“Conflict,
discrimination and humanitarian challenges
in Northern
By Chris Lewa, Forum
Delivered at the EU –
In contrast to
the Thai-Burma border, very little international attention has been given to conditions
on the Bangladesh-Burma border. Consequently,
But Arakan is no less than
a microcosm of
Two major
communities inhabit
According to
UNHCR,
Arakan was an independent kingdom until 1784, encompassing at times the
southern part of today’s
During the
British colonial period, a large number of people of Indian origin settled throughout
Muslims
and Buddhists co-existed in the Arakan region for many centuries, and until
WWII, the two communities did not show any sign of strong animosity towards
each other. However, in 1942, the
Japanese conquest and the withdrawal of the British created a political vacuum
which gave room for accumulated tensions sparked by the Indian immigration to
explode and the first major communal riots broke out in Arakan.
After
Ruthless campaigns and discriminatory policies against them prompted two
massive exoduses of more than
250,000 Rohingya refugees to
The military regime’s
monolithic concept of nation building promotes assimilation, rather than
integration of all ethnic minorities, within a primarily Burman
Buddhist nation. In Arakan, the junta
has implemented policies of exclusion against the Muslim population, while
attempting to forcibly assimilate the Rakhine Buddhists through “Burmanisation”. This
divide-and-rule tactic is very effective as, by denying all rights to the
Rohingya population, depriving them of citizenship and labelling them as
illegal immigrants from
The conflict in
Recognition as an ethnic
nationality of
In addition, emphasis is
also given to the Islamic faith professed by this population. The consensus of Burmese opinion is that the
Muslims can enjoy religious freedom but they will be relentlessly barred from
obtaining political representation on the basis of their religion.
Policies of exclusion and discrimination imposed on the Rohingyas by successive Burmese military regimes have
prevented them from developing socially and economically, and are deliberately
designed to encourage departure to
1)
Denial of citizenship:
The Rohingyas have been rendered stateless
through
2)
Restrictions on freedom
of movement:
The Rohingya are subject to strict
restrictions of movement. They are
virtually confined to their village tracts.
They need to apply for a travel pass, which they have to pay for, even to
visit a neighbouring village. Since February
2001, Sittwe has remained off-limits for the Rohingyas
of
3)
Obstacles to family
development
A series of measures has been imposed to control
birth and to limit expansion of the Rohingya population. Unlike other peoples of Burma, the Rohingya must apply for permission to get married, which is
only granted in exchange for high bribes and can take up to several years to
obtain. Polygamy has been prohibited,
and widows must wait at least 3 years to remarry. To register their children’s birth, parents
are charged fees that have significantly increased over the last year. In several areas, women’s dignity is greatly offended,
as they have to declare their pregnancy to the NaSaKa[4] and sometimes show their belly. Moreover, building a new house, extending
existing dwellings and even maintenance and
repair also require authorisation, resulting in overcrowded and precarious
living conditions.
4)
Construction of “model villages”
The establishment of “model villages” to resettle
Buddhists (Rakhine and Burman) onto Muslim land has
been going on since the
1950s. Such demographic engineering is
designed to alter the ethnic composition of the region. There are already 26 such model
villages of about 100 houses each in
In addition to these policies of exclusion specifically targeting the
Rohingya, economic policies are being pursued to maintain
underdevelopment. These are also
practised in other ethnic areas, but considering that 60% of the Rohingya
population are landless and depend on a hand-to-mouth existence, the related loss of income greatly contributes to food
insecurity. It appears as a deliberate attempt to induce starvation and trigger
departures. The main elements are:
5)
Forced labour
As documented by the ILO in early 2003[5], forced labour is far from being eradicated in
6)
Arbitrary taxation
Arbitrary taxation and other forms of extortion are
common practices. These informal taxes
range from cattle registration fees to a multitude of ad-hoc donations to be
made to the authorities in kind or in cash[6]. An
increase in monetary contributions appears to compensate for a slight decrease
in forced labour. The tactic of
arresting people for minor offences and demanding high bribes in return for
their release is also widespread.
7) Control of the economy through a monopoly
system
Business monopolies are
granted in exchange for licences obtained against high bribes. All economic sectors are controlled through a
monopoly system based on licences, which totally forbids any free-enterprise
initiative. Anyone engaging in an
economic activity must either sell his product to the licence holder below
market price or pay him a tax. As soon
as a new income-generating endeavour appears, a new monopoly is installed. The authorities grant or revoke licences
annually and always guarantee the monopoly to the highest bid.
8)
Paddy procurement
The paddy tax is based on a pre-set quota of
baskets per acre rather than on yield and is sold directly to the government at
a price well below the market rate. It
can represent up to 50% of small farmers’ paddy production. In April 2003, the SPDC announced the
scrapping of its paddy procurement policy.
Starting from the next harvest in late 2003, farmers would be allowed to
sell their products through local rice trading committees. Many observers are sceptical about this
reform and believe that a new monopoly system will soon be put in place.
The distressing realities in which the Rohingyas
live in Arakan are the outcome of the policies listed above, and demonstrate
that there is no willingness on the part of the Burmese government to integrate
this population. As long as these
policies remain in place, attempts to develop these communities are bound to
fail, and the cycle of exodus will not be stemmed.
In 1994, after considerable
international pressure to repatriate the 250,000 Rohingya refugees who fled to
UNHCR’s intervention to address the Rohingyas’
status of statelessness prompted the government to issue them with a temporary
registration card (white card), which clearly states that it does not
constitute evidence of citizenship. To
date, only a third of the Muslim population has been issued with this card,
which does not grant any legal status, merely residency already acknowledged
through the system of family lists. This
initiative does not change the nature of the citizenship problems.
UNHCR and WFP have managed
to significantly reduce the amount of compulsory labour by taking over
responsibility for building local road infrastructure, but the practice is
still widespread when it comes to activities for the direct benefit of the
military.
Moreover, UNHCR’s protection mandate has been seriously hindered by
restrictions of movement, making access to UNHCR problematic for the Rohingyas.
Efforts
have been directed at improving educational and health services by
rehabilitating government-run schools and health centres, and providing
training to teachers and health workers.
However, obstacles were encountered, as Rohingyas
cannot apply for any government posts.
The majority of staff are thus Rakhine, who
are generally not attracted to serve in isolated, rural areas dominated by Rohingyas. Some of
the newly built facilities therefore remain unused[7].
NGOs have been attempting
to tackle the food security situation of the poorer strata of this population
by implementing income-generation projects and other development
activities. However, food security
continues to deteriorate steadily. Over
the last year, increased pressures through arbitrary taxation, tighter control
of the local economy as the licence system extends to new commodities and
activities, as well as restricted access to forest resources, have led to a
crisis, which can only be stopped if direct food assistance is immediately
delivered to the most vulnerable segment of the population, estimated at one
third of the total population of Northern Arakan State.
Despite these
shortcomings, the presence of international NGOs and UN agencies has been
crucial in providing some degree of protection to the Rohingya, and somewhat
alleviates their conditions. UNHCR’s presence is vital since it is the only international
agency with a protection mandate.
Without the programmes of UN agencies and international NGOs, it is
likely that a new exodus of refugees could no longer be contained.
The
In July 2003, high-level
officials from UNHCR headquarters in
Repatriating refugees when
the conditions at home have not improved and when a return in safety and
dignity cannot be achieved raise many questions. The probability that they may soon come back
to
CONCLUSION
The root causes
of the humanitarian crisis in
The solution to the Rohingyas’ problems requires that new policies be put in
place to eradicate their statelessness and respect their fundamental human
rights. Political will is required to
end these policies of exclusion and discrimination and to improve the lot of
the Rohingya people for, as long as they are considered illegal immigrants from
While it is unlikely that
one could expect any positive move from the military junta, there is also no
guarantee that discriminatory policies would be removed with the emergence of a
democratic government. The Rakhine
Buddhist population, public opinion in
The intransigence of all
protagonists makes it extremely difficult to find a solution, and in the
meantime, providing assistance and protection to the Rohingya population is
both a moral and a legal obligation of the international community.
++++++
[1] Martin Smith, The Muslim “Rohingyas” of
[2] Martin
Smith,
[3] In response to UNHCR,
Secretary-1 wrote in 1998, "this issue is essentially one of migration,
of people seeking greener pastures ... these people are not originally from
Myanmar ... they are racially, ethnically, culturally different from the other
national races in our country. Their language as well as religion is also
different”.
[4] The NaSaKa is the Border Administration Force and comprises five different
government agencies: the police, military intelligence (MI), Lone Htein (riot police), customs, and immigration.
[5] In relation to
ILO Liaison Officer’s visit to Northern Arakan State in January 2003, the ILO
Governing Body report GB.286/6 of March 2003 stated in paragraph 7: “While
it is her impression that there is probably less use of forced labour in
central parts of Myanmar, the situation in areas near to the Thai border where
there is continuing insecurity and a heavy presence of the army, as well as in
northern Rakhine State, is particularly serious and appears to have changed
little.”
[6] UNHCR,
[7] Lisbeth
Garly Andersen, “Analysis of the livelihood situation
of the Muslim population in
[8] Concern only
handed over their medical and nutritional programmes. They are still providing education,
sanitation and social counselling in the camps.