Text Box: Destruction and Degradation of the Burmese Frontier Forests Text Box: # Text Box: serious damage has been done in the ethnic minority areas along the borders with Thailand and China. These areas previously contained untouched forest reserves with various types of hardwood and tropical rainforests, and included many important watershed areas. The increased fighting along the Thai border in the late 1980s and early 1990s coincided with unsustainable and clear-cut logging practices by Thai logging companies. In November 1988, the Thai government announced a total logging ban in Thailand after logging-related mudslides caused the death of 350 civilians. In December 1988, soon after the formation of the SLORC and the bloodbath of August and September 1988, Thai Army Commander Chaovalit visited Burma and returned with lucrative logging and fishing concessions. As a result of this trip, a large number of Thai logging companies, most of them well connected to high-ranking Thai military officers or powerful Thai politicians were granted logging concessions by the SLORC. Many of these concessions were located in areas controlled by armed ethnic opposition groups, including the KNU, NMSP, KNPP, and MTA. From the SLORC’s perspective, these logging concessions were part of a larger scheme to defeat the ethnic insurgencies. In 1991, U Nyunt Shwe, then Burmese Ambassador to Thailand, said: “We are selling [the logging concessions] to get foreign exchange. No one can deny that countries need foreign exchange. Had the deal not been sealed before the logging ban [in Thailand] then there would be political problems in Thailand. Therefore, politically you [Thailand] gain. Economically we [SLORC] gain, and politically and economically the insurgents lost." (Kramer, 1994) The sale of logging concessions in US dollars brought in much-needed foreign exchange. Annual income from the sale of these logging concessions might have been US $112 million a year. In the 1990s, the total average annual timber revenue was US $200 million and was the largest single source of foreign exchange (Smith, 1994). Thai logging companies removed forest cover for guerrilla armies, and built strategic roads into hitherto inaccessible terrain. Furthermore, on a number occasions the Thai army allowed Burmese troops to attack Karen, Mon and Karenni strongholds from behind, using Thai territory. In this way, the Burmese army quickly overran a number of bases that had been impregnable before. These ‘logging wars’ were chaotic in nature and led to many conflicts between logging companies, ethnic minority armies, and the SLORC, and lasted until the mid-1990s. By that time, huge parts of Burma along the Thai border had been deforested by Thai companies (Kramer, 1994). Logging also increased dramatically in northern Shan State and in Kachin State after the cease-fire agreements. Organisations such as the KIO, NDA-K and the SSA-North, found it increasingly difficult to finance their organisations, and became reliant on the sale of natural resources; mainly timber, to China. They claim to have no other alternative. After the cease-fire, the KIO lost control of the jade mines at Hpa-kant, which up until then, was its main source of income. The majority of the timber is cut by Chinese companies, who subsequently export the logs across the border to neighbouring Yunnan Province in China. In recent years, both the KIO and the NDA-K have also given out logging concessions to foreign companies, mainly Chinese but reportedly also Malaysian and Singaporean. These concessions were exchanged in return for road building projects in Kachin State, which is very underdeveloped and has poor infrastructure. Representatives of the KIO and the NDA-K say that since the government has made no efforts to develop Kachin State, they have to do it themselves. The only way to finance this, they argue, is by selling logging concessions ( Moncreif and Myat, 2001). References: Kramer, T. 1994. Thai Foreign Policy Toward Burma 1987-1993. MA thesis, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam. Lintner, B.1990. The Rise and Fall of the Communist Party of Burma (CPB). Cornell University Press, New York. Moncreif, J., and H. Myat. October-November 2001. The War on Kachin Forests. The Irrawaddy 9(8):14-17. Myanmar Forestry Department. 1991. Population statistics for May 1991. Smith, M. 1999. Burma, Insurgency and the Politics of Ethnicity. Zeb Books, London. Smith, M. 1994. Paradise Lost? The Suppression of Environmental Rights and Freedom of Expression in Burma. London, Article 19:13.