LEGAL ISSUES ON BURMA NO. 11, APRIL 2002
BURMA LAWYERS' COUNCIL

FEDERALISM IN BURMA

Burma's Ethnic Problem is Constitutional 

Harn Yawnghwe and B. K. Sen* 

Dr David Steinberg of Georgetown University presented a paper, "Myanmar's Minority Conundrum: Issues of Ethnicity and Authority", at the Conference entitled "At the Front Lines of Conflict Prevention in Asia", held in Tokyo on 6 and 7 July 2001. He said that, "The issue of the status and authority of one-third of the population of Myanmar's population, composed of diverse indigenous non-Burman peoples, remains the most intractable of the problems facing the Burmese state since independence in 1948. The sharing of political power in some manner acceptable to the local populations, and social and economic equity among these diverse peoples are all related to, but even more fundamental and difficult of solution than, the issue of the political form of government that has bedevilled the state for decades. Myanmar has been on the brink of fragmentation because of the diffuse, often antithetical, perceptions of these issues by one or more ethnic groups since independence (…)" 

While the issue of the status of the non-Burmans in a future Burma is a key issue that will have to be dealt with, the "fragmentation" thesis needs to be re-examined. Has Burma really been on the brink of fragmentation since independence? Are the ethnic nationalities and the politics of ethnicity the root cause of the problem? Was General Ne Win correct when he claimed in 1962 that he had to seize state power to prevent Burma from disintegration? The current State Peace and Development Council also claims that there are 135 languages and 8 major races in Burma requiring a strong centralized military to keep the country together. Is this true? 

The fear of fragmentation probably has its roots in the fact that post-colonial states or nations were created by grafting nation states onto tradi tional societies. The new leaders, the successors to the legacy of colonial "state-making", the leaders of sovereign "nation-states", therefore, feared losing their newly acquired piece of "real estate". This fear— reinforced by the inadequacies and insecurities of the new power elites— was bolstered by the "modernization" theorists of the 1950s and 60s. The modernization theorists and theories pitted the modern elites (in control of the state) against the backward, premordial societies and their parochial, traditional leaders. In this view, the state was modern and modernizing, while traditional 'societies' were backward, irrational, etc. 

The unfortunate result has been the emergence of state-centric (state-sympathetic) state-society theories, with scholars riding on the back of the 'rampaging elephants' (the new states and power holders), looking down on societies, communities, and individuals as these were trampled. The actions of the state, no matter how coercive or repressive, were looked upon as laudable state-building, nation-building exercises. The defensive reaction and resistance of the victims were portrayed as being state-fragmenting, state-destroying acts of tribal insulates or traditional elements. 

Of course, in the Cold War context, the state was also a sacred thing for both the US-led "free world" and the communist bloc. Thus was 'society' made invisible, as were the repressive actions of the power-holders (who were clients of the respective blocs). 'Society' did not count or was considered subversive or infiltrated by the enemy. 

In the case of Burma, the earliest rebellions against the new state of Burma were waged by the White Flag and Red Flag Communists and the Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League's pocket armies, the Yebaws, and also by men and officers of the First and Third Burma Rifles. These were all Burmans. The communist-leftist rebellions and armed uprisings, were actually really and truly state-fragmenting. They did not even acknowledge Burma's independence. To them it was counterfeit. Their aim was to overthrow not only the AFPFL but the new state itself— lock, stock, and barrel. But these rebellions are not generally considered by the power elite to be state-fragmenting. 

On the other hand, the Karen rebellion was fuelled mainly by the Burma Independence Army massacres during the Second World War, and by the post-war massacres of Karens. In fact, the common thread running through the ethnic rebellions in Burma is that they were reactions to military atrocities. But the "state-fragmenting" approach to history saw the ethnic rebellions as such because they pitched traditional societies against the modern state. 

It cannot be said that the Burman elites (the AFPFL as a whole, and the military) eschewed playing the politics of identity. They, and especially the military, had ethnic aspirations, and nationhood was viewed in terms of Burman hegemony (or, as Michael Aung-Thwin and Robert Taylor put it, "Pax Birmanica"). 

The "Pax Birmanica" version of history is one informed and buttressed by the textbook history of Burma written by English historians of the Victorian-Edwardian age. The history was gleaned from court chronicles and interpreted in "national" terms (as were histories of the imperial-colonial epoch). Burmese history was portrayed in ethnic terms. What we have then, as a history, is one that gives the impression that Burma evolved through a series of nation-building conquests; that Burma was unified long ago by Burman "conqueror-kings". 

The English Victorian-Edwardian school of history is now unfortunately quite entrenched, fed by ignorance and the military's control of academic life, and censorship, for over forty years. This situation has produced in turn a counter-history which portrays the Burmans as destructive, expansionist, chauvinistic, brutal, and which alludes to great Mon, Rakhine, Shan, etc., kingdoms and empires, as if nationalism existed in Burma among ethnic-linguistic groups since time immemorial, rather than nationalism or ethno-nationalism being the product of modern imaginings and Western intellectual and technical contributions. 

To these historical fancies and myths have been added the military's image of itself as the saviour the nation, keeping the country together, and other such self-serving propaganda. Scholars should not take the claims of the military seriously. To do so is to buy into the myth that the Union was saved from fragmenting by the military by way of coups and massacres, and brutal and systemic, systematic atrocities. 

It would not be wrong to say that the military is inherently part of the problem. Therefore, to look upon the "ethnic" problem in Burma as having to do with fragmentation, describing Burma as being on the brink of fragmentation is to unwittingly rationalize the irrational, to defend the indefensible. It is blame being pinned on everyone except the real culprit. 

It is not too late to undo the mischief caused by military rule. Even today, there is almost no ethnic animosity on the people-to-people level. Ordinary folks, regardless of ethnicity, are tolerant, accommodative, kind, generous, and so on. There is no ethnic hatred as witnessed in the former Yugoslavia or today in Afghanistan. 

The politics of identity is actually played out only at the elite level, at a political level. In reality, the central problem is the problem of brutal rule, the arbitrary exercise of power, and the mismanagement of everything. Who would like to be a part of a country where an alien and alienating army of occupation does what it wishes with impunity with your village, your crops, your fields, orchards, animals and livestock, and with your wife, your daughter, with any members of your family? 

It is the everyday violation of the fact and spirit of Panglong, on which the Union, "modern Burma", was founded. At Panglong, the people of Burma were for the first and only time united in purpose. Contrary to common perception, even the Karens agreed to the concept of Panglong: equality, self-determination and democracy. At the time of the massacres, the Karens were negotiating to be recognized as a state within the Union. 

Had the AFPFL abided by the spirit of Panglong, much of the subsequent fighting over the years could have been avoided. As was witnessed in the early days of independence, the Karen, Chin, Kachin and Shan Rifles rallied to the rescue of U Nu's government. 

Recognizing that Burma's "ethnic" problem is a constitutional one, Shan and other ethnic leaders in 1960-61 formed the Federal Movement and worked within the legal democratic framework to remedy this problem by constitutional means. But they were stopped by General Ne Win who seized power and claimed he had to save the country from disintegrating. What he has done in 40 years to further fragment the country is well-documented. If Burma does finally fragment (which is not likely though) blame will rest squarely on the shoulders of the generals and their juntas. 

Endnote 

* Harn Yawnghwe is the Director of EU-Burma. His father, Soo Thanke, was Burma's first independent President. B. K. Sen is an Executive Committee Member of the Burma Lawyers' Council.