Some Talk, Little Action

Special Report:

Burma’s Secret Talks

April 2002

ALTSEAN Burma

Published April 2002

CONTENTS

2 Talks Checklist

4 Uneasy Dance

Confidence Building or Confidence Trick?

Dashed Hopes

Razali Backstep

Concrete Signs

Sshhh!

Mid-Term Developments That Signal Imminent Reforms – tripartitie talks, Release of political prisoners, political freedom

Ethnic Nationalities

The Wider Picture

9 Factors in the Dynamic

Military consolidation – march 202 “coup plot”, refashioning of khin nyunt, the army’s party,

Leverage – Forced Labor, Pinheiro, Drugs

CRPP

National Convention

22 What Do They Say?

NLD – ethnic politics

Ethnic Groups

SPDC – talk on ethnic groups

Pro-Democracy Allies

International Community – west, east

39 Who’s Who

Aung San Suu Kyi

Than Shwe

Khin Nyunt

Maung Aye

Razali

Kyaw WIn

Than Tun,

U Lwin

Other Players

52 Chronology

ISBN: 974-90316-7-9

Published Bangkok, April 2002

TALKS CHECKLIST

Weather:	HOT – rumours, followed by disappointment. Cloudy decision-making.
Regularity:	Intermittent, with significant hiatus in Feb-May 2001.
Who’s talking:	Aung San Suu Kyi meets Col. Than Tun, he reports to Maj-Gen Kyaw Win, who reports to Lt-Gen Khin Nyunt, who hopefully discusses with Sen Gen Than Shwe. On rare occasions Aung San Suu Kyi reportedly meets with Lt-Gen Khin Nyunt. Rumour that she went to meet Sen. Gen. Than Shwe in Jan 2002.
Who’s talking 2:	Aung San Suu Kyi meets Leon de Riedmatten, who reports to Razali Ismail, who reports to UN Secretary General Kofi Annan. Mr Razali also discusses situation with a number of key governments – notably Japan, UK, US & Malaysia. He visits Rangoon when SPDC allows him.
SPDC wants:	Aid and trade to ease severe economic deterioration. Increased legitimacy. Consolidation of power. End sanctions. Undermine and co-opt pro-democracy and ethnic forces. Stamp out Thai-based exiles.
nld wants:	Release of political prisoners & Aung San Suu Kyi. End forced labour and other human rights abuses. Dialogue. A political solution to Burma’s problems. Economic and political reforms.
ethnic groups want:	End to war & human rights abuses. Economic and social development. Basic healthcare and education. Cultural rights. Political rights. Some want an equitable federal system.
intl community wants:	Transform talks into genuine dialogue. Reforms, reforms, reforms. Stability and accountability to allow Burma to be a viable partner in aid and trade.
Outcomes:	Talks yet to be transformed from “confidence building” into genuine dialogue. No actual commitment economic or political reforms yet. Much anticipated power-sharing statement on Jan 4, 2002 never happened
Prisoners:	Releases in dribs and drabs, mostly in time for visits of UN and international officials. Criminal releases combined with political. Many politically significant prisoners still in jail, despite age, health concerns. Most eligible for parole or have completed sentences. Access to prisoners by ICRC improving.

Ethnic nationalities:	Military offensives still ongoing, notably in Karen state. No peace deals with others, merely cease-fires.
Forced relocation:	Not easing.
Forced labour:	Still rampant. Regime “substituting” forced labour with prison labour, i.e. more civilians being jailed for minor offences so that they can be sent to labour camps. Increasing number of labour caps for infrastructure and commercial agriculture.
Freedom of Expression:	NONE. Dr. Salai Tun Than, 74, sentenced to 7 years at Insein prison for leafletting, Nov 2001.
Arbitrary Detention:	New politically motivated detentions still occurring, but in fewer numbers.
Torture:	Does not seem to have decreased.
Religious Tolerance:	MINIMAL. Post Sep 11 justifies increased harassment of Muslims. Pagoda renovations and new
Military Intelligence:	Activity on the rise in neighbouring countries, especially Thailand. Burst in energy due to alleged Sandar Win coup plot in Mar 02.
DrugS:	Burma wins back heroin title from defender Afghanistan. Amphetamine production still rising. Drug-related armed clashes with Thai army still occurring.
ASEAN response:	Passive position: “Leave it up to Razali”. Almost all ASEAN states are actually taking a backseat and NOT engaging to encourage progress of talks. Ironic lack of support for Razali’s efforts.
European & North American response:	Getting impatient with lack of progress. Will not rush into dismantling sanctions or granting large amounts of aid until genuine reforms achieved. Activists pushing for new sanctions against textile imports from Burma.
JAPAN:	Initially most optimistic about talks. Made aid commitments, including the controversial Balachaung Dam. Now getting concerned at lack of progress.
FORECAST	Need more coordinated pressure/encouragement for SPDC to deliver. Increase size of both carrots and stick as motivation
lATEST RUMOUR	Aung San Suu Kyi will be released in time for Thinjan, the Buddhist New Year (mid-April)

UNEASY DANCE

The secret talks between Burma’s State and Peace Development Council (SPDC) and National League for Democracy (NLD) have begun to resemble a frustrating dance. The SPDC appears intent on dancing backwards, while the NLD gallantly attempts to stay in step without tripping.

It has been 18 months since talks were initiated between the SPDC apparently led by Lt. Gen. Khin Nyunt and the NLD led by Daw Aung San Suu Kyi.[1] Sadly, but unsurprisingly there has been little tangible process. There is still no dialogue process and no concrete sign of commitment to national reconciliation and democratic change by the SPDC. It is widely accepted that the talks have not progressed beyond the “confidence-building” stage.

Confidence-building or confidence trick?

One questions whether the situation is indeed that of “confidence-building” or that of a “con job”. The SPDC has sought to use the secret talks as leverage to dismantle international pressure and to gain aid and trade concessions. The absence of genuine progress, and the intermittent nature of these talks have not helped the SPDC gain new friends.

Dashed Hopes

Hopes were dashed on Independence Day (4 Jan) 2002 when a much anticipated “breakthrough” did not take place. On 13 December 2001, NLD spokesperson U Lwin spoke of Independence Day with great optimism, anticipating the release and amnesty of political prisoners and/or the start of a substantive dialogue process towards national reconciliation and democracy. This anticipation was reflected amongst Rangoon diplomats and locals alike.

Independence Day came and went, the only mention of the talks being in the NLD’s first formal statement on the talks. The NLD reiterated calls for speedier process of the talks, the start of a meaningful tripartite political dialogue, release of Aung San Suu Kyi and all other political prisoners and the granting of political freedom.[2] These are the demands consistently made by the pro-democracy movement and would go part of the way in proving some kind of genuine commitment to dialogue by the regime.

Razali Backstep

UN Special Envoy Mr Razali’s initial comments were also grounds for optimism,[3]. However optimism turned to frustration – he stated in February 2002 that the talks are not making speedy enough progress. This setback is compounded by the SPDC’s last-minute and unexpected postponement of his visit scheduled for March 19.[4] At time of printing this report, the SPDC had not yet responded to the UN’s request that Mr Razali’s be allowed to travel in the first week of April[5]

Concrete Signs

Immediate indicators that long-time Burma analysts are watching out for are:

· Release of politically significant prisoners including U Win Htein, U Win Tin and U Aye Thar Aung

· Release of Aung San Suu Kyi from house arrest

· Open discussion of the talks in the national Burmese media.

Sshhhhh!

Although the talks began in October 2000, they were not announced to the international community until 9 Jan 2001, and have not been mentioned to the Burmese public. Nobody, including Razali – the UN Special Envoy, can say anything of substance. The SPDC argue that “this [dialogue/talk] process, which is very much complex and delicate, should be left confidential. The freedom of the country very much depends on this.”[6] It is in fact extremely harmful, and the only group benefiting from this opacity is the regime.

Due to the wall of silence that has surrounded the talks, rumours and speculation have been the steering force of reports and updates. While there has been speculation of power sharing talks and a time framework for a transitional administration,[7] reports suggest that democracy has some conditions, including criminal immunity for the SPDC and assurance that Aung San Suu Kyi will not take a leading political role.[8] However, Gen Than Shwe also said a year ago, that if Suu Kyi was elected there would be no interference. As seductive as the rumours are, they are just rumour, and in reality the only thing that is clear is that the talks are still a long way from genuine political dialogue. The environment for many observers and activists now, is one of frustration.

Mid-term developments that signal imminent reform are:

1. Tripartite talks

The talks and any future dialogue process must include representatives from other political parties and non-Burman nationalities if it is to stand any chance of success. Only if talks are open and tripartite can the SPDC be genuinely seen to be committed to moving towards political progress. [see What Do They Say? Pg22]

2. Release of Political Prisoners

While approximately 200 political prisoners have been released since the talks started, there remain up to 1,800 still in prison. Aung San Suu Kyi, herself under house arrest, has made the release of political prisoners her central demand as a confidence-building step.

Most of the prisoners released had already served their sentences and should not have been arrested in the first place. If those arrested with Daw Aung San Suu Kyi when she tried to travel outside of Rangoon in Sept 2000 are not included in the prisoner release tally, the number of those released is effectively halved.

Prisoners of key concern include:

U Aye Tha Aung – a high profile ethnic leader imprisoned for 21 years at Insein prison and who was known to be ill in Sep 2001.

U Win Tin – renowned journalist, recipient of several awards including the Golden Pen of Freedom, and the Guillermo Cano World Press Freedom Prize.

U Win Htein – aide to Aung San Suu Kyi serving a 14 year sentence.

Min Ko Naing – a student leader who has been incarcerated for over 12 years.

For a genuine commitment to potential dialogue and political transition, the SPDC must release more that several high-profile political prisoners; they must release all in one go, not in dribs and drabs to appease visiting UN officials.

Most of the prisoner releases focus on those the regime considers least threatening, instead of such obvious criteria as age, health, and eligibility for parole. Indeed, a number of prisoners still held have already been detained beyond their prison sentences, and some are being detained without trial.

3. Political Freedom

Decrees suppressing political parties and activities remain firmly in place. The UN has expressed concern regarding continuing political harrassment and intimidation, including arrests and imprisonment of individuals engaged in peaceful political activities and their families. Such arrests and intimidation expose the regime as disingenuous.

Only a small number of NLD offices have been permitted to re-open, most of which are in Rangoon. The opening of these offices has often required ‘deals’ with local authorities and there remain restraints on activities. In areas outside Rangoon, the political climate is even more hostile, for example an NLD office in Mandalay was refused permission to open, although such refusal could not be obtained in writing but would only be made verbally.

Although Suu Kyi has been able to meet with some visiting diplomats, free access to other democracy leaders and ethnic nationality groups has yet to happen. Furthermore, she has no influence over Razali’s visits which have been delayed by the regime in the past, and are currently being delayed again (Mar 02) – clearly not an indicator of the regime’s commitment.

In mid-2001 there were mysterious disappearances of pro-democracy individuals living in exile along the Thai-Burma border, highlighting the frightening power of the Military Intelligence Services (MIS) even outside of Burma. In an environment where freedom of expression, assembly and opinion remain severely restricted,[9] genuine dialogue cannot occur.

Ethnic Nationalities

Military offensives do not appear to have ceased, neither have such abuses as forced relocation, forced labour and looting.

A dangerous trend that is emerging is the growth of labour camps. Civilians, significantly those from ethnic areas, are arrested and given long sentences for the most minor infringements. They are then transferred to labour camps to work on infrastructure developments or plantations owned by the military. This way, the military is able to substitute civilian forced labour with prison labour.

Politically, the regime has also not left out ethnic nationality leaders:

· The most recent documented arrest has been that of Dr. Salai Tun Than, arrested in November 2001 for peacefully distributing leaflets calling for democratic reform and elections on the steps of City Hall in Rangoon. He was sentenced to 7 years imprisonment at Insein prison. The fact that he was permitted to meet with UN Special Rapporteur Pinheiro does not alter the fact that his rights are being violated.

· Pastor Gracy, a Chin Baptist, arrested for her alleged connections with a rebel group was arrested in July 2001 and sentenced to 2 years’ hard labour.

· A prominent ethnic leader who worked closely with Aung San Suu Kyi, Mr. Gin Kam Lian, Secretary General of the Zomi National Congress, was arrested on 19 March 2001 for unknown reasons.

Attacks on political personnel and most political parties continue. For example, Sai Panlu, secretary of a township branch of the Shan Nationalities League for Democracy (SNLD) was reportedly forced to resign in September 2001 after pressure from the military.[10]

The Wider Picture

The lethargic process of the talks has added weight to the theory that the talks are merely a manipulating tactic of the regime to enhance its international reputation in order that sanctions may be dropped and aid granted. The long-term role of UN Special Envoy Razali Ismail is a reason for hope that the talks will eventually lead somewhere. However, the ironic lack of support for Razali’s efforts from key ASEAN states may undermine his standing with the regime.

It is crucial that the international community keep supporting the talks by ensuring that the talks deliver genuine progress. Simultaneously, the talks must be opened up to the public and all ethnic groups, including all relevant parties. Only then can there be a meaningful change to the future of Burma.

Supporting the talks can be complemented by supporting a wider picture of change in Burma.

· Pressure must be maintained to ensure that the ILO has genuine and guaranteed access to Burma to effectively work towards the abolition of forced labour.

· The judiciary must become independent so that the people of Burma are protected by the Rule of Law and have means for redress whilst human rights abuses are brought to a halt.

· The drug trade must be properly tackled and this can only be done when the people supporting the networks are exposed and their activities halted.

· The authorities must be encouraged to take responsibility for the well being of the people of Burma. Responsibility does not mean using the people’s poverty to plea for aid. Rather it means restructuring budgetary allocations and properly supporting civil structures such as health, education and housing.

The international community needs to review the best way to provide this support, as the status quo does not appear to be making great advances.

All of these things must be done concurrently if democracy in Burma is to be achieved. If the proper support is given to the talks then a momentum can be formed whereby tripartite political dialogue cannot be avoided.

FACTORS IN THE DYNAMIC

MILITARY CONSOLIDATION

March 2002 “coup plot”

In early March, the authorities detained Sandar Win (former dictator Ne Win’s favourite daughter), her husband Aye Zaw Win and their three sons for allegedly plotting a coup.

Four high-ranking officials were arrested and dismissed from their posts for being part of the plot (Air Commander in Chief Maj-Gen Myint Swe, Golden Triangle Region Commander Brig-Gen Chit Than, Coastal Region Commander Maj-Gen Aye Kyway, Police Chief Maj-Gen Soe Win).

A significant number of other senior officers, both serving and retired have been detained and interrogated. Officers of mid-rank and above in the Rangoon and Pegu divisions were ordered to cancel any leave and return to their units, pending investigation.

In a rare burst of openness, the SPDC held a series of press conferences featuring the talents of Maj-Gen Kyaw Win who revealed details of the alleged coup plot. Kyaw Win was very quick to (erroneously) guarantee that the coup attempt was not motivated by the talks, and nor would it impede on their progress.[11] This is indeed impressive. The daughter of headman Ne Win is the alleged ringleader of a coup to be performed by Ne Win’s son-in-law and grandchildren whereby they violently take over power. Their plans are foiled and life continues as normal. The structures of government must be secure indeed.

Then, there is the other looking glass. In an environment where it is becoming increasingly imperative to watch one’s back, members of Ne Win’s family are looking after themselves to re-secure dollars and privileges. They are frustrated with the dire straits of the economy and the fact that others are the keepers of pockets of gold and turn to strategic allies in the military. Their disruption was economic in nature; their disruption was most likely not a coup attempt.

Why would the regime talk of a coup? The regime works in (not-so-) mysterious ways sometimes. If there is a coup plot and it can arrest the “ringleaders” before it happens, then it can portray itself as strong and effective and protectors of the people. And, it can ‘legitimately’ increase military intelligence and corruption clampdowns. About 100 senior soldiers and police are being interrogated in connection to the ‘coup’ (supposedly on a list drawn up by Ne Win’s daughter - apparent mastermind and informer) with 4 senior officers already dismissed.[12]

While the ‘coup plot’ is most probably a continuum of the November 2001 reshuffles (where Khin Nyunt signed for the dismissals of 2 top generals and allies of Maung Aye), the political and structural changes must have implications for the talks. To quote Razali, “Obviously, all events like this are serious. They have a direct impact.”[13] The first direct implication has been that the UN Special Envoy’s 7^th trip has been postponed again.

Due to arrive on 19 March 2002, Razali has been asked to postpone his trip at the last minute as the military are too busy dealing with the ‘coup’ attempt. As the US has stated, this delay casts sincere doubt over the regime’s commitment to dialogue.[14] It is vital that the international community supports the talks at this crucial time as, to quote a UN spokesperson, “The process must continue.”[15]

The re-fashioning of Khin Nyunt

In the wider picture, the military changes may bring increased momentum to the talks, as Khin Nyunt appears to be overseeing the strategic stream of dismissals, many of whom may well be opposed to any talks with Aung San Suu Kyi.

Many in the SPDC are scared to start a transition towards democracy they may lose control of. […] They have been indoctrinated to believe Suu Kyi is evil and a traitor. That sentiment can't be changed overnight. Sunai Phasuk, Forum Asia[16]

A massive purge in 1997 was perhaps a preliminary to the changes ocuring now, where Khin Nyunt started to neutralise potential challenges to his hold over the inner circle. In one fell swoop, he removed a number of rivals previously considered untouchable, including Maung Aye’s close friends. In the reshuffles in November last year, Khin Nyunt continued to gain and widen his political power. He is head of a widely influential – and frightening – military intelligence unit whose influence is broadening. If Khin Nyunt is indeed the person behind the talks and Maung Aye their greatest critic, then Khin Nyunt’s eradication of his opposition may mean the talks face less obstruction.

There has been wide speculation concerning the 2 rivaling factions in the regime, headed by Khin Nyunt and Maung Aye. In February some reports claimed the death of Secretary No.2, Lt. General Tin Oo (ally of Maung Aye) in the February 19 helicopter crash was no accident, but rather part of an ongoing struggle for power and influence. Speculation continued in March 2001, with rumours of a coup by Khin Nyunt and the arrests of Maung Aye and Than Shwe. While this latter rumour was clearly false, such speculation does indicate Khin Nyunt’s perceived potential strength.

Saying this however, it is crucial to bear in mind that Maung Aye is immensely popular among soldiers – and there are hundreds of thousands of them – who could unbalance Khin Nyunt from any perch of power he may take if they so wished. Therefore, while this section details Khin Nyunt’s increasing political influence and power, he is well aware that the power struggle is far from over.

Khin Nyunt is certainly remoulding himself into a diplomat, convincing some that he is ‘moderate’ or at least willing to listen. He has taken the initiative in directing, possibly even instigating the talks, and is carving himself into the roots of the regime so that it cannot function without him. He seems to be positioning himself as the only viable link between the old (military regime) and the new (democracy). If he is seen to be moderate enough then he hopes his role can be larger and he can assert more influence. He has made it clear that democracy in Asia does not mean the same as democracy in the West and looks at the ‘strong’ government of Malaysia in particular as a role of what can be; as a role of perhaps what he can be.

Such concentration of power and influence does not bode well for long-term political change, even if Khin Nyunt is the driving force behind the talks. The more Khin Nyunt strengthens his position, the greater bargaining power he will lay claim to.

The Army’s Party

The military are desperate to assert themselves as the primary party in their ‘multi-party’, ‘democratic’ state. Following on from Than Shwe’s earlier calls for the ‘Myanmar War Veterans Association’ to become involved in politics, the Union Solidarity and Development Association (USDA) has been organising political rallies in major cities in an attempt to reassert its hold on power. The rallies imply that aligning themselves with the USDA is an investment. Membership of the USDA already provides people with special benefits, including access to a newly opened Myanmar and International Studies Course.

It is imperative that the USDA and the rest of us do our best to see to the materialisation of these objectives and tasks, for the sooner that can be done, the better off we will be. USDA rally, 2002 [1]

You have to make efforts for the emergence of a strong organisation with dynamic efficiency in order to successfully carry out the...tasks of the War Veterans Organisation: national politics, state defence, security, economy, community service, social activities and welfare. Than Shwe, 6 Jun 01[1]

If, as some observers have predicted, the regime is using the talks to buy itself time to remould itself into a politically acceptable body, to lose the ‘baggage’ of the military, the result could be a missed opportunity for real democratic change in Burma. While the military undergoing a process of change into a civilian body is welcomed, it is crucial to realize that with Khin Nyunt as an unchallenged leader, the wellbeing of the people and democratic principles are far from guaranteed. Rather, politics are likely to be polarised from the societal level for even longer.

It must be realised that the talks can be abandoned whenever the regime so wishes as there is no formal commitment to anything with NLD. The regime has already got a back out clause drawn up if ever they find the need: Asked whether the NLD, a legal political party, would be allowed to stand for seats in the new parliament, the military’s answer was, “I cannot give you black and white answer at this date because when you walk out [of the National Convention] you are disqualified after certain number of days. […] but I think this is for the decision maker to decide what they will do in the near future.”[17]

If any of the above do transpire it will be a disaster. The election results of 1990 will mean nothing and the democratic values that have so long been fought for by so many people may be pushed further back into Burma’s closet.

The international community therefore has to be persistent in its demands for genuine tripartite and equal dialogue and support for processes that will eventuate in peaceful and collaborated reconciliation and democracy. Some governments may find it acceptable to have the military lead a new form of ‘democratic’ government in Burma. However, years of abuse, corruption, unaccountability, mismanagement in almost all aspects of society and complicity with the drugs trade at the very least, tell that more imagination must be used when envisaging Burma’s future.

LEVERAGE

The SPDC are well aware that their human rights (forced labour) and drugs records are the major obstacles to sanctions being lifted and aid being granted. Although most countries have tied the lifting of sanctions to progress in the talks and political change, Burma’s drug production will also have weight.

If the regime can make some moves in the right direction, the international may well reward it with a change in economic and aid policies. Japan has already moved in this direction, increasing aid dramatically. Other countries have insisted, however, that more concrete steps be taken. Such caution is commendable, considering the regime’s kleptomaniac tendencies. What is required to maintain the talks and political change in Burma is for international bodies and funders to make observations with an open mind and from a healthy distance.

Forced labour

The eradication of forced labour has been a central part of the international community’s antagonistic relationship with Burma. The ILO resolution, passed in November 2000 (Article 33), called for companies and organisations to review their relationship with Burma with an eye to increasing sanctions, as they found forced labour to be widely practiced. In November 2001, the ILO High Level Team found forced labour was still widespread, particularly in highly militarised areas, and often accompanied with violence. Of course, “the authorities concerned launched thorough investigations [into all allegations of forced labour]. These investigations showed the allegations were baseless and false.”[18]

Such an unacceptable response has met with further action from the ILO, who stated there are “no grounds for complacency.”[19] To “trigger a more open attitude from the international community,” the ILO clearly stated that there must be a “more coherent political commitment” to eradicating forced labour.

It has been agreed that a ‘Liaison Officer’ will be based in Rangoon, by June 2002. While it appears the understanding is for the Officer to provide technical assistance that would include the freedom to move around and meet the population,[20] it would be surprising to many if the regime accepted this, considering limitations placed upon UN bodies currently established in Rangoon.

In the end, eradication of forced labour can only eventuate with the political will of the military and a parallel restructure and reorganisation of the regime and military forces. If Article 33 was revoked and the doors to aid were opened, the ILO would have no absolute guarantee of its future in or with Burma. In essence, forced labour cannot be effectively banned outside of a transition to democratic government. To quote Madeleine Albright, 18 Jan 01:

Forced labor is unlikely to end in Burma as long as democracy is denied. Thus, it is especially important for the current dialogue to lead to genuine progress: the full and free participation of the National League for Democracy and the Burmese people in the political life of their country, the release of political prisoners, and an end to forced labor.[21]

Pinheiro

UN Special Rapporteur Pinheiro’s reports have been far kinder than his predecessor Lallah’s, with the former spending almost as much energy thanking his hosts for their hospitality as he does trying to get down to the nitty-gritty. This is partly considered to be strategic so that he can continue entering the country. His report, which speaks of “clean and tidy” prisons and other ‘improvements’,[22] which most observers feel do not reflect the true human rights situation. Indeed, Dr Salai Tun Than (imprisoned in February 2002 for a peaceful demonstration) expressed to Pinheiro, during his most recent visit (Feb 02), that prisons look far more livable during his visits than any other time.

While Pinheiro’s wish to continue visiting Burma is understandable, it is crucial that the regime’s stageplays are recognised. Their reactions to even Pinheiro’s relatively mild statements remain highly defensive. It is considered to be “based on false premises - obviously left in to maintain pressure on us,”[23] clearly not indicating a more open view on human rights. Reports congratulating any improvements in human rights must be carefully weighed up against the situation that remains to be true on the ground. In the context of Burma, this means paying high attention to continued use of forced labour and political marginalisation and oppression. [see ‘Supporting the talks’] The UN and the international community are justified in remaining “gravely concerned” about conditions in Burma. Efforts need to be sustained to ensure human rights are upheld and political change is definite, to quote the Prime Minister in exile:

If they [the military] continue with the abuses, the talks will be just talks, while the people continue to suffer and the country degenerates. Sein Win, PM NCGUB, 5 May 01[24]

Drugs

While authorities in Burma continue to boast of drug seizures (miniscule when compared to production) and the UNDCP claims Burma’s opium gum production more than halved in 2001 to 865 metric tonnes, it is clear that the SPDC is reluctant and unable to tackle the drugs situation properly. Drug seizures have actually experienced a downwards trend since 1998.

Based on the statistics, it is difficult not to conclude that the SPDC’s much publicised drug seizures and burnings are done purely as a public relations stunt for the consumption of potential foreign-aid donors – and there is very little, if any, real commitment to eradicate drugs in Burma.

There is no question that the Burmese government is using the drug issue to ‘sell’ itself internationally; being able to show a decent human rights record, it believes that it would be re-accepted into the international community if it can show some impressive seizures of drugs and other statistics, which actually bear little resemblance to the reality on the ground in the Golden Triangle. Bertil Lintner

Powerful and well-connected people are running the show meaning that drug production – both opium and methamphetamine - continues to be inextricably linked to, and supported by, the SPDC. Significant anecdotal evidence suggests that the regime continues to be explicitly involved.[25]

Whatever is said of insurgency groups and poverty, the fact remains: without any structural changes in the form of government there will be no significant change where drugs are concerned. Reports suggest that the Wa are looking for alternative trafficking routes (Wa methamphetamines have already reached Europe, as a seizure in Switzerland (Aug 01) has shown) and drugs are crossing the border at an alarming rate.[26] Indeed, under the prevailing status quo, increased sign-ups of anti-drug aid (for example, Thailand and UNDCP funders) will prove to perpetuate the powers that be.

COMMITTEE REPRESENTING THE PEOPLE’S PARLIAMENT (CRPP)

One of the SPDC’s conditions for ‘dialogue’ in the past has been dissolution of the Committee Representing the People’s Parliament (CRPP); a committee which has received widespread recognition from the international community.

The CRPP, formally established at its first meeting on 16 September 1998, is a 10-member committee representing the 1990 elected parliament. Formation of the CRPP was necessary as the military regime has consistently refused to honour the election results[27]. The CRPP declared it will remain active until parliament is allowed to convene.[28]

The junta has tried to dismantle the CRPP since its formation. Formation of the CRPP alone speaks volumes of the total absence of democratic processes in Burma. The CRPP was formed in strict adherence to legal principles and orders and reflected the wishes of a majority of elected MPs. The committee therefore poses a threat to the regime as it has the support of the people, while the regime is dependent on coercion, force and intimidation.

The CRPP’s formation saw direct retaliation, sometimes against members of the committee and other times against the wider democratic opposition. The committee was attacked in the regime-controlled media, hundreds of NLD members and MPs were arrested after its formation, MPs from many parties were harassed and pressured to resign, numerous NLD offices were closed, and “no confidence” rallies were orchestrated. As a key democratic body, time is taken here to look at the treatment of CRPP members and persons directly attached to it since its formation.

Daw Aung San Suu Kyi

CRPP Secretary for Committee for Ethnic Nationalities Affairs, Chairperson Committee for Education

NLD General-Secretary

Released from house arrest in 1995, Suu Kyi was placed back under house arrest in September 2000 after trying to leave Rangoon to meet with NLD party members. Up until January 2001 Suu Kyi was vilified in the state-run press, along with her political party. Despite talks having started in October 2000, she remains under house arrest. Suu Kyi was not permitted visitors until 10 December 2000 when U Lwin was permitted to visit. She has left her home only once, in January 2001. Escorted by military officials, it is not known where she went. Became CRPP Secretary after Aye Thar Aung was arrested.

U Aung Shwe

CRPP Chairperson for Committee for Foreign Affairs

NLD Chairperson, MP for Mayangone 1, Rangoon Division

Became NLD Chairperson in 1990 after Aung San Suu Kyi, Kyi Maung and Tin Oo were placed in detention. Arrested 22 Sep 00 with Aung San Suu Kyi, he was moved from military camp to house arrest on 25 Jan 01 and not released until 27 August, coinciding with Razali’s visit.

U Tin Oo

CRPP Chairperson for Committee for Legal Affairs, Chairperson for Committee for Defence

NLD Deputy Chairperson

Arrested 22 September 2000 with Suu Kyi; released 27 August 2001 to coincide with Razali’s visit.

U Lwin

CRPP Chairperson for Committee for Health and Social Affairs

NLD Secretary, MP for Thonekhwa 1, Rangoon Division

Denounced in ‘no-confidence’ demonstration. He took legal action but the court dismissed the case.[29] U Lwin has been in charge of the NLD since Aung Shwe, Tin Oo and Aung San Suu Kyi were placed under house arrest in September 2000.

U Than Tun

CRPP Chairperson for Committee for Workers’ Affairs

MP for Taungtha 2, Mandalay Division

First MP targeted by ‘no-confidence’ demonstration. He took legal action but the court dismissed his case on the grounds that such activities were not anti-government. Arrested 22 September 2000 with Suu Kyi; released 2 December 2000.

U Nyunt Wei

CRPP Committee for Finance/Economy/Commerce

MP No.2 constituency, Taungoo Township, Pegu Division

Target of a ‘no-confidence’ demonstration organized by regime.[30] Arrested 22 September 2000 with Suu Kyi; released 2 December 2000.

Dr. U Saw Mra Aung

CRPP President

Arakan League for Democracy, MP Mrauk-U 1, Arakan State

Arrested almost immediately after he was elected CRPP President. He was detained in 1998, and was only freed in June 2001 (at the age of 83)[31]

U Aye Tha Aung

CRPP Secretary, Chairperson of CRPP Committee on Ethnic Nationalities’ Affairs

Representative of SNLD, ALD, MNDF, ZNC

Central Executive Committee Member, Arakan League for Democracy

Member, ALD & Union National League for Democracy Secretariats

Arrested on 24 Apr 00and sentenced for 21 years, he remains incarcerated to this day. His release is of key concern. U Aye Tha Aung represents the SNLD, ALD, MNDF and ZNC, the latter 3 forced to dissolve as the leaders were also arrested and incarcerated. He was seriously ill, requiring hospitalisation in Sep 2001.

U Hla Pe

Chairperson of CRPP Committee for Parliamentary Affairs

MP Moulmeingyun 1, Irrawaddy Division

Arrested 22 September 2000 with Suu Kyi; released 2 December 2000.

U Soe Myint

Chairperson of CRPP Committee for Cultivators and Peasants Affairs

MP South Okkalapa Township 1, Rangoon Division

Arrested 22 September 2000 with Suu Kyi; released 2 December 2000.

U Lun Tin (aka Col. Lun Tin, retired)

Chairperson of CRPP for Committee for Workers Affairs

MP Moulmein Township 1, Mon State

Arrested 22 September 2000 with Suu Kyi; released 2 December 2000.

Alongside these attacks, the regime has also used political prisoners and consistent demand for dialogue as bargaining chips. The junta proposed that they would release political prisoners or start dialogue if the CRPP dissolved as a confidence building measure.[32] Given past practices and behaviours by the regime, there was nothing to base trust upon and furthermore dissolution of the CRPP, a democratic body, was a highly inappropriate ‘confidence-building’ step when the ultimate aim is democracy.

It is without the dissolution of the CRPP that talks have started between Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, NLD representative, and the regime, proving that CRPP dissolution was not necessary to start a dialogue. Furthermore, the regime are no longer explicitly demanding this as a confidence-building measure, perhaps because they realise the futility of such a demand or they feel that the prolonged detentions of key CRPP members have been sufficiently disruptive.

At the time of going to press, all members of the CRPP are released, bar Aung San Suu Kyi who remains under house arrest, and U Aye Thar Aung, who remain behind bars despite deteriorating health. U Lwin, U Tin Oo and U Aung Shwe are reportedly meeting with her 3 times week and the 3 men are taking their responsibilities seriously. All 3 men are highly respected by the NLD and wider democratic forces and can work well together. They provide a strong link between Aung San Suu Kyi, the talks and the NLD and can be trusted to treat the situation in a safe and fair manner that will benefit all involved, both currently and potentially.

NATIONAL CONVENTION

The regime continues to assert the National Convention (NC) provides the future for Burma. The NC was formed after the regime’s crushing electoral defeat in 1990. It allowed the regime to go back on its word to honor the election outcome. The regime claimed that it was impossible to convene Parliament without a new constitution. To pro-democracy and a significant number of ethnic nationality leaders, Burma’s (original) 1947 constitution has been acceptable.

At the moment, the National Convening and Working Committees of the National Convention are working on the basic principles in the matter of power sharing between the central organs of the State and those of the States and Divisions. With half of the National Convention [sic] already completed, the delegates will be able to discuss this important and sensitive issue when the National Convention reconvenes. In view of the sensitive nature and its far-reaching implications for the future of the country, it is vital for the National Convention to proceed with great caution to safeguard the interest of all national races…

The Government firmly believes that the National Convention is the only political process suitable for Myanmar and that consensus will be achieved finally for a system which will ensure enduring peace and stability and prosperity in the country. Permanent Mission of Myanmar to the UN, 21 Mar 01[33]

Without a constitution a government cannot be formed. For the military to remain in power therefore, the absence of a constitution clearly works to their advantage. The NC is perceived by pro-democracy activists as a means of prolonging military rule, and when political change does transpire, it appears the regime may claim the NC entitles them to much more than the people believe. Section (1f) provides for a future role for the military as the principle upon which the future constitution must be drafted. The NC is not fooling anyone in the political opposition.

Claims that the NC is a forum for all voices is a blatant lie. In the first place, only 10 of the 93 political parties that stood at the general election in 1990 were considered legal and not all-ethnic groups were invited to attend the convention. Those that did attend had to abide by the SPDC’s strict direction and control of papers. Of the 702 delegates, 600 were handpicked by the regime -only 99 elected representatives were entitled to attend along with 3 representatives of the wider community – including the army.

The National Convention was first convened in January 1993, nearly 3 years after the election. It has not met since March 1996 and is not likely to meet in the near future. The main bulk of the work claimed by the SPDC are being done by committees, working with only the mandate of the SPDC.

In 1995 the NLD staged a boycott when their request for more open discussions in the Convention were rejected. The NLD were subsequently expelled. Since then the NC has become even more dominated by the military and procedures have been practically unknown to the Burmese public. In May 1996, an NLD party congress decided to continue to boycott the NC and to draft an alternative State Constitution. In response, the regime issued a new law (No.5/96) prohibiting anyone from writing or even discussing a state constitution other than the one connected to the NC.

Criticism of the NC had always been forbidden and punishable by lengthy imprisonment under Section (5)(47) of the National Convention Procedural Code. In 1993 almost a dozen activists were given 20-year prison sentences for distributing leaflets, which criticised the workings of the convention.

The fact that the regime continues to talk so passionately of the NC is a cause for concern as its contents are opposed to what opposition groups will have to present during dialogue. Democracy groups and ethnic representatives argue that the National Convention must be abandoned as it does not represent any voice other than the SPDC’s. Rather it has actively suppressed their voices continually. If the talks are to emerge into anything new, rather than the dashed hopes of past ‘dialogues’, new thinking must emerge. The NC is a process of the past, what is needed now are new ideas that can contribute to a genuine and equal dialogue.

WHAT DO THEY SAY?

This section looks at what concerned bodies have said about the progress of the talks since their inception: the 2 parties directly represented in the talks, SPDC and NLD, ethnic groups who are intricately involved, even in their absence; other allied pro-democracy groups and the international community. While responses to the talks have been broadly divided into 4 response groups, it is noted that pro-democracy voices do overlap and intersect each other.

National League for Democracy (NLD)

formed: 24 September 1988

won election: 27 May 1990, 81% of popular vote, 392 seats (NUP 10 seats, SNLD 23, other 60)

withdrew from National Convention: 28 November 1995

first mention of talks: 10 Jan 01, a day after they were announced by UN Special Envoy Razali

formal statements on talks: Independence Day 2002 (4 Jan 02)

meetings with UN Special Envoy:

Aung San Suu Kyi 30 Jun 00, 11 Oct 00, Jan 01, Jun 01, 28 Aug 01, Nov 01Other NLD leaders, include: 8 CEC members 29 Aug 01,

Their Take on Dialogue

U continue to be flexible & co-operative, only published 1 formal statement on talks

U although still patient, encourage faster pace of talks & release of political prisoners

U talks still in confidence-building stage but on track

U ethnic groups must be included in the reconciliation process (eventually)

Independence Day was a day of much significance as the NLD issued its first formal statement on the talks. The break in silence indicates dissatisfaction with the progress of the talks and explicitly demanded the release of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and all other political prisoners, freedom for political parties to operate and an environment whereby all ethnicities can work together. These are demands that have been made by the pro-democracy opposition since the talks began, but after 18 months still remain unaccomplished.

While expressing its dissatisfaction, the NLD was extremely generous in its opening paragraph:

Because “time and tide waits for no man" and because the phrase "always enemy, always friend" does not apply to politics, the National League for Democracy and the State Peace and Development Council will in this new year commencing from this Independence Day strive to achieve a true and meaningful dialogue with new and fresh ideas and in all honesty and expeditiously.[34]

Such a statement indicates that the NLD are not interested in casting the SPDC as eternal enemies of themselves or of Burma. The regime is clearly portrayed as a dialogue partner with whom the party wish to start honest dialogue. The statement made clear recognition that such a process will take time, and hence urges for dialogue to be embarked upon as quickly as possible. As previous NLD statements have made clear, their door is always open for dialogue.

We as the National League for Democracy and as part of the forces for democracy, are always ready to work together with the authorities to achieve national reconciliation. Aung San Suu Kyi 1995.

The NLD have a track record of patience and co-operation with the regime. Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD have scrupulously maintained confidentiality around the contents of the talks. Instead, it took 15 months after the talks started, and a year after the first public statement of the talks, for the NLD to make a formal statement. Reading between the lines, the NLD appears to have struck a deal with the regime whereby the state-run media stops its attacks of Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD in return for the NLD holding its tongue.

The government papers have stopped carrying provocative articles and cartoons and therefore we decided not to do anything that will be provocative.

U Lwin, Jan 01

True to its word, the NLD has not openly criticised the progress of the talks and has been careful not to agitate the regime during the talks process. It is possible that the NLD did not celebrate the 11^th Anniversary of its 1990 election win, nor the ‘8888’ commemoration in 2001 precisely for this reason. Such gestures continue to be symbolic of the party’s willingness to be flexible, perceived by the authorities as non-confrontational, if they trust it will benefit a dialogue process.

Both sides have to be careful not to irritate the process. U Lwin, 10 Jan 01[35]

U Lwin, NLD spokesperson, is the only person permitted to speak to the media about the talks and his statements will have been approved by Aung San Suu Kyi and, more recently, also by U Tin Oo and U Aung Shwe. It is clear to observers that NLD statements are tailored to be strictly non-confrontational, although there have been occasions when discontent has been apparent. It is generally perceived that Aung San Suu Kyi spoke through her actions on Martyrs’ Day 2001 (19 Jul) by not attending the celebrations for the first time since 1995, passing silent disapproval of restrictions on her movement. U Lwin has been given the space to deny Thai Deputy PM Chavalit’s Sep 2001 statement that Khin Nyunt was meeting with Aung San Suu Kyi and that there were talks of power sharing. He has also been given the space to urge for the faster release of prisoners. Other than this however, statements have generally been upbeat; often more upbeat that observers feel is reflective. A statement by U Lwin in January this year is a case in point:

They [the talks] are in a confidence-building stage right now and the process is gradually progressing. The release of political prisoners and the reopening of NLD township offices are proof of the progress. […] In a political and organizational sense [there are signs of] freedom of movement. The important factor is there have been no political arrests or detentions lately. These are all significant developments. For such success to be achieved the dialogue has to be ongoing. In other words it is not stalled, it is very much alive. […] Once the confidence-building stage has met the expectations then automatically it will develop into a dialogue on political matters. U Lwin, 31 Jan 02[36]

Ethnic politics

The NLD remains convinced of the fact that sustainable peace can only come to Burma as a result of genuine tripartite dialogue. All ethnic groupings and political parties must be represented in the national reconciliation process in order that political change can be agreed upon by all players.

[I]t is necessary for all citizens including all the nationalities and all political parties jointly and unitedly with one accord [to] participate in disentangling the manifold political, economic and social difficulties of the country.

NLD, Independence Day (4 Jan) 2002[37]

It is very important for all our ethnic nationalities, such as Kachin, Kayah, Karen, Chin, Burman, Mon, Rakhaing, and Shan, to re-enforce the spirit of unity that existed when the Panlong Agreement was signed in order to prevent the country's disintegration. The NLD strongly requests and urges all the ethnic nationalities of Burma to rebuild the Panlong spirit or solidarity of ethnic nationalities by joining hand in hand, with courage, firm efforts and objectives, and genuine patriotic spirit. Moreover we believe that in order to achieve unity among the ethnic nationalities, it is necessary to draft a constitution in a democratic manner, acceptable to all people including ethnic nationalities. NLD, Union Day (12 Feb) 2000[38]

Ethnic Groups

alliances, include:

Ethnic Nationalities Solidarity and Co-operation Committee (ENSCC) Aug 01, rrepresentatives from 7 ethnic groups (incl. United Nationalities League, NDF, KNPP, SDU, KNU)

National Reconciliation Programme (NRP) May 99

National Democratic Front (NDF) 10 May 96, exclusively non-Burman ethnic armed opposition groups

Democratic Alliance Of Burma (DAB) Nov 88, Burman & non-Burman groups

ethnic percentage of population: 40%

ethnic vote in 1990 election: SNLD 23 seats, other 60 seats (NLD 392, NUP 10)

ceasefire agreements:

Myanmar National Democratic Army 31 Mar 89,

Shan State Army 24 Jun 89,

National Alliance Army 30 Jun 89,

Local Administration Committee 30 Jun 89,

United Wa State Army (aka Myanmar National Solidarity Party) 9 May 89,

New Democratic Army 15 Dec 89,

Kachin Democratic Army 11 Jan 91,

Pa-O National Organisation 18 Feb 91,

Palaung State Liberation Party 21 Apr 91,

Kayan National Guards 27 Feb 92,

Kachin Independence Organisation 1 Oct 93,

Karenni Nationalities People’s Liberation Front 9 May 94,

New Mon State Party (NMSP) 29 Jun 95,

Karenni National Progressive Party 6 Jan 96 (broken after 3 months by Maung Aye),

Mong Tai Army Jan 96

engaged in armed conflict:

Karen National Union,

Shan State Army-South (SSA-S),

Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP),

break away group from NMSP under Col. Pan Nyunt (formed Sep 01) & other smaller groups

statements on talks, include: Leadership Calls for National Reconciliation 6-7 Mar 01; DAB May 01; Dr. Saw Mra Aung 29 Aug 01; Khun Tun Oo, SNLD Sep 01; CNF 26 Sept 01; KNPP 17 Oct 01; NRP briefing 1 Nov 01; Khu Hteh Bupeh, KNPP 8 Dec 01; Sai Myo Win, Shan Democratic Union 8 Dec 01; Harn Yawnghwe, Euro-Burma Office 8 Dec 01; Saw Bin Thin, KNU 8 Dec 01

meetings with UN Special Envoy: 17 ethnic ceasefire groups, 4 ethnic areas with elected MPs, Wa & Kokang (drug eradication) Nov 01, leaders incl. SNLD (Khun Tun Oo) Karen, Mon, Arakan Aug 01, Aung Kham Htyi (Palaung) Oct 00

Their take on Dialogue

U tripartite dialogue must be established for long term solution, say ceasefire & non-ceasefire groups

U trust in Aung San Suu Kyi

U ethnic groups are working together to prepare for dialogue & co-ordination

Ethnic groups (ceasefire and non-ceasefire) have spoken with one voice in their call for any talks and/or dialogue to be tripartite – to include the SPDC, NLD and representatives from ethnic groups. The non-inclusion of representatives from ethnic minority groups will be a source of continuing conflict if ‘dialogue’ between Aung San Suu Kyi and the regime brings about some ‘resolutions’, secret or otherwise. Three-way negotiations must be established in order for any political agreement to be accepted in the long term.

On 26 March 2001 ceasefire groups met with Khin Nyunt in Rangoon where, according to the junta, “they discussed matters relating to further strengthening of Union Spirit.” But, according to a source from the cease-fire groups, “Khin Nyunt warned them to silence. It is too early to join in current dialogue.”[39] While the regime holds onto the National Convention as a concept for the future, excludes all representatives from groups engaged in conflict and simultaneously continues to suppress activities in ceasefire areas, there remains little hope that ethnic groups will be heard until genuine tripartite dialogue exists. As a KIO official has said:

We need a political settlement, not just a cease-fire. […] We absolutely support the current dialogue. […] At the same time, we have the same idea as all other ethnic organisations, that is to be involved in future dialogues. KNPP, Apr 01[40]

The KNPP will not enter another cease-fire unless it is part of a process that that leads to a political solution. Khu Theh Bupeh, Chairperson KNPP, 8 Dec 01[41]

To this end, alliances of ethnic and pro-democracy groups, including cease-fire groups, have made joint statements.[42] On 27 March, the Shan State Peace Council, the New Mon State Party, the Karenni People's Liberation Front, the Shan People's Liberation Front, the Kayan New State Party and Palong State Liberation Party all signed a joint letter addressed to Khin Nyunt, demanding inclusion in the talks.[43] In this respect, all pro-democracy players are united:

[We] encourage SPDC and Daw Aung San Suu Kyi to broaden and deepen the current talks to include a time frame and general framework within which the role in a future Burma of all participants can be defined.

Leadership of Non-Burman Ethnic & Democracy Forces opposing Military Rule in Burma, 6-7 Mar 01[44]

The question of democracy, military rule and the constitutional arrangement with the non-Burman ethnic nationalities are intrinsically intertwined and cannot be resolved one without the other.

NRP, 1 Nov 01[45]

In the interim, ethnic groups have publicly stated their support for Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, for example:

We assume that she [Daw Aung San Suu Kyi] will discuss general issues including the ethnic people. […] She understands everything. Let her do her job. We believe that she will not do anything wrong.

Dr Saw Mra Aung, CRPP President,29 Aug 01[46]

Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and the Burmese democracy movement are fighting to ensure that the will of the people of Burma is respected. […] We have a common goal and can work together. Khu Hteh Bupeh, KNPP, 8 Dec 01[47]

However, it must be clearly stated that this support does not eradicate the necessity for the talks to be tripartite. As Khun Tun Oo has said, trust in Aung San Suu Kyi is a separate issue from the right of ethnic nationalities to speak for themselves, about themselves, in talks for national reconciliation.[48] Representatives of ethnic nationalities better know the situation and experiences of their people and it is therefore imperative that they be actively involved in discussions concerning their future. Aung San Suu Kyi and the SPDC cannot embark upon national reconciliation and political change alone, ethnic groups must be included at every stage of the process.

The SPDC claims that the frictions between different ethnic groups run too deep for them to able to work together peacefully at the current time. This is simply propaganda asserted in an attempt to justify maintenance of their abusive power. Harn Yawnghwe from the Euro-Burma office made the vital point that the regime purposely causes divisions among ‘national races’, “implying that it is impossible to cater to everyone and therefore, it is necessary to have a strong military to hold the country together.”[49] Harn Yawnghwe continues by asserting that these ‘races’ are constructs of the regime’s oppressive rule, which has actually manipulated different dialects as being different racial types. With this in mind, ethnic groups can be seen to have much wider common ground than the regime would have anyone think. The problem in Burma is not an ethnic problem, rather it is a political problem.

Ethnic groups have been meeting together for a long time, in order to explore their common ground and prepare for tripartite talks. One of the important bodies in this context (there are numerous strong alliances) is the NRP, formed May 1999. Established in order to encourage and empower all ethnic nationalities to engage in dialogue with each other regarding their political future, the NRP is considered by many to be a great asset to the political opposition through its capacity building and conflict resolution activities.

ENSCC recently formed in August 2001 as a direct response to the talks between Aung San Suu Kyi and the regime. Composed of representatives from 7 ethnic nationalities, the committee was established to develop a framework for different ethnicities to work together for national reconciliation along the lines of the Panglong Agreement - self-determination, equality & democracy. The ENSCC is dealing with crucial areas concerning the redrafting of the constitution and formation of a federation of 8 states. Any reformations will fail without their participation.

In order for ethnic groups to work effectively together for the future peace and democracy of Burma, representatives must be able to meet together.

I think all the national race groups should be given the opportunity to meet and hold talks among themselves freely because when the time comes for a tripartite meeting rather than all the groups saying all sort of different things at the same time, they should find a common ground and act on a single principle. […] There must also be proper means for the national groups to select and send the delegation of their choice. That will speed up the process. Khun Tun Oo, SNLD

Herein is where the tension lies. The regime know that if ethnic groups are freedom to voice their opinion, their claims to be their protectors will be completely thwarted. Ethnic representatives will make clear their dissatisfaction with the National Convention, meaning that the regime will have to abandon one of their pet projects. Basically, the regime fears the strength in diversity that ethnic groups pose.

The fact that different ethnic groups have joined the NLD and other democratic forces in demanding key progress in the talks – abandonment of secrecy, release of political prisoners and increased political freedom whereby all political parties can operate effectively – is even more intimidating to the regime. Much as the military has tried to pose ethnic groups against each other, the fight for democracy is much stronger.

State Peace & Development Council (SPDC)

formed: 1989; took over from SLORC, many of the same people in both

established National Convention: 1992, appointed 600 of 702 delegates itself

first mention of talks: after UN Special Envoy’s announcement, only to the international community (Jan 2001)

formal statements on talks: none to the Burmese public

meetings with UN Special Envoy: Khin Nyunt, Win Aung 30 Jun 00, Than Shwe, Khin Nyunt Oct 00, Khin Nyunt, Win Aung et al. 5 Jan 01, Khin Nyunt, Win Aung Jun 01, Khin Nyunt, Win Aung et al. Aug 01, Khin Nyunt, Wing Aung Nov 01

postponed trips of UN Special Envoy: Feb 01 ð June 01, Feb 02ð19 Mar 02ðfuture date

Their take on the talks

U talks are going well - power sharing talks are underway - but must proceed slowly

U delicate and must remain confidential for protection, strictly an ‘internal’ issue

U Aung San Suu Kyi is confined for personal safety

U Talks started because NLD ceased being confrontational

U now is not the time for ethnic participation

If we look at the regime’s statements over the past 18 months, on the surface they appear encouraging:

We are not playing games for the sake of the media ... this is not a public relations stunt. [...] This is for the sake of the people of Myanmar [...] if we played games we might have done so a long time ago. Foreign Minister Win Aung, 30 Apr 01[50]

According to ‘confidential document’ that was leaked in November 2001, power sharing talks are in the process with both sides had reached consensus on the framework, if not the content. It is generally agreed by the democratic forces however that this was a strategic leak by the regime to feel out the response to its wish-list; the components of which include an allocated (and substantial) number of parliament seats going to the military.[51] Public statements have been made this effect:

[The military will] be involved in the future political process of the country because we will be having 25% of the seats in the Parliament. [Gradually, over time the role of the military will decrease] and this is what the Myanmar people want. We want evolution. We don’t want revolution. Col Hla Min, Aug 01[52]

An article published in late November 2001 suggested that the UN has a similar working plan, but these have never been substantiated and the only public statements made by the UN have been to call for continued support of the talks. The fact that this report came out close to the military ‘leak’ suggests that the source is someone other than Razali, as the article suggested.

While the regime speaks boldly on the one hand of the progress of the talks, on the other they stress their delicacy. While everyone would agree that any talk and dialogue process in Burma is to be treated with care, there are very different ideas about how the process can be strengthened. The regime are firm in their insistence of utter secrecy, arguing that the process needs to be protected from interference by the international community - the probable reason they were not announced to the international community until 3 months after their initiation, and then by the UN Special Envoy. More importantly, the talks have never been publicly announced to the Burmese public, neither their process nor inception.

This [dialogue] process, which is very much complex and delicate should be left confidential. The freedom of the country very much depends on this.

Win Aung, Foreign Minister, 5 May 01[53]

The SPDC insist that the talks are strictly a domestic issue, despite the fact that hundreds of exiled pro-democracy people from Burma have strong working relationships with those inside, complementing efforts to attain democracy and support the welfare of the people of Burma. The regime is clearly afraid that the international pro-democracy movement and their allies will be able to apply pressure that will influence the sort of democracy that will emerge in Burma. The military know that freedom for Burma in the eyes of Western democracies means freedom from the military rule that has oppressed the people of Burma for too long. It has been made very clear that the regime does not want ‘Western democracy’ and ideals that are portrayed as threats to the stability of Burma.

[I]t is impossible to introduce the same democratic system to all countries as they differ in historical backgrounds, geographical conditions, national characters, traditions and culture, and the evolution of their political, economic and social conditions. A certain period of time is needed to implement the national policy and create a disciplined and durable democratic system which will be the most compatible with the desires of all nationalities. Khin Nyunt, Jan 01[54]

Along with the unhelpful secrecy, the time-lag between SPDC statements and follow-up action is also extremely disconcerting for the progress of the talks. For example, release of Aung San Suu Kyi, Aung Shwe and Tin Oo was spoken of as early as December 2000 when 6 other members of the NLD CEC were released. The ‘appropriate’ time of release was however not considered to be until late August 2001, and it seems it is still ‘appropriate’ to hold Suu Kyi under house arrest. In fact, the regime continues to claim that it is in her best interest.

It is also a known fact that Daw Aung San Suu Kyi is also initiating and takes part in political activities of her party within the boundaries of prescribed regulations and her personal safety. 21 Mar 01, presentation to UN Economic & Social Council[55]

Talk on Ethnic nationality groups

The regime is clearly not interested in widening the talks at this stage. The junta insists that the situation of the ‘national races’ is too tenuous to be involved in dialogue at this stage as long-term peace has not been established. They claim that now is not the appropriate time for inclusion of diverse ethnic groups, a move they argue is potentially destablising,

State and divisional administrative authorities are to understand that we are completely against tripartite.[56] SPDC Home Minister, Col Tin Hlaing, Jul 01, reported quote

Talk on the NLD

In the same month that the talks began, the regime was still talking of Suu Kyi’s attempts to cause chaos that would be disruptive to the country. For example, on 8 October 2000 Myanmar Alin newspaper claimed that Suu Kyi’s trip outside of Rangoon in September 2000 was planned so as to “incite and instigate unrest and riots.” It was not until the beginning of 2001 that the state-controlled media stopped attacking Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD.

When Razali visited Burma in October 2000, Khin Nyunt spent much time detailing the confrontational nature of the NLD. Considering Khin Nyunt is the key person behind the talks his comments do not bode well. Those interested in establishing political dialogue clearly come from a particular political stand point but it is essential that they are able to use their imagination and exercise a degree of flexibility. It rather seems that the regime has struck a “ceasefire” with the NLD whereby they have both agreed to hold their critical tongues for the time being. Indeed, SPDC Home Minister, Col Tin Hlaing reportedly remarked to state and division officials that the regime decided to hold talks with the NLD as it had abandoned its ‘confrontational policy’.[57]

The regime’s bottom line is this: steps towards democracy must be taken with caution so that Burma can be well prepared, unlike after independence.[58] The underlying truth? That the regime has to proceed slowly so that it can either delay the inevitable indefinitely or secure its power and position in any new political order.

Pro-Democracy Allies

Alliances, include:

Members of Parliament Union (MPU) May 96, members of elected representatives from 1990 general election

National Council of the Union of Burma (NCUB) Aug 92 (NDF, DAB, NLDLA, MPU)

National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma (NCGUB) 18 Dec 90, MPs from NLD & 3 ethnic nationality parties

International activist networks, notably in Asia, Europe, North America, Australiasia and South Africa.

statements on talks, incl: Dr. Sein Win, NCGUB 8 Dec 01; All Burma Federation of Student Unions (ABFSU) 26 May 01; ISM 17-19 Mar 01

meetings with UN Special Envoy:

Talk on Dialogue

U trust in Aung San Suu Kyi

U tripartite dialogue must be established for long term solution

U talks must be opened up, end the secrecy

Pro-democracy groups have clearly stated their trust in Aung San Suu Kyi’s role in the talks. Faith has been expressed that she will actively promote the establishment of genuine tripartite dialogue through a process of confidence building.

[B]ased on the 1990 election results, the NLD led by Daw Aung San Suu Kyi has the mandate to form the Government of the Union of Burma [.. ] the NLD and Daw Aung San Suu Kyi have the right to enter into a dialogue with the SPDC and others, and to negotiate a transition to democracy.

Bommersvik Declaration II, 25 Feb-1 Mar 02, emphasis original[59]

We reaffirm our confidence in Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s leadership and commitment to tripartite dialogue. ISM statement, 17-19 Mar 01[60]

Pro-democracy groups are resolute in their demand for tripartite dialogue. As members of ethnic groups are represented within many pro-democracy bodies, the urgency for ethnic representation within talks is well understood. Burma pro-democracy groups outside of Burma emphasise, in conjunction with ethnic groups and the NLD, that long-term peace and democracy can only be achieved through genuine tripartite dialogue where all groups are represented equally. It is not enough to include Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD as confidence and trust must be established among all groups in Burma, as all are directly affected by any processes and outcomes connected to political transition.

[We] welcome initiatives by non-Burman ethnic nationalities reaffirming their commitment to ensure the integrity of the Union and to rebuild it on the basis of ‘Panglong Spirit’.

Bommersvik Declaration II, 25 Feb-1 Mar 02[61]

Only through […] tripartite dialogue can real peace be brought to Burma in the form of a democratic federal union based on principles of equality and human rights. ISM statement, 17-19 Mar 01[62]

Those outside the shroud of secrecy veiling the talks are also insisting that the content of the talks be made public. Democratic forces argue that accountability and transparency will give the talks validity and weight. While the talks remain unknown, rumours and speculation abound, intensifying the vulnerable nature of the process. Secrecy has certainly not helped the progress of the talks and it has not inspired any great hope in the dialogue process. If the content of the talks were known, trust could be garnered at a wider societal level, receiving wide feedback and ultimately support.

No political problem can be solved in a group of people in secret. Only through transparent and free discussions, a permanent solution to the country’s problems can be achieved. ABFSU, 26 May 01[63]

If they are true and honest, it is high time to let the people know

Sein Win, PM, NCGUB. 5 May 01[64]

Furthermore, openness would enable democracy groups to better respond to the progress of the talks and to prepare themselves for any upcoming political dialogue and eventual transition.

International Community

meetings with UN special envoy Japanese PM Jan 02; Japanese Ambassador, ASEAN diplomats & OECD diplomats Aug 01, EU troika Jan 01, French & Japanese Ambassadors 30 Jun 00,

meetings with Aung San Suu Kyi EU delegation Mar 02 (confidential); former Japanese Foreign Minister Dec 01; Ralph Boyce US, Germany early 01 (denied, cancelled entire trip); EU troika Jan 02;

meetings with other NLD members EU delegation 15 Mar 02

meetings with regime, include: EU delegation Mar 02 (Win Aung, Khin Nyunt cancelled); Chinese officials Jan 02; Laos’s deputy minister Jan 02; ASEAN 30 Apr 01; EU troika Jan 01; Malaysian PM Jan 01; numerous foreign delegations, business people & INGOs

official statements, include: US Feb 02; NCGUB 6 Nov 01; EU 8 Feb 01;

Since the talks’ inception, the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan has called on the international community “to continue supporting the dialogue process.”[65] While Razali has previously spoken with optimism, a more recent comment expresses impatience:

The talks are not going as fast as they should. Razali, Feb 02[66]

It is clear that the definition of ‘support’ is not monolithic as different countries have done this in different ways, broadly forming an ‘East-West’ divide, the polar views being illustrated by a comparison of Western democracies stance and that of ASEAN.

Even within that divide exist internal dynamics and tensions between those keen to reward the regime merely for having talks, those who prefer to passively observe and not do anything for the time being, and those who wish to use strategic pressure t ensure that there are genuine, irreversible outcomes in favour of reforms.

West

The US and EU are generally seen to lead the way for Western democracies in their relationship with the junta. Their consistent message has been that they are prepared to review its economic politics when substantial progress is made.

The United Kingdom stands ready to respond to any such positive developments. I urge the regime not to let this opportunity pass them by. Jack Straw, UK, 8 Dec 01[67]

The EU delegation, which met with Aung San Suu Kyi in March 2002, was only at liberty to confirm the talks were happening after their meeting with her. Their request to the regime to release her from house arrest was merely noted.[68]

The EU and the US, with the encouragement of the pro-democracy movement,[69] are not dismantling sanctions until they see clear progress and a genuine and irreversible commitment by the regime.[70] Neither will development aid be given the general go-ahead. The demand for such a commitment has been made since the talks were announced, and as yet have not been met.

[T]he EU […] emphasises the need for concrete measures leading to national reconciliation, democracy and the respect of human rights, in line with the EU's common position and the resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly. 8 Feb 01[71]

While Western countries, including the US and the EU, are involved in contributing funds to UN projects in Burma, it has been made clear that should the process of the talks backtrack, the money will be withdrawn. There is a concern that the talks may be purely a ploy to improve Burma’s relationship with the international community so that it may coax money from the international community in the form of aid and trade, and justify the dismantling of sanctions.

The regime or at least the Khin Nyunt faction may have commenced the talks without a clear roadmap, hoping that merely having talks and perhaps offering a few minor concessions to the NLD would have the desired effect – the dismantling of sanctions. […There is then the fear that] the SPDC may abandon talks once its pockets are full. Altsean-Burma, Mar 01[72]

Concerns that the talks may be a bargaining chip set against removal of sanctions and increased aid, are heightened by comments and warnings such as:

The international community must roll back sanctions if it wants to see "the emergence of a peaceful, modern and democratic state." Khin Nyunt, 16 Jan 01[73]

Attempts from the outside to set the pace and influence direction for Myanmar would not only hinder the process of democratisation but also prove to be counterproductive. Regime’s presentation to UN Economic& Social Council, Mar 01[74]

Such statements are a U-turn to previous vehement assertions by the regime that sanctions were not working. It is highly probable that the regime will withdraw from the talks on seeing gold, as it were, and the chance for democratic change will be significantly reduced. For this reason aid, accountable aid, should be withheld until such a time as the authorities are committed to improving the equity and standards of living of all citizens and taking concrete steps towards democracy. The NLD suggest that such a time is when “all political detainees have been set free and the NLD leadership is satisfied that the outcome of the talks are satisfactory and irreversible.”[75]

~

The regime is most displeased. It considers it has made substantial progress merely by initiating talks with NLD leader Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, and should henceforth be rewarded. Rewards equals no sanctions and more aid.

The government is trying to show positive gestures not only to the political party but also for the international community to see. I think the international community also has to reciprocate in a similar way. Aug 01, posted by regime Dec 01[76]

The regime feels that it has proven itself enough and that it is now the international community’s responsibility to enhance Burma’s economic situation. While ignoring it’s own responsibility for the economic and political crisis in Burma, the regime claims that the international community’s denial of aid is oppressing the people.

We have a lot of trouble, difficulties, internal disturbances and external interference. If we did not have this interference and difficulties, the country would develop more quickly and the democratisation process in the country would be faster. Than Shwe, 19 Feb 02[77]

If we have some kind of push from behind, which means assistance from the international community, we will reach our objective in a shorter period of time. [...] They want Myanmar to be a democracy and we also want Myanmar to be a functioning democracy, so it’s almost the same. Aug 01, posted by regime Dec 01[78]

There are Western countries that have taken a different position from that stated above however and feel increased uncritical engagement will help the talks. In July 2001, New Zealand and Australia resumed contact with Burma after what they saw as ‘positive moves’.[79] Such moves by countries that have previously condemned the regime are disturbing as they grant the regime the legitimacy they are so desperate for and send the message that it is taking adequate steps to ensure democracy and national reconciliation in Burma.

East

Engagement, i.e. uncritical and unconditional interaction, has long been the line of ASEAN and the regional body argues it is best supporting the talks through this policy. ASEAN, particularly Malaysia, hold fast to the statement that change in Burma will occur gradually through internal dialogue and cannot be pressurised from outside.

They claim that progress is being made and argue that the West should join with ASEAN to help build Burma’s economy, hence criticising the sanctions and reluctance to increase aid.[80] As the body takes pains to emphasise, the Asian way differs from the Western way and prioritises economic stability over political openness and rights. Despite the rhetoric, ASEAN member states themselves are loathe to grant aid to the regime, and are unlikely to match the amounts countries from Europe and North America are prepared to offer for irreversible and genuine progress.

Governmental optimism is not reflected in private enterprise. Mostly ASEAN government-owned corporations have been the ones sufficiently backed and daring enough to engage in risky business ventures in Burma.

Also muddying the waters is Malaysia. Officials have been quick to claim credit for Razali’s efforts. PM Mahathir Mohamad’s closeness to the regime has helped open doors for Razali, a Malaysian citizen and an adviser. This jars with Razali’s role as UN Special Envoy, a role that answers to the UN Secretary-General. While Razali’s perceived closeness to Dr Mahathir may be an asset in some circles, it is also a liability in others.

The Japanese have reportedly been looking for an excuse to resume Overseas Development Assistance (ODA)[81] and increase their influence in Burma, apparently to counter China’s growing influence. In 1999, Japan stated that no more aid would be forthcoming without substantial political and human rights reforms.[82] Japan has been easily persuaded to accept the secret talks as such “reforms”. (In 2001 Japan provided about US$13.8million in ODA.[83]) However, even Japan is showing irritation with the slow pace of progress, with November 2001 comments by Japanese Prime Minister, Junichiro Koizumi, urging the regime to do more towards democracy.[84]

Razali and pro-democracy groups have stressed to Japan that its role in bringing change in Burma is central. While some, mainly Asian countries accepted Japan’s April 2001 resumption of non-humanitarian bilateral assistance (note that Razali was involved in discussions regarding ODA and the controversial Balachaung Dam), many of the opposition groups have called these ‘premature rewards for dialogue’. NCGUB has stressed that granting aid at this time is not considered appropriate and have called upon Japan to take more “active roles” in promoting democracy and national reconciliation.[85]

…Appeal to the Japanese Government to withhold resumption of Official Development Assistance until a transparent, accountable and responsive government of national reconciliation is in place.

Bommersvik Declaration II, 25 Feb-1 Mar 02[86]

WHO’S WHO

name: Daw Aung San Suu Kyi

role in talks: only person from political opposition directly involved

age: 56 (dob 19 June 1945)

ethnicity: Burman

religion: Buddhist

Photo Credit: Free Burma Coalition

place of residence: family home, 54 University Avenue, Rangoon

(returned to Burma 1988)

place of birth: Rangoon, Burma

family: father - General Aung San, considered father of Burmese independence by many; assassinated 19 July 1947. mother – Daw Khin Kyi, former ambassador to India; passed away 27 December 1988. brother - Aung San Oo. husband - Michael Aris, passed away 27 March 1999. sons - Alexander (1973) & Kim (1977).

education: BA Philosophy, Politics & Economics, St. Hughes College, Oxford University, UK; Lady Shri Ram College, New Delhi; St Francis Convent, Methodist English High School, Rangoon

job: General-Secretary, National League for Democracy; CRPP Secretary for Committee for Ethnic Nationalities’ Affairs, Chairperson for Committee for Education

political history: co-founder of NLD

other relevant history:

1987 Fellow, Indian Institute of Advanced Studies, Simla

1985-1986 Visiting scholar, Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, Kyoto University, Japan

1972 Research Officer, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Bhutan

1969-1971 Assistant Secretary, Advisory Committee on Administrative & Budgetary Questions, UN Secretariat, New York; volunteer work at Belleview hospital, NY

pro-democracy opinion: often considered figurehead of Burmese democracy movement

- Our Chairman and General Secretary who are acting in accordance with our expectations are hereby authorized to enter into consultations and talks that are necessary to put in place machinery that will achieve a genuine democratic government, NLD, 13^th Anniversary of NLD[87]

detentions:

21 September 2000 - present: house arrest for defying official restrictions by twice (2^nd & 21^st) attempting to travel outside Rangoon for party meetings

20 July 1989 - 10 July 1995: house arrest under martial law

she said:

- We are absolutely confident that democracy will come to Burma. […] It is important that we achieve our goal quickly because people suffer too much. 2000, videotaped statement

- We in Burma […] think that democratic institutions are essential for peace and unity within the country, as well as peace and harmony within the region and within the world. 26 June 2000, statement at Community of Democracies Conference[88]

- Burma is made up of many ethnic peoples and unless there is freedom to discuss, to negotiate, to find common values, we shall never make any progress towards genuine peace in our country. 26 June 2000, statement at Community of Democracies Conference [89]

- …unity comes from within […] unless we [all ethnicities] can create a framework to talk to each other openly, we’ll never get unity. It’s not, ‘How will democracy achieve unity?’, rather, ‘How will we ever achieve unity without democracy?[90]

awards include:

2000 Presidential Medal of Freedom Award, highest US civilian award

2000 Freedom of the City Award

1991 Nobel Peace Prize

1990 Sakharov Prize (European Parliament human rights prize)

1990 Rafto Human Rights Prize

1990 elected honourary fellow of St Hugh’s College, Oxford University

name: Than Shwe

title: Senior General

role in talks: instigator supposedly

age: 69 (dob 2 Feb 1933)

ethnicity: Burman

religion: Buddhist

place of birth: Kyaukse, Mandalay Division

Photo credit: BBC family: wife - Daw Kyaing Kyaing; 8 children

education: Officers Training Course; attended Secondary School

job: paramount leader since 1992; SPDC Chairman, Commander in Chief, Prime Minister, Defence Minister, Army Deputy Chief of Staff, Minister of Agriculture

political history: SLORC Chairman (September 1988-November 1997); SLORC Deputy Chairman (1990-92); deputy Defence Minister (1988); officer in Psychological Warfare Section; attache in Psychological Warfare (1958-60); Army member (1953-present)

he said: If Suu Kyi were to be elected in an election, that is democracy and not something we could interfere in. November 2001[91]

other: supposed to retire in 1995

name: Khin Nyunt

title: Lieutenant General

role in talks: director

age: 59

ethnicity: Burman

religion: Buddhist
place of residence: Rangoon

Photo credit: BBC place of birth: Syriam, Kyauktan; 12 km south of Rangoon

family: wife - Dr. Daw Kin Win Shwe. 1 daughter. 1 son - army officer. 1998 placed advertisement in New Light of Myanmar announcing other son “Dr. Ye Naing Win was disowned by the parents for his inexcusable deed.”[92]

education: completed 1 year of Officer Training Course; dropped out of Yankin College (late 1950s)

job: Secretary 1 of SPDC; head of Military Intelligence DSIB Defence Strategic Intelligence Bureau; thought to be key policy maker; directly responsible for ethnic minorities along border, drugs, refugees & border issues

political history: 1998 formed Political Affairs Committee, mostly comprising of MI officers;[93] 1997 led Burma into ASEAN; 1994 created Office of Strategic Studies (OSS); led cease-fire talks; architect of opening Burma to foreign investment; 1988 he & his Directorate of Defence Service Intelligence were crucial in paving the way for army coup; entered service 1960.

pro-democracy opinion:

- Khin Nyunt has tried to make himself indispensable by expanding his role to cover a wide range of policy matters including foreign affairs, cease-fire relations, education, health, information, and computer science development. Christina Fink[94]

- Military intelligence organizations go in for torture and oppression and a whole lot of nastiness, so as somebody who represents such an organization I suppose you can call Khin Nyunt all sorts of things, but expressions like the 'prince of darkness' are rather too dramatic. Aung San Suu Kyi, 1999[95]

- Never underestimate Khin Nyunt. Aung Zaw, editor of The Irrawaddy

regime opinion:

- good strategist (or manipulator)[96]

- regarded as the brains behind the regime

- feared by other generals as head of intelligence.

- protégé of Ne Win & thought to still have good relationship

he said:

- It should be witnessed that some big neo-colonialist countries are interfering and applying pressure on Myanmar on all fronts to force the adoption of a democratic system identical to theirs. In fact, it is impossible to introduce the same democratic system to all countries as they differ in historical backgrounds, geographical conditions, national characters, traditions and culture, and the evolution of their political, economic and social conditions. A certain period of time is needed to implement the national policy and create a disciplined and durable democratic system which will be the most compatible with the desires of all nationalities. Jan 01[97]

- We regard dialogue not as a single event but as a process involving several stages. First, there must be initial contact. This will be followed up by trying to engage each other in discussions in order to build confidence. Once confidence-building is achieved, then this could lead to substantive discussions. 1999[98]

awards include: medal awarded by International Body Building Federation

other:

- thought to be in control of release of political prisoners

- signed declarations for dismissal of key figures in November 2001 reshuffles giving no reasons; many were allies of political opponent Maung Aye

- instrumental in close relationship with China & improving relationship with Thailand

- expanded power base over intellectual community, filmmakers and artists. only person in army to get backing from this group.

- developing diplomatic relations

- seeming leader against corruption

- media-shy. It is thought his avoidance of the international media stems from a lack of confidence in his English language ability.

- his accession to the top of the regime is undermined by a “tradition” that the leader must have battle experience

name: Maung Aye

title: General

role in talks: not involved, thought to be resistant to them

age: 62

ethnicity: Burman

religion: Buddhist

family: wife - Daw Mya Mya San

Photo Credit: MRTV education: B.Sc. DSA, Maymyo

job: Vice-Chairman of SPDC; Commander in Chief (Army)

political history: Vice-Chairman of SLORC; May 1999 chaired 12-member Myanmar Industrial Development Central Committee[99]; 1997 head of National Trade Council; 1988 based in Shan State – no direct involvement in suppressing the democracy uprising

SPDC opinion: no-nonsense professional soldier

pro-democracy opinion:

- Gen Maung Aye and Lt Gen Tin Oo [deceased] are considered hardliners by some factions. I do not think you could unilaterally categorize Gen Maung Aye like that. I consider and imagine him as a colleague who will be involved in the dialogue in a supporting role. U Mya Win, NCGUB, Feb 01[100]

- Maung Aye is of the old-school isolationist, even xenophobic, class of generals. […] His promotion bodes ill for any chance of early reform. Thomas Lansner, assistant dean, school of International Affairs, Columbia University USA[101]

he said: [no documentation available of Maung Aye’s views on the talks]

other:

- head of faction within SPDC; Khin Nyunt is head of other faction. strong ally, Lt Gen Tin Oo, killed in helicopter crash Feb 01. Rumours crash was part of power struggle between Khin Nyunt & Maung Aye. rumour in Feb 01, sparked by Thai 3^rd Army Commander Chavalit, that Maung Aye & Than Shwe were arrested by Khin Nyunt. Proved to be false. Muang Aye’s allies & friends have been removed from influential positions in Khin Nyunt’s reshuffles.

- virulent in attacks of democratic opposition, speaks of their ‘annihilation’

- reputation for ruthlessness & responsible for massive military build-up

- thought to be against reforms of any kind

- resumed offensive against Karenni insurgents after Khin Nyunt reached ceasefire agreement, March 1995[102]

- opposed engagement with Southeast Asian countries

- plays golf

name: Razali Ismail

title: Tan Sri

role in talks: facilitator

age: 62

nationality: Malaysian

religion: Muslim

place of residence: Malaysia

photo credit: UN place of birth: Kedah, Malaysia

family: married, 3 children

education: BA (hons) humanities & literature

job: special envoy to UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan

emissary of Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad (unofficial)

political history incl:

President of 51^st session of UNGA (1996 – 1997)

Permanent Representative of Malaysia to the UN (1988 – 1998)

member of Board of Directors of the International Peace Academy (1989-1990); adviser to Malaysian Prime Minister when he chaired UN Conference on Drug Abuse and Illicit Trafficking (1987); member of Malaysia’s delegations to ASEAN meetings

various diplomatic posts from 1963

other employment history incl:

currently Chairman of Iris Technologies (M) Sdn Bhd

1993-1995 Adjunct Professor of International Studies, Michigan State University

pro-democracy opinion:

- His main function here is to mediate and facilitate and he said he would do everything in his power to achieve success. […] We did have many problems to talk about and we are satisfied he understood them.[103] U Lwin, Aug 2001

- Ambassador Razali has brought an energetic, far-seeing and balanced perspective to his efforts at facilitating communication between all parties in Burma. US Department of State, Spokesperson, 1 Mar 01

he said:

- There is a mandate from the United Nations, the stand of the Myanmar government and also the wishes of the Myanmar people. So we have to combine all these to find a solution. Nov 00[104]

- “He told us that there will be transition from military to civilian government in two to four years.” Rangoon-based diplomat, 4 Jun 01[105]

UN said:

- Mr. Razali was pleased that all parties remain committed to the process of national reconciliation and democracy. […] He is hopeful that some significant progress could be achieved in the near future. Dec 01[106]

- I think my Special Representative Razali Ismail has done a very good job. He has kept the parties talking. And we are making progress and as you notice many opposition politicians have been released from jail. The process is moving ahead slowly. Annan, 1 Sep 01[107]
awards: Panglima Setia Mahkota (Tan Sri), Langkawi Environment Award 1992, Honorary Doctorate of Law, NUM; Ordre Nation al du Merite from the French Government 14 Nov 00

other:

- special interests: technology and environment

- close to Malaysian PM Mahathir

- known for speaking his mind and his informal style

Note:

Controversy has dogged Razali over his role in the talks. While his official brief has been to “facilitate” the talks in the context of the UN General Assembly resolutions, there have been calls for him to play mediator. Razali initially intimated that his role was to get the regime and the NLD talking, without emphasis on what was being discussed.

Razali’s Malaysian citizenship, and more importantly, his closeness to PM Mahathir Mohamad, has been a double-edged sword. While it has opened doors to the SPDC, it has undermined his credibility as an international diplomat. This may have been fed by persistent efforts of the Malaysian Foreign Ministry to claim credit for Razali’s work, when Razali’s actual “boss” is supposed to be the UN Secretary-General.

Some ethnic nationality and exiled pro-democracy groups, dissatisfied that the talks do not appear to have gone beyond confidence building measures, have called for Razali to expand his role to that of mediator. They want Razali to more actively facilitate a genuine breakthrough.

Stakeholders critical of Razali have also urged him to explain himself. In his efforts to maintain the confidence of the junta, Razali has sought to distance himself from border and exiled groups that the regime considers its enemy.

His predecessor, Alvaro de Soto, visited Rangoon 6 times without significant results.

name: Kyaw Win

title: Major General

role in talks: SPDC assigned person to meet with Aung San Suu Kyi

age: 56

education: psychology, University of Rangoon; officer training school, Rangoon

job: Khin Nyunt's deputy in the department of military photo credit: MRTV intelligence; Deputy Director of DDSI and Office of Strategic Studies (OSS); spokesperson at regular Rangoon press conferences in late 2001

political history: intelligence corps, key dialogue figure in 1990’s ceasefire talks which Khin Nyunt took credit for, head of Intelligence in Mandalay

SPDC opinion:

- he straddles the military factions & is liked by the ‘top 3’. Works under & reports directly to Khin Nyunt, Maung Aye likes him as a good fighter and he is one of Than Shwe's 2 most favored officers, from when Than Shwe was his senior officer as commander of 88^th Light Infantry Division.[108]

- reputation among military & OSS for pragmatism

Burmese public & pro-democracy opinion of him:

- commands little respect. "If Kyaw Win is representing the government, there is no dialogue." Burma analyst, January 2002[109]

he said:

- November Cabinet re-shuffle was not linked to and “will not have any impact on the ongoing talks with the opposition.” November 2001[110]

- "He said the discussions on transition - that was the word he used - were going very well." Associate (emphasis own), May 200[111]

- Aung San Suu Kyi is " very genial, a very nice person to deal with. May 2001[112]

other:

- when Aung San Suu Kyi was released from house arrest in 1995, Kyaw Win said "I believe I'll be the one to negotiate with you sometime in the future." When the talks came he was too busy with ‘other tasks’ so Lt Col Than Htun was the ‘negotiator’.

- has risen in the ranks of the regime fast

- private person, does not give interviews

- respected painter, avid photographer & sportsman - plays golf

name: Than Htun (sometimes spelt in English, Than Tun)

title: Colonel

role in talks: administrator, setting up meetings with Kyaw Win & Suu Kyi

job: military liaison between Aung San Suu Kyi & SPDC for about a decade; Head of Department Office of Strategic Studies; Deputy Director of Defence Services Intelligence; Member of Implementation Committee for

Convention No. 29 (ILO, forced labour); joint secretary of Political Affairs Committee (formed 18 Sept 1998 by Khin Nyunt); name attached to OSS publications

SPDC’s opinion:

- powerful figure in military intelligence, connected to & supports Khin Nyunt

- regarded as protege of Than Shwe

political history:

- delivered Aung San Suu Kyi “option” of going to England when her husband was dying, 1999

- given responsibility of organising a meeting for talks between Aung San Suu Kyi & Kyaw Win after the former’s 1995 release from house arrest. Kyaw Win was too busy. talks never eventuated.

he said:

- NLD offices should be reopened based on "mutual understanding". Aug 01, refusing to issue official statement regarding opening of NLD offices[113]

- The people of Myanmar do not care if it's four nines or four tens - they will not allow themselves to be deceived twice. They desire to follow the correct national political path while preserving favourable foundations for internal peace. Sept 99, following arrest of 36 people in preparation for 9.9.99[114]

- Only 169 of the original 485 MPs remain valid members of the would-be parliament, he claimed in May 2000. 34 members died, 185 were disqualified and 97 "voluntarily resigned from elected membership."[115]

name: U Lwin (aka. Colonel Maung Lwin (retired))

role in talks: go-between between Daw Suu & CEC & other NLD members (has been allowed to visit her since Dec 2000 & now visits Monday, Wednesday & Friday with U Aung Shwe and U Tin Oo); NLD spokesperson - only person in NLD permitted to comment on talks

age: 77 (dob 22 Sept 1924)

nationality: Mon

photo credit: BBC religion: Buddhist

family: married with children

education: military officers' training at Japanese Royal Military Academy; British Royal Military Academy 1952-1954

job: CRPP Committee for Health and Social Affairs; Secretary NLD; Treasurer NLD, MP for Thonekwa 1, Rangoon Division

political history: joined NLD 1988; member of BSPP State Council under Ne Win; former Deputy Prime Minister; Military Attache to USA; served in BIA, BDA and PBF from 1942-1945; student (age 21) involved in independence movement led by General Aung San

opinion: generally considered the least threatening by the SPDC

he said: - They are in a confidence-building stage right now and the process is gradually progressing. The release of political prisoners and the reopening of NLD township offices are proof of the progress. […] In a political and organizational sense [there are signs of] freedom of movement. The important factor is there have been no political arrests or detentions lately. These are all significant developments. For such success to be achieved the dialogue has to be ongoing. In other words it is not stalled, it is very much alive. […] Once the confidence-building stage has met the expectations then automatically it will develop into a dialogue on political matters. 31 Jan 02[116]

- The talks are still at the confidence-building stage because there are many prisoners still waiting to be released. 29 Nov 2001[117]

- [Khin Nyunt] hasn't seen her for several months. […] There [is] in fact no dialogue process going on at present. […] I have met her more than 100 times already. But I don’t have any knowledge about this power-sharing proposal 6 Sept 2001, in response to Chavalit’s claim that Khin Nyunt told him he was seeing Aung San Suu Kyi fortnightly[118]

- I'm not a fortune teller and I can't foresee the future. 29 Aug 01[119]

other: - displeased with Pinheiro’s Oct 01 visit as not spending enough time with pro-democracy leaders & local communities, spending disproportionate time with regime[120] (1^st talks with Pinheiro 4 Apr 01)

- denounced at ‘no-confidence’ meetings organised by regime

OTHER PLAYERS

Win Aung: foreign minister in Burma

Leon de Riedmatten: Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue. Razali’s man in Rangoon, meant to have contact with Aung San Suu Kyi on regular basis. Was instrumental ICRC being allowed to re-enter Burma.

Aung Shwe: NLD Chairperson, currently allowed to meet with Aung San Suu Kyi

Tin Oo: NLD Deputy Chaiperson, currently allowed to meet with Aung San Suu Kyi

Aye Tha Aung: CRPP member, continued incarceration is cause of great concern

CHRONOLOGY

Apr 00 Razali appointed UN Special Envoy on Burma by Kofi Annan

29 Jun-3 Jul 00 Razali’s 1^st trip to Burma, meets with Aung San Suu Kyi, Khin Nyunt & Win Aung

22 Sep 00 Aung San Suu Kyi & others arrested for attempting to travel out of Rangoon. Aung San Suu Kyi placed under house arrest, others under house arrest or imprisoned in jail.

16 Sep 00 2^nd anniversary CRPP formation

27 Sep 00 12^th anniversary of NLD formation

Oct 00 Talks start between Aung San Suu Kyi & SPDC representative, not public until 9 Jan 01

Release of James Mawdsley, UK

4 Oct 00 Vietnam confirms contact with SPDC & certain concerned countries over mounting crisis in Burma but concluded there should be no intervention

5 Oct 00 Release of 8 NLD members

6 Oct 00 SPDC cancels scheduled October visit by EU foreign policy troika

8 Oct 00 Myanmar Alin (newspaper) accuses West of conspiring for international pressure & that Suu Kyi planned to cause unrest & riots by travelling out of Rangoon.

9-12 Oct 00 Razali begins 2^nd mission to Burma; meets Than Shwe, Khin Nyunt, Foreign Minister U Win Aung, Health Minister Maj-Gen Ket Sein & Minister for Home Affairs Col. Tin Hlaing. Also Aung San Suu Kyi & Aung Kham Htyi, a Palaung leader.

12 Oct 00 Roldolfo Severino, ASEAN Secretary-General, states ASEAN is monitoring Burma situation but will not mediate

13 Oct 00 SPDC newspapers accuse US & British diplomats of encouraging NLD complaints to Razali about SPDC repression

17 Oct 00 Release of 6 elderly NLD members after request by Razali

20 Oct 00 French Foreign Minister announces EU will resume talks with ASEAN in December after break of 3 years

25 Oct 00 Deadline of NLD Rangoon headquarters eviction notice, served 25 September along with imprisonment of the 2 elderly female landladies. Eviction date was temporarily withdrawn.

1 Nov 00 Release of female political prisoner, Thin Thin Moe, NLD member

20 Nov 00 28 independence veterans send letter to SPDC urging restrictions imposed on NLD leaders, including Aung San Suu Kyi, be lifted

Release of 2 NLD members

23 Nov 00 Malaysia threatens to downgrade involvement in ASEAN-EU dialogue if EU bloc send junior officials instead of ministers

29 Nov 00 Singapore Prime Minister, Goh Chok Tong, says ASEAN will only deal with EU if it agrees to include Burma in EU-ASEAN meeting

Dec 00 11 imprisoned for accompanying ASSK to catch a train to Mandalay in Sept 00

2 Dec 00 6 CEC members released from house arrest (arrested 22 Sep), included some CRPP members

3 Dec 00 Former NLD members, dismissed from party, send letter to SPDC to step up dialogue with opposition parties

5 Dec 00 Letter to SPDC written by independence veterans, 20 November, is made public

9 Dec 00 SPDC permits EU top officials to visit Burma on ‘fact-finding mission’ in January, but will not allow it to mediate political dialogue

10 Dec 00 U Lwin is allowed to visit Aung San Suu Kyi; her 1^st visitor since placed under house arrest on 22 Sept.

11-12 Dec 00 ASEAN-EU meeting, Laos.

SPDC agrees to lift house arrest of 3 NLD members, including Aung San Suu Kyi, at an "appropriate time."

Foreign Minister Win Aung, says dialogue can only start when NLD drops hostile attitude & international pressure is not a threat.

14 Dec 00 11 NLD members arrested 13-14 September are given sentences, between 7-21 years, for issuing statement when Suu Kyi was forcibly returned from Dallah Township

15 Dec 00 Female political prisoner, San San Aye, released, NLD member

Jan 2001 SPDC press stops ridiculing Aung San Suu Kyi

3-8 Jan 01 Malaysia Prime Minister, Mahathir Mohamad, makes official visit. Reports that he talks with Than Shwe

5-9 Jan 01 Razali’s 3^rd visit to Burma

9 Jan 01 Razali announces talks for 1^st time, stating they started in October 2000 & are expected to start more substantive discussions soon

10 Jan 01 NLD confirms talks, saying there already appeared to have been some progress

16 Jan 01 Khin Nyunt says democracy can only occur when international community roll back sanctions

EU announces troika will visit Burma 29-31January

16-19 Jan 01 UNLD, umbrella organisation for non-Burman political parties, was resurrected with meeting on Thai border

17 Jan 01 Swedish ambassador says EU troika will not insist on immediate release of Aung San Suu Kyi

18 Jan 01 KNU Secretary, Pado Mahn Sha, tells DVB there was a meeting between KNU & SPDC but that there is no possibility of dialogue at present

KNPP representative tells DVB that an SPDC letter asked them to join SPDC & engage in development activities & talks

24 Jan 01 U Tin Oo, NLD Vice-Chairman, & 83 other NLD members are released, 11 of whom were sentenced in Dec 00 for accompanying ASSK in Sept

29 Jan 01 Than Shwe warns against outside interference

29-31 Jan 01 EU troika visits Burma, meeting Aung San Suu Kyi & SPDC representatives

8 Feb 01 FEER reports building of prison for political prisoners in isolated area of Kachin state

19 Feb 01 Helicopter crash kills Lt. Gen. Tin Oo & 2 Cabinet ministers

23 Feb 01 Internal coup in Kachin Independence Organisation

26 Feb 01 Japan International Cooperation Agency sends 6 doctors & medical technicians to Mandalay for a month

28 Feb 01 1^st report of rumoured arrest of Maung Aye & Than Shwe by Khin Nyunt, by Free Burma Coalition. Sparked by Thai 3^rd Army Commander Chavalit. Proved to be false.

Mar 01 Release of 4 political prisoners

6-7 Mar 01 Leadership of Non-Burman Ethnic and Democracy Forces Opposing Military Rule in Burma meeting, Burma

9 Mar 01 Report in Thai national daily, Bangkok Post, of rumour of power change 1^st reported 28 Feb 01. Proved to be false.

12-30 Mar 01 ILO Governing Body meets to further consider sanctions

17-19 Mar 01 International Strategy Meeting on Burma, Thailand

19 Mar 01 Arrest of Secretary General of Zomi National Congress, reasons unknown

27 Mar 01 Resistance Day, otherwise known as Armed Forces Day

Senior SPDC official makes first public domestic statement about talks

Ethnic ceasefire groups send joint letter to Khin Nyunt demanding inclusion in talks

Apr 01 EU’s regular review of sanctions

3-5 Apr 01 Pinheiro makes 1^st visit to Burma

5 Apr 01 Speech given at session to UN Human Rights Commission, Geneva, urging for release of Saw Mra Aung, oldest political prisoner

30 Apr 01 Informal ASEAN ministerial retreat, Golf Club, Rangoon

9-20 May UNLDC Conference, Belgium, EU. SPDC Minister was granted visa to attend despite being on EU blacklist.

11 May 01 DVB reports SPDC cabinet reshuffle

14-17 May 01 Democratic Alliance of Burma conference

15 May 01 ruling on Aung San property suit to be given on 30 May

18 May 01 U Ko Ko, Minister Counsellor & Deputy Representative of Burmese Mission to UN, defected to US

17-19 May 01 ILO team visits Burma

25 May 01 Australia announces it will renew its Human Rights initiative at a cost of AU$140,000

29 May 01 Bill, S. 926 introduced in US Senate to impose further sanction against SPDC

30 May 01 Aung San property case postponed again until 3 September

1-4 Jun 01 Razali visits Burma

4 Jun 01 World Association of Newspapers awards annual press freedom prize, 2001 Golden Pen of Freedom, to imprisoned Burmese journalists San San Nweh & U Win Tin

12 Jun 01 SPDC makes official request to ILO that FTUB be derecognised

State House of Massachusetts hears bill to drop companies engaged in Burma from state pension fund

13 Jun 01 Release of political prisoner U Soe Thein (aka Maung Wuntha), NLD Central Committee member

14 Jun 01 Release of 8 elected MP political prisoners

15 Jun 01 Release of Dr Saw Mra Aung, CRPP President, imprisoned after elected into position

20 Jun 01 Tin Maung Lay (aka Tin Maung Myint), NLD member, dies in Mandalay prison

22 Jun 01 Burma added to International Money Laundering Blacklist

25 Jun 01 Maung Maung Aye, NLD member, dies in Bassein prison

Jul 01 Moustache brothers released from prison

6 Jul 01 Baptist Pastor Gracy sentenced to 2 years hard labour

12 Jul 01 Sithu, student leader arrested 1990, dies in Tharawaddy prison

13 Jul 01 3 MPs released from prison

18 Jul 01 Daw San San Nwe, journalist & NLD member, released from prison

19 Jul 01 Martyrs’ Day Aung San Suu Kyi does not turn up to Martyrs’ Day Ceremony

21 Jul 01 Khin Maung Myint, NLD Youth leader, dies in Kale prison

20-22 Jul 01 ASEAN Regional Forum

Aug 01 formation of ENSCC to co-ordinate tripartite dialogue NCGUB, Dec 01

2 Aug 01 delegation led by US deputy assistant Secretary of State for East Asian & Pacific Affairs met with SPDC & Aung San Suu Kyi

4 Aug 01 Saw Tin Myint, KNU arrested 1983, dies in Tha-yet prison

13 Aug 01 2 MPs released from prison

26 Aug 01 Chairman Aung Shwe & Vice-Chairman Tin Oo released from house arrest

27 Aug 01 Aung San property case postponed to 3 Sept

27-30 Aug 01 Razali visits Burma, meets with Aung San Suu Kyi, diplomats, ethnic leaders, regime, NGOs, ASEAN diplomats & OECD diplomats; pushed regime to release 29 NLD MPs AFP, 29 Aug; Times of India, 2 Sep

31 Aug 01 NLD stresses importance of release of U Win Tin, U Win Myint & Thu Wai Times of India, 2 Sep

2 Sep 01 CEC, NLD, credit Razali as working hard for success of talks AFP, 2 Sep

4-6 Sep 01 Khin Nyunt visits Thailand

6 Sep 01 U Lwin, NLD, denies Khin Nyunt is meeting with Aung San Suu Kyi & denies any power sharing agreement BBC interview

9 Sep 01 Mon break-off group re-engages in fighting SPDC troops

10 Sep 01 6 political prisoners released AP, 10 Sep

DVB report SPDC only started talks as NLD stopped being ‘confrontational’

16 Sep 01 3^rd anniversary of CRPP

17 Sep 01 ILO HLT starts 3 week assessment of SPDC’s forced labour ban

26 Sep 01 Chin National Front release statement welcoming the talks but doubting sincerity of regime

27 Sep 01 13^th anniversary NLD at party Headquarters, attended by NLD members, U Saw Mra Aung (CRPP chairperson), Rangoon-based diplomats, leaders of national ethnic groups, veteran politicians & other invited guests, totaling about 600 people DVB, 28 Sep

2 Oct 01 Pinheiro’s report (January-mid August) made public

3 Oct 01 U Hla Soe released from prison Xinhua, 3 Oct

9-17 Oct 01 Pinheiro visits Burma

18 Oct 01 student leader, Min Ko Naing’s birthday, celebrations held in USA Mizzima, 17 Oct

23 Oct 01 Thinggangyun Township branch of NLD allowed to reopen Irrawaddy, 23 Oct

26 Oct 01 8 political prisoners released AP, 26 Oct

29 Oct 01 U Lwin says political freedom has not improved DVB, 29 Oct; AFP, 21 Nov

31 Oct 01 NMSP issue statement disassociating itself from break-off group

1 Nov 01 ABSDF accuse regime of using talks to improve international, increase aid & reduce sanctions Reuters, 1 Nov

5 Nov 01 Than Shwe hint she will not interfere if Aung San Suu Kyi is elected in the future Kyodo, 5 Nov; South China Morning Post, 6 Nov

9 Nov 01 Pinheiro presentation scheduled at UNGA

10-11 Nov 01 major SPDC cabinet reshuffles, biggest since 1988 AP, 18 Nov (posted on Burmanet)

11 Nov 01 Myo Myint Nyein, political prisoner, receives 2001 Canadian International Press Freedom Award BMA, 28 Sep

15 Nov 01 4th anniversary of formation of SPDC

17 Nov 01 Kyaw Win says reshuffles nothing to do with talks & will not impede their progress Reuters, 17 Nov

20 Nov 01 SPDC deny all allegations of forced labour alleged in the ILO report AFP, Reuters 20 Nov

27 Nov–3 Dec 01 Razali visits Burma for the 6^th time & asks SPDC to release more political prisoners, meets Aung San Suu Kyi… AFP, 2 Dec, 3 Dec He states he is ‘satisfied’ with talks BBC, 3 Dec

29 Nov 01 Prof Salai Tun Than arrested for peaceful demonstration at City Hall

Dec 01 National Day NLD statement: talks must start yielding more tangible results Reuters, 10 Dec 01

6 Dec 01 President Bush, USA, sent letter in support of ASSK to Nobel Peace celebrations

8 Dec 01 launch of Nobel Peace campaign for release of ASSK AFP, 4 Dec; AP 8 Dec

Indian MPS sign for release of ASSK Mizzima, 8 Dec

About 1,500 attend concert in Bangkok for anniversary of ASSK Nobel Peace Prize AFP, 8 Dec

An NLD office reopens AFP, 8 Dec

10 Dec 01 AAPPB launches website with detailed information on political prisoners Irrawaddy, 10 Dec

10^th Anniversary of ASSK receiving Nobel Peace Prize & prize centenial

14 Burmese dissidents hold 36 hour hunger strike for release of ASSK Kyodo, 10 Dec

SPDC says working towards a ‘functional democracy’ with ASSK AFP, BBC 10 Dec

11 Dec 01 Former Japanese foreign affairs minister reports Aung San Suu Kyi said dialogue has not started but is only at stage of overcoming mutual distrust AFP, 11 Dec 01

Churches around Britain held prayer for peace & democracy in Burma PA News, 10 Dec

Desmond Tutu, Nobel Laureate, calls for release of ASSK & democracy 11 Dec

13 Dec 01 4 NLD members released AFP, 13 Dec

18 Dec 01 ethnic groups warn talks will fail if not tripartite South China Morning Post, 18 Dec 01

19 Dec 01 U Lwin makes statement that 194 NLD-affiliated political prisoners have been released since Jan 01, but 822 still incarcerated Kyodo, 19 Dec

30 Dec 01 Regime posts interview of role of National Convention & military in future politics & asks for patience Channel-J News Agency, Japan

4 Jan 02 expectations for ‘breakthrough’ are dashed

NLD makes 1^st formal statement calling on faster progress of the talks AFP, BBC 4 Jan

8 Jan 02 start of USDA rallies in Rangoon AFP, 16 Jan

9 Jan 02 5 political prisoners released BBC 9 Jan

10 Jan 02 Razali says talks are making ‘significant progress’ Future World News, 10 Jan

15 Jan 02 Hearing of Aung San property case, to be continued Irrawaddy, 25 Feb

16 Jan 02 USDA organise rallies in cities AFP, 16 Jan

22 Jan 02 Former university professor, Dr. Salai Tun Than, arrested for handing out brochures asking for monitored elections within a year, sent to Insein prison Irrawaddy, 22 Jan

25 Jan 02 Report that Min Ko Naing has had another year added onto sentence Irrawaddy, 25 Jan

29 Jan 02 Latha township allowed to open NLD branch DVB, 29 Jan

30 Jan 02 Rumour ASSK has met with top army general, she left home escorted for about 2 hours BBC, 30 Jan

Report that Razali’s 7^th trip has been postponed until March DVB, 30 Jan

Irrawaddy publish article criticising Razali, particularly request for increased Japanese ODA

31 Jan 02 U Lwin says talks still in confidence building stage, although there have been some positive changes DVB, 31 Jan

Than Shwe denies meeting ASSK AFP, 31 Jan

KNU leader, Saw Ba Thin Sein, renews calls for tripartite dialogue Kyodo, 31 Jan

8 Feb 02 Dr Salai Tun Than, democratic protester, (arrested Nov 01) sentenced for 7 years under Article 5(J), Insein prison AHRC 20 Mar

10-19 Feb 02 Pinheiro visits Burma, meets Aung San Suu Kyi & Dr Salai Tun Than, visits Kachin State & Insein prison & 11 political prisoners released during stay AHRC, 20 Mar; Reuters, 19 Feb

12 Feb 02 Union Day. NLD calls for national unity & 6 ethnic political party representatives make joint statement for tripartite dialogue AP, 12 Feb

13 Feb 02 Myo Myint Nyein, journalist, released after 12 years RSF, 13 Feb

SPDC representative makes statement that success in talks is ‘imminent’ AFP, 13 Feb

14 Feb 02 Myo Myint Nyein says prison conditions are improved during Pinheiro’s visits Radio Burma, 14 Feb

19 Feb 02 Junta says sanctions are slowing democratisation process Reuters, 19 Feb, Morning Star, 20 Feb

Aung San property case continues, final decision hoped to in a week Irrawaddy, 25 Feb

21 Feb 02 13 Sri Lankan MPs express solidarity with NLD, call for release of political prisoners, tripartite dialogue & recognition of 1990 general election Mizzima, 21 Feb

22-27 Feb 02 ILO team to Burma, denied access to Aung San Suu Kyi AFP, 27 Feb

7 Mar 02 arrest of Ne Win’s son-in-law & 3 grandsons for supposed ‘coup’ attempt FEER, 21 Mar

8 Mar 02 3 political prisoners released & 3 women prisoners AFP, 8 Mar

9 Mar 02 Burma human rights day

13 Mar 02 EU delegation to Burma, release of 25 more women prisoners BBC, 13 Mar

19 Mar 02 Razali’s 7^th trip to Burma postponed due to illness of Burmese Foreign Minister, Win Aung

ILO & SPDC sign document for “Liaison Officer” in Burma

UN Human Rights Commission session starts, Pinheiro to give report on Feb 02 visit to Burma

Resources from Altsean-Burma

1998 Mar Special Briefing: Human Rights Situation for Women in Burma. 16pp US$2 [Sorry, photocopies only]

1998 Mar Video: Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s Address to the UN Human Rights Commission. 18 mins. PAL/NTSC. US$15

1998 Apr Report Card: Slorc’s Performance as the State Peace and Development Council. 45pp. US$5 [Sorry, photocopies only]

1998 Jun Book: Burma ~ Voices of Women in the Struggle. 116pp. US$10

1998 Jul Report Card: Burma’s Regime on the Edge. 40pp. $5 [photocopy only]

1998 Sep Yellow Flower Postcard & Badge Campaign Pack: 20 postcards & 5 badges to support women in the movement. With the BWU. US$7

1999 Jan Report Card:The Burma Junta Grits its Teeth. 68pp. $5 [photocopy only]

1999 Apr Report Card:The Stakes are Raised in Burma. 60pp.$5 [photocopy only]

1999 Apr Report Card:The Situation of Women in Burma. 20pp.$5 [photocopy]

1999 Aug T-Shirt (Multilingual): “COURAGE”. US$15 ea.[US$400 for 40]

1999 Aug Badge (Bilingual): “COURAGE”. US$10 for 10

1999 Sep Burma Special Report: The Committee Representing the People’s Parliament (CRPP). A5, 32pp. Gratis

1999 Sep Report Card:Looming Crackdown. A5, 56pp. Gratis

2000 Jan Report Card:New Hope, Old Reality. A5, 56pp

2000 Jan ALTSEAN-BURMA ACTIVISTS’ CALENDAR 2000: A4, 28pp

2000 Apr Special Briefing: Women’s Report Card on Burma 2000. 36pp. $5

2000 May Report Card:Consequences of Violence. A5, 40pp. Gratis

2000 Sap Report Card:Stand Off!. A5, 40pp

2000 Oct T-Shirt: “Safety is Everybody’s Right - Refugees too” US$15/40 for US$400

2001 Jan ALTSEAN-BURMA ACTIVISTS’ CALENDAR 2001: A4, 28pp

2001 Mar Report Card:Tentative Steps. A5, 80pp. Price $5 each

2001 Jun Special Briefing: Women’s Report Card on Burma 2001. 36pp. US$5

2001 Jun Poster: What Women of Burma Want! A2. Price $5 for 5

2001 Jun T-Shirt: “Burma: Asean’s Shame” US$15/40 for US$400

2001 Sep Report Card: Still Waiting. A5, 66pp. Price $5 each

2001 Oct Report Card: Burma’s Plea. A5, 80pp. Price $5 each

2001 Dec T-Shirt: “Free Aung San Suu Kyi t-shirt” US$15/40 for US$400

2002 Mar Report Card: Labor Pains. A5, 64pp. Price $5 each

2002 Apr Special Report: Some Talk, Little Action, Burma’s Secret Talks. A5, Price $5 each

Please contact us by fax (662 939 0286) or email <[email protected]>to order

This [dialogue] process, which is very much complex and delicate should be left confidential. The freedom of the country very much depends on this.
- Win Aung, SPDC Foreign Minister, 5 May 2001

If they are true and honest, it is high time to let the people know.
- Sein Win, PM (in exile), NCGUB, 5 May 2001

[I]t is necessary for all citizens including all the nationalities and all political parties jointly and unitedly with one accord [to] participate in
disentangling the manifold political, economic and social difficulties of the country.
- NLD, Independence Day 4 Jan 2002

---

[1] The Age, Australia (10 Mar 01) Suu Kyi, army close to a deal; http://www.theage.com.au/news/2001/03/10/FFXU0C3R2KC.html

[2] United Press International, Rangoon (30 Jan 02) Release on horizon for Suu Kyi

[3] AP, Rangoon (13 Dec 01) Myanmar opposition sees sign of reconciliation on Independence Day

[4] BBC (18 Mar 02) Burma Cancel UN Envoy’s Trip

[5] Irrawaddy magazine (30 Mar 02) Razali Trip Cancelled

[6] Burma Courier (5 May 2001) ‘Sein Win: "It Is High Time to Let the People Know"’

[7] Sydney Morning Herald, Australia (28 Mar 01) Talk of Political Transition Suggests Breakthrough Is Nearing

[8] The Nation (18 Mar 01) A New Burmese Election Without Aung San Suu Kyi?

[9] Burma is not a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

[10] Shan Herald Agency for News (18 September 2001) ‘One more Shan party official forced to resign’

[11] There has been reference to a UN officer who suggests that these moves may actually help move the talks along, but this person remains unidentified and this is only speculation. [see BBC (18 Mar 02) Behind Burma’s ‘non-coup’]

[12] see BBC (18 Mar 02)

[13] AFP, Kuala Lumpur (20 Mar 02) Coup must not derail Myanmar’s reconciliation process: UN envoy

[14] AFP, Washington (19 Mar 02) US chastises Myanmar over UN visit cancellation

[15] AFP, Kuala Lumpur (20 Mar 02)

[16] Far Eastern Economic Review (10 May 01) Something for Nothing Issue

[17] Channel-J News Agency, Japan (Aug 01, broadcast Sept 01, posted by Myanmar Information Committee 30 Dec 01) interview with Col. Hla Min, Government spokesperson, OSS, Ministry of Defence Panel

[18] Khin Maung Win, Deputy Foreign Minister; quoted in Reuters (20 Nov 01) Myanmar rejects ILO call for permanent presence

[19] HLT, ILO (Nov 01, para.82)

[20] ILO Conclusions of the Governing Body (Mar 02) GB.283, Agenda No.5

[21] Madeleine K. Albright (18 Jan 01) US Secretary of State, Statement on Burma

[22] Pinheiro (Nov 01) UNGA, Agenda Item 119(C), A/56/112

[23] Labor and Cultural Minister, Tin Winn; quoted in The Washington Times (8 Dec 01) Guarded optimism; Burma hopes parleys will usher in democracy

[24] Burma Courier (5 May 01) Sein Win: "It Is High Time to Let the People Know", excerpts from reactions to statements by Foreign Minister, Win Aung, broadcast on DVB

[25] see Altsean-Burma (Mar 01, p22)

[26] Far Eastern Economic Review (29 Nov 01)

[27] Preventing parliament from convening violates the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; in particular Article 21 which guarantees the right to participate in government based upon the will of the people.

[28] The parties represented by the CRPP (NLD - 9 members; Arakan League for Democracy (ALD), Mon National Democracy Front (MNDF), Shan Nationalities League for Democracy (SNLD) and the Zomi National Congress (ZNC) - all represented by the 10^th member) hold 433 (89%) out of the total 485 parliamentary seats. see Altsean-Burma (May 00) for further discussion

[29] ‘No-confidence’ motions, petitions, meetings and demonstrations against NLD MPs were organised by regime after the formation of the CRPP; March 2000 alone saw 6 no confidence demonstrations in one. (see Notification No.9 (20 Mar 00)) The junta aimed to discredit MPs by asserting they were no longer representative of the people, suggesting an increase in support for the regime. Numerous reports speak of the forced nature of such demonstrations which thousands of people were made to attend. As noted by Altsean-Burma (May 00), in organizing these ‘no-confidence’ motions the regime inadvertently recognised that MPS were indeed representatives of the people, a fact which had always been denied. (see Altsean-Burma (May 00) pp23-25 for further discussion of ‘no-confidence’ motions)

[30] see CRPP Notification No.65 14 Dec 99

[31] MPs detained, often suffering gross human rights abuses as a result of their political, non-violent, activities. Abuses include solitary confinement and denial of basic necessities, such as food, water, clothing and light. (see CRPP notifications No. 21 12 Apr 99, No.40 7 Jul 99)

[32] see CRPP Notification (8 Dec 98) No.7, (27 May 99) N0.34

[33] Permanent Mission of Myanmar to the UN (21 Mar 01) Question of the violation of human rights and fundamental freedoms in any part of the world, E/CN.4/2001/140

[34] NLD (4 Jan 02) Resolutions made and documented on the 4th January, 2002; 54^th anniversary of Independence Day.

[35] Reuters, Rangoon (10 Jan 01) Suu Kyi party hails government talks, asks for patience

[36] DVB (31 Jan 02) Burma's Opposition Spokesman Optimistic About Government-Suu Kyi Talks

[37] NLD (4 Jan 02) Resolutions made and documented on the 4th January, 2002; 54^th anniversary of Independence Day

[38] NLD (12 Feb 00) Message Of U Aung Shwe And U Lwin For Union Day

[39] The Nation (21 Apr 01) Burma: from two-way talks to three-way?

[40] The Nation (21 Apr 01)

[41] Khu Hteh Bupeh, Chairman, KNPP (8 Dec 01) Towards a Transition in Burma, Workshop, Oslo

[42] Note: there are no written agreements in ceasefires, they are only verbal.

[43] The Nation (21 Apr 01)

[44] Statement signed by NCGUB, NCUB, DAB, NDF. see Altsean-Burma (Mar 01, Appendix 1) for full statement

[45] NRP, Harn Yawnghwe (1 Nov 01) Briefing

[46] BBC (29 Aug 01)

[47] Khu Hteh Bupeh, Chairman, KNPP (8 Dec 01) Towards a Transition in Burma, Workshop, Oslo

[48] DVB (5 Sep 01) Ethnic groups "trust" Suu Kyi but seek to solve their own problems

[49] Harn Yawnghe, Director, Euro-Burma Office (8 Dec 01) The Non-Burman Ethnic People’s of Burma

[50] AFP, Rangoon (30 Apr 01) Myanmar junta says Suu Kyi talks no publicity stunt

[51] see Burma Media Association (24 Sep 01) Secrete Dialogue Leaked Out: Power-share Talk -- Some nations might not be happy

[52] Channel-J News Agency, Japan (Aug 01, broadcast Sept 01, posted by Myanmar Information Committee 30 Dec 01) interview with Col. Hla Min, Government spokesperson, OSS, Ministry of Defence Panel

[53] Burma Courier (5 May 01) Sein Win: "It Is High Time to Let the People Know", excerpts from reactions to statements by Foreign Minister, Win Aung, broadcast on DVB

[54] Kyemon, Burmese language newspaper (18 Jan 01)

[55] Permanent Mission of the Union of Myanmar to the UN office (21 Mar 01, p7)

[56] DVB (10 Sep 01) Minister says NLD's rejection of "confrontational policy" led to talks

[57] DVB (10 Sep 01) Minister says NLD's rejection of "confrontational policy" led to talks

[58] see Myanmar Times (2-8 Apr 01) ‘Peace, democracy’ in Tatmadaw address

[59] Convention of Elected Representatives Union of Burma (25 Feb-1 Mar 02) Bommersvik Decleration II, Sweden; http://www.ncgub.net/NCGUB/Bommersvik%20Declaration%20II%20-%2003-02.pdf

[60] see Altsean-Burma (Mar 01, Appendix 2) for full text

[61] Convention of Elected Representatives Union of Burma (25 Feb-1 Mar 02) Bommersvik Declaration II, Sweden; http://www.ncgub.net/NCGUB/Bommersvik%20Declaration%20II%20-%2003-02.pdf

[62] see Altsean-Burma (Mar 01, Appendix 2) for full text

[63] ABFSU (26 May 01) Position on the “talks” (between Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and the military junta) & the 1990 election verdict

[64] Burma Courier (5 May 01) Sein Win: "It Is High Time to Let the People Know", excerpts from reactions to statements by Foreign Minister, Win Aung, broadcast on DVB

[65] AFP (15 Jun 01) Annan welcomes release of prisoners in Myanmar

[66] BBC (12 Feb 02) Analysis: Burma's generals feel the heat

[67] Reuters, London (8 Dec 01) Britain urges Myanmar to return to democracy

[68] Kyodo (15 Mar 02) Reconciliation in Myanmar goes on: EU

[69] Convention of Elected Representatives Union of Burma (25 Feb-1 Mar 02) Bommersvik Declaration II, Sweden, http://www.ncgub.net/NCGUB/Bommersvik%20Declaration%20II%20-%2003-02.pdf; All Burma Students Democratic Front (5 Jun 01) Time for Transparency

[70] for US see Agence France Presse (13 Feb 02) ‘Myanmar talks making progress, success imminent: junta’

[71] European Union (8 Feb 01) Initial contacts between SPDC and NLD, Declaration by the Presidency on behalf of EU on Burma, Press Release, Brussels; Central & Eastern European countries associated with EU, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovak Republic, associated countries Cyprus, Malta & Turkey, & EFTA countries Iceland, Liechtenstein & Norway, members of the European Economic Area align themselves with this declaration.

[72] Altsean-Burma (Mar 01, p8)

[73] Kyemon (18 Jan 01) Burmese language newspaper.

[74] Permanent Mission of the Union of Myanmar to the UN office (21 Mar 01, p8)

[75] Far Eastern Economic Review (16 Aug 01)

[76] Channel-J News Agency, Japan (Aug 01, broadcast Sept 01, posted by Myanmar Information Committee 30 Dec 01) interview with Col. Hla Min, Government spokesperson, OSS, Ministry of Defence Panel

[77] People’s Press Printing Soc.Ltd. Morning Star (20 Feb 02) Myanmar hits out at Western sanctions for slowing move to democracy

[78] Channel-J News Agency, Japan (Aug 01, broadcast Sept 01, posted by Myanmar Information Committee 30 Dec 01) interview with Col. Hla Min, Government spokesperson, OSS, Ministry of Defence Panel

[79] see AP (24 Jul 01) Australia to urge Myanmar to continue dialogue with Suu Kyi; AFP (24 Jul 01) Australian FM detects signs of movement from Myanmar

[80] see AFP (26 Jul 01) EU asks UN to push democratic reforms in Myanmar; FEER (10 May 01) Something for Nothing

[81] Irrawaddy Magazine (Oct/Dec 00)

[82] HRW (2000) Annual Report: Burma; http://www.hrw.org/wr2k/Asia-01.htm

[83] Irrawaddy (30 Jan 02) Burmese Express Criticism Over Razali

[84] Reuters (5 Nov 01) Japan urges Myanmar to do more on democracy

[85] NCGUB (6 Nov 01) Japan Asked to Play 'Active Role' To Push Democratisation Forward

[86] Convention of Elected Representatives Union of Burma (25 Feb-1 Mar 02) Bommersvik Declaration II, Sweden; http://www.ncgub.net/NCGUB/Bommersvik%20Declaration%20II%20-%2003-02.pdf

[87] National League for Democracy (2001) Resolutions taken on the 13th anniversary of the founding of the National League for Democracy

[88] Aung San Suu Kyi (26 June 2000) Statement to Community of Democracies Ministerial Conference, transcript

[89] Aung San Suu Kyi (26 June 2000)

[90] Network First, Inside Burma: Land of Fear, p25

[91] Reuters (5 Nov 01) Japan urges Myanmar to do more on democracy

[92] Rumors said Ye Naing Win was disowned for marrying a Singaporean against his parents wishes. The SPDC drafted state constitution of Burma says individuals married to foreigners and their parents cannot be included in the government. Other rumours spoke of corruption by Ye Naing Win. http://www.irrawaddy.org/database/1998/vol6.2/romeo.html

[93] By doing this Khin Nyunt can be seen as increasing his power to be in a position to speak with non-military groups.

[94] The split over the split, http://www.irrawaddy.org/database/2000/vol8.3/cover.html

[95] Asiaweek (17 Dec 99) We Restored Order, Vol.25 No.50, http://www.asiaweek.com/asiaweek/interview/khin.nyunt/

[96] http://www.irrawaddy.org/database/2000/vol8.3/cover.html

[97] Kyemon, Burmese language newspaper (18 Jan 01)

[98] Faits And Protects, France (Apr 99) ‘Interview With Lt.-General Khin Nyunt, Secretary-1 of The State Peace and Development Council’ Delphine Evmoon

[99] Policies stipulate industrial businesses must be developed in accordance with SPDC’s desire to keep economy in state hands.

[100] DVB (22 Feb 01) interview with U Mya Win, NCGUB

[101] Time Asia (18 Dec 00) Two to Tangle; Vol.156 No.24

[102] The Split over the Split, http://www.irrawaddy.org/database/2000/vol8.3/cover.html

[103] AFP, Rangoon (29 Aug 01) UN envoy meets with Suu Kyi, diplomats, ethnic leaders in Myanmar

[104] AP (4 Nov 00) UN Envoy To Visit Myanmar Next Month, Meet With Suu Kyi

[105] Reuters (4 Jun 01) U.N. envoy upbeat on Myanmar political progress

[106] The Washington Times (8 Dec 01) Guarded optimism; Burma hopes parleys will usher in democracy

[107] Annan (1 Sep 01) Progress has been made in Burma talks, Durban, South Africa

[108] The other is Brig-Gen Zaw Tun, sacked from deputy minister's post in 2000 for speaking out too boldly for reform.

[109] Irrawaddy (30 Jan 02) Burmese Express Criticism Over Razali

[110] Military Shake-Up Explained Briefly, Hits Big Business (posted 27 Nov 01); http://www.karen.org/news/wwwboard/messages/1260.html

[111] Asiaweek (25 May 01) Talking Points

[112] Asiaweek (25 May 01)

[113] Burma Media Association (10 Aug 01) More NLD Offices Allowed to Reopen

[114] Free Burma: isolate the dictatorship; http://www.yap.com.au/channels/politics/article/512.html

[115] AP, Rangoon (25 May 00) Decade After Historic Election, No Democracy In Myanmar

[116] DVB (31 Jan 02) Burma's Opposition Spokesman Optimistic About Government-Suu Kyi Talks

[117] Washington Times, US (8 Dec 01) Guarded optimism; Burma hopes parleys will usher in democracy

[118] BBC (6 Sept 01) Burma opposition denies 'power share'

[119] AFP, Rangoon (29 Aug 01) UN envoy meets with Suu Kyi, diplomats, ethnic leaders in Myanmar

[120] AFP, Rangoon (18 Oct 01) UN rights envoy admitted to hospital before cutting short Myanmar trip, BBC (15 Oct 01) Burmese opposition criticises UN envoy