CAVEATS,
CAUTIONS AND STRINGENT CONDITIONS
(On the
suggestion that NGOs should go into
6th Floor, 777, UN Plaza,
Tel (+1-212) 338 0048; Fax 692 9748
Email [email protected]
AUTHOR'S FOREWORD
This
memo was written in 1994, and slightly updated following Aung San Suu Kyi's
release from house arrest in 1995. I may eventually get round to a revision, to
incorporate such factors as the slightly better prospects in 2002 of being able
to consult with the National League for Democracy (not even a remote
possibility at the time of original writing) but in the meantime, here is the
original, so far as I have been able to reconstruct it. I have, however,
removed the list of contacts from the end, since most are out of date,
reformatted it for html and put in a couple of online references – in square
brackets. It is thus a more or less historical document which may, seven or
eight years on, help demonstrate once more that in Burma, as elsewhere, plus ca change...
David
Arnott
October
2002
UPDATE
SINCE
THIS TEXT WAS WRITTEN, DAW AUNG SAN SUU KYI HAS BEEN RELEASED. POTENTIALLY THIS
IS AN IMPORTANT STEP TOWARDS THE RESTORATION OF REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT IN
BURMA. SO FAR, HOWEVER, NO FURTHER POLITICAL MOVEMENT HAS OCCURRED, AND HUMAN
RIGHTS MONITORS SPEAK OF A WORSENING IN THE HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION.
ANOTHER
FACTOR IS THAT SLORC DOES NOT APPROVE OF CROSS-BORDER ASSISTANCE, AND HAS
WRITTEN A PROHIBITION ON CONTACT WITH FOREIGN ORGANISATIONS (INCLUDING,
PRESUMABLY, HUMANITARIAN ORGANISATIONS) INTO ITS CEASE-FIRE TERMS WITH AT LEAST
ONE ETHNIC GROUP. TWO PROPOSALS WHICH THE BURMESE MINISTRY OF HEALTH HAD AGREED
WITH MEDECINS SANS FRONTIERES (FRANCE), WERE REJECTED
AT THE POLITICAL LEVEL. MSF WORKS ON THE THAI/BURMESE AND BANGLADESH/BURMESE
BORDERS WITH VARIOUS ETHNIC GROUPS, AND IS OUTSPOKEN ON HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES.
IF
AND WHEN THE POLITICAL PROCESS MOVES FORWARD, AND/OR THE SITUATION FOR THE
ETHNIC GROUPS AND THE REST OF THE POPULATION APPEARS TO BE IMPROVING,
"CAVEATS" WILL BE REVISED. AT PRESENT, HOWEVER, ALL THE RECOMMENDED
CAVEATS, CAUTIONS AND CONDITIONS STILL APPLY.
DAVID
ARNOTT
PREFACE
Since
1992 the State Law and Order Restoration
Council (SLORC), the martial law administration acting as the de facto government of Burma, has
expressed interest in having international non-governmental organizations
(NGOs) undertake relief and development projects in the country. This study
summarizes some of the issues involved for the international community in
general, and NGOs in particular. It concludes that on balance, NGO involvement
at this time would not be in the long-term interests of the Burmese people; but
for those organizations which decide to go in, it lists a number of conditions
which, if followed, would help limit the damage. The critique of NGO
involvement and the need for stringent conditions applies even more of course
to bilateral and multilateral loans, aid or development assistance. The memo is
offered as a working document within the current debate on NGO involvement in
THE MILITARY BACKGROUND
("Politics is war carried out by other
means")
A
basic standpoint of this paper is that SLORC logic remains essentially
military, with all policy decisions subordinated to questions of control over
the people and survival of the ruling group, and that the invitations to NGOs
must be seen in this light. This applies to the whole of
Concerning
the non-Burman groups, the Burma Peace Foundation's May 1993 article, "The
Hunting of the SLORC" [http://www.ibiblio.org/obl/docs/hunting_of_the_slorc.htm ] describes SLORC's "four cuts" civil
war strategy of Low Intensity Conflict, the main aim of which is to occupy
territory and control the civilians in the non-Burman areas.
Since
late 1993 this strategy has been assisted by Thai pressure on the ethnic groups
which live along the Thai/Burmese border to
make cease-fire agreements with SLORC. However, without a minimal
carrot to complement the military stick, agreements are unstable, and SLORC
does not yet have enough troops to occupy the whole of the non-Burman areas.
Carrots must therefore be offered, at least provisionally, and NGOs are the
readiest source of this vegetable.
If
we could guarantee that SLORC's final plan for the non-Burman peoples were
benign, NGO participation could well be supported. The problem is that SLORC's
past record is decidedly sinister, and we are not privy to its long-term
intentions. The present analysis assumes
that one of its goals is that ultimately its opponents should surrender their
arms, leading to the military occupation of all the territory of the non-Burman
groups. Several scenarios come to mind:
1)
Politics but no arms: the non-Burman peoples preserve their identity and still
participate in national politics. Local autonomy and participation in future
national elections is the picture presented by Xuwicha
Hiranyapruek, the Thai businessman who as advisor to
the Thai National Security Council and intimate of SLORC shuttled between
the various parties, arranging deals. However, a SLORC spokesman has said that
a condition for taking part in national politics is that the minority
organizations should disarm.
2)
Arms but no politics: the non-Burman ethnic nationalities preserve their
identity and weapons but refrain from participating in national politics. A policy of separate development.
3)
Assimilation: the non-Burman groups merge their cultural and political identity
into a greater Burmese identity. This scenario is supported by reports of the
continuation of the policy of cultural and genetic burmanization
(minority languages are discouraged; it is reported that soldiers are
encouraged to marry girls from the ethnic group which predominates in any given
non-Burman area).
4)
Selective military occupation: important areas (towns, rich agricultural land,
development projects of various kinds, actual or potential mines,
hydro-electric and other energy projects, strategic areas for defence or communications
etc) are occupied by the military and their families and subjected to further burmanization, while the non-Burman populations are driven
onto marginal land and called on to provide unpaid labour, brides, and recruits
for the army. The "Liberated Areas" are penetrated by various kinds
of military enclaves centered around development
projects and other locations of strategic, economic or communications
significance, for which localized "cease-fires" are negotiated. Such
enclaves, needless to say, also act as fortresses for military and settlement
purposes, and when linked up, can act to partition and control the general
area.
5)
Total military occupation: total military occupation of all the minority areas
would be a simple development of scenario 4 (Mao's Go strategy). SLORC troops
might not mass on the Thai border, but there would be little to prevent them if
it suited their purpose. One would certainly expect a very large number of
refugees to seek asylum in
Some
of these scenarios could occur simultaneously and/or sequentially. For example,
2 and 3 could apply respectively to the ethnic heartlands and the mixed areas,
and then lead into scenarios 4 and 5.
NGOs considering
SHOULD NGOS GO INTO
Political assumptions
underlying attitudes towards NGO activities in Burma
Among
those genuinely concerned for the well-being of the Burmese people, differing
assessments on whether or not NGOs should go into the country seem to rest
partly on political judgements concerning the state
of the democracy movement and whether SLORC has turned over a new leaf or not.
Those who think the Burmese democracy movement has a chance of succeeding
and/or who see no change in SLORC tend to oppose NGO involvement, or insist on
very stringent conditions. Those on the other hand who consider that SLORC is
in an unassailable position and/or that the junta has reformed with time and
international pressure tend to support NGO involvement on the grounds that the
humanitarian gains far outweigh any political loss.
Regardless
of one's view on the political future of
ARGUMENTS HOLDING THAT SLORC IS IN A
VULNERABLE POSITION AND THAT ANY MOVES WHICH COULD STRENGTHEN IT SHOULD
THEREFORE BE AVOIDED:
*
Daw Aung San Suu Kyi has been released and is busy re-establishing contact with
her party in preparation for a dialogue with the military, a process which may
involve a period of power-sharing.
*
In spite of the fact that the delegates and the agenda of the National
Convention were chosen by SLORC, there has been a high degree of resistance to
many of SLORC's central proposals, particularly the stipulation that the
military should retain its political dominance.
*
The Burmese army is deeply split and is held together by the continued presence
on earth of General Ne Win, 85 years old and in poor health. There is a good
chance that his death will break the log-jam and open up the political
situation.
*
Despite the increased number of cease-fires and the military reverses of the
Karen, support from the non-Burman nationalities for a federal democracy is stronger
than ever. Armed resistance continues on
*
The cease-fires are extremely fragile, as we see from the renewal of fighting
between SLORC and the Karenni.
*
SLORC is extremely anxious about new uprisings; for instance in early 1994 (?)
there was an incident in
*
SLORC's attempt to create a mass movement, the Union Solidarity and Development
Association, which would eventually become a political party to contest future
elections, is being done in a very heavy-handed manner, with people punished
for non-attendance at the rallies. Popular enthusiasm for this enterprise is
understandably less than total.
*
The country's economy is in an appalling and highly unstable condition:
Most wealth is concentrated in the towns, while
rural
Inflation is increasing, due largely to the
irresponsible printing of money by SLORC; the value of the Kyat, already 20
times less than the official rate, continues to plunge. A civil servant's
salary is no longer enough even to buy enough plain rice for two people (rice
prices have more than quadrupled in real terms since 1988).
An increasing number of refugees, including many
from the Burmese heartland, claim the impossibility of earning a living as
their reason for leaving the country.
*
The Wa, with whom SLORC made a peace agreement in 1989
are extremely upset that their proposals for a separate Wa state within the
Union of Burma were ignored at the National Convention. This group, fielding
about 30,000 troops, has recently formed a political alliance with the Kokang, Palaung and other
"cease-fire" groups. The alliance, the Peace and Democracy Front, is
calling, among other things, for respect of the 1990 elections and the release of
Aung San Suu Kyi and other political detainees.
*
The Burmese people are still committed to the person and policies of Aung San
Suu Kyi and the National League for Democracy (NLD).
*
During the years of Aung San Suu Kyi's detention, the NLD has maintained a
strong underground network.
* A
number of pro-democracy groups have studied the lessons of 1988 and are
currently training underground in political theory and political defiance and
preparing themselves for the next phase of the political struggle.
*
International pressure for the restoration of democracy is still strong. The UN
Commission on Human Rights has adopted resolutions on
*
SLORC's attack on the Karen from the end of 1994 angered the international
community, and has lost SLORC most of the public relations gains it had made
over the past two years.
ARGUMENTS HOLDING THAT SLORC IS UNASSAILABLE FROM A POLITICAL AND MILITARY
STANDPOINT, THAT THE ETHNIC AND POLITICAL OPPOSITION HAS BEEN DEFEATED, THAT
THERE IS LITTLE LEFT TO LOSE, AND THAT THEREFORE IT IS BEST TO SAVE WHAT CAN BE
SAVED; LIVES FOR INSTANCE:
* The NLD has been decimated and
demoralized.
*
SLORC will push the National Convention into endorsing the constitution it has
prepared, which will guarantee the continued dominance of the military; new
elections will be held, and SLORC will this time ensure the victory of the
party it backs.
*
Gen. Khin Nyunt is strong enough to retain power after Gen. Ne Win's death.
*
The Mon have signed a cease-fire and the Karen are
currently talking to SLORC.
*
The alliances between the ethnic and political opposition have been seriously
weakened by the loss of the Karen bases and the cease-fire signed by the Mon.
*
*
*
The other ASEAN countries are supporting SLORC internationally.
*
Although they criticize SLORC's human rights record, Western countries do not
discourage their private sector from doing business in
*
Competition for trade and resources, as well as political and strategic
influence, is driving
*
Transnational corporations are developing
*
The Karen suffered serious military setbacks in the recent offensive.
CONDITIONS FOR NGO
INVOLVEMENT
The
present study concludes that the political struggle for change in Burma is
still alive domestically and internationally, and that NGO activity in the
country at this time may impede this process, or further SLORC's long-term
civil war plans.
If,
however, there are NGOs which are not convinced of these dangers and are
seriously considering projects in Burma, adherence to the following conditions
or ground rules may help limit the political and economic damage. This would
apply particularly if these ground rules were used to define the terms of NGO
involvement during the preliminary negotiations with SLORC.
All
NGOs considering
NGO
representatives should be aware that they have a strong bargaining position
since SLORC wants them in
NB
Although these ground-rules were designed with NGOs in mind, many of them are
equally applicable to multilateral agencies delivering humanitarian assistance.
Indeed, in some cases the ground-rules may be more relevant to UN agencies than
NGOs.
BEFORE MAKING MAJOR COMMITMENTS TO A
1.
Engage in ongoing consultations with:
*
The
*
The elected representatives in exile
*
Authentic representatives of the different ethnic groups
*
* A
wide range of human rights NGOs, and
*
NGOs with
At
such meetings, NGOs could discuss conditionalities
and assess the long-term implications of relief and development programs. The
Burma meetings/round tables held regularly in Bangkok, New York, Boston, San
Francisco, Washington DC and London, which bring together a variety of Burma
expert groups, also provide a useful context for this kind of consultation.
2.
Discreetly support the human rights and
3.
Ask these groups and other observers, including reliable NGOs which do not have
4.
Never be in a hurry to enter
5.
Give serious prior attention to the circumstances which would lead them to
cease operations in
6.
Do their own survey work and not just accept the statistics of SLORC or UN
Agencies. On the basis of this research, groups can identify problems and
appropriate programs. [how possible is this, beyond a
basic needs assessment/health survey?
How safe would it be for local people to participate in such research?]
7.
Be aware that people in Burma are so used to SLORC's development aid projects
being obviously military or stage-managed, that they may well view NGO activity
with suspicion and even hostility.
8. Be aware of the Burmese military's decimation or domination
of most aspects of civil society in
9. Be aware that where local organizations do exist (eg Church or monastic organizations), the ability of
foreign NGOs to negotiate with SLORC more firmly than is possible for their
local partners may reduce the authority of the local groups (while advancing
projects the latter may have initiated).
10.
Hold firmly to the principle of cross-border assistance from neighbouring
countries where logistically possible as an alternative to assistance via
11.
Build such conditions as listed in this memo into the Memorandum of
Understanding negotiated with SLORC. In particular the capacity of flexibility
(to scale up or down, to effect programme changes etc) should be guaranteed.
PRELIMINARY STEPS
12.
Make an effort to hire expatriates who speak Burmese -- this makes an enormous
difference to their ability to control or even understand what is going on.
13.
Set up small-scale pilot projects prior to larger programs, in order to test working
conditions, but be aware that SLORC is operating on a time-frame of several
years. Go step by step, with a short planning horizon, perhaps on the basis of
6-monthly programs, thus allowing continuous evaluation. It must be made clear
to SLORC that NGOs are genuinely prepared to withdraw if the negotiated
conditions are not respected after the project has begun.
14.
Work independently of UN agencies in the early stages in order to ensure more
local involvement. The most valuable place for NGOs is at the local level,
filling needs they identify through their own assessment missions and data
collection. Cooperation with UN Agencies is valuable when programmes
are running.
BASIC PROGRAMME CONDITIONS
(suggested
by Burmese, and westerners who have worked in
15.
No investment should be made in infrastructure (roads/rail) because of the way
this is used to mobilize the military.
16.
Priority in NGO programs should be given to those in greatest need, ie the forced relocatees and the
internally displaced people. They should be given assistance to return to their
original homes if they so wish, and longer-term
development assistance provided to enable them to resettle there. Both of these
groups are located principally in the non-Burman areas. Representatives of
these ethnic groups should therefore be involved at every stage of the
programs. [How likely is it that NGOs will be allowed
to help those forcibly relocated return to their homes in SLORC-controlled or
"brown" areas?]
17.
Humanitarian aid delivered via
18. Where not covered by point 17, assistance
programs should be balanced between urban and rural projects.
19.
The area of any program should be clearly defined and NGOs involved should then
have complete freedom of movement in this area without SLORC escorts of any
kind. The statements of people presented to the NGO as "village
leaders" by SLORC officials should never be taken seriously.
20.
NGOs should work with the lowest possible level of administration rather than
through any central government authority in
21.
Every effort should be made to strengthen local support structures and local NGOs
independent of SLORC control.
22.
International NGOs should press for the respect of the Right of Association,
permitting the free formation and independent functioning of local NGOs. Where
possible and appropriate, the international NGOs should insist on the formation
of independent local NGOs as a condition for entering the country.
23.
NGOs must be given full freedom to choose their local partners. Once cease-fire
agreements are in place, local NGOs which have close links with the minority
organizations should be fully accepted as potential partner organizations.
24.
Local presence and access is vital. NGOs should ensure that continual project
monitoring (process, impact and evaluation) is conducted personally by the
expatriate staff of the NGO. SLORC should be informed that in the event that
proper access is restricted or the NGO is prevented from monitoring its
project(s) for any reason whatsoever, all inputs to that project will be
stopped immediately. In the case of projects with lasting effect, such as
schools or hospitals, monitoring should continue regularly after completion, to
ensure freedom from military intervention and proper use of the materials and
facilities. In the case of food, medicines or other relief aid, NGO
representatives should be present for its distribution. If this is not possible
(as with medicines left with the doctors at a hospital), NGO representatives
should return regularly to inspect records of how the materials were
distributed and ensure that they are not confiscated by the military when the
NGO is not present.
STAFF AND MATERIALS
25.
Only people with experience of working in politically difficult situations
should be sent. In working with SLORC, be transparent and flexible -- do
unexpected things in order to retain freedom of manoeuvre.
26.
Expatriate staff, preferably Burmese-speaking, should be in all positions of
significant authority. NGOs must have full freedom to hire employees of their
choice. Even so, they should remain aware that there will
always be informers, and that their employees may be subject to pressure and
threats from SLORC Military Intelligence to act as informers and collaborators.
27.
No locally-hired staff should be present when NGOs are talking to local people
(they might be informers, or be under subsequent SLORC pressure to inform. Even
if they are not, local people may be afraid that they are, and may not speak
frankly). If at all possible, neither these employees nor any SLORC officials
should even see which local people are spoken to. NGOs should bring their own
interpreters from outside
28.
In any project involving construction or any kind of labor, workers should be
hired and managed by NGO representatives rather than representatives of SLORC.
Otherwise, experience shows, villagers will be forced to provide slave labor,
building materials, and money, while SLORC officers pocket the money budgeted
for wages, and sell any building materials provided by the NGO. NGOs should
choose their own suppliers for any materials they have to purchase.
29.
All accounts relating to the hire of labor, purchase
of materials etc should be closely overseen by the NGO staff.
30.
In projects requiring the use of land for agriculture or buildings, NGO
representatives should freely consult beforehand with as many local people as
possible in the absence of SLORC officials and locally hired staff, to find out
their views of the project and full details of who owns the land to be used.
Payment or compensation for such land must be handled personally by NGO
representatives in order to prevent SLORC confiscation of land without
compensation.
MONETARY FACTORS
31.
No aid, except where strictly necessary, should enter the country in monetary
form. Special exchange rates should be
negotiated for that aid which has to be brought in monetary form. (Because of
the discrepancy between the official and black market exchange rates and
SLORC's enthusiastic use of its money printing presses, SLORC
benefits directly from all foreign currency entering
32.
NGOs should consult Burma-based UN officials and NGOs on the ways and means to
get round the exchange difficulties.
REDUCING LEGITIMATION OF SLORC
33.
NGOs should make every effort to avoid participating in official ceremonies or
being photographed with SLORC officials (see one or two issues of "The New
Light of Myanmar" to get the point).
34.
The military should not be allowed to distribute aid provided by NGOs.
CONCLUSIONS
SLORC's
shift into longer-term planning has not changed its basic military logic. The
military no doubt hopes that NGO involvement in
RECOMMENDATIONS
NGOs
should not go into
N.B. This document is a collective production incorporating feedback
from 30 or 40 people including Burmese ethnic leaders, NGO workers, Burmese
democracy figures, UN consultants,
ANNEXES
Not
enclosed in the Internet version)
1)
The Hunting of the SLORC -- an analysis of SLORC's Low-Intensity Conflict
strategy [http://www.ibiblio.org/obl/docs/hunting_of_the_slorc.htm
]
2)
"
3)
Australian response to the ICVA report "
4)
The Involvement of United Nations Agencies in
5)
Comments on the possible resumption of foreign NGO aid to the SLORC -- Saw Ba Thin
6.
The Thai-Burmese Border: The Need for Humanitarian Assistance by Jack Dunford (This and Annex 7 are papers delivered at the
conference "Burma The Silent Emergency", Sydney, 28 May 93, which
looked at the prospect of NGO involvement in
Burma)
7.
8.
NGOs in
9.
Will forever flow the Ayeyarwady? Khin Maung Kyi (a critical analysis of the
Burmese economy)
.................................................................................................................................