DISPLACED PERSONS IN ASIA

Geneva, 5^th April 2004

Burma’s Displaced People in India and Bangladesh

Paper presented by Chris Lewa

Burma’s borders with India and Bangladesh have received much less international attention than the Thailand-Burma border. A major reason is the difficult access to refugees in these border areas due to policies of the host governments. Nevertheless, outflows from Burma to India and Bangladesh are no less significant. More than 50,000, mostly Chin, have fled to India while up to 200,000 Rohingya are found in Bangladesh in and outside refugee camps.

An essential difference appears when comparing the overall situation along the eastern and western borders of Burma. In Chin and Arakan States, bordering India and Bangladesh respectively, there is little ethnic armed resistance and the military regime does not resort to ruthless counter-insurgency tactics to assert control, as is the case along the Thai-Burma border. Therefore, the worst forms of human rights violations such as massive forced relocation, torture, summary executions, are less frequent, but this does not mean that the situation is noticeably better. Over the last decade, the Burma Army’s presence has rapidly expanded along the western border. The establishment of new battalions has resulted in two significant consequences:

- (1) exaction of forced labour and arbitrary taxation from the local population to build and maintain camps and grow foodstuff for the army, but also for road construction carried out in the name of development, but which mostly facilitates army penetration; and

- (2) military control of the local economy for the Army’s profit, either directly through collection of taxes at checkpoints and from the border trade, or indirectly through the granting of business monopolies on local commodities in exchange for high bribes.

These practices have severely affected the livelihood of already impoverished communities and compelled them to leave Burma.

Like most countries in the region, India and Bangladesh have not acceded to the 1951 UN Refugee Convention and its related Protocol, nor have they enacted any national refugee legislation. Refugees are dealt with on an ad-hoc basis. Both India and Bangladesh have allowed the UNHCR to assist and protect some Burmese refugees.

In their host countries -- whether in India or Bangladesh --, most of these 250,000 displaced people from Burma are thus not recognised as “refugees” but labelled as “economic migrants”. The root causes behind this forced migration are ignored in order to keep the outflow invisible and to deprive these people of protection and assistance. Meanwhile, the two host governments are engaging in negotiations with the military regime in Rangoon to enhance cooperation and improve economic ties.

Let me first address the specific situation of displaced people from Burma in India and then in Bangladesh.

INDIA:

At a rough estimate there are 50,000 Chin refugees in India. Apart from a few hundred who came to New Delhi to seek UNHCR protection, the vast majority have taken shelter in Mizoram State and a small number in the southern part of Manipur State.

Forced labour, arbitrary taxation and lack of education facilities are the main root causes for flight. Chins also experience many difficulties in practising their religion. The military regime regards Christianity as a threat to its control since the only civil society groups active in the region are linked to the churches.

Displaced Chins in Mizoram State have no camp to accommodate even the most vulnerable and they have joined the local labour market, in the weaving industry, on road construction sites, etc. As undocumented migrants, their situation is very precarious. While Mizos are religiously and ethnically related to the Chins, they resent the continuous increase of “foreigners”. Chin refugees have sporadically been threatened with deportation, particularly during election time, when they become scapegoats for the various local political parties. From 19 July 2003, in response to a rape incident in which a Burmese national was alleged to be responsible, the Young Mizo Association, a broad-based social organization, ordered the eviction of thousands of Chins from their houses in Mizoram. This expulsion drive resulted in the forced return of over 6,000 Chins to Burma and left at least 5,000 families homeless.[1]

India does not allow UNHCR to exercise its protection mandate in Mizoram State where access is also denied to most outsiders. As a result the displaced Chin receive little or no assistance.

A few hundred Burmese activists plus their relatives facing persecution have approached UNHCR in New Delhi for protection. About 1,000 individuals have been recognised by UNHCR as “persons of concern”, but their situation in Delhi is also precarious, as since March 2003, UNHCR has started cutting the small monthly subsistence allowance [Rs 1,400 or about US$30 per person and even less for dependents] they used to provide in order to promote self-reliance. Lack of education and employment opportunities combined with inadequate and cramped living standards make their lives miserable. The Indian authorities have issued them with residence permits, but denial of work permits makes any attempt at self-reliance almost impossible and illegal[2].

BANGLADESH:

Displaced people from Burma in Bangladesh can be divided into 3 categories:

1) About 20,000 Rohingya refugees sheltering in two camps: They remain from the mass refugee exodus of 1991/92 and are recognised as “prima facie” refugees by the UNHCR (group recognition).

2) Between 100,000 and 200,000 Rohingya refugees outside camps in South Bangladesh:

They are not recognised as refugees and are often labelled as economic migrants.

3) A caseload of about 70 mostly Rakhine urban refugees in Dhaka who have been granted “Person of Concern” status by the UNHCR (individual basis).

The Rohingya Muslims are the group most discriminated against in Burma and they are simply excluded from the nation-building process. They do not feature amongst the “135 national races” identified by the government as indigenous, and thus as citizens of Burma, and the Citizenship Law of 1982 renders them stateless.

The Rohingyas’ freedom of movement is highly restricted, as they need permission to travel even to a neighbouring village. Their land has been confiscated to accommodate Buddhist settlers. They are routinely subjected to forced labour, extortion, and constant humiliations. Measures have been imposed to limit the expansion of the Rohingya population. Unlike other people of Burma, they must apply for permission to get married, which is only granted in exchange for high bribes and can take up to several years to obtain. Moreover, all economic sectors are controlled through a monopoly system based on licences, which totally forbids any free-enterprise initiative. The root causes of the refugee outflow to Bangladesh are the policies of exclusion and discrimination carried out against the Rohingya community by the Burmese military regime.

Bangladesh bore the brunt of two mass exoduses of approximately 250,000 Rohingya refugees each, in 1978 and again in 1991/2. In both cases, repatriation followed in conditions far from conducive to safe return. In 1994, UNHCR gained access to the Burma side of the border to supervise the last mass repatriation, the “voluntariness” of which was seriously questioned by international relief agencies.[3] At present, about 20,000 Rohingya refugees remain in two camps in Bangladesh.

The conditions in the refugee camps are particularly appalling. They are managed by Bangladeshi officials and not, as along the Thai-Burma border, by the refugees themselves. Refugees are housed in dark, cramped and poorly maintained sheds – long houses containing 6 rooms. Capacity-building for refugees is minimal. Corruption and violence are rampant. In March 2002, Médecins sans Frontières (MSF) revealed that 58% of refugee children suffer from chronic malnutrition.[4] A recent survey conducted in the two camps indicated that 14,126 refugees (more than two thirds) do not want to repatriate or would do so only when conditions improve, to guarantee a return in safety and dignity [C1] [5].

The Bangladesh government has always been adamant that all Rohingya refugees must return to Burma. Following improved relations and enhanced economic ties with its eastern neighbour, Bangladesh has recently persuaded the Burmese authorities to lift all restrictions for the remaining 20,000 refugees to return to Burma. Starting in October 2002, the repatriation exercise was reactivated. Concurrently, UNHCR announced its plan to promote self-sufficiency pending return, including the phasing-out of its “care and maintenance” responsibilities in the camps. In May 2003, the number of refugees being repatriated rose dramatically, and so did the number of complaints denouncing coercion, intimidation and forced repatriation. Finally, in July 2003, UNHCR strengthened its presence in the camps, which led to significant improvements and a fall in repatriation figures. However, refugees continue to be harassed, as psychological pressure and fear are still used. Voluntary repatriation is thus being achieved by making conditions in the camps comparatively worse than in Burma.

It is unlikely that Bangladesh would endorse the UNHCR self-reliance proposal, which they regard as a disincentive to return, but UNHCR has already moved toward implementation by streamlining health services. The UNHCR plan of disengaging from both sides of the border by the end of 2005 raises grave concerns for the protection of these refugees and of those who returned.

Both repatriated refugees as well as new arrivals continue to enter Bangladesh illegally. But they have to survive as undocumented migrants without any protection from UNHCR nor humanitarian assistance, as access to the refugee camps has been denied to new arrivals since 1995 at the time of the mass repatriation. Between 100,000 and 200,000 Rohingya are living illegally in slums or villages in the Southern region of Bangladesh. Even though they fled Burma for exactly the same reasons as those recognised as refugees in the camps, they are denied the right of asylum in Bangladesh. The Bangladesh authorities refer to them as “economic migrants” and do not allow any relief for fear of creating a pull-factor. Fortunately, incidents of refoulement have been rare but more than 4,000 were evicted from their shelters in November 2002 and are still camping out in a makeshift camp near Teknaf in extremely precarious conditions. They were originally threatened with deportation, but the Burmese authorities would not even accept them back. Repatriation has thus not proved a durable solution, and only turns visible refugees into invisible ones.

Stateless, expelled from Burma and unwanted in Bangladesh, many Rohingya are relying on human smuggling and trafficking to search for better living conditions in Malaysia, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia or Dubai.

Around 70 Rakhine and other Burmese have been recognised by UNHCR as urban refugees in Dhaka. Most of them are political activists involved in the 1988 pro-democracy uprising or with ethnic resistance movements in Burma. Assistance from UNHCR was curtailed in 1998 and most survive in substandard conditions.

In addition, I must mention the hopeless situation of more than 500 Burmese “released prisoners” detained in Bangladeshi jails. Many are fishermen from various parts of Burma who first came to Thailand seeking jobs on Thai fishing trawlers and were later caught fishing illegally in Bangladeshi territorial waters. The rest are Rohingyas arrested as illegals in Bangladesh. All of them have long ago served their sentence for illegal entry but could not be released because the Burmese authorities are generally not interested in taking them back. A few of them have recently been deported back to Burma but many are still languishing in jails, some for more than 10 years.

The solution to displacement obviously lies in the Burmese Government’s respecting international human rights standards. India and Bangladesh have both enhanced ties with Burma and expanded regional economic cooperation. As a result they opt to conceal Burma’s forced migration problems. Instead, they could use their leverage to pressure Burma in improving its human rights records.

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