(III) RIGHTS OF CHILD
“In the stone mines just outside Mandalay (called Thone Bo) , I saw girls of 10 and 12 years old working. They fill baskets with stones (I could hardly lift) and carry them down from the mine to a machine that selects the sizes, to the truck. They get 60 Ks for 8-9 hours work. They work every day and have never been to school. The stone are being used for road construction. Moreover, young girls who are as young as 13 have been working in silk factories, at lacquerware factory and in hotel construction, including the Plaza Hotel in Rangoon.” [An Eyewitness travelling inside Burma]
3.1. Background
In Burma, the participation of children in the armed conflict has become routine, as the country has been at war for the majority of this century. Although international law forbids the use of children under the age of fifteen as solider, almost all of the Burmese groups have child soldiers within their ranks, as does the Tatmadaw under the control of SLORC. Although all parties to the conflict in Burma use child soldiers, the treatment of them, recruitment methods and conditions of service, vary a great deal both between, and within, these armed groups. The treatment of child soldiers in the Tatmadaw is much more severe than that of other groups.
The widespread use of child soldiers has ensured that many thousands of children in Burma have suffered exceptional cruelty during the war; many child soldiers have been killed or wounded, or have witnessed terrible atrocities. Many children have taken part in these human rights abuses themselves. Some youngest SLORC child soldiers joined the military service at the age of 12.
The use of children as soldier in Burma results in serious human rights abuses. Children are killed, forcibly conscripted, unwillingly separated from their families, kidnapped, tortured during their service, forced to kill and torture, and due to the rampant corruption in the military, are underpaid, or are not paid at all.
Children in Burma suffer extreme poverty, with Burma being the seventh poorest nation in the world. Although children under five make up only 15% of the population, they account for half the country’s annual death rate. According to UNDP 1994-1995 report, infant mortality is estimated at 146/1000, with 175,000 under five dying every year. UNICEF mentioned in its 1992 report that most of these deaths are due to the easily preventable or treatable diseases, including malaria. Moreover, 10% of children under three suffer from severe malnutrition. In the ethnic border areas the situation is worse.
Many Burmese children leave their homes for neighbouring countries to work, as the employment and economic situation inside Burma is so poor. According to Asiawatch report in 1994, hundreds of thousands of these children are currently exploited in forced labour situation such as sweatshops, and in prostitution in Asian countries in the region such as Thailand. UNICEF estimate that over 40,000 Burmese children are working in Thailand’s sex industry.
Although most of the warring factions in Burma have forcibly recruited some children, most of the children joined the ethnic armies voluntarily, usually because they saw no other way to survive. Children say that they joined for various reasons: to avenge the killings of family and friends, to protect their families and communities from the opposition army or armies, or to get food for themselves, and in some cases, for their families. Not infrequently, when the child’s family had been killed, there was no one left to take care of them. They therefore took the only option that they thought open to them, to joined a military force, ethnic or Burman. Ethnic military leaders state that many child soldiers, both volunteers and recruits, are orphans. Some ethnic armies and the Tatmadaw are know to have institutions to train these orphans as child soldiers. Other claim that orphans often volunteer due to a lack of other options.
Since 1988 and the military’s rapid growth, the Tatmadaw have begun recruiting boys at fourteen and below. UNICEF officials even found out that boys could be ‘officially conscripted’ into the military at fourteen. These boys are placed in training centres where they receive military style education. Designated the “Ye-Nyunt Youth,” the boys are also said to receive political training, and are taught to be loyal to the government and the army. They are eventually assigned to serve in the army, in intelligence units, or as security for high-ranking officers. Most of these recruits tend to be orphans, street children, children captured from enemy positions or those abandoned in front-line villages. Anecdotal reports exist of such children being taken to other cities at some distance from their homes, before they are forced into armed service. UNICEF also identified at least one residential SLORC military camp, near Kengtung in Shan State, where children aged seven and above (believed to be orphans) were being trained for a future life with the military. Ethnic armies such as the Mong Tai Army (MTA) in Shan State, controlled by notorious drug warlord Khun Sa, had similar institutions.
Although all armed sides in the conflict use child soldiers in their forces, the differences between the children’s recruitment reasons, treatment, duties, and post-service situations, with each side vary significantly. Not only are there differences from between child soldiers’ experiences with each army, there are also variances from region to region, and command to command . It is, however, apparent in all the ethnic armed forces and the Tatmadaw, when an impending large-scale battle is approaching, more child soldiers are recruited and used in the front-lines as more man-power is required.
Children have played various other roles in the conflict: they have performed front-line/active combat duties, done cooking and other menial labour, stood sentry/check-point duty, acted as body-guards (a feature common to the ethnic armies especially), served as porters carrying ammunition and supplies, and been used, as cannon fodder to draw the fire of their adversaries, and sometimes in human-wave attack tactics in which hundreds are usually killed. All child soldiers interviewed were familiar with and even adept in the use of a wide variety of automatic weapons, and even heavy weapons. Most of the child soldiers on all sides of the conflict are male.
Military training makes a poor replacement for civilian education, even in a country where most schooling is substandard. In Burma, education in government schools, where parents must supply all school materials, is a luxury. According to UNDP/UNESCO Education Sector Study in 1992, an estimated 80% of students enrolling in primary school drop-out before completion. Some 35% of children never enrol in primary school and only 25% complete the five year cycle, said in the January 1995 report of UNICEF. Ethnic border regions are severely under-serviced. Even in areas where some groups operate schools independent of the central Burmese regime, education systems are routinely disrupted when villages are forced to relocate during combat. Many child soldiers come from poor families or are in fact orphans, and many have barely started their schooling before it is interrupted by military duty. Military training under the auspices of different armed groups varies in length and content, however it can be stated unequivocally that most child soldiers do not receive significant instruction to enhance literacy or vocational and occupational skills. Lack of educational opportunity for young recruits has significant ramifications for their post-military futures, and indeed, portends difficult prospects for the Burma’s economic and social development.
Despite the fact that many children join the army seeking benefits for themselves or their families, almost all interviewed told of receiving inadequate food and clothing and few received benefits for their families. Most Tatmadaw soldiers also spoke of being regularly punished, and often of being beaten and abused by the their senior officers. In addition, while it is sometimes believed that children are less cognisant of atrocity and death, the interviewed child soldiers made frequent reference to the fear, despair, and horror they felt, especially when they were ordered to beat porters, witness rapes by their senior officers, or engage in combat situation. [Source: Images Asia]
3.2. Kidnap of Schoolchildren for SLORC Army Recruitment Drives
In the last week of January 1994, three 6th-standard students -- Maung Tun Tun (13), Maung Hla Myo (12) and Maung Aye Naing (12) from No. 1 State High School in Thingangyun -- were missing on their way home from school. When their parents reported this to the police station, a police sergeant said that they were definitely sold. As SLORC had to deployed more troops in important places in Rangoon in 1995, they needed recruits for the army and opened "recruit gathering centres" in Rangoon. Under this forced recruitment programme, those who can find a recruit will be given 300 Ks in cash and a bottle of Army Rum while those who promise to find five recruits are given 1500 Ks and five bottles of Rum in advance.
The aforementioned three students were lured by unscrupulous means and sent to recruit gathering centre in Mingaladon. When their parents heard about their fate, they proceeded straight to Mingaladon gathering centre, bringing recommendation letters from headmasters and other needed letters. But they were not allowed to talk to their sons in person although they met their sons from a distance. On the following day, the number of the students mounted to approximately 200. The students who were in their school uniform — white shirt and green longyi (sarong) — were forcibly transported from Rangoon to Prome with massive deployment of armed soldiers to make sure that they would not escape.
The rich could afford for the release of their sons by giving a ransom to concerned SLORC officers and medical officers who later on managed to bring these students back to Mingaladon Military Hospital for medical check-up. Their parents could bring their sons home from Mingaladon Hospital. Even though their examinations were drawing near, SLORC considered the recruitment rather than their education. [Source: Inside source]
3.3. Forced Recruitment of Ethnic Child
SLORC has been expanding their military strength from 18,000 in 1988 to an estimated 400,000 in 1995. Over half of national budget has been used in defence service. Many ethnic youth have been forcibly recruited into army without their consent. Particularly in Sagaing Division and Chin State, SLORC launched forced recruitment of the ethnic youth to the army. SLORC authorities took the ethnic children from their families with a promise of education opportunity in cities. Instead of sending to the school, ethnic Naga boys were directly sent to the military recruitment centres or training schools and forced to join the army.
SLORC authorities recruited 37 Naga boys from Sumra, Konkilon, Kuki, Phontharet, Nga Kyan and Nami Ubi villages in Sagaing Division with a promise of education opportunity in the cities. Among these children were Barry Saw (14, son of U Tha Don), Cara Phor (12, son of U Kyan Chi), Yin Shi, (12, son of U Nar Wor) and Saw Htee (son of U Raphan) from Nga Kyan village, Sumra Township, Sagaing Division.
These 37 Naga school boys were sent to an army training school in Monywa, Sagaing Division, instead of sending to school as they promised. They were later forced to enrol the military training for six months. Some boys had managed to escape from the training school. Barry Saw and Saw Htee are now in army service at Mawlaik, Sagaing Division.
3.4. Impact of Tourism
The impact of tourism on local communities in Mandalay, Sagaing, and Amarapura is now becoming apparent. Children wait for tour groups to arrive in places such as pagodas and other sites of interest. They follow tourists around begging for presents and money and at times perform for the tourists, smiling, holding their hands, etc. These children are earning up to 800 Ks a day which is four times what their parents are earning. According to conversations that members of SAIN had with some parents and other local sources at these sites, these children are now being sent to earn money for their families in this way and not going to school. There is great concern about the increase of this situation, especially for young girls who will, when older, be uneducated and unable to have a chance to enter what is already a competitive workplace. [Source: SAIN]
3.5. Child Slavery
Following account was revealed by an eyewitness who travelled inside Burma in December 1995.
“I met two former porters 16 and 18 years old. They were rounded up for portering from a video hall on 26 June 1995 together with 30 or 40 other men from the area of “Five mile village” (near Loikaw). The youngest in the group was 16, the oldest 45. The two boys had to work as porters for two months, but some of the others came back only in the middle of November. They worked from sunrise to sunset, carrying ammunition (weight “about half a bag of rice”). Once a day, they got a small bowl of rice-soup, no blankets. Anyone who could not keep up was beaten, including one of the boys. Two villagers died from disease (malaria they think) and starvation.
Another source said that until now there is still portering going on in Shadaw, 30 miles east of Loikaw, and in Bawlake, south eastern Karenni State, 15 miles from Loikaw.”
[See also under “Personal Accounts”, interview 3, 6-8, 12, 14-15, 18, 23-24, 33, 36, 42, 46, 52, 71, 77-78, 83, 90, 93, 99, 106, 113-116, 118, 120, 149-151, 179, 182, 192-193, 196, 202-203, 221, 233, 239-241, 258, 261, 265-266, 270-271, 275, 277-280, 288-292, 301]
3.6. List of Incidents
3.6.1. SLORC IB 54 and LIBs 256 and 261 forced the local people in Loikaw Township, Karenni State, into portering during their offensive against the KNPP, which started in June 1995. Among the victims, Maung Aung Thein (13), son of U Maung Doe and Daw Jo Wah Nar from Daw Tha Naw village, Loikaw Township, has disappeared and his whereabouts remain unknown. [Source: NLD-LA]
3.6.2. In February 1995, SLORC troops entered Ko Ra Hta village in Papun District, Karen State. All the villagers fled, but an 11-year-old boy (name not available) was left behind. The SLORC troops captured him, executed him with a knife and left his body behind in the village. [Source: KHRG]
3.6.3. On 20 April 1995, a SLORC military column from IB 101 led by Maj Thet Oo entered Wan Nar village in Tenasserim Township, Tenasserim Division, and arrested Daw Ohn Kyi (40) and her daughter Ma In Kyi (14) with the allegation that they were being supporters of ABSDF and informing the students. The two women were forced to enter a nearby mini video hall in the village. Daw Ohn Kyi was forced to stand in the sun for the whole day while Ma In Kyi was dragged into the video hall and repeatedly raped by the SLORC soldiers. [Source: KNU]
3.6.4. In Akyab, IB 20 has been recruiting young boys who are only 12 to 13 years old for the military service. When these young boys are asked why they joined the military, they replied, “We can have a regular meal if we join the military. We did it for hunger”. The young boys also stated, “Outside the military compound, we are unable to enjoy regular meals”, they said. [Source: ABSDF]
3.6.5. On 4 October 1995, SLORC troops under the command of Brig-Gen Comdr Kyi Aung from Taungoo-based Southern Command captured school girls and boys to carry ammunition and heavy loads for them. [Source: KNU]
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I. Extra-judicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions
II. Arbitrary Detention and Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances III. Rights of Child
IV. Forced Labour and Slavery V. Forced Relocation and Internally Displaced Persons
VI. Deprivation of Livelihood VII. Minority Protection
VIII. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, Degrading Treatment or Punishment
IX. Freedom of Belief: Discrimination Against the Right to Practice Religion and Intolerance
X.
Freedom of Opinion and Expression XI.
Freedom of Assembly and Association XII.
Freedom of Movement
XIII.
Abuse of Women XIV.
The Refugees Situation and Forced Repatriation