4 Executive
Summary
8 The
General Humanitarian Situation in
Poverty; health; HIV/AIDS; education; food insecurity; displacement; landmines
16 Why is
there a Humanitarian Crisis in
Economic mismanagement; oppression
of civil society; ongoing conflict, displacement, human rights abuses and access
20 The
National League for Democracy’s Position
21 Current
Humanitarian Assistance in
Specific challenges faced by international aid agencies; past incidences of concern involving international aid agencies; building the capacity of civil society; the joint principles of operation/code of conduct for INGOs
30 Humanitarian Cease-fires: Potential
Peace-Building Tool
34 Potential Institutional Processes for
the Provision of Humanitarian Assistance
37 A Possible Humanitarian Assistance Model
for
42 Annex
I: Summary of UN Agencies and Projects Inside
56 Annex
II: List of International NGOs Inside
59 Annex III: Joint Principles of Operation of International Non-Governmental
Organizations (INGOs) Providing Humanitarian Assistance in Burma/Myanmar
62 Annex IV: The Sphere Project – Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards
in Disaster Response
65 Annex V: Case Studies of Humanitarian Intervention
71 Annex VI: Guidelines Table for the Arrangement of Humanitarian Cease-Fires
“Better governance [not increased funding] is the answer to
“The
root cause of the on-going humanitarian crisis in Burma is the lack of a democratic
government accountable to the people, and the military’s focus of holding on to
power instead of promoting the interest of the nation” – Strategy Coordination
Committee, ‘Humanitarian Aid – Burma’ Statement, 20 January 2002
“The issue of humanitarian aid for a country where an
authoritarian government has a stranglehold on every aspect of the lives of its
citizens has to be handled with the greatest care” – Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, 1999
“We have always said that assistance to Burma should depend on
accountability, transparency, and independent monitoring, which is to say that
assistance projects, aid projects must be opened to scrutiny…we have said
everything that we do, we do only with the benefit of the people in mind, which
is why we insist that assistance and aid must be opened to scrutiny to ensure
that the right assistance is getting to the right people in the right way,
ensure that our people are really benefiting from whatever aid or assistance is
given to the state’ – Message from Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, 19 July 2002
“Unless there is accountability and transparency, you can never
say what happens to all that assistance. It may not go to help the people, on the contrary, it may go into schemes that harm
the people. So unless there is accountability and transparency we cannot say
that humanitarian aid is assisting the people” – Daw Aung San Suu Kyi,
interview August 2002
“[The
international community must] respect the concerns and engage Burman and
non-Burman democratic groups and civil society organizations in a transparent
and constructive debate before taking any decisions on increasing international
aid to Burma” – Statement by Concerned Individuals along the Thai-Burma border,
20 July 2002.
“international
agencies – such as UNDP, UNICEF, FAO, WHO or UNDCP – have not confronted the
government over rights of access and NGOs have not gained unimpeded access to
the displaced in contested areas”- Burma Ethnic Research Group, September 2000
“Among
the areas in most need of significant improvement is the situation of
vulnerable groups, inter alia the poor, children, women and ethnic minorities
and, in particular, those among them who have become internally displaced in
zones of conflict between the army and armed groups” – Special Rapporteur on
the Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar, Professor Paulo Pinheiro, CHR report
2002, paragraph 108.
“Humanitarian
assistance should not damage the process of democratization by helping the SPDC
shift money from health and education to the military” – Dr Sann
Aung, NCGUB
NCGUB position on humanitarian assistance to Burma
The National Coalition Government of the
In a leaked letter dated
The NCGUB shares the concerns of the UN and the
international community regarding the rapidly deteriorating humanitarian
situation in
The NCGUB’s position is supported by both the UN Secretary-General’s Special Envoy, Ambassador Tan Sri Razali Ismail, and the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in Burma, Mr. Paulo Sergio Pinheiro. Ambassador Razali and Professor Pinheiro have discussed with the SPDC and Daw Aung San Suu Kyi the need for greater humanitarian assistance to deal with the challenge posed by HIV/AIDS and other health-related issues, including malaria and the lack of immunization programs in certain areas. Both Ambassador Razali and Mr. Pinheiro have raised the idea of a functional committee with mixed composition and oversight by the UN.
Language in Commission on Human Rights resolution 2002/67 concerning the ‘Situation of human rights in Myanmar,’ reflects this idea of a joint mechanism and the need for cooperation and consultation with all relevant players on the provision of humanitarian assistance.[1] However agreement has not yet been reached with the SPDC on modalities to enable the provision of such assistance.
The need for joint consultative mechanisms is due to the root
cause of the humanitarian crisis in
The politics cannot be taken out of aid due to the root
cause of the current situation – prolonged military rule. That the regime
clearly views humanitarian aid as political is demonstrated by the pervasive
surveillance of and interference in the work of international aid agencies
operating in
Another concern is that an increase in humanitarian assistance by donor countries may undermine political pressure for democratic change. Political strategies must be pursued together with humanitarian strategies. Daw Aung San Suu Kyi stated on 22 August, ‘We would be happy to cooperate with the SPDC on aid and assistance programs which will benefit the people and which will also promote the process of democratization and the second part is very important.’[3]
Fundamental prerequisites for democratic change are the pursuit of peace and national reconciliation. It is of vital importance in crafting and implementing aid projects that there is genuine and official consultation and cooperation not just with the NLD but also with other political and ethnic nationality representatives, and local communities. All relevant political and ethnic groups must be consulted and treated as equal partners.
The correlation between increased militarization, human
rights abuses and humanitarian problems is extremely strong. The authorities
have not authorized independent monitoring or humanitarian assistance to
displaced persons and/or other vulnerable populations. According to Mr.
Pinheiro, estimates of the total number of displaced persons in
The NCGUB believes that appropriate humanitarian assistance to cover
basic needs
requires
adequate nutrition, water, sanitation, clothing, health care and security
The first section of this paper outlines the general
humanitarian situation in
The second section explores why there is a humanitarian
crisis in
The third section addresses current humanitarian aid
operations in
The fourth section focuses on the call for a nationwide cease-fire, which would enable the provision of humanitarian assistance to conflict areas, by raising the use of humanitarian cease-fires as a potential peace-building tool. Humanitarian cease-fires constitute attempts to get much-needed humanitarian space in the midst of violent armed conflicts. If such initiatives are both of a humanitarian and political nature they can truly be used as a peace-building tool.
The paper then discusses potential institutional processes for the provision of humanitarian assistance to ensure accountability, transparency and independent monitoring in light of lessons learnt from other contexts.
The final section of the paper proposes an institutional
process for the provision of humanitarian assistance in
The General Humanitarian Situation in
In a letter dated 30 June 2001, leaked to the press in early
August, all nine UN agency representatives in Rangoon collectively called on
their respective headquarters and the international community for a ‘dramatic
overhaul of the budget allocations’ for Burma because the country is ‘on the
brink of a humanitarian crisis.’[4]
UNICEF wrote to the UN Secretary-General in March 1992 describing the situation
facing the children of
In the wake of international isolation and sanctions, multilateral and bilateral assistance has shrunk and the UN has emerged as the largest source of aid, which is mainly humanitarian. At present, 68 per cent of official development assistance (ODA) is channelled through UN agencies operating in the country.[5]
The European Union (EU) has provided 11.17 million euros towards humanitarian programs in Burma since 1996. It has contributed 5 million euros to the Joint Action Plan on HIV/AIDS and announced on 8 August 2002 that it has allocated two million euros towards malaria prevention and treatment programs and a project by the International Committee of the Red Cross which monitors political prisoners.[6]
There are around 30 international NGOs (INGOs) operating in Burma, of which 16 are subcontracted by UN agencies. Assistance from these INGOs has increased from $4.5 million in 1999 to more than $7 million in 2000.[7] INGO activities are concentrated mainly on HIV/AIDS, primary health, and maternal and child health care.
The Secretary-General’s Special Envoy, Ambassador Tan Sri Razali Ismail, and the UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights in Burma, Mr. Paulo Sergio Pinheiro, have discussed with the regime and Daw Aung San Suu Kyi the possibility of greater humanitarian assistance to deal with the challenge posed by HIV/AIDS and other health-related issues, including malaria and the lack of immunization programs in certain areas. Agreement has not yet been reached with the regime on modalities to enable the provision of such assistance.
The discussion below will outline the current humanitarian situation in Burma.
Four decades of military rule and mismanagement have
resulted in widespread poverty, poor health care, and low educational
standards.
The health care system in
The maternal mortality ratio (MMR) in the country is high, with estimates ranging between 230 and 580 per 100,000 live births. Contraception is largely unavailable and it is estimated that the consequences of unsafe abortion account for around 50 per cent of maternal deaths[12].
The border areas score lower than the national average on
most social indicators, with
Official HIV surveillance data in
Included among the major direct human factors contributing to this incidence are: injecting drug use (around 60% in 2000), direct and indirect commercial sex (38% in 2000), and male and female STI infections.[23] Overall, HIV levels in blood donors have been rising slowly but steadily over the past decade.
The known impact of HIV/AIDS is most severe along the north,
Eastern and Southern border areas of
An increasingly high number of young girls are being
trafficked to
Specific challenges to effective HIV/AIDS control and prevention in Burma include: risk factors associated with mobile and transient populations; limited condom use and availability (condoms were outlawed until 1992 and usage remains very low due); limited access to high-risk and at-risk populations, the inadequate involvement of people living with HIV/AIDS; inadequate behavioral research; limited supportive laboratory capacities; and limited resources to support blood safety programs.[25]
Efforts to fight the disease are complicated by stigma, discrimination and fear. Poor quality and overpriced treatment for sexually transmitted infections facilitates the transmission of HIV. People with HIV infections are generally stigmatized and do not always access the care and support actually in place. Few support groups exist for People Living with HIV/AIDS. Only recently has the regime publicly acknowledged concern about HIV/AIDS and publicly named the epidemic as one of the top three priority public health issues, along with malaria and TB.[26]
In the absence of any significant bilateral and multilateral
donors, the UN system in
Several INGOs have been subcontracted by the UN or have their own programs on HIV/AIDS prevention and care.[27] All of the UN co-sponsors have funded and partnered with at least one of these NGOs for HIV projects. Though INGOs are reported to be generally effective, their geographical and population reach is very limited.[28]
Rates of
school attendance and educational attainment decreased during 2001, largely due
to increasing formal and informal school fees, as the junta diverted
expenditures from health and education to the armed forces.[30]
Low educational
attainment is a serious social, economic and political problem. Only three out
of four children enter primary school, and of those only two out of five
complete the full five years. In other words, only 30% of Burmese children get
proper primary schooling, let alone secondary and tertiary education.[31]
According to a study conducted by
UNICEF and the regime, the single greatest obstacle to school attendance in
Those
children who are able to attend school rarely receive quality education.
Textbooks, equipment and school supplies are outdated and in short supply.
Standards are low and a new exam system makes it easier to pass the primary,
middle and high school levels.[33]
Teachers’ salaries are far below subsistence wages and have forced many teachers to quit teaching out of economic necessity. Increasingly, only prosperous families can afford to send their children to school, even at the primary level. In some areas in the center of the country, in which few families are able to afford unofficial payments to teachers, teachers generally no longer come to work and schools no longer function. In response to government neglect, private institutions have begun to provide assistance in education, despite an official monopoly on education.[34] The higher costs in this sector effectively exclude the poorest and weakest strata of the population.
Female students are
disproportionately affected by high dropout rates. Fewer
than one third of all girls who enroll make it through primary school.[35]
Access to primary education is highly politicized. In many townships, NLD members are prohibited from participating in Parent Teacher Associations. Therefore, aid projects implemented through Parent and Teacher Associations invariably exclude on the basis of extraneous political considerations – the children of families the regime considers to be supporters of the democracy movement.
In addition to dropping out of school for financial reasons, thousands of children are forced to drop out, or interrupt, their education for reasons associated with conflict due to: lack of an educational infrastructure; few teachers; security concerns; constant transience due to forced relocation; and ‘Burmanization’ policies that force the closure of non-Burman schools in ethnic areas. Other factors include: forced labor requirements; burning of villages by the military and subsequent free-fire zones; extra-judicial killing or arbitrary arrest of parents; and the general disruption of village life by military authorities who view all civilian activities as subordinate to military and state interests. [36]
Reports
from
While
Displacement
Independent monitoring or
assistance to displaced persons has so far not been authorized by the regime
and it is very difficult to verify their number. Estimates of the total number of displaced persons
in Burma range between one and two million,[39]
with around 300,000 in north-eastern Shan State, 100,000-200,000 in Karen
State, 70,000-80,000 in Karenni State, 60-70,000 in
Mon State and about 100,000 in Arakan State.[40]
According
to a recent report, more than 2,500 villages have either been
relocated, destroyed or abandoned due to activity by the Burma army since 1996.
A minimum of one million people in eastern Burma have been displaced since
1996. At least 150,000 have fled as asylum seekers, and there are at least
633,000 displaced persons still either living in hiding or in more than 176
relocation sites in the border areas adjacent to Thailand.[41]
Most of the asylum seekers arriving in Thailand had previously lived for some time as displaced persons. They became displaced either as they were forcibly relocated, or in anticipation of forced relocation, or else they fled when human rights abuses or military threats become intolerable. In urban areas, massive forced relocation has reportedly taken place for purposes of "land development planning" and other urban works.[42]
Relocation site residents are frequently subject to extortion, forced to work on government infrastructure projects or income generating programs for the military and are vulnerable to abuse. Those who choose not to enter the relocation sites flee their villages, and live in hiding in the jungle. The military launches regular patrols, aimed at seeking out these IDPs, destroying their temporary shelters and rice supplies.
Displaced persons hiding in the jungle and in relocation sites lack basic necessities such as food, appropriate shelter, medicine, access to basic health services, education and security. Rates of malnutrition, infant mortality and deaths from preventable diseases such as malaria, respiratory infections and diarrheal diseases are high.
This year has seen a marked increase in the frequency of anti-resistance operations in ethnic areas, leading in turn to an increase in the level of displacement.[43] Displaced persons are now finding it increasingly difficult to flee Burma and seek asylum in neighboring countries as the Burma army now controls most of the border, the number of land mines in use has substantially increased and they face an uncertain welcome from neighboring authorities.
Landmines
Landmines are now believed to affect 9 out of 14 of the states or divisions of Burma, in areas near its borders with Bangladesh, India and Thailand, with a heavy concentration in eastern Burma. Landmines are placed by the Burma army and anti-resistance groups. Civilians are known to be used as human minesweepers by the Burma army in anti-resistance campaigns.[44]
The number of landmine casualties in Burma is now believed
to surpass even that of Cambodia, and the manufacture of anti-personnel
landmines is on the rise.[45] Sixty percent of victims are combatants;
the remaining forty percent are civilian victims.[46]
The number of landmine victims in Burma remains unknown. There is currently no centralized
agency collecting statistics on landmine incidents or survivors within Burma.
Relying on disparate data, Landmine
Monitor Report 2000 estimated that conflict in Burma produced approximately
1,500 mine victims in 1999 alone.
The landmine
casualty rate may be increasing. Statistics of landmine victims transported for
surgery by Medicins Sans Frontières show a modest increase during the year 2000
over the previous two years.[47]
There is no humanitarian demining in Burma;
mine survivors receive little assistance: unless a victim can pay for
treatment, no care is available; Burma still produces mines and is not a party
to the Mine Ban Treaty. Most disturbing are reports from users of mines of
‘lost’ mines - mines planted with no record of their position.
‘The problems of Burma are due to bad government…So it is
like pouring water into a bucket with a hole in it’ – Daw Aung San Suu Kyi
on ‘aid and investment’, TIME Magazine,
The UN, INGOs, donors, the international community and other interested parties must understand the underlying causes of the crisis to ensure that humanitarian assistance neither prolongs nor reinforces the causes of Burma’s current crisis.
Vital indicators – health, education, development status and the human rights situation – have all deteriorated under the successive military regimes that have ruled Burma as discussed above. ‘The underlying cause of the social, political and economic crises which have created untold hardships for the people is the lack of good governance.’[48]
There is no evidence of sufficient political will within the regime to address the underlying causes of the crisis. Until this year, the regime has not acknowledged the gravity of the situation. Two days before Daw Aung San Suu Kyi was released, the regime employed a Washington lobbyist group, DCI Associates for a total value of US$550,000 for one year (ending 15 May 2003), to “work with members of Congress and the administration to begin a dialogue on political reconciliation and humanitarian issues” amongst other objectives. This amount is over 18 times the SPDC’s budget for HIV/AIDS.[49] This is after stating it needs international assistance as the country is too poor to solve the humanitarian crisis alone.[50]
The causes underlying the crisis situation are well-known and well documented. This paper will highlight a few major causes: economic mismanagement; oppression of civil society; ongoing conflict perpetuating displacement and human rights abuses.
The Asian Development Bank (ADB) stated in a report on the
Burmese economy in November 2001 that the country's economy is on the verge of
collapse, as the military government struggles to provide basic services. It
reveals a country that has suffered from massive economic mismanagement,
instability and stagnation under decades of military rule. The report argues
that Burma's economy
needs thorough reform and without it there is little prospect of reducing the
widespread poverty in the country. Government
expenditure on education and health is amongst the lowest in the world, while
the country's state economic enterprises are inefficient and a drain on the
economy.[51]
The ADB’s Asian Development Outlook 2002 report criticized the SPDC for delaying reforms and pursuing haphazard economic policies. The report states: “There are no clear prospects for the introduction of necessary widespread economic reforms by the government of Myanmar to correct macroeconomic imbalances and reduce poverty. It lacks the necessary policies, and its strategies are ad hoc and respond to a variety of problems in, at times, contradictory ways. Moreover, the capacity to implement policies is lacking.”[52]
James Kelly, the U.S. State Department's senior Asia policymaker said recently that “Burma was once poised to be one of the most prosperous countries of Southeast Asia. Now its broken economy has trouble feeding itself. This is a man-made, not a natural phenomenon, and Burma's leaders should hang their heads in shame."[53]
Among the SPDC’s policy mistakes is its excessive spending on the military. The regime decided to spend U.S. $150 million on twelve MiG fighter planes from Russia in 2001.[54] Meanwhile there has been a steady decline of government expenditures for education and healthcare on a per capita basis. Spending on healthcare and education is one of the lowest in the world at under 1% (US$0.60 and US$0.28 per annum respectively).
UNICEF pointed out the serious lack of government priority on social welfare in their letter to then UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali in 1992: “These problems all have one thing in common, namely a chronic and malignant failure by the State to provide for the survival, protection and development needs of children…these problems also reflect the Government’s persistent refusal, since 1962, to allocate any part of its foreign exchange earnings to the non-military sector.”
This has led to serious humanitarian repercussions as illustrated by the WHO report 2000 grading Burma’s overall health system performance as 190th of 191 countries. The expansion in military capacity is not compatible with the national reconciliation process.[55]
The overall economic environment is not conducive to improving the humanitarian situation in a sustainable manner. Without political change, economic change cannot occur. The same is true for the humanitarian situation.
An open civil society has support networks which allow the flow of information, the sharing of knowledge, development of skills and building of capacity. Such networks empower people to understand issues affecting themselves and their communities. This has direct bearing on a country’s humanitarian situation. Knowledge about HIV/AIDS in Burma for example is severely lacking and has been hampered by the oppression of civil society by the regime.[56]
There is extremely limited independent civil society participation in Burma. Since 1988 the regime has foreclosed all opportunities for the development of civil institutions and has nationalized or co-opted all existing NGOs in Burma. It has established several para-statal organizations (GONGOs) to work with INGOs, thus creating additional barriers to effective humanitarian intervention. At the community level, the lack of sustainable civic structures deprives alternate means to social services delivery.
As Altsean points out in its report, ‘A Peace of Pie?’ “Systematically oppressing civil society is nothing short of a myriad of multiple human rights violations and a direct causal factor in the humanitarian situation in Burma.”[57] See capacity-building section below for more information about civil society in Burma.
The correlation between increased militarization, human rights abuses and humanitarian problems is extremely strong. The ongoing armed conflict and its attendant human rights atrocities are a direct cause of the dire humanitarian situation. People in areas where there are anti-resistance forces are the most vulnerable populations in terms of humanitarian need.
According to the SPDC, around 17 resistance groups have concluded cease-fire agreements with the SPDC, however open conflict is occurring in ethnic areas – especially Shan, Karen and Karenni States, as well as pockets in cease-fire areas where splinter groups have taken up arms against the government due to dissatisfaction with the cease-fire deals which have not addressed political issues.
Ongoing armed conflict directly results in and prolongs
human suffering. Civilians have been forcibly relocated, displaced, used for
forced labor and portering of military equipment to
frontline areas, for laying landmines and acting as human minesweepers, and are
subjected to torture and or extrajudicial killing if suspected of having links
with anti-resistance forces. Women and girls in particular are vulnerable to
rape and other forms of gender-based violence by
Independent monitoring or assistance to displaced persons has
not been authorized by the government. Estimates of the total number of
displaced persons in
Government displacement programs have taken place at least
since the late 1960s. Known as the ‘Four Cuts’ policy to cut links between
civilians and armed groups, supplies of food, funds, recruits and intelligence
to opposition forces are cut thereby reducing the impact of armed groups.
Villages and food supplies are burnt in areas where resistance forces are
active, and civilians are forcibly relocated into
Since 1996, over 2,500 villages are known to have been
relocated or burnt down in the States and Divisions adjacent to the Thai border
(Shan, Karen, Karenni and
Displacement disproportionately affects children in ethnic
areas as they are most vulnerable to disease and malnutrition due to lack of
access to health care. They have no access to education, no security and are at
risk of further serious human rights abuses if found by members of the
Aid channeled into the system which created such a dire humanitarian situation is unlikely to succeed without a proper institutional mechanism to ensure accountability, transparency and independent monitoring. Otherwise it is unlikely that aid will reach the most vulnerable populations. A serious discussion on the institutional processes to ensure aid reaches the right people in the right way is urgently required.
The NLD’s position regarding humanitarian aid has been consistent in the last decade. The NLD proposed two main principles on foreign donor aid in communications with the UNDP in 1996:
Neither of these principles have been heeded to date. For example, international aid agencies have been discouraged from consulting with the NLD (this may change with Daw Aung Suu Kyi’s recent release from house arrest. However, there must be genuine consultation rather than merely informing her of projects); and local NGOs have been politicized by the regime through purges of all members with NLD associations.
Since her release on
On 19 July 2002, she reiterated the NLD’s
position: “We have always
said that assistance to Burma should depend on accountability, transparency,
and independent monitoring, which is to say that assistance projects, aid
projects must be opened to scrutiny…we have said everything that we do, we do
only with the benefit of the people in mind, which is why we insist that
assistance and aid must be opened to scrutiny to ensure that the right
assistance is getting to the right people in the right way, ensure that our
people are really benefiting from whatever aid or assistance is given to the
state.”
She
further outlined the conditions of accountability, transparency and independent
monitoring in an interview in August: “Unless there is accountability and
transparency, you can never say what happens to all that assistance. It may not
go to help the people, on the contrary, it may go into
schemes that harm the people. So unless there is accountability and
transparency we cannot say that humanitarian aid is assisting the people.”[61]
The paper will look at current humanitarian assistance in
At present 9 UN agencies have branch offices in
Most international aid agencies have focused on providing safe drinking water and sanitation, supporting access to education and health care, starting community-based projects and micro-loans, and confronting the HIV/AIDS crisis. The UN system entities in Burma include: the UN Development Program (UNDP); the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF); the UN Populations Fund (UNFPA); the UN International Drug Control Program (UNDCP); the World Food Program (WFP); the Food and Agriculture Program (FAO); the World Health Organization (WHO); the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR); the Joint UN Program on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS); and the UN Information Center (UNIC). Refer to Annex I for a summary of the UN agencies projects and Annex II for a list of international NGOs and their project areas.
Aid providers generally encounter the following constraints implementing their projects:
|
Special Rapporteur, Mr. Paulo Sergio Pinheiro, stated in his report to the Commission on Human Rights in March 2002, that international NGOs must be encouraged to develop their activities to address the serious humanitarian situation. To this end, the relationship between INGOs and the SPDC must improve. He noted recent restrictive measures affecting INGOs operations:[70]
Mr. Pinheiro emphasized that it is “in the best interests of the SPDC to demonstrate to the international community that these organizations do operate freely, within the laws of the country, thus facilitating their access to funding and contributing to the alleviation of the existing humanitarian situation.”[71]
Given the number of challenges and operational constraints on international aid agencies in implementing their projects, it is not surprising that there have been incidences of concern relating to the provision of humanitarian aid. The following incidences are but a few to illustrate the concerns. Note these incidences are not detailed as most have been received in confidence and due to the reluctance of humanitarian workers to share such information given the sensitivity of their presence inside. The incidences illustrate the problems in providing humanitarian assistance in Burma if: line ministries and government organized NGOs are used to implement projects; and, UN agencies, INGOs and donors are not prepared to consult with the NLD and other political, ethnic and community-based groups.
Incidences include:
International aid agencies have been criticized for either not monitoring the human rights situation in the areas they have access to or not sharing this information, even privately, with human rights organizations. Their silence has led to criticism of complicity. For more incidences of concern please refer to Altsean’s report, “Peace of Pie?”[74]
In order to overcome the challenges faced by international
aid agencies and to avoid the recurrence of such incidences cited above,
international aid agencies must focus on fostering and empowering civil society
in
‘Civil society’ generally refers to all organized groups, small
and large, which act independently from government.[75] A
flourishing civil society implies an open political and economic system and the
dispersion of power. A weak civil society is generally related to the
centralization of power and a lack of tolerance for dissent. Civil society in
When
Meanwhile, the regime has established numerous military-led organizations which promote loyalty to it and its policies. It has attempted to create its own civil society. The largest such organization is the United Solidarity and Development Association (USDA) under the patronage of General Than Shwe. Despite its ostensible social welfare functions, the USDA has been referred to as an “auxiliary national defense force.”[78]
There are several government-organized NGOs (GONGOs). These include the Myanmar Red Cross Society, the Myanmar Medical Association; the Myanmar National Committee for Women’s Affairs, the Myanmar Maternal and Child Welfare Association (MMCWA), and the Auxiliary Fire Brigades. These organizations have no independent role and like the USDA and professional organizations are controlled by the regime.[79]
One of the few independent NGOs permitted by the regime is the Metta Development Foundation established in 1998 by a Kachin woman after the SPDC negotiated a cease-fire with the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO). The KIO insisted that foreign NGOs be able to work as part of its cease-fire deal - most other cease-fire groups do not have this arrangement. The Foundation focuses on sustainable community based projects and skills training. As long as it stays away from politics and manages its relations with authorities at various levels, it seems able to operate fairly independently.
Some religious, cultural, and social welfare organizations
have been allowed to function outside direct government control, at the local
level mostly in cease-fire areas. Such NGOs include the Young Women’s Christian
Association (YWCA), the Myanmar Council of Churches (MCC), the
In the early and mid-1990s, most international NGOs worked through GONGOs but since then have increasingly dealt with church and women’s groups and encouraged formation of village or ward-level associations. This is essential for moving beyond providing direct services, such as food, health care and shelter to ensure sustainable development. It is also important in terms of not relaying the message that international NGOs that have partnerships with GONGOs support the regime. The NCGUB supports the partnerships international NGOs have with these community groups.
Some UN agencies and INGOs still work with GONGOs. For example, UNICEF works closely with the MMCA and
the ICRC is planning to hand over its prosthesis center in Pa-an,
Working in partnership with GONGOs strengthens the SPDC, jeopardizes effective assistance and risks prolonging human suffering.[80] The existence of these organizations is part of the problem, not the solution to addressing the humanitarian situation.
Independent organizations would proliferate if the space
emerged for them to do so as they have in the past when the opportunity
presented itself. Establishing and consolidating the foundation of real
community groups to expand their activities and roles in civil society is
crucial to ensure sustainable development. It is the duty of international aid
agencies to actively pursue establishing this foundation if they are truly
committed to empowering the people of
While the provision of humanitarian aid through INGOs is the preferred mechanism for the NCGUB, as monitoring of small-scale projects is easier, INGOs need to be held accountable to a code of conduct to ensure the aid reaches the intended beneficiaries in the right way. In an attempt to overcome the challenges faced by INGOs in the delivery of aid, a group of international NGOs devised a framework for the delivery of assistance. Although this framework is welcomed by the NCGUB, there is room for improvement in the actual framework devised.
A group of INGOs operating inside
The JPO was drafted as a response to the discussion about the ability of INGOs to undertake humanitarian assistance due to the political situation. INGOs who adhere to the JPO are confident that they have developed and maintain a high level of ethical and effective programming that the complex operating environment demands. There is a belief that their experience over the last decade has improved their strategies and interventions. It is recognized that maintaining high operational and ethical standards while minimizing the potential negative impact of their presence is of critical importance.
On its face the JPO sets clear standards on issues such as
independence, monitoring and accountability, accessibility, capacity building,
sustainability and INGO cooperation. It is stated that there are variations in
how organizations operationalize these principles and
it is up to each organization to produce supplementary documents to these
principles to further explain their operations in
Signing and implementing a code of conduct or this JPO is part of reflecting organizational commitment to ethical performance. However signing and introducing the JPO may not be sufficient to guarantee ethical performance. The effectiveness of the JPO hinges on personal interpretation and application by individual practitioners.[81]
The organizations which supposedly adhere to the JPO are not listed. This is confidential information. Apparently this is due to ‘fear’ that the regime will be displeased, target them for more scrutiny and gather ‘evidence’ to expel them. How can their adherence to the JPO be assessed? This is extremely problematic.
The JPO does not mention adherence to international humanitarian law or human rights standards, a crucial aspect to humanitarian assistance. Humanitarian assistance cannot ignore the situation of human rights (see Annex IV, The Sphere Project – Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response). Reference to IHL and human rights principles should be made in the JPO otherwise INGOs may appear complicit in the human rights abuses committed by members of the armed forces.
The “Monitoring and Accountability” section in the JPO is also cause for concern. It states that “INGOs are accountable to donors and beneficiaries and adopt and implement necessary monitoring mechanisms to ensure all assistance reaches the intended targeted beneficiaries….[and] are prepared to discontinue assistance if we become unable to implement and/or monitor our programs in an ethical and effective manner.” On its face this sounds reasonable; however it does not refer to independent monitoring and evaluation of assistance programs. Human rights monitors should be deployed to help protect local populations from exploitation and repression by the fighting factions. INGOs should monitor human rights in the area around their projects – if prevented from advocacy on human rights issues these agencies should provide information to human rights groups (inside and outside the country) and the UN privately.
The JPO does not elaborate on the decision to discontinue assistance. Consultation with beneficiaries about the magnitude of abuses committed by factions and whether to impose conditions or terminate assistance should be part of this decision-making process. However, the imposition of conditions and threat of withdrawal are pointless unless all the INGOs operating in the area are united.
There is no mention of security for INGO staff. This is an area of global concern as aid workers have increasingly been targeted by parties in conflict. It is crucial that security is not provided by the regime or any other party to the conflict. This may seem obvious but should be made clear.
Another area which could be added in the section on INGO cooperation is to share and coordinate closely to keep payments at reasonable levels for housing, transport and local salaries to ensure an aid dependent economy is not established which will cause hardship for staff and beneficiaries if the INGO leaves or is expelled.
In implementing the JPO: there must be periodic certification and auditing to assure compliance with the standards, and well-defined and fair enforcement procedures including sanctions on non-compliance.
A revised JPO, which addresses the shortcomings illustrated
above, would become a crucial tool of humanitarian aid in
“International
agencies – such as UNDP, UNICEF, FAO, WHO or UNDCP – have not confronted the
government over rights of access and NGOs have not gained unimpeded access to
the displaced in contested areas”- Burma Ethnic Research Group, September 2000
One insurmountable challenge in the current political
context for international aid agencies is access to ethnic nationality areas, particularly
those where there is open conflict. These areas are where the most vulnerable
populations of
Humanitarian cease-fires are attempts to get the much-needed humanitarian space in the midst of violent armed conflict. In the 1990s humanitarian cease-fires were extensively applied to allow the provision of health and humanitarian assistance, such as immunization campaigns (e.g., the Global Polio Eradication Initiative) and food supplies to populations in need. They became a relatively common practice in current conflicts and constituted one of the few ‘entries’ into long-standing and particularly violent conflicts, in conditions otherwise inaccessible for other types of international actions.
In different forms – “humanitarian cease-fires”, “Days of
Tranquility” and “Safe/Peace Corridors” – have been carried out in the midst of
wars in 19 countries since 1985:
An overview of the different cases of application of humanitarian cease-fires is rather complex, as the borderline with traditional cease-fires is often very blurred. Moreover, most if not all cease-fires establish measures resulting from humanitarian concerns. However, the distinction is of importance as the two are different in nature and objectives, even if the ultimate goal is the same.
Humanitarian cease-fires have lasted from one to several days, to one or more months. In many cases more than one short humanitarian cease-fire was negotiated in one year or during several years of war.
An explanation of the main concepts: Humanitarian Cease-Fires: cease-fires agreed to by protagonists in an
armed conflict to allow the provision of health and humanitarian
assistance, such as immunization campaigns and food supplies. Normally
refers to a geographic area that will be affected by the cessation of
hostilities. It can be the whole territory (as in the case of El Salvador,
1985-91), or only some regions (Angola, 1995; Sudan, 1998 and 2000;
Afghanistan, 2000; Sierra Leone, 1998). Days of Tranquility: negotiated truces to allow the provision of
health and humanitarian assistance as well as to allow for other
activities not possible during hostilities. This is similar to
humanitarian cease-fires but the aim emphasizes the limited time-span of
the suspension of fighting (in terms of just days) and particularly the
informality of the suspension (to counter fears that a party will use such
a humanitarian arrangement as a method of being recognized politically or
legally). For example, Corridors of Peace: transit routes designated for safe passage for
non-combatants and humanitarian supplies. For example, Safe Havens: term used in the Balkans conflict to identify villages or human
settlements that were only for civilian inhabitants and not to be
attacked. Sanctuaries of Peace: health/medical institutions, not to be
affected by war. Children as ‘Zones of Peace’ or as a ‘Conflict-free Zone’: the idea was
formulated by UNICEF in the early 1980s to acknowledge that children need
special protection in situations of armed conflict, as they are highly
vulnerable to violence. Humanitarian Pause: used in the conflict in Health as a Bridge for Peace (HBP): as a WHO program, HBP
was formally accepted by the 51st World Health Assembly in May
1998 as a feature of the ‘Health for All in the 21st Century’
Strategy. HBP aims at providing a policy and planning framework to
strengthen the returns of health sector investments in areas affected by
conflict or undergoing post-conflict transition. HBP integrates the
delivery of health care with conflict management, social reconstruction,
and sustainable community reconciliation. It has been adopted as a program
in countries like
In all cases the arrangement was concluded with the intervention of third parties as facilitators. Third parties were always international and sometimes also national. Amongst the main international actors were the following: UNICEF, the UN secretariat, WHO, OCHA, ICRC, IFRC, MSF, Rotary International, USAID, and World Conference on Religion and Peace (WCRP).
The arranged suspension of hostilities could be either:
Humanitarian cease-fires usually have the following features:[83]
Please refer to Annex V: Case Studies of Humanitarian Intervention, which includes the humanitarian pause in Aceh. The ‘pause’ was conceived both for humanitarian and political purposes.
Lessons learnt by the World Health Organization in
the 1990s[1] The
WHO has, through its Health as a Bridge to Peace project, identified a
number of lessons learnt that can be relevant to
More
specifically
Humanitarian cease-fires can contribute to conflict resolution and peace-building, but only under certain conditions. When humanitarian cease-fires have been arranged in an ad-hoc basis, their outcome has varied depending on a wide range of factors.
As such a set of guidelines for the arrangement of humanitarian cease-fires could make humanitarian cease-fires effective for peace-building. These guidelines seek to respond to the following aims:[84]
In order to be effective, humanitarian cease-fires need high levels of flexibility to adjust to different conditions (political, socioeconomic and cultural) existing in a given conflict at a national level, but also taking into account the international context. Notwithstanding this necessary flexibility, it is possible to identify a core set of elements, which should be present in all humanitarian cease-fires, whatever form they take.
The proposed guidelines respond to an attempt to set a minimum standard for humanitarian cease-fires and consists of three elements:
1. The General Principles are:
Strategic Planning: from the conception of an humanitarian cease-fires an overall plan should be established, which includes strategic aims/objectives, feasible means to accomplish them in different scenarios, and a monitoring system. This plan should entail a coordinated approach (amongst all actors involved) and should refer to both the humanitarian needs to be addressed and the political dimension of the ongoing conflict. Also, a time frame should be established. This principle aims at guaranteeing the effectiveness of the action.
Involvement of Local Capacities: at all stages of
humanitarian cease-fires there should be a deep analysis of the humanitarian
crisis and the conflict, including a specific analysis of root causes,
prevailing interests of the warring parties and major processes of social
change. Local actors (such as government, opposition, civil society, media and
armed groups) should be involved at all stages of this process. This principle
aims at guaranteeing the appropriateness of the action.
Addressing
Local Sources of Conflict:
any humanitarian cease-fire
should be based on the knowledge of the root causes of the conflict, as well as
the particular interests of the warring parties. The strategic planning of humanitarian
cease-fires should take into
consideration those elements in order to address them, as much as possible, or
at least avoid ‘feeding them’, making the situation worse. This means that at
all stages of the humanitarian cease-fire, actions should be prioritized which are capable of addressing the
sources of conflict and preventing/restraining any perverse impact on the
dynamics of the conflict. Particular attention should be given to the respect
for human rights and international humanitarian law. This principle aims at
guaranteeing the sustainability of the action.
2. The key
elements are the following:
·
The facilitator(s) elaborate a conflict
analysis;
3. The stages are:
Design of humanitarian cease-fire: from the origins of the humanitarian concern to the elaboration of a complete plan of action.
Implementation of humanitarian cease-fire: from the first moment of application until its natural end or definitive interruption.
Exit/assessment from the end of humanitarian cease-fire.
Please refer to Annex VI for the guidelines table, which combines all these elements with a view to assisting the arrangement of any humanitarian cease-fire.
According to this framework, humanitarian cease-fires have to be based on strategic planning, to involve local capacities for change and to address (as much as possible through a humanitarian intervention) local sources/root causes of conflicts. These conditions would guarantee effectiveness, appropriateness and sustainability of the humanitarian intervention undertaken during a humanitarian cease-fire, thus contributing to a peace-building process.
These guidelines refer to humanitarian interventions which must face the challenge of addressing the urgent humanitarian needs, while at the same time promoting the creation of conditions favorable to the respect of human rights and a peaceful settlement of the conflict. Humanitarian cease-fires, as a form of humanitarian intervention, should always be political in nature or at the very least based on a political understanding.
UN Special Rapporteur, Mr. Pinheiro, raised the possibility
at the Commission on Human Rights in Geneva 2002 of a “functional committee
with a mixed composition under the patronage of the UN coordination system with
the role of monitoring and evaluation assistance provided to [
It is the NCGUB’s understanding that the SPDC is not ready to accept joint consultative mechanisms. However this initiative should be the top agenda item in any substantive political dialogue which begins between the NLD and the SPDC. This initiative should be supported by the UN, the international community, other political groups and ethnic nationalities. Given the political context, assistance by donors should not be given to the ministries of the SPDC as this will increase the likelihood that assistance will not reach the right people in the right way and thus will not mitigate the potentially adverse consequences of such aid. The NCGUB believes that funding of small-scale projects managed by INGOs is preferable to an increase of funding to the UN agencies, whose mandate requires them to work through the SPDC’s ministries (except for the UNDP) and GONGOs. Until the joint consultative mechanisms can prove there is transparency and accountability in the delivery of assistance, funding should not substantially increase to support UN agencies projects.
Humanitarian
cease-fires should be negotiated between the NLD, the SPDC and other relevant
political and non-Burman ethnic nationality groups where such interventions are
necessary to enable humanitarian relief activities and to promote confidence-building
measures towards achieving a peaceful solution to the conflict. Humanitarian
cease-fires should be negotiated in order to access vulnerable populations in
Chin, Karen, Karenni Rakhine
and
Needs
assessment survey
A needs assessment survey should be conducted by an international agency in consultation with the actors mentioned to identify key target aid beneficiary groups. Proposed interventions should be based on the survey.
There
should be an officially recognized external facilitator of the negotiating
process. This facilitator must have or be able to obtain the trust of all
parties, and have their impartiality recognized. Actors should be brought into
the process by the facilitator at appropriate stages. It will be of utmost
importance that the facilitator has the full support of the international
community in fulfilling its mandate.
An analysis of the conflict and humanitarian crisis should be elaborated with the assistance of a university or an expert who specializes in this area. This must include a specific analysis of the root causes, prevailing interests of the warring parties and major processes of social change. Local actors must be actively involved in the research and preparation of this conflict analysis.
Objectives
The
objectives of humanitarian interventions for
1. Conducting
immunization days/weeks in currently inaccessible areas due to security
concerns and permission;
2. Providing
assistance to the internally displaced and forcibly relocated populations,
including cross-border assistance;
3. Providing
selective aid for village and household food security in cease-fire areas;
4. Provision of
security modalities with a view to supporting the delivery of humanitarian
assistance and to reducing tension and violence which may cause further
suffering;
5. All
humanitarian interventions are to be conducted in a coordinated approach by the
actors involved in the interventions;
6. Promotion of
confidence-building measures towards a peaceful solution to the conflict
situation in
The time frame should depend on the aid project. Different timeframes should be negotiated for immunization campaigns as opposed to the provision of food aid and health services to IDPs. The hope is to expand the timeframe following the success of pilot humanitarian cease-fires.
There should be at least four main bodies to oversee the provision of humanitarian assistance. All would equally integrate representatives of the regime, the NLD, and ethnic nationalities. There needs to be a discussion as to the representation of the ethnic nationalities – should the United Nationalities Alliance choose or elect one representative, or should there be up to 7 representatives for each proposed forum? The forum should not be too big as it will become harder to negotiate consensus. The following forums should be considered:
1. The Joint Consultative Forum at the national level consisting of representatives of the NLD, the SPDC, the ethnic nationalities and the UNDP Resident Representative (as coordinator of the UN country team).
The Forum would primarily be mandated to formulate policy and review progress by:
Ø Prioritizing issues and target areas to be addressed;
Ø Formulating guiding principles for implementing agencies;
Ø Formulating procedures to prevent parties from misusing the HCF to strengthen their positions;
Ø Defining confidence-building measures;
Ø Discussing policy reform at the national level; and
Ø Reviewing reports by the monitoring teams.
In order to be effectively
involved in any humanitarian policy initiatives, the NLD and ethnic nationality
representatives should be empowered to establish technical teams on various
humanitarian themes and be permitted to consult with technical experts both
inside
2. A Joint Committee on Humanitarian Action, in order to coordinate humanitarian assistance, from needs assessment to ensuring unhindered access for delivery assistance. This body should coordinate with the proposed INGO Council. In terms of delivery and distribution, the following is advised:
Ø Independent local leaders and community based organizations must be consulted;
Ø A proper distribution mechanism must be established by all actors delivering assistance to ensure aid reaches intended beneficiaries;
Ø Delivery should be by INGOs that publicly endorse and abide by the JPO;
Ø Assistance should not be delivered through the military or organizations directly or indirectly under the regime’s control. For example, GONGOs such as the Myanmar Maternal and Child Welfare Association, the Myanmar Medical Association, the Myanmar Red Cross Society, and the Union Solidarity Development Association;
Ø Assistance must be delivered to vulnerable populations in ‘Black’ and ‘Brown’ security areas in ethnic nationality states which are currently inaccessible due to lack of permission by the regime and where the need is greatest;
Ø Cross-border activities should be expanded into border areas of ethnic nationality states through Thai-based relief organizations.
3. A Joint Committee on Security Modalities, mainly in order to guarantee the absence of offensive military actions in the areas where humanitarian assistance is being provided. Representatives of the Burmese Army and armed-resistance groups would need to be represented on this Committee.
4. An INGO Council to act as a clearing-house for exchange of information. Members publicly adhere to and abide by the proposed revised JPO and has an accountability/monitoring committee to oversee implementation.
In order to ensure respect for human rights and international humanitarian law, transparency, accountability and non-discrimination in the delivery and distribution of humanitarian aid, proper monitoring mechanisms must be established.
Monitoring teams should be established to assess the implementation of the humanitarian action and of the security modalities. The teams:
Ø Should be composed of both internal and external actors;
Ø Must report periodically to the Committees and the INGO Council;
Ø Must monitor and report on abuses – in delivery, violence and human rights violations witnessed during implementation - and what proportion of deliveries actually reached the intended beneficiaries;
Ø Must consult with local actors and beneficiaries as to the magnitude of abuses committed by factions and whether to impose conditions or terminate assistance;
Ø Must monitor and analyze the impact of action taken on the root causes of the conflict.
In terms of external monitors, donor governments could nominate technical experts that have no links to implementing agencies, to partake in an independent evaluation mission or as part of the mixed monitoring team.
Internal
facilitators and local actors
To
ensure capacity-building of civil society and sustainability, it is of utmost
importance to identify internal facilitators to assist the main facilitator.
This may not be possible given the current degree of polarization in
Local
actors should be identified to assist:
Ø
In the needs assessment survey and the
humanitarian and conflict analysis;
Ø
In identifying strategies or measures to address
sources of conflict;
Ø
Identifying confidence-building measures between
the different actors in their area;
Ø
In overseeing the delivery of aid, and;
Ø
Provide analysis of the impact of the
intervention to the monitoring teams.
Such
local actors should be or include members of the community-based organizations
- the religious,
cultural, and social welfare organizations that have been allowed to function
outside direct government control.
Results achieved by international
aid programs can only be sustained with the development of competent
community-based local NGOs. Skills training at the grassroots level should be
conducted to empower people. Local people should be recruited as working
partners to impart experience. The relief actions should be transferred to
locals as much as possible and as soon as possible. The SPDC must be persuaded
to permit space for local community-based organizations and NGOs to develop without
interference.
The donor and international community must:
Ø Highlight the reasons for the humanitarian situation with the SPDC to ensure the success and sustainability of any humanitarian aid effort.
Ø Pressure the SPDC to undertake political and economic reforms;
Ø Pressure the SPDC to acknowledge the extent of the humanitarian crisis and allow joint consultative mechanisms to be established;
Ø Ensure that the SPDC allocates more of its budget on social priorities such as health and education, in order to mitigate ‘fungibility’;
Ø Consult regularly with the joint consultative mechanisms;
Ø Not fund any UN agency or INGO that does not participate in good faith in the proposed joint consultative mechanisms.
Such participation will ensure
that the donor forum will have a constructive role to play in the
reconstruction of
The
United Nations Development Program (UNDP) has operated in
All
projects are meant to target the poorest people in some of the most deprived
areas of the country through social mobilization concepts and practices thus
empowering villagers themselves to formulate development strategies to raise
their living standards.
The
locations of HDI townships are in:
Ayeyarwaddy Delta: Laputta,
Mawlamyainggyun, and Bogalay
townships;
Dry
Zone: Magway, Chaung U and Kyaukpadaung townships;
There
are primary health, water and sanitation, HIV/AIDS, primary education, micro
finance and food security projects in the Shan, Dry Zone and Delta
townships.
There
are Community Development in Remote Townships projects
in Mrauk U, Kyauktaw and Minbya townships,
UNICEF
has operated in
The
Overall goal of the UNICEF Country Program for the period 2001 - 2005 is to
advocate for and contribute towards the progressive establishment of an
environment where the rights to survival, development, protection and
participation of children and women are realized according to the obligations
and responsibilities assumed by Burma as a State Party to the Convention on the
Rights of the Child (CRC) and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW).
Programs for Children and Women are implemented
through the following sectoral areas:
Objectives are:
The
following broad strategies will be used to help achieve the country program
goal and objectives:
Interventions in
the Country Program will be at three levels: national level, nation-wide, and
area-focused townships. The national level activities include advocacy, policy
analysis and capacity-building to facilitate an enabling environment for
positive change. Increasing allocations to basic social services, and ensuring
national legislation and the legal framework are compatible with international
conventions, such as the Convention for the Rights of the Child, will be critical
components of the Country Program.
Those activities
which, according to past experience proved to be effective, because of low cost
and high impact, will be implemented nation-wide and cover all townships. They
will focus on prevention and aim at:
To provide
essential care and satisfy needs during pregnancy and childhood in a holistic
manner, convergence will be promoted gradually to cover one-third of all
townships, referred to as area focused townships (AFTs),
by the end of the program cycle. Within the AFTs,
modalities will be explored to build and strengthen intersectoral
linkages and their management at the township and community levels, with a
balanced basic education and health thrust. For example, the school will be a
point of convergence for education, health, nutrition, safe water, sanitation
services and communication, re-enforced with community-based health services.
Although the majority of program activities will converge increasingly in AFTs, the high prevalence of HIV/AIDS and malaria, for
example, and program opportunities may see specific activities implemented in
some non-AFT areas.
Project
reports for 2000 activities are available for:
On
14 May, UNICEF announced plans to increase its funds up to US$2.5 million from
$2 m on HIV/AIDS this year. Priority will be given to preventing child to
mother transmission. These programs, which were conducted in seven townships
last year, are planned to expand to five more this year: Taunggyi,
Magway, Pakkoku, Meiktila and Myeik.
The United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) was granted approval to
support a special program of humanitarian assistance to
The overall objective of program is to serve the urgent needs of the
poorest and most vulnerable segments of the population in terms of:
1. preventing HIV/AIDS and other sexually transmitted infections (STIs)
2. reducing high levels of maternal mortality through support for
reproductive health information and services and;
3. the provision of reproductive health commodities, including condoms and
other contraceptives;
4. supporting the collection and analysis
of data to better understand the reproductive health and HIV/AIDS situation in
the country and to provide the basis for monitoring and evaluating program
results.
The main purpose will be to contribute to an increased utilization of integrated, quality and
gender-sensitive reproductive
health services by women, men and young people, as well as to achieving behavioural changes in favour of
healthy reproductive and sexual practices through appropriate reproductive health and
HIV/AIDS information and counselling.
UNFPA will coordinate its
activities in partnership with INGOs and with the other UN agencies, especially
UNDP and UNICEF. UNFPA will work closely
with the members of the United Nations system that are co-sponsors of the
UNAIDS Joint Plan of Action (2001-2002), ensuring that all activities
complement and supplement each other.
Currently, UNFPA is the co-chair with Population Services International
of the UNAIDS subcommittee on targeted condom use and reproductive health. Coordination among executing and implementing
agencies for the proposed program will be carried out primarily through sectoral task forces.
INGOs, national NGOs, the private sector and community organizations
will be entrusted with implementation of the program. In order to reach the maximum number of rural
communities, they will use certain parts of the public health infrastructure,
namely service delivery points at the community level, such as hospitals,
clinics, rural health centers and sub-centers. Information, education and communication
(IEC) activities will
be implemented through lower levels of the public sector
infrastructure in collaboration with those local NGOs that have an outreach
network that reaches to the grass-roots level.
The
program draws on recommendations from a UNFPA-supported
reproductive health needs assessment carried out in May 1998 as well as an
external evaluation that was conducted in October 1999 with the involvement of
international consultants on reproductive health.
The
WFP has a Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation (PRRO) which provides
assistance to returnees and vulnerable groups in Northern Rakhine
State (NRS) covering three townships: Maungdaw, Rathedaung, and; Buthidaung,
which are estimated to have a yearly food deficit of between 20,000 to 40,000 mt, aggravated by a weak infrastructure, variable climatic
conditions, inadequate farming inputs, irrigation systems, lack of access to
land tenure and rice trade restrictions.
WFP’s most recent operation began in April 1994, under a MOU between the
government and UNHCR, under which WFP provided food through general
distribution to returnees from the mass exodus to Bangladesh in 1992. These
interventions broadened into food for work in 1994, and later included food for
training in 1996.
The
executive board (based in
The
immediate objective of the WFP operation is to bridge the food gaps for the
vulnerable poor, including returnees, particularly during periods of severe
food deficit through:
(a) providing relief food
assistance to returnees (about 5,000 who are expected to return in the next 2
years – 6 month food ration of 25 kg per month) and chronically vulnerable
households during the lean season (pre-harvest season, July-Sept, beneficiaries
receive 100kg of rice in two distributions) – in total about 62,000 food aid beneficiaries
(5,000 returnees and 57,000 vulnerable individuals, 87% will be women);
(b) creating opportunities for
vulnerable groups to gain and preserve social and economic assets;
(c) promoting human development through
increased enrolment and attendance of girls in primary schools;
(d) enhancing year-round
agricultural productivity through improved irrigation structures and natural
resource management; and
(e) facilitating access to markets and basic
services by rehabilitating and upgrading local infrastructure.
Activities
which stress the altering of household trade-offs in favor of nutrition,
education and asset-creation, and the linkage between short-term consumption
and long-term sustainability can be broadly categorized into three components:
(a) assistance to vulnerable
families, including returnees, through relief rations (target groups:
returnees, female-headed households, landless);
(b) formal education, through
food for education and informal education through food for training (target
groups: female headed-households, primary-school girls);
(c) agricultural production and
infrastructure rehabilitation through food for community asset creation (target
groups: landless, seasonal laborers).
WFP
has identified female-headed households, the elderly, orphans, landless,
mentally and physically disabled, primary-school girls and returnees as the
most vulnerable and deprived groups. Overall, approximately 59% of the
beneficiaries will be women.
Since
1996, WFP has implemented the food for education activity in 95% of the primary
schools in the NRS for levels between kindergarten and grade 5 (approx. 10
years of age). Girls who meet the 80% attendance criteria per academic year are
entitled to 15 kg of rice per month, for a total ration of 90 kg through 3
bimonthly distributions. The % of girls to boys enrolled in primary schools has
increased from 32 to 57%.
WFP
supports teachers to increase the availability of teaching staff in primary
schools. Those who meet the attendance requirement of 90% of the academic year
are entitled to a monthly honorarium of 100kg. The food for education activity
will provide assistance to a total of 105,000 girls and 1,250 teachers.
WFP
supports vocational training activities implemented by MRCS and other NGOs such
as fishnet-weaving, bamboo crafts-making and tailoring. This will reach
approximately 40,000 food aid beneficiaries, approx. 60% of whom will be women.
Rice is the only
commodity required under the operation – locally purchased and received in Sittwe and transported by boat to the 4 WFP warehouses in
the NRS. Owing to state limitations on the movement of rice, WFP currently
works with the NaSaKa, the agency mandated with
administrative and legal control on the NRS border area, to facilitate
transport arrangements to the warehouses. Discussions have led to the
possibility of using commercial transporters. A commodity tracking system is
being established which will systematically track commodity movements from
source to beneficiaries and allow for more accurate and timely reporting of
receipts and distribution.
WFP currently cooperates with UNHCR, UN Office for Project Services (UNOPS), three international NGOs and one local agency in project implementation. It is a participant in the UN Country Team and Common Country Assessment. It will continue to seek participation from community-based organizations (CBOs) and the village development committees in the identification of beneficiaries and activity areas, as well as in evaluation and food management tasks. Cooperation with some government ministries on returnee issues will also be maintained: Immigration and National Registration Department (INRD); the Ministry of Progress of Border Areas and National Races and Development Affairs; the Ministry of Social Welfare, Relief and Resettlement.
The
UNDCP and its predecessor UNFDAC have worked with the government for the past
25 years to reduce the illicit cultivation, production, trafficking and abuse
of drugs.
The
UNDCP country program has a strong emphasis on the elimination of opium poppy cultivation.
The country office has 3 international and two national staff members.
The
Wa Alternative Development project is located in the
southern portion of the Wa
area. The project covers the District of Mong Pawk which comprises the southern portion of the Wa Special Region 2, in the north-east of
Other
UNDCP programs in the supply reduction sector support the local communities in
the Kokang region and Nam Tit township
(Northern Shan) in their efforts to establish an alternative to the opium based
economy. The immediate objective is that the area under irrigation is
increased, improved varieties and crops are introduced and road access is
improved.
In
the field of demand reduction, UNDCP is funding a drug injection prevention
program in
There
is a community based demand reduction project in
Additional
international assistance to
The UNDCP launched
a ‘Stars Against Drugs’ campaign last year, which has
enlisted celebrities to raise awareness of the dangers of substance abuse.
On
UNHCR
has been working in
A 5
year UN Integrated Development Program (UN-IP), led by the UN Country Team was
expected to take over UNHCR’s reintegration
activities in
Constraints:
slow repatriation movement due to the lengthy verification process required by
the authorities, the existence of mixed marriages between cleared and
non-cleared families and the presence of newborn infants’ whose fathers did not
appear on the list of cleared cases, delays in granting clearance and visas to
new UNHCR staff and implementing partners.
Issues
of concern impeding stabilization efforts: compulsory labor, extortion, land
reallocation, the lack of citizenship, and restrictions on freedom of movement.
Demands for compulsory labor decreased towards the end of the year due to SPDC
instructions dated
Community
Services: A
total of 1,520 girls and women, both returnees and local population, received training
in sewing, needlecraft (including fishing nets) and mat-weaving, at 4 Magsaysay centers for women. Special assistance, such as
emergency cash grants and household assistance, was given to 7,749 people,
including female heads of households, unaccompanied children or elderly people,
and the physically or mentally disabled. 13 community development centers in Maungdaw and Buthidaung were run
with UNHCR’s assistance.
Crop
production: Village
stores were set up to provide better access to agricultural supplies, such as
improved seeds and cheaper pesticides. Through ‘seed banks’, improved seeds
were given to 920 farmers, mainly returnees, as a type of loan to be repaid in
kind after the harvest.
Domestic
needs/household support: All 1,323 returnees who returned during the year received a cash grant
of 10,000 kyats each as assistance to help them
resettle.
Education:
Five new schools were built, and 15 existing schools were rehabilitated.
On-the-job training courses were provided for 92 people, a total of 300 women
participated in literacy training, 2,218 children were reintegrated into state
primary school, 250 teachers became skilled literacy
teachers. A survey of educational needs was conducted in NRS, as basis for future educational
assistance programs.
Fisheries:
Equipment
and chemicals for shrimp breeding were procured, training on aquaculture was
provided.
Food:
Rice was
purchased and utilized for voluntary repatriation assistance, emergency
assistance to vulnerable individuals, food for school
girls, food-for-work and food-for-training.
Health/Nutrition:
During
repatriation, health assistance was provided to returnees as required. Mass
vaccination campaigns targeted children and women of childbearing age. A health
outreach system was instituted in 16 selected villages and health education was
given to community health workers and leaders. Various health education classes
were provided at local primary schools. Awareness campaigns were conducted on
eradication of polio; 13 community-based oral rehydration
therapy centers were established for children who required intensive care;
volunteers were trained in reproductive health and family planning.
Income
generation: Representatives
of over 4,500 households were assisted in organizing 922 rotating savings and
credit associations. Assistance was extended to 2,517 households to establish
various income-generating activities.
Legal
assistance: All
returnees received returnee identification cards upon arrival at the reception
centers. Registration cards for their communities were also issued.
Livestock:
training on
poultry keeping was provided for 50 livestock farmers; 2,200 chickens were
distributed to the poorest and most vulnerable.
Water:
A total of
15 tube wells were dug and installed with hand pumps at primary schools to
reduce risk of water borne diseases.
UNHCR works closely with 11 implementing partners: one government agency (Immigration and National Registration Department), 5 UN agencies (FAO, UNESCO, UNICEF, UNOPS, WFP), three INGOs (Bridge Asia Japan, Community and Family Services International and Groupe de recherché et d’echanges technologiques), two national NGOs (Myanmar Maternal and Child Welfare Association and Myanmar Red Cross Society).
UNHCR
has had an office in
With
respect to urban refugees, UNHCR’s objective will be
to ensure that they are granted protection and that their fundamental rights
are respected until a durable solution is found. UNHCR will also continue
promoting accession to the 1951 Refugee Convention and the adoption of national
legislation on asylum. To this end, UNHCR will make efforts to enhance
awareness of UNHCR’s mandate and refugee law among
Government officials and civil society, especially NGOs, the media and universities.
The
FAO is the UN’s lead agency for food, agriculture, forestry, fisheries and
rural development. The mandate of the FAO is to eliminate world hunger and rural
poverty, to increase agricultural production and improve the living conditions
of rural populations. It acts as an information center, a neutral forum for
policy dialogue, an adviser to the Government, and a development agency.
FAO
works to alleviate poverty and hunger by promoting sustainable development of
agriculture, a long-term strategy for increasing food production and food
security while preserving and managing natural resources. The aim is to meet
the needs of both present and future generations by promoting a sustainable
development that does not degrade the environment and is technically
appropriate, economically viable and socially acceptable.
FAO collects,
analyses, interprets and disseminates information on nutrition, food,
agriculture, forestry and fisheries. It publishes authoritative reports on
global conditions and trends regarding these fields. The organization serves as
a clearing-house providing farmers, scientists, traders, and government
planners with the information they need to make rational decisions on planning,
investment, marketing, research or training.
FAO’s information mandate includes two major undertakings:
The
Global Information and Early Warning System which monitors the crop and food outlook to
detect emerging food shortages and assess possible emergency food requirements.
The
World Agricultural Information Center which provides access to FAO’s
data and analysis on agriculture, forestry, fisheries and rural development in
a variety of forms, including the internet, diskettes and CD-ROMs.
In
1999, the FAO funded 4 technical cooperation projects related to hybrid rice,
fruit, vegetables and flowers, emergency supply of seeds, and agriculture
market information. Out of the 10 HDI projects funded by UNDP, FAO is the
executing agency for the three food security projects, which also focus on
sustainable management of natural resources. Since July 1999, FAO also executes
a sustainable agriculture development project funded by UNHCR in
Six
regional projects were active in 1999 in
WHO
provides technical support for global health needs through a highly decentralized
structure composed of regional and country offices.
The objective of WHO is the attainment by all people of the highest possible
level of health. Its two main constitutional functions are to act as the
directing and coordinating authority on international health work, and to
encourage technical cooperation in the areas of health with member states.
WHO
has been working in
WHO’s assistance covers the majority of the projects under the National
Health Plan. This includes direct technical support in areas such as malaria
and vector-borne disease control, TB and HIV/AIDS control, expanded programs of
immunization, family health, community health, and population issues. A special
financial and technical support is provided to poliomyelitis eradication.
WHO
promotes and supports capacity building of selected professionals from the
Ministry of Health, by organizing seminars, training programs and meetings of
expert advisory panels, and helps various departments of the Ministry to
prepare and execute operational research projects.
WHO
collaborates with UNICEF in the fields of immunization, maternal and childhood
illnesses, and essential drugs. WHO also works with
UNDP and UNICEF in the fields of HIV/AIDS, malaria control and elimination of
iodine deficiency disorders.
UNAIDs is an innovative joint venture of the UN. UNAIDS brings together the resources and varied expertise of seven UN system organizations (UNICEF, UNDP, UNFPA, UNDCP, UNESCO, WHO and the World Bank) to help prevent new HIV infections, to provide care and support for those already infected and affected by the disease, to reduce the vulnerability of individuals and communities to HIV/AIDS, and to alleviate the socioeconomic and human impact of the epidemic.
The Joint Plan (2001-2002) constitutes the practical
framework for UN co-ordinated support for HIV/AIDS in
The
Plan has the following objectives:
The
priority areas are:
The
Joint Plan will focus on a number of priority population groups in order to
reach people with high-risk behavior and those in vulnerable situations. A
second priority will be to reach people who may adopt high-risk behavior or
fall into vulnerable situations in the future: women in the entertainment
industry; clients of such; injecting drug users and their sexual partners;
people with STIs; vulnerable people, including
married women in risk situations, exposed to husband’s risk behavior and young
women about to marry.
Implementation:
since the beginning of 2000, the UN Theme Group on HIV/AIDS work in country has
been coordinated and implemented in a three level structure:
The
Theme Group, chaired by the TG Chairperson, is composed of the heads of
cosponsoring agencies (UNICEF, UNDCP, WHO, UNFPA, UNDP/UNOPS) and other UN
agencies working in
The
Technical Working Group is chaired by the UNAIDS Country Program Advisor and
composed of technical focal points from the cosponsoring agencies, as well as
representatives of the National AIDS Program, international and national NGOs.
The Strategic Sub Groups will depend on changing emphasis in the work. UN agencies that are working on HIV/AIDS are: WHO, UNICEF, UNFPA, UNDCP, and UNDP.
INGOs active in HIV/AIDS control, and largely funded and partnered by UN agencies, are:
· ICRC – supports activities of MRCS countrywide;
· World Vision – community based prevention & care in Mandalay & Thai-Burma border areas and feeder areas for cross-border migration - Kyaingtong, Dawei and Myeik
· CARE – prevention & care in Rangoon & Mandalay divisions, Muse, Northern Shan State, Monywa District, and Mon State
·
Save the Children (
· Population Service International – social marketing of condoms in 203 townships
·
Medicins du Monde – education materials and assistance in
·
Medicins sans Frontieres (
·
Marie Stopes
International – CBOs in
·
World Concern – preventive education especially
for youth involved in high risk activity in
· Population Council – provides technical support to a range of institutions and government bodies in the field of reproductive health research.
INGOs have been
able to work with people engaging in high-risk activities who are usually hard
to reach, most particularly sex workers and drug users. The majority of their
activities to date have been in the field of behavioral development and change
communication, and reproductive health especially STI prevention and
management, but increasingly they are turning their attention to care.
Thematic
groups bring together key staff with relevant expertise of different UN agencies,
NGOs and sometimes Government. These groups identify important development
issues, exchange information and facilitate a coherent and complementary
approach by all organizations regarding these issues.[95]
Thematic Group[96]
|
UN Agencies
|
|
Monitoring
& Evaluation (M & E) Working Group |
Office of the UN
Resident Coordinator (RCO); UNDP (chair); UNICEF (chair); UNDCP; UNFPA;
UNHCR; WHO; FAO |
|
Management
Committee on Common Premises and Services (MCCPS) |
UNDP
(chair); UNICEF; UNDCP; UNFPA; UNHCR; WHO; WFP; FAO |
|
Information,
Education & Communication (IEC) Working Group |
RCO;
UNDP; UNICEF (chair); UNDCP; UNFPA; UNHCR; WHO; WFP; FAO |
|
Thematic
Group on Disaster Preparedness |
UNDP;
UNICEF; UNDCP; UNHCR; WHO; WFP (chair); FAO |
|
Thematic
Group on Food Security and Nutrition |
UNDP;
UNICEF; UNDCP; WHO; WFP; FAO (chair) |
|
Thematic
Group on Gender |
UNDP;
UNICEF (chair); UNDCP; UNFPA; UNHCR; WHO; WFP; UNAIDS |
|
Thematic
Group on Primary Education |
UNDP;
UNICEF |
|
Thematic
Group on Water and Sanitation |
UNDP;
UNICEF; UNDCP; UNHCR; WHO |
|
Workgroup
on Illicit Drugs |
UNDP;
UNICEF; UNDCP (chair); UNHCR; WHO; WFP; FAO; UNAIDS |
|
UNAIDS
Theme Group |
RCO;
UNDP; UNICEF; UNDCP; UNFPA; WHO (chair) |
|
UNAIDS
Technical Working Group + subgroups |
RCO;
UNDP; UNICEF; UNDCP; UNFPA; WHO; UNAIDS (chair) |
Name of Organization |
Year established |
Main sectors of activities |
|
1. Medecins Du Monde |
1991 |
Health, HIV/AIDS |
|
2. World Vision |
1991 |
Health, HIV/AIDS, micro-credit, street children |
|
3.
Medecins Sans Frontieres – |
1992 |
Health, HIV/AIDS |
|
4. International Federation of Red Cross (The Federation) |
1993 |
Health |
|
5. Association Francois-Xavier Bagnoud |
1994 |
Programs, including preventive, for sex workers, HIV/AIDS care |
|
6. Action Contre La Faim (ACF) |
1994 |
|
|
7. Adventist Development and Relief Agency (ADRA-Myanmar) |
1995 |
Health, sanitation |
|
8.
Bridge |
1995 |
Income generation |
|
9.
Care ( |
1995 |
Health, HIV/AIDS, agro-forestry |
|
10.
Groupe de Recherche et d’Echanges Technologiques (GRET), |
1995 |
Micro-credit, food security |
|
11. Population Council |
1995 |
Reproductive health |
|
12. Population Services International |
1995 |
HIV/AIDS, social marketing |
|
13. Pact |
1995 |
Micro-credit |
|
14. Save the Children-UK |
1995 |
Social development, child development |
|
15. Save the Children-US |
1995 |
Health, education, income generation |
|
16. World Concern |
1995 |
Health, education, income generation, food security |
|
17.
Oisca International ( |
1996 |
Rural development, agro-forestry |
|
18.
Association of Medical Doctors of |
1997 |
Health |
|
19. Grameen Trust Bank |
1997 |
Micro-credit |
|
20. International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) |
1998 |
Prison conditions, health |
|
21. Marie Stopes International |
1998 |
Reproductive health |
|
22. Association for Aid and Relief |
1999 |
Disability rehabilitation |
|
23. Karamosia International (Jap) |
1999 |
Integrated development, environment |
|
24. Medecins Sans Frontieres – Suisse |
1999 |
Malaria |
|
25. Partners |
1999 |
Water and sanitation |
|
26. Medecins Sans Frontieres – France |
2000 |
Malaria |
|
27. U-Law |
2000 |
Drug rehabilitation |
|
28. Center for Humanitarian Dialogue |
2000 |
Humanitarian activities |
|
29. Aide Medicale Internationale (AMI) |
2001 |
Health |
|
30. SWISSAID |
2001 |
Environment, agricultural development |
|
31.
|
Jan 2001 |
Training/workshops for INGO staff |
|
32.
Malteser |
Jan 2002 |
Primary
Health Care, Health System Development, Water, Sanitation, CDC |
|
33.
Save the Children |
|
Health - maternal and child health program |
Sources: Adapted from UN/Myanmar, Country Paper, January 2002 [internal working draft]; Directory of International Non-Government Organizations Working in Myanmar/Burma, February 2001, and; Altsean “Peace of Pie?” October 2002.
INGOs recognise that the right to receive humanitarian assistance, and to offer it, is a fundamental humanitarian principle that should be enjoyed by all citizens of all countries. When we give humanitarian assistance it is not a political or partisan act and should not be viewed as such. Our primary motivation for working in this country or in any other country in which we work is to improve the human condition and alleviate human suffering.
INGOs follow a policy of non-discrimination regarding ethnic origin, sex, nationality, religion, sexual orientation, political orientation marital status or age in regard to the target populations with whom we work.
INGOs respect the local culture, religions and traditions of the people of
Burma/Myanmar.
· INGOs are agencies that function independently from all governments, government controlled/organised bodies, and political parties.
· INGOs set independent policies, design our own programs and use implementation strategies which we believe are in the best interests of the humanitarian needs of individuals, families, and communities of the target population and, ultimately, in the best long-term interests of the people.
· While INGOs operate in Burma/Myanmar with permission from the host government, we do not implement the policies of the host government nor are instruments of foreign policy of donor governments, except in so far as these policies coincide with the independently set policies of the INGOs.
· INGOs select where we work based on our organisational mandate, our independent assessment of need and organisational capacity.
· INGOs do not knowingly allow ourselves to be used to gather information of a political, military, or economically sensitive nature for governments or other bodies that may serve purposes other than those purposes that are strictly humanitarian.
· INGOs provide funds and project materials directly to project beneficiaries.
· INGOs do not provide funds or materials directly or indirectly to government departments or parastatal organisations for project implementation.
· INGOs work with organisations that are determined to be independent non- governmental organisations, which may include religious and cultural groups. business associations, and others.
·
INGOs recruit and hire staff independently of
any outside influence.
necessary monitoring mechanisms to ensure all assistance reaches the intended
targeted beneficiaries.
and/or monitor our programs in an ethical and effective manner.
5.1 Financial
Accountability
that responsibility with the utmost seriousness.
financial resources and assets are used solely by and for our intended
project beneficiaries and are not diverted by the government or any other
party.
do not exchange money at the central bank rate of US$1 = 6 Kyats.
expenditures.
5.2 Accessibility
INGOs work directly with and have direct access to project beneficiaries and
their communities to, assess, evaluate and monitor projects.
6
Rights-Based Programming and Advocacy
7.
8. Sustainability
INGOs employ a diverse set of strategies with a long-term goal of achieving sustainable impact in our programming. Sustainability can be defined in a number of different ways, including the long-term impact of a specific intervention following the closure of a project, continued financial viability of an institution, or capacity built within the community, within local community-based organisations or among staff members. Different INGOs may employ different definitions and different methods, but all of us consider sustainability of paramount importance and strive to achieve it.
9. INGO Co-operation
· INGOs exercise mutual respect for each agency’s mandate, methodology, independence and self-determination.
· INGOs practice transparency and confidentiality in engaging in a regular dialogue with one another regarding these principles and encourage one another to maintain the highest possible level of ethical programming.
· INGOs encourage and support additional INGOs entering the country to develop and undertake responsible ethical programming to provide needed humanitarian assistance.
· INGOs encourage donor agencies to significantly increase funding for ethical and responsible humanitarian assistance activities within the country.
Humanitarian agencies committed to this Charter and to the Minimum Standards will aim to achieve defined levels of service for people affected by calamity or armed conflict, and to promote the observance of fundamental humanitarian principles.
The Humanitarian Charter
expresses agencies’ commitment to these principles and to achieving the Minimum
Standards. This commitment is based on agencies’ appreciation of their own
ethical obligations, and reflects the rights and duties enshrined in
international law in respect of which states and other parties have established
obligations.
The Charter is concerned with the
most basic requirements for sustaining the lives and dignity of those affected
by calamity or conflict. The Minimum Standards which follow aim to quantify
these requirements with regard to people’s need for water, sanitation,
nutrition, food, shelter and health care. Taken together, the Humanitarian Charter
and the Minimum Standards contribute to an operational framework for
accountability in humanitarian assistance efforts.
We reaffirm our belief in the
humanitarian imperative and its primacy. By this we mean the belief that all
possible steps should be taken to prevent or alleviate human suffering arising
out of conflict or calamity, and that civilians so affected have a right to
protection and assistance. It is on the basis of this belief, reflected in
international humanitarian law and based on the principle of humanity, that we
offer our services as humanitarian agencies. We will act in accordance with the
principles of humanity and impartiality, and with the other principles set out
in the Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent
Movement and Non-Governmental Organizations in Disaster Relief (1994).
1.1 The
right to life with dignity
This right
is reflected in the legal measures concerning the right to life, to an adequate
standard of living and to freedom from cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment. We understand an individual's right to life to entail the right to have steps taken
to preserve life where it is threatened, and a corresponding duty on others to
take such steps. Implicit in this is the duty not to withhold or frustrate the
provision of life-saving assistance. In addition, international humanitarian
law makes specific provision for assistance to civilian populations during
conflict, obliging states and other parties to agree to the provision of
humanitarian and impartial assistance when the civilian population lacks
essential supplies.[97]
1.2 The distinction between combatants
and non-combatants
This is the distinction which
underpins the 1949 Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols of 1977.
This fundamental principle has been increasingly eroded, as reflected in the
enormously increased proportion of civilian casualties during the second half
of the twentieth century. That internal conflict is often referred to as 'civil
war' must not blind us to the need to distinguish between those actively
engaged in hostilities, and civilians and others (including the sick, wounded
and prisoners) who play no direct part. Non-combatants are protected under
international humanitarian law and are entitled to immunity from attack.[98]
1.3 The principle of non-refoulement
This is the principle that no refugee
shall be sent (back) to a country in which his or her life or freedom would be
threatened on account of race, religion, nationality, membership of a
particular social group or political opinion; or where there are substantial
grounds for believing that s/he would be in danger of being subjected to
torture.[99]
2.1 We recognize that it is firstly through their own efforts that the basic needs of people affected by calamity or armed conflict are met, and we acknowledge the primary role and responsibility of the state to provide assistance when people’s capacity to cope has been exceeded.
2.2 International law recognizes that those affected are entitled to protection and assistance. It defines legal obligations on states or warring parties to provide such assistance or to allow it to be provided, as well as to prevent and refrain from behavior that violates fundamental human rights. These rights and obligations are contained in the body of international human rights law, international humanitarian law and refugee law.
2.3 As humanitarian agencies, we define our role in relation to these primary roles and responsibilities. Our role in providing humanitarian assistance reflects the reality that those with primary responsibility are not always able or willing to perform this role themselves. This is sometimes a matter of capacity. Sometimes it constitutes a willful disregard of fundamental legal and ethnical obligations, the result of which is much avoidable human suffering.
2.4 The frequent failure of warring parties to respect the humanitarian purpose of intervention has shown that the attempt to provide assistance in situations of conflict may potentially render civilians more vulnerable to attack, or may on occasion bring unintended advantage to one or more of the warring parties. We are committed to minimizing any such adverse effects of our interventions in so far as this is consistent with the obligations outlined above. It is the obligation of warring parties to respect the humanitarian nature of such interventions.
2.5 In relation to the principles set out above and more generally, we recognize and support the protection and assistance mandates of the International Committee of the Red Cross and of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees under international law.
The Minimum Standards which follow are based on agencies’ experience of providing humanitarian assistance. Though the achievement of the standards depends on a range of factors, many of which may be beyond our control, we commit ourselves to attempt consistency to achieve them and we expect to be held to account accordingly. We invite other humanitarian actors, including states themselves, to adopt these standards as accepted norms. By adhering to the standards set out in chapters 1-5 we commit ourselves to make every effort to ensure that people affected by disasters have access to at least the minimum requirements (water, sanitation, food, nutrition, shelter and health care) to satisfy their basic right to life with dignity. To this end we will continue to advocate that governments and other parties meet their obligations under international human rights law, international humanitarian law and refugee law. We expect to be held accountable to this commitment and undertake to develop systems for accountability within our respective agencies, consortia and federations. We acknowledge that our fundamental accountability must be to those we seek to assist.
End of relevant section. See http://www.sphereproject.org/handbook/hc.htm
for further information.
ANNEX V – CASE STUDIES OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION[100]
The 1990s illustrated disastrous consequences of the international community’s acceptance of the concept of the use of force in humanitarian interventions. Military interventions in civil war situations for substantially humanitarian objectives occurred in:
In October 1993, the murder of 18
After the genocide in
In 1995, the UN emphasis on humanitarian responses was
discredited by the fall of Srebrenica, a safe haven in
Following these clear failures of military-humanitarian
interventions, a general reluctance developed in interventionist countries (like
the
The humanitarian INGO Medecins du Monde in 1999 stated that the ‘humanitarian label’
affixed to the missions in
The UN is leading a new trend in the direction of
considering the humanitarian access to needy populations as a strong imperative
to the international community and a right of the individuals in need. Many
humanitarian cease-fire case studies illustrate attempts to promote a space for
humanitarian aid in the midst of civil armed conflict. These studies show how
they achieved their humanitarian objectives but did not contribute to
shortening the conflict (e.g.,
HCF need to have a political aspect to make them more effective in their response to contemporary challenges. It has been demonstrated that the need goes beyond humanitarian space to the creation of political space – this is a space for setting up conflict resolution processes and for promoting a dialogue, which goes beyond the armed elites and horizontally involves local actors.
The Humanitarian Pause in Aceh was conceived both for humanitarian and political purposes. In terms of patterns of HCF arrangements and mechanisms used it is the most developed system since a structured system of bilateral bodies and a monitoring system were set out. In terms of impact of HCF on the dynamics of conflicts and the building of peace, the Pause in Aceh has probably been the most successful to date, even if partially, as it deliberately set up confidence-building measures.
One caveat at the beginning: the Pause constituted a major achievement in Aceh as it opened up a dialogue between the Parties to the conflict, to an extent that seemed impossible only some months prior to the Pause. However, it could not prevent widespread violence and a high number of human rights violations from taking place.
Conflict Background (in brief)
On
There is a low-intensity armed conflict in Aceh between ABRI and local independent forces,
GAM. Historically, Aceh
was an independent Sultanate which was violently subjugated by the Dutch in
1903. It provided financial and material support for the nascent
In the 1970s, President Suharto
called the province’s autonomy into question and started a policy of economic
colonization and ethnic “javanization” of the area.
This led to uprisings and the creation of the Free Aceh
Movement (GAM), which symbolically declared the independence of Aceh on
There are three main cleavages:
After the fall of Suharto, the
government of Habibie scaled back the activities of security
forces in Aceh. An independent commission was
appointed in order to investigate the abuses committed against civilians. The
Indonesian Parliament approved new laws on decentralization, which established
the transfer to regions of certain prerogatives of central power. A specific
law on Aceh’s status was also approved, ‘which
defined a “special status” of the province as the right to organize its own
religious, cultural and educational affairs within the national guidelines set
by
In October 1999, Wahid was appointed President. He had already launched a dialogue with the Acehnese. This also involved the GAM. In July 2001, Wahid was replaced by Megawati Sukarnoputri.
With the facilitation of the
By recognizing the ‘imperative to reduce tension and suffering of the population’, the Party signatories agreed to declare a Humanitarian Pause, as
‘[..] A means to promote confidence of the people and parties to this Joint Understanding in their common endeavor towards achieving a peaceful solution to the conflict situation’ (Preamble).
‘The objectives of the Humanitarian Pause are:
A. Delivery of humanitarian assistance to the population of Aceh affected by the conflict situation;
B. Provision of security modalities with a view to supporting the delivery of humanitarian assistance and to reducing tension and violence which may cause further suffering;
C. Promotion of confidence-building measures towards a peaceful solution to the conflict situation in Aceh (my emphasis).’
The Joint Understanding established three main bodies, all of them equally integrating representatives of the government and GAM:
1. A Joint Forum (JF), in order to formulate policy and review progress;
2.
A Joint Committee on Humanitarian Action (JCHA),
in order to coordinate humanitarian assistance, from needs assessment to
ensuring unhindered access for its delivery;
3.
A Joint Committee on Security Modalities (JCSM),
mainly in order ‘to guarantee the absence of offensive military actions […].’
Two
monitoring teams, one responding to JCHA and the other one to JCSM, assess the
implementation of the humanitarian action and of the security modalities,
respectively.
The
HDC is officially recognized as facilitator within the JF and JCHA.
Additionally, it ‘facilitates the process of fundraising for humanitarian
assistance’.
The
Humanitarian Pause came into effect on
On
In
April 2001, the government released the Presidential Instruction 4/2001 on
‘Comprehensive steps in the context of resolving the Aceh
problem.’ The problem is defined as ‘the dissatisfaction of the people and the
existence of an armed separatist movement’, in reference to members of GAM. The
military began to scale up its operations against GAM an offensive was
officially announced on
However,
the space for dialogue remained open and a new round of negotiations took place
in
Analysis
Facilitators: The HDC was
the officially recognized external facilitator of the negotiating process. It
was able to obtain the trust of all parties, and its impartiality was
recognized.
The
Center tried to involve internal actors as additional facilitators but the
polarization did not permit success in this attempt. As such, only GAM and the
government signed the Joint Understanding.
As
fundraiser, the HDC was not able to get the necessary back-up/involvement of
the international community. The lack of funds, crucial in a situation of
transition in order to soften tensions and polarization, failed to support the
Humanitarian Pause.
Conflict
analysis:
HDC elaborated a conflict analysis, with the aid of the Post-war Reconstruction
and Development Unit of the University of York, UK.
During the period in which the Humanitarian Pause was in effect, HDC developed
contacts with most of the social actors of Aceh,
sharing conflict analysis. However, the field presence of the Center was too
limited, as well as the capacity to adjust the analysis and strategies to the
fast-evolving political context.
Objectives: The objectives
and time frame were clearly stated. The objectives had both a humanitarian
(delivery of humanitarian assistance) and a political nature (measures of
confidence-building between the warring parties in order to facilitate a
peaceful settlement of the conflict).
Monitoring: The two teams
set up were extremely useful in giving certainty to the process and involving
the Acehnese civil society in the dialogue. However,
the participation of civil society was too limited. Only some NGOs participated
in the two teams. Moreover, the monitoring activity was completely overwhelmed
by the failure of the Pause to guarantee real security in the province.
Widespread violence and human rights violations were frequent.
Misuse:
Both
GAM and the Indonesian army took advantage to strengthen their positions. This
was more evident in the case of GAM, which expanded its control, both political
and military, within the province. It seems the structures of the Pause failed
to properly prevent/react to misuse from the parties.
Outcome: There were
high levels of violence (during and after the Pause) and virtually no progress
in the process of finding a solution to the conflict. However, the Pause had a
very important impact on the dynamics of the issue in Aceh.
First, it allowed the flow of needed humanitarian assistance. Secondly, it gave
a determinant contribution to bringing the warring parties together, thus
creating a ‘space’ for dialogue. Thirdly, the negotiation itself of the Pause
may also have implied “recognition that the conflict in its present form is ‘unwinnable.’” It is likely the Pause also delayed a
full-scale military onslaught.
In
conclusion:
·
The Pause was a major achievement in Aceh as it opened up a dialogue between the parties to the
conflict, to an extent that seemed impossible only some months prior to the
Pause.
·
The Pause was meant to further dialogue between
the armed, elite state and non-armed state actors. The Pause was locally
arranged, with the intervention of external facilitators but this facilitation
was practically isolated and not significantly supported by the international
community. The outcome was an initially solid negative peace, which later on
failed to avoid violence, mainly due to the fact that the army and some
factions of GAM had a different political agenda.
·
Civil society was not adequately participating
in the endeavor, notwithstanding HDC attempts.
·
Moreover, the deep crisis of the Indonesian
regime made the task of the Pause even harder to accomplish ending the conflict
through peaceful means as this requires vigorous national political leadership
(ICG, 2001b: 27).
·
The limited importance given to human rights
protection during the Pause represented one of the main weaknesses of the
strategy of the Humanitarian Pause (AI, 2001).
|
STAGES PRINCIPLES |
DESIGN |
IMPLEMENTATION |
EXIT |
|
STRATEGIC PLANNING (Effectiveness) |
Objectives/Means defined Time frame established Coordinated approach HCF zones marked Prevention of misuse set out Monitoring system defined |
Actions implemented International media involved in mobilizing Reaction of misuse undertaken Monitoring system in action |
Evaluation of HCF Media involved in socializing results |
|
INVOLVEMENT OF LOCAL CAPACITIES (Appropriateness) |
Conflict analysis Internal facilitators Needs assessment Confidence-building measures defined |
Actions implemented Local media involved in mobilizing Monitoring system in action (HCF, human rights, international humanitarian law) |
Evaluation of HCF Relief transferred to locals |
|
ADDRESSING LOCAL SOURCES OF CONFLICT (Sustainability) |
Conflict analysis Confidence-building measures defined Attention to human rights and IHL |
Confidence-building measures taken Analysis of impact |
Analysis of impact Measures to address sources of conflict advised Relief action linked to development strategies |
[1]
See paragraph 4(h): ‘Expresses
its grave concern at the ever increasing impact of HIV/AIDS on the population
of Myanmar and urges the Government of Myanmar to recognize further the gravity
of the situation, the need to commit adequate resources and the need to take
measures, in cooperation with the National League for Democracy, ethnic groups,
non-governmental organizations and women’s groups…’; and, 7(n): ‘Strongly urges
the Government of Myanmar to cooperate fully with the United Nations
international humanitarian organizations, and all sectors of the community
through consultation, to facilitate the granting of authorization to work
throughout the country to United Nations and international humanitarian
personnel, to allow the provision of humanitarian assistance and to guarantee
that it actually reaches the most vulnerable groups of the population, in
cooperation with all relevant political and ethnic groups’.
[2] Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, “Better Governance
is the Answer”, transcript of interview, August 2002.
[3] Steve Hirsch, United Nations Wire interview conducted
on
[4]
Copy of letter is with author.
[5] Asian
Development Bank, “Economic Update.
[6] Nwe Nwe Aye and Thet
Khaing, ‘EU allocates $2 million for malaria
program’, Myanmar Times,
[7] Ibid.
[8]
See, ICG humanitarian assistance
report at page 9 quoting World Bank,
[9] ICG humanitarian
assistance report, at p. 10, citing UN Country Paper.
[10] ICG humanitarian
assistance report, at p. 10 quoting UN Country Paper, January 2002.
[11] See UNICEF, Children and Women in
[12] See UNFPA 2001 report, para. 5 and UNAIDS/WHO 2000 (revised) report, p. 3.
[13] ADB Nov 2001 report, at p. 6.
[14]
ICG humanitarian
assistance report, at p. 11.
[15] ADB Nov 2001 report, at p. 6.
[16] See ICG HIV/AIDS report, at p. 8.
[17] See, ‘Report on the situation of human
rights in Myanmar, prepared by Mr Paulo Sergio
Pinheiro, Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, in accordance
with Commission resolution 2001/15’, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2002/45 [hereinafter ‘Pinheiro’s CHR 2002 report’], at para.
94.
[18] See ICG HIV/AIDS report, overview.
[19] UNAIDS, Report on Global HIV/AIDS
Epidemic, June 2000.
[20] Dr C Beyrer,
‘War in the Blood: Sex, Politics and AIDS in
[21] ICG HIV/AIDS report, at p. 2 and
UNAIDS/WHO 2000 (revised) report, p. 3.
[22] UNAIDS, “United Nations Response to HIV/AIDS
in
[23] UNAIDS Joint Plan of
Action, id, at 6 and ICG HIV/AIDS report, at 2.
[24] See
[25] UNAIDS Joint Plan of
Action, at 6.
[26] USAID HIV/AIDS 2002 report, at page 6.
[27] The UN agencies are: UNDP, UNFPA,
UNICEF, WHO, UNDCP. All UN agencies are coordinated through UNAIDS. The INGOs
are: the ICRC; World Vision; CARE; Save the Children (UK); Population Service International; Medecins du Monde; Medecins sans Frontieres
(Holland); Marie Stopes International; World Concern,
and; the Population Council.
[28] See ICG HIV/AIDS report, at p. 6.
[29] See U.S State
Department’s 2002 human rights report, section on children.
[30] U.S State Department’s
2002 human rights report, section on children.
[31] ICG humanitarian
assistance report, at p. 9.
[32] UNICEF and Myanmar Department of Labor,
Report on Working Children and Women in
[33] In
[34] U.S State Department’s
2002 human rights report, section on children.
[35] UN Working Group, Human Development in
[36] NCGUB, Human Rights
Yearbook Burma 2000-2001, at 326-7.
[37] Ibid, at 328.
[38] ICG humanitarian assistance report,
quoting UN/Myanmar, Food Security in Myanmar: A Proposal to Deal with Natural Shocks,
January 2000, internal report, and the People’s Tribunal on Food Scarcity and
Militarization in Burma, ‘Voice of the Hungry Nation’, (found at: www.hrschool.org/tribunal/index.htm),
at p. 10.
[39] UN
General Assembly,
[40]
Mr. Paulo Sergio Pinheiro, Special
Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, “Report on the situation of human
rights in Myanmar”, in accordance with Commission resolution 2001/15, 10
January 2002, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2002/45 [hereinafter CHR 2002 report], at para. 100.
[41] Burmese Border
Consortium, Internally Displaced People and Relocation Sites in
[42] Source: Global IDP Project, Norwegian
Refugee Council, at www.db.idpproject.org.
[43]
Refugees International, “
[44] See Report of the Commission of Inquiry appointed under article 26 of the
Constitution of the International Labour Organization to examine the observance
by Myanmar of the Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (No. 29), Geneva, 2 July 1998,
at paras. 300, 319, 327-9, 300 found at: http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/relm/gb/docs/gb273/myanma3a.htm#(1)%20Portering.
Also see, KHRG, ‘Northeastern Pa’an
District: Villagers Fleeing Forced Labor Establishing SPDC Army Camps, Building
Access Roads and Clearing Landmines’,
‘Flight
from Hunger and Survival: Landmines’ (October 2001) found at: www.ibiblio.org/freeburma/humanrights/khrg/archive/khrg2001/khrg0103c.html#Landmines.
[45] See Landmine Monitor Report 2000,
at http://www.igc.org/nonviolence/burmamines/lm2.html
and Yeshua Moser-Paungsuwan
‘Seeds of Destruction’ Burma Debate, Vol.
VII, No. 4 Winter 2000/01 found at www.burmaproject.org.
[46] See Landmine Monitor 2001 Report: Toward
a Mine-Free World, Country Report for
[47] See Landmine Monitor 2001 Report: www.icbl.org/lm/2001/burma/. Also
see Andrew Selth, ‘Landmines in
[48] Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, Foreword to the Working
Paper prepared for the Workshop on Humanitarian Aid to
[49] See Altsean,
“Peace of Pie?
[50] See id, pp. 19-22 for discussion on SPDC’s call for aid.
[51]
See Asian Development Bank report
found at http://aric.adb.org/aem/myanmar.pdf
and ‘
[53] Agence
[54] Roger Mitton,
‘The Arms Deals:
[55]
[56]
Altsean’s report at 24.
[57] Altsean’s report at 24.
[58] See Shan Women’s Action Network & Shan Human Rights Foundation,
LICENCE TO RAPE, June 2002. The report can be accessed
at: http://www.ibiblio.org/obl/docs/License_to_rape.pdf.
The report documents 173 cases of rape and sexual violence involving at least
625 girls and women by
[59] See Burmese Border Consortium,
“Internally Displaced People and Relocation Sites in Eastern
[60] Letter of Aung San Suu Kyi to Gustave Speth, UNDP
Administrator,
[61] “Better Governance is the Answer”,
transcript of interview with Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, August 2002, found in Altsean’s report at 11-13.
[62] See David Tegenfeldt,
‘International Non-Government Organizations in
[63] David I Steinberg,
‘Civil Society, NGOs and Pluralism in
[64] Steinberg, id.
[65] Confidential source.
[66] See Altsean’s
report at 48-9.
[67] Steinberg, at 30.
[68] See Altsean’s
report at 50-51 for discussion on the defensiveness of international aid
agencies about their operations and fear of being linked to border groups.
[69] The most recent example of this was the
SPDC using ICRC’s presence in
[70] Pinheiro’s CHR 2002 report, para. 113.
[71] Pinheiro’s CHR 2002 report, at page 31, para 113.
[72] If the NLD had been consulted before the
inspections took place, they could have informed them of prison transfers and
asked them to take necessary action with the military authorities.
[73] See NLD Statement #20,
[74] Pages 50-51.
[75]
This includes the private media,
business and legal associations, religious, cultural and social welfare
organizations, student groups and political parties.
[76] International Crisis Group, ‘
[77] ICG civil society
report, at 9.
[78] General Maung Aye quoted in
‘Council Meets Trainees of USDA Management Course’, New Light of Myanmar,
[79] GONGOs are
often run by military officers or their wives. For example, the MMCWA is run by
General Khin Nyunt’s wife.
[80] See Altsean’s
report at 32.
[81]
[82] WHO, ‘Humanitarian Cease-Fires List by
Country As Of April 2001’, found at: http://www.who.int/disasters/hbp/hcfcntrs.htm.
[83]
[84]
This section is taken from Guido Galli,
“Humanitarian Cease-fires in Contemporary Armed Conflicts: Potentially
Effective Tools for Peacebuilding”,
[85] See Pinheiro’s CHR 2002 report at para.
11.
[86] At paragraphs 4(h) and 7(n) (see supra
note 1 for language).
[87] Information from UNICEF’s website
[88] See UN Population Fund Proposed Projects
and Programs, “Recommendations by the Executive Director: Proposed Special
Assistance to
[89] Information from WFP’s website.
[90] Information from UNDCP’s website.
[91] Information found on UNHCR’s
website and world report.
[92] Information about the FAO comes from
‘United Nations in
[93] Id, at 47-49.
[94] UNAIDS, ‘United Nations Response to
HIV/AIDS in
[95]
Office of the UN
Resident Coordinator, ‘United Nations in
[96] Office of the UN Resident Coordinator,
“Annual Report of the Resident Coordinator in
[97]
Articles 3 and 5 of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights 1948; Articles 6 & 7 of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966; common Article 3 of the four
Geneva Conventions of 1949; Articles 23, 55 and 59 of the Fourth Geneva
Convention; Articles 69 to 7 of Additional Protocol I of 1977;
Article 18 of Additional Protocol II of 1977 as well as other relevant
rules of international humanitarian law; Convention against Torture and
Other Cruel Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 1984; Articles 10,
11, 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural
Rights 1966; Articles 6, 37, and 24 of the Convention on the Rights of
the Child 1989; and elsewhere in international law.
[98]
The distinction between combatants
and non-combatants is the basic principle underlying international humanitarian
law. See in particular common Article 3 of the four Geneva Conventions of
1949 and Article 48 of Additional Protocol I of 1977. See also Article
38 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child 1989.
[99]
Article 33 of the
Convention on the Status of Refugees 1951; Article 3 of the Convention
against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 1984;
Article 22 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child 1989.
[100] Taken from Guido Galli,
“Humanitarian Cease-fires in Contemporary Armed Conflicts: Potentially
Effective Tools for Peacebuilding”,