others. They were not above the law. An army that thinks of itself as a national vanguard, as the savior of the nation, as more patriotic than anyone - this kind of army is a threat to everyone.
Q: How You Handle The Differences
Between Armed Struggle And Non-Violence?
CTY: As noted by many thinkers and democratic leaders - including Daw Aung San Suukyi - if you win by violent means, you will rule with the same violence-prone mind-set when you win.
If we look at successful armed and violent revolutions all over the world and throughout history, such revolutions "eat their own sons and daughters", and the best and the brightest are among the first to be eliminated by the revolution. Because the brightest and the best are no longer around, the revolution invariably becomes corrupt, tyrannical, and self-serving.
Armed struggle is a science. Shooting up and killing lowly or low-ranking enemy (government) soldiers is not science. It is also not armed struggle. It is shooting and killing without strategic thrust. For example, the Burmese communist, CPB, waged this kind of "armed struggle". It said its aim is to kill a lot of Ne Win's soldier - as many as possible. The CPB did kill a lot of lowly enemy soldiers, but it was directionless fighting, a war without strategy and direction. In the end the CPB was defeated.
Therefore to wage an armed struggle, the first requirement is to have the ability to fight strategically, i.e., to use one's army - and brain power -- to change the strategic situation, to immobilize the enemy.
As a negative example, I would like to point out the way war was waged by the CPB. They concentrated on storming government garrisons mainly in the jungles and mountains. It was successful and the CPB killed a lot of lowly soldiers. But there was no strategic value to their victories. Ne Win had a lot of low-ranking soldiers to waste.
The CPB almost never staged effective ambushes on army convoys on the roads, near towns - the nearer the better. When a large convoy is ambushed and destroyed near a town, this shakes up the enemy's morale very badly. Fear grips the top officers, and they can’t hide their defeat from the public.
Fighting strategically therefore is the key. War is not about killing. War is about brainpower, and it is won firstly up here, in the head. War is about psychology, making the enemy feeling weak although they may be many times stronger, more numerous.
As many philosophers of warfare say, war is politics. At the heart of war is politics. If one loses the political war, the armed might that one possess, no matter how mighty, becomes useless. Ten, twenty battlefield victories can be neutralized, cancelled-out, by one political move.
Q: What Motivated You To Carry On
The Movement?
CTY: I don’t like what the military has done to the country and the people. Military rule is a cancer. And military rule was not necessary, and it is still not necessary. In fact, military rule is never needed nor necessary in any country.
It is the responsibility of everyone - every good sons and daughters of all ethnic segments in Burma - to remove this cancer from the body of our politics and our society.
I believe we can do this. This is why I am still in the fight. If I did not believe that this putrid cancer can be removed, I would not be doing what I am doing now.
Q: Why Is The State Constitution
So Important For The Future Of Burma? How Far Along Is The Shan State
Constitution?
CTY: State constitutions are at the heart of any federal arrangement. Federalism means the de-centralization of power so that power is distributed to the people, the local communities, through power structures that empower the people.
No one can dispute the fact that the Union or Pyidaungzu was founded because the Panglong Accord was signed in 1947. This country which was created jointly by Burman and non-Burman leaders and rulers in 1947 at Panglong, was granted independence a year later, in 1948. So, the Panglong Accord and its principles or the Panglong spirit is at the very heart of our past, present, and future.
The Panglong vision - shared by all non-Burman leaders and by U Aung San - was to establish a democratic, federal Pyidaungzu based on federalism: an arrangement based on the equality of states and their self-determination. Further, no one state was envisioned as being the mother-state (Pyi-Ma), superior to or above other states.
One goal of the state constitution drafting (SDC) process is to make leaders, activists, intellectuals, and politicians, etc., examine and explore their own future, their goals, visions, and to work out among themselves the kind of state they would like to live in.
When they begin the exercise of actually drafting their state constitutions, they will not only begin to understand federalism, democracy, etc., but to also understand how the people can be empowered to govern themselves through their local governments, their state governments, and the federal government. They will also be compelled to think seriously about ethnic self-determination and will also be compelled to think about how to incorporate this legitimate aspiration of all ethnic groups in their state constitution.
In short, the state constitution drafting process is both learning and a working process, and it is needed if the political slogans are to be translated into concrete and rational reality.
The Shan State constitution drafting process is in the bottom-up consulting stage. The drafting commission thinks that this is the most important stage, more important than the actual drawing up of the document.
I think the Shan drafting
commission is on the right track. Consulting with the people (bottom-up),
consulting among leaders and political parties, consulting between activists
and cadres, discussions on constitutional matters - they are very crucial. The
next stage will be discussions between the different drafting committees about
the
articles, clauses, provisions, etc. of the drafts (or "model"
constitutions).
Q: Why do you think the Panglong
Spirit is important? What are the challenges ahead?
CTY: As indicated above, the Panglong Accord gave birth to the Union/Pyidaungzu, and it also led to the obtaining of independence. That is why Panglong is important.
The Panglong spirit is important because it provides a solid and historical basis for democracy, peace, and real people's power. It is because our leaders aspired to these goals in 1947 - fifty five years ago - that they met at Panglong. The goals they aspired to, and which the people also wanted, is not fulfilled up till now, today. This is sad.
The challenges are many - basically because the military and successive military regimes have done much violence to the Panglong spirit, although they pay shallow lip-service to Panglong and the Panglong spirit - every year without fail since 1962. Very hypocritical.
It is most likely that the Panglong spirit will be a very hotly contested in the dialogue, if dialogue happens. The military camp will oppose federalism because it is opposed to the idea of equal status for all states.
Furthermore, there are still a lot of people, Burmans and non-Burmans alike, who do not understand federalism. Some non-Burmans like to equate federalism with Burmanization or being dominated by the Burman or by the Burman mother-state (Pyi-Ma). Some Burmans equate federalism with separatism, secession, balkanization, and so on. These elements can cause a lot of problems and also inflame emotions. This would be dangerous.
Q: How do you want to see the
future of Burma? The future of Shan people?
CTY: Like everyone, I would like to see a Union of Burma as a peaceful and prosperous place: a country where the people of all ethnic-belonging can live in freedom under the protection of the law and the constitution - of both the Union and state constitutions.
I would like to believe that the
future of the Shan people is bright and hopeful. If Shan State leaders are
politically skillful, and if they are also wise, there is no reason why the
Shan State cannot become the most prosperous state within the new, really
federal, really democratic Union. Society in the Shan State will and can become
the most free,
democratic, harmonious society on earth.
On the other hand, if Shan leaders are witless, emotion-driven, hot-headed, and do not know or understand politics, i.e., if they are politically illiterate and intellectually infantile, I fear life will be worse. It will be an endless hell, a slide down an endless slippery slope.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
All
Burma Federation of Student Unions, Foreign Affairs Committee (Dec 01) The Current Education Situation in Burma:
Education Report Year 2000
Altsean-Burma (Apr 02) Some Talk, Little Action; Special Report: Burma’s
Secret Talks
Altsean-Burma (Feb 02) Labour Pains; Report Card: 1 Sept –
Altsean-Burma (Oct 01) Burma’s Plea; Report Card: 1 May –
Annan, K (18 Mar 02) Report of the Secretary-General on the situation
of human rights in Myanmar, Commission on human rights, 58th
session, Item 9, E/CN.4/2002/35
Committee
to Protect Journalists (Feb 02) Under
Pressure: How Burmese journalism survives in one of the world’s most repressive
regimes
International Labour Office CEACR
2001 (Mar 02) Observations Concerning ILO Convention
No. 29, Forced Labour:
Médecins Sans Frontières-Holland (Mar 02) 10 Years For the Rohingya Refugees in Bangladesh -
Past Present and Future
Pinheiro (28 Mar 02) Report to UN Commission on Human Rights
Pinheiro (10 Jan 02) Report to UN Commission on Human Rights
US Department Of State (11 Feb 02) Conditions In Burma
And Us Policy Toward Burma For The Period March 28, 2001 – September 27,2001
ERRATA
Some Talk, Little Action: Burma’s Secret Talks,
Special Report
(published April 2002)
p20, para.1, sentence 1
Without a constitution a government cannot be formed.
meant to
read:
The
SPDC unconvincingly argue that without a constitution an elected government
cannot be formed. Despite the fact that Britain has had a democratically
elected parliament without any written constitution, the regime is sticking to
its guns on this point.
p41, THAN
SHWE
political history: SLORC Chairman (September 1988-November 1997)
meant to read:
political history: SLORC Chairman (September 1992-November 1997)
p44, photograph of Maung Aye incorrect
replace with………………...
Burma’s Plea: Report Card 1 May – 31 Aug
’01
(published October 2001)
p7, para.1, sentence 1
Recent releases of U Aung Shwe (NLD Chairman) and U
Tin Oo (NLD Deputy Chaiman) on 26th August (a day before Razali’s
trip) are welcome but many hundreds more (estimated at 1,500 by Amnesty
International) remain imprisoned with Aung San Suu Kyi still under house arrest
and denied diplomatic visitors.
meant to read:
Recent
releases of U Aung Shwe (NLD Chairman) and U Tin Oo (NLD Deputy Chaiman) on 26th
August (a day before Razali’s trip) are welcome but many hundreds more remain
imprisoned with Daw Aung San Suu Kyi still under house arrest and denied
diplomatic visitors.
Altsean-Burma apologises for any confusion that may
have been caused