JAPAN INSTITUTE
OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
‘At the Front Lines of Conflict
Prevention in
Conference
Myanmar’s Minority Conundrum: Issues of Ethnicity
and Authority
David I. Steinberg
Background
The issue of the status and
authority of the one-third of the population of Myanmar (Burma), composed of
diverse indigenous non-Burman peoples, remains the most intractable of the
problems facing the Burmese state since independence in 1948.[1] The sharing of political power in some manner
acceptable to the local populations, and social and economic equity among these
diverse peoples are all related to, but even more fundamental and difficult of
solution than, the issue of the political form of government that has bedeviled
the state for decades. Burma-Myanmar has
been on the brink of fragmentation because of the diffuse, often antithetical,
perceptions of these issues by one or more ethnic groups since
independence. The desires for
independence from the British, dependant on minimal titular ethnic unity, and
the forceful leadership of General Aung San whose role was accepted by most
minorities, were the factors that initially succeeded in bringing these groups together at the Panglong
Conference in February 1947 that forged the fragile cohesion that existed on
independence. An effective answer to the
minority issues is still sought, and its amelioration or solution may provide
signals and models for approaching some of the more delicate other national
issues that transcend ethnicity.
The unity of the state has been a
primary goal of the military SLORC (State Law and Order Restoration Council)
and the SPDC (State Peace and Development Council). The concern over this goal is, however, not a
product of this relatively new incarnation of the military. Since independence, the Burmese military have
fought for the unity of the state; more specifically the 1958 and then 1962
military coups were carried out with the avowed purposes of preventing civil
war and upholding this unity.
The problem of internal unity has had external dimensions. As the Burmese military has been preoccupied
with national unity, senior staffs have been suspicious of the role that
foreign nations and peoples have played in fomenting national fragmentation and
disunity. They accurately can point, and
do so continuously in the controlled press, to history to support their present
concerns. They correctly charge that the
British employed the ‘divide and rule’ policy of administratively separating
some of the peripheral minority areas from Burma Proper (where most of the
Burmans lived).[2]
More important, however, has been recent history, when each foreign
power, unofficially and often clandestinely, at one time or another has
supported for their own and diverse purposes, political or ethnic rebellions
involving minority peoples. These
included some unofficial British encouragement of independence for the Karen,
Chinese assistance to the Burma Communist Party,[3] United States covert support to
Chinese Nationalist (Kuomintang) troops that retreated into Burma in 1949-50,[4] external Muslim support to
Muslim rebels in the Arakan, Indian connivance with Naga
and Chin (Zo) rebels on that frontier, and Thai assistance at various national
and local levels to a wide variety of ethnic and political rebellions located
along its long littoral. It is no wonder
that Burmese authorities have viewed with great suspicion the roles that foreigners
have in the past played in interfering in their country, have projected these
same roles into the present, and fear that they may exist into the future. Present internal administrative policies are
in part likely to have been formulated with this in mind.
These past problems, severe in themselves
and sufficient to cause suspicions, were however aggravated by seven
additional and important factors:
[1] Some of these
peoples had significant Christian percentages of their populations in contrast
to the overwhelming importance of Buddhism among the Burmans.[5]
This aroused the sympathies of some of the external Christian
communities and sects that helped propagandize the plight of these peoples and
gave them moral (and perhaps financial) support.
[2] As the military,
especially in the period of military rule under the Burma Socialist Programme
Party (BSPP: 1962-1988), insulated the state from the outside world, the
minority groups were more in touch with external affairs and foreign elements
for both weapons and moral support than was the central Burmese
government. Thus they made their case to
the court of world opinion while the military regime became more introverted, isolated, and more
xenophobic. This naturally increased
suspicions that foreigners were once again aimed at dividing the country.
[3] The Burman
majority is the only major ethnic group that does not have ethnic kin in other
lands across the arbitrarily demarked colonial borders; this creates a sense of
international ethnic identity Burmans lack.[6]
In traditional
[4] The military,
perhaps without central authority and on the whims of individual local but
exceedingly powerful military commanders, have treated the minorities, among
whom they were stationed and whom they administered, with disdain for their
cultures and often religions.[7] Charges of human rights abuses
and forced porterage by the military in border regions are widespread.
[5] The hill
(minority) areas were climatically suitable for the production of poppies from
which opium, morphine, and heroin were produced, thus giving those engaged in
this trade the means to purchase arms and the motivation to keep the central
government at arm’s length. Opium
production was introduced in the colonial period, and until 1959 opium was
legal in the
[6] The natural
resources of the hill regions, such as jade and timber, provided lucrative
means to sustain local populations in rebellion.
[7] Foreign
missionaries and then international non-governmental organizations (NGOs), some
of which had religious origins, were extensively involved with the minorities
both because they often were animists and more susceptible to Christian
conversion, and then because poverty was exceptionally high and health
standards low in those regions.
All of these factors have increased
mutual suspicions.
However accurate the perceptions of
foreign support to various diverse minorities may have been in the past, the situation
has vastly changed since the earlier period of Burmese independence. It is now accurate to maintain that no
foreign power wants to see the break up of the Burmese state. The balkanization of
As foreign perceptions have also
changed, most minority aspirations have also undergone major shifts. Where some minority leaders in the past had
publicly advocated independence, some UN trusteeship, most now do not do
so. They have instead argued for some
form of local autonomy or federal authority, although the word ‘federal’ seems
anathema to the military who equate it with virtual independence and the
eventual effective break up of the state.[9]
Yet the old acquiescence of the
minorities to Burman domination is now more problematic. As Burman nationalism has understandably
grown, so has ethnic nationalism, a phenomenon that is evident worldwide. This means that minorities are likely to
demand more from the center as they see their brethren having more autonomy and
doing better across the porous borders.
This paper will consider only the
issue of the indigenous minorities of
State Goals
The goal of national unity of the
SLORC/SPDC government is thus conceptually appropriate, proper, and potentially
in the interests of the peoples of that country and in those of the neighboring
nations. In
That admittedly strong statement
needs explication, for on the surface the SLORC/SPDC can point with
considerable pride to the changes it has brought about in the minority
regions. There is now a wide array of
cease fires with diverse minority peoples; the bloodshed has stopped, but it
had continued for decades, in some areas even over two generations, and this is
not easily forgotten. This has brought
some relief to some of the minority peoples, and has further served to
strengthen the military in its control over the state as a whole, for it has
freed its troops to deal with the remaining insurgencies that have become
weaker and more ineffective. Some
infrastructure has been built where little existed before, providing access to
previously isolated regions, and there now is a concerted effort to administer
regions that were essentially beyond the control of the central government
almost since independence. The creation
of a new ministry, the Ministry of Development of Border Areas and National
Races under an August 1993 law, is part of the process. As access has been strengthened or created,
so has the responsibility of the central authorities in direct or indirect
management increased.
Yet these new conditions of relative
tranquility remain fragile. The cease
fires have not solved problems–they have sequestered them for an indefinite
period, but such armistices are likely to collapse without major changes and
improvements in the economic and social conditions of these peoples,
and in the political arrangements that must be made to provide some locally
defined degree of justice in the majority-minority relationships.
If the minorities in some cases have
relied on foreign moral support, the Burmese government has in part not been candid in
its portrayal of minority issues. Under
the BSPP military government, the state downplayed minority issues in such
international United Nations fora as ECAFE (later ESCAP), claiming that there
were no such issues. Later, under the
SLORC/SPDC it has averred that there were 135 ‘races,’ all of whom had to be
dealt with in some appropriate manner and for whom the old administrative
structures did not work.[11] Both approaches grossly exaggerated the issue
but from opposite points of the spectrum.
The figure of 135 ‘races’ is actually a pre-World War II designation of
a linguistic map that includes languages and dialects of such languages.[12]
There are actually far fewer ethnic groups, and ‘race’ is not an
appropriate scientific term to apply to this diversity. Many believe that the military in differing
periods has used the minority issue–either dismissing it or overemphasizing
it–as a means to perpetuate its direct control.
The formation and expansion of the
Union Solidarity and Development Association (USDA) create another element of
social and political control by the Burman military-dominated group over
minority peoples. With between about 15
million members, it is a military attempt at mass mobilization that increases
the tatmadaw’s
capacity for action toward its desired ends.
Although it is Burman lead and completely controlled by the military,
its membership has been extended to minority regions.
Majority-Minority Problems
There is a profound lack of
trust between the majority and individual minority groups that has become
exacerbated over time. In their efforts
to maintain national unity, the tatmadaw has engaged in actions that have lengthened the
distance between majority and the minorities, and thus made more tenuous the
relationships between Burman and most minorities. These actions may have been in response to
varied stimuli such as perceived internal threats to the state sometimes
encouraged from foreign sources, attempts to ensure internal military hegemony
over all centers of power within the state, and an essential disdain of
minority cultures and peoples. These
actions include:
‚ Elimination
of the limited local minority autonomy under civilian rule (1948-58, 1960-62).
‚ Direct
administration of local government in minority areas by military personnel.
‚ Treatment of
minority areas as virtually foreign occupied territories.
‚ Elimination
of significant minority leadership in the upper echelons of the tatmadaw.
‚ Lack of
official recognition of education in local, non-Burman languages.
‚ Restriction
of the avenues of social mobility for minority peoples.
‚ Lack of
respect for local religious practices in certain minority areas (especially the
‚ Arbitrary
confiscation of land.
‚ Lack or
transfer of central economic resources to minority areas commensurate with
their believed contribution to the national income (through exploitation of
natural resources).
‚ Support of
military units foraging off the countryside and the confiscation of land for
military and military-owned agricultural purposes.
‚ Forcing
villagers to be removed to alternative, military approved sites and in some
areas creating ‘free-fire’ zones.
‚ Forced
porterage of military supplies in the minority areas where fighting is endemic.
If mutual trust
is not forthcoming, major points of tension could intensify these past problems. For
example, the minority groups involved in the cease fires have not surrendered
to the Burmese authorities. They still
are allowed to retain their weapons and can engage in their traditional
agricultural pursuits. But when, for
example, a new constitution is promulgated, and before elections can be held,
the minorities are supposed to surrender their weapons to ensure the fairness
of such voting. It is highly unlikely
that this will happen beyond some token release of arms. The levels of trust do not now exist, and are
unlikely to exist in the future without significant changes in the
administration of minority affairs, to encourage the withdrawal of such weaponry . The
surrender of arms by minorities around the world under various peace plans has
not worked, and it is highly unlikely that it would occur in
The military
have promised to deliver to minority areas increased access to education,
health services, and employment opportunities.
Yet the budgets allocated to such activities are highly limited and
inadequate to accomplish the intended purposes.
These budgets seem mainly to be the reported reallocation of previously
determined national sectoral budgets (education, health, etc.) to these areas,
but the total national budgets for such services are already grossly
insufficient for the needs on a national basis and have deteriorated in real
and per capita terms over the past decade, let alone in the minority regions.
Thus mutual
levels of suspicion, inflamed by historical precedents and recent activities,
require the deft handling of negotiations at least to meet the minimal set of
requirements of all sides. There is no
evidence that there is either this political will or interest.
The
situation becomes more complex when the role of the National League for
Democracy (NLD) is factored into the already complicated equation. The NLD, although in alliance with a number
of minority parties especially the Shan NLD, is essentially a Burman
party. It has through the exiled
National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma (NCGUB) called for
‘National Reconciliation’ at a March 6-7, 2001meeting close to the Thai
border. It supported making public the
secret dialogue between the SPDC and Aung San Suu Kyi that started in October
2000 and that continues at this writing, and wants the minorities brought into
the dialogue process but at a later date because the present dialogue
conditions are too fragile. It sees a
staged set of consultations: intra-ethnic (to ensure those representing a
minority are legitimate), inter-ethnic, and national. It recognizes that although minorities are
considered as ethnic entities, they are internally split with factional
problems that must be overcome. Yet the
government and the NLD share a common attitude: each demands
from its adherents a kind of orthodoxy that makes dialogue far more
difficult.
Current Dilemmas
Many observers outside
In the
early period following the establishment of the SLORC, the NLD position (or
more accurately that of Aung San Suu Kyi) seems to have been that the solution
to minority issues could be easily resolved following the re-institution of
democracy in that country, and thus discussion of specific minority questions
should be delayed to some later date.[14]
That seems to have changed. As
the National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma (NCGUB) has attempted
to draft possible constitutions for the state, acts that the military have said
to be illegal, the National Convention that the SLORC convened to draw up a new
constitution with a highly select group of delegates and in a manner that was
heavily scripted and controlled, has floundered on the issues of minority
representation and power under such a new configuration.
As the
issue of a new constitution is sporadically debated,[15] the state organs of information
have leaked certain guidelines on minority rule that are likely to be enshrined
under a new constitution, whenever it may appear, led by the military
authorities. The first is that the
former minority ‘states’ (Shan, Kachin, etc.)
are inappropriate as pivotal administrative entities because they are
inaccurate descriptions of ‘race,’ as these areas contain many minority groups,
not only the ethnic group for which the state was named (the Chin State is an
exception). Second, that in order for
some of the most important cease fires to continue, some groups with concentrated
ethnic populations within contiguous townships would have a degree of local
autonomy called ‘self-administered zones.’
Most important among them are the Wa, who are
the best armed and most difficult to contain.
Others are said to be planned for the Naga, Danu,
This is an
effective but short-term strategy. This
provides such groups with local autonomy that they have never legally had since
independence, and at the same time it defuses power to such a local level that
it has no national impact. The model for
such activity may be drawn from the Chinese ‘autonomous regions,’ where limited
local authority rests with minority groups but real power is lacking. The Chinese model may appear to more savory
than the Russian model, which the Burmese may view as having led to the
dissolution of the
The levels
of distrust between the majority and minority ethnic groups are part of a
series of such apprehensions about the sharing of power. They are part of the pattern of problems that
include a tendency of the central government (civilian and military alike) to
deny effective authority to any potential peripheral political, ethnic, or
social grouping.[17]
Although these tendencies are simply that, and can be overcome, it makes
compromise more difficult.
The minority
issues are further complicated by internal divisions among some minorities and
fighting between some of them. The Karen
National Union, the oldest extant rebellion in the state, has for years been
led by Bo Mya, an anachronistic leader who is evidently out of step with the
younger Karen rebel leaders who would be prepared to make compromises with the
SPDC.[18]
In the recent (spring 2001) disputes between the Thai and
Suggestions for Potential Resolution of Minority Problems
The
solution to the internal distribution of ethnic power in
Private foreign organizations, the international NGOs
(non-governmental organizations), have potentially important roles to play as
well. The military do not have
the budgets, the knowledge, and lack the trust of the local populations to
solve the economic issues that these peoples face. Often deprived of their ancestral villages
and agricultural land, moved into safe areas where their actions can be
monitored by the military and prevented from being sympathizers of, or bases
for, potential insurgents, these peoples desperately need basic human needs
assistance. This at present must come,
if it is to be provided at all, from the international NGO community. Such assistance is in the interests of all
parties. Support by such groups helps
build local coalitions and organizations that can band together to resolve
local problems and this contribute to the social and economic stability of the
region–a desirable development that would in fact strengthen the military’s
primary goal of national unity. The
long-term goal is the re-creation of civil society at the local level in
The second
step would be for a compromise on local autonomy. The provision of local autonomy to specific
minority groups, as presently envisaged by the government under its proposed
‘self-administered areas,’ could be maintained as a sign of progress. Such autonomy could be limited to customary
and family law, inheritance, some forms of local taxation, etc. At the same time, some of the previous
administrative functions of the seven states and divisions could be maintained,
and their representation built into a national legislature but not necessarily
exactly on the model of the 1947 constitution.
These two administrative layers would not necessarily be inconsistent
with each other. As the center devolves
authority to the state and divisions, so the states could devolve certain types
of authority to the townships.[22] The groups receiving such local
‘self-administration’ would be pleased to have the greatest degree of autonomy
they have experienced, although groups such as the Shan and Kayah would see
their former limited autonomy during the civilian period erode further.
These
approaches themselves would be inadequate without the military receding into
the background in minority areas. This
would involve the military retaining responsibility for the maintenance of the
borders and the garrison of such troops necessary to ensure the preservation of
the state and to deal with such issues as transnational crimes, including
narcotics trafficking, illegal migration, etc.
But it would necessarily involve the military in the training of
minority peoples in aspects of local public administration starting long before
such a new system were to come into
effect–perhaps during a two-year period.
An administrative cadre needs to be created to take over the administration
of township and state-level offices and functions, now run by the
military. Those remaining from the
previous civilian era are too few, old, and outdated to staff the positions
that would be required under such a system; such positions are now dominated by
the military. A staged military
withdrawal from local administration would be an important element of any
amelioration of minority issues; continuation of direct military
administration, even under a ‘civilianized’ administration, would exacerbate
problems.
Budgetary
issues have long been a problem, with minorities in the civilian period
proclaiming that they did not receive an adequate share of national
resources. A more effective system of
sharing of such resources needs to be determined in consultation with various
minority groups. These budgetary
arrangements under present and likely near-term future conditions would require
that the percentage of funding going to the military budget, both officially
and publicly recognized and that buried in other accounts, be reduced, for
without sufficient economic incentives any solution to the minority issues will
not take place.[23]
The
devolution of some significant authority in local affairs should not alone be
concentrated in minority regions. The
Burman divisions also should be included, because the 1990 election indirectly
indicated dissatisfaction with the lack of local participation in the
administrative processes. There are few
models from which
Local state
and/or township authority should extend to educational systems, in which local
languages may be taught as long as the national language of Burmese is also
included in the curriculum. This has not
been possible under any Burmese administration, and the change would likely be
greeted with enthusiasm by local peoples.
Language is one of the critical indicators of identity, and preservation
and use has become intimately associated with nationalism. Language policy has been a critical component
of ethnic complaints on every continent, even inciting rebellion (witness
The
granting of certain rights to the minorities is necessary but not
sufficient. Ironically, as the state
should loosen control over the peripheral minority areas, it must tighten control
over the military command system. The
regional military commanders, who have been elevated to inclusion on the SPDC,
need to come under central authority to control their arbitrary actions that
only serve to undercut centrally mandated change. Some regional commanders have become the
equivalent of warlords with wide discretionary authority. Further, they have remained in their posts
far longer than in previous administrations, thus strengthening their control. The state should redefine their nonmilitary
functions, reducing their authority over civilian administration and control.
Finally,
the military should actively recruit (as once they did) minorities into the
senior military leadership. There seems
little question that the military will retain effective and ultimate power
within the state as they have done since independence and under any likely
future government over the next decade or two, even though some positions will
probably be provided to civilian leadership and retired military, and that
opposition parties may be allowed to function more fairly. This will occur through military
representation in a national legislature and through other means. Simply because it is most probable that the
military, which has created a dual society—an ascendent
military and a subservient civilian (of any ethnic background) one—that is
pervasive, that the military should share some of that power with minorities
who can rise within the military ranks as evidence of the fairness of the
government and as a means to alleviate ethnic discrimination.
These
suggestions are unlikely to be instituted.
Yet they could constitute the beginnings of a set of compromises that
could have important implications for the defusion of
the antagonisms that have caused the loss of so many lives over so many years,
and pauperized what should have been a rich and vibrant region of the
country. If the immediate problems of
the minorities can be assuaged, then the lessons from that process could assist
any central government through creating administrative and representational
models. Final authority essentially
would remain in Burman hands, but under a system regarded as much more
fair. Because the military have the
authority and power in the state, they must assume greater responsibility to
start a process through which the tensions could be ameliorated and eventually
resolved.
The Role of
Since the early 1950s,
The Japanese aid program has
undergone revision, and various human rights and good governance provisions
have been applied to foreign support, although they have been only sporadically
employed (e.g., Indonesia under Suharto). Among the industrialized states, however,
During the Ne Win era (which may not
yet have reached its final moments), Japanese diplomats had more access to the
Burmese leadership than those of any other country. Even as early as 1958, Ne Win was quoted
during the ‘Caretaker’ military government as wishing to import Japanese
farmers to teach productive farming to the Burmese in the Mu River valley. Today, the treatment of visiting Japanese by
the government has been the most friendly of any OECD
country.
In 1999, this writer accompanied a
distinguished Japanese delegation to Yangon, and recommended at that time that
Japan provide humanitarian assistance through Japanese and international NGOs
and through the UNDP because it would support needed help to the poor, train
future Japanese specialists on Burma-Myanmar, strengthen the Japanese NGOs, and
help begin the process or rebuilding civil society in Myanmar. But he recommended against restarting lending
until significant changes took place in the political economy. In a sense, Japanese policy seems to have
been to encourage change through provision of support, while the
But any assistance, even
negotiations, should take place in a quiet, measured atmosphere without public
hectoring that plays to the internal politics of the potential donor and
encourages emotional nationalistic responses and defense. A former Japanese ambassador to the
APPENDIX: David
I. Steinberg, ‘
David I Steinberg is Director of Asian Studies,
[1]. In 1989, the military
government changed the name of the state from
[2]. This was a policy based on an Indian model. The British probably separated some of the minority areas from Ministerial Burma, as it was called, for administrative ease and fiscal prudence since they had the power to govern the country in any manner they chose, as it was cheaper to keep the traditional local power elites and systems in place.
[3]. Deng Hsiao-ping argued that state-to-state relations were different from party-to-party relations, the the CCP could support the BCP.
[4].
Since 1988, there has been a palpable fear among some in the military
that the
[6].
There are more Kachin and Shan in
[7]. Here one should distinguish between the admirable articles of previous constitutions that gave appropriate, theoretical recognition and protection to local, minority cultures in contrast to the actuality of their conditions, in which they were clearly subordinate to the Burman population. All rights under the constitutions were never absolute, but always subject to law and issues of national policy. Actions considered by the state to subvert national unity (interpreted as Burman control) were illegal.
[8].
There are now between 500,000-750,000 illegal Burmese workers in
[11]. The evolved administrative structure was seven ‘divisions’ (provinces) for Burman areas, and seven minority ‘states’ (also provinces, each named for the majority ethnic group in that area but which contained other smaller groups as well). This implied a sense of ethnic and administrative power balance, which in fact was lacking as power was concentrated at the center in Burman hands.
[12]. It is assumed that language implies ethnicity, which is often, but not always, the case. There are about two dozen linguistic families of languages and many more dialects. The government’s attempts to distinguish ethnicity from race seem designed to avoid significantly large administrative units with ethnic names.
[13]. One of the unheralded conclusions that can be drawn from the results of that election is that there was an upsurge of regionalism that transcends minority issues, but was a reflection of the apparent frustration of local groups to the stringent centralized control that has been a hallmark of military rule under all tatmadaw governments. Some have argues that the military, in agreeing to hold the election and in allowing so many parties to participate (over 90 did so), fully expected a splintering of the votes so that they could exert continuing control over the government that was to evolve. When the NLD won so overwhelmingly, their attitude toward transfer of power hardened, as did the opposition’s belief in their right to rule.
[14]. Professor Josef Silverstein, whose writing on both Aung San and Aung San Suu Kyi are seminal, has indicated that one essential difference between the father and daughter was the former’s priority on minority issues, while the latter preferred to delay their consideration.
[15]. It should be remembered that the military ruled by decree from 1962 until 1974 without a constitution, and thus the present constitutional hiatus dating from 1988 is not without precedent.
[16].
The minority training institute established in the Sagaing Division
under the BSPP has been transformed under the SLORC into a university. It was designed to train party cadre from
minority groups to work among minority peoples, and was likely modeled on the
Chinese minority institute in
[17].
This in turn is based on a more basic concept of the nature of power and
authority as finite, thus sharing is anathema.
See David I.
[18]. The position of Bo Mya among Karen rebels seems reminiscent of Ne Win’s position among the Burman military. Both represented old-line autocratic leadership outdated under contemporary needs and conditions.
[19].
This is based on the assumption, likely to be spurious, that the Burmans
can control the Wa. The question remains as to what
groups occupy the areas vacated along the Chinese border. The Chinese? From the 1950s it has been the obvious policy
of the Thai at various and perhaps uncoordinated levels to support ethnic and
other rebellions along its
[20].
This was proposed in David I. Steinberg, ‘Burma/Myanmar and the Dilemmas
of U.S. Foreign Policy.’ Contemporary
[21].
See David I. Steinberg, ‘A Void in
[22]. The townships were eliminated by the BSPP as based on an Indian model, but they seem to have been re-instituted.
[23]. The minority regions under the civilian administration wanted independent authority to negotiate foreign assistance without reference to the central government. This was never allowed. Yet the Yangon Municipality Act under the SLORC gave that city the right to negotiate foreign assistance autonomous from central government approval. Rather than indicating a lessening of central control, to this writer it indicated the degree of confidence by, and intent of, the military that they would continue to remain in authority.
[24].
For a study of Japanese assistance, see David I. Steinberg, ‘Japanese Aid to