Camilla Buzzi
Table of Contents
Acknowledgements
I.
The foundation of modern
II.
III. Government response in an era of
parliamentary democracy, 1948-1962
IV. The era of socialist rule, 1962-1988
I. The armed forces
II. The pro-democracy movement
III. The ethnic movement
I. Differing concepts of democracy
II. Alternative transition processes
III. The difficult issues
I. Economic and social deterioration
II. A divided international community
H. BIBLIOGRAPHY AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER
I. WEB SOURCES
J. ENDNOTES
THANK YOU!
I would like to thank Kjersti Tromsdal and Trine Johansen at PD-Burma, Kjersti for initiating the project, and Trine for patiently seeing it through, in spite of the many delays that have been occurred over the past two years.
I owe a
great debt to many friends, both Burmese and non-Burmese, for patiently
initiating me to
The responsibility for the content of this paper is, of course, entirely my own.
Camilla Buzzi
A. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
In
1988,
Is the
democratisation of
This paper provides an
overview of the main players on the Burmese political stage and presents the
key issues that have divided
The
current difficulties in
·
The Burmese armed forces, known as the Tatmadaw:
The
paper examines the structure and value system of the Tatmadaw as well as the
military’s role as a social and political actor in
·
The pro-democracy movement within and outside of
Emphasis
is given to political parties within
Outside
of
·
The ethnic movement:
The
paper introduces the situation of the ethnic political parties within
The issues that are discussed include the following:
· An analysis of the concept of democracy seen from the perspective of the military, the pro-democracy movement and the ethnic forces.
· An overview of the transition process and alternative strategies for a transition.
· A presentation of difficult questions facing the parties, including the 1990 election, the question of impunity for the military and the ethnic issue.
· A discussion of confidence-building measures and the issue of a dialogue.
The
political conflict in
-----------------------------------------------
B. INTRODUCTION: A country in
transition?
Since
1988,
The
mass uprising in
Is the
democratisation of
As
Within
The
military appears to be in increasing control. During the 1990s, the regime has
managed through military conquest and cease-fire agreements to assume control
over vast tracts of territory that formerly were in the hands of armed
opposition groups. The Burmese armed forces are now present in border areas
towards Thailand, China and India, where they never before had access, and on
the surface, peace has been restored to an unprecedented degree. Within the
country, there are few signs of open dissent. A call for massive mobilisation
against the regime on
Outside
of
In the
international community, the situation in
In the
meantime, the people of
In January 2001, news broke
out that the SPDC and Aung San Suu Kyi have been holding secret talks since
October 2000. The EU, which sent a troika to
This paper provides an overview of the main players on
the Burmese political stage and presents the key issues that have divided
C. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: The lead-up to 1988
Many of
I. The foundation of modern Burma
Modern Burma[3]
is a construction, resulting from rivalries between the French and British
colonial powers for control over Southeast Asia during the 19th
century, and a gradual British conquest of the territories that have become
today’s Burma. While the British presence in
British rule institutionalised a separation
between the central plains where the majority of the population is Burman, and
the mountainous border areas inhabited by different ethnic groups. Burma Proper
was brought under the direct administration of a British governor, and the
monarchy was dissolved. The Frontier Areas, which comprise almost half of the
total land area of
The imposition of a Western concept of the
state and the import of new political ideas, such as those of democratic
governance and the nation-state, had lasting effects on
The war left a sore legacy. Many members of
the ethnic minority groups had fought with the Allies since the beginning of
the war. As the BIA progressed towards
1.
The Panglong Agreement:
The Panglong Agreement laid the foundation for future co-operation between Burma Proper and the Frontier Areas. It guaranteed full democratic rights for the citizens of the Frontier Areas as well as “full autonomy in internal administration for the Frontier Areas”. However, the agreement suffered from a number of weaknesses. It was a declaration of intent and needed to be clarified and developed into political measures. In addition, the agreement was reached between Aung San and representatives of the Kachin, Chin and Shan people. It did not include a number of other ethnic groups, such as the Karen, the Karenni, the Mon and the Arakanese, with a history of conflict with the Burman majority. Neither did it include representatives of other minority people from the Frontier Areas, such as the Pa-O. The Panglong agreement turned out to depend on a personal understanding between Aung San and the ethnic leaders that was given a devastating blow with Aung San’s death.
The Panglong Agreement continues to be valid for today’s pro-democracy and ethnic movement, and the “Spirit of Panglong” remains a goal to be achieved.
2.
The 1947 Constitution
In addition to the Panglong agreement, the
1947 constitution laid out a blueprint for how
The new state was partly federal, although
the term “federalism” is not mentioned in the constitution, and the new system
mixed federal and unitary elements. While the
In 1952, a
The new system of government was parliamentarian. Executive power was vested in a president, who was indirectly elected by the parliament, but his powers were limited. Legislative power belonged to a parliament called the Pyitthu Hluttaw, divided into a lower chamber of deputies and an upper chamber of nationalities. In the chamber of deputies, the representatives were elected by universal suffrage, and their number was about twice the size of the upper chamber. The chamber of deputies would elect the government, which was only answerable to this chamber.
Some of the ethnic minority groups were given special representation in the chamber of nationalities, where half of the seats were reserved for representatives from the ethnic member states and the Chin Special Division, while the other half went to representatives from territories ruled by the central government. Not all the ethnic representatives were elected by their constituencies. Traditional ethnic leaders such as the Shan and Karenni Saophas[4] were guaranteed seats in the chamber of nationalities. Apart from the Karen, who had reserved seats in the lower chamber until 1952, there were no guarantees for the representation of ethnic minority people living in former Burma Proper.
The constitution did not provide any details for the administration of the states. A head of state, a state council and a cabinet of state ministers were created for each state, but there was no separate election for positions concerning the states, Representatives elected to the Pyitthu Hluttaw from each state would make up the state council, while the Prime Minister of the union would appoint the head of state among them. The head of a member state was also minister in the union government.
The constitution contained a bill of rights that secured rule of law as well as basic political and civic rights. It did not actively promote cultural rights for ethnic minorities, but protected religious and linguistic minorities from discrimination in access to state education. Freedom of religion was also guaranteed.
The electoral law followed a system of
plurality voting in single-member constituencies, similar to the British
first-past-the-post system. This is a system that favours clear-cut majorities
rather than broad representation of diverging interests.
In addition to the need for interethnic accommodation, the constitution reflected tensions between liberal and socialist principles, and guaranteed a number of economic and political rights for all citizens. The state was given an important role in securing public welfare. Coupled with attempts to create a welfare state during the 1950s, this meant that a number of public welfare tasks were guaranteed by the constitution and the union legislation. As a result, the autonomy of each member state was further curtailed.
Strong and independent courts developed
during the first decade after
II. Burma at
Since 1948, the state has been challenge by
opposition forces of various natures. In
1. The Communist insurrection
The state has been challenged by forces from the political Left since the days of the struggle for independence. The most important have been a number of Communist groups, including the Communist Party of Burma (CPB), the People Volunteer Organisation (PVO), a war veterans group founded by Aung San, and mutineers from the armed forces. The Socialist Party, on the other hand, was a member organisation of the AFPFL throughout this period.
The CPB was a member organisation in the
AFPFL until 1946, when the two split as a result of strategic disagreements
over how to conduct the struggle for independence. The CPB continued as a legal
opposition party for another year, but boycotted the election for the
Constituent Assembly in 1947. In March 1948, the CPB went underground and took
up armed struggle. The communist rebellion spread very quickly, and reached its
height during the first half of the 1950s, when armed communist troops, joined
by PVO and army mutineers, operated in an area that stretched across
Membership in the CPB underwent important changes during this period. In 1939, the CPB was founded by a group of young Burmese intellectuals and students with connections to the mainstream independence movement, including Aung San. Internal disagreements led several of these young nationalists to split from the party, and form separate organisations, but overall, the first generation of CPB leaders continued to play a leading role in the party until 1966, when a purge of the CPB leadership was carried out. As the CPB was pushed towards the Burma-China border, members of the ethnic minority groups in these areas were to an increasing degree recruited for the CBP army. Gradually, the CPB developed into an organisation led by a few cadres, who were mostly Burman, while the majority of the rank and file belonged to different ethnic minority peoples. Conflicts between these groups finally led to the collapse of the CPB in 1989.
2.
The ethnic insurrections
In addition to the Communist insurrection,
conflicts between the government in
Three large waves of ethnic insurrection have broken out since independence. First, the Karen, Mon and Arakanese launched their armed resistance in 1948-1949. Shan and Kachin armed groups were formed at the end of the 1950s and the beginning of 1960s. Finally, the Chin armed rebellion was given a boost after 1988.
The Karen rebellion erupted less than a
year after the CPB went underground, but tensions had been running high between
the Burman and Karen communities since before World War II. The battle of
Insein, a suburb of
The Shan and the Kachin initiated the next
wave of insurrection. In
In
Ethnic insurgencies have not been directed
only against perceived Burman domination of the state. For instance, resistance
among Pa-O people in
In addition to interethnic co-operation,
there has been some collaboration between the CPB and the Arakanese in
By the time of the pro-democracy uprising
in 1988, more than 20 insurgent groups, including the KNU and the CPB were
still active. Together, they controlled vast rural areas.
III. Government response in an era of parliamentary
democracy, 1948-1962
The armed insurrection reached its height
in 1948-51, when the rebels controlled up to two-thirds of the territory, while
the government was barely in charge of the capital and its surrounding areas.
During the first decade of
The central government relied on a number of different strategies to face the situation, including military pressure, direct negotiations and attempts to create a general environment that would undercut support for the armed groups.
There were several challenges to a lasting political settlement during the first decade of independence. The institutions of the new state were modelled on the British system, and not always adapted to a Burmese context. It took until 1951, before peace had been restored to such an extent that elections could be organised. The first election took place in three stages so that the troops providing security for the voters and the candidates could be moved around in the country. In the first election, the AFPFL gained a landslide victory, and assumed control of a government headed by U Nu. However, electoral participation was low, and the electoral system contributed to discrepancies between the number of votes and the number of seats for several political parties that contested in the election.
Although the situation improved ahead of the next election in 1956, the 1960 election was the first really free and fair, and the first election where all the seats could be contested. Both in 1956 and 1960, the number of voters who participated in the election increased. The AFPFL maintained its leading position until 1958, when the league split into two rival factions. Both factions stood for elections in 1960.
Public administration was also deficient.
At the central level, the new political leadership lacked skills and training,
and controversies often erupted between politicians and bureaucrats. The
government lacked local influence, and in many areas, it depended on
influential local leaders. Although U Nu repeatedly insisted on the need to
develop
In 1952, the government embarked on an
ambitious plan to build up a welfare state in order to improve the living
conditions of the population, promote the socialist principles enshrined in the
constitution and undercut a potential source of public discontent. However, the
necessary resources to carry out these plans were lacking. The battles of World
War II had led to the destruction and dislocation of the country’s economic resources.
The civil war further inhibited the restoration of the economy, and increased
state expenditures dramatically. Due to
An important reason why attempts to manage
interethnic conflicts did not succeed was the increased Burmanisation of the
state that took place at several levels. At the institutional level, the
constitution subordinated ethnic states to the union government in
In state administration, discrimination was
a problem. The case of the armed forces is an example. Under British colonial
rule, the armed forces had been dominated by ethnic minority people such as the
Chin, the Kachin and the Karen, and organised into ethnically segregated
military units. The British had based their rule on the concept of a plural
society, i.e. that the “races mix but never combine”, and instituted an ethnic
division of labour. Initially, the new
Assimilationist tendencies in language, education and religion policies further served to promote Burman culture and values. The 1947 constitution made Burmese the sole official language, but English could also be used. Other indigenous languages were not mentioned. However, Burmese gradually became the dominant language in the education system, while many secondary schools and all the universities were located in Burman areas. In practice, it became necessary to speak Burmese in order to get higher education or seek employment.
Furthermore, the government made use of Buddhism to diffuse tensions.
Missionary work was conducted in the Karen hills to promote Buddhism in an
animist population, and a campaign to protect Buddhism against the threat of
the Communist insurrection was launched. U Nu’s suggestion during the run-up to
the election in 1960 that Buddhism became state religion secured him support in
the Buddhist electorate, but antagonised religious minorities such as the
Christian Kachin. To ease the situation, an amendment was added to the
constitution to secure freedom of religion. However, this amendment met with
resistance from the Buddhist clergy.
Expectations towards the state were built up that could not be met. Popular disaffection and loss of confidence in the government’s ability to solve problems developed. The influence of the military also grew as a result of the difficulties faced by the civilian government. Between 1958 and 1960, the military led by Gen. Ne Win held power legally in a temporary caretaker government.
Generally, the military has opposed attempts to seek an accommodation with the armed opposition groups, and the civil war has served as an important justification for the military to play a leading role in politics. As the Army developed into an influential political actor, it was increasingly able to put its stamp on the decision-making process. During the period of the caretaker government, an amnesty offer by the civilian government to reduce armed opposition was cancelled, while the number of arrests of dissidents increased. The hereditary status of the Shan Saophas was also retracted.
When a civilian government headed by U Nu
returned to power in 1960, preparations were made to resume negotiations with
the Shan and other ethnic groups over demands for a federal state. However,
further attempts to seek a solution were thwarted by the coup d’Etat in March
1962 at the same time as many Shan leaders were attending a federal seminar
with the government in
III. The era of socialist rule, 1962-1988
The military coup d’Etat abrogated the 1947 constitution and brought the Panglong agreement to an end. A military junta known as the Revolutionary Council (RC) took over power. Massive arrests followed, while the violent repression of political opponents resulted in a recruitment drive for the CPB as more people took to the jungle. The situation further deteriorated after the death in military custody of Sao Shwe Thaike. The students were also among the first social groups to protest against the military take-over, and sporadic protests took place throughout the 1970s and 1980s, until the time of the popular uprising of 1988.
The new government of Gen. Ne Win emphasised military solutions to deal with the armed opposition.
Since 1968, the Tatmadaw has operated according to a counter-insurgency strategy, known as the Four Cuts strategy whose aim is to severe all links between the insurgents, their families and local villages by cutting their access to food, funds, information and recruits. In addition, the army also practises scorched earth strategies during military campaigns.
The military government made two attempts
to reach a political solution. First, offers were made in 1963 for peace talks
that included both communist and ethnic groups, but the talks failed. Then, in
1968-1969, Ne Win invited former political leaders under the direction of U Nu
to make suggestions for the restoration of national unity. The majority of the
members of this advisory committee recommended a return to democratic civilian
rule and a federal state, but their advises were rejected. As a result, U Nu
and several of his associates took up arms and formed the People’s Patriotic
Party (PPP) along the Thai-Burma border. U Nu later returned to
The authorities also hoped to diffuse
ethnic tensions through education and development policies, but the
Burmanisation of the ethnic minority groups intensified. An Academy for the
Development of National Groups was founded in 1965. However, it was located to
Sagaing, in the Burman-dominated central heartland, and most of the staff had
connections with the military. A new Citizenship Law enacted in 1983, further
restricted citizenship rights to those who could prove that their ancestors had
lived in
In economy and politics, the Revolutionary
Council engaged in a fundamental restructuring of society, as they introduced
the “
The new regime was institutionalised in a
constitution in 1974 that turned
Many members of
The policies of the Revolutionary Council
led to a stagnation in the economy, that culminated in escalating consumer
prices and rice riots in 1967. These were particularly directed against
Between 1974 and 1984,
In March 1988, student demonstrations again
erupted in
D. THE PROTAGONISTS: Who are the key players today?
I. The armed forces
The armed forces[6],
known as the Tatmadaw in Burmese, comprise the Army, the Navy and the Air
Force. The Army is the dominating service, and was created with troops from the
former British army, from the nationalist movement and from a number of private
and semiprivate armed units after independence. In addition,
The current structure of the Tatmadaw was
established in 1951-1954 when a unified command was created under general Ne
Win in order to make field operations easier. A unified code of law for all the
three services and a system of martial courts were also established. After the
military coup in 1962, the War Office in
Since 1988, a massive programme to expand
and modernise the Tatmadaw has taken place. Recruitment has increased, an arms
procurement programme has been launched, and improvements have been made in the
structure of command, control, communication, and intelligence. The War Office
has become a seat for intelligence and security agencies. The ability to engage
in modern warfare and eliminate internal dissent has been strengthened. The
Tatmadaw has been able to initiate these reforms with support from
Political dissidents are the key targets of
the intelligence apparatus. There are several intelligence agencies, either
under the Tatmadaw or under the Ministry of Home Affairs. Lt. Gen. Khin Nyunt
has played an important role in the development of the military intelligence
services (MIS). In addition to his position in the SPDC, he controls the
Directorate of Defence Services Intelligence (DDSI) whose activities range from
military intelligence operations against insurgents to suppression of political
dissent and threats to the security of the state. They also include
surveillance within military ranks[9].
Khin Nyunt also heads the Office of Strategic Studies (OSS), which was created
at the beginning of the 1990s in order to promote security co-operation in the
Asia-Pacific region. The
Outside of
Recruitment of personnel has increased dramatically. In 1988, the Tatmadaw comprised approximately 186,000 men. By 1996, the strength of the Tatmadaw had nearly doubled. The goal is a force of 500,000 men. In the past, compulsory military service did not use to be necessary. Now, the drive to increase the number of draftees has changed the recruitment pattern. Criteria of admission have been eased, age limits have been dropped, and medical examinations have become easy to pass.
In order to cover the need for a rapid growth in manpower, the Tatmadaw is increasingly relying on forced recruitment and child soldiers. Although it is difficult to get an exact overview of the number of children serving in the Tatmadaw, human rights organisations estimate that very young people comprise a significant portion of troop numbers[11]. Children are recruited as spies, porters or human minesweepers during military campaigns. In addition, paramilitary forces such as the Police Force, the Fire Brigades and the Myanmar Red Cross Society have been trained to quell internal dissent, and serve as auxiliary forces to the Tatmadaw.
An arms procurement programme has improved the battle capabilities of the armed forces. Much equipment has been bought from abroad, but efforts have also been made to develop a national defence industry to make the country less dependent on foreign assistance. Domestically, the current military government is now in a better position to control internal political developments. However, certain aspects of the modernisation programme are also deceptive. The Tatmadaw's main asset in 1988 was its experience as a battle-hardened force, but generally, the Army, the Navy and the Air Force were all in a poor state. As a result, the modernisation programme started from a low level.
1.
The value system of the Tatmadaw
Two sets of values affecting the working
methods and institutions of the Tatmadaw were brought into the military during
its formative years. On the one hand, British traditions emphasised
professionalism and the separation between military and politics. On the other
hand, Japanese traditions put weight on loyalty and instant and unquestioned
obedience to command. In the Navy and the Air Force, British influence was strong
from the onset, while both value systems contributed in shaping the army. At
the same time, officers trained by
General Ne Win took over as supreme
commander in 1949. Since the beginning of his career, General Ne Win has
maintained close contacts with
The outbreak of communist and ethnic rebellion in the post-independence era, as well as army mutinies brought about by the insurgencies, contributed in shaping Ne Win’s perceptions of the means necessary to secure a strong military force. Discipline, hierarchy, and compliance with rules and regulations became remedies to avoid an army in which the loyalties of the officers and the troops were divided along political, ethnic or personal lines. With the slogan “One Blood, One Voice, One Command”, developing a common identity as a “Tatmadaw man” became an important task. Furthermore, a ghettoisation of the Tatmadaw has taken place, as military personnel and their families usually live on separate premises from the civilian population, where special education and health facilities as well as other welfare services are reserved for them.
Since 1948, the Tatmadaw has been operating
with an extended definition of the concept of national security, which has
covered both external and internal threats to the state. The Tatmadaw’s role is
threefold, as expressed in the slogan
“The Three Main National Causes: (1) Non-disintegration of the
The concept of the enemy has been redefined over the years. While the enemy used to be Communist and ethnic armed insurgents, the term has been reinterpreted since 1988 to describe anybody who can be labelled a «destructive element», a «foreign stooge» or a “neo-colonialist”, terms that have frequently been used against the pro-democracy movement.
2.
The Tatmadaw as a social and political actor
Since 1962, the command structure of the Army has become the model of the decision-making process in the state, and the current regime is strongly hierarchical. The military does not only control top positions in government, but is deeply entrenched at all levels of society.
The first step towards institutionalising
military rule took place in 1962, when the structure of command of the Tatmadaw
was linked to the overall political structure of the country, with general Ne
Win at the apex of both military and political power. After 1974, a formal separation
between the military and the civilian administration was enforced as the Burma
Socialist Programme Party (BSPP) took over political responsibilities. However,
Ne Win continued to serve as president of the
The coup d’Etat by the SLORC in 1988 abolished all organs of power and re-imposed a system of direct military rule. At the national level, legislative, executive and judiciary powers now rest with a military junta. The junta is a collegiate body and reaches its decisions by consensus[12]. At the local level, the regional military commanders are vested with authority as chairmen of the local Law and Order Restoration Councils/Peace and Development Councils.
In 1997, the SLORC went through a reshuffle and re-emerged as the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC). The SPDC is smaller than the SLORC. It is composed of the commander-in-chief of the Tatmadaw, the commanders-in-chief of the three services, three secretaries and the regional military commanders. The four most powerful members of the SPDC are believed to be Sr. Gen. Than Shwe, Gen. Maung Aye, Gen. Tin Oo and Lt. Gen. Khin Nyunt[13]. Most members of the SPDC no longer hold ministerial portfolios. The Cabinet is run by officers from the Regional Military Commands (RMC) and the Light Infantry Divisions (LID). A Ministry of Military Affairs was also created.
The military also operates with a civilian facade. The National Unity Party (NUP) was registered in 1988 to contest the general election. Many leaders of the NUP were former BSPP cadres, including several retired military officers. The NUP also inherited the properties and membership lists of the BSPP. But the party performed poorly in the election, and won in only 10 constituencies. Since 1990, it has been dormant. However, recent information indicates that the NUP could again become active[14].
In 1993, the SLORC founded the Union Solidarity
and Development Association (USDA). The USDA is a social organisation that
works to promote three goals identical with the “Three Main National Causes” of
the Tatmadaw. The USDA has been used to organise mass meetings in support of
the military government as well as various campaigns against elected
representatives, the NLD and Aung San Suu Kyi. Membership in the USDA is
compulsory for all civil servants, while students and military personnel are
also enticed into joining the USDA. The USDA is believed to be a potential
vote-gathering machine for the military in the case of future elections.
Currently, the USDA claims a membership of 7 million people.
II. The pro-democracy movement
1.
Inside
The leading force in the pro-democracy movement is the National League for Democracy (NLD). Its most active supporters have been social groups with a history of political activism and opposition to military rule, chiefly the students and the Buddhist Sangha (the religious order of monks and nuns).
Many political parties registered in the run-up to the election in 1990. Some were political novelties, such as the NLD, while others included prominent figures from the pre-1962 era. A number of parties were also proxies set up by larger parties expecting to be outlawed. 93 parties contested the election in 1990. 27 won one or more seats. The election led to the emergence of two kinds of parties - those with strong support nation-wide and those with strong local support, often on a territorial or ethnic basis. The NLD gained 60% of the votes, and assumed control of 392 out of the 485 seats in the legislature. The election was widely interpreted as a rejection of military rule and support for a democratic system of government. During 1991-1992, most parties were banned. By year 2000, only ten parties were legal.
The NLD was registered in September 1988. With approximately two million members spread across the country, it is by far the largest political party. The NLD is composed of three groups in the opposition who joined forces in 1988. One group was constituted by artists and intellectuals under the leadership of Aung San Suu Kyi, while the other two groups were former military personnel, led by U Aung Shwe and former Defence Minister U Tin Oo, and by U Aung Gyi, once a close associate of Ne Win. U Aung Gyi left the party in December 1988.
The highest authoritative organ in the NLD is the National Congress, but a ten-member central executive committee, is responsible for the management of daily affairs. U Aung Shwe has served as chairman since 1989, while both U Tin Oo and U Kyi Maung have served as vice-chairmen. U Kyi Maung, widely seen as the man most singly responsible for leading the NLD to victory in the 1990 election, left the party in 1998 for private reasons.
The NLD is first and foremost identified with its general-secretary, Aung San Suu Kyi. When she entered the political stage in August 1988, she was unknown to most Burmese as she had lived abroad most of her life. The authorities have frequently used her foreign connections, including her marriage to a Briton, against her.
Aung San Suu Kyi's charisma and legacy as
daughter of Aung San first drew popular attention, but according to Bertil
Lintner, “her insistence on Gandhian
principles of non-violent confrontation came to play a crucial role in
transforming the Burmese uprising into a sustained and remarkably co-ordinated
movement"[15].
Timothy Garton Ash, who met her in
Students and monks have played an important political role in Burmese politics since the 1930s, and political activism is in many ways part and parcel of student identity.
Student activists in
The Democratic Party for a New Society was registered as a political party in October 1988 under the leadership of Moe Thee Zun. With 250,000 members, the DPNS became the second largest party after the NLD. During the 1990 election, the party fielded few candidates, and emphasised support for the electoral campaign of the NLD. The DPNS did not win any constituencies, and has been supporting the post-election policies of the NLD. A crackdown on the party in 1990 forced Moe Thee Zun, to leave for the border, where he joined the ABSDF. A new executive committee was formed, but the party was subsequently banned by the SLORC in December 1991.
The All-Burma Federation of Student Unions (ABFSU) was founded in 1936, and has traditionally played a significant role in student politics. It was outlawed by the military after the coup in 1962. The ABFSU re-emerged during 1988 under the leadership of Min Ko Naing, who was arrested during the crackdown on the opposition in 1989. The ABFSU was forced to go underground again. After student demonstrations in 1996, several activists from the ABFSU had to flee the country. In 1998, they formed a Foreign Affairs Committee at the Thai-Burma border.
The Sangha was another leading force in
1988. In 1990, monks in
Several explanations have been advanced as to why the monks are not more active. First, the Buddhist religion does not have a structure that provides opportunities for regular meetings within the religious congregation, such as the Christian church, the Jewish synagogue or the Islamic mosque. Most monasteries are independent units, and do not participate in a formal countrywide structure that is independent of the state. Nor is there an institutionalised supranational structure such as the Catholic Church.
Moreover, the authorities have taken steps to control the monk-hood. Since 1980, a State Sangha Council has enabled the state to control the monks, as the monks depend on the state for the organisation of religious examinations. Since 1990, it has been compulsory for all monks to register with the council. Monks who do not fill the proper requirements may be defrocked. The military has also tried to subdue the monks with a mix of intimidation and rewards for those who are loyal to the regime, and Buddhism has become a central element in attempts to legitimise military rule.
Furthermore, some explanations point to aspects of Burmese Buddhism that may encourage a passive and a fatalistic outlook on life. For the Buddhist clergy, to become a monk or a nun is to renounce from the world. It entails a retreat from worldly concerns and a focus on meditation and spiritual efforts to attain Nirvana. Among lay people, a common interpretation of the Buddhist law of karma is that nothing can be done about current events. The present situation is seen as a result of past deeds, which should be addressed by religious rituals. Attempts have been made by Aung San Suu Kyi to promote engaged Buddhism or what she calls active metta (loving-kindness), as an alternative.
In November 1999 and February 2000, two senior abbots in Central-Burma wrote to the NLD and the SLORC, as well as to General Ne Win requesting a dialogue. They urged both sides to cast aside their differences in the interest of national peace. The NLD responded positively. However, the SPDC accused the monks of bowing to political influences, and put the abbots and their monasteries under close surveillance. Their movements were restricted, and donations were blocked.
There are also a Christian Church organised
in the Myanmar Council of Churches (MCC) and an Islamic community in
A group of veteran politicians from the pre-1962 era has made several attempts to mediate between the NLD and the military authorities. This veterans’ group is led by Bohmu Aung, one of the Thirty Comrades. These veteran politicians have made several appeals for dialogue between the SPDC and the NLD.
2.
Over the past four decades,
However, an exile community of broad
political significance only emerged after 1988. Initially, many people who fled
the country after the crackdown arrived to bases under the control of ethnic
armed groups along the Thai-Burma, India-Burma and China-Burma borders (known
as the “Liberated Areas”). Military losses over the past decade have increasingly
pushed these forces across the border and into sanctuary in
Organisations based outside of
The All-Burma Students Democratic Front
(ABSDF) was formed in rebel-controlled territory along the Thai-Burma border in
1988 in order to wage armed struggle against the military authorities, while
the All-Burma Students League (ABSL) is the main student group in
In September 2000, the ABSDF went through a
reshuffle during a central committee meeting. A new leadership was elected,
while many of the former leaders were transferred to an advisory board. In an
interview with the opposition radio station Democratic Voice of Burma (DVB),
the new leader of the ABSDF confirmed problems with leadership and ideological
differences within the organisation. He emphasised that separate political and
armed groups would be formed, and that the ABSDF would concentrate on armed
struggle and broader political activities. He also announced close co-operation
between the ABSDF and the DPNS as well as renewed efforts in anti-narcotics
activities. In 2001, former members of the ABSDF set up the Network for Democracy
and Development (NDD) in
The National Coalition Government of the
Union of Burma (NCGUB) was set up in 1991 on the basis of the Gandhi Hall
Declaration[17]
made in 1990 by elected representatives from the NLD, asking for the SLORC to
convene parliament. A decision was also taken during a subsequent meeting with
some of the MPs , that a government-in-exile would be formed if an attempt to
set up a parallel government within
Currently, the head office of the NCGUB is
located in
The National Council of the Union of Burma
(NCUB) was formed in 1992 in response to the NCGUB. The alliance rests on four
pillars, the National Democratic Front (NDF) the Democratic Alliance of Burma
(DAB), the Member of Parliament Union (MPU) and the National League for
Democracy-Liberated Areas (NLD-LA). To some extent, it has eclipsed the DAB as
the most influential umbrella group in the opposition movement. The NCUB is
often described as a parliament intended to function as a check-and-balance to
the NCGUB, but there are some difficulties with this concept. While the
legitimacy of the NCGUB is formally based on the general election in
presidium and the secretariat as well as the leaders of the committees are elected from among the leaders of the four pillars during a congress that takes place every third year.
III. The ethnic movement
The ethnic movement in
1. Inside
Thirty-six political parties that contested the election in 1990
identified themselves as representatives of ethnic groups. Nineteen of these
parties won in one or more constituencies. The largest winning ethnic parties
after the NLD were the Shan Nationalities League for Democracy (SNLD) with 23
constituencies and the Arakan Democracy League with 11 constituencies. A
coalition of ethnic parties, the United Nationalities League for Democracy
(UNLD) controlled 66 constituencies. Most ethnic parties were subsequently
banned in 1991-1992. By September 2000, only eight ethnic parties remain legal,
including the SNLD.
The United Nationalities League for
Democracy (UNLD) was a pre-electoral alliance of 21 parties formed in 1989.
During the general election, members of the UNLD contested separately, while
the UNLD as a whole also fielded candidates, one of whom was elected. The
structure of the UNLD is that of an executive body comprising a presidium and a
secretariat, elected from among the leaders of the member parties. The UNLD and
the NLD have been co-operating since 1990. In 1992, the UNLD was banned,
together with most of its member parties. In 2000, an exile wing of the UNLD
was set up in
The Shan National League for Democracy (SNLD) was registered in October 1988. Although it did not join the UNLD, the SNLD agreed to co-operate with the alliance. The SNLD currently plays an important role in the Committee Representing People’s Parliament (CRPP) founded in 1998 (see section E.II.3 below).
2. Outside of
2.
1. Armed groups
The uprising in 1988 brought the ethnic forces and the students in close contact with each other for the first time, and a number of alliances have been reached. The most important are the DAB and the NCUB. However, the relationship with the pro-democracy movement has at time also been uneasy.
Among the most important issues that have faced the ethnic movement over the past decade have been a series of cease-fire agreements concluded between several armed organisations and the military authorities. These have reshaped relations between different forces in the ethnic opposition. The first phase occurred after 1989, when the BCP split into several ethnic factions that concluded separate cease-fire deals with the junta. These deals allowed the armed groups to retain their arms, exercise considerable autonomy in their own territories, mostly located in North and North-eastern Burma, conduct business, and in some cases attend the National Convention in Rangoon (see section E. II.1 below). Some of these groups, in particular the United Wa State Army (UWSA) have become heavily involved in the production and distribution of drugs
The second phase started in 1994 when the Kachin Independence Organisation (KIO) entered a crease-fire agreement. This cease-fire was different from the first set of deals because the KIO had been one of the largest and best organised of the ethnic armies, and a heavyweight in the opposition movement, with leading positions in the three alliances. In 1995, another major ethnic organisation, the New Mon State Party (NMSP) followed suit to the Kachin cease-fire. In 1996, a cease-fire agreement was also reached between the SLORC and the Shan Mong Tai Army of Khun Sa, infamous for his involvement in narcotics production and traffic in the area.
The cease-fire agreements and the loss of
the Karen military and administrative headquarters at Manerplaw in 1995 have
forced a reappraisal of the situation of the movement based along the border,
and drained strength from formerly powerful groups such as the NDF and the DAB.
The fall of Manerplaw, which had been held continuously since 1974, was an
important emotional loss. The Burmese military now has access to territories
that never before were under the control of the central government in
These events have ended a situation in
which the ethnic insurgents constituted a buffer zone between
Currently, the only remaining sizeable army without a cease-fire agreement is the Karen National Union (KNU). The KNU has suffered a number of splits over the past years, which have led to the formation of smaller groups such as the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA) that concluded a cease-fire with the junta in 1994, the Karen Solidarity Organisation (KSO) and God’s Army. There are also smaller remnant groups from other ethnic armies that have split off due to the cease-fires. In addition, a number of cease-fires have broken down, notably those of the Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP) and Shan State Army (SSA), and the fighting has resumed in these areas. The cease-fires remain controversial. For instance, the KIO leadership went through a reshuffle in February 2001. One reason was said to be disagreement over the cease-fire from 1994.
2.
2. Non-armed groups
After the 1988 uprising, a number of ethnic
youth also came to the border areas. While some of them joined the newly formed
pro-democratic groups, others did not identify with these often Burman-based groups.
And while some of them joined the ethnic armed organisations, others did not
identify with their military strategies and the guerrilla warfare. As a result,
they formed up separate organisations, based on a non-violent strategy.
Representative of this new generation of ethnic youth are the Committee for
Non-violent Action in Burma (CNAB), a coalition of organisations based in
E. GOALS AND PROCESSES: A common future?
I Differing
concepts of democracy
Since 1988[18],
all main protagonists agree that democracy is the most desirable system of
government for
The pro-democratic movement promotes an
alternative vision for the future and a concept of democracy that is defined in
opposition to military views. For the pro-democratic movement, any future
government should be elected by the people in free and fair elections, and
should be guided by respect for the individual and for basic human rights. The
need to restore civil and political rights has been a dominant feature of the
struggle, but increasingly, the lack of social and economic rights is also
being emphasised. In addition, the NLD has extended its focus from the lack of
individual human rights to an acknowledgement of the need for collective
rights, in order to accommodate the demands of the ethnic minority groups. Rule
of law, a market economy that is not distorted by cronyism, the right to
privacy and a government concerned with people's daily welfare, such as food,
shelter, jobs and education are examples of
issues relevant to
A third view of democracy is promoted by many ethnic organisations, including the NDF. The concept of “national democracy” is a system of government that takes into account ethnic interests and the need for representation of the ethnic groups in the political system, and that institutionalises ethnic representation in the political structure of the country.
The democracy discourse spans across a broad
ideological spectrum. As in many former colonial states in
II. Alternative transition processes
1. From a military point of view
For the military, a continuation of the present situation, in which the legitimacy and legality of military rule continues to be challenged domestically and internationally, is not a viable option. For the junta, the challenge is to initiate change while preserving the old order of military-dominated rule. The military needs to be able to control the transition process, and ensure that it follows a track acceptable to them.
The junta has so far chosen to rely on a step-by-step approach to change that promotes economic growth rather than political reforms, and that gives peace and stability achieved by military means precedence over political and civil rights. According to the SPDC, progress towards a transition is taking place, but has been delayed due to the lack of domestic and international support.
The first step of the transition was the restoration of law and order. Intervention by military and paramilitary forces led by the SLORC restored security in urban areas after the uprising in 1988 while cease-fire agreements brought an end to violence in border areas. According to the junta, the dissolution of the SLORC in 1997 marked the end of this first phase of military rule.
Efforts to reach a permanent solution entered a new stage when the SPDC came to power. Currently, the junta has defined its aims to be the promotion of peace and development, so that basic human needs can be covered, access to health and education can be assured, and economic growth can be promoted. While the restoration of law and order is a limited task, the new name reflects goals that cannot be accomplished in the foreseeable future, and opens up for long-term military involvement in politics. The SPDC did not present a new working programme for itself but has continued along the same path as the SLORC.
The military’s strategy for development
relies on the liberalisation of the economy as well as on foreign engagement.
The junta’s most important tool for a political settlement is a new draft constitution. The junta has emphasised that such a constitution is a necessary precondition for power to be handed over to a new government. In 1992, the SLORC established a National Convention, composed of 702 delegates, selected on the basis of eight social groups (political parties, elected representatives, ethnic minorities, farmers, workers, intellectuals, civil service, others). The NLD, in spite of being the largest election-winning party, was given only 88 seats. For the Tatmadaw, the National Convention is the appropriate forum for a political dialogue. The Convention has not met in full session since 1995, but Foreign Minister Win Aung claimed in April 2000 that the National Convention Convening Commission meets several times a week, and that the work is in progress. No time frame has been set for the end of the constitution-writing process.
Information from the state-controlled press concerning this new draft constitution currently being discussed in the National Convention indicates that the Tatmadaw favours a unitary state with a presidential system of government, an extensive and visible military presence at all levels and limited space for party politics. The Tatmadaw also makes a distinction between national politics that serve national interests, and party politics, with the latter being subordinated to the former. The activities of political parties such as the NLD will be constrained by military involvement.
This military draft introduces a bicameral parliament, with one chamber of elected representatives and one chamber of representatives from the regions, states and union territories that will make up the state. Seats will be reserved for military personnel in both chambers, but no details have so far been provided concerning the legislative process. The president will be elected by an electoral college composed of representatives from both chambers in the parliament as well as by military representatives to the parliament. Together with the parliament, the president will control the appointment of the government. Politicians will not be able to stand as presidential candidates and the new president does not need to be an MP. Requirements have been made that will bar Aung San Suu Kyi from running for presidency, and that demand that the president possesses military experience.
2.
From a pro-democratic point of view
The pro-democracy movement rejects the Tatmadaw’s programme for change, and doubts that the Tatmadaw is willing or capable of initiating necessary economic and political reforms. Their rejection is founded on normative as well as pragmatic grounds. For the NLD, political reforms are not only a consequence, but also a pre-condition for economic development. The SPDC has so far failed in securing good governance and rule of law, without which there can be no economic growth and political development. Cronyism, corruption and the failure to develop human resources are other examples of military mismanagement. The NLD also rejects the National Convention, and withdrew from its proceedings in 1995. The league has objected that a new constitution is not necessary for the elected parliament to be convened. In addition, the league has protested against the manner in which the proceedings of the National Convention are being conducted, for not being consistent with democratic procedures. Guidelines have been laid down and limits have been imposed on the participants that prevent a free debate. The Tatmadaw should therefore take a back seat in implementing economic and political reforms.
The NLD is seeking international pressure against the regime and isolation through economic sanctions as tools to reach a transition.
3.
Some of the difficulties
Both sides of the conflict call for the
restoration of some degree of mutual trust and confidence in their relations.
The challenge for those who are seeking the democratisation of
The NLD’s strategy for political reforms is
based on a non-violent struggle to change
Support for the non-violent tactics of the
NLD has not been unanimous. For instance, the ABSDF has engaged in armed
struggle against the military regime. There are several reasons for this.
Partly, it is the result of
The aim of the pro-democracy movement has
been a tripartite dialogue that includes representatives from the military, the
NLD and the ethnic minority groups. Contact took place between the military
authorities and representatives from the NLD in 1994, 1997 and 1998. However,
they did not result in any agreement between the two sides. The military
refused to negotiate directly with Aung San Suu Kyi, while the NLD accepted a
number of compromises in order to kick-start a dialogue. The league agreed to
lower level talks without the presence of Aung San Suu Kyi and the party’s top
leadership. In addition, the league agreed to talks confined to one issue only.
Furthermore, the NLD proposed informal talks in which both sides would be
represented by delegations with an equal number of members holding equal
positions on each side. The league also accepted suggestions for compromise
offered by countries in
However, the junta failed to respond to these offers. In July 2000, Aung San Suu Kyi stated that the NLD had gone as far as it could in compromising to get negotiations to start, and that the league had nothing more to offer[22].
The pro-democracy movement has emphasised three confidence-building measures that could be taken by the military authorities; the release of political prisoners; the convening of parliament and freedom for the NLD and other political parties to exercise regular party activities. In particular, the restoration of freedom of opinion, expression, assembly, association and movement as well as an end to the arbitrary detention of elected representatives and the harassment of party activists are seen as important measures.
The NLD has chosen to conduct its activities within the limits imposed by the regime. The party participated in the 1990 election in spite of calls for a boycott at the time, and in spite of the rejection by the authorities of Aung San Suu Kyi’s candidacy. In addition, the NLD joined the National Convention when it was established in 1992, and co-operated on the regime’s draft constitution until 1995. Furthermore, the NLD has in the past cancelled plans for public ceremonies that have not met with government approval. In exchange, the military authorities have disregarded certain measures that have hampered activities by the NLD. For instance, the NLD was able to conduct weekly public meetings in front of Aung San Suu Kyi’s residence during 1995-1996 in spite of a ban on gatherings of more than five people. These gatherings assembled thousands of NLD supporters and other listeners.
Symbolic politics such as celebrations for
anniversary days play a role in mobilising supporters on both sides. The SPDC
and the NLD usually organise separate commemorative ceremonies in relation with
national anniversary days, such as Independence Day on 4th January
and Union Day on 12th February. Apart from an official ceremony to
mark the assassination of Gen. Aung San on 19th July, the junta does
not allow representatives from the NLD to attend government-sponsored events.
In addition to national days, the NLD commemorates certain overtly political
dates such as
After 1996, the fronts were sharpened
between the two sides, and 1996 became the worst year for human rights in
The reshuffle of the junta in 1997 did not lead to substantial political reforms. The military government continued to reject political and civil rights such as freedom of opinion, expression, assembly, association and movement that would enable the pro-democracy movement to advance its cause. The junta did not allow the formation of non-governmental organisations without subjecting them to strong military scrutiny and supervision. Universities and colleges remained closed for most of the decade to prevent student unrest, while the media was tightly controlled by the authorities and subject to strict censorship. The NLD has not been granted a publishing license since 1990.
Relations hit a new low in 1998. In May
1998, the NLD set a deadline for the convening of parliament and vowed to
initiate the convening process should the authorities fail to comply. Their
decision resulted in the formation of the CRPP. A number of stand-offs between
Aung San Suu Kyi and the military took place during the summer of 1998, as Aung
San Suu Kyi was prevented from leaving
The SPDC increased its repression of the political opposition. NLD working committees were dismantled, while party offices were forcibly shut down. NLD activists and their families were subjected to pressure and intimidation, and a large number of party members were forced to resign. Several of Aung San Suu Kyi’s closest advisers were arrested, while some left the NLD. Over the past couple of years, military-sponsored mass meetings have been held across the country to declare loss of confidence in elected representatives and call for the NLD to be banned.
In 2000, the pro-democracy movement warned
that the authorities may have decided to destroy the NLD and “every vestige of the democratic process”[24].
In August and September 2000, the relationship between the NLD and the SPDC
took another turn for the worse as Aung San Suu Kyi, Tin Oo and other members
of the NLD were stopped twice while they were making attempts to visit local
party office. The authorities raided the party headquarters in
So far, the NLD has managed to control popular frustrations with the lack of progress towards democracy, and it continues to provide leadership and guidance to popular expressions of discontent with the current regime. However, there have been signs of growing impatience. In April 1999, 25 members of the NLD, including three members of parliament, were expelled after they sent a letter to the party leadership and the SPDC criticising the formation of the CRPP and calling for new efforts towards a dialogue.
Then, in January 2001, news broke out that Aung San Suu Kyi and the SPDC were holding talks, and that these had been taking place since October. Nothing has yet been reported about the substance of these talks. They are at an early stage, and aimed at building confidence between the parties. Reactions to the news have been positive, but cautious. Representatives of the exile movement have warned against been overtly optimistic, stressing that the talks are not irreversible and that the military is still very much in control. The talks are limited, given that only Aung San Suu Kyi is so far representing the interests of the pro-democratic and ethnic movement. The military regime has released a number of political prisoners from the NLD, but has not embarked upon legal reforms that will secure democracy and respect for human rights. Military offensives against ethnic minority groups are also continuing.
4.
Liberalisation?
In spite of the bleak picture drawn up so
far, certain events took place during 1999 and 2000 that could also indicate
that the regime is opening up. In May 1999, the International Committee of the
Red Cross (ICRC), which withdrew from
In February 2000,
Moreover,
In general, the pro-democracy movement,
including the NLD, has responded
negatively to these moves. They consider them as attempts by the military to
improve its international standing rather than a reflection of the regime being
serious about reforms.
III. The difficult issues
For those who want to advance the cause of
democracy in
Negotiation as a means of solving political conflicts has many advantages, but also some limits[26]. While a bargain may be necessary for the breakdown of the old regime, past experiences indicate that it may also result in an outcome that will make it difficult for a strong democracy to develop. For instance, in several Latin American countries, the military continued to wield considerable influence during the transition phases. To some extent, the armed forces were able to call the shots and control the outcome. As a result, a limited democracy, in which authoritarian forces continued to exercise their influence, became the outcome of the process.
To understand the nature of a dialogue process and the impediments to the full democratisation of the country, and be realistic about it is important because of the nature of negotiations that result in a pact between the leadership of each dominating political force, as a means of moving towards democracy. Pacts are negotiated between a few people, with limited influence and transparency for larger sections of the population. They distort the principle that all citizens should be treated as political equals in a democratic system of government. For negotiations to succeed, the participants in the pact need to reassure themselves and each other that they can convincingly represent the interest of their constituencies. They have to be able both to gain support for the outcome of the pact, and to control those forces ready to reject the result.
Examples from a number of countries can serve not only as potential lessons and models for the pro-democracy movement. Events such as the trials against former presidents Chun Doo-hwan and Roh Tae-woo in South Korea in 1996 and the arrest of Gen. Pinochet in the UK in October 1998, with the subsequent lifting of his immunity by the Chilean High Court in August 2000, could also serve to fuel the SPDC’s concerns about what could happen should a civilian government come to power in Burma.
1.
How to get started?
Timothy Garton Ash has captured the essence of the Burmese situation in one eloquent formulation: “The heart of the Burmese problem is that Suu (Aung San Suu Kyi) has all the legitimacy and SLORC has all the power”[27].
The pro-democracy movement faces a twin challenge in trying to reach its goal. As long as the military’s power remains pervasive, the movement needs to respond to regime initiatives and prevent a strengthening of the military’s grip on power. At the same time, the movement needs to carve out a space in which it can advance its own agenda of democratisation. However, as long as the regime is not opening up, this remains difficult.
With the latest development in relations between Aung San Suu Kyi and the regime, one first challenge may have been overcome. However, as we have seen, there has also been talks in the past that have not yielded tangible results. Concrete measures over the coming months will prove important in securing faith in the ongoing process.
2.
The 1990 election and the CRPP
For the pro-democracy movement, the recognition of the result of the 1990 election and the convening of parliament have remained the fundamental issues at stake throughout the decade. The elections are important to the NLD because they establish the legal and legitimate basis for the claim by the league to represent the people.
The formation of the CRPP in September 1998 added a new dimension to this question. For the NLD, it served to remind the military authorities that the election result is still valid, and that is non-negotiable. The military responded with a crackdown against the NLD and suggested that political prisoners from the NLD could be released in exchange for the dissolution of the CRPP, but the NLD has so far refused to relinquish the committee.
For the junta, the issue of the general
election in 1990 is thorny. The Tatmadaw’s model for a transition conveniently
disregards this election. The military has gradually redefined the meaning of
the 1990 election from being an election for a national assembly to being an
election for the National Convention. According to the military, a new
constitution is required before elections for a national assembly can be
organised, and that is why a national convention has been established. There
has been concern within the pro-democracy movement that the military may be
preparing to finish the work of the National Convention, and organise new
elections that will nullify the 1990 election result. In 1999, Maj. Gen. Kyaw
Win, a close associate of Lt. Gen. Khin Nyunt, suggested during a visit to
At the same time, time is now running out
for those members of parliament who were elected in 1990. According to figures
from the NCGUB from April 2000, 22 members of parliament remain of the 485 who were
elected ten years ago. 44 representatives have passed away; 64 MPs from the NLD
have been dismissed; 96 MPs from the NLD have been fired or have resigned; 22
MPs are living in exile, and seven MPs have given up politics. Although it is
difficult to get information about political activists in
3.
Protecting military interests
When the military finally comes to the negotiation table and compromises are reached, a number of factors could have played a role. For time being, little suggests that the junta would voluntarily return to the barracks. However, the Tatmadaw may find that it is in its own interests to reach an agreement.
Threats to the inner workings of the Tatmadaw could force a change in the Tatmadaw’s position. The survival of the military’s institutionalised hierarchy, discipline and cohesiveness, a certain degree of autonomy from civilian intervention and a share of the national budget that the Tatmadaw finds reasonable are likely to be issues of concern within the armed forces.
A matter of debate is the extent to which the Tatmadaw should be allowed to entertain a broader role in the state. For more than five decades, the military has been a strong participant in political, economic and social life. The question remains how the Tatmadaw will define its position in the future, and what range of activities most Burmese will be willing to accept for the military.
The junta favours a broad role for the
armed forces in a future
The exile movement appears to have taken a stricter stand over the future role of the military. In a draft constitution by the NCUB from 1997, the NCUB states that the military is to be under civilian supremacy in the future, with the defence of the union from external danger as its only purpose. The federal president should be the supreme commander of the armed forces, while the minister of defence cannot be drawn from military ranks. Furthermore, the exile movement seems to favour a parliamentarian system of government, as opposed to the military’s presidential model of government[30].
Many members of the military elite have gained considerable economic and social privileges due to their positions during the years of Army rule. It seems reasonable to believe that many members of the ruling junta and their associates will continue to have personal interests to protect, while the military as an institution may also seek to protect its access to such privileges.
The case of
4.
Preventing the disintegration of the regime
Whether the junta will be able to continue to take the initiative in the transition process depends on the extent of support it gets from the armed forces. This depends chiefly on the army and the military intelligence services, which constitute the junta’s power base. There has clearly been concern that internal conflicts of interests may affect the unity of the armed forces and trigger unwanted change.
Andrew Selth[32] has identified potential sources of conflict within the Tatmadaw. He points out that the first dilemma is military rule itself. On the one hand, the Tatmadaw has been preparing for the consolidation of the military's grip on power. One the other hand, past experience has also shown that many members of the armed forces are ready to accept a return to civilian rule. In 1976, a failed coup attempt calling for the military to return to the barracks was made against Gen. Ne Win. In 1990, military personnel and their families were among those who voted for the NLD. More recently, the arrests of military personnel who have been voicing their sympathy with the pro-democracy movement have been reported on several occasions, including in 1999 and 2000. Disaffection is present at lower ranks within the Tatmadaw, but so far, lower ranking officers and rank and file soldiers have chosen exit rather than voice to express their discontent. Desertions are believed to be widespread, and opposition sources claim that 100,000 men have deserted since 1988.
A second dilemma does not concerns the
military’s right to rule, but the strategy by which the military is seeking to
stay in power. Two questions are crucial; How to deal with the NLD and the
international community; and how to handle
Some observers have suggested that Khin
Nyunt could play the role of a moderate within the Tatmadaw. Khin Nyunt was the
chief architect between the cease-fire agreements reached with armed ethnic
groups during the first half of the 1990s, and in getting
Differences in training, experience and promotions within the Tatmadaw also carry the potential of encouraging conflicts between different sections of the military. For instance, differences in traditions between the Army on the one hand, and the Navy and the Air Force on the other, have already been recorded. However, the Army remains by far more powerful and influential than the other two services.
In terms of training and appointments, rivalries exist between graduates from the Defence Services Academy (DSA) and from the Officer Training School (OTS). The DSA has traditionally been considered as a more prestigious institution, but recruitment from DSA dropped after the coup attempt in 1976. Tensions could also arise between officers who have been appointed because of their links to Ne Win, such as Khin Nyunt, and officers who have risen through the ranks on a more professional career path. However, such tensions are likely to become less significant as Ne Win’s influence wanes and new generations enter the military.
Finally, antagonisms exist between the
soldiers in the field who suffer the hardships of being at war in the
front-line, and the military personnel pursuing a bureaucratic career in the
rear, with opportunities for personal profit. Over the past years, disparities
between higher levels in the Army and the rank and file have become noticeable.
Reports of dissatisfaction, low morale and lack of discipline among lower
ranking soldiers are numerous, and corruption has become a serious problem. The
Army can no longer afford to pay salaries to its soldiers, and have given orders
that soldiers fend for themselves by requisitioning local resources or by
running agriculture, farming, factories and other business projects. In
addition, soldiers have been used in an increasing extent to perform forced
labour since the international community started criticising
The Tatmadaw has taken counter-measures to prevent a split. Reports of incidences that confirm substantial political disagreements within military ranks since 1988 are rare, and they have usually been dealt with in a quick and decisive manner. For instance, the deputy minister for national planning and economic development, Brig.-Gen. Zaw Tun, was sacked in August 2000 after he criticised economic policies and admitted shortcomings during a seminar at the Myanmar Business Association.
The ruling junta has united representatives from all the three services since 1988 and many in the top leadership share family, business or other personal ties. The reshuffle in 1997 co-opted several younger officers, and brought a number of regional commanders, who wield considerable local influence, in closer contact with the Rangoon-based top military leadership, while the most corrupt members of the SLORC were eliminated. Promotions, privileges and business opportunities serve to reward loyalty, while punishments for disloyal behaviour are severe. Intelligence services to supervise military personnel are probably widely used.
5. The issue of amnesty
Many members of the Tatmadaw are responsible for serious human rights violations that have taken place during the years of Army rule, and the need to escape punishment could be an issue of concern. In addition, human rights violations have been committed by the armed opposition groups which also will have to be dealt with in the future.
How a community chooses to deal with the
human rights violations that have occurred under authoritarian rule have moral,
legal, political and psychological implications for the individuals who have
suffered abuses as well as for that society as a whole. The question is of
great relevance to a country like
Aung San Suu Kyi has been asked repeatedly about the views of the NLD concerning an amnesty for the military. The NLD has not issued guarantees that the military will not face any criminal charges. However, the party has conceded that prosecution may not be possible in a post-authoritarian context, and that it is important to emphasise other means by which justice can be served.
The NLD recognises that
At the same time, the issue of an amnesty
carries the potential to be a source of conflict between the Burman-dominated
pro-democracy movement and ethnic minority groups. Human rights abuses have
historically been more widespread and more intense in ethnic areas than in the
Burman heartland. The viewpoint of Maran La Raw, executive director of
Kachinland Projects, who has called for transitional justice to be part of any
political reform process in
6.
Solving the ethnic issue
The most frequent human rights abuses are
extortion, rape, torture, other forms of ill-treatment, forced labour and portering,
arbitrary arrest, long term imprisonment and forced relocation. They often
occur as part of military counter-insurgency campaigns, such as the Four Cuts
strategy. For instance, the Burma Border Consortium estimated in June 2000 that
there were more than 600,000 internally displaced people in
Forced relocations are widespread in Shan,
Karen and
Amnesty International estimates that more
than 300,000 people have been relocated in
Human rights violations in ethnic areas are
not recent. In
After more than fifty years of civil war,
ethnic conflicts have become an enduring and protracted challenge in any
political process in
The question remains how
The standpoints of the ethnic organisations
affect nation-building policies as well as the democratisation process in
Both the ethnic and the military concepts of the nation are based on the assumption that the accentuation of ethnic identity is the most natural way of expressing political autonomy. For each ethnic group, the group’s national identity as a “race” serves to promote a common ethnic identity within the group as well as in relation to other groups, in particular the Burman majority. For instance, the Karen National Union (KNU) emphasises the existence of a Karen nation based on notions of shared race, civilisation and history for the Karen people. At the same time, the Karen nation is defined in opposition to the Burman nation, to the extent that “it is a dream that Karen and Burman can ever evolve a common nationality”[40]. At the same time, the ethnic nations conceal important differences within each ethnic group. For instance, the Karen identity of the KNU is closely linked to Christianity. It masks important differences between rural Karen living in the mountains and urban Karen, between Christians and Buddhists. The emphasis on Christianity in particular has been a source of conflict, and a widening split has emerged between Buddhists and Christians in the Karen movement.
Furthermore, the concept of a “National Democracy” was developed by the National Democratic Front in the 1970s and 1980s after claims for independence were abandoned by mutual agreement in 1976. An exception to this view is the Karenni, represented by the Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP). They continue to call for independence for the Karenni people, and have so far refused to join umbrella groups in the opposition such as the NDF, the DAB and the NCUB for this reason.
Ethnic interests should be safeguarded in the eyes of the NDF by establishing a proper institutional structure. Subsequently, the DAB and the NCUB have developed draft constitutions. Although these texts remain drafts, and do not have unanimous support from the exile movement, they suggest which issues the exile organisations are concerned about. The NCUB draft paves the way for a political structure that will provide members of ethnic minority groups with individual human rights as defined in a bill of rights and international covenants as well as group rights to preserve their identity. The draft calls for a federal union of ethnic states based on the right of equality and self-determination. Each ethnic group will be represented by one state for each ethnic group, including the Burman majority, and there will be a bicameral parliament in which the upper chamber should represent the states, and have an equal number of representatives from each state. There is no right of secession, and all alterations of boundaries require the consent of all member states. In addition, the NCUB emphasises the importance of cultural rights, proper language policies, educational policies and freedom of religion.
The NLD promotes an alternative concept of
the nation as an act of will among different people ready to live together in a
common existence based on trust and mutual respect, where both majority and
minority recognise each other’s needs and concerns. This view builds on Aung
San’s vision of the nation from 1946, as “a
collective term applied to a people, irrespective of ethnic origin”[41].
The nation develops as a result of a common citizenship in the state. At the
same time,
In 1990, the NLD suggested a modified version of the 1947 constitution that retained the current division of the country into seven states and seven divisions during the transition process. In 1996, the NLD started working on a new draft constitution, a task that has been pursued by the CRPP since 1998. The NLD has agreed to a federal state, based on democracy and human rights, and in which the right to secession is abandoned. The NLD has proposed that the central government ensure that democracy and human rights prevail, while there will be constitutional guarantees for the ethnic minorities, and local elections at all levels.
The ethnic movement and the pro-democracy
movement within
The demand for federalism has encountered
strong opposition from the military. The military has strong traditions for
opposing a federal state. For the military,
The Tatmadaw adheres to a view of the nation as an extended family sharing blood ties and a presumed common ancestry and history. The Burmese nation of the military is developed in opposition to the foreigner, in particular the former Western colonial ruler. According to the military, the history of the Burmese nation was characterised by peaceful coexistence until the British colonisation and current ethnic conflicts are the result of the divide-and-rule policies of the colonial government.
Indeed, some of the roots of
The current military draft constitution
suggests that a new military government will continue to pursue the same
policies as in the past. Although the draft constitution is not explicit on ethnic
issues, the overall structure of the state remains centralised and
military-dominated, as we have already seen. The constitution retains the
current division of the country into seven states and seven divisions, which
favours the Burman minority. In addition, union territories administered
directly by the president, and autonomous units may be formed, but these
concepts are not elaborated upon. Key ministries for interethnic relations,
such as the ministry of defence, security and home affairs, and border affairs
will remain under military control. There is no right of secession.
F. THE BACKDROP: What are the options?
I. Economic and social deterioration
Once known as “The rice bowl of
Currently,
According to the World Bank, government mismanagement is the main cause of this decline as the Burmese military government has given priority to maintaining political stability rather than economic and social progress since the early 1960s.
At the same time,
Defence spending is currently taking the
lion-share of public spending, and was estimated at 46% of total expenditures
between 1989 and 1994[43].
Currently,
Forty years of authoritarian rule have left a legacy of destruction that will pose a serious challenge to any future government for years to come. At the same time, the situation that most Burmese have to face in their daily lives is making it increasingly difficult for them to involve in political activities. This is a fact that the pro-democracy movement has to take into account when analysing the opportunities and constraints imposed on its activities.
1. Military control over the economy
Since independence in 1948, state intervention has played a key role in the economy, whether in terms of public planning or public ownership. State intervention was strengthened after the military coup d’Etat in 1962.
In spite of moves towards a market economy since 1988, state intervention continues. As a result, the military carries considerable economic clout through its control over state enterprises as well as relevant public institutions such as the Myanmar Investment Commission.
The armed forces and the Ministry of
Defence are also heavily involved in the private sector. They have established
their own companies or engage in other forms of enterprise management. For
instance,
Furthermore, top leaders of the junta,
their families and associates, including Sr. Gen. Than Shwe, Lt. Gen. Khin
Nyunt, Gen. Maung Aye, also have important private stakes in the economy[44].
2. An agrarian economy
However, government policies are an
impediment to agricultural production. The farmers are not free to choose what
to produce and they are required to sell a quota of their production to the
state at a rate below market price. They also have to contribute a quota to
different local authorities. During the past few years, the government has
encouraged the cultivation of former wetland areas and the promotion of industrial,
large-scale agriculture, but these measures are not likely to benefit the
majority of
Furthermore, the agricultural sector has
experienced a decline since the second half of the 1990s, and in 1997/1998, the
export of rice was close to nil.
3. Failed investments: Energy and
tourism
During the 1990s, the military authorities
gave priority to the energy sector and to tourism as means to boost the
economy, and there was a rise in foreign direct investment to
During the first half of the 190s, the
energy sector attracted large Western investments such as those of French
Total, American Unocal and British Premier Oil. The goal was to exploit
The tourism sector attracted investors
particularly from the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). A
construction boom took place that provided
During the second half of the 1990s, foreign direct investment has fallen. International consumer boycotts and the poor economic situation have led a number of foreign companies to withdraw from the country, while several energy and tourism projects have been completed.
One effect of the economic crisis is rampant inflation. Burma’s economy is in severe difficulties, and the state is not able to keep up with its expenses. For several years, Burma has run with a state budget where expenditures have exceeded income. Public deficit is mainly funded by the Central Bank, and this fuels inflation.
Furthermore, there is reason to believe that money laundering and profits from the narcotics traffic play an important role in the overall economy. According to a 1999 US State Department report from 1999, family members of current and past drug traffickers have invested heavily in infrastructure projects, such as roads, port facilities, hotels and real estate. The large number of political and economic constraints on legal capital, the underdeveloped banking system and the lax enforcement of measures against money laundering have created a business and investment climate in which drug money has become the seed capital for many legitimate enterprises[45].
Since 1988, social and economic disparities have increased. People with connections to the regime have benefited from the liberalisation of the economy. A small class of well-to-do people has emerged, while the great majority of the population faces increasing difficulties in covering daily needs. A civilian middle class that could take a lead in the democratisation process has not developed.
About a quarter of the population lives below a minimum subsistence level. However poverty is not only affecting farmers and workers. About eight percent of the labour force are employed in the public sector, where real wages in 1999 were worth about one third of what they were in 1994. In April 2000, wages were increased fivefold and the minimum monthly salary for a government employee was brought to 3,000 kyat (less than nine US dollars). However, the hike fuelled further inflation and the depression of the value of the kyat[46].
An estimated seven percent of the working force, about 1,3 million people, are unemployed. Many young Burmese have left to look for jobs abroad, in order to cope with the unemployment, the low wages and the poor economic situation at home. In Thailand alone, there are an estimated 700,000 illegal Burmese workers, while another 20,000 Burmese nationals are working in Japan.
Furthermore, public spending for the
development of infrastructure and communication is inadequate. Government
control over the media and censorship remain strict.
Transportation is underdeveloped. Several ethnic
states, such as Chin and Karenni states do not have proper railway connections.
The train is slow, and the equipment is old. For instance, it takes about 12
hours to travel from Rangoon to Mandalay, a distance of about 620 kilometres.
In other areas of Burma, the road system is underdeveloped, and unusable in the
rainy season. Generally, the central heartland is better developed than the
ethnic areas. The military also uses forced labour to carry out public works,
such as the building of roads, railways, bridges etc.
4. The education sector
The education sector is in disarray. At the primary and secondary level, many school buildings are in need of repair. Schools are overcrowded, and there is a shortage of teaching and learning materials as well as other facilities. Teaching methods and curricula have not been updated and modernised, and two out of three teachers have not received formal training. Because wages are low, many teachers give private tuition classes to make ends meet. Corruption has become common in order to pass exams.
A large number of children do not attend school, and one out of four children never enrols in primary school. Dropout rates are also very high. Only one third of students in primary school complete the full five compulsory years. There are several reasons why children drop out. Basic education should be free of charge, but parents have to pay extra fees for school material, uniforms, the Parent and Teacher Associations and other unspecified donations during the school year. As a result, many families cannot afford to keep their children in school. Poverty is also forcing many children to work to help sustain their families.
Key features of the curriculum have not changed much since 1962. Science and technology are given precedence over other subjects. Before 1988, social sciences were biased towards the studies of the official ideology of the BSPP regime – and studies of the official ideology were made compulsory. Humanities have been downgraded, and English-language instruction has been limited.
There is little equality of opportunity. Students are selected for higher studies depending on the marks they receive at the examination after tenth standard. Students with the highest marks are allowed to enter medicine, followed by engineering and other sciences and mathematics. Students with lower marks may enter arts subjects. Many students experience that the skills that they are taught have little relevance for their future employment. There is no academic freedom and freedom of expression.
Only three percent of the students that finish primary and secondary levels will probably continue with tertiary education. However, higher education has been sacrificed for political purposes. As a result of the political role played by students, the military authorities have been wary of letting campuses become breeding grounds for dissent, and the closure of institutions of higher education is a measure that has been used by various authorities since 1962. Between 1988 and June 2000, most universities and colleges had been open for less than 40 months, although military learning facilities remained open throughout the period. As a result, students who finished high school in 1988 only entered university in 1994.
Aung San Suu Kyi has warned that
After student demonstrations erupted in December 1996, the universities and colleges closed down again. A gradual reopening has only taken place since December 1999. In December 1999 and January 2000, the opening was limited to senior levels as well as certain subjects. In June and July 2000, the authorities allowed a broader reopening at junior level and comprising more subjects. An estimated 75,000 students have been re-entering classes since June. However, they only represent a fraction of the 400,000 students who have passed their entrance examination since 1996 and who have been queuing for admission. The quality of the education provided is poor. The school year has been reduced to three months, and university campuses have been decentralised in order to spread the students. It has been reported that students and parents have to sign a declaration confirming that the students will stay clear of politics. Teachers and professors, as well as all other civil servants, have had a legal ban on political activities since 1991. Teachers have surveillance duties as part of their job in order to ensure that the students remain apolitical. The current reopening hardly reflects a strong commitment by the government to the education sector.
5. The health sector
The health sector is also in dire straits. A few health indicators, such as
infant mortality and vaccination coverage, have improved, but overall, the
state of health services in Burma remains poor. At the same time, the health
and social sectors have not become politicised to the same extent as the education
sector.
There has been an expansion in basic health services during the 1990s. However, the quality of the services provided has been declining. Communicable diseases such as pneumonia, diarrhoea, malaria, tuberculosis, dengue fever and HIV/AIDS are major health risks for the population. Poor sanitation, unsafe water and inadequate hygiene practices contribute to the spread of diseases[48].
Burma lacks trained doctors, nurse, midwives and other medical personnel, as well as medicine and medical equipment. Health services should be free of charge, but patients and their families often have to make their own arrangements for medicines and necessary equipment for surgery and treatment while in the hospital. Corruption has become widespread, and bribes have to be paid to hospital staff in order to benefit from their services. As a result, confidence in the public health care system has fallen. Private health care services are growing, but high fees prevent many poor people from accessing these services.
Burma is experiencing one of Asia’s worse HIV/AIDS epidemics. The World Health Organisation (WHO) and the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) estimate that about 450,000 people, or nearly one percent of the population, are infected with the HIV virus. Dr. Chris Beyrer, who heads an international research team at the Johns Hopkins School of Hygiene and Public Health states, links the spread of HIV/AIDS in Burma to a dramatic increase in heroine abuse that has taken place since 1988[49]. Burma has the highest HIV rates ever reported among addicts worldwide[50]. Burma is one of the world’s largest producers of opium and heroine, and is currently providing 40-60 percent of global supplies.
For many years, the military authorities have denied that HIV/AIDS is a problem, and blamed the opposition for trying to ruin the country’s reputation by spreading false information. Little has been done in terms of prevention and treatment of patients. There is a lack of accurate information about HIV/AIDS in Burma[51]. The national HIV/AIDS programme launched a massive investigative project in 1994-1995, but was never allowed to publish the results. In January 2001, Lt. Gen. Khin Nyunt admitted for the first time that HIV/AIDS was a problem for the country, and that is has to be taken seriously[52].
The breakdown of the social fabric in Burma has increased disparities that are likely to accentuate existing conflicts and make it more difficult to reach a lasting political settlement. In particular, the lack of human development in ethnic and rural areas may heighten inter-ethnic tensions.
The seven Burman divisions have received more development assistance than the seven ethnic states, among other reasons because of the civil war. For instance, Burma has an overall literacy rate of 80 percent. However, the literacy rate is only 50-65 percent in many ethnic states, and the teaching of minority languages is forbidden. Poverty is also more widespread among members of ethnic minority groups.
Urban areas have generally received more
resources than rural areas. Certain rural areas remain extremely isolated.
Modern banking facilities, transport and communication services are limited.
The provision of health care and basic education as well as other services is
inadequate. Rural poverty is likely to affect many members of ethnic minority
groups as well, as ethnic areas are predominantly rural. In addition, attention
should be drawn to intra-urban disparities, especially in Rangoon’s satellite
towns. The Burmese authorities have engaged in the massive relocation of
inhabitants from downtown
II. A divided international community
The National League for Democracy and the pro-democracy movement have called on international support for their cause. They have requested pressure, isolation and sanctions against the military authorities. The Burmese government, on the other hand, has called for foreign economic engagement, while warning the international community against involving in its internal affairs.
Internationally, an important issue
currently at stake is a process that began in the International Labour
Organisation (ILO) in 1992. In June 2000, the ILO ruled that
Although the international community agrees
on the need for political reforms in
International attempts to broker political reforms in Burma are taking place at several levels, in multilateral institutions such as the United Nations (UN), the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the European Union (EU), by individual governments, such as the US, Australia and Japan, or by various non-governmental forces.
1. Multilateral relations
1.
1. The United Nations
At the United Nations, the situation in
Since 1992, a Special Rapporteur has been
reporting to the UN on the situation of human rights and the progress towards
democracy in
Since 1993, the UN has made several
attempts to broker a dialogue in
The move to appoint Razali followed
attempts by the UN to assume a more pro-active role in breaking the political
impasse in
1. 2. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations
The appointment of Razali Ismail as UN Special
Envoy can be construed as an attempt to give the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN) a greater responsibility in efforts to promote democratic
reforms in
ASEAN favours engagement with
Aung San Suu Kyi has appealed for stronger
Asian support for the pro-democracy struggle. During the ASEAN ministerial
meeting in
1. 3. The European Union
The European stand on
2.
Bilateral relations
2.
1.
An important reason for the unwillingness
of many Asian countries to isolate
Since the mid-1980s, there has been a boom
in cross-border trade between
There is also growing military co-operation
between the two countries. Together with
2. 2.
It is assumed that
Although
2. 3. The
The American position has remained constant
and critical. Since 1995, cities and counties in the
2. 4.
A few Australian cities have passed
selective purchasing laws. However, over the past few years,
G. AN ATTEMPT TO CONCLUDE: What is next?
Given the current dialogue between Aung San
Suu Kyi and representatives of the SPDC, the transition in
1.
The military:
Most analysts agree that the military will
not be giving up power willingly, but that it has been forced to the
negotiation table. This reduces the likelihood of a quick transition. Several
factors may have forced the military to change its position on a dialogue. They
include the disastrous economic and social situation in
So far, Aung San Suu Kyi is reported to have met with Lt. Gen. Khin Nyunt, Maj. Gen. Kyaw Win from the Directorate of Defence Services Institute (DDSI), and Col. Than Tun, who is said to be close to Sr. Gen. Than Shwe. There has been speculation that the dialogue could be linked to rivalries within the SPDC, but this has been strongly denied by the military. The dialogue is said to have been approved by Se. Gen. Than Shwe. However, there is concern that compromises between the parties to the dialogue may meet with opposition from military hardliners.
2. The NLD:
The current talks are the outcome of a strategy that the NLD has pursued since 1988 by calling for peaceful change through dialogue. At the same time, the NLD is in a weaker organisational position than before as many members have been forced to resign. The party apparatus has been dismantled by the authorities over the past two years. At present, the NLD is talking to an adversary whose avowed aim until recently was to destroy the league.
In the past, the NLD has called for confidence-building measures that would indicate that the junta is serious about reform. More specifically, the NLD has called for the release of political prisoners and freedom for the league and other political parties to exercise their activities. The SPDC has released a number of political prisoners from the NLD since January. However, these only comprise political prisoners who had been arrested since Fall 2000, and did not include prisoners who are not members of the NLD or who have been in prison for some time. Many more dissidents remain under arrest, including U Win Htein, policy advisor to Aung San Suu Kyi. Neither has the situation changed so far regarding the ability of political parties to exercise their activities, although DVB radio station has reported that NLD offices will be allowed to reopen in the near future.
The talks have started with Aung San Suu Kyi as the sole representative of the democratic forces of the country, and this has raised concern over the pressure that is being put on her. At the same time, the NLD is reported to have been informed about the talks in December. According to DVB, Aung San Suu Kyi currently has access to other NLD leaders, including vice-chairman U Tin Oo and CEC member U Lwin.
3. The ethnic movement:
Ethnic armed groups, including the Karen National Union, the Kachin Independence Organisation, and the National Council of the Union of Burma (NCUB) have welcomed the talks. At the same time, they are also calling for caution. A tripartite dialogue in which ethnic groups are present has long been seen as a necessary prerequisite for any reforms to take place. In particular, issues such as power-sharing with the military and possible immunity for the armed forces are sensitive and potential sources of disagreement between the democratic and ethnic forces.
4. The exile community and the international community:
For the international community, the main
challenge in the months to come will be to find the right balance between
pressure so that the dialogue inside
Since the talks begun in October, Aung San
Suu Kyi has met with representatives from the EU and the
The EU and the
The international solidarity movement has
called for an escalation of action, so that pressure is kept up and for
governments to refrain from economic engagement with
5. The issues:
So far, both the SPDC and Aung San Suu Kyi
have remained tight-lipped about the content of the talks. In April-May 2001,
the two sides broke the silence for the first time. During an ASEAN Foreign
Ministers’ Retreat in April 2001,
There are a number of challenges ahead before
- The 1990 election result: Should these elections be implemented, or should new elections be organised?
-
The nature of the state: Should
-
The political system: Should
-
Civil-military relations: What
role should the military play in
- How to deal with past abuses: Should the military be granted immunity or should a system of retribution be set up as pat of a transition process?
As we have seen, there have been contacts
in the past between the military and the NLD without these resulting in
tangible reforms. The coming months will prove crucial in determining whether
the ongoing talks turn out differently. The process towards political change in
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[1] There is no general agreement on the name of the country or of its
citizens. While the military authorities renamed the country
[2] The bulk of this paper was written before the talks were known, and
before October when they started. The current discussions are at a very early
stage, and nothing has so far fundamentally changed in
[3] The information for the historical
background is taken from the following sources:
Brown: The State and Ethnic politics in
South-east Asia; Cady: The history of
post-war Southeast Asia; Cady: A
history of Burma; Elliott: The White
Umbrella; Lintner: The rise and fall
of the Communist Party of Burma; Kachin Independence Organisation, Karen
National Union, Karen National League, Mon Unity League, Sargent: My life as a Shan Princess; Silverstein:
“Burma”, Smith: Burma, Insurgency and the Politics of Ethnicity; Smith: Ethnic Groups in Burma; Weller: Democracy and Politics in Burma;
Yawnghwe: Memoirs of a Shan in exile.
[4] A saopha, or sawbwa, is a traditional hereditary ruler among the Shan and the Karenni
[5] See Lintner 1990, p. 19.
[6] Information about the main protagonists is taken from the following sources: ABSDF: To stand and be counted, Aung San Suu Kyi: Freedom from Fear & Voice of Hope, Ball: Burma’s military secrets & SIGINT, Callahan: The Sinking Schooner, Images Asia: No childhood at all, KHRG reports, Maung Maung: Burma and General Ne Win, Khin Maung Win & Smith: Burma, Selth: The Tatmadaw, Silverstein: Aung San’s legacy, websites, material written by the organisations.
[7] KHRG report #99-04,
[8] See Selth 1996, p. 6.
[9] Political
dissidents are the key targets of the intelligence apparatus. There are several
intelligence agencies, either under the Tatmadaw or under the Ministry of Home
Affairs. Lt. Gen. Khin Nyunt has played an important role in the development of
the military intelligence services (MIS). In addition to his position in the
SPDC, he controls the Directorate of Defence Services Intelligence (DDSI) whose
activities range from military intelligence operations against insurgents to
suppression of political dissent and threats to the security of the state. They
also include surveillance within military ranks. Khin Nyunt also heads the
Office of Strategic Studies (OSS), which was created at the beginning of the
1990s in order to promote security co-operation in the Asia-Pacific region. The
[10] According to Ball (1998) , “with Singapore and Thailand being the two important exceptions, Burma’s SIGINT/EW (Signal Intelligence/ Electronic Warfare) capabilities are now superior to most of the other countries in Southeast Asia in terms of modern conventional military capabilities”.
[11] See Images
[12] See Selth 1996, p.20.
[13] Gen. Tin Oo was killed in a helicopter accident in February 2001. See AP report, Burmanet News, 19.02.01
[14] See Text of report by Democratic Voice of
[15] See Lintner 1991, p. 3.
[16] Timothy Garton Ash, in
[17] The Gandhi Hall Declaration: This declaration is the outcome of a
meeting of newly elected representatives from the NLD that took place in
[18] Information for the section on goals and processes is taken from the following sources:
Aung San Suu Kyi: Freedom from Fear & Voice of Hope, Ball: SIGINT & Burma’s military secrets, Brooker: Authoritarian regimes, Brown: The State and Ethnic politics, BLC, Burmanet News, CRPP and NLD statements and notifications, Cruz & Diamint: The new military autonomy, DVB, Garton Ash 2000, Gravers: The Karen Nation, Jung & Shapiro: South Africa’s negotiated transition, Lavik: Pain and survival, Linz & Stepan: Problems of democratic transition, Maran La Raw, NCUB, NDF, New Light of Myanmar, Selth: The Tatmadaw, Smith: Burma – Insurgency and the politics of ethnicity, UN Special Rapporteur on human rights in Burma, websites.
[19] The doctrine of Dwifungsi or “dual function” was formulated in 1965. It reflects an understanding that the Indonesian military has a dual role. In addition to its traditional role as a security force protecting the state against external aggression, the military also entertains a broader role in society that covers ideological, political, social, economic, religious and other matters.
[20] According to Aung San Suu Kyi, “members of the Buddhist Sangha in their customary role as mentors have led the way in articulating popular expectations by drawing on classical learning to illuminate timeless values, See Aung San Suu Kyi 1991/1995, p.168.
[21] See Min Zin 2000.
[22] For an overview of the issue of dialogue, see CRPP Notification 34 (5/99) from 27 May 1999 as well as Aung San Suu Kyi's message to the 33rd Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) ministerial meeting and 7th ASEAN regional forum, Burmanet News, 21.07.99
[23] See Amnesty International, news service, ASA
[24] CRPP no. 5/99, NLD statement 67/2000.
[25] See AFP news report, Burmanet News, 24.08.00.
[26] See for instance Jung & Shapiro 1995
[27] Timothy Garton Ash, in
[28] See NCGUB April 1998 and ABSDF June 1998.
[29] CRPP statement no.1/1998, 17.09.98.
[31] See Cruz & Diamint 1998.
[32] See Selth 1996, chap. 7&8.
[33] A second dilemma does not concerns the military's right to rule,
but the strategy by which the military is seeking to stay in power. Two
questions are crucial; How to deal with the NLD and the international
community; and how to handle
[34] See Ball 1998.
[35] See Larry Jagan, BBC, 16.11.00
[36] For an overview of the human rights situation in ethnic areas, see KHRG and Amnesty International reports as well as BERG 2000.
[37] See KHRG, April 1998
[38] See for instance Sargent 1995, pop. 48-49
[39] See Smith 1991, p. 324
[40] See Gravers 1996, p.238.
[41] See Gravers 1996, p.238.
[42] Information on socio-economic conditions
in Burma is largely based on four main sources; the World Bank, the International
Monetary Fund, the Asian Development Bank and a number of UN agencies. In 1999,
World Bank and the IMF conducted a joint survey to update and improve knowledge
of the situation in
[43] Burmese government statistics are notoriously unreliable. Estimates of the military’s share of overall government spending range from 8,2 percent to 50 percent. It is reasonable to believe that expenditures within other sectors of the state economy are used for the benefit of the military as well.
[44] See The Irrawaddy, Vol.8 No.3,
March 2000, see also the series in the
[45] In Burmanet News, 03.03.00
[46] In Reuters, 30.05.00
[47] See CIA World Factbook 2000
[48] For
instance, Only 49 percent of the population have access to clean water, while
46 percent of the population have access to safe sanitation.
[49] Drug abuse in
[50] For instance, 74 percent of all drug addicts in the capital
[51] See Burmanet News; 10.03.00.
[52] See
[53] In November 20000, The UN Special Rapporteur on human rights in Burma, Judge Rajsoomer Lallah resigned, citing lack of logistical and administrative support from the Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights due to a lack of resources. His predecessor, professor Yozo Yokota, resigned for similar reasons in 1996. Judge Lallah was replaced by politics professor Paulo Sergio Pinheiro in February 2001. ( See AP reports, 03.11.00 and 07.02.01)
[54] See Aung San Suu Kyi’s message to United Nations Commission on Human Rights, 09.04.99.
[55] See the Nation 11.03.00
& Radio
[56] See the covering of the visit by the Mizzima News Group
[57] See “Intensity the pressure on
[58] Associated Press
Online, Nando Times at <http://www.nandotimes.com>