LEGAL ISSUES ON BURMA JOURNAL No. 7, DECEMBER 2000
BURMA LAWYERS' COUNCIL


JUSTICE IN TRANSITION

Dealing With Past Human Rights Abuses: 
Promoting Reconciliation in a Future Democratic Burma

Jeremy Sarkin*

Introduction

As the twenty-first century begins, transitions from repressive rule to democracy have become a worldwide phenomenon. In many cases, the displaced regimes have been characterized by massive violations of human rights. While it is unclear when Burma will be free, it is certain that it will eventually become a democracy. A critical challenge that will arise for the democratically-elected government when it comes to power will be how to deal with past human rights abuses.1 Burma is not alone – Czechoslovakia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Germany, Honduras, Chile, Columbia, Greece, Germany, Poland, Hungary, the Philippines, Rwanda, Ethiopia, Cambodia, East Timor, Nigeria, Northern Ireland, Sierra Leone and other countries have recently or are presently looking at ways of dealing with these issues.

How a society deals with its past has a major determining influence on whether that society will achieve long term peace and stability. The critical question for such a state is whether or not to prosecute and punish those responsible for past gross human rights abuses. The objectives of policies to deal with past human rights abuses are often to prevent future human rights abuses and to repair the damage that has been caused. The need of victims and the society as a whole to heal from the wounds inflicted upon them by the former regime often has to be balanced against the political reality in which the new government may have limited political power and in which it may have inherited a fragile state. A new state has to be founded on a commitment to human rights and a dedication to the rule of law. Often, however, achieving national reconciliation, building unity, reconstructing the institutions necessary for stable political and economic systems, and obtaining the resources necessary to fund the transition are seen to be in conflict with dealing with the past.

Knowing about the abuses of the past2 and acknowledging them seems to be crucial issue in a transitional process.3 Ignoring history leads to collective amnesia, which is not only unhealthy for the body politic but is essentially an illusion – an unresolved past will inevitably return to haunt the citizens.4 The establishment of a full official account of the past is increasingly seen as an important element of a successful transition to democracy. Criminal trials are one way in which the facts of past abuses may be established. The establishment of a truth commission is another.

This article looks at the question of transitional justice in a future democratic Burma to determine the possibilities and options for dealing with past human rights abuses.


Dealing with the past

Dealing with past injustices is a crucial test for a new democratic order. Facing the tension between justice and peace, the transitional process entails tremendous challenges.5 Countries in such a situation have to resolve similar problems: should they punish human rights violations committed under the old order? Is an amnesty permissible and necessary in the interest of peace, reconciliation and unity? Does a society need an official account and acknowledgement of the wrongs of the past? Must the public sector be purged of supporters of the old regime? How can the victims of human rights violations be assisted in some way and have their dignity restored? To what extent should unjustly expropriated property be restored?

New democracies have various options in dealing with these issues.6 They make their choices according to the contexts of their transitions, taking into account the seriousness of the crimes committed and the resources available to deal with these issues. The choices made by a future democratically-elected Burmese government will be determined by the type of transition which takes place and the constraints which this may impose.


The importance of how democracy comes to be established

There are three broad types of political transition from an authoritarian regime to a democratic one:7 overthrow, reform and compromise.8 Being overthrown9 is the fate of a regime that has refused to reform: opposition forces become stronger and finally topple the old order. In the ‘overthrow’ model, the dominant forces are staunchly opposed to reform and over time the opposition gains significant political strength while the authoritarian regime loses strength. Democratisation occurs after the authoritarian government collapses or is overthrown and the opposition comes to power. Under these circumstances, the former regime has lost not only power but legitimacy as well. Consequently, the transitional government comes to power with no significant political constraints inhibiting implementation of a legitimate human rights policy. In such a case the new government has the widest discretion to decide how it should deal with the past, including unfettered power to bring the perpetrators of human rights abuses to justice.

When reform is undertaken, 10 the old government plays a critical role in the shift to democracy as, initially at least, the opposition is weak and the old government determines the type and pace of change. Sometimes a group within the authoritarian regime steps forward and leads a movement towards ending the old order and establishing democracy. In this scenario, the old forces still retain control at some level even though they have allowed a democratic government to come to power. This unequal distribution of power is a significant obstacle to exacting transitional justice and the new government’s power to implement the human rights policy of its choice is limited. Because such a transformation may have occurred from within the authoritarian regime, there may be a feeling among some that democracy is at the will of the former regime. Since these former leaders retain a lot of power, they have the ability, to a greater or lesser extent, to dictate what happens in the transitional process.

An example of this, relevant to Burma, is Chile where General Pinochet was able to enact legislation during his tenure to ensure that he would not be prosecuted after a civilian government came to power for human rights abuses. Additionally, the military retained a great deal of power even after the handover of power to the civilian government. There was, therefore, always the fear of another coup d’etat if the military was provoked. As a result, nothing was done to deal with the gross human rights violations allegedly perpetrated by Pinochet for two decades. Only now, as a result of the process in Spain and the United Kingdom, the state in Chile is feeling secure enough to bring Pinochet to book.

Where the reform model of change applies, an amnesty is likely, few prosecutions if any are likely to occur, and the past will largely be ignored.

In countries where change is the result of compromise,11 the existing regime and opposing forces are equally matched and cannot make the transition to democracy without each other.12 Such was the case in South Africa. This model therefore entails democratisation by the combined actions of the former regime and the opposition forces. In compromising itself out of power, the authoritarian regime will generally negotiate protections for itself in terms of amnesties or a promise by the new government not to investigate or prosecute certain past crimes. Therefore, the human rights policies adopted by successor governments in such a situation generally involve institutional measures aimed at deterring future human rights abuses13 rather than investigating and punishing past abuses.14

The nature of the transition to democracy in Burma will determine the extent to which justice can be pursued. If the military is overthrown, at present an unlikely scenario, this will give the widest scope of action to a new government. More than likely the process of change will occur on the basis of reform or compromise or a combination of the two. The critical determinant is the level of power retained by the old order.15 If the forces of the old order are strong enough, they may simply wait for the new government to make a mistake or push its power too far (especially when it comes to seeking prosecutions). Former leaders may be able to state outright that they will not tolerate being held accountable for human rights abuses committed during their reign. If this happens, the new government will have to make a choice between dealing with the past or succumbing to the pressure exerted by the former regime to deal only cosmetically with the human rights abuses of the past. If it does not deal with the past, its legitimacy could be undermined. If it takes on the challenge of forcing the former regime to account for the past, it runs the risk of becoming susceptible to overthrow. The risks attached to the second option may mean a majority of people in Burma do not favour the pursuit of transitional justice because they fear oppressive forces will once again rise up and assume power.


Truth, justice and reconciliation

Broadly speaking, options available to a new democratic society include (1) criminal sanctions, (2) non-criminal sanctions, and (3) the rehabilitation of the society. Usually, the path chosen takes into account three goals: truth, justice, and reconciliation.16 The type of balance17 between these three goals is determined to a large extent by the type of transition and thus the limits of the power of the new regime to make unfettered choices.

Truth is knowing about and officially acknowledging past human rights abuse. This official acknowledgement can open a dialogue in the state between individuals, and the various groups in the society.18 Facilitating an open and honest dialogue can effect a catharsis, and prevents ‘collective amnesia which is not only unhealthy for the body politic but also, essentially an illusion – an unresolved past ... inevitably return[s] to haunt [a society in transition]’.19

Justice is a critical aspect of ensuring respect for human rights and the rule of law – it is necessary to prevent future violations. Justice deters similar acts in the future and promotes peace and human rights while consolidating the new government as one bound by the rule of law and, therefore, distinctly different to the regime of the past. The degree of justice possible depends on, among other things, historical, political, military and socio-economic factors. It is shaped by the nature of the past the obstacles of the present, and the future needs of the society.20 The prosecution route does not always lead to positive results for a transitional society. Experiences with war crimes trials, for example, show that it is difficult to meet the hopes and expectations of the victims by these means. Victims are mostly not involved in the trials, and are often denied the cathartic experience of a process that focuses on them as victims. In isolation, trials allow for recognition of only a single version of events.

While trials can help lead to truth, the criminal justice system must adhere to principles of due process and assignment of individual, not collective, responsibility. Trials often limit truth discovery. Critically, in a society in transition, the courts are often composed of judges from the old order. Their decisions may therefore, not always be responsive to the needs of the new democratic order. If new judges have been appointed, they may not be willing to hand down decisions which are too politically controversial. The standards of proof for conviction in a criminal trial are higher than those that must be attained in a civil trial. Thus, guilty verdicts are far from certain. An acquittal can have a devastating effect on victims and the society in general. It must also be remembered that the aim of a trial is to attain a guilty verdict, not to assist victims in their recovery process. There could, therefore, be major failings and disadvantages in the use of the criminal justice system in a transitional society for victims of human rights abuses.

Prosecutions may be ineffective in fragile democracies where regimes may not be able to survive the destabilising effects of politically-charged trials. Many countries emerging from dictatorship are polarised and unstable, and may be further fractured by prosecutions of the previous regime’s depredations. Under these circumstances, democratic consolidation can be furthered by implementing an act for reconciliation embodied in an amnesty law covering past human rights violations.21 In countries where the military still retains enormous and substantial power after relinquishing office, any attempt to prosecute past violations may provoke a rebellion or other confrontations that could weaken the authority of the civilian government. Another constraint is the fact that transitional societies may not yet possess the attributes of a viable democracy – in particular the new government may lack the power to bring the military to account. Another question is whether the new government will have the ability to prosecute many of those involved in human rights abuses. Thus, issues such as resources and the state of the criminal justice system will play a critical role in determining the number of trials as the state might not have the available human and financial resources to pursue or carry these prosecutions. If the requirement to prosecute everyone who has committed is met, it may place impossible demands on the judiciary. However, criminal punishment is a very effective means of preventing future repression. 22 Knowing that there is a good chance of being prosecuted will deter many who may be tempted to commit human rights abuses.

These are some of the reasons prompting some states to grant amnesty to perpetrators of gross human rights abuses or not to prosecute those who have committed atrocities. A truth commission, on the other hand, analyses various versions of events and can validate more than one version by accepting differing testimony and incorporating all versions into a report that becomes official history. This will be examined in more detail below.

Reconciliation, in the context of a transitional setting, includes both conflict resolution and social rehabilitation. Without long-term peace, something that cannot occur without reconciliation, a nation cannot ensure stability and growth. Critically, new regimes inherit societies fractured by oppressive regimes that have utilised race, religion, ethnicity, and other divisions to gain and maintain power. Such will be the case, at least to some degree, in Burma. Populations subjected to ‘divide and rule’ tactics are likely to remain divided and to continue to feel deep-seated fear, resentment and other negative emotions against other groups in the society. These are formidable obstacles to reconciliation in any country. Reconciliation is a long-term goal which requires deliberate, measured programmes and processes.

The goals of achieving truth, justice and reconciliation may be in conflict with each other in Burma as they have been in other countries. For example, the pursuit of truth must sometimes come at the expense of justice. Likewise, the pursuit of justice does not always promote reconciliation.23 Dealing with the unique circumstances of each situation requires balancing truth, justice and reconciliation to achieve the best result, given the relevant political, social, economic, demographic and other factors. Although it is always valuable to learn from the experience of other countries which have been through a transition to democratic rule, the unique situation in Burma demands a unique solution if it is to stand a chance of success.

How strong the old regime is in the old order is critical in determining the ability of the new government to deal with perpetrators of past human rights violations. Various countries have established processes outside of the criminal justice system for this purpose, one model being a truth and reconciliation commission.


A truth and reconciliation commission 24

There are various truth and reconciliation models. The model implemented in South Africa, in addition to dealing with issues of truth and reconciliation, also established a process to grant amnesty to individual offenders. In terms of the legislation, perpetrators had to apply for amnesty and their applications had to comply with various criteria. These criteria included proving a political motive and revealing the complete truth about the crime for which they were applying for amnesty. However, such an institution need not, necessarily, replace criminal prosecutions or grant amnesties. In fact, international law prohibits the granting of amnesty for certain gross violations of human rights.

Truth and reconciliation commissions create records of human rights abuses that are as complete as possible. They often record the nature and extent of the crimes and a full record of the names and fates of the victims. The identities of those who gave the orders and those who executed them have been included in some reports, but others have omitted the names of perpetrators fearing vigilante justice. Some commissions have covered very short periods while others have covered much longer, but still well-defined periods.

A truth and reconciliation commission can be set up in a variety of ways. Tailoring the commission’s mandate and powers to both the country’s current situation as well as its history provides the best chance for success. A truth and reconciliation commission can facilitate a national catharsis.25 Should a commission be successful in its work, future generations will be served by the knowledge that the record of past abuses is as complete as it can be. The hope is that such a record, in combination with the recommendations made by the commission, will ensure that such human rights violations do not take place in the future and will also further the development of a human rights culture in the society.

A properly-constituted commission in Burma would generate public awareness of what really happened. In the absence of the processes envisaged in the workings of such an institution, anger, resentment, hatred, and revenge might be the order of the day. Only by publicly and collectively acknowledging the horror of past human rights violations will it be possible for the country to establish the rule of law and a culture of, and respect for, human rights.

Should a truth and reconciliation commission be established, victims across the spectrum will have a credible and legitimate forum through which to reclaim their human worth and dignity; perpetrators, irrespective of persuasion and motivation, will have a channel through which to expiate their guilt. Failure to establish this kind of process disregards the rights and views of victims, denies the need for a healing process, prevents recovery of the past, imagines that forgive-ness can take place without full knowledge of whom and what to forgive, and fails to establish human rights values as the core standard for the future.

A truth and reconciliation commission could develop a complete picture of the causes, nature, and extent of gross violations of human rights and, importantly, make this known. It could also provide a mechanism that would facilitate confession of crimes and ease the pressures on the weak criminal justice system. If the route of granting amnesty is chosen, it can assist in this process or suggest sentences for persons who make full disclosure of all the relevant facts relating to acts associated with a political objective. Such a truth and reconciliation commission should establish and make known the fate or whereabouts of victims and restore the human and civil dignity of survivors of abuse by granting them an opportunity to relate their own accounts of the violations they suffered. By recognising and publicising the victim’s story, the inherent worth and dignity of the person is acknowledged. In addition, the commission can recommend such reparation measures as are possible in the circumstances.

A commission can also compile a public report detailing its activities and findings and recommend measures to prevent future violations of human rights. Several positive consequences would flow from this. First, it would deter new governmental authorities from committing abuses themselves because they will have to respect the rule of law because mechanisms to ensure accountability will be in place. It would demystify the past and expose the previous regime’s brutality and its inability to govern fairly. It would imbue the new government with respectability because, especially by prosecuting the planners of the human rights violations, it would be sending the clear message that no one is above the law, and that ethical values may not be discarded in the name of a political goal. Finally, it would legitimise the new government’s actions because it upholds the rule of law.

A possible danger, and something that should be anticipated and proactively addressed, is the fact that a truth and reconciliation commission holds the potential of opening up old wounds, renewing resentment and hostility against the perpetrators of abuses. Therefore, careful planning and preparation is crucial to ensure that the process achieves its aims and objectives. If this is not done, revenge killings may be committed.

It is, of course, vital that such a process is credible and legitimate. Unless this is the case, it will not be accepted by all parties and whatever result it arrives at will be questioned. In other words, it is crucial to ensure that the commission has political legitimacy. In the absence of such legitimacy, whatever record of past human rights abuses the commission produces will be contested and reconciliation will remain a vain hope.

Various key factors have to be considered when establishing a process. For example, the choice of the time period over which human rights violations are to be examined will often determine the acceptability of the process. In order to promote reconciliation, it is vital to ensure that the process has political legitimacy.

It is vital to the success of the project that all sectors of the population buy into the process. If the process is not seen to be independent of the government, it will affect the objectivity of the process, at least as far as the perception of the population is concerned.

If such a process is to enjoy legitimacy and fulfil its function of enabling reconstruction, rehabilitation and reconciliation, its establishment must be informed by an understanding of the particularities of the history and transition of the country within which it is to operate. The extent to which a process is established by the new order, in co-operation with those who were vanquished, plays an important part in determining whether such a process can assist in national reconciliation. On the other hand, the extent of the involvement of the vanquished perpetrators also has a bearing on the acceptance of that institution by those who suffered human rights abuses. Great sensitivity is called for in this regard.

Even though there cannot be one final ‘objective truth’, it is critical that the version of ‘the truth’ arrived at by the commission embraces the experience of all. Unless the people feel that they have been a part of the process of decision making, they will doubt the integrity and motivations of those setting up the commission and those involved in its processes.

Legitimacy for a commission means that the process is accepted as an objective body capable of finding an unbiased ‘truth’. This perception is generally achieved by having a well-balanced commission of highly respected people. A process is perceived to be well-balanced when the individuals serving on it are from a variety of ethnic and political backgrounds and constituencies. The key to legitimacy is that the enquiry must not only be unbiased and non-partisan in fact, but it must also be perceived in this way by the population as a whole.

To attain legitimacy, an enquiry must be an officially designated, non-partisan entity. This means that the process cannot be controlled or influenced by the government or even appear to be under the government’s control or influence. To ensure that this is the case, the very creation and setup of the process must be unbiased and, most importantly, perceived as such by the country’s nationals. These are extremely relevant questions for societies that have a history of major human rights abuses. A critical overarching factor is democracy without which, whatever path chosen, a society will be unable to deal with its past inclusively. This is critical in Burma with its many ethnic groups. Progress towards an inclusive democracy is the process most likely to achieve long-term sustainable peace.


Conclusion

A future democratic Burma will have to plot its course carefully with regard to dealing with the past. Decisions about whether to have trials and, if so, who ought to be tried; or whether to pass or rescind amnesty laws; and whether there should be a truth commission or some similar process are difficult and complex. They must be taken in the context of the unique historical, economic, political and social factors, as well as what would best satisfy the needs of the victims. While there is an accepted and majority view that, for certain crimes, international law puts a duty26 on a state to prosecute or extradite offenders, in reality the type of justice which a particular country adopts is dependent on the balance of power between the new government and the repressive one it replaces.27

The amount of available resources, and competing demands for those resources, are also very relevant in determining whether resolving the past is high on a country’s list of priorities. What may be relevant and possible in other parts of the world may not be possible in Burma. In addition, the manner in which change occurs and the power relations that continue to exist in that society after the transition are important factors in these decisions.

Prosecutions are not the panacea to a country’s past, as problems and difficulties will arise. Truth commission processes have become more fashionable because, if well resourced and managed, they can achieve much in the life of a nation. A truth commission can analyse various versions of events and can validate more than one version by accepting differing testimonies and incorporating all versions into a report that becomes a part of the country’s official history. This process is useful because the society as a whole is able to listen, absorb, and begin the healing process that leads to reconciliation. Without such a dialogue, the pain, anger, and other issues which will arise during a transition may never find a satisfactory outlet. If a way of releasing this pressure is not found, underlying tensions may ferment for a period of time until they erupt, leading to renewed social fragmentation and conflict.

Neither a truth commission nor a process focusing on prosecutions can succeed in isolation. Using both strategies in combination will have a much better effect. A truth commission with amnesty powers can be complemented very well by a clearly stated intention to prosecute those who do not come forward to apply for amnesty. Such a carrot and stick approach can be used to bring more people into the process than would be possible if only one approach was chosen.

There is a need for the symbols, structures and operations of the new state to be founded upon a commitment to human rights and a dedication to the rule of law. Thus, a policy to deal with the past should focus on 1) engaging in a public process to investigate and disclose the complete and unbiased truth about the past to the victims, their families, and society as a whole; 2) doing justice by punishing at least some perpetrators of human rights abuses; 3) recognising the worth and dignity of the victims as human beings by granting reparations, monetary or otherwise, that are feasible and appropriate to acknowledge the harm done; 4) lustration28 (prohibiting individuals who have committed human rights abuses from holding public office); and 5) utilising a process that will be both credible in itself to all, as well as produce results that will be perceived as legitimate by most citizens.

Although spending significant resources on dealing with the past may seem to be in conflict with urgently beginning the reconstruction of the society, a stable democracy requires national reconciliation, reconstructing political and economic systems, and entrenching a respect for human rights. Securing a foundation for stability in a future democratic Burma will require dealing with those responsible for human rights abuses while at the same time not jeopardising the tenuous position of the new government during the transition.


Endnotes

* Professor of Law and Deputy Dean, Law Faculty, University of the Western Cape, South Africa; BA LLB (Natal), LLM (Harvard), LLD (UWC); attorney of the High Court of South Africa, attorney at law in the State of New York, USA.

1. See Sarkin, J. 1996. ‘The Trials and Tribulations of South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission’ South African Journal on Human Rights 12: 617; Sarkin, J. 1997. ‘The Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa’ Commonwealth Law Bulletin 528; Sarkin, J. 1998. ‘The Development of a Human Rights Culture in South Africa’ Human Rights Quarterly 20(3):628; Sarkin, J. 1999. The Necessity and Challenges of Establishing a Truth and Reconciliation Commission in Rwanda. Human Rights Quarterly, 21(3): 767; Sarkin, J, 1999. ‘Preconditions and Processes for Establishing a Truth and Reconciliation Commission in Rwanda: The Possible Interim Role of Gacaca Community Courts’ Law Democracy and Development 1999(2): 223; Sarkin, J. 1999. ‘Transitional Justice and the Prosecution Model: The Experience of Ethiopia’ 1999(2) Law Democracy and Development 253; Sarkin, J. 2000. ‘Promoting Justice, Truth and Reconciliation in Transitional Societies: Evaluating Rwanda’s Approach in the New Millennium of Using Community-Based Gacaca Tribunals to Deal with the Past’ International Law Forum, 2 (2):112.

2. See Sarkin, J. 2000. ‘The South African Constitution as Memory and Promise’ in Villa-Vicencio, C. (ed) Transcending a Century of Injustice 72–84.

3. See for example Minow, M. 1998. Between Vengeance and Forgiveness: Facing History after Genocide and Mass Violence.

4. Sarkin, J. 1999. ‘The Necessity and Challenges of Establishing a Truth and Reconciliation Commission in Rwanda.’ Human Rights Quarterly, 21(3):767.

5. Siegel, R. 1998. ‘Transitional Justice: A Decade of Debate and Experience’ Human Rights Quarterly 20 (2) 433.

6. See further Carter Center of Emory University. 1992. Investigating Abuses and Introducing Safeguards in the Democratisation Process. Conference convened 6–7 July 1992. Conference Report Series 61.

7. See generally O’Donnell, G. Guillermo, P. Phillipe, C. & Schmitter, C. (eds) 1987. Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions About Uncertain Democracies; O'Donnell, G Philippe, C. and Whitehead, L. (eds) 1986. Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Prospects for Democracy.

8. Kritz, N. (ed) 1995. Transitional Justice: How Emerging Democracies Reckon with Former Regimes.

9. As in Argentina, East Germany, Persia (now Iran) and the Philippines.

10. As in Chile, Hungary and Spain.

11. As in El Salvador, Namibia, Nicaragua, Uruguay and Zimbabwe.

12. See Huntington, S. 1995. ‘The Third Wave: Democratisation in the Late Twentieth Century’ in Kritz, N. (ed) Transitional Justice: How Emerging Democracies Reckon with Former Regimes (vol 1) 69.

13. Arriaza, N. 1996. ‘Combating Impunity: Some Thoughts on the Way Forward’ Law & Contemporary (59) 93 and Teitel, R. 1997. ‘Transitional Jurisprudence: The Role of Law in Political Transformation’ The Yale Law Journal 106: 2009–80

14. Zalaquett, J. 1989. ‘Confronting Human Rights Violations Committed By Former Governments: Principles Applicable and Political Constraints’, in Aspen Institute Justice and Society Program State Crimes: Punishment or Pardon reprinted in Hamline Law Review, 13:623, 629.

15. Hungtington, S. 1995. ‘The Third Wave: Democratization In The Late Twentieth Century’, in Transitional Justice: How Emerging Democracies Reckon With Former Regimes, 65 (Kritz, N. (ed).

16. See for example Bronkhort, Daan. 1995. Truth and Reconciliation: Obstacles and Opportunities for Human Rights.

17. Pankhurst, Donna. 1999. ‘Issues of Justice and Reconciliation in Complex Political Emergencies. Conceptualizing Reconciliation, Justice and Peace’ Third World Quarterly 20,1: 239–56.

18. Cherif Bassiouni, M. 1996. ‘Searching For Peace and Achieving Justice: The

19. Sarkin, J. 1996. ‘The Trials and Tribulations of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa’ South African Journal on Human Rights 617.

20. Goldstone, R. 1996. ‘Justice As A Tool For Peace-Making: Truth Commissions And International Criminal Tribunals’ New York University Journal International Law & Politics 28:485, 486 (1996).

21. See the South African Promotion of National Unity Act 34 of 1995, which established a Truth and Reconciliation Commission with the sole motive ‘to promote national unity and reconciliation in a spirit of understanding which transcends the conflicts of the past’ and Section 3(1)(b) of the Act ‘…the granting of amnesty to persons who make a disclosure of all relevant facts relating to acts associated with political motive…’

22. See for example Malamud-Goti, J. 1990 ‘Transitional Government in the Breach: Why Punish State Criminals?’ Human Rights Quarterly 12: 1,12 (1990).

23. See Nino, C. 1991. ‘The Duty to Punish Past Abuses of Human Rights Put into Context: The Case of Argentina’ Yale Law Journal 100: 2619 (arguing that a categorical absolute rule demanding the punishment of human rights abuses is not always conducive to remedying/ ending such abuses). However, Diane Orentlicher has argued that such choices are not open in certain cases and that international law demands prosecution or extradition. See Orentlicher, D. 1991. ‘Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights Violations of a Prior Regime’ Yale Law Review. 100: 2537.

24. See Sarkin, J. 1996. ‘The Trials and Tribulations of South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission’ South African Journal on Human Rights 12: 617; Sarkin, J. 1997. ‘The Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa’ Commonwealth Law Bulletin 528; Sarkin, J. 1998. ‘The Development of a Human Rights Culture in South Africa’ Human Rights Quarterly 20(3):628; Sarkin, J. 1999. ‘The Necessity and Challenges of Establishing a Truth and Reconciliation Commission in Rwanda.’ Human Rights Quarterly, 21(3): 767; Sarkin, J, 1999. ‘Preconditions and Processes for Establishing a Truth and Reconciliation Commission in Rwanda: The Possible Interim Role of Gacaca Community Courts’ Law Democracy and Development 1999(2): 223; Sarkin, J. 1999. ‘Transitional Justice and the Prosecution Model: The Experience of Ethiopia’ 1999(2) Law Democracy and Development 253; Sarkin, J. 2000. ‘Promoting Justice, Truth and Reconciliation in Transitional Societies: Evaluating Rwanda’s Approach in the New Millennium of Using Community-Based Gacaca Tribunals to Deal with the Past’ International Law Forum, 2 (2):112.

25. Sarkin, J. 1998. ‘The Development of a Human Rights Culture in South Africa’ Human Rights Quarterly, 20(3): 628.

26. Scharf, M. 1996. ‘The Letter of the Law: the Scope of the International Legal Obligation to Prosecute Human Rights Crimes’ Law and Contemporary Problems 59.

27. See further Meron, T. 1995. ‘International Criminalisation of Internal Atrocities.’ American Journal of International Law 87.

28. See further Bertschi, Charles C. 1995. ‘Lustration and the Transition to Democracy. The Cases of Poland and Bulgaria’ East European Quarterly 2,4: 435; Blankenburg, Erhard. 1995. ‘The Purge of Lawyers after the Breakdown of the East German Communist Regime’ Law and Social Inquiry 20,1: 223; Boed, R. 1998. ‘An Evaluation of the Legality and Efficacy of Lustration as a Tool S. 1993. ‘Human-Rights and Crimes of the State: The Culture of Denial’ Australian and New Zealand Journal of Criminology 26,2: 97; Cohen, S. 1995. ‘Crimes of the State Accountability, Lustration and the Policing of the Past’ Law and Social Inquiry 20,1: 7; De Greiff, P. 1996. ‘Trial and Punishment, Pardon and Oblivion: On Two Inadequate Policies for the Treatment of Former Human Rights Abusers’ Philosophy and Social Criticism 22: 93.