EBO
Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - 2002
Released by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor
The regime reinforced its firm military rule with a
pervasive security apparatus, the Office of Chief Military Intelligence (OCMI).
Control was implemented through surveillance of government employees and
private citizens, harassment of political activists, intimidation, arrest,
detention, physical abuse, and restrictions on citizens' contacts with
foreigners. The SPDC justified its security measures as necessary to maintain
order and national unity. Members of the security forces
committed numerous, serious human rights abuses.
The country had a population of approximately 50 million.
The country was extremely poor; the estimated annual per capita income was
approximately $300. Four decades of military rule and mismanagement resulted in
widespread poverty, poor health care, and declining educational levels.
Primarily an agricultural economy, the country also had substantial mineral,
fishing, and timber resources. Extensive state influence over the economy,
widespread corruption, and poor infrastructure has led to rapidly deteriorating
economic conditions.
The regime's human rights record remained extremely poor,
and it continued to commit numerous serious abuses. Citizens did not have the
right to change their government. In ethnic minority areas, security forces
continued to commit extrajudicial killings and rape, forcibly relocated
persons, used forced labor, and conscripted child soldiers. Disappearances
continued, and members of the security forces tortured, beat, and otherwise
abused prisoners and detainees. Citizens were subjected to arbitrary arrest
without appeal. Arrests and detention for expression of dissenting political
views occurred on numerous occasions. The SPDC arrested approximately 45
persons, including some NLD members, for political activities during the year;
most were released within days. The Government also released approximately 550
political prisoners since talks began with the NLD in 2000. By year's end, an
estimated 1,300 political prisoners (including members and supporters of ethnic
armed groups) remained in prison. Prison conditions remained harsh and life
threatening, although conditions improved in some prisons since the
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) was allowed access. The
judiciary was not independent.
The SPDC continued to restrict severely freedom of speech,
press, assembly, association, and travel. During the year, persons suspected of
or charged with prodemocratic political activity were
subjected to regular surveillance and occasional harassment. The junta
restricted freedom of religion, coercively promoted Buddhism over other
religions, and imposed restrictions on religious minorities. The regime's
control over the country's Muslim minority continued, although acts of violence
against Muslims decreased from last year. The regime regularly infringed on
citizens' privacy; security forces continued to monitor citizens' movements and
communications systematically, search homes without warrants, and relocate
persons forcibly without just compensation or legal recourse. The SPDC also
continued to forcibly relocate large ethnic minority populations in order to
deprive armed ethnic groups of civilian bases of support. The regime continued
to restrict freedom of movement and, in particular, foreign travel by female
citizens. On May 6, the regime released opposition leader and National League
for Democracy (NLD) General Secretary Aung San Suu Kyi from almost 20 months of
house detention and has allowed her to travel within the country since that
time. The regime also loosened restrictions on NLD activities and generally
allowed Aung San Suu Kyi to meet representatives of foreign governments and
international organizations. The regime closely monitored NLD activities at NLD
offices as well as the activities of other political parties throughout the
country. The junta recognized the NLD as a legal entity; however, it restricted
their activities severely through security measures, harassment, and threats.
The NLD was permitted to reopen approximately 90 out of 300 offices
countrywide. The SPDC did not allow domestic human rights organizations to
function independently and remained generally hostile to outside scrutiny of
its human rights record. However, in 2001 and during the year, it allowed the
U.N. Special Rapporteur on Human Rights in
Ethnic armed groups including the Karen National Union
(KNU), the Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP),
and the Shan State Army-South (SSA) reportedly also committed human rights
abuses, although on a lesser scale; abuses included killings, rapes, forced
labor, and conscripted child soldiers.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom From:
Arbitrary or Unlawful Deprivation of Life Amnesty
International (AI), and groups like the Shan Human Rights Foundation (SHRF) and
the Karen Human Rights Group (KHRG), which have been associated with armed
ethnic resistance groups, reported numerous cases throughout the year of
military troops killing civilians in border areas and areas of ethnic
resistance, often after confiscating property or torturing the individuals (see
Sections 1.g. and 5). Interviews by foreign observers documented similar
abuses.
In a July report entitled "
Brutal treatment by soldiers also caused deaths among those
conscripted as military porters and laborers. There were unconfirmed reports by
various groups indicating that porters and laborers who no longer physically
were able to work sometimes were abandoned without medical care or were killed
(see Section 6.c.).
In 2001 according to one report from the KNU, at least 200
prisoners from the Tavoy prison in Tenasserim division
were conscripted by SPDC troops as laborers to construct a front line camp. The
prisoners were tied together in groups of 5 and were guarded by 40 soldiers. As
prisoners weakened and no longer could work, 11 of them were shot and killed.
During the year, there were similar credible reports of the military taking
over 300 prisoners from jails in
Inmates died in prisons and labor camps, or shortly after
being released from them, due to harsh treatment and lack of adequate medical
care (see Section 1.c.). On July 31, Aik Paung, Secretary of the Palaung
Liberation Front, died in
Some armed ethnic groups also reportedly committed killings.
On April 15, according to the SPDC, the KNU blew up a trishaw in Myawady,
b. Disappearance
Private citizens and political
activists continued to "disappear" for periods ranging from several
hours to several weeks or more, and many persons never reappeared. Such
disappearances generally were attributed to government authorities detaining
individuals for questioning without the knowledge of their family members, or
the SPDC troops' practice of seizing private citizens for porterage
or related duties, often without the knowledge of their family members (see
Section 6.c.). In many cases, the individuals who were detained for questioning
were released soon afterward and returned to their families. However, the
whereabouts of persons seized by SPDC units to serve as porters, as well as of
prisoners transferred for labor or porterage duties,
often remained unknown. There also were reports of private citizens who were
killed while serving as porters (see Section 1.a.). Family members generally
learned of their relatives' fates only if fellow prisoners survived and later
reported information to the families. According to the SHRF, in August a
villager returning from gathering wild vegetables allegedly disappeared after
being taken by three SPDC troops to the military camp at Naa
Kawng Mu village in Mung-Ton township.
During an interview with the Democractic
Voice of
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment
There are laws that prohibit torture; however, members of
the security forces reportedly tortured, beat, and otherwise abused prisoners,
detainees, and other citizens. They routinely subjected detainees to harsh
interrogation techniques designed to intimidate and disorient. There were
reports in past years that prisoners were forced to squat or assume stressful,
uncomfortable, or painful positions for lengthy periods. There continued to be
many credible reports that security forces subjected citizens to harassment and
physical abuse. The military forces routinely confiscated property, cash, and
food, and used coercive and abusive recruitment methods to procure porters.
Persons forced into porterage or other labor faced
extremely difficult conditions, beatings, and mistreatment that at times
resulted in death. From June 7 to June 20, SPDC troops forced more than 130
civilians to serve as porters near Keng Tung,
During the year, there were complaints of government
mistreatment and exploitation of farmers. In the past, numerous farmers were
held in custody for failing to meet local production requirements, although
there were no such reports during the year.
In early March, in downtown
In May according to the KHRG, SPDC troops attempted to
extort money from villagers in
The KHRG reported that on July 11, soldiers opened fire on
Saw Poe Tot, a villager looking for his elephant, in Kameik
village in Tenasserim division. He was taken to a hospital by relatives and
survived.
On August 17, Captain Zaw Min Oo reportedly entered Yusomoso, a mainly Catholic village in Timoso
township in
SPDC troops raped women who were members of ethnic
minorities, especially in Shan, Karenni, and
Corruption among local government officials was widespread
and included complicity in the trafficking of persons (see Section 6.f.).
During the year, both men and women were conscripted to
serve as forced laborers and some of the women subsequently were raped at
gunpoint by military personnel (see Section 1.g.).
Prison and labor camp conditions generally remained harsh
and life threatening. The regime's Department of Prisons operated approximately
35 prisons and approximately 70 labor camps throughout the country (see Section
6.c.). In the prisons, food, clothing, and medical supplies reportedly were in
very short supply. Bedding consisted of a single mat on the floor. Prisoners
were forced to rely on their families, who were allowed to visit once every 2
weeks for 15 minutes per visit, for basic necessities. HIV/AIDS infection rates
in prison reportedly were high due to communal use of single syringes for
injections. During the year, the health of several political prisoners
deteriorated, and at least three political prisoners died in custody (see
Section 1.a.).
During the year, some prisoners were denied adequate medical
care while in prison. In one case, authorities did not provide a prisoner with
proper medical attention, and the prisoner subsequently died (see Section
1.a.). There were reports during the year that the health of U Win Tin, a 72-year-old
journalist who has been in prison since 1989 for his political activities,
continued to decline. Similarly, there were serious concerns about the health
of Min Ko Naing, a student leader also arrested in 1989 and subjected
to years of isolation and torture. The AAPP reported that on May 17 and 18, prison authorities severely beat two political prisoners
in Bassein prison because they submitted a complaint
to the prison superintendent. AAPP also reported that 22 political prisoners
were moved from Kalay prison to Kathar
prison, because they smuggled out letters documenting conditions in the prison.
According to the regime, political detainees were separated
from common criminals, juveniles from adults, and men from women. According to
the ICRC, the regime stated that political prisoners should not be subjected to
hard labor.
During the year, the ICRC conducted periodic visits to all
prisons in the country, attempting to visit each one a minimum of once a year.
ICRC visits to labor camps began in March 2000 and continued during the year.
There reportedly were approximately 70 of these camps, but many were temporary,
existing only long enough to complete a specific work project. The regime
allowed the ICRC to perform its traditional services, such as providing
medications, delivering letters to and from prisoners, and providing support
for family visits to prisoners.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
There is no provision in the law for judicial determination
of the legality of detention, and the SPDC routinely used arbitrary arrest and incommunicado detention. The Penal Code allows authorities
to extend sentences arbitrarily after prisoners have completed their original
sentence.
From September 2000 until May, Aung San Suu Kyi was held
under house detention without charge. Although the regime allowed visitors to
meet with her, the visits were controlled.
The regime has released an estimated 550 political
prisoners, as well as another 380 political prisoners on humanitarian grounds,
since talks began with the NLD in October 2000. However, it also arrested some
political activists. In August approximately 20 activists were arrested for
distributing pamphlets. There were reports that at least some of the 20
students were beaten during interrogation before being released approximately
10 days after their arrests. Two students arrested for a protest at
Prior to being charged, detainees rarely had access to legal
counsel or their families. Even after being charged, detainees rarely had the
benefit of counsel. Political detainees were not released on bail. Some
political detainees were held incommunicado for long periods.
In September Aung May Thu died in custody while serving the
sixth consecutive extension of his sentence, as permitted under the Penal Code
(see Section 1.a.). At year's end, there were approximately 50 political
prisoners serving extended sentences, including Min Ko Naing, a former
political activist and student leader who reportedly was in deteriorating
health (see Section 1.e.). In Mandalay 11 prisoners sentenced for political
reasons, including Zaw Min, Ne Win, U Tin Aye Yu, U
Tin Myint, U Tin Aye, U Khin Maung Thant, U Zarni Aung, U Thein Than Oo, U Kyaw Sein Maung, U Naing Myint, U
Htay Nyunt, and Soe Myint
completed their terms, but were not released.
Since October 2000 when confidence-building talks between
Aung San Suu Kyi and the SPDC began, the SPDC has reduced its campaign of
detention and intimidation against the NLD. In June 2001, the regime began
releasing NLD political prisoners from "guest houses" and prisons. By
year's end, the releases totaled approximately 550, including most NLD
detainees and all members of the NLD's Central
Executive Committee (CEC). However, at year's end, according to ICRC, there
were more than 1,300 "security detainees," including approximately
170 NLD members, still incarcerated, 17 of whom were elected (NLD) M.P.s. Included among the 1,300 political prisoners were
ethnic leaders, supporters of ethnic opposition groups (some of which were
armed), non-NLD politicians, lawyers, journalists, and students (see Section
1.e.).
Authorities continued to detain private citizens and
political activists, some of whom disappeared, at times temporarily, at the
hands of security forces (see Section 1.b.).
During the year, the authorities did not detain or deport
any foreign journalists.
The Constitution does not provide for forced exile, and the
regime did not use forced exile.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
The judiciary is not independent of the military junta. The
junta appoints justices to the Supreme Court who, in turn, appoints lower court
judges with the approval of the junta. These courts then adjudicate cases under
decrees promulgated by the junta that effectively have the force of law. The
court system includes courts at the township, district, state, and national
levels.
During the year, the regime continued to rule by decree and
was not bound by any constitutional provisions providing for fair public trials
or any other rights. Although remnants of the British-era legal system formally
were in place, the court system and its operation remained seriously flawed,
particularly in regard to the handling of political cases. The misuse of overly
broad laws--including the Emergency Provisions Act, the Unlawful Associations
Act, the Habitual Offenders Act, and the Law on Safeguarding the State from the
Danger of Destructionists--and the manipulation of the courts for political
ends continued to deprive citizens of the right to a fair trial. Pervasive
corruption further served to undermine the impartiality of the justice system.
Some basic due process rights, including the right to be
represented by a defense attorney, generally were respected in criminal cases,
but not in political cases that the regime deemed especially sensitive. In
criminal cases, defense attorneys generally were permitted to call and
cross-examine witnesses; however, their primary purpose was to bargain with the
judge to obtain the shortest possible sentence for their clients. Reliable
reports indicated that senior military authorities dictated verdicts, regardless
of the evidence or the law. In addition, in political cases, trials were not
open to the public. However, during the year, two high profile cases, one
involving Ne Win's grandchildren and the other
involving Aung San Oo and Aung San Su Kyi, were opened to the public. The press
attended and reported on both trials.
In March Professor Salai Tun Than, a 74-year-old academic
was sentenced to 7 years' imprisonment for staging a peaceful protest in
November 2001; the details of his trial, or if he even had a trial, were not
public.
During 2000 the regime initiated an extensive campaign to
remove independent lawyers who were capable of providing advice and counsel to
the NLD. The regime arrested and sentenced under fabricated charges nearly
every lawyer with a perceived connection to the NLD. Cases included those of U Soe Han, a 77-year-old highly respected and nonpolitical
lawyer, who was arrested with several others and sentenced to 21 years in
prison for sending a letter to Senior General Than Shwe and Secretary One Khin Nyunt, urging the regime to
release political prisoners and begin a dialog with the NLD. In 2001 the regime
discontinued its campaign against independent lawyers. During the year, there
were no new arrests of lawyers perceived to have NLD connections, and NLD
members appeared to be able to retain the counsel of lawyers without fear of
the lawyers being imprisoned. However, approximately 20 of the more than 40
lawyers jailed in 2000 remained imprisoned at year's end.
During the year, the regime slowly continued to release NLD
members from prison and also began releasing a small number of student
activists, many of whom had been in prison since 1989-90. The majority of the
releases were of prisoners who had completed or almost completed their
sentences or who were in poor health. Several political prisoners, who were
convicted of crimes against the regime, were required to sign an agreement
accepting to serve the remainder of their current sentences if they were
rearrested for any reason. Prisoners who were being held in detention, but who
had not been convicted of a crime, were not required to sign an agreement. In
addition, political prisoners who were released shortly after the October 2000
talks between the regime and Aung San Suu Kyi began,
were not required to sign any pre-condition agreement.
The ICRC reported that as of October there were 1,300
"security detainees" in the country. The AAPP estimated that there
were approximately 1,400 political prisoners. It also found that some political
prisoners remained in custody despite having completed their sentences (see
Section 1.d.). Of the estimated 1,300 political prisoners, 17 were NLD M.P.s elect from the 1990 elections. Among prisoners
released this year was U Aye Tha Aung, who represented
four large ethnic groups in the Committee Representing the People's Parliament
(CRPP). In August the regime released U Aye Tha Aung,
who was arrested in 2000 and whose health was deteriorating rapidly while
serving three 7-year sentences. He immediately underwent an operation for a
lung tumor. Another prominent political prisoner, U Win Tin, a noted journalist
and writer, arrested in 1989, still was in prison at year's end. He was
72-years-old and also reportedly was in poor health. Another high-profile political
prisoner was Min Ko Naing, a student leader whose sentence was extended under
the penal law and who reportedly was in Sittwe Prison
and in deteriorating health. Three political prisoners, Aung May Thu, U Sai Hpa, and Mai Aik Pan, a leader of the Palaung
ethnic group, died while in prison during the year (see Sections 1.a., 1.c.,
and 1.d.).
Opposition political parties have attempted to use the
courts to enforce their political rights, thus far without success. In April
2000, the Supreme Court dismissed an appeal by the NLD against the regime for
illegally detaining and libeling M.P.s elect. The
Supreme Court ruled that a case could not proceed
against a government official--in this case the head of military
intelligence--if the Head of State did not grant permission. In September 2000,
lawyers for the NLD began a suit against General Than Shwe and the Chairman of the Election Commission for
failing to fulfill commitments made in regard to the transition to democracy.
In 2001 the suit was dismissed without a hearing.
In November 2000, the regime allowed Aung San Suu Kyi's brother, a foreign citizen, to file a suit against
her seeking half ownership of the family compound in which she resided. The
case widely was believed to be motivated politically, because the regime
generally did not allow foreigners to file claims for property against
citizens. In fact the regime had to grant a special authority to the brother
for the case to be filed at all. The trial was public and lasted for several
months. The case eventually was dismissed for having been filed improperly,
however, the regime granted the brother authority to file a second suit, and in
October the judge presiding over the case ruled that Aung San Suu Kyi's brother had the right to inheritance of the property
under Buddhist customary law. The case continued at year's end.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
The Constitution does not provide for these rights, and
authorities infringed on citizens' privacy rights. The military regime
interfered extensively and arbitrarily in the lives of citizens. Through its
pervasive intelligence network and administrative procedures, the regime
systematically monitored the travel of all citizens and closely monitored the
activities of many citizens, particularly those known to be active politically.
The law requires that any person who spends the night at a
place other than his registered domicile inform the police in advance, and that
any household that hosts a person not domiciled there to maintain and submit to
the police a guest list. There were reports that this restriction, which
appeared to be relaxed somewhat last year, was
enforced strictly this year. At least 30 arrests reportedly occurred following
house-to-house searches.
Telephone service also was controlled tightly. Security
personnel regularly screened private correspondence and telephone calls. The
authorities generally continued to discourage citizens from subscribing
directly to foreign publications (see Section 2.a.). However, in 2001 the
regime loosened controls over the use of satellite television that allowed the
general population to register satellite receivers for a small fee. Previously
only a few businesses and individuals with special connections to the regime
were allowed licenses for satellite receivers.
The regime continued to control closely the licensing and
rationing of all electronic communication devices, which were monitored
closely. Possession of an unregistered telephone, facsimile machine, or
computer modem was punishable by imprisonment (see Section 2.a.). In April
2000, an Indonesian citizen, Irawan Sidaria, and two local technicians were arrested under the
statute for having installed an Inmarsat satellite
telephone unit at the Asia Plaza Hotel in
Weak private property rights and poor land ownership records
facilitated involuntary relocations of persons by the regime. The law does not
permit private ownership of land; it recognizes only different categories of
land-use rights, many of which are not freely transferable. Postcolonial land
laws also have revived the precolonial tradition that
private rights to land were contingent upon the land being put to productive
use.
For decades successive military regimes have applied a strategy
of forced relocation against ethnic minority groups seeking autonomy in an
effort to deny support to the armed ethnic groups; such forced relocations
continued during the year, particularly along the Thai border. The forced
relocations often were accompanied by alleged rapes, executions, and demands
for forced labor to build infrastructure for villagers and SPDC units. To make
way for commercial or public construction and, in some cases, for reasons of
internal security and political control, the SPDC forcibly relocated citizens
to "new towns." This practice has become somewhat less common in
recent years. Persons relocated to new towns generally suffered from greatly
reduced infrastructure support. Residents targeted for displacement generally
were given no option but to move, usually on short notice (see Sections 1.c.
and 2.d.).
A September report by a highly respected private citizen in
The forced relocations often generated large refugee flows
to neighboring countries or to parts of the country not controlled by the
regime. In some areas, the junta replaced the original ethnic settlements with
settlements of ethnic Burmans. In 2000 in
Military units also routinely confiscated livestock, fuel,
food supplies, fishponds, alcoholic drinks, vehicles, or money. Such abuses
have become widespread since 1997, when the junta ordered its regional
commanders to meet their logistical needs locally, rather than rely on the
central authorities. As a result, regional commanders increased their use of
forced contributions of money, food, labor, and building materials throughout
the country (see Sections 1.c. and 6.c.).
In violation of humanitarian law, both army and insurgent
units used forced conscription, including conscription of children (see
Sections 1.g. and 6.c.).
Government employees generally were prohibited from joining
or supporting political parties; however, this proscription was applied
selectively. In the case of the regime's mass mobilization organization, the
Union Solidarity and Development Association (USDA), the regime used coercion
and intimidation to induce many persons, including nearly all public sector employees, both to join the union and to attend meetings in
support of the regime (see Section 2.a.).
In the past, government officials, including senior
officials, repeatedly made statements warning parents that authorities could
hold them responsible for any political offenses committed by their children;
however, there were no reports of this practice during the year.
The regime's intelligence services also monitored the
movements of foreigners and questioned citizens about conversations with
foreigners. Government employees generally were required to obtain advance
permission before meeting with foreigners. During the year, international NGOs
officially were required to ensure that a representative from a government
ministry accompanied them on all field visits (at the NGOs' expense). However,
the requirement appeared impractical and was not enforced fully (see Section
4).
Marriages between female citizens and foreigners officially
were banned; however, the ban was not enforced.
g. Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian Law
in Internal Conflicts
Since independence in 1948, SPDC troops have battled a
variety of ethnic insurgencies. Ethnic insurgent groups have sought to gain greater
autonomy or, in some cases, independence from the ethnic Burman-dominated
State. Since 1989, 17 groups have concluded cease-fire agreements with the
regime. Under the agreements, the groups have retained their own armed forces
and performed some administrative functions within specified territories
inhabited chiefly by members of their ethnic groups. However, a few groups
remained in active revolt. The KNU continued to conduct insurgent operations in
areas with significant Karen populations in the eastern and southern regions of
the country. In
In May the SHRF and Shan Women's Action Network (SWAN)
alleged the military used rape as a systematic weapon of war against the ethnic
populations in
The SPDC denied the report and ordered three internal
reviews. In August the junta claimed that no soldiers were involved in the
rapes. In October the regime stated it continued to investigate the allegations
and had found evidence of five cases of rape similar to those described in the
SHRF/SWAN report. The regime stated it provided copies of its report on the
investigations to the international community and to the U.N. Special
Rapporteur, Paulo Sergio Pinheiro. However, according to Pinheiro, the
investigations were undertaken by military and other SPDC personnel with no
special skills or experience in investigating human rights allegations. The
investigations reportedly consisted of prearranged, large, collective, and
public meetings with local officials, organized by military personnel. There
has been continued international pressure on the regime to allow an independent
assessment of the allegations and to take appropriate actions to prevent rape
and sexual abuses by the military.
In central and southern
Border disputes with
In January 2001, according to a credible but not
independently confirmed report, in Murng-Nai,
military troops beat to death a Palaung villager,
raped his wife, and stole his property. In March 2001, according to the SHRF,
SPDC troops gang-raped a woman in Murng-Ton township after troops had tortured and killed her uncle.
Also according to the SHRF, in April 2001, SPDC soldiers encountered four
villagers near Naa Ing,
According to Human Rights Watch (HRW), SPDC troops
conscripted children as young as the age of 11, especially orphans and street
children (see Section 5).
Active insurgent groups included the Chin National Front,
the Naga National Council, the Arakan-Rohingya
Solidarity Organization (ARNO), the SSA-South, and the KNU (including its
affiliate the Karen National Liberation Army). Some members of the insurgent
groups committed serious abuses. For example, according to the regime, in
December 2001, the KNPP killed seven villagers who refused to join their ranks
in Loikaw township. The
regime also accused the KNU and the SSA of killings and bombings throughout
Shan and
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
The law allows the regime to restrict freedom of speech and
freedom of the press and, in practice the junta continued to restrict these
freedoms severely and systematically during the year. The regime continued to
arrest, detain, convict, and imprison citizens for expressing political
opinions critical of the junta, and for distributing or possessing publications
in which opposition opinions were expressed (see Sections 1.d. and 1.e.).
Security services also monitored and harassed persons believed to hold such
political opinions.
Legal restrictions on freedom of speech have intensified
since 1996, when the junta issued a decree prohibiting speeches or statements
that "undermine national stability." In all regions of the country,
the regime continued to use force to prohibit virtually all public speech
critical of it by all persons, including persons elected to Parliament in 1990,
and by leaders of political parties. The regime has pursued this policy
consistently since 1990, with few exceptions.
There was an unconfirmed report from the Democratic Voice of
Burma that in August 2001, military security personnel arrested a monk for
delivering a sermon criticizing the economic and political conditions in the
country during a ceremony at the Mahamyatmunni Payagyi Pagoda in
The regime permitted the NLD to resume some public meetings
during the year. In keeping with the confidence-building that has surrounded
the talks between the regime and Aung San Suu Kyi, the
NLD moderated its criticism of the regime in these meetings. The NLD continued
to press for substantive dialog with the regime as quickly as possible, and has
refrained from any direct attacks on the policies or actions of the regime.
Many prominent writers and journalists remained in prison
for expressing their political views. The Paris-based organization Reporters
Sans Frontieres reported that at least 18 journalists
remained in prison at year's end, including Ohn Kyaing, better known by his pen name Aung Wint, who wrote articles in favor of democracy and also was
a NLD M.P, elect from
Between April and June 2000, the junta arrested 11 persons
for distributing antijunta leaflets and allegedly
planning attacks on government buildings. In September 2000, the junta
sentenced Chein Poh, a highly
respected, 77-year-old lawyer in
The regime owned and controlled all daily newspapers and
domestic radio and television broadcasting facilities. These official media
remained propaganda organs of the junta and normally did not report opposing
views except to criticize them. The only partial exception was the Myanmar
Times, an expensive English-language weekly newspaper, targeted at the foreign
community in
All privately owned publications, including the Myanmar
Times, remained subject to prepublication censorship by state censorship
boards. Due in part to the time required to obtain the approval of the censors,
private news periodicals generally were published monthly. However, since 1996
the regime has given transferable waivers of prepublication censorship for
weekly periodicals. As a result, weekly tabloids proliferated. Regime controls
encouraged self-censorship, and publications generally did not report domestic
political news.
Imported publications remained subject in principle to predistribution censorship by state censorship boards, and
possession of publications not approved by the state censorship boards remained
a serious offense. Cases involving prodemocracy
literature, including two such cases during the year, were punished by
imprisonment. The regime also restricted the legal importation of foreign news
periodicals and discouraged subscriptions to foreign periodicals. However,
foreign newspapers may be purchased in
Since 1997 the regime issued few visas to foreign
journalists and has held only a handful of press conferences on political
subjects. Journalists occasionally were blacklisted. In previous years, several
journalists who entered the country as tourists were detained and deported by
the regime. During the year, the regime began holding more frequent press
conferences and invited foreign journalists to the country, including some who
previously were blacklisted. Cable News Network, the British Broadcasting
Corporation (BBC), and other foreign news organizations filed reports from the
country during the year. However, the regime refused visas to Australian
reporters seeking to cover Australian Foreign Minister Downer's visit to the
country in October.
Due to widespread poverty, limited literacy, and poor
infrastructure, radio remained the most important medium of mass communication.
News periodicals rarely circulated outside urban areas. The junta continued to
monopolize and control the content of the two domestic radio stations. Foreign
radio broadcasts, such as those of the BBC, Voice of America, Radio Free Asia,
and the Democratic Voice of Burma, remained the principal sources of uncensored
information.
The regime continued to monopolize and to control tightly
all domestic television broadcasting, offering only a government channel and an
armed forces channel. However, in 2001 the regime loosened restrictions on the
reception of foreign satellite television broadcasts by allowing new licenses
to be purchased. Previously, new licenses were not available and the operation
of an unlicensed satellite television receiver was a crime punishable by up to
3 years in prison and or a fine. The Television and Video Law makes it a
criminal offense to publish, distribute, or possess a videotape not approved by
a state censorship board.
The junta systematically restricted access to electronic
media. All computers, software, and associated telecommunications devices were subject
to government registration, and possession of unregistered equipment was
punishable by imprisonment (see Section 1.f.).
The Ministry of Defense operated the country's only known
Internet server and offered expensive, limited Internet services to a small
number of customers. During the year, a café that was billed as a cybercafe opened, but it did not have access to the
Internet, only CD-ROM and other such games.
The regime continued to restrict academic freedom severely.
University teachers and professors remained subject to the same restrictions on
freedom of speech, political activities, and publications as other government
employees. The Ministry of Higher Education routinely warned teachers against
criticizing the regime. It also instructed them not to discuss politics while
at work; prohibited them from joining or supporting political parties or from
engaging in political activity; and required them to obtain advance ministerial
approval for meetings with foreigners. Like all government employees,
professors and teachers have been coerced into joining the USDA, the regime's
mass mobilization organization. Teachers at all levels also continued to be
held responsible for the political activities of their students.
In June and July 2000, the regime reopened the remainder of
the institutions of higher education that were closed in 1996 following
widespread student demonstrations. However, the regime took a number of special
measures to limit the possibility of student unrest. Campuses were moved to relatively
remote areas, teachers and students were warned that disturbances would be
dealt with severely, and on-campus dormitories were closed, which disrupted
university life. There was evidence that many students chose to continue with
self-study because the quality of education deteriorated to such an extent that
many students opted to stay with self-study or tutoring. The regime tightly
controlled the limited number of private academic institutions in the country
as well as what they were allowed to teach.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
The law limits the freedom of assembly, and the regime
restricted it in practice. An ordinance officially prohibits unauthorized
outdoor assemblies of more than five persons, although the ordinance was not
enforced consistently. The 10 existing political parties also are required to
request permission from the regime to hold meetings of their members;
nevertheless, meetings occurred without regime permission.
The military junta continued its decade-long policy of
preventing the Parliament elected in 1990 from convening. During the year, the
regime loosened its restrictions on the activities of the main opposition
party, the NLD, and allowed 90 of NLD's 300 offices
to reopen (see Section 3).
In May and September 2001, the regime forced the closure of three Shan National League for Democracy (SNLD) offices in
townships near the capital of
In previous years, authorities used force to prevent prodemocracy demonstrations, punish participants and
organizers in prodemocracy demonstrations and
meetings, and detained or imprisoned persons suspected of planning and
organizing such demonstrations. During the year, there were no reports of such
practices (see Section 1.c.). However, authorities did attempt to prevent the
public from coming out to see Aung San Suu Kyi when she traveled to
The regime at times interfered with the assembly of religious
group members (see Section 2.c.).
The Government restricted freedom of association,
particularly in regard to members of the main opposition political party, the
NLD. The law prohibits more than 5 persons from meeting outdoors without prior
government approval. In the past, while the regime allowed the NLD to celebrate
certain key party events with public gatherings, it restricted the size of the
gatherings and the individuals who were allowed to attend. For example, in
September 2001, the NLD held a ceremony to commemorate the third anniversary of
the CRPP and the regime responded with Military Intelligence (MI) personnel
surrounding NLD headquarters. In 2000 the regime prevented Aung San Suu Kyi
from traveling to
Since the initiation of talks between Aung San Suu Kyi and
the junta in October 2000, there have been no reports of coerced resignations
or recall motions. The regime-controlled media ceased its campaign against the
NLD, and the regime loosened some restrictions on NLD party activity.
In general the right of association existed
only for government-approved organizations, including trade associations and
professional bodies, such as the Forest Reserve Environment Development and
Conservation Association. Few secular, nonprofit organizations existed,
and those that did took special care to act in accordance with government
policy. There were 10 legal political parties but most were moribund.
c. Freedom of Religion
The 1974 Constitution permits restrictions on religious
freedom, stating that "the national races shall enjoy the freedom to
profess their religion... provided that the enjoyment of any such freedom does
not offend the laws or the public interest." Most religious adherents duly
registered with the authorities generally were free to worship as they chose;
however, the regime imposed restrictions on certain religious activities. In
practice the regime restricted efforts by Buddhist clergy to promote human rights
and political freedom, and coercively promoted Buddhism over other religions in
some ethnic minority areas.
The regime's pervasive internal security apparatus sought to
infiltrate or monitor meetings and activities of virtually all organizations,
including religious organizations. Religious activities and organizations also
were subject to restrictions on freedom of expression and association. In
addition, the regime controlled and censored all publications,
including religious publications (see Section 2.a.).
Although a government directive exempts "genuine"
religious organizations from registration, in practice only registered
organizations were allowed to buy or sell property or open bank accounts. In
addition, the regime provided some utilities at preferential rates to
recognized religions. There was no official state religion; however, the regime
continued to show preference for Theravada Buddhism, the majority religion. For
example, the regime funded the construction of the
The regime has attempted to control the Buddhist clergy
("sangha"). The regime authorized military
commanders to try members of the sangha before
military tribunals for "activities inconsistent with and detrimental to
Buddhism," and imposed on the sangha a code of
conduct that was enforced by criminal penalties. The junta also subjected the sangha to special restrictions on freedom of expression and
freedom of association (see Section 2.a.). The military junta prohibited any
organization of the sangha other than nine
state-recognized monastic orders under the authority of the State Clergy
Coordination Committee ("Sangha Maha Nayaka Committee,"
SMNC). The regime prohibited all religious clergy from being members of any
political party.
The regime continued to restrict the
building activities, education, and proselytizing of minority religious groups.
Christian groups continued to have difficulties in obtaining
permission to build new churches. The regime reportedly denied permission for
churches to be built along main roads in cities such as Myitkina,
the capital of
Muslims reported that they essentially were banned from
constructing any new mosques during the year. Early in 2001, local authorities
in
In most regions of the country, Christian and Muslim groups
that sought to build small churches or mosques on side streets or other
inconspicuous locations at times usually were able to proceed, but only based
on informal approval from local authorities. These groups reported that formal
requests encountered long delays and generally were denied.
The Government discriminated against non-Buddhists at upper
levels of the public sector. Only one non-Buddhist served in the Government at
the ministerial level, and the same person, a Brigadier General, was the only
non-Buddhist known to have held flag rank in the armed forces since the 1990s.
The regime actively discouraged Muslims from entering military service, and
Christian or Muslim military officers who aspired to promotion beyond the
middle ranks were encouraged by their superiors to convert to Buddhism. In some
ethnic minority areas, such as
The regime discourages proselytizing by all clergy.
Evangelizing religions, like Christianity and Islam, are most affected by these
restrictions. In general the regime has not allowed permanent foreign religious
missions to operate in the country since the mid-1960s, when it expelled nearly
all foreign missionaries and nationalized all private schools and hospitals.
Religious publications, like secular ones, remained subject
to control and censorship (see Section 2.a.). Translations of the Bible and
Koran into indigenous languages could not be imported legally; with the
regime's permission, Bibles in indigenous languages were allowed to be printed
locally.
In the past, there were credible reports that in
Religious affiliation at times was indicated on
government-issued identification cards that citizens and permanent residents of
the country are required to carry. There appeared to be no consistent criteria
governing whether a person's religion is indicated on his or her identification
card. Citizens also are required to indicate their religions on some official
application forms, such as passports.
For a more detailed discussion see the 2002 International
Religious Freedom Report.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the
Country, Foreign Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
The regime restricted freedom of movement. Most citizens
were able to travel within the country, although their movements were monitored
and they were required to notify local officials of their whereabouts (see
Section 1.f.). Movement was limited in areas of armed conflict. Urban and rural
residents were subjected to relocation.
In past years, the freedom of movement of opposition
political leaders also was curtailed rigorously. Between 1995 and 2000, the
junta allowed NLD general secretary Aung San Suu Kyi to travel outside the
capital only once, on a visit to a monastery, and until May 6, she remained
under house detention. While the Government has relaxed restrictions on Aung
San Suu Kyi, generally allowing her freedom of movement and association, some
restrictions remained. Since her release from house detention in May, Aung San
Suu Kyi has traveled to Mon, Shan, and Rakhine
States, as well as to Mandalay, Magwe, and Irrawaddy divisions. Although she generally was allowed to
meet with international visitors, including the foreign ministers of Japan and
Australia, the Government did not allow either Malaysia's Prime Minister Mahathir or the Malaysian Foreign Minister to call on her
when they visited in August. Aung San Suu Kyi and her party also were harassed
by government-affiliated groups on some of her visits to various regions of the
country (see Section 2.b.). During the year, the regime loosened travel
restrictions on all NLD members including the most senior members. NLD M.P.'s elect who were released from prison were able to
travel between their electoral districts and Rangoon to coordinate with NLD
leaders.
During the year, the regime reportedly implemented policies
to consolidate the border with Bangladesh and to further control the movement
of Muslim Rohingyas in Rakhine
State (see Section 6.c).
The regime refused to accept Burmese deportees from other
countries, but accepted the return of approximately 4,000 illegal migrants from
Thailand. The regime allegedly refused to document Burmese seafarers who were
stranded abroad due to the sinking of their ship or bankruptcy of the ship
owners.
The regime also carefully scrutinized prospective travel
abroad. Such control facilitated rampant corruption, as many applicants were
forced to pay large bribes. Bribes for passports were sometimes as high as
$3,000 (approximately 3.6 million kyat), the equivalent of more than 10 years'
salary for the average citizen. The official board that reviews passport
applications has denied passports on political grounds. All college graduates
who obtained a passport (except for certain government employees) were required
to pay a special fee to reimburse the regime for the cost of their education.
Citizens who emigrated legally generally were allowed to return to visit
relatives, and some who lived abroad illegally and acquired foreign citizenship
also were able to return.
Residents unable to meet the provisions of the citizenship
law, such as ethnic Chinese, Arakanese, Muslims, and
others, must obtain prior permission to travel internally. Since the mid-1990s,
the Government also has restricted the issuance of passports to female citizens
(see Sections 5 and 6.f.).
The regime prohibited foreign diplomats and foreign
employees of U.N. agencies based in Rangoon from traveling outside the capital
without advance permission. All residents, foreign and local, were required to
apply for authorization to leave the country.
Restrictions on foreign travelers to the country were eased
as part of an effort to promote tourism. Burmese embassies now generally issue
tourist visas, valid for 1 month, within 24 hours of application. However,
certain categories of applicants, such as foreign human rights advocates,
journalists, and political figures were denied entry visas regularly unless
traveling under the aegis of a sponsor acceptable to the regime and for
purposes approved by the Government.
There was a large number of
internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the country. NGOs based in Thailand
estimated that the regime moved forcibly more than 250,000 citizens from their
villages and districts to live near or along the Thai border (see Section 5).
These NGO estimated that more than 350,000 IDPs resided in SPDC relocation
sites.
During the year, the military continued to abuse thousands
of villagers and drove them from their homes, including during the course of
military campaigns in Karen, Kayah, and Shan States
(see Section 1.f.). In January AI reported that a 75-year-old Shan man said
that he and his family fled to Thailand after SPDC troops and United Wa State Army (UWSA) troops
confiscated all their land, arrested villagers, looted homes, raped numerous
women, and drove them out of their village. He reported that between
500 to 600 UWSA troops occupied the area, and that he received no
compensation for the loss of his woodlands, orchards, or fields.
Ethnic minority areas previously affected by conflict, such
as the large Karen areas of Irrawaddy division,
experienced tighter controls on personal movement, including more frequent
military checkpoints, closer monitoring by military intelligence, and larger
military garrisons. "Informal taxes", or bribes, were extracted from
all nationalities at checkpoints in border areas. In Rakhine
State, many controls and checkpoints applied only to the Muslim population (see
Section 5).
Harassment, fear of repression, and deteriorating
socio-economic conditions continued to force many citizens into neighboring
countries and beyond. In the border regions populated by minority ethnic
groups, the regime continued its policies of forced labor, confiscation of
lands, compulsory contributions of food, and forced relocations. These policies
produced thousands of refugees in neighboring countries such as Thailand,
China, and India. One report from Kachin State
alleged that in May 2001, 3,000 Naga villagers fled
the country into northeastern India when SPDC troops launched an offensive
against Naga separatists. The security forces
reportedly burned villages and laid landmines to discourage villagers from
returning. Harsh conditions in Shan State compelled an exodus to Thailand, with
unconfirmed estimates that approximately 10,000 Shan citizens may have
relocated there during the year (see Section 1.f.). There were approximately
150,000 persons in refugee camps on the country's borders. Of these at least
135,000 Karen, Mon, and Karenni resided in refugee
camps in Thailand. In addition, there were tens of thousands of Shan refugees
in Thailand not living in camps. On the country's western border, 22,000 Rohingya Muslims remained in refugee camps in Bangladesh
(see Section 5). More than 100,000 Rohingyas lived
outside the refugee camps in Rakhine State with no
formal documentation as refugees. In addition, Rohingyas
who have returned to Rakhine State claimed that they
faced government restrictions on their ability to travel and to engage in
economic activity.
The regime did not allow refugees or displaced persons from
abroad to resettle or seek safe haven in the country and has not formulated a
policy regarding refugees, asylum, or first asylum. There were no reports that
persons formally sought asylum in the country during the year. There were no
reports of forced repatriation.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of
Citizens to Change their Government
Citizens did not have the right to change their government.
The junta continued to prevent the Parliament elected in 1990 from convening.
Since 1962 active duty military officers have occupied most
important positions in both the central Government and in local governments.
Since 1988 a military junta has held all state power. All members of the regime
have been military officers on active duty, and the junta has placed military
or retired military officers in most key senior-level positions in all
ministries. At year's end, active duty or retired military officers occupied 37
of the 39 ministerial-level positions.
Following the NLD's victory in the
1990 elections, the military junta refused to implement the election results
and disqualified, detained, or imprisoned many successful candidates (see
Sections 1.d. and 1.e.). Many other M.P.s elect fled
the country. Following an aborted effort from 1993-96 to draft a new
constitution assigning the military the dominant role in the country political
structure, the military junta continued its systematic use of coercion and
intimidation to deny citizens the right to change their government.
In September 1998, the NLD leadership organized a CRPP on
the basis of written delegations of authority from a majority of the surviving
members elect of the 1990 Parliament, in view of the junta's refusal to allow
the entire Parliament to convene. The committee was empowered to act on behalf
of the Parliament until the Parliament was convened. In retaliation the junta
launched a sustained and systematic campaign to destroy the NLD without
formally banning it; the authorities pressured many thousands of NLD members
and local officials to resign and closed party offices throughout the country.
Military intelligence officials also detained more than 200 members elect of
Parliament in 1998. At year's end, a total of 19 M.P.s
elect remained in prison. According to AAPP, two of these M.P.s
elect have been in prison since 1990 (see Section 1.d.).
In October 1999, the Multiparty Democracy General Election
Commission announced, that of 392 NLD members elected to Parliament in 1990,
only 92 remained both NLD members and M.P.s elect. It
claimed that 105 had resigned their parliamentary status, 139 had been
disqualified by the commission, 27 had resigned from the NLD, and 31 had died.
In contrast, in September 2000, the CRPP claimed to enjoy the support of 433 of
the 485 members elect of Parliament.
Late in 2000, with encouragement from the U.N. Special Envoy
Razali Ismail, the regime
initiated talks with Aung San Suu Kyi that produced some relaxation in the
restrictions on the NLD. In subsequent years, the NLD was able to resume some
normal party activities. Press attacks on the NLD and Aung San Suu Kyi also
ceased. However, since 2000, the regime has not opened a substantive dialog
with the NLD and still held more than a 1,000 political prisoners at year's
end.
Women were excluded from military leadership. There were no
female members of the regime, ministers, or Supreme Court judges.
Members of certain minority groups also were denied full
citizenship and a role in government and politics (see Section 5).
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human Rights
The Government did not allow domestic human rights
organizations to function independently, and it remained generally hostile to
outside scrutiny of its human rights record.
The regime's restriction on travel by foreign journalists,
NGO staff, U.N. agency staff, and diplomats; its monitoring of the movements of
such foreigners; its frequent interrogation of citizens concerning contacts
with foreigners; its restrictions on the freedom of expression and association
of citizens; and its practice of arresting citizens who passed information
about government human rights abuses to foreigners all impeded efforts to
collect or investigate information regarding human rights abuses. Reports of
abuses, especially those committed in prisons or ethnic minority areas, often
emerged months or years after the abuses allegedly were committed and seldom
could be verified with certainty.
There were approximately 25 nonpolitical, international
humanitarian NGOs working in the country. A few others have established a
provisional presence while undertaking the protracted negotiations necessary to
establish permanent operations in the country. Beginning in 2001, international
NGOs sometimes were required to have a government ministry representative
accompany them on all field visits, at the NGOs expense (see Section 1.f.).
The regime permitted the U.N. Special Rapporteur, Paulo
Sergio Pinheiro, to visit the country three times during the year. In his
reports, Pinheiro cited instances of positive change and pledged to work with
the regime, the opposition, members of civil society, and the international
community to promote human rights in the country. He also cited problems,
including the denial of fundamental freedoms of assembly, association,
expression, and movement, and encouraged the regime to correct these
deficiencies. He also called for the release of all political detainees. In
addition, he cited "the gross violations of human rights of
civilians" living in areas of conflict in eastern Karen and Kayah States, southern Shan State, northern Sagaing division, Rakhine, and
Chin States.
In 2001 the regime announced the creation of a Human Rights
Committee, chaired by the Minister of Home Affairs and including the Chief of
Police as one of the members. Several human rights workshops that targeted
abuses and were sponsored by the Australian Government were held in
Section 5 Discrimination Based on
Race, Sex, Disability, Language, or Social Status
The military junta continued to rule by decree and was not
bound by any constitutional provisions concerning discrimination.
Women
Domestic violence against women, including spousal abuse,
appeared to be relatively infrequent, although there was little data available.
The regime did not release statistics regarding spousal abuse or domestic
violence. Married couples often lived in households with extended families,
where social pressure tended to protect the wife from abuse.
Rape is illegal; however, spousal rape is not a crime unless
the wife is under 12 years of age. The regime stated that rape was not common
in populous urban areas but occurred more often in remote areas. The Government
did not release statistics regarding rape.
Prostitution is prohibited by law and punishable by 3 years
in prison; however, it was becoming an increasing problem, particularly in some
of
There were no laws against sexual harassment.
In general women traditionally enjoyed a high social and
economic status and exercised most of the same basic rights as men. Consistent
with traditional culture, women kept their names after marriage and often
controlled family finances. However, women remained underrepresented in most
traditional male occupations, and women continued to be barred effectively from
a few professions, including the military officer corps. Poverty, which was
widespread in rural areas, affected women disproportionately. Women did not
receive equal pay for equal work on a consistent basis. Women legally were
entitled to receive up to 26 weeks of maternity benefits; however, in practice
these benefits often were not accorded them.
There were no independent women's rights organizations. The
National Committee for Women's Affairs in the Ministry of Social Welfare was
responsible for safeguarding women's interests. The Government and at least one
international NGO operated schools and other rehabilitation programs for former
prostitutes. The Myanmar Maternal and Child Welfare Association, a
government-controlled agency, provided assistance to mothers. A professional
society for businesswomen, the Myanmar Women Entrepreneurs' Association,
provided loans to women starting new businesses.
Children
The regime continued to allocate minimal resources to public
education. According to the latest available statistics, government
expenditures for all civilian education were equivalent to less than 1 percent
of gross domestic product (GDP) during the year and have declined by more than
70 percent in real terms since 1990. According to government studies conducted
with U.N. assistance, only 37 percent of children finished fourth grade in
urban areas and only 22 percent did so in rural areas. Rates of school
attendance and educational attainment decreased during the year, largely due to
rising formal and informal school fees as the junta diverted expenditures from
health and education to the armed forces. On average teacher's pay was equal
only to approximately $7.00 (10,000 kyats) a month,
far below subsistence wages and has forced many teachers to quit teaching out
of economic necessity. Only relatively prosperous families were able to afford
to send their children to school, even at the primary level. In ethnic minority
areas, the regime often banned teaching in local languages. In some areas where
few families were able to afford unofficial payments to teachers, teachers
generally no longer came to work and schools no longer functioned. In response
to government neglect, private institutions began to provide assistance in
education, despite an official monopoly on education.
Children also suffered greatly from the junta's severe and
worsening neglect of health care. The junta cut government expenditures on
public health care even more sharply than it cut spending for education.
Government expenditures for civilian health care in 1998-99 were equivalent to
only 0.3 percent of GDP. Government studies sponsored by U.N. agencies in 1997
found that, on average, 131 of 1,000 children died before reaching the age of 5
years, and that only 1 out of 20 births in rural areas was attended by a
doctor. Those same studies indicated that, among children under 3 years of age,
37 percent were malnourished, and 13 percent were malnourished severely. The
World Health Organization considered the country's health care system to be
extremely poor.
Child abuse is prohibited by law. The Government stated that
child abuse was not a significant problem; however, the regime did not release
supporting statistics.
Child prostitution and trafficking in girls for the purpose
of prostitution--especially Shan girls who were sent or lured to
The official age of enlistment in the ostensibly
all-volunteer army is 18 years. However, the authorities reportedly rounded up
orphans and street children in
Several international NGOs and agencies promoted the rights
of children in the country, including World Vision, Save the Children UK, CARE,
UNICEF, UNDP, and foreign governments.
Persons with Disabilities
In principle official assistance to persons with disabilities
includes two-thirds of pay for up to 1 year of a temporary disability and a
tax-free stipend for permanent disability; however, in practice assistance was
limited severely. There was no law mandating accessibility to buildings, public
transportation, or government facilities. While there were several small-scale
organizations to assist persons with disabilities, most must rely on their
families to provide for their welfare. Military veterans with disabilities
received available benefits on a priority basis. Because of landmine
detonations, there were a large number of amputees in the country.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities
Wide-ranging governmental and societal discrimination
against minorities persisted. Animosities between the country's many ethnic
minorities and the Burman majority, which has
dominated the Government and the armed forces since independence, continued to
fuel active conflict that resulted in serious abuses during the year. These
abuses included reported killings, beatings, torture,
forced labor, forced relocations, and rapes of Chin, Karen, Karenni,
and Shan by SPDC soldiers and the armed ethnic groups (see Sections 1.a., 1.c.,
1.f., and 1.g.).
The Government continued to discriminate systematically
against non-Burmans. Because the regime reserved
secondary state schools for citizens, Rohingya
Muslims did not have access to state run schools beyond primary education and
were ineligible for most civil service positions.
There were reports that forced labor of Muslims occurred in
Since only persons who were able to prove long familial
links to the country were accorded full citizenship, nonindigenous
ethnic populations (such as Chinese, Indians, and Rohingya
Muslims) were denied full citizenship and were excluded from government
positions. Members of the Rohingya Muslim minority in
Ethnic minority groups generally used their own languages.
However, throughout all parts of the country controlled by the regime,
including ethnic minority areas, Burmese remained the language of instruction
in state schools. Even in ethnic minority areas, most primary and secondary
state schools did not offer instruction in the local ethnic minority language.
There were very few domestic publications in indigenous minority languages.
There were reports that the junta resettled groups of Burmans in various ethnic minority areas (see Section
1.f.). There were ethnic tensions between Burmans and
nonindigenous ethnic populations, including Indians,
many of whom were Muslims, and a rapidly growing population of Chinese, most of
whom immigrated from
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
The 1926 Trade Unions Act, which remained in effect, permits
workers to form trade unions only with the prior consent of the Government;
however, no free trade unions existed in the country, and the junta dissolved
even the government-controlled union that existed before 1988.
In June 2001, the Committee on the Application of Convention
and Recommendations of the International Labor Conference once again expressed
profound regret regarding the persistence of serious discrepancies between the
law and practice with respect to freedom of association. The committee
criticized the regime for not implementing the provisions of the ILO Convention
87 on Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize, which the
Government ratified in 1955. In 2001 a government representative testified to
the committee that the Trade Unions Law was being revised, but that he could
not provide the draft text at that time.
The International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU)
reported that in August, army troops killed an official of the Free Trade Union
of Burma (the Kawthoolei Education Workers Union). U
Saw Mya Than, a village headman who was widely known
for his trade union activities, forcibly was recruited as a porter by the army
and then killed in retaliation for an attack by opposition forces.
No unions in the country were affiliated internationally.
The Government forbade seafarers who found work on foreign vessels through the
Seafarers Employment Control Division from contacts with the International
Transport Workers' Federation and the regime often refused to document
seafarers who were stranded abroad (see Section 2.d.).
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
Workers did not have the right to organize and bargain
collectively. The government's Central Arbitration Board, which once provided a
means for settling major labor disputes, has been dormant since 1988.
Township-level labor supervisory committees existed to address minor labor
concerns.
The regime unilaterally set wages in the public sector. In
the private sector, market forces generally set wages. However, the regime has
pressured joint ventures not to pay salaries greater than those of ministers or
other senior government employees. Some joint ventures circumvented this with
supplemental pay or special incentive systems. Foreign firms generally set
wages near those of the domestic private sector but followed the example of
joint ventures in awarding supplemental wages and benefits.
According to the law, workers generally are prohibited from
striking, although a small number of workers purportedly are accorded the right
to strike. The last reported strike was in 2000, when an employer retracted a
promise to pay piece rates. Subsequently 30 employees were detained, many for
up to 3 months. All employees lost their jobs.
There were no export processing
zones (EPZs). However, there were special
military-owned industrial parks, such as Pyin-Ma-Bin,
near
c. Prohibition of Forced or Bonded Labor
Forced or bonded labor remained a widespread and serious
problem. Although the Penal Code provides for the punishment of persons who
imposed forced labor on others, there were no known cases of the application of
this provision. Throughout the country, international observers verified that
the regime routinely forced citizens to work on construction and maintenance
projects. The law does not specifically prohibit forced and bonded labor by
children, and forced labor by children was also a serious problem.
In 2000 the ILO determined that the regime had not taken
effective action to deal with the "widespread and systematic" use of
forced labor in the country and, for the first time in its history, called on
all ILO members to review their relations with the regime and to take
appropriate measures to ensure that the regime would not be able to take
advantage of such relations to perpetuate or extend the system of forced labor.
Initially the regime rejected the ILO's actions and
statements; however, during the year, it began to work with the ILO by allowing
visits and a liaison office to be opened in the country. In February an ILO
team visited the country and an agreement was reached to establish a permanent
ILO office in
Human rights groups and the ILO continued to receive
allegations of forced labor from around the country, including Rangoon
division, Rakhine State, and areas along the Thai
border. In an October report, the ICFTU reported that the military continued to
use forced labor on a massive scale. The ICFTU report echoed allegations
contained in a July report by AI, Myanmar: Lack of security in
counter-insurgency areas, which contained a number of specific allegations of
human rights abuses by the armed forces, including forced labor. The AI
allegations related primarily to areas of Shan, Karen, and Mon States, and Tenassarim division.
The ICFTU reported that women, children (including orphans
and street children), and elderly persons were required to perform forced
labor; that porters often were sent into dangerous military situations, rarely
received medical treatment, and almost never were compensated; that forced
laborers frequently were beaten; and that some women performing forced labor
were raped or otherwise abused sexually by soldiers. The ICFTU reported several
cases of the military pressuring civilians to conceal the incidence and extent
of forced labor from the ILO investigation team during the year. Government
authorities often allowed households or persons to substitute money or food for
labor for infrastructure projects, but widespread rural poverty forced most
households to contribute labor. Parents routinely called upon children to help
fulfill their households' forced labor obligations (see Section 6.d.).
According to SHRF, in June 2001, SPDC troops forcibly conscripted 250 civilian
porters, including 108 women and children, many of whom were between the ages
of 8 and 16 years. Some children were forced to carry 6 cans of milk and some
were forced to carry 10 mortar rounds each. Many of the children were kicked
and beaten when they could not move fast enough.
According to an HRW report, Crackdown on Burmese Muslims,
there was increased repression of Muslims and increased use of forced labor in Rakhine State. According to Forum Asia, the establishment
of new "Model Villages" resulted in a higher demand for forced labor
and land confiscation. However, other credible reports suggested that forced
labor in Rakhine State had declined overall; however,
army demands for forced labor reportedly continued to occur in selected
townships, as did demands for porterage and other
army services. There also were reports of further control on the activities and
movements of Rohingyas in Rakhine
State (see Section 2.d.).
There were no accurate estimates of the number of citizens
forced to provide labor each year but the practice was common. The regime has
taken some limited measures toward eliminating the practice; however, the
measures did not appear to have reduced significantly the use of forced labor,
especially by the military. The regime has established a committee to implement
measures against forced labor and has allowed the ILO to open an office in
Rangoon and to travel throughout the country. The implementation committee,
however, has not identified or prosecuted any instances of forced labor and did
not appear to have the authority to intervene in allegations of military use of
forced labor. The committee has not implemented adequate mechanisms for the
reporting, investigation, and prosecution of incidents of forced labor.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment
Although the law sets a minimum age of 13 for the employment
of children, in practice the law was not enforced. Child labor has become
increasingly prevalent and visible. Working children were highly visible in
cities, mostly working for small or family enterprises. In the countryside,
children worked in family agricultural activities. Children working in the
urban informal sector in Rangoon and Mandalay often began work at young ages.
In the urban informal sector, child workers were found mostly in food processing,
street vending, refuse collecting, light manufacturing, and as tea shop
attendants. According to government statistics, 6 percent of urban children
worked, but only 4 percent of working children earned wages; many were employed
in family enterprises.
The law does not specifically prohibit bonded labor by
children; while bonded labor was not practiced, forced labor by children
occurred (see Section 6.c.). The authorities reportedly rounded up orphans and
street children in Rangoon and other cities and forced them into military
service. Children also were forced to serve as porters in combat areas, during
which beatings and other mistreatment reportedly occurred (see Section 6.f.).
The Department of Social Welfare provides support and
schooling for a small number of children (approximately 3,000) who were
orphaned or in some other way estranged from their families.
The Government has not ratified ILO Convention 182 on the
worst forms of child labor.
The military regime reportedly used children as porters, in
infrastructure development, and in providing other services to military forces.
Children often built or repaired roads and irrigation facilities. Households
reportedly satisfied forced labor quotas by sending their least productive
workers (usually children). In recent years, there have been reports that
military units in various ethnic minority areas either forced children to
perform support services, such as fetching water, cleaning, cutting bamboo, or
cultivating food crops, or allowed households or villages to use children to
satisfy SPDC orders to perform such services (see Sections 5 and 6.c.).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
Only government employees and employees of a few traditional
industries were covered by minimum wage provisions. The minimum daily wage for
salaried public employees was $0.10 (100 kyats) for
what was in effect a 6 hour workday. Various subsidies and allowances
supplemented this sum. Neither the minimum wage nor the higher wages earned
even by senior government officials provided a worker and family with a decent
standard of living. Low and falling real wages in the public sector have
fostered widespread corruption. In the private sector, urban laborers earned
approximately $0.20 (200 kyat) per day, while rural agricultural workers earned
approximately half that rate. Some private sector workers earned substantially
more; a skilled factory worker earned approximately $4.00 (4,800 kyat) per day.
Surplus labor conditions, a poor economy, and lack of
protection by the regime continued to dictate substandard conditions for
workers. The 1964 Law on Fundamental Workers Rights and the 1951 Factories Act
regulate working conditions. There are legally prescribed 5 day, 35-hour
workweek for employees in the public sector and a 6 day, 44-hour workweek for
private and state enterprise employees, with overtime paid for additional work.
The law also allows for a 24-hour rest period per week, and workers were
permitted 21 paid holidays per year. However, in practice such provisions benefited
only a small portion of the country's labor force, since most of the labor
force was engaged in rural agriculture.
Numerous health and safety regulations existed, but in
practice the regime did not make the necessary resources available to enforce
the regulations. Although workers may in principle remove themselves from
hazardous conditions, in practice many workers could not expect to retain their
jobs if they did so.
f. Trafficking in Persons
Trafficking in women and children was a serious problem
during the year. There reportedly was widespread complicity among local regime
officials in trafficking in persons.
The law does not prohibit trafficking in persons and there
were reports that persons were trafficked from and within the country. There
are laws which are used against traffickers such as the Penal Code which
prohibits kidnaping; the Suppression of Prostitution
Act; and the Child Law, which includes provisions against the sale, abuse, or
exploitation of children. According to the regime, traffickers have received
sentences of between 3 and 14 years for trafficking in persons. According to
the regime's figures, investigations have resulted in jail sentences being
handed out in approximately 90 cases. Between 1999 and June, the Myanmar National
Committee on Women's Affairs and other NGOs held more than 10,000 village-level
seminars to educate families regarding the dangers of trafficking. In
Trafficking of women and girls to
While laws exist against child prostitution and child
pornography, they were not enforced well. Reports from
In recent years, the regime has made it difficult for women
to obtain passports or marry foreigners in order to reduce the outflow of women
both as victims of trafficking (see Sections 1.f. and 2.d.). In addition, there
are regulations forbidding girls under the age of 25 from crossing the border
unless accompanied by a guardian. However, most citizens who were forced or
lured into prostitution crossed the border into
Corruption among local government officials was widespread
and included complicity in the trafficking of persons. The regime's efforts to
stop international and internal sex and exploitative trafficking were limited
given the magnitude of the problem.
A number of NGOs offered poverty alleviation and education
programs designed to counter trafficking. Reportedly these programs have been
moderately successful.
While the Government has made limited progress on
trafficking in persons during the year, baseline information on the extent to
which trafficking occurs and the success of the government's activities is not
available. The government's pervasive security controls, restrictions on the
free flow of information, and lack of transparency prevent a meaningful
assessment of trafficking in persons activities in the country. For example,
while experts agree that human trafficking from the country was substantial, no
organization, including the Government, was able or
willing to estimate the number of trafficking victims.