12. The Freedom of Movement, Assembly and Association
12.1 Background
Throughout 2003, the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) continued to restrict, monitor and interfere with the movement of the people of Burma, especially in border areas. Similarly, the rights to assembly and association continued to be effectively denied. In 2002, there were rising hopes for improved conditions for these rights when Aung San Suu Kyi was released from house arrest and the National League for Democracy (NLD) was allowed to reopen offices around the country. Yet, the feeling of optimism was not long lasting as Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD were subject to intense harassment during their tours around the country in the first five months of 2003. The SPDC’s true attitude towards the freedom of assembly and association was clearly illustrated on 30 May when the State sponsored Union Solidarity and Development Association (USDA) led an organized attack on Aung San Suu Kyi and NLD supporters. The attack resulted in the re-imprisonment of Aung San Suu Kyi and many other leaders of the NLD. At the same time, NLD offices across the country were closed and assembly for opposition political activities was effectively banned.
There has been overall a notable absence of the freedoms of assembly and association throughout the period of military rule in Burma, especially since the 1988 coup and formation of the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC). Under the SPDC these freedoms have been further restricted, and labor unions, student unions and private civic associations have all been banned. Through its extensive intelligence network and administrative procedures, the SPDC systematically monitors the travel of all citizens, especially the movements of politically active people in the country. All residents in Burma are required to carry national identity cards, showing their citizenship status, normal place of residence, date of birth, name of father, and so on. Since 1990 these cards have also been required to contain information on the holders’ ethnicity and religion. All residents and citizens of Burma are required to apply for these cards, with the exception of the Muslim Rohingya minority, who are not considered citizens by the government (see chapter on religion for further information). As possession of these national identity cards is mandatory in order to buy train or bus tickets, to register with a local council outside one’s normal place of residence, to vote in any future election, or to enroll in institutions of higher learning, those without such cards face severe restrictions on their freedom of movement.
Citizens with proper identification are able to travel freely within the country except for limitations in areas of ethnic armed activity. However, there is the requirement that any person who spends the night at a place other than his registered domicile must inform the police in advance, and that any household that hosts a person not domiciled there must submit to the police a guest list. The name of the overnight guests must be reported to and registered with the local authorities. SPDC Order 1/90, issued on 22 May 1990 stated: "action will be taken against all those who fail to report people illegally residing in their home."
Authorities sometimes enter homes during night hours to check registration documents of occupants, as part of government efforts to monitor people’s movements. Security forces also commonly search private premises and other property without warrants. In addition, curfews have also been enforced in parts of Burma.
12.2 International Travel
Leaving the country legally requires the possession of specific government authorization, which it is extremely difficult to obtain. The SPDC carefully scrutinizes prospective travel abroad. This produces rampant corruption as many applicants are forced to pay large bribes to obtain passports to which they are otherwise entitled. According to the US Department of State, applicants for passports and exit visas had to pay approximately 300,000 kyat, which is comparable to an annual salary. In addition, single women under 25 years of age were reported to have paid up to 1,000,000 kyat or $1,000 US. The official board that reviews passport applications denies applicants in some cases solely on political grounds. All college and higher education graduates who obtain passports (except for certain government employees) are required to pay a specific education clearance fee to reimburse the government for the cost of their education. The authorities on occasion restrict the issuance of passports to young women applicants seeking work abroad, reportedly to prevent young women from being enticed to travel abroad for jobs in the commercial sex industry. Burmese citizens are required to return their passports to the authorities each time they re-enter the country, and a new passport application must be submitted each time they want to travel outside the country.
12.3 Restrictions on the Movement of Women
Throughout the 1990s, Burma received increased international attention regarding the situation of human trafficking of women and girls into the sex industry. As a result, the SPDC has imposed stricter regulations for women’s travel, both domestic and international, which are ostensibly to prevent the trafficking of women. Due to a great deal of international media attention on the trafficking of women in Shan State, women between the ages of 16 to 25 in Shan State are restricted from traveling without the company of a guardian. In some other border areas, it is compulsory for women to possess a special permit when traveling between towns. Women under the age of 25 are particularly restricted from traveling abroad unless accompanied by a guardian. Unmarried women also face enormous difficulties obtaining passports. Women are also banned from marrying foreigners, which the SPDC alleges is a measure to stem human trafficking. (Source: Belak, Brenda, Gathering Strength: Women from Burma on Their Rights, Images Asia, January 2002)
At the end of 2002, the SPDC reportedly formed “Human Trafficking Prevention Committees” in various states and divisions to monitor the movements of both men and women between the ages of 16 and 25. The SPDC claimed that these committees would help prevent the movement of women into the sex industries of neighboring countries. At the same time, concern has been expressed that these committees will do more to limit freedom of movement and expression than to deter trafficking.
Despite all of these restrictions, hundreds of thousands of young women from Burma travel to neighboring countries because they find it difficult or impossible to make a living in Burma. More often than not, these young women travel with the assistance of a broker or by paying heavy bribes to officials along their journey. In many cases, the heavy restrictions on women’s movement have made little difference except to make travel more expensive. Restrictions on women’s movement also forces many to rely on traffickers to whom they often have to pay even higher fees and are put into a compromising and powerless position rendering women more vulnerable to exploitation and abuse. In effect, the SPDC’s alleged anti-trafficking measures serves to create the need for women to utilize the services of traffickers due to their inability to move freely.
12.4 Restriction on Movement of Migrant Workers to Thailand
On 13 October 2001, a law came into effect which imposed harsh penalties on those seeking to leave Burma illegally. This is part of an effort by the regime to stem migration flows. Large billboards have been erected in many townships accusing those who wish to leave Burma of "fleeing the country". Checkpoints near border areas such as Myawaddy, Karen State reportedly even have orders to turn back young people to stop them from migrating. Ironically, money repatriated by these workers is crucial in helping many people in Burma to survive. Despite the SPDC’s laws attempting to deter migration, there is an estimated one million Burmese migrant workers in Thailand.
Throughout 2003, the border with Thailand remained open and relations between the SPDC and Thai government continued to improve. The product of their relationship has been increased cooperation on many issues including regulating Burmese migrant workers in Thailand. In June 2003, Thailand and Burma signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) through which 400 illegal workers would be officially deported each month to the SPDC reception center in Myawaddy, Karen State. Since August 2003, when the MoU was implemented, 400 illegal Burmese migrant workers have been deported each month in this process. The increased participation of the SPDC in the deportation process has raised concerns of augmented persecution of those that are sent back to Burma (source: Out of Sight, Out of Mind, Human Rights Watch, February 2004). Moreover, there are no international organizations conducting regular independent monitoring of the conditions at the reception center. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) is the only organization, which has been able to visit the reception center on both deportation and non-deportation days in coordination with the Burmese authorities.
The reception center in Myawaddy was established following a MoU reached with Thailand in November 2001, through which the SPDC agreed to establish a series of reception centers to facilitate the deportation of migrant workers back to Burma. Currently the only center to be operational is the one located in Myawaddy, across the border from Mae Sot, Thailand. At this center, deportees go from table to table to be screened by five different state branches. These include the Ministries of Health and the Interior, the police, the immigration authorities and the army and/or DKBA. The deportees are photographed and have their fingerprints taken. These are then checked against existing files. Under SDPC Regulation 367/120–(b) (1), those who have emigrated illegally may be subject to up to seven years imprisonment (source: Out of Sight, Out of Mind, Human Rights Watch, February 2004). Yet, most are reportedly transported back to their hometowns and there made to sign a pledge to the local authorities that they will never attempt to illegally migrate again.
Members of opposition groups based along the Thai–Burma border fear and report that former pro-democracy activists who have recently surrendered to the SPDC identify returned migrants suspected of being involved with opposition groups who are then handed over to military intelligence. Deportees are also subjected to a mandatory blood test without any explanation at the reception center. This test is used to check migrants for a number of communicable diseases such as HIV/AIDS, Malaria, TB, and Sexually Transmitted Diseases. A number of human rights organizations have protested this mandatory HIV/AIDS testing, and the reported separation of 20 individuals who tested positive for HIV/AIDS. Such mandatory testing contravenes UN HIV Principles and Guidelines to which both Thailand and Burma are signatory. (See Section 12.14 for an interview with a Burmese migrant worker who was deported through the reception center in Myawaddy and detained for HIV testing in December 2003.)
12.5 Laws Restricting the Freedoms of Assembly and Association
The most far-reaching law prohibiting free association and assembly is Order 2/88, which the SPDC (then SLORC) issued on the day it assumed power. This law outlaws strike centers and the gathering of more than five people in one place. While this law has not often been enforced, there are many other laws which have. The most frequently used law is the 1908 (1957) Unlawful Association Act which allows for the detention of up to five years of anyone who is a member of or assists in any way an association outlawed by the regime. A number of organizations, including political parties, student unions, profession groups, religious associations, as well as armed opposition groups, have been declared illegal under this Act. This Act contravenes international human rights standards; and its incompatibility with international standards is underlined by the arbitrary, indiscriminate, and heavy-handed manner in which it is applied, usually to suppress peaceful dissent.
The Law on Formation of Associations and Organizations or Law No. 6/88 of 30 September 1988, defines an organization or association as an “organization, union, party, committee, headquarters, syndicate, front,…or similar association and organization that may not have a name but is composed of a group of people for a purpose or program.” All organizations which fit into this description are required to obtain permission to function, without which they have no right to operate. If denied permission, members of an organization may be subject to up to three years imprisonment. (Source: Myanmar; Justice on Trial, Amnesty International, 30 July 2003)
Order 1/90 was issued on 22 May 1990 to remind people that "action will be taken against all those who fail to report people illegally residing in their homes." Under existing laws any person not normally residing in a house who stays for one night or more must be registered at the local township office. This order threatens to charge persons failing to do so under section 124 of the criminal code, "for failing to disclose to the authorities concerned either an act or a conspiracy that amounts to high treason." The order was issued following the arrest of two members of the ABSDF after they had been hiding in Rangoon for some time. Another regulation, SLORC Order 1/91, issued on 30 April 1991, prohibits public servants from engaging in party politics.
Since July 1998, the SPDC has used section 5/1(g) of the 1961 Habitual Criminal Offenders Act against NLD MPs in order to restrict the activities of the NLD. This act puts repeat offenders on permanent probation, forcing them to sign up with local authorities on a daily basis. This 1961 act was intended to be applied only to monitor and restrict habitual criminals and not to limit, monitor and control political activity. The SPDC has misapplied this act, and has used it to issue restraining orders against NLD MPs. These orders, which force MPs to remain within a prescribed area, violate the provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
In 2003, the military junta continued to restrict the right to assembly and association except for government approved organizations such as the USDA. The Government continued to harass the NLD and coerce members to abandon the party or deter them from gathering to listen to speeches given by Aung San Suu Kyi. Following the events of 30 May, the NLD was restricted from all assemblies and gatherings. The Government hindered religious gatherings as well. Government approved political parties were required to seek authorization prior to conducting meetings or assemblies.
12.6 Restrictions on Foreigners in Burma
As the military government aims to promote tourism, restrictions on travel within the country for foreigners have been moderated. Foreigners wishing to travel as tourists in Burma are usually able to obtain one-month visas within 24 hours from Burmese embassies abroad. In September, it was reported that Burma would launch an electronic visa system, which would allow travelers to obtain visas over the internet within 36 hours. The main server for the online visa service would be maintained by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with the cooperation of the Intelligence and Immigration Departments. Burma would be the first Southeast Asian nation to utilize the e-visa system (source: “Myanmar to Introduce E-visa System,” Xinhua, 16 September 2003). In addition, at the beginning of the year, the SPDC indicated plans to grant visas on arrival for travelers on certain airlines (source: “500,000 Foreign Tourist Visit Myanmar in 2002,” Xinhua, 24 January 2003). Yet, despite the ease of restrictions, military intelligence continued to monitor the movement of foreigners within the country and to question citizens about conversations with foreigners. In addition, the Government required foreigners and local inhabitants to obtain permission before leaving the country. Diplomats were exempt from this rule.
Select categories of applicants, such as foreign human rights advocates, journalists and political figures continue to be denied entry visas unless traveling under the agency of a sponsor and with a purpose acceptable to the SPDC. In 2003, some foreign diplomats or Rangoon based NGOs were required to obtain advanced permission from the government before traveling outside of Rangoon. This requirement was remitted for the International Labor Organization (ILO) during the year.
International Non-governmental Organizations (INGOs) are subjected to monitoring and restrictions by the SPDC. In order for INGOs to operate programs inside Burma, they must obtain MoUs from top generals in the SPDC (an exception is the INGOs which are in Arakan State under the UNHCR mandate for the Rohingya repatriation). One of the restrictions in these ‘MoUs’ states that "…(NGO) representatives and personnel shall not interfere with the political and religious affairs of Myanmar and shall abide by the laws and regulations of Myanmar." In addition, INGOs conducting field activities were required to have a government representative on all visits. According to the US Department of State, the authorities required complicity to this rule during periods when the SPDC was concerned with the activities of the democratic opposition. (Source: Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - 2003, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, United States Department of State, 25 February 2004)
As the Government heavily monitors the activities of INGOs, diplomats, and foreign journalists, Burmese citizens are often heavily questioned, arrested or deterred from having contact with them. This was specifically illustrated this year when the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) conducted missions in accordance with authorization they had received in 2002. The SPDC granted the ICRC permission to travel to areas of eastern Burma, including Shan and Karenni States, to monitor the conditions of villagers and prisoners in prisons and labor camps. During the ICRC visits to Shan State in January, it was reported that villagers were threatened with bodily harm if they shared information against the Government. The Shan Women’s Action Network (SWAN) also reported that local officials were ordered to record all questions posed by ICRC representatives. During the ICRC’s fourth mission to Shan State, in September, it was reported that local military officials warned villagers not to communicate with the foreigners (source: “Red Cross Visits Shan Area 4th Time," SHAN, 9 September 2003). In addition, ICRC representatives reported a significant military presence in the villages that they visited, causing villagers to be averse to working with them (source: “ICRC on Fifth Trip to Shan Township," SHAN, 30 September 2003). (Please see chapter on freedom of expression for more information.)
The SPDC exhibited their tendencies to monitor the activities of diplomats again in March when the UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights for Myanmar, Paulo Sergio Pinheiro made his fifth mission to investigate the situation of human rights in Burma. Despite the fact that SPDC authorities had granted him permission to conduct his activities, a bugging device was found hidden in the room when he was conducting interviews with political prisoners on 22 March. The mission was concluded 4 days earlier than planned and Pinheiro left Burma indicating that he was very angry and disappointed with the Government of Myanmar. Prior to his arrival, Pinheiro had sought assurances from the SPDC that he would be allowed to go anywhere and meet with anyone. Moreover, the SPDC had also agreed upon the terms of privacy when Mr Pinheiro met with political prisoners. While the SPDC indicated to Mr Pinheiro that they agreed to his terms, their actions were clearly contrary to that agreement (source: “Bugged UN Envoy Departs with Vow to Pursue Mission," Bangkok Post, 26 March 2003).
12.7 Restrictions on Political Parties
In 1988, political parties were allowed to form for the first time in decades. Over 200 such parties were formed, yet as of 1993, following the 1990 elections which were never honored, only 7 remained legal. Notably, among the first parties to be de-registered were those which represented ethnic minorities and those which had collectively called for a federal constitution in their party manifestos. However, some of the parties which were formed by the ethnic minority groups that had made cease-fire agreements with the SLORC between 1989 and 1993 were removed from the list of "unlawful associations." In 2003, there were 10 legally registered political parties, most of which were inactive.
In the beginning of January, the SPDC officially refused to acknowledge the United Nationalities Alliance (UNA), which is comprised of eight national race political parties which won seats in the 1990 elections. While the SPDC had indicated on several occasions that they would not recognize the party, this was the first time that SPDC officials made a statement and had military intelligence officials warn UNA leaders. The UNA is comprised of the Arakan League for Democracy (ALD), Chin National League for Democracy (CNLD), Kachin State National Congress for Democracy (KNCD), Karen National Congress for Democracy (KNC), Kayah State all Nationalities League for Democracy (KNLD), Mon National Democratic Front (MNDF), Shan Nationalities League for Democracy (SNLD), and Zomi National Congress (ZNC). The statement came at the same time as increased USDA pressure on the NLD causing concern over the possible consequences to the UNA activities. (Source: “Burmese Authorities Refuse to Recognize United Nationalities Alliance," DVB, 13 January 2003)
In February, the SPDC issued a statement calling for the cooperation of all 10 legal political parties as the country moved toward democracy. Despite this call for unity, reports of harassment on political activities and political parties, particularly the National League for Democracy, were reported throughout the year. (Source: “Myanmar Govt Urges Political Parties to Help Democracy Transition," Xinhua, 13 February 2003)
12.8 Prohibition of Free and Independent Trade Unions
In 2003, there were no free trade unions in Burma despite the fact that under the 1926 Trade Unions Act, workers may form trade unions with the authorization of the Government. In addition, Burma ratified the Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize Convention, 1948 (No. 87) in 1955 and is bound, as an ILO member, to apply the principles of freedom of association. However, the SPDC has been criticized for not bringing its laws into compliance with Convention No. 87 by refusing to recognize independent trade unions and harassing workers who attempt to organize.
Several of Burma’s laws relate to freedom of association and union organizing, but each is inconsistent with international standards and ignored in practice. The SPDC does not recognize any independent labor unions in Burma. Rather, civil servants, who form the majority of the white collar work force, are compelled through various coercive means, to join the Union Solidarity and Development Organization. The SPDC actively suppresses attempts by workers to organize, and workers who try to form or join such unions are liable to be harassed, arrested and tortured. They are also under constant surveillance by the police and military intelligence
12.9 The Union Solidarity and Development Association
The Union Solidarity and Development Organization (USDA) recently gained international attention for its role in the harassment of Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD. Most notably, the USDA has been recognized for its lead role in the violent attack on the NLD near Depayin, Sagaing Division on 30 May 2003 (please see section below on the freedom of movement of the NLD for more information). The USDA has often been employed by the SPDC to intimidate and obstruct Aung San Suu Kyi on her visits around the country or to engage in activities such as defacing NLD billboards. Although it is clearly an instrument of the State, SPDC officials utilize the USDA to mask and distance their role in initiating such human rights abuses and to give such actions the appearance of popular grass roots support.
The USDA was formed on 15 September 1993, about two weeks after the SPDC announced that they were holding a national convention to write a new constitution. The USDA is registered with the Ministry of Home Affairs, and although it is not a political party, some claim that it was created to rival the opposition National League for Democracy for popular support. The USDA mandate is to support the activities and policies of the military, and the association was created by the junta to give the illusion that the regime enjoys popular support from its citizens. Membership in the USDA is virtually compulsory for school children, civil servants and anyone seeking the favor of the generals. In 2003, the USDA claimed to have 16 million members (source: Moe, Kyaw Zwa, “Forced Backing for the Road Map," Irrawaddy, 22 September 2003).
The organization claims that membership is voluntary, and that the purpose of the association is essentially social, yet even at the basic and middle school levels, students are pressured to become members. This pressure includes the incentive that if the students have fulfilled their "social" requirements, they receive extra marks on their final examination and recommendations from their schoolteachers. Members of all ages are given social and economic incentives for joining. USDA members have the privilege of attending vocational, language, management and other courses. In October, SHAN reported that the USDA was active again requiring that each village in Kentung, Mongyawng, Monghpyak, and Tachileik choose 5 villages to become new USDA members. The villagers were also required to provide food for the families of USDA members. USDA members were exempted from taxes and other duties ordered by the authorities. A member from Tachilek reported that university students who joined earned at least an additional 20 marks. (Source: “USDA Rises Again," SHAN, 11 October 2003)
Until September 2003, the organization claimed to be non-political, and members were required to stay away from party politics. In September, following an organizational meeting, the Mon State USDA announced that it will become a legal national political party to compete in the elections as according to Prime Minister Khin Nyunt’s seven-point road map to democracy (source: “USDA to Become ‘Legal Political Party’," DVB, 9 October 2003). Moreover, since its formation the USDA has been directly involved in opposing the NLD, and recently has been involved in organizing events to call for the abolishment of the NLD. USDA members, along with the police and MIS forces have been actively involved in pressuring NLD members to resign, and in coercing or often forcing other citizens to sign papers stating their "loss of trust" in the NLD, the CRPP, and/or certain elected MPs. In another disturbing trend, USDA members and leaders have been increasingly involved in the arbitrary arrests of those suspected to be in opposition to the regime, going along with SPDC and MIS agents, or even sometimes alone. The USDA has also achieved the power that enables members and leaders to call upon people to "contribute" their labor for free. USDA involvement in forced labor has been especially notable over the last few years.
The USDA claims further to be fully supported by their own businesses, such as the Myan-Gon-Myint Group of Companies. Yet the organization receives the majority of its support, both direct and indirect, from the military regime. In contrast to attacks on the NLD, the military’s ‘New Light of Myanmar’ consistently praises the USDA. In September 2000, Senior General Than Shwe addressed the USDA annual general meeting and praised it as, "a reliable force, serving the historic duty of undertaking tasks in line with our three main national causes…"
The tight relationship between the SPDC and USDA can further be seen through the power and privileges that comes to USDA members. In the past, BSPP members were appointed by the military as Township PDC authorities. Now it is USDA members that are appointed to these prestigious posts.
Examples of Forced Attendance at Mass Rallies
On 20 September, the USDA organized a rally to exhibit support for Prime Minister Khin Nyunt’s 7-point road map plan. The rally took place at Thuwunna Stadium, Thingankyun Township, Rangoon. According to government run media sources, over 15,000 people attended the rally. At the same time, a local resident reported that students and civil servants were ordered to attend the rally, and the USDA organized transportation for people in remote areas. Another local resident indicated that the USDA provided 200 kyat and free lunch to some of the attendants. (Source: “Forced Backing for Road Map," Irrawaddy, 22 September 2003)
On 24 September 2003, Maj. Mya Win, the director of artillery from Rangoon headquarters arrived in Tavoy town. He organized all the families from Artillery Battalion No.302, 304, 307 to conduct a demonstration to express support for the 7-point road map, created by Prime Minister Khin Nyunt. (Source: Monthly Human Rights Situation Report, Mergui-Tavoy Information Department, KNU, October 2003)
On 25 September, Major Mya Win went to Mergui and conducted another demonstration with Artillery Battalion No. 301, 201, 309, 306, 501 and 401 to show that they support the 7-step road map. (Source: Monthly Human Rights Situation Report, Mergui-Tavoy Information Department, KNU, October 2003)
On 28 September 2003, Coastal Region Military Command Commander Own Myint ordered the people in Mergui district to assemble in Mergui's Mya Aeya football ground for a demonstration to show that they support the 7-step road map announced by Prime Minister Khin Nyunt. The commander mentioned that each household was required to send 2 people to attend. If not, they would be charged 500 kyat for the absent number of people. (Source: Monthly Human Rights Situation Report, Mergui-Tavoy Information Department, KNU, October 2003)
12.10 Other Social Organizations in Burma
No independent human rights or pro-democracy groups are allowed to operate inside Burma. Those that did in 2003 were able to do so only from outside the country. People in Burma are only allowed to associate with social organizations approved by, and under the control of the SPDC. In addition to the USDA, the government backs its own organizations, and pressures the population to join them. Government sponsored organizations include: The Myanmar Medical Association (MMA), Myanmar Red Cross (MRC), Myanmar Maternal and Child Welfare Association (MMCWA), Myanmar Anti-Narcotic Association, Auxiliary Fire Brigade, Parent Teacher Associations, Women’s Welfare Association and the Myanmar Nurses Association (MNA).
The extent to which these organizations, which are located at township levels across the country, are dominated by the SPDC, varies. However, the organizations are generally led by senior officials with military backgrounds, or the wives of senior officials, military officers, or USDA members, as is often the case with the chairpersons of the local MMCWA. Members of these organizations are expected to participate in pro-military and USDA rallies, or anti-opposition rallies, and often the political agendas of the regime have more precedence in the organization then the actual social issues the organizations are supposed to address.
A select number of local NGOs, mostly religious and church-backed organizations, are able to operate limited social programs. However, SPDC laws confine them to religious activities. These groups are not allowed to be registered as non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in Burma and are instead registered under the Ministry of Home and Religious Affairs. This non-NGO status limits these organizations’ access to overseas funding and their ability to conduct in-country training with foreign experts. Local NGO programs are also under constant surveillance from the SPDC and SPDC backed social organizations. For the most part, individuals in SPDC controlled areas of Burma who desire to work for their communities have no alternative but to join government sanctioned organizations. (Source: HRW)
12.11 Restriction of Villagers in Border Conflict Areas
Roadblocks and Checkpoints in Conflict Areas
During 2003, domestic travel continued to be monitored and numerous checkpoints existed along all major travel routes. During periods of military operations or political tension, more checkpoints were opened and roads blocked. This was particularly true following the events of May 30 and the attack on Aung San Suu Kyi and NLD members and supporters near Depayin, Sagaing Division. Military officials severely restricted movement to prevent the transfer of information and the possibility of people organizing and protesting (see section on harassment of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD for further information).
In areas of ethnic insurgency, there are often severe restrictions placed upon movement. In "brown" or "black" areas, people wishing to leave their villages often must obtain a permission slip from local officials before they can go out to tend their farms, or travel. These permission slips are usually only obtained if a "fee" is paid. In relocation sites, people are often not allowed to return to their land, as they have been warned that anyone moving about in their former fields and towns will be shot on sight. In addition, it is common for the army to burn houses and place landmines in the former fields and towns of relocated communities to further prevent people from returning.
In July 2002, Amnesty International released a report entitled, Myanmar, Lack of Security in Counter-Insurgency Areas. The report noted that despite improvements in some urban centers, human rights abuses committed by the Tatmadaw and its allies against ethnic populations in and next to war zones in Burma continued unabated. These included draconian restrictions of freedom of movement, assembly and association. (See also torture, extra-judicial executions and forced labour chapters). The Shan Human Rights Foundation, Karen Human Rights Group, Human Rights Foundation of Monland, and other human rights organizations documented multiple human rights abuses of villagers suspected of supporting or having connections with ethnic resistance groups. As a result of these heavy restrictions and blatant human rights abuses, many residents in such areas have been forced to abandon their livelihoods, and relocate or migrate in order to survive.
Restriction of Movement of Villagers in Conflict Areas - Partial List of Incidents for 2003
(For more information see chapter on Internally Displaced People and Forced Relocation.)
In May 2003, it was reported that State Peace and Development Council's No.1 Strategic Commander, Col. Soe Thet, who had to shift his frontline HQ to Yahpoo village in the northern area of Yebyu Township (Tavoy District in Tenasserim Division, the southern most region of Burma), ordered villagers to build sentry posts along Ye-Tavoy car-road before 25 May 2003. After the posts were completed, personnel from the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA) and the Karen Peace Army (KPA) were posted there. The assigned armed troops allowed vehicles to pass through the gates in the day time (6:00 am - 6:00 pm) only. No vehicle was allowed to travel at night (6:00 pm - 6:00 am) time. The No.1 Strategic Command issued an order that no vehicle was allowed to travel at night (6:00 pm - 6:00 am) on the Ye-Tavoy car-road. Moreover, the villagers were restricted from going out of their houses between (9:00 pm - 6:00 am). The villagers were required to construct fences around their concerned village and to leave only 2 openings for entering and exiting the village. Before 9:00 pm, if the villagers need to travel from house to house they are not allowed to use a flashlight. They were only allowed to use candles or kerosene lamps said the order. The commander further said that those did not follow the orders would be punished effectively. (Source: Monthly Human Rights Situation Report; Tenasserim Division, Mergui-Tavoy District Information Department, KNU, May 2003)
On 18 July 2003, Bo Kyaw Myo Htun of SPDC IB 73, ordered all Karen and Burmese villages in the plain region of Tan-ta-bin Township to make lists of family members and lists of cattle. The villagers had to pay 150 kyat for the family list and 600 kyat for a list of cattle. He instructed those who failed to make cattle lists to be fined 5,000 kyat. (Source: KIC, 2003)
On 29 July 2003, troops from Burma Army LIB 703 Column 2 led by Bo Sein Win combined with DKBA troops led by Pah Daw Bo and Moe Kyo came to Ta-rit-po-kwee Village in Lu Plein Township of Pa-an District. Within 3 days, they planned to clean the areas from Htee-tha-blu-toe, Htee-nya-ah-kee, Ma-ka-law-kee, Ta-kha-kee, Htee-wa-bway-kee, Htee-pah-reh, Htee-mo-kee, Khaw-thoo-kee villages. They issued order to those who were cultivating crops for their livelihood close to the foot of mountain and in the flat area must not go to their paddy fields. If anyone was found, they would be shot on the spot. (Source: Department of Information, KNU, 2003)
On 25 August 2003, SPDC IB 73, led by officer Myo Htun based in Klaw Mi Der, ordered all villagers from the villages around Klaw Mi Der area, Taw Ta Tu Township, Taungoo district to get a pass from him if they wanted to go out of their villages or sleep in their paddy huts or on anther plantation. To get this pass, villagers had to pay 200 kyat each. They had to buy this pass every month. (Source: KORD, 2003)
On 1 September 2003, the DKBA troop base in Lay Po Hta, Dwe Lo Township, Mutraw district, led by Officer Maung Chit established a "Block and Destroy" operation in the area and forced the villagers in surrounding area to get an exit pass or travelling pass from him. Every villager over the age of 14 was required to get this exit pass from him at the cost of 200 kyat per person. (Source: KORD, 2003)
On 2 September 2003, DKBA commander Kyaw Than instructed his troops to block the villagers in the area from going out to their fields and into the jungle in Doo Tha Htu district, Thaton Township. He instructed his troop to shoot and kill if they found any one of the villagers in the jungle or in the fields. (Source: KORD, 2003)
On 22 September 2003, DKBA battalion Bo Be and SPDC IB 1, led by Battalion Commander 2 Saw Mya Oo, instructed villagers in Khaw Po Pleh, Shwe Oak and Kwee Lay village tracts not to go out of their villages. Anyone who was found carrying rice or a bundle of cooked rice was to be shot and killed. Villagers in the area did not dare to go out to tend their farms and as a result, paddies were heavily destroyed by both household animals and wildlife. (Source: KORD, 2003)
On 5 October 2003, DKBA Bo Lweh blocked the villagers of Toe Teh Khee, Klaw Hta and Kwee Lay Pya villages in Bilin Township from going out of their villages. (Source: KORD, 2003)
On 10 October 2003, combined SPDC and DKBA troops led by Eh Hser and Zaw Zaw banned villagers of Ta-roi-khee village, Tha-ton Township, from going to their upland paddy fields. As a result, 7 upland paddy fields were ruined belonging to Saw Nag Taw, Kaw Lar Po, Baw Na Pa, Maung Htun Win, Pa Ba, Than Htun and Maung Lo. (Source: KNU, 15 January 2004)
On 30 October 2003, Henry of DKBA prohibited villagers from going to their paddy
fields and as a result the paddy fields of Noe-hkeh-hta villagers, Thaton were
spoiled. The villagers were:
(1) Tee Maung Lay,
(2) Naw Thein Khin,
(3) Naw Meh,
(4) Maung Chai,
(5) Maung Thay Nge,
(6) Maung Keh,
(7) Saw Ka Doe, and
(8) Pa Ta Klay Pa She.
In addition, paddy fields in Htaw-po-hta village, Bi-lin Township were spoiled, belonging to the following villagers:
(1) Tee Pa Kha,
(2) Aung Zaw Win,
(3) Tee Law Lah,
(4) Maung Mya,
(5) Tee Maung Bi,
(6) Naw Paw Lah, and
(7) Maung Kee.
A total of 16 hill paddy fields were spoiled. (Source: KIC, 2003)
On 10 November 2003, troops from a column of SPDC LIB 20, led by Bo Htay Win, and from a column of SPDC IB 73, led by Bo Aung Nyunt Win, banned all villagers living in villages in areas at the foot of the mountain and in the plain areas beginning from Sha-zee-bo village to Swa-lo village, from going out of their villages. The troops warned the villagers that they would be considered as an enemy, if they went out of their villages. (Source: KIC, 2003)
12.12 Restriction on the Movements of Religious Minorities
Rohingya Muslims in Arakan State continued to face heavy travel restrictions in 2003, which prevented them from moving from village to village, let alone throughout the country. Most Rohingya Muslims do not qualify to receive a national identity card under the requisites of the 1982 Citizenship Act, possession of which is necessary for free travel in the country. Under the provisions of this act, a citizen must be able to prove that they are one of the 135 “national races” or else that their ancestors settled in Burma prior to British colonization in 1823. Rohingya are not considered one of the 135 national races and most are unable to prove their ancestral origins in Burma. Those without a national identity card must obtain permission from the authorities prior to any domestic travel.
Since February 2001, Rohingya have been banned from traveling to Akyab (Sittwe), the capital of Arakan State. Rohingya are also required to obtain permission and a pass from the authorities to travel from village to village. This rule emerged following a meeting on 7 June 2000 held by Maj. Gen. Aung Htwe, the commander of the Western Command in the Arakan State capital Akyab (Sittwe). The meeting was attended by members of all Township Peace and Development Councils (TPDC), District PDCs, the Director of Immigration, the Head of the MI and Director of the NaSaKa (Western Area Command) Headquarters. Thereafter, Rohingya were permitted travel between their localities only with the possession of recommendations or exit passes from the Township PDC, District PDC, Military Intelligence, or Area Commander of the NaSaKa. In addition, they had to fill out "Form-4" issued by the Department of Immigration. To obtain these documents, the Rohingya traveler has to pay the authorities a sum of 2,800 kyat to process an Exit Pass that is usually valid only for 24 hours. Any Rohingya who is found to be traveling with improper documentation, is accused of illegally trying to immigrate and is jailed for 3 years. (Source: ARNO, 2002)
In most cases, passes are only granted for a 12-hour period; only on rare occasion are Muslims permitted to stay outside their village overnight. To travel further, for instance, to the Township capitals at Maungdaw or Buthidaung or the state capital at Sittwe is virtually impossible. The only Muslims able to travel to Sittwe, or further to Rangoon, are those who can afford to bribe SPDC officials. Muslim traders have been reported to have paid bribes of 500,000 kyat to be able to travel to Rangoon (source: Narinjara News, 2002). Those who have overstayed their passes and have difficulty returning to their villages risk being deleted from their family list. In the event that this happens, they are considered guests in their own homes and villages when they do return home (source: Conflict, Discrimination, and Humanitarian Challenges in Northern Arakan State, Forum Asia, 8 October 2003). (For more information, please see the chapter on freedom of religion.)
Further restrictions imposed on the freedom of movement of the Rohingya
In December, Kaladan news reported that the authorities had imposed new and increased restrictions on the movement of Rohingya in Arakan State. A Rohingya attempting to travel the 16 miles from Buthidaung to Maungdaw had to go through several steps in order to do so. First, a recommendation form costing 200 kyat must be obtained from the Village Peace and Development Council. A "Form 4", which is usually used for foreigners, and a recommendation costing 500 kyat must be obtained from the Township Immigration Office. With all of these documents, the Nasaka transit camp at the Buthidaung town gate must grant permission for 200 kyat. Thereafter, the Rohingya traveler must go to the Township Peace and Development Council and the District Peace and Development Council offices to receive approval and pay more fees of 500 and 200 kyat. In order to stay in Maungdaw over night, the Rohingya traveler must pay 500 kyat at the Maungdaw Nasaka checkpoint, which is 3 miles out of town, and 500 kyat to the Buthidaung Nasaka transit camp. To return, the Rohingya traveler must pay 200 kyat at the District Immigration office. The total cost of receiving permission to go on the trip is 2,800 kyat. A one-month residence permit costs 15,000 kyat. If a traveler is found to be in non-compliance with these procedures, he will be subject to imprisonment for six months to engage in hard labor. (Source: “Further Restrictions Imposed on the Freedom of Movement of Rohingya," Kaladan, 21 December 2003)
Curfew in Maungdaw following arson attack on mosque
Following an arson attack on a mosque in Maungdaw on 4 November 2003, the authorities imposed a dusk to dawn curfew for Rohingya in Maundaw, Arakan State. Initially, the curfew was from 6:00 pm to 6:00 am and later reduced to 10:00 pm to 5:00 am. Despite the change in curfew timeframe, Kaladan News reported that the police continued to observe the initial curfew restrictions. Police arrested Rohingya found outside around 8:00 pm. The police would then detain the Rohingya person in an isolated location until 10:00 pm when they were taken to the police station and charged them with not complying with the curfew restrictions. The detainees were reportedly released after paying some sort of fine in the form of money or goods. The curfew continued through the beginning of 2004. (Source: “How Long Curfew Would Be Continued!! Continued Curfew Paralyses Movement of Rohingyas in Northern Arakan," Kaladan, 18 January 2004)
12.13 Restriction on the Movements and Harassment of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD
"It could be argued that all the progress that had been achieved since the process of dialogue began in 2000 had been undone in one stroke."
– UN Special Rapporteur for Human Rights in Myanmar, Professor Paulo Sergio Pinheiro in his report the UN General Assembly. (Source: “Interim Report of the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights on the situation of human rights in Myanmar,” Fifty eighth session of the United Nations General Assembly, Item 119 (c), 5 August 2003)
"A climate of fear has now descended on Rangoon," said a senior Asian diplomat. "It is reminiscent of the period before the crisis of 1988 – an economic crisis, political uncertainty and a military crackdown. An all-pervasive atmosphere of uncertainty has now descended over the whole country."
(Source: Jagan, Larry, “Generals on the Offensive, But Also at Odds over Suu Kyi," IPS, 4 June 2003)
In May 2002, Aung San Suu Kyi was released from 19 months of house arrest. NLD offices had been allowed to reopen in January 2002, prior to her release. These moves by the SPDC were thought to be steps of great progress towards political change in Burma. Secret talks, brokered by UN Special Envoy Razali Ismail of Malaysia, had been taking place between the SPDC and the NLD and Aung San Suu Kyi since the end of 2000.
Any tenuous optimism arising from these developments was effectively shattered by the events of 2003. During the first half of the year, the SPDC continually refused to engage in dialogue with Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD. The SPDC’s sentiment towards the dialogue became clear as UN Special Envoy Razali Ismail was denied entry to Burma for the first half of the year. On 21 January Lt Gen Soe Win stated, “The SPDC not only will not talk to the NLD but also would never hand over power to the NLD,” (source: “No Plan to Talk to NLD and We Are Not Afraid of USA," DVB, 28 January 2003). At the same time, harassment of Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD’s movement and campaigning was excessive during her trips to Chin and Kachin State in the first half of the year. It was also clear that the state sponsored social organization, the Union Solidarity and Development Association (USDA), combined with local authorities were responsible for creating obstacles for the NLD activities, threatening NLD supporters from greeting or supporting Aung San Suu Kyi, and harassing the NLD convoys.
This rapidly intensifying harassment came to a head on 30 May in an incident that has come to be known as the “Depayin Massacre” or “Black Friday”. On 30 May, Aung San Suu Kyi, U Tin Oo, and other NLD members and supporters were brutally attacked in a remote village near Depayin, Sagaing Division (see full details of the event below). As the attack was perpetrated by local authorities, members of the USDA and other individuals recruited for the attack, it is believed that Sr Gen Than Shwe was also behind it, as an event of that magnitude could not occur without his permission. The attacks resulted in the end of Aung San Suu Kyi’s freedom and she was initially detained in an undisclosed location and held incommunicado. Later, she was transferred to house arrest at her family home in Rangoon where she remained at the time of this report. U Tin Oo, NLD vice chairman, who had been traveling with Aung San Suu Kyi at the time of the attack, was also detained and remained in Kale Prison, Sagaing Division at the end of the year. The entire NLD Central Executive Committee was arrested as well. The attack also resulted in the closure of NLD offices across the country and a ban on all opposition assemblies, meetings, and activities. Despite international and domestic calls for an independent investigation into the events of 30 May, the SPDC held firm to their claim that only 50 people were injured and 4 people died following a violent outbreak "that was instigated by the NLD." Throughout the rest of 2003, the crackdown on the democracy movement continued with ongoing arrests, intimidation, and harassment of NLD leaders, members and supporters. At the end of February 2004, the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (Burma) (AAPP) reported that approximately 265 people were either detained, killed, or missing in conjunction with the massacre at Depayin and the ensuing crackdown on the democracy movement (source: AAPP, 29 February 2004). (For more information about the arrest of political activists, please see the chapter on arbitrary arrest.)
The following sections outline the growing harassment leading up to the incident at Depayin, the involvement of key SPDC officials in orchestrating the attacks, and the crackdown that occurred afterwards to cover the authorities’ complicity.
In April, Aung San Suu Kyi, accompanied by NLD vice chairman U Tin Oo and members of the NLD Youth Wing, journeyed to Chin State in her seventh trip since being released from house arrest in May 2002. Prior to the convoy’s departure, there were reports of anti-NLD and anti-Aung San Suu Kyi pamphlets distributed in Gangaw, Magwe Division, where she was expected to stay for one night. Reports of harassment commenced with the first day of the trip on 3 April. In Aunglan, Taungdwingyi, Minbu and Pwintbyu, Aung San Suu Kyi attempted to deliver speeches but was drowned out by loud music played by the local fire brigades (source: “Surprise- Daw Aung San Suu Kyi Harassed," DVB, 3 April 2003).
On 8 April, in Kale, Sagaing Division, Aung San Suu Kyi was able to deliver a speech to an estimated 35,000 to 40,000 people. While there was no overt harassment or interference by the authorities as in other locations, the No.17 regional military intelligence unit was reported to have videotaped the people in attendance from atop a fire engine. In addition, the intelligence officials demanded the names of all the youth providing security for Aung San Suu Kyi. (Source: “Aung San Suu Kyi Gets Rousing Welcome from 35,000 People in Kale," DVB, 8 April 2003)
On 6 May, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, NLD vice chairman U Tin Oo, and 12 members of the Youth Wing commenced what was expected to be her longest political tour since release from house arrest in May 2002.
On 8 May, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and her convoy were greeted by hundreds of supporters in Shwebo despite the fact that local residents had been warned by USDA officials not to gather in large crowds. (Source: “Crowds Flock to See Myanmar’s Aung San Suu Kyi Despite Warnings," AFP, 8 May 2003)
On 9 May, the local authority chairman of Momeik threatened the local NLD chairman, U Myint Swe. In the evening, members of the USDA destroyed sticks meant for hanging an NLD signboard. (Source: “Daw Aung San Suu Kyi in Phakant," DVB, 14 May 2003)
On 10 May, Brigadier General Than Tun of the SPDC admitted that the authorities had tried to deter NLD supporters from coming out and greeting Daw Aung San Suu Kyi during her travels, claiming these measures were taken as a means of preserving peace and stability. The statement further indicated that the authorities would not impede Daw Suu’s journey and NLD supporters were free to greet her in front of respective NLD offices. (Source: “Government Spokesman Admits Preventing Supporters from Welcoming Suu Kyi," DVB, 10 May 2003)
On 13 May, the secretary of the Katha District USDA, U Htay Aung, held a grand dinner party celebration for those who had participated in harassment of Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD convoy in Indaw and Katha, Saigaing Division. (Source: “Daw Aung San Suu Kyi in Phakant," DVB, 14 May 2003)
On 14 May, local authorities in Tanaing, Kachin State ordered the Tanaing NLD chairman, U Kason Sinwa Naw, not to greet Aung San Suu Kyi with brass bands or loud speakers. In addition, the commander and members of the No.8 Intelligence Base arrived in Tanaing to coordinate methods of harassing Aung San Suu Kyi. It was also reported that in Momeik, members of the USDA were preparing for Daw Suu’s arrival by making daily trips out to villages where she was expected to speak. The residents of the villages were told not to welcome the NLD convoy. Four truckloads of USDA members were reported to have arrived in Myitkyina, Kachin State in preparation for Daw Suu’s visit. (Source: “Daw Aung San Suu Kyi in Phakant," DVB, 14 May 2003)
On 16 May, Daw Suu and the NLD convoy encountered a group of 300 USDA members protesting her presence as they attempted to cross a bridge into Myitkyina, the capital of Kachin State. The USDA members stopped the NLD convoy armed with catapults and small objects to be used as weapons. While the USDA members were reported to have put their faces up against the motorcade, no one was hurt or attacked. (Source: “Myanmar’s Suu Kyi Encounters ‘Most Serious’ Protest," AFP, 16 May 2003)
On 19 May, 100 USDA members with posters and banners protested the NLD convoy as they arrived in Waingmaw and held a signboard raising ceremony for the local NLD office. On the same day, military authorities denied Daw Suu and her group permission to go to Kachin Independence Organization controlled Hlaingza, where she was expected to give a speech at the Town Hall. In addition, it was reported that Sergeant Soe Nyung of Military Intelligence No.21 warned General Secretary of the DKO, Dr. Tuja, not to receive Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and her group. (Source: “Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and team at Bhamaw, Kachin State," DVB, 20 May 2003)
On 20 May, 300 USDA members armed with machetes and sticks blocked Aung San Suu Kyi and her group 3 miles outside of Bhamaw. The USDA members shouted slogans while photographing and video taping the NLD group. When the NLD group members started to video tape and photograph as well, the USDA members attempted to grab their cameras and hit them. The USDA members also banged on the car containing U Tin Oo. (Source: “Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and Team Left Bhamaw for Shwegu," DVB, 20 May 2003)
On 24 May, the War Office in Rangoon issued a directive putting all armed forces on a state of emergency. (Source: “Burma War Office Places All Armed Organizations on State of Emergency," DVB, 26 May 2003)
On 25 May, members of the USDA shouted slogans such as “Run for your lives or you will have to pick up your own corpses!” over loud speakers at supporters waiting to greet the NLD group as they passed through Kyidauk Pauk village near Mandalay. The supporters were also intimidated by over 100 USDA members carrying catapults, sticks and other weapons. One person was reported to have sustained a head injury. A brick was reportedly thrown at Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s car but did not result in any damage. (Source: “Myanmar Pro-democracy Activists Sentenced to Prison, Suu Kyi’s Party Reports Harassment," AP, 26 May 2003)
On 27 May, the SPDC issued a statement admitting that clashes between pro-junta supporters and pro-NLD supporters occurred. At the same time, the SPDC said that the NLD must accept that there are "those who support the NLD, there are also those who do not." Therefore, the NLD must be careful not to disturb the peace or to cause anyone harm. (Source: “Myanmar’s Military Junta Tells Opposition to Accept Protest," AFP, 27 May 2003)
After being harassed throughout their tour of Kachin State and Sagaing Division, Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD convoy were brutally attacked just outside of Kyi village on their way to Depayin, Sagaing Division. Due to the build up of harassment and other measures taken by the SPDC prior to 30 May, it is widely believed that the attack was premeditated and well planned by the military authorities. The Ad Hoc Commission on The Depayin Massacre (Burma), formed by representatives of different Burmese opposition groups based on the Thai-Burma border to investigate the events of 30 May, conjectures that the purpose of the attack was either to hinder the NLD’s activities or to eliminate the NLD altogether. Altsean-Burma, an NGO based in Thailand, has called the incident on 30 May, “the most ruthless and bloodiest crackdown on the democracy movement in Burma since the 1988 massacre." (Source: Briefing: Black Friday and the Crackdown on the NLD, ALTSEAN, 24 June 2003)
On 30 May, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and her team commenced the day in Monywa and left for Budalin where they reopened an NLD office and raised a signboard. As the group left Budalin for Depayin, cars of USDA members started to follow them. Around 8:00 pm, the NLD team reached Kyi village and were warmly greeted by the villagers. As the group continued, two monks blocking the road just 100 yards outside of Kyi village stopped the NLD group and requested that Daw Aung San Suu Kyi give a speech. When the NLD security in-charge, Tun Zaw Zaw went to explain that Daw Aung San Suu Kyi did not have enough time to make a speech as it was already late, the passengers of the cars following the NLD started shouting slogans such as “We don’t want axe handles and cynics who rely on foreign stooges!” The USDA members, along with men dressed as monks, and others got out of their cars wearing white arm bands and carrying iron rods, bamboo sticks and metal spikes. They proceeded to attack the villagers standing nearby. More vehicles containing USDA members and others assisting them arrived to the scene and started to beat the NLD members as well. (Source: The Second Preliminary Report, The Ad Hoc Commission on Depayin Massacre (Burma), May 2004) The exact numbers of attackers and NLD members involved in the incident is unknown but estimates range from 500 to several thousand.
The attackers reportedly shouted, “Those of you women who have destroyed our race! Those who want to make Kala their husbands! Come and make us your own husbands before you choose the Kala as you husbands!”(“Kala” is a derogatory term referring to people of Indian or Muslim decent. In this case, it is a an insult referring to foreigners as the SPDC has often tried to cast a negative light on Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s marriage to a British man, Michael Aris). Women’s clothing was torn off leaving them half or fully naked and the attackers bashed their heads into the ground. (Source: The Second Preliminary Report, The Ad Hoc Commission on Depayin Massacre (Burma), May 2004)
One witness, Ko Zaw Zaw Aung, of the NLD Mandalay Youth Wing, reported, “We had no weapons. Our leaders didn’t allow us to defend or react when we are attacked by the other side. To say all, we were told to endure the beating. The severity of the beatings became so bad that they would beat anyone that moved after the beating. ‘This person is not dead yet, keep on beating,’ they shouted. ‘I am afraid. Please spare me,’ if someone shouted like that they would keep beating the person. They would also beat up people who were walking by. ‘We build roads and bridges and we don’t include you. What has your Aung San Suu Kyi done for the country? She is the wife of an Indian who obeys his order,’ said the thugs and they kept on beating people who were already limp and lifeless.” (Source: “Eyewitness Accounts of Black Friday," DVB, 14 June 2003)
Members of NLD Youth attempted to protect Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s car by linking arms and encircling it. They were all subject to severe beatings and the attackers broke windows on the car containing Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. Her car was able to drive away towards Depayin. The car containing U Tin Oo was also attacked. One witness reported that he got out of his car to fight off an aggressor and ran away. Other NLD members who tried to run away towards Depayin were pursued by the attackers. Residents of Depayin reportedly came to the scene chanting, “Long live Daw Aung San Suu Kyi.” As a result, the USDA issued a curfew on the spot and military troops soon arrived to confront the villagers. The situation remained unstable until around 2:00 am. (Source: “Eyewitness Tells of Bloody Friday," Irrawaddy, 6 June 2003)
Around 11:00 pm, members of the Pyithu Swan-ar Shin (People’s power or force of the people) and police arrived to commence removing dead bodies on trucks. One truck driver reported that his truck and 10 others were detained by the North-Western Command. He was instructed to go with a captain of the North-Western Command who drove his truck to the scene of the attack. The truck driver was ordered to help load bodies onto the truck. He reported putting 17 dead bodies on his truck alone. When they returned to the North-Western Command, he and the others were invited to join a feast and paid 300,000 kyat for their assistance. (Source: The Second Preliminary Report, The Ad Hoc Commission on Depayin Massacre (Burma), May 2004)
On the morning of 31 May, approximately 60 NLD members who were able to hide returned to the site of the attack. The police and military officials soon arrived and arrested them. (Source: “Eyewitness Tells of Bloody Friday," Irrawaddy, 6 June 2003)
The SPDC’s Claim
As the SPDC has not allowed an independent investigation of the events of 30 May, it is impossible to ascertain the precise number of dead and wounded. The SPDC reported that the attacks resulted in four people dead and 50 wounded. In addition, the SPDC took extensive measures to prevent information about the event from being released. Both during and approximately one week after the attack, phone lines in Monywa and Depayin were reported to be cut, and vehicles were not allowed to pass through the area (source: “Eyewitness Tells of Bloody Friday," Irrawaddy, 6 June 2003). It was also reported that villagers in the area and participants in the attack were ordered to sign pledges that they would retell the events of 30 May in accordance with the SPDC’s contentions (source: “Killings, Rapes in Well-Planned Attack by Burmese Junta," RFA, 5 September 2003).
The SPDC claimed and publicized that the violence of 30 May was instigated by Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD. On 2 June, Labor Minister Tin Win reported, "These incidents happened because Aung San Suu Kyi had taken advantage of her party organizational trip to campaign publicly, thereby making many people resent her actions," (source: “Myanmar Cracks Down on Opposition; Nation's Military Rulers Hold Pro-democracy Activist Aung San Suu Kyi for a Third Day. Party Offices and Universities Are Shut Down," LA Times, 2 June 2003). The SPDC has continually denied any responsibility for the events of 30 May, and in a letter from Sr. General Than Shwe to another Asian leader, he accused Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD of planning a violent uprising that would cause chaos, mass demonstrations, and instability in the country. The alleged goal was to take over government offices, banks, and factories. He further claimed that Aung San Suu Kyi was working to cooperate with armed groups despite her commitment to nonviolent measures. As a result, Sr. General Than Shwe indicated that the SPDC was compelled to take action to prevent the compromise of national security (source: Kazmin, Amy, “Junta Says Suu Kyi Planned Uprising Burma,” Financial Times, 11 July 2003).
On 10 June, the Myanmar Information Committee issued the following statement regarding the events of 30 May:
“An official inquest is being conducted by the Police Department under the Ministry of Home Affairs. Preliminary investigation reveals that the incident began when the convoy of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi attempted to plow through the crowd that was blocking the road. Up to that point there were no incidents of violence.
However, since some people were hit by the cars in the convoy, a melee ensued between the followers and opponents of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. As it was nighttime and in an area with no public lighting, there was much confusion and things got out of hand.
Finally, when the police regained control of the situation, four persons were found dead and 48 persons injured. As a result, the Depayin Police Station has opened a case under Section 304 (A) of the Penal code.
Contrary to the exaggerated reports circulated by some quarters, I wish to confirm once again that only four persons died during the incident, not 70 or more as alleged.” (Source: Myanmar Information Committee, 10 June 2003)
Evidence of Premeditation
Eyewitness testimonies of the USDA’s involvement in the attacks are not the only evidence lending to the SPDC and USDA’s accountability in organizing the violence. Weeks before the attack occurred, the SPDC increased riots and weapons training as well as harassment and surveillance of the NLD. Approximately one week before the attack, the War Office in Rangoon put all armed organizations on a state of emergency. Furthermore, it was reported that Lt Gen Soe Win, Secretary 2 of the SPDC and a senior leader of the USDA, was responsible for planning the attacks on 30 May. Minister for Home Affairs Col Tin Hlaing, who is also a leader in the USDA, is also believed to have been a key planner in the attack. The two were reported to be in Monywa, near the site of the attack, on the same night, and were reported to have sent orders to the attackers. In addition, Brig-Gen Kyaw Hsan, one of the secretariat members of the USDA and Burma’s Minister of Information arrived in the area at the end of the month. Many believe that the presence of these three significant leaders of the USDA in the area of the attack is not coincidence but evidence of the planning and premeditation of the event. Others indicate that an attack of this magnitude could only occur with the consent of Senior-General Than Shwe. (Source:Moe, Kyaw Zwa, “Military Leaders Behind Black Friday," Irrawaddy, 9 June 2003)
On 5 September, Radio Free Asia recorded the testimony of a former USDA member who participated in the attack, which provides further evidence of the USDA and SPDC’s involvement in planning the events of 30 May. He indicated that he had been recruited and complied for fear of being accused of supporting the opposition. According to his testimony, the authorities ordered all USDA members in the area to assemble at the No.1 State High School by 27 May. At the high school, the recruits were trained and provided with free food. He further explained that the authorities attempted to conceal the attack by hiring men to dig holes in which to put bodies. He reported that approximately 100 bodies were brought to be buried “including people who were alive with serious injuries.” The authorities also attempted to conceal the events by forcing villagers to sign affidavits attesting to the death of only four people during the night. Those who were recruited to participate as attackers were also made to sign pledges that they would retell the events of the night according to the SPDC’s stories, to which they were briefed. (Source: “Killings, Rapes in Well-Planned Attack by Burmese Junta," RFA, 5 September 2003)
Deaths, Disappearances, and Detention Resulting from 30 May
The US Department of State reported that at least six pro-democracy supporters were killed including four NLD members, San Myint, Tin Maung Oo, Thein Toe Aye, and Khin Maung Kyaw. A Buddhist monk, U Panna Thiri, and a student, Min Zaw Oo, both from Monywa were also confirmed to have been killed in conjunction with the attack. The National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma (NCGUB) reported that 70 people were killed and 200 hundred were injured. Eyewitness accounts and other unofficial sources indicate that as many as 100 may have been killed while others remained missing, wounded, or detained. On 10 July, it was reported that only eight of the people from Mandalay who had accompanied Aung San Suu Kyi had returned home. Information about the status and whereabouts of the others was still unavailable (source: “Missing People from Mandalay," DVB, 10 July 2003).
It is certain that, Aung San Suu Kyi and U Tin Oo were both arrested and held in undisclosed locations in what the SPDC called “protective custody.” The SPDC claimed that the NLD leaders would be released when the situation in the country had become stable again. Other leaders of the NLD were put under house arrest while numerous NLD supporters and eyewitnesses to the attacks were detained. Initial efforts by foreign diplomats such as Mike O’Brien, British Foreign Minister, to make contact with Aung San Suu Kyi were unsuccessful. The ICRC was granted permission to visit some of the prisoners arrested on 30 May but was not able to meet with Aung San Suu Kyi until July. Only UN Special Envoy Rizali Ismail was able to meet with her on 10 June while she was being detained in a hut at Insein Prison. Simultaneously, the SPDC ordered NLD office across the country to close and banned opposition assemblies and activities while delaying the reopening of schools and universities after summer holidays for two weeks. (For more information about the continued arrest of political activists in conjunction with and following the Depayin Massacre, please see chapter on arbitrary arrest.)
Incidents of Harassment of the NLD Following 30 May
Anti-NLD demonstration training
On 6 June, it was reported that local authorities in Rangoon and other locations around the country were calling residents of different neighborhoods to be trained to hold anti-NLD demonstrations. A lawyer from Rangoon indicated that he believed the order to make these preparations must have come from the senior leaders saying, "Nobody dares to do such a thing without approval from the top military leaders." (Source: Moe, Kyaw Zwa, “Regime Organizes More NLD Attacks," Irrawaddy, 6 June 2003)
NLD supporters’ businesses undermined
On 4 July, a shop owner in Mandalay reported that the authorities ordered all 4000 shops at the Zegyo market to be dismantled by the end of June. According to the authorities, the order is part of an attempt to make the market appearance similar to the rest of Mandalay City. Yet, because many of the shop owners are NLD supporters, they feel that this is an attempt to punish them for endorsing Daw Aung San Suu Kyi on her trip in Mandalay. (Source: “NLD Supporters’ Businesses Undermined," DVB, 4 July 2003)
Myanmar state media launches fresh attack against Suu Kyi
On 8 July, the government run newspaper, The New Light of Myanmar, published an article allegedly written by a former discontented NLD member. The article highlighted that Daw Aung San Suu Kyi was breaking the law drafting a new national constitution independent of the constitution that the government is drafting. The penalty for such an action is 5 to 10 years in prison for an individual. For a group, the penalty is suspension or termination. The writer further commented that in drafting a national constitution with the participation of only a few people indicates that the NLD leaders are “not genuinely concerned about the future of the country.” (Source: “Myanmar State Media Launched Fresh Attack against Suu Kyi," AP, 8 July 2003) (For more information on the State control of media and information, please see chapter on freedom of expression)
On 9 September, a NLD member in Thaton Township reported some details about the situation in his area and nearby villages. The NLD member reported that the authorities were trying to persuade NLD members to quit working for and supporting the NLD. The authorities also stated that if the NLD members would join them, they would have many advantages. The NLD member continued that sometimes he has guests staying at his house. When the guests leave, the authorities always question him. The authorities always ruin the business that he has and as a result, his children's education has been delayed. After his children passed tenth standard, they wanted to attend university but the authorities would not allow this to happen. His children are only allowed to continue their studies through the Distance Education Program. (Source: HRDU, 2003)
Myanmar blocks Suu Kyi followers' march
On 10 October, approximately 30 NLD members attempted to visit Aung San Suu Kyi at her home in conjunction with the Full Moon day that marks the end of Buddhist lent. Their attempt to visit her followed her return to her home and placement under house arrest after a gynecological operation. The group was denied permission to proceed at a checkpoint near Aung San Suu Kyi’s home. (Source: “Myanmar Blocks Suu Kyi Followers’ March," AP, 10 October 2003)
Celebrating National Day
As National Day approached, members of the NLD in Rangoon organized National Day celebrations. A few days before the event, it was reported that monks and other people were called to meet with the authorities and warned against engaging in political assemblies. Officials indicated that they were specifically opposed to NLD members wearing their uniform of a traditional Burmese Pinni jacket and a Kachin longyi. Those hosting the event assured the authorities that the National Day celebrations would only be for NLD members to come to the pagodas, make offerings, pray and listen to sermons. On National Day, several hundred NLD Youth members were reported to have gathered and ascended Shwedegon Pagoda wearing their NLD uniforms. Approximately, 100 military intelligence officers and pagoda security officials came to the gathering carry batons while photographing and video taping the activities. The intelligence officials warned the students that the law only permits the assembly of 5 people and therefore, they should disperse. The students exited in pairs and moved onto another NLD celebration organized at a monastery. (Source: “Preparing for ‘National Day’," NCGUB News Desk, 18 November 2003)
12.14 Interviews
Source: Interviewed by Human Rights Documentation Unit
Interview Date: 23 January 2004
Name: Zaw Oo Htin (not real name)
Sex: Male
Religion: Buddhist
Occupation: Construction Worker
On 12 December 2003, at a different work place [in Thailand], we were taking a break to eat lunch when the immigration police came to our work place. We were eating at the time and some people ran away when they saw the police. They arrested me and took me to the Immigration Detention Center (IDC).
I was there for 3 days. The immigration police were waiting until they had a certain number of people to deport us. I heard that they had a quota to send to Myawaddy. I also heard that the Myawaddy officials were demanding a certain number of people. My friend, who had been deported before, told me this. I do not know how many they wanted exactly. I just know that they were waiting to fill a quota. When we were deported, there were over 100 of us.
They sent us across the (Thai-Myanmar Friendship) bridge in a car and the Myawaddy officials had us sit on the ground on the bridge for a little while. Then they put us on a bus and took us to the Myawaddy playground. At the playground, they asked us to sit down and a high-ranking official gave us a speech. He talked to us about how dangerous we are because we went to work in another country. He said that we should just stay and work in Burma. He said that this time, we would be forgiven. He warned us that if we did this again, we would be charged with illegally leaving the country.
After the speech, we were questioned for our personal information and then we were given blood tests for HIV/AIDS. We were questioned by authorities from both Myawaddy and Rangoon. They asked us where we were from, when we went to Thailand, how many brothers and sisters we have, what does our family do. They did not ask us directly if we were involved with politics, but they asked indirectly. They asked many specific questions. For example, they asked; what did you do in Mae Sot, who are your friends, when did you leave Burma, what problems did you have in Burma that made you leave?
At the playground, there was a military barrack building and we had to sleep there for one night. They told us that they were going to send us to Pa'an the following day at 7:00 am. From Pa'an we would be sent to the place that we were from. I was the only person in the group from Arakan State, so they put me in the group to go to Rangoon.
There were about 10-15 people who stayed in Myawaddy and did not go to Pa'an. They stayed because they were from Myawaddy but they needed high-ranking officials to support them in order to stay.
Everybody was sent to Pa-an, but they transported us in different groups. When we first arrived in Pa-an, we went to the immigration office. The police then came and picked us up to take us to the police station/detention area. We had to stay there for the night. At first, they did not lock us in but someone ran away. After that, they locked us in. At this point, I was with a group of people who were all going to Rangoon. The officials did not say anything to us in Pa-an. They only told us not to run away because they would transport us to Rangoon the next day.
The next day, they sent us directly to XXXX Hospital in YYY Township, Rangoon Division. At the hospital, we had to have another blood test for HIV/AIDS. They told us that they were checking us because we had come back from another country. It took one week to get the results of the tests and we had to wait in the hospital. Military Intelligence (MI) guards stayed with us the whole time.
When I got my results, they were negative. Then they took x-rays of us as well. They told me that my lungs did not look so good and that I should not smoke so much. When we were finished, the MI's told us that we could not just go. We needed to wait for our parents or family to come and get us. Our parents needed to guarantee that they would not let us go to Thailand again.
I found a woman in the hospital who had come to visit a sick family member. I asked her to sign for my release and pretend to be a member of my family. She helped me.
Table of Contents Facts on Human Rights Violations in Burma 2003