Burma’s Plea

Report Card, Burma

1 May - 31 August 2001

ALTSEAN Burma

Published October 2001

In memory of

Daw Kyi Kyi

(18 May 1920 – 15 June 2001)

CONTENTS

Introduction 5

Democracy 6

Progress? Open & Tripartite, Response, Humanitarian assistance

International Relations 10

‘Pat on the back’, Keeping a distance, Japan

Drugs 14

SPDC involvement, Thailand, Anti-Drugs

Thai-Burma Relations 18

Drugs & Armed Conflict, Social Relations, Prime Minister’s visit

The Military 21

Internal turmoil, New weapons, Ramifications

Economic Situation 23

Growth & GDP, Mismanagement, Private sector, Agriculture, Kyat & Inflation,

Border Trade, Foreign trade & investment, Textiles, Quotas, Tourism,

ILO & Safety, Appeal for aid

Health 32

HIV/AIDS, Thai-Burma Health Initiative, Humanitarian assistance

Human Rights 41

Forced labour, Human rights Training, Pipeline investment, Freedom of information

Education 45

Funding, NHEC Education seminar, Its political … Political

Displacement: IDPs, Refugees & Migrants 50

Shan-Wa, Hunger strike, Thai Refugee camps, Registration, Repatriation,

Xenophobia, Asylum & HIV

Ethnic & Religious Relations 58

Ethnic relations, Religion

Environment 62

Salween dam, Logging, Refugees & Deforestation

Landmines 65

Victims, SPDC, Others use, Medical treatment

Chronology 69

Appendix A: Mobility & HIV 71

Appendix B: Prisoner Releases 73

Bibliography 77

ISBN: 974-90051-3-9

October 2001, Bangkok

INTRODUCTION

Khin Nyunt has confirmed the SPDC is only a transitional government.

There must be peace, order and economic growth in the country and only then will the military relinquish power to the government elected by the people through the democratic process.

But ‘peace’, ‘order’ and ‘economic growth’ are not words used to describe the climate in Burma, nor are they likely to be in the near future.

The ‘dialogue’ process is still surrounded in secrecy and the basic prerequisites for productive dialogue are still lacking. The talks are by all accounts (other than the SPDCs) still at the confidence-building stage, and do not appear to have touched upon issues that will move Burma closer towards democracy.

Relations with many in the international community remain tense because of this, and even Japan - the largest ‘reward’ giver - is unhappy with the lack of substantial progress that has been made.

While Burma activists and politicians urge the SPDC to open the talks, the regime pleas with the international community for humanitarian aid. The regime appears to think it has made progress enough and has proved itself as committed to democracy. For this the regime considers it deserves reward and uses the desperate situation of the people of Burma to argue its case.

However, with human rights abuses, violent and intense gender discrimination, promotion of ethnic and religious tensions, continued and purposeful understatement of the HIV epidemic, political limitations on education and oppressive economic (mis)management, the regime has clearly not ‘proved itself’. The people of Burma continue to suffer from the regime and its oppressive rule, women suffering disproportionately as is the case in most situations of conflict, instability and poverty.

Greater and more tangible progress must be made before humanitarian assistance is given or else the money will find its way into the regime’s pockets. As Aung San Suu Kyi says:

If the provision of aid simply enables an authoritarian government to assume less responsibility for the welfare of the people, or to strengthen its despotic grip, or to increase the opacity of its administration, it will do irreparably more harm than good.

DEMOCRACY

* Improving R Stagnant * Deteriorating

Progress?

In the 2^nd quarter of 2001 it appeared the talks were stalled, although when the regime had spoken of them it was always in positive terms. Diplomatic sources in Rangoon suggested the death of Lt.-Gen. Tin Oo in mid-February led to a power struggle within the SPDC making the talks a point of contention. Aung San Suu Kyi’s noticeable absence at the Martyr’s Day ceremony (19 July), where respect is paid to her father, was widely interpreted as an indicator the talks were not proceeding in a satisfactory fashion. (This was the first time in 6 years that Aung San Suu Kyi has not attended the public Martyr’s Day event.) Sources suggest that this was to make a stand that the regime cannot dictate her movements, such as occurred on 27^th May when Daw Suu was not allowed to participate in the 11^th celebration of the NLD election victory.[1] As it turned out the party did not hold this celebration nor the ‘8888’ commemoration, perhaps frightened of negative consequences this could entail.[2]

Further indications of unsatisfactory progress are Razali’s postponed trips to Rangoon; after his January trip he was only permitted to visit in early June and again in late August. Aung San Suu Kyi did not give her assent to these delays; on the contrary she wants him to visit more often as she thinks this will speed up the process.[3] Razali has been permitted to meet with Aung San Suu Kyi, SPDC members; representatives of ethnic-nationalties and the NLD Central Executive Committee.[4] According to a press release on 30 August by Kofi Annan’s spokesman, “Razali was pleased to confirm that all parties remain committed to the process of national reconciliation. He hopes that further progress in the ongoing talks between the Government and the NLD will be possible.”[5] There have been increasing calls for Razali’s role in the talks to become more active; to be a mediator rather than merely a facilitator and to widen the ‘dialogue’.

Recent releases of U Aung Shwe (NLD Chairman) and U Tin Oo (NLD Deputy Chairman) on 26^th August (a day before Razali’s trip) are welcome but many hundreds more remain imprisoned with Daw Aung San Suu Kyi still under house arrest and denied diplomatic visitors.[6] Daw Suu asked for some 200 political prisoners to be released by the end of June 2001 as a goodwill gesture. However, only about 160 have been released so far and, according to Amnesty International, about 1,850 political prisoners remain in prison.[7][01] Of those released most were detained without charge in the first instance, or had already completed their sentences. [see Appendix B] Release of prisoners is predictable and occur around the same time as visits by Razali and other key individuals, such as UN Special Rapporteur on Myanmar Prof. Pinheiro.[8] A report in mid-August stated that Daw Suu was demanding the release of all prisoners as a focus point.[9]

Min Ko Maing: There has been confusion over where Min Ko Maing (student leader) is being held. Imprisoned in Sittwe prison for years, reports suggest that he was recently moved to Buthiduang township although other reports say he is still in Sittwe. A move to Buthiduang would make it harder for international human rights organisations to monitor his situation.[10]

Although some releases are definitely better than none, there is more to democracy than the release of limited numbers of political prisoners (particularly when new arrests continue[11]). Although 18 NLD offices in Rangoon Division have been allowed to revive party activities, erect flags and signboards,[12] hundreds elsewhere remain forcibly closed. (Release of political prisoners and opening of NLD offices in Rangoon were key requests of Razali’s, as well as of Aung San Suu Kyi.[13]) Beyond gestures of goodwill, it is not clear that the dialogue is making progress on substantive issues, in particular over any form of power sharing between the generals and the opposition.[14]

Aung San property court case: The court case drags on. On May 15th the judge declared that a ruling on the eviction suit would be given on 30^th May, but then it was postponed again until 3^rd September. A date for a formal hearing was not set.

The case has implications beyond the ownership of property, as if he wins, Aung San Oo is expected to give his share of the property over to the military. If the SPDC have any legal rights over the property the current talks and security of Aung San Suu Kyi will undoubtedly be placed into question.

Open & Tripartite

The SPDC argue that “this [dialogue] process, which is very much complex and delicate, should be left confidential. The freedom of the country very much depends on this.”[15] Critics however argue that this dialogue process, essential to democratic progress and national reconciliation, must be opened up and include representatives from other political parties and non-Burman nationalities if it is to stand any chance of success. The talks with Aung San Suu Kyi, the most eminent person in the political scene in Burma, can be seen to be a diversion tactic by the regime to buy them time. Only if talks are open and tripartite can the SPDC be genuinely seen to be committed to political progress.

In an effort to widen the dialogue process, Bohmu Aung (one of the original ‘30 comrades’) wrote an open letter to Senior General Than Shwe. The letter displayed respect and patience and asked that the talks be extended to other bodies and stated “we will be happy if official announcements are made about the progress and the points on which agreement has been reached in the dialogue. The whole country will rejoice with us.”[16]

Although some reports, including those from inside Burma,[17] are stressing that patience is needed, other groups are expressing irritation. This disatisfaction was so intense in May that the Democratic Alliance of Burma stated armed conflict would be escalated against the Burmese military in order to pressurise them to improve the status of the talks.[18] Although this tactic is considered dubious and misguided by some, it is reflective of how little faith some groups have in the SPDC and how desperate they are to be heard. The Karen National Union and All Burma Student Democratic Front also want the talks opened and criticise the regime for its lack of commitment to change, illustrated by its continued human rights violations.[19]

Other happenings which throw the SPDC’s commitment into question are the alleged pressure applied to members of the Shan Nationalities League for Democracy, Mongkerng Branch to resign (June). Threatened with charges of “collaboration with the armed resistance,” members could expect to face persecution if they did not accept the military’s ultimatum.[20] In another incident, 8 pro-democracy dissidents living in exile on the Thai border border disappeared in mid-July. Meanwhile it appears that all political movement is being watched, unsurprisingly members of the NLD[21] but also members of the Union Solidarity and Development Association (USDA) to ensure they are toeing the regime’s line.[22]

In the words of Chaiyachoke Chulasiriwongs, a lecturer at Chulalongkorn University (Bangkok, Thailand), the talks are a delaying tactic to enable the regime to develop a strong political base that can compete with the NLD. “The SPDC is weakening the NLD, threatening those who are not already in jail, while preparing its own political foundations.”[23] Mahathir has said that the ruling junta would have to be included in a future civilian government, further strengthening the suspicion that this may be one of the regime’s conditions for moving to a more democratic state.[24]

Response [see International Relations for further discussion]

While ASEAN, particularly Malaysia, continue to hold fast to the statement that change in Burma will occur gradually through dialogue,[25] the international community, including Japan, has expressed irritation at the snail’s pace of the talks.[26] Kofi Annan has called on the international community “to continue supporting the dialogue process”[27] while amalgamations of Burma’s democratic forces urge that pressure on Burma be continued.[28] The 2 approaches need not be seen as mutually exclusive, and in fact reflect the behaviour of bodies such as the US and the EU.

Humanitarian Assistance

There is frustration that talks are still not beyond the “confidence-building stage”, but sources state NLD leaders understand that the military must see benefits from continuing the talks. For this reason and for the good of the people in Burma, the NLD will consider limited humanitarian aid so long as “all political detainees have been set free and the NLD leadership is satisfied that the outcome of the talks are satisfactory and irreversible.”[29] This is reiterated by the US[30] and numerous bodies also stress the SPDC must agree to certain benchmarks concerning the distribution and direction of aid.

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

* Improving * Stagnant R Deteriorating

Over this 4-month period visions of the SPDC patting itself on the back lurk in the mind. Relations continue to be built with numerous countries, improving the legitimacy of the regime on a global scale. The trend is clear however, relations with Burma are predominately focused on trade and military benefits. However, some disturbing new relations have evolved as previously critical countries have established relations as a reward for the dubious ‘progress’ of the talks whilst ignoring continued human rights abuses. In general, those countries who do consider human rights and political and democratic rights to be important benchmarks continue to keep a distance from the regime.

‘Pat on the back’

Countries including North Korea, Pakistan, China, Russia and India all continue to experience improved relations with Burma, mainly based on military and economic terms. This is not to say that other factors do not interplay, but highlights that these are typically the main focus points.

The regional body ASEAN claims support for national reconciliation but maintains its hands-off policy of non-interference. ASEAN countries view Burma’s authoritarian regime as legitimate and state that the country alone can deal with its ‘internal’ problems. Since Burma joined ASEAN the body has stood by the theory that engagement is the way to help the country develop, both economically and politically.

Although comments are made regarding democracy in Burma, ASEAN countries are encouraging of the slightest progress. Although comments are made regarding human rights abuses in the form of forced labour, ASEAN condemns the ILO resolution and argues against sanctions against Burma. Negative international action against Burma can be said to reflect badly on ASEAN as a regional body.

During this period trade, military partnerships (Malaysia[02] ) and general relations with Burma have continued to improve with recent trips to Burma by ASEAN dignitaries; Lao (18-21 August) and Indonesia (24 August). [see ‘Thai-Burma relations’ for further discussion of Thailand] The draft statement by ASEAN at its Regional Forum (20-22 July, Hanoi, Vietnam) was warm and supportive. ASEAN “noted encouraging developments in the efforts of the government of Burma towards these developments.”[31]

In a disturbing new move, New Zealand ended a decade of no relations by resuming contacts with Burma after the ASEAN conference. The Foreign Minister spoke of ‘democratic progress’ in Burma as the reason for these improved relations. “We’re wanting to promote the ongoing dialogue and change that we hope will occur in Burma and the restoration of democratic and human rights there. It’s far from clear what the timetable will be for that, but at least there have been positive moves in recent months that we want to encourage.”[32]

Australia seems to be of a similar mindset, talking of “signs of movement” in the democratic process. “We take the view that some sort of engagement with them is better than none. We have been trying to explore ways we can engage without engaging too warmly.”[33] These moves by countries that have previously condemned the regime are disturbing as they give legitimacy to the regime and send the message that it is taking adequate steps to ensure democracy and national reconciliation in Burma.

Cynical analysis can put the Australasian countries moves down to a wish to benefit from trade and other relations with Burma, as building diplomatic relations is a first step towards this. Australia’s Human Rights training programme may be viewed as another example such diplomacy building.

SPDC & Sanctions:

Despite Khin Nyunt’s claim that sanctions have had no adverse effect on Burma[34], most maintain that it is these sanctions that are partially responsible for the ongoing talks with Aung San Suu Kyi.[35] Actions by the regime also indicate that international sanctions are of concern.[36] While quantifying the effect of the sanctions and strained diplomatic relations is intensely difficult, and beyond the scope of this report card, it is important to note that SPDC claims that they have had no effect are inaccurate. The economic situation in Burma continues to worsen and has lead the regime to resort to panic-stricken and short-sighted policies along with the more positive development of establishing some process, albeit limited, of ‘dialogue’.

Maintaining sanctions and diplomatic distance can therefore be seen as a key strategy in promoting democracy for the people of Burma. According to the analysis of many pro-democracy supporters sanctions should be maintained until such a time as real progress is made in the areas of human rights, democracy and national reconciliation. Many also argue that humanitarian assistance be withheld unless conditions can be attached regarding control of aid projects and input from concerned, non-SPDC, groups.

Keeping a distance

The European Union (EU) has criticised the “constructive engagement” policy of ASEAN and Australia towards the regime, and specifically criticised a statement on Burma issued by the ASEAN Regional Forum as “rather weak.” Co-operation between the EU and ASEAN remains stalled because of differences over Burma. EU President, Louis Michel, warned that inadequate protection of human rights and democracy in Burma especially, does not bode well for improved relations between the 2 bodies.[37] It is worrying that Australia and New Zealand do not seem to have considered ongoing human rights abuses in their decisions to re-establish relations with Burma.

The EU and the US maintain sanctions against the regime but things have changed slightly in light of the ‘dialogue’. Belgium, as President of the EU, hopes to send another mission to Rangoon in order to assess developments before ministers review sanctions at the end of October. It was stated that pre-requisites for lifting sanctions included the release of more political prisoners and freedom of action for political parties. The report of the September ILO mission will also be taken into account[03] , the regime’s renewed contact suggesting a slight shift towards improving its relationship with the international community[04] .

The United States has made uncharacteristically few inflammatory statements about the situation in Burma over the last 9 months[05] . Senior US officials held talks in Rangoon on 2^nd August with Burma’s military leaders and a delegation led by US deputy assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Ralph Boyce met with Khin Nyunt and Aung San Suu Kyi.

East Timor has declared solidarity with Aung San Suu Kyi and her struggle for democracy[06] .

Japan

Japan has been the centre of controversy in recent months, due to its reestablishment of official development assistance (ODA) to the ‘government’ of Burma. There continues to be opposition to Japanese ODA, particularly regarding the Baluchaung hydroelectric plant as the money will be in the hands of the regime and many argue that civilians will not benefit. Reports claim that Aung San Suu Kyi has expressed unease[38] and Powell (US) has declared the aid package to be “not a proper investment [...] at this time.”[39] Despite this criticism, a grant of between US$24.5-$28.5 million is expected to be approved by the Japanese Cabinet by the end of the year.[40]

It appears that Japan’s patience may be tested however. During the ASEAN conference, Japan’s foreign minister expressed irritation with the slow pace of progress, stating that Burma’s contention that it faced “internal problems” was not an excuse to delay progress.[41] Although the giving of ODA seems to enable Japan to exert some influence in regards to the process of national reconciliation[07] ,[42] there do not appear to be conditions attached to this aid and so how much the regime will heed this criticism is unknown.

DRUGS

* Improving * Stagnant R Deteriorating

Burma has reclaimed its crown as the world’s leading producer of opium since the Taliban has reduced cultivation in Afghanistan[x8] .[43] A report sent from the Lashio based North-Eastern Military command to Rangoon Military Headquarters clearly stated that in North Shan State alone there are 76,000 acres of poppy plantations.[44] Other reports indicate that increasing numbers of methamphetamine and heroin plants are opening up in Laos as the UWSA are relocating their factories there.[45] Destruction of the drug industry is exceedingly difficult as it is highly lucrative in terms of money, public relations and control.

Burma experts agree that for any anti-narcotic policy to be successful, it must include a meaningful political solution for all insurgent and ethnically diverse groups. A genuine alliance must be created that unites the government, civilian and international bodies to help tackle the massive drug industry.[46]

SPDC involvement

An interview with a former SPDC soldier described how the Tatmadaw is integrally involved in poppy growing, with battalions ordered to grow at least 50 acres.[47] Anecdotal evidence also tells of commanders being ordered to sell 150,000 methamphetamine pills each, per month or face transfer; drug seizures by the military being sold on to Thai buyers;[48] involvement in trafficking[49] and villages having to raise funds for road maintenance through growing poppies.[50]

Further evidence, in the form of an Australian documentary, claimed to have irrefutable evidence that proved the SPDC, including Khin Nyunt, were integrally involved in the drugs trade.[51] Prof. Des Ball, a noted Australian defence strategist, and Bertil Lintner both speak of the SPDC troops’ integral role in the drugs trade with cease-fire ‘deals’ and securing trafficking routes.[52] Finally, a document listing drug factories must surely convince Thailand of SPDC involvement in the drug trade as it contains a photo of Khin Nyunt at the Wa headquarters holding hands with Wa chief, Pao Yu Chang.[53] The military’s vow to fight alongside the Wa if the task force from Thailand crosses into Burma also suggests some form of suspicious alliance.[54]

Thailand

Drugs continue to provoke aggression on the Thai-Burma border, and the recent kidnappings of Thai narcotics officials, has created not only unease and fears regarding safety in these areas, but also increased tensions between Burma and Thailand. [see p18-19]

In the face of continued trafficking of heroin and ‘yaba’ and low seizure rates (an expected increase from 200million to as high as 800milion methamphetamines this year, with only about 10% seized[55]), the Thaksin government appears committed to tough drug eradication measures. It has recently approved Bt382million to the Thai Defence Ministry to fight drugs.[56] Rumours of ‘death squads’ to ‘eradicate’ 1,000 drug traffickers in 2001 were denied but clearly have the support of some army and police officials. Meanwhile, hundreds of suspected drug traffickers buy themselves out of jail with their illicit earnings lining the pockets of Thai officials.[57]

After a meeting in May [x9] and during Thaksin’s visit to Burma in mid-late June, the 2 countries apparently agreed to co-operate and fight drug production.[58] Similar statements have been made in the past and only time will tell if the agreement will eventually come to fruition.

Anti-drugs

Money Laundering

The United Wa State Army (UWSA) - labeled “the world’s biggest gang of armed drug traffickers” is involved in a growing number of legitimate businesses through which they can launder money. They now control one of Burma’s biggest banks – the May Flower Bank, an airline, lucrative gem-mining concessions, have a ¹/₃ stake in a mobile-phone company,[59] and ‘drug lords’ are winning contracts from the state to build roads.[60]

The recently formed Anti Money Laundering Office (AMLO), Thailand made their first arrest of a drug courier, seizing Bt35million. The money is thought to derive from UWSA drugs. The office is currently investigating 50 cases although the officers readily admit this is barely a start. (The Thai government revoked the Thai nationality of Wei Hsueh-kang, involved in UWSA drug operations.[61])

In an effort to keep up the fight, the European Union recently announced that they would soon be opening their Anti-Money Laundering office in Bangkok. As well, the US Embassy held a four-day seminar in Bangkok in early May attended by 75 law enforcement officers from 16 countries to discuss money laundering. Burma has announced it will write and enforce a law banning money laundering according to international law. Such a move would mean powerful men such as the drug lord Lo Hsing Han and fugitive Khun Sa would have to be investigated. Again, only time will tell.[62]

Seizures, burnings, arrests

In a continuation of human rights abuses, 5 people were sentenced to death in 2000 for drug trafficking in Burma.[63] A Taiwanese man was sentenced to death on drug trafficking charges following his arrest in June.[64]

As part of a United Nations Drug Control Program (UNDCP), SPDC authorities handed over drug suspect, Tan Xiaolan, wanted by China for his involvement in the drug trade.[65] It is important to note that this man is not connected to the regime and hence they lose nothing by handing him over. Rangoon must stop providing safe havens for all drug traffickers and money launderers, including their allies. Only then will the region be able to effectively tackle the drug-trade.[66]

The SPDC (and the pro-Rangoon UWSA) continue to hold public ceremonies of drug burnings, attempting to impress foreign governments of their commitment to drug eradication.[67] The most recent public relations campaign has been the opening of a US$1.8million anti-drugs museum in Rangoon on 26^th June. Elimination museums are also in Mongla town, eastern Shan State and Laukkai town, northern Shan State[M10] .

Critics claim that the museum – partially funded by convicted drug trafficker Lo Hsin Han,[68] is merely a showpiece, exaggerating the small steps while sweeping larger issues under the carpet. There are no discussions of trafficking along the Thai-Burma border, why it takes the regime so long to report seizures,[69] why those charged are not able to see the drugs they have ‘smuggled’,[70] nor of allegations regarding the regime’s involvement.

To quote directly from a US report to congress, “The United States does not believe that Burma’s current counter narcotics efforts are commensurate with the scale of the problem in Burma.”[71] Burma must engage actively in regional and international drug-eradication initiatives and must prove itself to be a trustworthy and reliable body. Maybe then the international community will engage more with the regime to assist in alleviating some of the problems associated with the drugs industry.

THAI-BURMA RELATIONS

* Improving R Stagnant * Deteriorating

Drugs & Armed Conflict

Drugs, or rather the control of drugs, continues to be the main source of conflict in Thai-Burma relations. Resulting casualties of Thai civilians and soldiers[72] and kidnapping of civilians [x11] and off-duty narcotics officers[73] do nothing to calm relations between the 2 neighbours, provoked in the last period (Feb-Apr 2001) to the lowest point in recent history. Fighting between Thailand and Burma continued to escalate during May, with accusations transpiring that Thai jets had fired missiles into Burmese territory. Burma lodged a complaint against 2 Thai F-16 fighter jets which had fired 7 missiles, supposedly causing injuries to civilians. Thailand stated that this was only a reconnaissance mission and denied dropping any missiles.[74] A third story was given by Thai residents on the border who said the planes had fired missiles, but that they fell into Thai territory causing no injuries. Fighting has calmed somewhat since then and Burma has called a truce in the disputed border area of Kuteng Nayong[x12] .

The SPDC still claim that Thailand is supporting insurgent groups, a belief that was supported by an ABC, Australia documentary. Thai officials deny this and perhaps in order that they are taken seriously, expressed strong public displeasure when Thai celebrities (Noppol Komarachoon, Preeyanuch Panpradab and Surachai Chantimathorn) crossed the border to celebrate Shan National Day festivities held by the SSA. Immigration officials stated the 3 would be arrested and fined Bt2,000 for leaving Thailand illegally.[75]

Prime Minister Thaksin visited Burma in June, General Watanachai and Defence Minister Chavalit visited on 23^rd July and top officials met in Phuket in August, all to discuss the issue of drugs. There has been no other topic so widely discussed between the 2 countries in contemporary history. During Thaksin’s visit a memorandum of understanding (MOU) was signed by both countries committing each to jointly suppress the drugs trade. Thaksin was told the United Wa State Army (UWSA) was determined to reduce its drug production, but that it currently did not have complete control over those concerned. To ‘prove’ the UWSA was not expanding their drug-related activities, Thaksin was invited to send representatives to Mong Yawn township - an area Thailand has claimed is the centre of the UWSA’s activities.

For the 2 countries to reach an agreement in this matter and establish a working relationship it is important that national governments themselves be united. As some Thai analysts have said, the Thai government must give a strong unified message so that there can be no misinterpretation or game playing.[76]

Social relations

The propaganda battle between Burma and Thailand heightened in May with a new history section published in a Burmese fourth grade textbook which portrays Thais as servile and lazy, calls Thailand a “bad neighbor”, and claims the drugs problem is Thailand’s responsibility as it supports ‘drug-trafficking insurgents’.[77]

Thai Foreign Minister, Surakiart Sathirathai, did not take any diplomatic action over the book but instead raised the issue when he met Burmese leaders. “Creating misunderstanding is not healthy for the relations of the people of both countries,” he said. He said Thailand thought the textbook content was an incorrect interpretation of history, but that the issue was ultimately a domestic one.[78]

Thaksin and some Thai experts agree that while Burma is guilty of inflaming relations between the 2 neighbours, so is Thailand, both in historic and contemporary times.[79] Media on both sides of the border must learn to be more responsible and unbiased in their reporting. A recent Thai movie Suriyothai, backed by the Royal family, portrayed the Burmese as warlords, somewhat ridiculous, dark skinned, ignorant and ‘uncivilized’. Another recent film, Bangrajan, was also widely criticized for playing on highly negative stereotypes of Burma.[80]

At the same time as the release of Suriyothai, the Thai press ran news articles on the amount of Burmese spies in Thailand. One of the characters portrayed in the movie was a Burmese spy and the parallel between the film and the media indicates the impact of the film on Thai society and its obsession with Burmese ‘others’.[81]

Prime Minister’s Visit

Due to a need for reconciliation between Thailand and Burma, Thaksin made the first official visit to Burma by a Thai Prime Minister since 1997 on 20^th June. Hailing his 2 day visit as a success, he claimed relations were back on track.[82] Besides the MOU on drugs, the 2 leaders signed a joint communique reaffirming “traditional ties of friendship and goodwill.” Thaksin said the document was historic in that it implied the damaged ties had been overcome and both sides would focus on cooperation rather than conflicts.[83] In a meeting with Thai businessmen in Rangoon, Thaksin expressed confidence that Thai-Burmese relations would be optimally restored soon as a result of co-operation in economic, cultural and political affairs.[84]

On 22^nd June Burmese Foreign Minister Win Aung visited Thailand as a follow-up to Prime Minister Thaksin’s trip.[85] The minister discussed cultural and technical co-operation, road links and preparations for the drugs summit in Kunming, also to be joined by China and Laos.

Since these diplomatic visits social relations have improved to the extent that accusations are not being vigorously and frequently fired as they were previously. Burma also reopened a border checkpoint that had been closed for 4 months and trade seems set to increase.[86] [see p27] The Burmese regime has given approval to road construction that will traverse from Thailand to a proposed deep-sea port in Tavoy. Rangoon’s approval is hardly surprising since, as with the Freedom Bridge at Mae Sot and various other infrastructure projects, Thailand is expected to pick up the bill.[87]

THE MILITARY

* Improving R Stagnant * Deteriorating

Domestic squabbles within the junta continue as individuals and their political alliances jockey for power both inside and outside the government while an arms race with Thailand has led the SPDC to create an alliance with Russia. The SPDC continues to spend disproportionate amounts of its resources on the military despite the fact that this will repel potential aid givers.

Internal turmoil

An ongoing struggle between Lt-Gen Khin Nyunt and Gen Maung Aye is being partly blamed for tensions along the Thai-Burma border.[88] Government re-shuffles exemplify strategic power plays,[89] as does the delay in naming a replacement of Lt-Gen Tin Oo, Secretary No.2.[90]

Former Minister for Telecommunications, Post and Telegraphs, Brigadier General Win Tin, is currently under investigation at an undisclosed location in Rangoon for corruption charges.[91] However, the situation is not as clear cut as it may at first appear and may well be highly political as the business conflict under investigation is concerned with Ne Win’s grandson. It is also implied that business matters with the mobile phone company, Skylink, are connected to this investigation. Skylink is owned by Ne Win’s daughter who is closely connected to Khin Nyunt.

Other government officials have chosen to leave the regime. U Ko Ko, Minister Counsellor and Deputy Representative of the Burmese Mission to the UN, defected to the US on 18^th May. In a fax, U Ko Ko stated his resignation was a result of military corruption and destruction of the Union Of Burma. U Ohn Gyaw, the former foreign minister, has also left his post.[92] Defection by such high-ranking officials speaks volumes of the dictatorial nature of the regime and its workings, as well as the unease of various ranking officials.

New Weapons

Military ties with Russia are growing with a recent deal to purchase 10 MiG-29s and talk of further sales and military co-operation. The acquisition appears to be a response to clashes with Thai fighter jets in May. [see p18] The arms sales, subsequent years of training and offers of assistance in nuclear energy[93] will give Moscow a strong foothold in the country.[94]

Figure 1: Military expenditure

Military links with Malaysia are also set to increase following an announcement in August that arrangements will be made for a technical team from Burma to visit Malaysia’s more advanced defense industry.[95] [see p10-11]

Ramifications

Most people in Burma are highly impoverished and urgently require the funds that are being spent on weapons. (It is ironic to note that Burma is at war with no external country and that the SPDC claims the country is more peaceful than is has been in contemporary history.) The regime is vigorously seeking aid and debt forgiveness (owing over US$6 billion), citing the gaps that need to be met in civilian areas such as health and education.

It would seem that the SPDC is ignorant to the fact that increased military strength is precisely what potential aid donors do not want to see. The SPDC spends large percentages of their finances directly on the army, amounting to 49.9% of state expenditure in 1998/99. [see Figure 1] Continued military spending on arms acquisition “risks undermining its case for further foreign aid and loan write-offs.”[96] Why should external bodies grant aid when abundant resources are being spent on increased military capability? Particularly when the military commits human rights abuses against the people within that country. Such disproportionate expenditure on the military demonstrates the regime’s lack of commitment to the Burmese people, their basic needs and their future.

ECONOMIC SITUATION

* Improving * Stagnant R Deteriorating

Growth & GDP

General Than Shwe has forecast economic growth at 11.3% for this financial year and GDP (2001/2002) at Kt1,001.43 billion, up from Kt899.52 billion in the previous fiscal year.[97] This is well above recent trend growth and is considered by many to be highly unrealistic. Although a recovery of the industrial sector - receiving investment in the form of increased imported machinery[98] - may aid economic growth, weak infrastructure, recent flooding, power shortages, the lack of investment in agriculture and general economic mismanagement severely constrain the economy. The Economist Intelligence Unit expects real GDP (in expenditure terms) to grow by only 5.3% in 2001/02 and 5.6% in 2002/03.[99]

Mismanagement

The key to Burma’s economic problems is the regime’s mismanagement of the economy. According to the Asia Development Bank (ADB):

Unless necessary structural reforms are undertaken, the economy will continue to depend heavily on ad hoc policies formualted in reaction to random factors such as weather and the changing regional economic environment […It is these] structural problems that prevent the economy from achieving a higher level of socioeconomic development.[013] [100]

Burma’s growth potential is hindered by the regime’s tight control of the economy and its mismanagement, including printing money not backed by gold reserves[101]. The government must address the grossly distorted foreign exchange market,[102] continuing levels of high inflation, low levels of revenue collection including taxes and unacceptably low levels of public expenditure (which have been used to reduce the fiscal deficit by 70%),[103] and the central bank must be given greater authority in controlling money supply and interest rates and monitoring commercial banks. Only when such changes are made can Burma begin to effectively tackle poverty.

The regime are poor businessmen and their projects deplete valuable resources. As a result of the losses of, and subsidies for, state enterprises the public sector budget continues to run at a deficit of 5-6% GDP. Reports suggest that that the military-owned company (U Pi Ltd.) lost US$2 million as it could not compete with private companies.[104]

Investment and savings ratios have been declining,[105] hampering industrial development. Initiatives to encourage domestic investment have not been successful as confidence of these initiatives is low; particularly after 6 soldiers could not cash in their dividends.[106]

Private Sector

The regime claims the private sector is thriving. A total of 33,081 private entrepreneurs[107] apparently accounted for 68.68% of total imports in January and February 2001 and 59.84% of total exports.[108] Although these private trade figures are down on the overall figures for 2000,[109] they are generally considered highly over-optimistic. While it is true that construction projects were handed over from the public to the private sector in April, it is widely believed this is because of lack of financial support from the state.[110]

Burma has many restraints on economic freedom[111] and many analysts feel the term ‘free market’ is rather spurious in Burma. As the FTUB stated in its report to the NGO Forum at the 3^rd UN Conference on LDCs, Burma does not have a true market economy. “Army-run companies dominate much trade, gems & jades, oil & gas, transport & communication, industry, and even banking.”[112] Furthermore, the economy is established in such a way that it feeds off of the private sector in the form of taxes, levies, subsidies, controlled prices and an over-valued currency.

Agriculture

Agriculture accounted for 52% of GDP in 1999/2000. Adverse weather conditions had a negative impact on Burma’s agricultural industry, as did pesticide and fertiliser shortages[x14] . The regime only spends approximately 11% of the budget on the agriculture industry, a decreasing percentage of GDP.

Figure 1: Agriculture and Military expenditure

It is as a result of the lack of appropriate incentives and investments and business skill directed at the agriculture industry that the current account remains in deficit. Agriculture is responsible for 37% of GDP and 25% exports. Rice prices remain low in order for the SPDC to attract increasing numbers of trading partners[x15] , but are too low for farmers to make a profit.[113]

Kyat & inflation

Figure 2: Currency Exchange (kyat:US$)

The Kyat fell dramatically against the US$ in May and now seems to have stabilised at around Kt680. The data for Figure 1 comes from the Far Eastern Economic Review, and if anything is a little conservative. Separate reports said that the kyat had fallen as low as Kt900:US$1 in mid-May,[114] substantially lower than is shown here. Speculators predict the kyat is set to fall further[x16] . (There continues to be disparity between the FEC and the US$; at the beginning of August FECs were only worth Kt550-565 whereas US$ were worth Kt680.[115])

In a continued attempt to stabilise the kyat, licenses of many FEC currency dealers were revoked in June, with 400 exchange traders in Rangoon arrested. Only a few are now privileged to hold licenses, including the junta-owned Myanmar Economic Holdings and Myawaddy Bank[x17] . Markets that affect currency exchange have also been subject to restraint and intimidation. Gold prices were reset at an SPDC-decreed level and about 30 car brokers were detained (cars must be paid for in hard currency).[116] While the initiative temporarily stabilized the exchange rate in June, it is not a long-term solution as hard currency demand cannot be suppressed through such arbitrary and oppressive measures.

The kyat fell to such frightening lows against the US$ that inflation and prices soared. In May, inflation was estimated to be 20%[117] and has risen since then. The cost of gold, cars and other imported items including condensed milk, monosodium glutamate, medicines and toiletries have risen significantly; even basic goods such as a cup of tea doubled in price from Kt25 in February to Kt50 in May.[118] Women suffer disproportionately during times of increased economic hardship. Money is often directed towards family members with women’s needs coming last.

Border Trade

The Mae Sai-Tachilek crossing (closed in March and re-opened on the Thai side in mid-April) was re-opened on the Burma side on 24^th June, attracting almost 3,000 border-crossers from Burma in 3 days. Trade of basic items picked up immediately, rendering many smuggling activities of recent months redundant. Cement (of which Burma has a shortage[119]) and iron were taken into Burma, but ‘strategic’ goods such as petrol and vehicles remained banned by Thai authorities.[120]

Although Burma claims its economy does not suffer from border closures, this seems highly unfeasible as border trade has been recognised as crucial, particularly in the face of international sanctions. Border trade is estimated to be worth Bt10 million[121] (excluding tourist revenue),[122] and is beneficial to people on both sides of the border.

Even behaviour by the regime indicates the importance of border trade. To encourage trade, Burmese authorities allowed transactions in US$, Kyat, and the currency of neighbouring countries[018] and in July opened an additional 4 special border-trade zones with new regulations.[123] More goods can now be traded, including 10 of the 15 Thai goods that were banned in Burma since the beginning of May[x19] .

Foreign Trade & Investment

Foreign trade (including border trade) reached US$769.15 million in January and February 2001, up 35.64% from the same period last year but still leaving a deficit of US$93.15 million dollars.[124] To reduce imports into Burma the regime has introduced a ‘Buy Myanmar’ ruling. Companies are now limited in what goods they can import. Some may not be able to continue their present operations as they may not be able to get sufficient raw materials, or if they can the cost may be too expensive.[125] Tough import restrictions have already proved to be a difficulty to Myanma Suzuki Motor Co. Ltd.,[126] forcing them to significantly cut back operations.[127]

Foreign investment is extremely weak, particularly as little is directed towards large-scale industry or manufacturing. Total foreign investment in Burma in the first 2 months of 2001 only reached US$4.03 million, a decrease of 52.54% compared to the same period last year.[128] It appears the more lucrative investment projects are being withdrawn with smaller scale projects taking their place[x20] .

Kvaerner, Norway pulled out of a contract with Premier Petroleum Myanmar Ltd. after discussion with human rights groups and consideration of the political climate in Burma. Although legislation does not prohibit Norwegian firms from investing in Burma, the government urges against it.

Saying this however, a Canadian Mining Company, Ivanhoe, is planning on extending its investments in Burma. The Letpadaung mine will be “the single largest foreign investment in Burma since international oil cartels developed two offshore natural gas fields in Burma in the Andaman Sea in the mid-nineties.”[129] Trade is likely to improve with those coutries which have good diplomatic relations with Burma, but it appears companies in industrialised countries are also keen to engage in advatageous trade.

ASEAN: Trade with Thailand, Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines, totaled US$445.83 million (39.8% of total trade) in the 1^st quarter of 2001, down 1.87% from the same period last year. The trade deficit valued at US$138.45 million.[130]

Industrialised countries: The US, UK, Japan, Germany and France were responsible for 18.5% of the total trade amount, an increase of 123.8% over the same period in 2000.[131]

Textiles

Despite vows by major retailers in Canada not to buy clothes made in Burma, textile imports were valued at C$13.367 million (US$8.783 million) for the first quarter of 2001, an increase of 57% compared to the same period in 2000.[132]

Meanwhile, a bill has been introduced in the US Senate and another in the State House of Massachusetts that if passed would reduce economic ties with Burma[x21] . Perhaps movements such as these will impact on US textile importers who in spite of the ILO resolution have increased trade with the country. The US is currently the largest importer of textiles, with imports rising 130% last year and doubling further in the first 6 months of 2001.[133]

Quotas

Petrol, electricity and cooking oil have been placed on a list of essential items that are rationed. Cooking oil has previously served as an indicator of Burma’s economic health and this desperate shortage reveals the dire straits of the economy.

Petrol: Crude oil production fell 11% and natural gas 9% in the first 2 months of 2001, compared to the same period in 2000. The drop in production emphasises that Burma cannot rely on pipeline investment indefinetly and must develop other forms of raising much needed foreign currency.

A more immediate problem is the domestic shortage of oil, most obvious in the shortage of petrol. Fuel quotas have been reduced which has led to almost a 50% increase (Kt600-900) in the price of petrol, with a 300% on the black market stretching incomes severely.[134] The fuel shortage also adversely affects major industries and export businesses through frequent electricity failures.

Oil: Since 10^th July [022] civilians have queued for their rationed half a viss (approximately 1.5kg) of cooking oil per household, providing they can show adequate documentation.[135] Palm oil has been in short supply since early May after the ruling military regime made it illegal for non-state owned businesses to import cooking oil and Myanmar Economic Holdings (MEH) ran out of supplies.[136]

Although MEH set the price of rationed oil at Kt350 (approximately US$0.45) per viss in May,[137] the blackmarket price rose to Kt980 by August. Wholesale oil distributors in Rangoon and Mandalay, previously the main suppliers, have been arrested and accused of driving up prices.[138]

Electricity: Electricity shortages continue despite reports that power generation increased 2.57% in the first 2 months of 2001, compared to the same period last year.[139] Only a privileged few can access power, and even fewer continuous power. The unreliable power supply is hindering economic activity and causing extreme inconvenience to daily life. Several townships in Rangoon have had their electricity ration cut from ½ a day to just 2 or 3 hours in May.[140]

Tourism

While tourism in Burma dropped in 2000 by 9.3% to 234,900, tourism in other Southeast Asian countries such as Cambodia, Malaysia, Thailand and Viet Nam, has “witnessed a spectacular increase.”[141] Tourism in Burma has continued to decline, with only 32,377 tourists visiting Burma January and February of 2001, a decrease of 32.6% compared with the corresponding period of 2000.[142]

In 2000 approximately 49% (21,195) of these visitors entered via land border crossings. Due to closed check points and insecurity along the Thai-Burma border this dropped to approximately 14.9% (4,692, constituting a fall of 77.8%) in January and February 2001.[143] According to these figures, the number of tourists visiting Burma by air, and probably staying a longer amount of time, has actually increased by 2% (about 4,147) in the first 2 months of 2001. It is still fair to say however that total numbers were significantly down and that Burma is far behind its neighbours[023] .

Intrepid Travel Ltd., an Australia travel agency which pulled out of operations in Burma 2 years ago, took a poll whereby voters could register their support or disapproval for re-entering. Apparently, this poll was skewed in mid-June by a computer hacker and the poll was removed temporarily. At the time of removal the poll read 199 supporting re-entry and 1,126 opposed[024] .[144] Ultimately, Intrepid concluded not to re-enter Burma at this time adding that they hope their decision “will add weight to the international pressure against the SPDC and result in a free and democratic Burma for everybody.”[145]

ILO & Safety

Mining, construction and farming are the 3 most dangerous employment industries in Burma. Nearly half the 1.2 million work-related accidents reported annually occur in the agricultural sector. For this reason, the International Labour Conference have taken measures against Burma for [x25] not having adequate safety measures for its many agricultural workers. If imposed sanctions are to be lifted, Burma must establish adequate systems of inspection and employers must accept the responsibility of their workers safety.

Appeal for aid

In May there were calls for aid from the ADB (annual meeting 11^th May) and the UN (UN Least Developed Countries (LDC) Conference, 9-20 May).[146] After praising the increase in ADB’s concessional lending for poverty reduction, Finance and Revenue Minister, Khin Maung Thein, proceeded to argue that “Myanmar has a right to ask for and receive financial assistance for environmental and basic human needs projects, without political interference.”[147] However, the bank’s board of directors feel that present conditions are not appropriate for reversal of the aid embargo applied in 1986.

Meanwhile, economic planning minister, U Soe Tha, urged the UNLDC annual meeting to erase the country’s 6-billion dollar debt; the response was in the negative. Preferential trade arrangements extended to LDC countries are withheld from Burma due to concern about human rights violations[x26] .

Sanctions and withholding of aid which have negative impacts on the economy are strategically placed and withheld to promote democratic change. The regime’s abuse of the economy (along with its abuse in other areas) indicates it is not dedicated to promoting an open and accountable economy or society. The SPDC must make changes to its economic policies along with others that will have positive effects for the people of Burma, enabling them to escape from the poverty they have been trapped in since the military came to power. This is the responsibility of government.

HEALTH

* Improving *Stagnant R Deteriorating

The SPDC has been condemned by the World Health Organisation (WHO) for its nominal spending on health (particularly in comparison to military spending), and health services in Burma have been highly criticised. Health expenditure has decreased significantly since 1988/89 when spending was 4.71% of GDP to 0.14% in 1998/99, only 0.001cent (US) per head[027] .

Figure 1: Health and Military Expenditure

Claiming they do not have sufficient funds to establish a national health service, the regime is promoting and establishing a private-public health alliance. However, private clinics are expensive and are almost all in urban areas. Healthcare in rural areas remains minimal with many people suffering from health complaints that would have been easily preventable or treatable under other circumstances. Burma’s HIV epidemic – a threat to the region – is a stark illustration of what results from such lax healthcare provision.

HIV/AIDS

A report based on 1999 National HIV Sentinel Surveillance figures,[148] presented by Chris Beyrer at a UN General Assembly (UNGA) special session on AIDS (25-27 June), tells of a “widespread generalised epidemic of HIV” in Burma.[149] Beyrer estimates 687,000 people living with HIV/AIDS, of which 218,300 are women and 468,700 men. In general, Beyrer estimates that 1 in every 29 adults are sero-positive, giving an adult prevalence rate of 3.46%, well over the 2% rate describing a generalised epidemic of HIV-1.[150] Those most affected are between 20-44 and a UNICEF survey [see below] does not bode well for the youth of Burma either (or for the region as a whole.)

UNICEF poll survey: Youth and HIV/AIDS[028]

Fact: 6.4million people in the region are known to be infected with HIV/AIDS. 50% are young people.

Sample: 10,000 children & adolescents, 9-17 years of age. 17 Asia-Pacific countries.

Statistics: 60% (9-13 years): know “absolutely nothing” or “only the name” of HIV/AIDS

68% (14-17 years): identify unprotected sexual intercourse as major mode of HIV transmission

41% (14-17 years): know what a condom is

Conclusions: Alarming ignorance about HIV/AIDS and its causes

It is important to note that Beyrer’s estimation does not include female sex workers or an estimated 1.4 million injecting drug users (IDUs), nor the hundreds, if not thousands, who are unaware of their infection. It would seem then that this estimate, shocking though it is, is a conservative one. If high-risk groups were included in these estimates, Burma would show to have the worst AIDS problem in Asia[029] .

Although the regime admits that infection is growing,[151] it continues to hide most evidence of this severe problem in what Beyrer refers to as an ‘ominous silence’. The regime presently claims only 40,000 people in Burma are HIV+;[152] 5.8% of the estimate made by international experts. According to a news release concerning the UNGA special session, “the health authorities in Myanmar, treating this world-wide scourge as a top priority problem, are doing their level best in cooperation with the WHO and the NGOs, to combat it. They certainly are in no way ‘hiding’ or even trivialising it.”[153]

If this is the case, why do official prevalence rates remain far lower than estimates made by independent and concerned international analysts? Why are condoms so expensive? Why is there no recognition of a domestic sex trade? Why do international organisations working in Burma[154] continuing to complain that the regime’s policies and actions directly hinder their strategies[030] ? Why does stigma remain so intense that HIV+ persons are often isolated in quarantine-like conditions on the outskirts of their communities?[155] Why is the regime failing to respond to China’s recent admission of an HIV epidemic, when migrant workers – including sex workers – move in 2-directional flows?

It is hoped that the joint National AIDS Programme (SPDC) and UNAIDS action plan (started this year), along with UNICEF’s announcement in May to triple annual spending on prevention (2001-2005) to US$1.5million, will help some necessary steps to be made.[156] There is apparently some HIV/AIDS education directed at 1.5 million school students and over 7, 000 teachers[157] but the content is currently unclear.

Sex Industry

WHO stated in August that Asia’s growing sex industry, such as in Burma, is significantly threatening HIV/AIDS prevention programmes.[158] Female sex workers in Burma are found in major urban centres such as Rangoon (where there has been mention of a ‘new Patpong’[159]), Pegu, Prome, Magway, Manaday, Monywa, Lashio, Pa-an, Tavoy and Mergui. Other women work along trade routes and international borders meaning that the Burmese sex industry is most prominent in border towns such as Tachileik, Muse, Mong La, Keng Tung, Myawaddy, Kawthaung or Tamu. [see Appendix A, Figure 1]

What makes this particularly worrying is that, according to UNAIDS experts, up to 95% of infected people in developing countries – such as Burma - remain unaware of their status[160] and women in areas hardest hit by AIDS – Burma has an HIV epidemic - do not feel they can insist on condom usage.[161] According to Beyrer’s research and methodology, 52% of all female sex workers in Burma are HIV+.[162] It is therefore vital that countries such as Burma focus on non-judgemental HIV/AIDS prevention programmes with sex workers and – importantly – their clients[031] .

Women

Women’s inequality must be addressed as it has many dire consequences. The human rights abuses of trafficked women and female sex workers and their heightened risk of HIV sero-conversion are important and particularly worrying.

The majority of women engaged in sex work are part-time, often having other employment as traders, labourers, and transport service workers in roadside tea-shops or restaurants.[163] Many of these women do not identify as sex workers as it is not their primary employment. Compounded with the high mobility of many women engaging in sex work, HIV/AIDS prevention and support programmes are hard to establish.

Females are trafficked for multiple reasons, but key reasons for the trafficking of Shan girls (often between the ages of 12 and 16) and women include: continued conflict in the State, poverty, an extreme drug dependency culture and inequality of women. Shan women and girls subsequently make up an increasing percentage of sex workers on the Burma-China border and in Thailand.[164]

Beyrer analyses the interconnections between the political crisis in Burma and the human rights abuses of Shan women and girls working in the sex industry, in particular the high HIV[165] and STI risks they bear. There is a high HIV prevalence rate among ethnic Shans in Thailand, alongside high rates of brothel work and usage.[166]

Many sex workers are forced into the industry,[167] often with significant amounts of physical and sexual abuse to ‘break them in’. Violent sex often results in abrasions, making HIV infection more likely. Furthermore, girls and young women are proven to be more susceptible to HIV infection due to the immaturity of their cervix. The practice of selling girls and young women as ‘virgins’ is therefore particularly heinous, rendering them forced into a particularly high-risk activity where they have little bargaining power in terms of demanding safer sex practices, or little else besides.

It is a distressing fact that many girls and women do not feel able to insist on condom usage (a key to HIV/AIDS prevention). “They feel subservient; they feel as if they are not trained and have the type of support system that will allow them to speak out.”[168] To quote from a WHO press release, “This is especially the case if they are victims of trafficking, migrants or are young, which is all too common across Asia.”[169] Human rights abuses of young trafficked women disempower them, making them more vulnerable to HIV and other sexually transmitted infections (STIs). As a result, it is believed that most commercial sex in Asia occurs without the use of condoms.

While there are valuable programmes aimed at eradicating trafficking,[170] it is clear that more must be done as women will continue to cross international borders so long as they feel unstable and/or unsafe.[171] Girls and women, sex-workers or not, must be empowered in order that they can make decisions to better protect themselves from disease and exploitation. This is an extremely long process and must be addressed immediately both inside Burma and in Burmese communities in other countries.

The work that groups like EMPOWER do are exemplary in this respect, and the recent UNAIDS session tells of the desperate need for this work to be extended. Women are not given equal status in Burmese society; any woman from Burma can tell you that gender roles are different, the more empowered can tell you that they are unequal.

Part of this empowerment must include education and safer-sex discussions, informed access to family planning methods, improved healthcare at a grassroots level, voluntary testing and counseling facilities[172] and self-esteem building. Because sexual activity – consensual and non-consensual, free and paid – is widely considered immoral, there is little discussion of sexual activity and that which does exist is often based on old wives tales and moral doctrines. There are few safe spaces for women and girls to discuss their sexuality, what they are forced to do make a living, family planning and safer sex methods, their sexual fears and experiences. At the judicial level, authorities – both in Burma and other countries – must promote and enforce laws that protect women from abuse and exploitation, particularly sexual[032] . Stephanie Urdang, UNIFEM, stresses that these steps must be taken within a broad context that addresses poverty (this was also stressed at the UNLDC conference in May[033] ) and prejudice.[173]

This message is deafeningly loud when we consider Burma. In a country where poverty is widespread and government assistance redundant in all except a few cases, HIV/AIDS programmes are, in Beyrer’s words, “grossly inadequate.”[174] Stigma remains intense with many women feeling they can never return to their communities because of their positive status.[175] Women’s empowerment must occur in a framework of abuse, corruption and poverty eradication across the board and the region. A resolution to the political crisis in Burma is therefore crucial as it brings numerous upon its people. Adequate protection of Burmese in 2^nd or sometimes 3^rd countries must also be assured and HIV/AIDS prevention strategies established within Burmese communities.

Epidemic on the move

Extensive population migration and mobility, both internal and external, is a fundamental factor in the Burmese HIV epidemic. Large numbers of mobile populations are often involved in HIV high-risk activities and situations that perpetuate the spread of HIV/AIDS. [see Appendix A] High mobility coupled with regular sexual activity and injecting of drugs make highways clearly identifiable routes of HIV transmission. “The epidemics in northern Thailand, Shan State, and across into northern Vietnam, are not isolated incidents – they are connected through trafficking and other travel.”[176]

While some women move from their villages to the nearest urban area for sex work, others travel great distances to avoid being recognised. Many in Keng Tung or Tachileik then move to ports and Thai border towns such as Ranong (where 80% of female sex workers are Burmese), Mae Sot, Mae Sai and Chiangrai.[177] These women are extremely vulnerable to HIV transmission as a result their work, but the risk is dramatically heightened by their inability to secure good working practices, personal protection, healthcare,[178] advocacy and safer-sex programmes including condom distributions. Their regular contact with other highly mobile groups, such as fishermen also increases probabilities of transmission as mobile men travelling singularly often have high numbers of casual sex partners. As HIV/AIDS transmission has a multiplier effect, all casual sex partners and needle-sharing partners are significant to all bodies engaged in activities exchanging bodily fluids.

Mobility of Burmese people is set to increase, not decrease. Forced relocation continues to be widespread with communities suffering from upheaval and consequent diaspora. Trade and ‘human mobility’ routes in and around Burma are growing, with new road constructions and port developments with international trade and labour migration set to increase. People continue to flee human rights abuses in Burma and cross international boundaries into 2^nd countries. From here, many move to 3^rd countries – either through relocation and asylum programmes or through trafficking.

With repatriation programmes looming above many heads, mobility will continue. For those who unable to pay traffickers at the border to bring them back into second countries (where clearly mobility patterns continue), Burma does not promise a life of stability. At the current time it is not unreasonable to expect individuals to move frequently in order that they can feel safe, moving away from insecure and threatening situations. Even if in the future, repatriated persons do not feel the need to maintain high levels of mobility as their safety and human rights become more assured, it will take a long time for communities to become settled and established. It will take even longer for communities to set up effective HIV/AIDS preventive strategies and campaigns.

Considering that high mobility correlates with high sero-conversion rates, the future does not bode well for the people of Burma; the HIV/AIDS risk to mobile individuals and groups will intensify further. It is therefore absolutely essential that the SPDC acknowledge the scale of this disaster and make conditions conducive to receiving international assistance. Also essential in tackling HIV are local level interventions aimed at the prevention of trafficking - where women have their own voices. If women can share the high risks and dangers of trafficking with other women in their ‘home’ countries, some women’s physical safety and health can be better protected.

The future of Burma’s AIDS crisis depends on the treatment of marginalised peoples, as stressed by WHO in August[034] . Drugs, same sex sexual relations and sex work are often considered too controversial and are strategically avoided by the SPDC and other groups. This behaviour is irresponsible and will mean the epidemic worsens with the numbers of deaths reaching even more appalling heights.

Thai-Burma Health Initiative

Burma and Thailand agreed, as of July, to work together for the 1^st time to tackle health problems along the border (in Mae Sot district of Tak, Mae Sai district of Chiang Rai, and Three Pagoda Pass in Kanchanaburi and Ranong). Border areas experience high number of health complaints due to the continuing exodus of Burmese peoples, most of whom have had extremely limited access to healthcare and many of whom have been surviving in extremely arduous situations. Public Health Minister Sudarat Keyuraphan hopes the joint initiative will “be more effective in increasing awareness against diseases among people moving between the two countries.”[179] The diseases targeted are malaria, tuberculosis (TB) and HIV/AIDS.

Due to high infection rates of HIV, the initiative will focus on drug rehabilitation programmes in an effort to decrease the number of IDUs. In order to house the programmes, it has been announced that in provinces bordering Burma (and Cambodia) hospitals for the mentally ill will be turned into drug rehabilitation centers.[180]

While it is accepted that such centres must be established, perhaps a better initiative to reduce HIV sero-conversion rates would be to introduce needle distributions (as recommended at the National AIDS Seminar, Thailand (July 2001)). Furthermore, the establishment of drug rehabilitation centres should not be at the expense of hospitals that serve those with other health conditions. This is of particular concern among a community of refugees and displaced persons where trauma levels are higher than among other populations. Current hospitals treating mental illnesses should be improved, not abolished.

Humanitarian Assistance

In early August, 9 UN agencies in Burma including the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the UN Drug Control Programme (UNDCP), the World Health Organisation (WHO) and World Food Programmes, sent an internal assessment of the humanitarian situation inside Burma,[181] calling for a dramatic overhaul of budget allocation to Burma[182] as well as better coordination between UN organisations. Following is part of the letter:

Under these critical circumstances, humanitarian assistance is a moral and ethical necessity, as well as an obligation of the international community. […] The nature and magnitude of the humanitarian situation does not permit delaying until the political situation evolves.[183]

Following this report, it was announced in The Nation (Bangkok) on 8^th August that the UN agencies were asking for international aid sanctions against Burma to be lifted due to the impeding humanitarian crisis.[184] The UN has denied this report, stating that the document did not mention lifting sanctions. The prospect of the international community lifting sanctions has been floated since the ‘dialogue’ between Aung San Suu Kyi and the SPDC began, and the release of political prisoners started. [see ‘Democracy’ p6-10] It is a topic that is bound to be discussed further by governments at the ASEM 2002 meeting in Denmark.

HUMAN RIGHTS

* Improving R Stagnant * Deteriorating

Introduction of a planned Criminal Tribunal in Asia faces problems as the level of understanding of what constitutes a war crime or crime against humanity is particulary deficient in Burma. It is clear that human rights abuses continue, with reports including details of forced relocation, torture, arbitrary killings, forced labour,[185] destruction and appropriation of crops and settlements, and gender-specific violations including rape.[186] However, human rights activists voice concern that evidence has not been systematically collected in a manner that will stand up in a Criminal Tribunal.[187]

Forced Labour

Labour organistions and human rights groups claim that Burma remains, in the words of the ICFTU, the world’s “biggest labour camp.” Despite the legal order in October banning forced labour, Amnesty International (AI) has said it is “not aware of a single case in which a Burmese official has been sanctioned for violating the order.”[188] The order is clearly not being followed at local levels and civilians from non-Burman populations suffer continued orders of forced labour. AI suggests that while military troops remain poorly paid they will not cease ordering forced labour for infrastructure programmes and farming.

ILO

In May, a delegation led by Francis Maupain, Special Advisor to the ILO Director General, visited Burma and set the stage for a 4-member ILO mission or High-Level Team (HLT) to visit in September; the HLT will also visit the border [035] areas[036] . The mission will comprise of Ninian Stephen - former Governor General (Australia), Nieves Roldan-Confesor - former Secretary of Labour and Employment (Philippines), Kulatilaka Ranasinghe - former Chief Justice (Sri Lanka), and Jerzy Makarczyk - former Deputy Foreign Minister (Poland) and currently a judge on the European Court of Human Rights. The composition of the team is important, as the credibility of the ILO’s assessment will largely depend on its reputation and skills.

The team’s charge is to assess whether the regime has, as it claims, stopped using forced labour; its report will be considered by the ILO Governing Body in November.[189] It is vital that before the HLT enters Burma the ILO reaches a specific arrangement with the junta regarding the team’s freedom to travel and operate in Burma and most importantly guarantees of witness security[037] . While the HLT is assured ‘discretion’ by the SPDC they may be subject to ‘valid’ security limitations.

The SPDC declares that it is concerned about the physical safety of the HLT and therefore may not give them access to areas with ‘insurgent activity’. It is important to note that the SPDC are particularly charged with committing human rights violations of civilian groups near or connected to insurgent groups but it is precisely these groups that the HLT may be denied access to.

To protect labour rights and effectively monitor forced labour in the long-term, ILO wants to establish a permanent presence in Rangoon.

Burma’s Response

In contrast to the Minister of Labour’s acknowledgement of the ILO and the issue of forced labour, the state-run newspaper, the New Light of Myanmar, bluntly denied the existence of forced labour claiming the ILO has “lost all its reputation and glories as it has to follow the plots of liars.”[190]

On 12^th June, the SPDC representative made an official request that the Federation of Trade Unions-Burma (FTUB) be derecognized by the ILO on the grounds that it does not have ‘proper registration’ as a labor organization. FTUB is currently included as a member of the International Confederation of Trade Unions (ICFTU). The regime’s attempt to remove its main opponent in the ILO is doomed to failure as there are no mechanisms to eject accredited representatives from groups like ICFTU; it is “a legal impossibility.”[191]

In August, U Maung Maung, founder of FTUB, was awarded the 2001 George Meany - Lane Kirkland Human Rights Award for his role in raising the visibility of migrant workers from Burma and their problems.

Human Rights Training

Australia has announced its intention to run human rights workshops for the second year at a cost of AU$140,000 to the Australian taxpayer. This year, the 4-day workshops will be conducted in Mandalay as well as Rangoon, inviting civil servants in Burma’s military regime but also representatives of Burmese civil society organizations. It is important to note that the regime does not allow independent civilian organisations. ‘Civil society organsations’ are linked to the SPDC and directed to follow their agenda. Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer believes the workshops will “will raise awareness of international human rights standards and relevant United Nations conventions.”[192]

While the Australian government engages in this controversial project, 18 Australian companies recently broke all economic ties with Burma as part of an international campaign condemning human rights abuses by the regime.[193]

Pipeline Investment

UNOCAL (US), continues to face public pressure to withdraw from Burma due to human rights abuses and environmental degradation. Experts gathered at a forum called The New World of Corporate Accountability: the Case of UNOCAL in Burma (5 May) to scrutinise UNOCAL’s responsibility and accountability of its investment in Burma. Michel Thacher, General Manager of Public Relations and Communications of UNOCAL was invited to defend the corporation.[194]

On 21^st May during the UNOCAL shareholders meeting, Students for Environmental Actions at Stanford (SEAS) carried out strong protests. Inside the meeting, shareholders rejected 2 new resolutions: the first to discourage business involvement in countries with forced labour and the second to tie executive compensation to the company’s ethical and social performance. The UNOCAL board recommended against both resolutions.[195]

In an effort to defend its activities in Burma, Premier (UK) commissioned a Social Audit exploring the ‘benefits’ Premier has brought to people of Burma. However, Warwick Business School - which verified Premier’s social auditing process - states that the repressive environment in Burma “unavoidably compromises the ability of Premier Oil’s community stakeholders to be fully expressive.” [196] The report does not have an appropriate methodology for gauging experiences and information from communities living under a repressive regime. Furthermore, the Social Audit does not engage with those who were forced to flee abuses in the pipeline area. It appears that Premier’s strategy to decontaminate itself has backfired, and instead public announcements have been made of Premier’s business partner’s (the SPDC’s) repressive nature and how civilians are not free to express themselves in a safe and democratic fashion.

Freedom of Information

The international press watchdog group Reporters Without Borders (RSF) states that “the situation concerning freedom of the press has not improved one iota” since talks began between Aung San Suu Kyi and the SPDC.[197] If journalists report on human rights situations or are in any way critical of the SPDC or the current environment, they are charged with being ‘hostile to the state’. Journalists continue to be subjected to harassment, arrest and long sentences under the military regime who have made Burma “the largest prison for journalists in Asia.”[198]

To denounce the regime’s policies of censorship and promote freedom of expression within a democratic environment, RSF urges the international community to maintain sanctions against Burma so long as journalists remain incarcerated.

Awards

Burmese journalists who stand out for their commitment to freedom of expression have received worldwide attention. On June 4^th, the World Association of Newspapers (WAN) awarded its annual press freedom prize, the Golden Pen of Freedom 2001, to imprisoned Burmese journalists San San Nweh and U Win Tin in recognition of their outstanding services to press freedom, both inside and outside of prison.[199] San San Nweh was released on 12^th July along with 10 other political prisoners.[200]

Recognition of the plight of Burmese journalists continues with a group of 24, currently detained for practicing their right to freedom of expression, being nominated for Canada’s International Press Freedom Award. According to the regulations however, only 1 person can be nominated at a time. Myo Myint Nyein was the unanimous choice for the responsibility he took in smuggling out reports from Insein Prison and will be co-awarded the prize on 8^th November.[201]

The Blacklist

On 9^th July Burmese embassies were ordered to add Evan Williams (Australia) and Tony Emerson (US) to a growing number of blacklisted foreign journalists[038] . Williams worked on the Australian Broadcasting Corporation programme (26 June) that claimed the SPDC were integrally connected with the drug trade. [see p15] Emerson wrote an article about the regime’s education policy, published in Newsweek (9 July).

It is clear that the SPDC wishes to restrict ‘controversial’ information and will impose punishment on those who challenge their authority and integrity, both Burmese and foreign.

EDUCATION

* Improving R Stagnant * Deteriorating

Knowledge is paralyzed. - Tin Maung Than, exiled editor

The Myanmar Education Committee has stated that it wishes Burma’s education standards to be as high as those in developed ASEAN countries within 4 years. To this end, the SPDC has reportedly allotted over Kt2.252 billion this year, the 1^st year of the ‘Special 4 Year Plan’.[202] A long term ‘30 Year Educational Plan’ has also been drawn up, sub-divided into five ‘6 year’ plans. Despite these plans however, it appears unlikely that Burma’s education system will be on par with those of developed ASEAN countries in the foreseeable future given the current poor state of the education system,[203] its politicisation and the continued downward trend in education expenditure. [see Figure 1]

The regime continues to boast of international standard e-education systems throughout the country (dependent on the power supply), with further multi-media resources, such as e-libraries, set to benefit all.[204] However, numerous reports stress most children, particularly those in rural, non-Burman communities, have never used, indeed never seen, these computers.[205]

It is clear that the SPDC does not heed the fundamental problems of the education system as it misdirects resources and public attention. In order for education in Burma to really develop, budgetary and political change that allows for adequate resources and freedom of thought are vital.

Funding

In 1988/89, state expenditure on education was only 1.44% of GDP and is now a terrifyingly low 0.49%. Real public spending per child has fallen from about Kt1200 per child (1990/1991) to Kt100 (1999/2000[M39] ). Converted at an exchange rate of Kt540 to US$1 (at the beginning of this period), this is under 20 cents per child, per year. Increased expenditure on military and defence [see Figure 1] illustrates the money is available but that in reality education is not perceived to be a priority by the regime.

Figure 1: Education expenditure relative to military expenditure

Communities and parents, often already poor, are expected to make ‘donations’ and hold ‘fund-raising festivals’ to pay for education. ‘Donations’ are often mandatory in order for children to attend school and can range from between Kt5,000-10,000 annually (3-5 months salary for many families). This does not including a payment to obtain the headmaster’s permission, which can cost up to another Kt10,000[040] . The

obligatory nature of these costly ‘donations’ means that many families cannot afford to send children to schools; 26% according to UNICEF (1995) figures. [see Figures 2 & 3]

The regime fails to comprehend that it is their responsibility to provide appropriate educational resources and support. When international donations to the education system are made, they are received with pride by the SPDC and its supporters.[206] These occasions have been grasped by the dictatorial regime as an opportunity to denigrate those countries that refuse to give unconditional grants. For example, when a

Japanese government grant of almost US$95,000 enabled a high school to be built and transferred to the Education Department in August, the regime criticised other governments whom they claim use aid as a political tool.[207]

Point of interest: A German group “Foerderverein Myanmar” wishes to donate over 100 computers to urban government schools & 1 monastery school[041] . The group is funded by the German government, making this a particularly interesting development to watch.

Figure 2: Crude estimates of school attendance in Burma (Source: UNICEF)

Fourth grade completion rates are higher in urban areas than in rural areas; 37% and 22% respectively. The average time to complete primary school is 12.2 years due to high repetition and drop out rates[M42] .

Figure 3: Crude estimates of school attendance, by nationality/area

(Source: NHEC (26-28 April 2001))

National Health and Education Committee, Education Seminar

The National Health and Education Committee (NHEC) is an independent body, neither aligned to the SPDC nor to any opposition groups. Burmese representatives meet at seminars to discuss the education of children from Burma. A recent seminar, ‘Children’s Opportunity to Learn in the Ethnic Nationality Areas in Burma’, was held on 26-28 April in Chiang Mai, to address the lack of education among many non-Burman ethnic nationality children. Several points emerged:

& Many children wish to attend school but cannot.

& Main obstacle to school attendance is poverty[043] .

& Forced labour disrupts education.

& Drug abuse among children is increasing.

& Supplies, such as stationery & uniforms, are often not available.

& Desire for education is wilting. Parents are often unconvinced of need for education.

& New curricula need to be written with consultation of all ethnic groups; particularly in regards to history, language & health education.

& Most agree student-centred teaching system is preferential to teacher-centred system. Rote learning stills prevails, students need to learn to think more ‘creatively’[044] .

& Number of schools and teachers, including mobile teachers, in Burma should be increased[045] .

& Teachers need further training, increased support & sufficient salaries.[208]

It’s political … Political

Universities remain strictly and politically regulated, with political discussion strictly forbidden. Students keenly await opportunities for independent, non-SPDC directed, education. Illustrative of this are the continued departure of students from Burma and the fact that when the US Information Service opened classes last year, students physically fought each other in the hope of acquiring places.[209]

It is not only universities that are politically regulated. A recent directive reveals that school teachers’ first priority should not be to ensure high educational standards and distribution of knowledge, but rather to police school activities.

Directive on strict security measures at schools, effective immediately (July 2001[046] )

w No one apart from students must be allowed inside the school during daytime.

w Teachers, parents & school council members shall rotate security duty at the school, day & night.

w Teachers, staff, vendors & students are not allowed to bring in any ‘unprescribed’ or ‘unrelated’ literature, pictures, badges or clothing.

w No ‘unauthorized’ slogans, pictures or posters shall be displayed in classrooms, on walls or inside & outside fences.

w Apart from normal teaching responsibilities, teachers must take extra security duty of school & students.

Military education

Burma has become a house divided. The military institutes being the only way to get a decent education, only pro-military students have a future while the rest of the country's youth is left uneducated. - Campaign Committee for Open Schools

The quality of education at military schools and universities is generally of a higher standard than (often costly) civilian education. It is important to note that resources for military schools do not come from the vast allocated military budget, rather it depletes the limited resources of the education budget. Furthermore, members of the Union Solidarity and Development Association (USDA) - formed by the SPDC - automatically get 16 points to pass annual examinations. This preferential treatment denies many civilian students their right to pursue further education[047] .

Attendees of military institutes also receive privileges beyond their superior level of free education in Burma. An FTUB report (May 2001) states that many are sent abroad to do further studies, “helping the junta breed an elite class for its own interest.” Those not aligned with the military, particularly those who have connections with the democracy movement, are discriminated against and not chosen to undertake international study programmes. In this way, international governments that mean well by providing access to education to students from poorer countries, actually aid the regime.

Basic education that many people take for granted is denied to Burmese children and students as the SPDC only perceives education to be important if it can further their needs of indoctrination and increased military strength. For those making a career in the military, everything is free with a job guaranteed after graduation. For those who are not, education is a luxury and a struggle all the way.

DISPLACEMENT: IDPs, Refugees & Migrants

* Improving R Stagnant * Deteriorating

Burmese peoples continue to be forcibly displaced resulting in increasing numbers of internally displaced persons ((IDPs) There are currently estimated to be 800,000[210])) refugees and illegal migrants. A disproportionate number of these persons are of non-Burman nationality, perpetually targeted by the military as a result of their ethnicity. For example, over 3,000 Naga people are reported to have fled Burma in May after suffering gross human rights abuses by the military. While some took refuge in Nagaland, India[211] many more remained in Burma as IDPs, hiding in the mountainous jungle area near Lahe, Sagaing division.[212]

While much displacement is a direct result of military activities, racist prejudice and vilification feed communities that are pro-Rangoon and/or believe the SPDC’s line due to an intense lack of information. Encouragement of the previously colonial ‘rule and divide policy’ extenuates tensions and conflict between ethnic groups, ultimately augmenting numbers of displaced persons.

Shan-Wa

Resettlement of the Wa[213] continues to have adverse affects on people in eastern Shan State. While most of the Wa migrants have settled in new border towns, such as Mong Yawn and Mong Mai, others have usurped villages and farms, inhabited by Shan peoples. Upon arrival, the Wa justify their intrusion by claiming they have been granted migratory permission from Khin Nyunt.[214] Human rights abuses perpetrated by the Wa and military officials, such as imprisonment[215] and stealing of land, livestock and personal effects have meant that Shan communities are forced to leave their homes with many seeking refuge along the Thai-Burma border.[216] Those forcibly displaced in this period are a large component of the over 600 Shan and Akha villagers who have sought refuge in Thailand since March 27^th.[217]

Incursions into Shan territory by the Rangoon-allied Wa appear to be connected with 2 key issues of control: drug trade and border trade. These strong economic factors mean that disregard of the Shan is unlikely to halt in the forseeable future; those in control of these trades have too much to lose in monetary terms. A strong national Shan movement poses a threat to military control and hence it seems there are concerted efforts to make the Shan as weak as possible.[218] Indeed, to quote a Western narcotics expert “The move [of Wa into Shan State] is designed to crush the Shan rebels and perhaps appease China.”[219] Forcibly relocating thousands of people effectively disrupts communities and relationships, destroys people’s connections to the land and creates diaspora.

Some predict that this non-consensual migratory movement will lead to an escalation of ethnic tensions and fighting. The Shan peoples and the Shan State Army (SSA) are extremely unhappy with this incursion and vow they will regain their traditional land.[220] For the meantime, it appears the SSA are waiting for the SPDC troops to cease supporting and protecting the Wa migration or for the Wa to move out of their own accord. [see p59]

Hunger Strike

For those in 2^nd countries, problems do not stop. A hunger strike was held by 24 Burmese asylum-seekers in New Delhi (8-12 May) until they were assured UNHCR would re-interview all of them for refugee status; they received the vocal support of Mr. S. Ramachandran Pillai, a Raja Sabha (Upper House) MP.[221] The hunger strike came after allegations that the UNHCR-India office was neglecting their duties of protection and assistance. Many asylum cases had been rejected after taking many months to process.

Some were granted asylum during the hunger strike with others interviewed soon after. Out of 24 strikers, 12 were granted refugee status from UNHCR a month later, with another 2 reportedly granted status after reappealing and reinterviewing. All those with refugee status receive Rs1,400 monthly financial allowance.[222] Those without refugee statuses are able to remain in India, but do not receive any allowance.

Thai Refugee camps

Maneeloy holding centre – ‘holding’ approximately 600 inmates - is tentatively scheduled to close in September [048] with other statements giving the end of the year as an absolute deadline. The Thai government will attempt to relocate the 498 Burmese students in 3^rd countries [049] while the remainder “will face legal action in accordance with the Immigration Act,” the National Security Council has said. In other words, they will be prosecuted for entering Thailand without refugee status being given by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). If convicted they face fines, jail or deportation. The UNHCR have granted those ‘illegal’ refugees ‘permission’ to apply for official refugee status. However, since some have applied previously and been rejected; their plight seems bleak[050] .[223]

As of the end of July 136,124 people from Burma were officially registered as refugees in Thai refugee and resettlement camps; the majority being Karen.[224] However, the number of Burmese living in refugee-like circumstances in Thailand is higher and was estimated at 216,000 at the end of 2000[051] . The influx continues on a regular basis. One such occurrence was in mid-July when 194 Karens, mostly women and children, fled following a violent clash between the pro-Rangoon Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA) and the Karen National Union (KNU). (About 200 more fled further inside Burma to find refuge, increasing the number of IDPs.)[225]

Update: The infamous twin brothers, Johnny and Luther Htoo (15), otherwise known as the leaders of ‘God’s Army’, have decided to stay in Tak, Thailand, despite being accepted for resettlement in the US[052] .

Thailand does not want the ‘burden’ of a refugee ‘crisis’. Thaksin wants the Burmese back in Burma and to this end has declared numerous refugee camps will gradually be closed[053] . The official line: “Our policy is to close refugee camps and send them back home,”[226] contrasts sharply with UN and other agencies’ analyses that Burma is not a safe place for returning refugees due to human rights abuses.[227] Although ECHO, a European Community humanitarian body[054] , and the UNHCR[228] have been engaged in efforts during this period (May-August) to prevent the forced repatriation of Burmese refugees, Thailand has its own agenda. While human rights abuses continue, any efforts to halt the flow of Burmese seeking refuge in Thailand or other countries will be rendered unworkable.

Registration

Thai authorities sealed its borders on August 24^th in an effort to stem “the continued influx of illegal workers” from neighbouring countries.[229] While official checkpoints remain open, border patrol officers guard frontier areas. The move came as the deadline to register illegal workers in Thailand drew closer and numbers of Burmese crossing the border increased from 12,000 a month to 14,266 in May 15,325 in June and 16,504 in July.[230]

The registration process has become somewhat more flexible than its initial conception and has been extended to September 20^th due to pressure from business leaders wishing to keep their migrant workers,[231] highlighting the current government’s strong links with the business community. All foreign labourers from Burma, Laos and Cambodia are permitted to apply for registration, including those unemployed at the time. It is expected that approximately 1 million workers will register; prior to this registration only about 90,000 ‘alien’ workers were legal. Non-registered workers will become increasingly vulnerable, as it seems punishment for non-registration will be severe and keenly given out.

Most migrant workers will take work in labour-intensive jobs typically avoided by Thais. Eighteen industries, including fisheries, rice mills, mining and livestock farming, have been identified as reliant on migrant labour due to their willingness – due to a lack of better options – to engage in arduous, and often dangerous and dirty work.[232]

Newly registered workers, the majority being Burmese nationals, will be granted a 1 year work permit: 6 months paid up front (Bt3,250 – Bt1,200 health insurance, Bt1,000 repatriation-cost insurance, Bt900 6 month registration, Bt150 documents and cards) and then renewed with further payment for the remaining 6 months (Bt1,200 – Bt900 6 month registration, Bt300 medical check). Formally, employers should ensure the fee is paid for each foreign worker they employ. The high cost of registration will mean that many remain unregistered.[233]

This high cost may well lead to some employers not registering workers as they wish to avoid theses overhead costs, particularly seasonal and casual employers. Some employers may also be disinclined to pay without guarantees that ‘their’ workers will stay working for them for the 12 months. It is possible that this may lead to increased amounts of abuse as employers increase control over their workers movements. Other employers may pay their workers even less to compensate for the cost of registration; while registration should bring some legal protection, workers will not benefit from a minimum wage. This is a crucial point of consideration as migrant workers are frequently subjected to forms of bonded labour. Migrant workers, both legal and illegal, are exploited so much that the President of the State Railway of Thailand’s labour union has described such labour as slavery.[234]

The ad-hoc and costly nature of registration creates suspicion that the real motivations of the Thai government are that they can gather information on foreign bodies in Thailand and make millions of Baht in the process. While it is argued that information is needed to enable Thailand to better make long-term decisions regarding its human resources,[235] it can be countered that long-term decisions cannot be made when workers are only guaranteed right of abode and employment for such short durations of time (6 months / 1 year).

With registration expected to benefit a significant number of workers, the remaining undocumented ones – most of whom are from Burma, and many of whom are sex workers - face an uncertain future. For those not fortunate enough to acquire a permit, or renew it on time, life is sure to become harder as immigration clamp-downs seem certain to become increasingly severe. If caught, unregistered workers face deportation and with it loss of livelihood and in many situations a safer life. Heavy fining, imprisonment and deportation are imminent according to officials who state that crackdowns will start immediately after the deadline of 29^th September. The situation is already harsh with 92,092 illegal Burmese deported between January and July.[236] For these reasons, Federation of Trade Unions-Burma have urged migrant workers from Burma to register.[237]

Although the registration programme undoubtedly raises serious issues of concern it does open legitimate space for NGOs and community groups who can more openly speak of their work with migrant communities. Perhaps more effective lobbying may be done and more attention called to concerns affecting migrants.

Repatriation

Programmes seeking to deport Burmese migrants are often xenophobic in origin and based on racial and ethnic stereotypes and often appear to be coupled with political games. Thai officials intend that unregistered workers will be sent back to their ‘home towns’, not merely dropped at borders where they can re-enter Thailand. However, many Burmese migrants have fled their ‘home towns’ due to human rights abuses and there is no guarantee that these abuses will not be repeated, the situation may have worsened. (Reports have spoken of forced labour camps for returning refugees.) The mobility of many now in Thailand was high before they left Burma, and so trying to establish where ‘home’ is will be a task in itself. For others there may simply be no home; the SPDC have forcibly relocated and destroyed numerous villages. To what will these villagers return? There is also the ongoing uncertainty that Burma will accept all those that Thailand wishes to repatriate, as similar obstructions have been posed in the past.

Thailand and Japan have agreed to work together in creating jobs inside Burma for returning refugees, and in helping to find markets for resulting products and services. It is proposed that the International Organisation of Migration (IOM) set up an office in Rangoon to aid returning refugees in gainful employment, but this can only be done if negotiations on the return of refugees are successful. It has been announced that Unocal (US) and the Petroleum Authority of Thailand are keen to develop ‘self-supporting communities’ inside Burma to help the resettlement of returning refugees[055] . There is scepticism regarding the petroleum companies motivations; some feel they are both compensating for their involvement in the controversial Yadana pipeline project whilst simultaneously trying to maintain good relations with the authorities in order to win further business contracts.

Xenophobia

Xenophobia of migrant workers and refugees is nothing new. Xenophobic scapegoating means they are rarely given mass support or recognition of their plight. Labelled as ‘foreign’ and ‘other’, intolerance towards Burmese refugees and other ‘aliens’ is encouraged to grow. A recent report in a Thai daily states, “Alien workers have become a serious threat to national security. Crimes committed by illegal immigrants have been on the rise in the last 5 years.”[238] Similar claims are being made by Mizoram State government, India who hold the Burmese population (estimated at 50,000) responsible for more over 75% of criminal and drug-related activities. To ‘protect’ its people, the government plans to fence its 404 km border with Burma and to issue identity cards to permanent residents in the state within the year.[239]

Branding ‘Burmese foreigners’ as criminals does little to encourage good relations, instead it breeds distrust and intolerance. Government behaviour is often similar, channeling much energy into ‘disencouraging’ new arrivals and repatriating those already there. Little, if any, protection is given to Burmese in 2^nd (or 3^rd etc.) countries, making them increasing vulnerable and unstable.[240]

Despite the ongoing conflict and human rights abuses in Burma, thousands of Burmese in 2^nd countries continue to be labelled as ‘illegal migrants’ seeking better lives, not as refugees[056] . Such labelling enables persons to be considered as ‘bad’ law-breakers without ‘proper paperwork’ and hence subject to punishment and deportation.[241] Furthermore, Burmese are particularly easy targets as they as often viewed as inferior due to images of poverty, poor health and education, and high numbers of people fleeing their home land.

Accordingly, negative stereotypes dominate media reports of Burmese migrants and refugees. A Burmese man in Malaysia who served at a food stall catering for some 3,000 people was reported to be the ‘source’ of a cholera ‘outbreak’ in May. The news article made it clear that this man’s ‘disease’ was a serious disturbance to activity in the state, emphasising that 136 food outlets had to be closed while 732 food handlers were given antibiotics as a ‘preventative’ measure. As a result the man was ‘quarantined’ at a hospital.[242]

Terminology such as ‘outbreak’, ‘disease’ and ‘quarantine’ are purposely employed in order to arouse fear and prejudice and incite racial and ethnic stereotypes. Government bodies are often as guilty of this, highlighted by a senior state health medical officer: “We do not know what kind of diseases [people from ‘less developed countries’] have before entering Malaysia. […] There are, at least, records to trace the legal foreign workers. The illegal ones pose a bigger threat because we do not know their health history or their migration pattern.”[243] Such language installs fear of the ‘other’ by labeling them as disease ridden and contagious.

Even those given acknowledgement as refugees are treated as inferiors. The latest US State Department human rights report criticised Thailand for its absence in legislation regarding the treatment of refugees and for failing to deliver justice to refugees who are victims of violent crimes, including murder.[244] In order to deliver such justice, concerted effort must be made to treat people from Burma with equality. The future does not bode well however, considering the prejudice response by the Thai National Security Council to condemnations regarding the poor conditions at refugee camps.[245] It was said that improving living conditions of refugees from Burma - including increased safety and health conditions - will escalate tension and confrontations between them and nearby hill-residing Thai communities who are also poor.[246]

Such statements attempt to disregard to the inadequate conditions refugees are forced to live in. This is true, not only in Thailand but also other 2^nd countries. In Bangladesh, Cox’s Bazaar camps are well known for their disgraceful security records, while in India, hunger strikers [see above] highlighted that refugees do not have adequate shelter or resources[057] . It is rare indeed that refugees are consistently treated with respect and equality. Official bodies appear to have vested political interests in keeping refugee communities isolated, dependent and controllable.[247]

Asylum & HIV status

Forty-six HIV+ Burmese who applied for US asylum from Guam have been allowed to apply for US residency status. The Office of Refugee Resettlement and the US Department of Health has said that HIV seropositivity will not affect asylum applications. The question remains why asylum seekers are therefore being tested while their claim is being processed and why their status is known by the Office of Refugee Resettlement. So far, 978 Burmese asylum seekers in Guam have been tested for HIV.[248]

[for further discussion of Migration & HIV/AIDS see p37-39 & Appendix A]

ETHNIC & RELIGIOUS RELATIONS

* Improving * Stagnant R Deteriorating

Ethnic Relations

Armed conflict and human casualties continue in Rohingya populated areas[M58] , Karen areas - against the SPDC and DKBA,[249] in Shan State, in Chin National areas[M59] , in Mon State where there is a ‘ceasefire’ [M60] and in Naga areas - the National Socialist Council of Nagaland recently rejected a truce offer from the SPDC saying, “We are against signing any agreement with a military regime that does not favour democracy.”[250] It is clear that the military is not waging a war only against armed insurgents, but against people of non-Burman nationalities in general, continuing its pattern of abuse, torture[251] and instigation of fear.

Shan

Armed conflict intensified between the Shan And the SPDC, the focus being on drugs.[252] The Shan State Army (SSA) claim the junta are using drugged Wa and Lahu militias against SSA troops.[253] This is the ultimate divide and rule policy where the central body encourages indigenous people to kill one another, crippling opposition movements while simultaneously diverting attention away from the larger problems.

Conflict between the Shan and the SPDC-backed Wa remained, so much so that long-standing curfews were imposed and military uniforms outlawed.[254] After fighting died down the military seemingly changed tactic, focusing on community leaders. Shan militia leader, Sai Nyein, was taken by the military and badly beaten for a forced confession that he had collaborated with the SSA.[255] In a further move to weaken the strength of the Shan, civilians near the Thai-Burma border had their hand-phones – their communication lines – confiscated in July.[256]

It appears that the SSA is waiting for the SPDC troops to cease backing the Wa or for the Wa to move from Shan land of their own accord. The SSA speak of their concern of an all out ethnic war developing, dangerous as it is clear that the SPDC would benefit from such conflict. While the Shan speak of “solv[ing] the problem by peaceful means”[257] the solution remains uncertain as Wa civilians are being pressured to relocate, but are finding their new homes at the expense of numerous Shan. There are larger forces at work here. [see p51]

Rohingya

Even when groups do manage to form alliances, there is often vocal disagreement based on racism. At the end of May, BurmaNet alerted its readers that a group of Arakanese students were seemingly sending ‘false’ reports in an attempt to create confusion and disease among the community. It would appear that the group are unhappy with the alliance between the National Unity Party of Arakans and the Arakan Rohingya National Organization.[258] Massive discrimination is suffered by the Rohingya, mostly due to their Muslim faith.

Religion

Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes the freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in private or public, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance.

- Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 18

Islam

The scene of anti-Muslim rioting in February sees hatred of Muslims continue. In April, military authorities of Maungdaw township, Arakan State ordered 70 mosques and religious schools be destroyed while Buddhist pagodas and monasteries are being constructed at an accelerated rate. Muslim communities are surrounded by intense fear and prejudice in a country with extremely high levels of tension and trauma. Muslim groups are of the frightening opinion that “the objective of the junta is to completely erase Muslim entity of Arakan and turn it to a purely Buddhist State.”[259]

Tension with the Muslim community continued with further anti-Muslim riots in May, spreading from Toungoo to Taunggyi and leaving at least 20 people dead – the majority Muslim. At least 4 Islamic spiritual leaders were reportedly killed when their throats were slit and 14 mosques set ablaze; 8 of which were destroyed. Over 100 homes were devastated and thousands of Muslims were forced to flee fearing for their safety, adding to the increasing numbers of internally displaced people (IDPs).[260]

In light of the prolonged violence, the SPDC – once again – used repressive means to supposedly ‘control’ the situation.[261] Despite the fact that Muslims were the target of most of the violence, they continue to be labelled as the instigators and are threatened with arrest.[262] The Union Solidarity and Development Association (USDA) – an SPDC group - was ordered to monitor monasteries and mosques, list those who do not follow the vague concept of the ‘code of conduct’ and scrutinise people from out of town.[263]

As a Rangoon based diplomat has put it, “The rumor behind the rumor is that regional military commanders have been organizing the attacks on Muslims to get people’s minds off their economic hardships.”[264] There have been reports that some of the monks involved in the religious violence were actually USDA members in disguise and directed by military commanders.[265] There are also reports that military intelligence has been publishing and distributing pamphlets to perpetuate and intensify anti-Muslim sentiment.[266]

If reports of the junta’s involvement in these and the February riots[267] are correct then it is unlikely tensions will ease soon. Such a strategy is a highly divisive, controlling and repressive one. The regime are clearly concerned about these ‘rumours’ as they urged townships to hold ceremonies ‘explaining’ the religious riots were instigated not by them, but by internal and external ‘destructive elements’.[268]

Christianity

Persecution of Christians continues. Pastor Gracy (a young [27] female pastor of Rinpi Baptist church, central Chinland) was sentenced to 2 years hard labour on 6^th July.[269] Arrested on 13^th February for supposedly supporting the Chin National Front, Chin women’s groups claim Pastor Gracy was denied her right to a fair and impartial trial. It is claimed that her arrest is an example of persecution of Christians, meant to discourage them from practising their faith.[270]

Originally detained at Haka army camp (where it is thought there are no separate facilities for women), Pastor Gracy was moved to Kalaywa hard-labour camp, Sagaing Division. During the period of her incarceration her health has deteriorated.[271]

Judaism

Political instability in the Middle East has meant that the Musmeah Yeshua synagogue - located near a Muslim area - has not held regular services. The Minyan is now held at the Israeli embassy or Jewish family homes.

While Jews have fared relatively well in comparison to the discrimination of Muslims and Christians, the community has shrunk to only 20 people with mass emigration and ‘outside’ marriages.[272] While it is hoped that “political change in Burma could spur business, bringing foreign businessmen including Jews who could re-establish a community,”[273] this would seem to be a long way off.

ENVIRONMENT

* Improving * Stagnant R Deteriorating

Burma is home to a diverse range of flora and fauna. There are over 3,410 species of botanical plants - including trees, bamboo and cane, and over 1,240 species of birds.[274] However, despite Khin Nyunt’s word perfect speech on ‘World Environment Day’ (5 June), the regime continues to disregard environmental issues and engage in activities causing serious environmental damage, both at home and abroad. Thai residents in Mae Sai continue to oppose a new lignite-powered electricity plant in Tachilek on grounds of heavy pollution, urging the Thai to suggest the location be moved.[275]

Desperate for foreign exchange currency, Senior General Than Shwe stresses the need for Burma’s rich natural resources to be exploited. Environmental legislation exists in name only in Burma and the near absence of real environmental regulation leads to environments, such as mountain habitats in northern Burma and fragile coastal zones, being sabotaged. It is fair to say the junta is financially dependent on destroying the environment and biodiversity of Burma, a process which often goes hand in hand with human rights abuses.

Salween Dam

The Tsang Dam (on the Salween River) is a hydroelectric project along the Thai-Burma Frontier, most likely to be a joint project between the SPDC and the Greater Mekon Subregion Power Co. Ltd. (Thailand). If constructed, the dam will stop the process of natural flooding which has replenished nutrients along the river for generations. Rainforests that have homed indigenous peoples and numerous endangered flora and fauna for centuries will be flooded - after the trees are felled. According to Earthlinks International, it is likely the riverbed will be eroded, malaria bred in the reservoir and the risk of regional earthquakes increased due to the weight of the reservoir.

Most of the power generated by the dam would be exported to Thailand, benefiting the junta through tax revenue on foreign investment. The dam is likely to bring no benefit to local populations, on the contrary forced labour and portering have already been used and communities already forcibly relocated. Completion of the dam looks set to bring further human rights abuses, including forced labor, forced relocation and suppression of dissent.

According to Earthlinks International, there is currently ‘inspiring’ activism resisting the Tasang Dam, “despite the notorious repression of the military regime.”[276] Earthlinks International argue the dam should be halted in accordance with the ILO resolution regarding forced labour, and on more general levels concerning human and environmental rights. Furthermore, they feel this is possible through lobbying. Although the dam is currently in the final stages of pre-construction planning, financing is still not secure.

Logging

One of the biggest environmental concerns in Burma is over-logging of forest resources. The rate of deforestation in Burma has more than doubled since the SPDC came to power in 1988.[277] With neighbouring countries, particularly China,[278] turning to Burma for timber after destroying their own forests, timber became Burma’s 2^nd largest export after agriculture products in the 1^st quarter of this financial year.[279] Last year timber exports exceeded GBP 200 million, ¼ of Burma’s total exports.

Depletion of the forest mainly benefits the junta and has helped pay for increased military capabilities. An extra-legal timber industry is also running strong with illegal wood being supplied to over 100 sawmills along the Thai-Burmese border; military personnel are purportedly the benefactors of these businesses.[280]

Massive deforestation is causing new problems of erosion, floods, siltation and landslides and is facilitating the growth of the illegal wildlife trade. It is also threatening some of the last habitats for endangered animals such as the clouded leopard, gaur, silvered-leaf monkey, tapir, tiger, Asian elephant, and Asian rhinoceros. The most vigorous reforestation projects can never re-establish the habitats and their species.

In addition to economic considerations, peripheral deforestation also reflects a military objective of denying strategic forest cover to ethnic insurgents along the Thai-Burmese border. Karen and other people of non-Burman nationality have therefore been subjected to forced relocation.

Refugees and Deforestation

A recent publication by Friends without Borders examines the link between Burmese refugees and forest degradation. The Thai government holds refugees responsible for the destruction of forests near refugee camps but their role is minor. Large scale environmental degradation occurs at the hands of larger, organised and commercial operations such as commercial agriculture and forestry production.

Ironically, refugee communities are some of the most affected by forest degredation, both economically and socially. Restrictions are placed on access to housing, food and fuel, subsistence farming is forced to change with negative effects, and the health effects from unregulated commercial agriculture will never be fully known. Socially, refugees are being turned into scapegoats and their ‘responsibility’ for environmental degradation is being vocalised by Thai officials and media in conjunction with current efforts directed at camp relocations and repatriation.[281]

LANDMINES

* Improving * Stagnant R Deteriorating

SPDC forces and at least 11 ethnic armed groups continue to lay antipersonnel mines with loggers and narcotics dealers now doing the same, significantly increasing the number of indistinguishable minefields. Landmines have many implications for Burma’s environment and pose severe human rights violations.

Victims

Although the number of landmine victims in Burma remains unknown it is suspected to have increased in 2000.[282] Particularly telling is the absence of data regarding landmines victims provided by Defence Ministry hospitals, indicating that landmine casualties are not considered a priority. This silence may also be considered part of a wider strategy to silence the topic.

Figures in 1995 showed that at least 10% were children who are more physically vulnerable than adults due to their smaller size.[283] A landmine explosion that causes the loss of a limb to an adult would likely damage a child’s vital organs; physical casualties inflicted upon children are therefore more severe. Emotional scars of landmines are also traumatising, with communities experiencing incapacitation, bereavement and increasing numbers of orphans.

Mine victims, mainly rural and non-Burman civilians, military porters and soldiers, can be seen in numerous border areas - despite official claims that there are no military victims of landmines.[284] The Mae Tao clinic (Mae Sot, Thailand) is seeing an increase in mine victims from Dooplaya district, Karen State.[285]

Humans are not the only victims, dogs, buffalo, tigers, wild pigs and elephants have been killed. As a result, elephants near the heavily mined Bangladesh border have changed their migration routes which poses another danger to their herds, as these go through agricultural areas and where they are being attacked by farmers.[286]

SPDC

Despite voting in favor of the 1996 UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution regarding the international banning of anti-personnel landmines, the SPDC has since abstained from every UNGA resolution.

Mine use is reported along the borders with Bangladesh, Thailand and India, with both Bangladesh and Thailand having accused Burma of illegally laying mines across the border. Internally, 9 out of 14 states and divisions suffer from heavy landmine concentrations.[287] [see Figure 1] In one attempt to block routes used by insurgents and refugees, mines have been laid between all military camps in upper Karen State, stretching from the West of the State to the Thai-Burma Border. Soldiers also plant landmines around areas they have attacked, recently including villages in the Naga area, making villagers afraid to return home.[288]

Officials acknowledge military use of mines but claim it “does not do so in an indiscriminate manner.”[289] Indeed, rather than calling military use of landmines ‘indiscriminate’, ‘systematic’ may be a better description. While not well organised or well-regulated, anti-personnel mines are constantly and repetitiously used against non-Burman nationalities to control movement and create fear and submission.[290]

Others use

The SPDC are not the only ones using landmines. Armed opposition groups have been lifting or capturing landmines from the SPDC and then re-deploying, or buying them on the black market. All groups documented using landmines during 2000 are believed to have continued in 2001, including: the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA), the Karenni Army (KA), All Burma Students Democratic Front (ABSDF), Peoples Defense Forces (PDF), Myiek-Dawei United Front (MDUF), Rohingya Solidarity Organization (RSO), Shan State Army (SSA), Democratic Karen Buddhist Army, God’s Army, United Wa State Army (UWSA) and the Chin National Army (CAN).[291]

To counter SPDC troops, the KNLA lays mines along military frequented routes and around areas they wish to block them from entering. Most KNLA mines are self-made although some Cambodian and Vietnamese mines are bought on the black market.

In what appears to be a new occurrence, loggers and narcotics traffickers are also directing mine usage. Local people in Dooplaya district are being trained by KNLA (hired by logging sub-contractors) on how to make mines – materials are provided by the loggers. Mines are then laid around the perimeters of logging areas in an attempt to protect the areas from competitors and the public. Mining in this area and beyond – in both Karen and Karenni States – is also a strategy of drug traffickers who wish to secure their smuggling routes. [292]

In a country that has weak law enforcement and is rampant with corruption and power struggles, it can be seen that landmines are being utilised by numerous bodies to exert control and power.

Medical Treatment

Due to neglect of the medical system in Burma, medical assistance for landmine victims is minimal.[293] Healthcare costs for emergency surgery, blood transfusions and rehabilitative care accrue to US$1,000-3,000. State expenditure on health is appallingly low and imbalanced [see p32] meaning that victims of landmines – often poverty stricken – rarely get the treatment they need.

Almost all victims of landmines lose one or more limbs and require prosthetics and rehabilitative care if they are to continue pursuing regular economic activities, such as working in fields and carrying loads. It can be anywhere between 3 months and 9 years after surgery before many have access to prosthetics, and in many cases bribes must be paid.

Treatment is therefore clearly not considered a right but a luxury, and is generally one granted by bodies other than the Burmese ‘government’. During 2000 the number of patients at the International Committee of the Red Cross more then doubled from 1999, with 55% of the 907 amputees fitted with prosthetic/orthopedic appliances being landmine victims.[294] These are the lucky ones.

CHRONOLOGY (not including release of prisoners: see Appendix B)

1 May – Labour Day

3 Thai villagers killed & 5 injured, clashes between DKBA & Thai forces [p18]

1-4 May

Pakistani executive visits Burma [p10]

5 May

‘The New World of Corporate Accountability: the Case of Unocal in Burma’, Forum [p43]

8 May

24 Chin asylum-seekers start hunger strike (New Delhi, India) [p52]

8-11 May

UN-backed drugs meeting between Thailand & Burma (Rangoon) [p15]

9-20 May

UNLDC Conference (Belgium, EU) [p31]

10-11 May

ASEAN labor ministers meeting, Kuala Lumpur

11 May

¬ ADB Annual Meeting [p31]

¬ Malaysia announces considering boosting military ties with Burma [p11,22]

12 May

Hunger strike ends as UNHCR agree to re-interview all for refugee status [p52]

14-17 May

Democratic Alliance of Burma conference [p8]

15 May

¬ Anti-Muslim riots in Toungoo-Taunggyi, result in imposition of a curfew [p60-61]

¬ Court declare ruling on Aung San property suit will be given on 30 May [p8]

18 May

U Ko Ko, Minister Counsellor & Deputy Representative of Burmese Mission to UN, defected to US [p21]

17-19 May

ILO team visited Burma again [p41]

21 May

¬ ICEM annual meeting

¬ Unocal’s shareholder meeting [p43]

22 May

¬ Shareholder meeting for Total (Paris)

¬ Shan Resistance Day [p18]

27 May

11th Anniversary of the 1990 election [p6]

28-29 May

Meeting between Japan’s Federation of Economic Organizations (Keidanren) & SPDC to promote economic cooperation

29 May

Bill S. 926 introduced in US Senate [p29]

1-4 June

UN Special Envoy Razali visits Burma [p6-8]

4 June

World Association of Newspapers awards 2001 Golden Pen of Freedom to San San Nweh & U Win Tin [p44-45]

10 June

2 Thais disappear from logging site [p18]

12 June

¬ SPDC make official request to ILO that FTUB be derecognised [p42]

¬ State House of Massachussettes heard bills to drop companies engaged in Burma from state pension fund [p29]

19 June – Women of Burma Day

Aung San Suu Kyi’s birthday

19-20 June

Thaksin visits Burma [p20]

20 June - Refugee Day, 1^st ever

21 June

Termination of FEC trading licenses [p26]

22 June

¬ Burma added to International Money Laundering Blacklist [p16]

¬ Burmese Foreign Minister visits Thailand as a follow-up to Thaksin’s trip [p20]

25-27 June

UNGA special session on AIDS [p33]

26 June

¬ 24 Burmese arrested trying to move from India into Pakistan

¬ Anti-drug museum opens, Rangoon [p17]

27 June

Thai National Security Council confirms closure of Maneeloy camp in 2001 [p52]

6 July

Baptist Pastor Gracy sentenced to 2 years hard labour [p61]

11 July

National AIDS Seminar, Thailand [p39]

17 July

Clashes between KNU & DKBA force 194 Karens to flee to Thailand [p52-53]

19 July – Martyrs’ Day

w ABC, Australian TV channel, screens documentary of SPDC involvement in the drug trade [p15,45]

w Aung San Suu Kyi does not turn up to Martyrs’ Day Ceremony [p6]

23-24 July

ASEAN Ministerial Meeting

25 July

ASEAN Regional Forum [p12]

1 August

7 Thai narcotics officials kidnapped [p18]

2 August

US delegation held talks SPDC & Aung San Suu Kyi [p13]

8 August

w 3 Thai soldiers killed, 1 wounded in clash with armed drug smugglers, believed to be DKBA [p18]

w WHO said Asia’s sex industry poses significant threat to AIDS control programmes & initiatives [p34]

18 August

High school building inaugurated with Japanese grant [p47]

18-21 August

Lao’s Prime Minister, Bounnyang Vorachit visited Burma [p11]

23 August

China admits AIDS epidemic [p34]

24 August

Indonesian President, Megawati talks with SPDC [p11]

26 August

Chairman Aung Shwe and Vice-Chairman Tin Oo released from house arrest [p7]

27 August

Aung San property case pushed back to 3 September [p8]

27-30 August

Razali’s mission to Burma [p7]

31 August – 7 September

World Conference against Racism & Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia & related intolerance (Durban, South Africa)

APPENDIX A

Source: Asian Development Bank, UNDP (2000)

Figure 1: Hot Spots of Population Mobility and HIV/AIDS Risk Situations in Burma

Hot Spots	Migrant/Mobile Population Groups	Population Size	HIV Risk Situations
Tachileik	Transport workers, migrant workers, female sex workers, traders, tourists, uniformed officials, IDUs	EEEE	-----
Keng Tung	Transport workers, female sex workers, traders, uniformed officials, construction workers, IDUs	EEE	---
Mong La	Transport workers, tourists, female sex workers, traders, IDUs	EE	--
Taunggyi / Aungbon	Transport workers, female sex workers, traders, uniformed officials, construction workers, IDUs	EEE	---
Lashio	Transport workers, female sex workers, traders, IDUs,	EEEE	---
Mandalay	Transport workers, tourists, female sex workers, traders, businessmen, IDUs	EEE	--
Meiktila	Transport workers, tourists, female sex workers, traders, IDUs	EE	--
Monywa	Transport workers, female sex workers, traders, IDUs	EE	--
Tamu / Moreh	Transport workers, traders, IDUs	E	--
Rangoon	Transport workers, traders, female sex workers, state officials, tourists, IDUs	EEEEE	---
Bago	Transport workers, female sex workers, traders, construction workers	EE	--
Pa-an	Transport workers, female sex workers, traders, uniformed officials	EEE	--
Myawaddy	Migrant workers, traders, transport workers, female sex workers, tourists, IDUs	EEE	--
Phyathongsu	Migrant labourers, female sex workers, traders, uniformed officials, IDUs	EE	--
Dawei	Fishermen, female sex workers, traders, state & uniformed officials	EE	--
Myeik	Fishermen, female sex workers, traders, state officials, uniformed officials	EE	--
Kawthaung	Female sex workers, fishermen & seafarers, migrant labourers, traders, state & uniformed officials	EEE	----

Figure 2: Typology of Migrant & Mobile Population Groups & Assessment of their HIV Risk

Situations, Burma

Migrant & Mobile Population Groups	Popn. Size	Geographical Locations	HIV Risk Situations
Road/rail construction workers	EE	Tachileik-Kyaning Tong-Ruili roads, Ye-Dawei rails	--
Hill Tribes & Ethnic Minorities	EEEEE	Minority states, inc. Burma-Thai border areas & refugee camps	--
Female sex workers (hospitality girls)	EE	Large cities & border towns	-----
Traders	EEE	Mostly in border towns	--
Road transport workers	EEE	Along major highways, especially in NE Burma	---
Migrant workers	EEEE	Rangoon & border towns	--
Resettlement residents	EE	Rangoon & Shan state	--
Fishermen & Seafarers	EEE	Dawei, Kawthaung, Myeik & other ports	----
Uniformed Officials	EEEE	Throughout Burma, especially in border areas	--
Private sector / businessmen	EE	Cities & border towns with Thailand & PRC	--
Tourists & visitors	EE	Border towns with Thailand & PRC	--

Figure 3: Typology of Migrant & Mobile Population Groups & Assessment of their HIV risk

Situations, outside Burma

Migrant & Mobile Population Groups	Population Size	Geographical Locations	HIV Risk Situations
Migrant labourers	EEEE	Thailand (& Malaysia)	---
Migrant fishermen	EE	Thailand & elsewhere in Thai boats	----
Migrant sex workers	EE	Thailand & PRC	-----
Refugees	EEE	Thailand & Bangladesh	--

E proportionately signifies population size - proportionately signifies severity of risks situations

APPENDIX B

Release Of Political Prisoners Sep 2000 – Aug 2001 (Source: AAPP)

Name	Arrest Date	Released date	Occupation
San Htay (f)	22 Sep 2000	26 Sep 2000	NLD
Nyunt Kyi	22 Sep 2000	26, Sep 2000	NLD
James Mawsley	31 Aug 1999	Oct 2000
Aye Lwin	22 Sep 2000	5 Oct 2000	NLD
Khin Maung Myint	22 Sep 2000	5 Oct 2000	NLD
Kyee Myint	22 Sep 2000	5 Oct 2000	NLD
Saw Than Htoo	22 Sep 2000	5 Oct 2000	NLD
Than Win	22 Sep 2000	5 Oct 2000	NLD
Thein Aung	22 Sep 2000	5 Oct 2000	NLD
Toe Lwin	22 Sep 2000	5 Oct 2000	NLD
Win Kyi (f)	22 Sep 2000	5 Oct 2000	NLD
one of 6 unknow persons		17 Oct 2000	NLD
one of 6 unknow persons		17 Oct 2000	NLD
one of 6 unknow persons		17 Oct 2000	NLD
one of 6 unknow persons		17 Oct 2000	NLD
one of 6 unknow persons		17 Oct 2000	NLD
one of 6 unknow persons		17 Oct 2000
Pan (f)	22 Sep 2000	17 Oct 2000	NLD
Thin Thin Moe (f)	22 Sep 2000	1 Nov 2000	NLD
Khin Oo	22 Sep 2000	20 Nov 2000	NLD
Tun Zaw Zaw	22 Sep 2000	20 Nov 2000	NLD
Hla Pe	22 Sep 2000	2 Dec 2000	NLD leader
Lun Tin	22 Sep 2000	2 Dec 2000	NLD leader
Lwin	22 Sep 2000	2 Dec 2000	NLD leader
Nyunt Wai	22 Sep 2000	2 Dec 2000	NLD leader
Soe Myint	22 Sep 2000	2 Dec 2000	NLD leader
Than Tun (CRPP Sec:)	22 Sep 2000	2 Dec 2000	NLD leader
San San Aye (f)	22 Sep 2000	15 Dec 2000	NLD
Aung Din	22 Sep 2000	24 Jan 2001	NLD
Aung Htoo	22 Sep 2000	24 Jan 2001
Name	Arrest Date	Released date	Occupation
Aung Nyein	20 Sep 2000	24 Jan 2001	NLD
Aung Tun	22 Sep 2000	24 Jan 2001	NLD
Aye Aye Soe (f)	22 Sep 2000	24 Jan 2001	NLD
Aye Than (f)	22 Sep 2000	24 Jan 2001	NLD
Aye Tun	22 Sep 2000	24 Jan 2001	NLD
Chit Tin	20 Sep 2000	24 Jan 2001	NLD
Chit Yin	20 Sep 2000	24 Jan 2001	NLD
Cho Cho Lwin (f)	22 Sep 2000	24 Jan 2001	NLD
Hla San	22 Sep 2000	24 Jan 2001	NLD
Hla Than	20 Sep 2000	24 Jan 2001	NLD
Hla Tun	22 Sep 2000	24 Jan 2001	NLD
Hlae Hlae (f)	22 Sep 2000	24 Jan 2001	NLD
Hlae Hlae Win (f)	22 Sep 2000	24 Jan 2001	NLD
Htay Htay (f)	22 Sep 2000	24 Jan 2001	NLD
Htay Zaw	20 Sep 2000	24 Jan 2001	NLD
Htin Kyaw	22 Sep 2000	24 Jan 2001	NLD
Khin Khin Htway (f)	22 Sep 2000	24 Jan 2001	NLD
Khin Lay (f)	22 Sep 2000	24 Jan 2001	NLD
Khin Lay Swe (f)	20 Sep 2000	24 Jan 2001	NLD
Khin Maung Htway	20 Sep 2000	24 Jan 2001	NLD
Khin Ohuu (f)	22 Sep 2000	24 Jan 2001	NLD
Khin Phyu (f)	22 Sep 2000	24 Jan 2001	NLD
Khin Saw Hmu (f)	22 Sep 2000	24 Jan 2001	NLD
Khin Zaw	22 Sep 2000	24 Jan 2001	NLD
Kyaw Swe	20 Sep 2000	24 Jan 2001	NLD
Kyaw Yin	20 Sep 2000	24 Jan 2001	NLD
Mar Mar Aye (f)	22 Sep 2000	24 Jan 2001	NLD
Mar Mar Swe (f)	22 Sep 2000	24 Jan 2001	NLD
Marlar (f)	22 Sep 2000	24 Jan 2001	NLD
Mhan Tun Shwe	22 Sep 2000	24 Jan 2001	NLD
Min Lwin	22 Sep 2000	24 Jan 2001	NLD
Mya Nyunt	22 Sep 2000	24 Jan 2001	NLD
Myat Soe @ Shwe Gyo	22 Sep 2000	24 Jan 2001	NLD
Myint Aung	20 Sep 2000	24 Jan 2001	NLD
Name	Arrest Date	Released date	Occupation
Myint Myint Sein (f)	22 Sep 2000	24 Jan 2001	NLD
Myint Myint Soe (f)	22 Sep 2000	24 Jan 2001	NLD
Myint Myint Thwin (f)	22 Sep 2000	24 Jan 2001	NLD
Myo Aung, Dr	22 Sep 2000	24 Jan 2001	NLD
Myo Khin	22 Sep 2000	24 Jan 2001	NLD
Myo Nyunt	22 Sep 2000	24 Jan 2001	NLD
Myo Thaw	22 Sep 2000	24 Jan 2001	NLD
Nan Kyu Than Win (f)	22 Sep 2000	24 Jan 2001	NLD
Naw Ohn Hla (f)	22 Sep 2000	24 Jan 2001	NLD
Phyu Phyu Thin (f)	22 Sep 2000	24 Jan 2001	NLD
Phyu Phyu Tun (f)	22 Sep 2000	24 Jan 2001	NLD
San San Myint (f)	22 Sep 2000	24 Jan 2001	NLD
San Shwe	22 Sep 2000	24 Jan 2001	NLD
Saw Lwin	20 Sep 2000	24 Jan 2001	NLD
Soe Soe (f)	22 Sep 2000	24 Jan 2001	NLD
Swe Swe Win (f)	22 Sep 2000	24 Jan 2001	NLD
Than Htike Aung	22 Sep 2000	24 Jan 2001	NLD
Than Than Aye (f)	20 Sep 2000	24 Jan 2001	NLD
Than Than Oo (f)	22 Sep 2000	24 Jan 2001	NLD
Than Tint Aung	22 Sep 2000	24 Jan 2001	NLD
Than Tun	22 Sep 2000	24 Jan 2001	NLD
Thein Lwin	22 Sep 2000	24 Jan 2001	NLD
Thein Swe	22 Sep 2000	24 Jan 2001	NLD
Tin Aye (f)	22 Sep 2000	24 Jan 2001	NLD
Tin Than Aye (f)	22 Sep 2000	24 Jan 2001	NLD
Tin Than Oo (f)	22 Sep 2000	24 Jan 2001	NLD
Tun Myint	22 Sep 2000	24 Jan 2001	NLD
Uproung	22 Sep 2000	24 Jan 2001	NLD
Ye Min	20 Sep 2000	24 Jan 2001	NLD
Zaw Min Kyaw	22 Sep 2000	24 Jan 2001	NLD
Htike	1995	March 2001
Maung Maung Oo	1995	March 2001
Moe Myat Thu	1995	March 2001
Tin Than Oo	1995	March 2001
Name	Arrest Date	Released date	Occupation
Aye Win		June 2001	NLD
Soe Thein	May 1996	14 June 2001	MP
Saw Mya Aung, Dr	Sep 1998	15 June 2001	ALD
Aung Soe	January 1996	July 2001	NLD
Lu Zaw @ Po Aye	January 1996	July 2001	Commedian
Maung Htway	January 1996	July 2001	NLD
Pa Pa Lay @ Tun Po	January 1996	July 2001	Commedian
Aung Mor Nyo, Dr		13 July 2001	MP
Saw Hlaing		13 July 2001	MP
Tin Htut Oo		13 July 2001	MP
San San Nweh		18 July 2001	NLD & journalist
Duwa Zaw Aung	1998	13 Aug 2001	MP
San San (f)	1997	13 Aug 2001	MP
Aung Shwe	22 Sep 2000	27 Aug 2001	NLD leader
Tin Oo	22 Sep 2000	27 Aug 2001	NLD leader

BIBLIOGRAPHY

ADB (December 2000) ‘Myanmar: 2001-2003’ <www.adb.organisation/Documents/CAPs/mya.pdf>

ADB (2000) ‘Asian Development Outlook’ <www.adb.organisation/Documents/Books/ADO/2000/Myanmar.pdf>

Asian Development Bank, UNDP (2000) ‘HIV/AIDS: Mobility and HIV/AIDS in the Greater Mekong Subregion’; cd-rom

ALTSEAN-Burma (Feb-Apr 01) ‘Still Waiting’ Report Card

ALTSEAN-Burma (Sept 00-Jan 01) ‘Burma: Tentative Steps’

Beyrer C. (2001) ‘Shan women and girls and the sex industry in Southeast Asia; political causes and human rights implications’, Social Science & Medicine 53, p543-550

Beyrer C., Myat Htoo Razak, Labrique A. & Brookmeyer R. (25 June 2001) ‘Assessing the magnitude of the HIV/AIDS Epidemic in Burma’, report presented at UNGA Special Session in AIDS

Bryant, R. (Fall 1996) ‘The Greening of Burma: Political Rhetoric or Sustainable Development?’, Public Affairs, 69 (3), p341-359

Brunner, Talbott & Elkin (August 1998) ‘Logging Burma’s Frontier Forests: Resources and the Regime’, World Resources Institute Vii

Burma and Anti-Personnel Landmines (26 September 2001) ‘A humanitarian crisis in the making’ <http://www.igc.org/nonviolence/burmamines/crisis.html>

Burma Project (25 Sept 2001) <http://www.burmaproject.org/CRISIS/green.html>

Earthlinks International (2001) “Fatally flawed, the Tasang Dam on the Salween River”

Friends without Borders (2001) ‘Taking Shelter Under Trees, Refugee Protection and sustainable forest management’, Chiang Mai University, Chiang Mai, Thailand

FTUB (May 2001) Report given at UN Conference on the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) and NGO Forum, Brussels 9-20 May 2001, by Sein Htay, Secretary, Economic and Research Department

ILO (2001) ‘An ILO code of practice on HIV/AIDS and the world of work’, Geneva, Switzerland

KHRG (20 December 1999) ‘The Breakup of Karen Villages in Southeastern Pa'an District’, #99-08

Landmine Monitor Burma/Myanmar (2001) ‘Landmine Monitor Report, 2001, Towards a Mine Free World’

Lonely Planet (August 2001) ‘Myanmar (Burma) 7 Upgrade’ <http://www.lonelyplanet.com/upgrades/index.htm>

Myanmar Representative to ADB (May 2001) Annual Meeting, Hawaii <www.adb.organisation/AnnualMeeting/2001/Speeches/mya.pdf>

National Health and Education Committee (NHEC) (26-28 April 2001) ‘Children’s Opportunity to Learn in the Ethnic Nationality Areas in Burma’

NCGUB (15 June 2001) News Desk

Burma on the Internet

The BurmaNet News is an Internet newspaper providing comprehensive coverage of news and opinion on Burma (Myanmar) from around the world. If you see something on Burma, you can bring it to other subscribers’ attention by emailing it to [email protected]

To automatically subscribe to Burma’s only free daily newspaper in English, send an email to [email protected].

To subscribe to The BurmaNet News in Burmese, send an email to: [email protected]. Burma News Summaries are available by email or the web. There are 3 Burma news digest services available via either email or the web:

Burma News Update
Frequency: Biweekly. Availability: fax, internet

Viewable online at <http://www.soros.org/burma/burmanewsupdate/index.html>
Cost: Free. Published by: Open Society Institute, Burma Project

Burma Today
Frequency: Weekly. Availability: E-mail, internet

Viewable online at <http://www.worldviewrights.org/pdburma/today.html>
To subscribe, write to [email protected]
Cost: Free. Published by: PD Burma (The International Network of Political Leaders Promoting Democracy in Burma)

The Burma Courier
Frequency: Weekly. Availability: E-mail, fax, post, internet
To subscribe or unsubscribe by email [email protected]
Viewable on line at <http://www.egroups.com/group/BurmaCourier>
Cost: Free. (News sources are cited at the beginning of articles. Interpretative comments & background details are often added.

TOP BURMA WEBSITES

BurmaNet (For current and archived news about Burma)
http://www.burmanet.org

Various FreeBurma websites with extensive links:
http://www.freeburma.org
http://www.freeburmacoalition.org

Open Society Institute Burma Project (FACT filled)
http://www.soros.org/burma.html

Burmese junta’s public relations website
http://www.myanmar.com

Resources from Altsean-Burma

1998 Mar Special Briefing: Human Rights Situation for Women in Burma. 16pp US$2 [Sorry, photocopies only]

1998 Mar Video: Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s Address to the UN Human Rights Commission. 18 mins. PAL/NTSC. US$15

1998 Apr Report Card: Slorc’s Performance as the State Peace and Development Council. 45pp. US$5 [Sorry, photocopies only]

1998 Jun Book: Burma ~ Voices of Women in the Struggle. 116pp. US$10

1998 Jul Report Card: Burma’s Regime on the Edge. 40pp. $5 [photocopy only]

1998 Sep Yellow Flower Postcard & Badge Campaign Pack: 20 postcards & 5 badges to support women in the movement. With the BWU. US$7

1999 Jan Report Card:The Burma Junta Grits its Teeth. 68pp. $5 [photocopy only]

1999 Apr Report Card:The Stakes are Raised in Burma. 60pp.$5 [photocopy only]

1999 Apr Report Card:The Situation of Women in Burma. 20pp.$5 [photocopy]

1999 Aug T-Shirt (Multilingual): “COURAGE”. US$15 ea.[US$400 for 40]

1999 Aug Badge (Bilingual): “COURAGE”. US$10 for 10

1999 Sep Burma Special Report:The Committee Representing the People’s Parliament (CRPP). A5, 32pp. Gratis

1999 Sep Report Card:Looming Crackdown. A5, 56pp. Gratis

2000 Jan Report Card:New Hope, Old Reality. A5, 56pp

2000 Jan ALTSEAN-BURMA ACTIVISTS’ CALENDAR 2000: A4, 28pp

2000 Apr Special Briefing: Women’s Report Card on Burma 2000. 36pp. $5

2000 May Report Card:Consequences of Violence. A5, 40pp. Gratis

2000 Sap Report Card:Stand Off!. A5, 40pp

2000 Oct T-Shirt: “Safety is Everybody’s Right - Refugees too” US$15/40 for US$400

2001 Jan ALTSEAN-BURMA ACTIVISTS’ CALENDAR 2001: A4, 28pp

2001 Mar Report Card:Tentative Steps. A5, 80pp. Price $5 each

2001 Jun Special Briefing: Women’s Report Card on Burma 2001. 36pp. US$5

2001 Jun Poster: What Women of Burma Want! A2. Price $5 for 5

2001 Jun T-Shirt: Burma: Asean’s Shame

2001 Sep Report Card: Still Waiting. A5, 66pp. Price $5 each

Please contact us by fax (662 939 0286) or email <[email protected]>
to order or to obtain more information about our publications

---

[1] See Far Eastern Economic Review (2 August 2001) ‘Burma - No News Is Bad News’; Mizzima (27 May 2001) ‘Aung San Suu Kyi not allowed to participate in the NLD function’

[2] AFP (8 August 2001) ‘Aung San Suu Kyi's party cancels 1988 uprising commemoration’

[3] Far Eastern Economic Review (16 August 2001) ‘Burma Talks Focus On Prisoner Release’

[4] AFP (4 June 2001) ‘UN envoy completes Myanmar reconciliation mission’; Reuters (4 June 2001) ‘UN envoy upbeat on Myanmar political progress’

[5] UN (30 August 2001) ‘Secretary-General’s Special Envoy for Myanmar confirms all parties still committed to National Reconciliation’ (SG/SM/7928) <www.un.organisation/News/Press/docs/2001/sgsm7928.doc.htm>

[6] AP (3 May 2001) ‘Philippines VP Says He Was Refused Audience With Suu Kyi’

[7] AP (27 August 2001) ‘Suu Kyi pledges to strive for democracy’

[8] see DVB (30 April 2001) 'Exiled Burmese leader welcomes Rangoon-Suu Kyi talks’, in Burmese 1430 gmt; AFP (26 August 2001) ‘UN envoy to make new tilt at pushing ahead historic dialogue’

[9] Far Eastern Economic Review (16 August 2001) ‘Burma Talks Focus On Prisoner Release’

[10] Burma Courier (30 June 2001) ‘Confusion over Location of Imprisoned Student Leader’

[11] see International Herald Tribune (5 July 2001) ‘Some Prisoners Freed as Junta and Opposition Talk’; Democratic Voice of Burma (7 August 2001) ‘Mandalay monk arrested over critical sermon’

[12] see AP (29 June 2001) ‘Suu Kyi's party opens another branch office outside Yangon’

[13] see NLD (August 2001) ‘Statement No: 2’; BBC (21 June 2001) ‘Burma releases more political prisoners’

[14] see Far Eastern Economic Review (2 August 2001) ‘Burma - No News Is Bad News’

[15] Burma Courier (5 May 2001) ‘Sein Win: "It Is High Time to Let the People Know"’

[16] Open Letter From Bohmu On Behalf Of The Veteran Political Colleagues To Sr. General Than Shwe (20 June 2001)

[17] BMA (9 June 2001) ‘Dialogue going well, patience needed, inside sources said’

[18] AP (19 May 2001) ‘Rebel Group Vows Continued Fight Against Myanmar Regime’

[19] AFP (6 July 2001) ‘Myanmar's secret talks spark frustration among dissident ranks’

[20] The SNLD is led by Khun Htoon Oo, regarded as the spokesperson for the non-Burman parties. He has quite extensive contact with foreign dignitaries. [Shan Herald Agency for News (7 June 2001) ‘Shan party members told to quit’]

[21] DVB (22 August 2001) ‘Burma's military intelligence closely monitors political activity’ <http://www.dvb.no/scoop/>

[22] DVB (20 August 2001) ‘Authorities dismiss official for contact with opposition’

[23] [Reuters (26 June 2001) ‘Myanmar's generals seek power with legitimacy’] A recent speech by SPDC Chairman Than Shwe called on war veterans to be more politically active, indicating the military could be preparing a vehicle to fight elections.

[24] Kyodo (6 August 2001) ‘Myanmar junta unlikely to go without guarantee: Mahathir’

[25] AFP (26 July 2001) ‘EU asks UN to push democratic reforms in Myanmar’

[26] US see Reuters (6 June 2001) ‘US envoy calls for Myanmar talk results soon’

[27] AFP (15 June 2001) ‘Annan welcomes release of prisoners in Myanmar’

[28] All Burma Students Democratic Front (5 June 2001) ‘Time for Transparency’

[29] Far Eastern Economic Review (16 August 2001)

[30] Reuters (6 June 2001)

[31] [AFP (22 July 2001) ‘ASEAN to hail ‘encouraging developments’ in Myanmar’] There is dissent among Thai officials such as Senator Kraisak Choonhavan head of Thailand’s Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs. Choonhavan has been critical of ASEAN and its passive role in Burma and its relations with Thailand. [Irrawaddy (May 2001) ‘Thais are very angry with the Burmese, mainly because of drugs’]

[32] AP (24 July 2001) ‘Australia to urge Myanmar to continue dialogue with Suu Kyi’

[33] AFP (24 July 2001) ‘Australian FM detects signs of movement from Myanmar’

[34] see AP (26 June 2001) ‘Myanmar Doesn’t want to be isolated – A Top Government Leader’

[35] For example see Boston Globe (7 May 2001) ‘Burma Sanctions’ Value’

[36] see ALTSEAN-Burma (September 2001:37)

[37] The Straits Times (28 June 2001) ‘EU sees Myanmar situation as a hurdle’

[38] Burma Office Japan: On meeting of UN Special Envoy for Myanmar withJapanese labor officials. [Hearing from the Meeting of Mr. Ismail Razali, Special Envoy of United Nations General Secretary to Burma and the leaders of RENGO (Labor Unions) of Japan]

[39] AP (18 May 2001) ‘Myanmar opposition group urges sanctions on military junta’

[40] Using an exchange rate of US$1 = JPY 122.832: Between 3 - 3.5 billion yen [The Japan Times (27 July 2001) ‘Tanaka tells Myanmar to free more prisoners held on political grounds’]

[41] AP (26 July 2001) ‘Japan Min Asks Myanmar To Free More Political Prisoners’

[42] Hisashi Owada, an influential Japanese official and President of the Japan Institute of International Affairs (a Foreign Ministry-approved think-tank), met with Aung San Suu Kyi in August with the Japanese ambassador, Shigeru Tsumori.

[43] Most of the heroin in the US, and 80% in Australia, reportedly comes from Burma.

[44] DVB (17 August 2001) ‘Poppy cultivation has been increasing’

[45] Irrawaddy (17 July 2001) ‘New Drug Factories in Laos’; The Nation (7 May 2001) ‘30 Drug Factories Spotted’

[46] The Nation (April 24, 2001) Chasing the Burmese dragon

[47] Freedom News, Shan State Army (10 May 2001) ‘Interview with A Burmese Junta's Soldier Confirmed Junta’s Involvement In Narcotics Trade & Committing Extrajudicial Killings’

[48] DVB (8 June 2001) ‘ Officials seize Thai-bound stimulant tablets.’

[49] Bangkok Post (15 June 2001) ‘DKBA troops defect to KNU over drugs’

[50] DVB (23 May 2001) ‘Palaung region reportedly permitted to grow poppies for road repair fund.’

[51] The Nation (20 June 2001) ‘Junta caught dealing drugs’

[52] The Nation (21 June 2001) ‘TV crew fingers junta’

[53] South China Morning Post (24 June 2001) ‘A war with no front’

[54] Chicago Tribune (19 May 2001) ‘US, China take sides in border skirmish’

[55] Bangkok Post (31 May 2001) ‘Drug Suppression-plans for a Wa State could threaten national security’

[56] Bangkok Post (7 June 2001) ‘Military gets lion's share of drug fund’

[57] AP (25 July 2001) ‘Thai general denies ''killer teams'' to wipe out drug runners’

[58] see Xinhua (18 June 2001) ‘Thailand, Myanmar to Sign MOU on Drug Suppression—Report’

[59] South China Morning Post (24 June 2001) ‘A war with no front’

[60] Shan Herald Agency for News (19 August 2001) ‘Drug traffickers win road construction contracts’

[61] AP (30 July 2001) ‘Thai government revokes nationality of alleged drug smuggler’

[62] Bangkok Post (20 May 2001) ‘Hitting Criminals in the Pocketbooks’

[63] Amnesty International (May 2001) ‘Myanmar Country Report 2000’, covering January - December 2000

[64] AP (19 August 2001) ‘Taiwanese gets death sentence in Myanmar for drug trafficking’

[65] AP (1 June 2001) ‘Myanmar hands over drug trafficking suspect to China’

[66] The Nation (30 July 2001) ‘Burma must join a regional effort’

[67] see AP (12 May 2001) ‘Myanmar drug burn is more than a dog-and-pony show’; Reuters (13 May 2001) ‘Myanmar ethnic group denies making, selling drugs’

[68] Voice of America (26 June 2001) ‘Anti-Narcotics Museum Opens in Burma’

[69] see Agence France Presse (12 June 2001) ‘Myanmar arrests 355 in drug raids’

[70] see Bangkok Post (13 June 2001) ‘Chinese crew did not get to see drugs taken off boat’

[71] Report to the Congress Regarding Conditions in Burma and U.S. Policy Toward Burma (12 April 2001) ‘Conditions in Burma and U.S. Policy Toward Burma for the Period September 28, 2000-March 27, 2001’

[72] 3 Thai soldiers were killed and another wounded on August 8^th in a clash with armed drug smugglers believed to be the DKBA. The armed individuals retreated into Burma leaving behind 536,000 methamphetamine pills [Bangkok Post (8 August 2001) ‘Three Thais die in border skirmish’]

[73] Loggers: see Shan Herald Agency for News (24 June 2001) ‘Shan army leaders deny newspaper reports’; Off duty anti-narcotics officials see The Nation (31 July 2001) ‘Wa army delivers 7 Thai officials to Burma Junta; release expected’; Bangkok Post (10 June 2001) ‘In brief: Rebels take Thais’

[74] The Nation (13 May 2001) 'Fighting 'Not Serious Enough' for Missiles - Chavalit'

[75] The Nation (22 May 2001) ‘Three join Shan 'party'’

[76] Bangkok Post (24 May 2001) ‘Tough talking on drugs, weak stomach on border’

[77] AP (5 June 2001) ‘New history textbook tells Myanmar kids that Thais are lazy’

[78] Reuters (6 June 2001) ‘Myanmar Textbook Calls Thais Lazy, Pleasure Seeking’

[79] The Nation (7 June 2001) ‘ Burma text 'could hurt relations'

[80] The Irrawaddy (18 August 2001) ‘Thai Film Stirs Concerns About Burma Relations’

[81] Over 1,000 Burmese Military Intelligence Service agents are said to have infiltrated Thai border towns, spying on and sometimes assassinating anti-Rangoon elements, reporting on Thai military movements and supplementing their meagre incomes with drug money. The juntas’ spies are set to amalgamate into Thailand as illegal immigrants, refugees or traders at the border or in towns and cities. [Bangkok Post (10 June 2001) ‘Burmese spies are everywhere’]

[82] BBC (20 June 2001) ‘Thailand and Burma 'back on track'’

[83] The Nation (21 June 2001) ‘Burma 'Peace Talks'-- PM Pledges End to Clashes’

[84] Bangkok Post (21 June 2001) ‘Joint panel to mull border reopening-All lingering doubts will be thrashed out’

[85] Bangkok Post (22 June 2001) ‘Burma’s Win Aung on visit’

[86] AP (26 June 2001) ‘Myanmar Doesn't Want To Be Isolated - A Top Govt Leader’

[87] BurmaNet (4 May 2001) ‘One Hand Clapping-No Approval for Road Construction from Bangkok’

[88] Bangkok Post (31 May 2001) ‘Instability of SPDC: Old Roots for New Troubles’

[89] see Burma Courier (2 June 2001) ‘New Face at the Table of the Ruling Military Council’

[90] Tin Oo died in a helicopter crash in February. [see ALTSEAN-Burma (September 2001:13-14)]

[91] Mizzima (10 July 2001) ‘Former Communication minister under investigation’

[92] According to BurmaNet News he was seeking asylum in Australia, but other sources have suggested he is in Canada [BMA (4 July 2001) ‘Missing Former Foreign Minister’]

[93] Reuters (14 July 2001) ‘Myanmar in nuclear reactor deal with Russia’

[94] Far Eastern Economic Review (23 August 2001) ‘Russian Spy Aids Burmese Military’

[95] Irrawaddy (Aug-Sept 2001) ‘Burma Seeking New Defense Tech Partners’

[96] BurmaNet News (13 July 2001) ‘Policy implications of regime’s borrowing to buy MiGs’

[97] Reuters (29 June 2001) ‘Myanmar leader sees 11.3% GDP growth 2001/2002’

[98] Burma imported US$147.08 million of machinery equipment in the 1^st 2 months of 2001, increasing by 65.72% compared with the same period of 2000 and accounting for 34.1% of total import values ($431.15 million). [Xinhua (15 June 2001) ‘Myanmar’s Machinery Import up in First Two Months’]

[99] EIU (12 Sept 2001) <http://www.viewswire.com/index.asp?country_id=MM&layout=country_home_page&x=17&y=7>

[100] ADB (2000:104)

[101] BBC (4 May 2001) ‘Burmese economy under siege’

[102] Such grossly distorted exchange rates may undermine effectiveness of monetary policy instruments.

[103] The only area which has consistently high spending is the military.

[104] Mizzima (20 May 2001) ‘Burma: Financial crisis and foreign assistance’, <www.mizzima.com>

[105] During the last financial year ratios were at 12-13% GDP.

[106] DVB (29 July 2001) ‘Policemen, employees complain of compulsory salary deductions’

[107] Note that many are in joint ventures, and may therefore be controlled by regime-aligned partners.

[108] Xinhua (20 June 2001) ‘Myanmar’s Private Sector Plays Leading Role in Foreign Trade’

[109] According to official 2000 statistics 76.8% of Burma’s foreign trade was private sector imports and 68.5% private sector exports.

[110] Mizzima (19 May 2001) ‘Construction works handed over to private companies in Burma’

[111] Analysis by Cato Institute, a Washington-based think tank, has described Burma as the least economically free country out of 123 in 2001.

[112] FTUB (May 2001)

[113] Burma Courier (15-21 Juuly 2001) ‘Agriculture Sector Hit by Sky-high Oil and Gas Prices’

[114] Mizzima (20 May 2001)

[115] Democratic Voice of Burma (5-11 August 2001) ‘Burma Courier: Moneyline’

[116] International Herald Tribune (11 June 2001) ‘Crackdown Does Little to Help Burma’s Economy’

[117] BBC (4 May 2001) ‘Burmese economy under siege’

[118] Mizzima (16 May 2001) ‘In Burma, Fuel crisis deepens and Kyat continues to sink’; BBC (4 May 2001)

[119] Business Daily, Thailand (9 July 2001) ‘China: Myanmar, Chinese company sign cement plant accord’

[120] The Nation (26 June 2001) ‘Refugees to gain from FM's idea – more in August’

[121] The Nation (25 June 2001) ‘Burmese overwhelm border checkpoint’

[122] Border trade last year registered around Bt18 billion. Thailand imported over Bt7billion worth of goods from Burma and exported over Bt11billion. [The Nation (24 June 2001) ‘Account trade to go ahead’]

[123] New zones are Sittwe, Hlaingtha, Lweje and Mergui. There were previously 6.

[124] Xinhua (3 June 2001) ‘Myanmar's Foreign Trade Up in 1st Two Months’

[125] Channel NewsAsia, Singapore (9 July 2001) ‘New law to get Myanmar firms to use local supplies’

[126] Myanma Suzuki Motor Co. Ltd is a joint venture between the Suzuki Motor Corp of Japan (60%) and Myanmar Automobile & Diesel Engine Industries (30%) connected to Maj. Gen. Saw Lwin - reportedly linked with arms dealing and production.[BMA (29 June 2001) ‘Suzuki still under Pressure to Pull out of Burma’]

[127] Parts are mainly imported from Japan, but also from the US, Indonesia and India. Permitted buyers have to wait over one year for their vehicles. Suzuki vehicles cannot be purchased with export dollars taken into Burma. [Burma Courier (4 June 2001) ‘Import Restrictions Force Suzuki to Reduce Production’]

[128] Xinhua (4 June 2001) ‘Foreign Investment in Myanmar Declines’

[129] BMA (11 June 2001) ‘Ivanhoe Plans $ 400 million Injection in Burma Mining Sector’

[130] Xinhua (2 August 2001) ‘Myanmar-ASEAN Members Trade Down Slightly in First Quarter’

[131] Xinhua (11 June 2001) ‘Myanmar's Trade with Five Western Countries Rises Sharply’

[132] Burma Courier (14 June 2001) ‘Canadian Imports from Burma on Steep Upward Curve’

[133] AFL-CIO (15 June 2001) John J. Sweeney President, AFL-CIO, Speech at the ILO

[134] Mizzima (16 May 2001) ‘In Burma, Fuel crisis deepens and Kyat continues to sink’, <www.mizzima.com>; The Irish Times (2 July 2001) ‘Prices soar as Burma faces financial collapse’

[135] Rationed oil is available only to consumers presenting household registration documents and certificates issued by local authorities.

[136] It is thought the regime stopped imports of cooking oil so as to gain tighter control of hard currency leaving Burma. [The Irrawaddy (15 August 2001) ‘Cooking Oil Shortage Continues-People are in line for cooking oil’]

[137] Burma Courier (24 May 2001) ‘Cooking Oil Queues Stir up Consumer Resentment’

[138] The Irrawaddy (15 August 2001) ‘Cooking Oil Shortage Continues-People are in line for cooking oil’

[139] Xinhua (31 July 2001) ‘Myanmar Generates More Electricity in 1st Quarter’

[140] Irrawaddy (11 May 2001) ‘Electricity Woes Continue’

[141] WTO; cited in de Villiers (2000)

[142] Xinhua (5 June 2001) ‘Tourist Arrivals in Myanmar Decline in January, February’

[143] Xinhua (5 June 2001)

[144] BMA (12 June 2001) ‘Hacker Attacks Survey of Burma Tourism’

[145] <www.intrepidtravel.com>

[146] There was controversy surrounding the SPDC representative’s attendance at the ADB annual meeting, held in the US, and UNLDC conference, held in Brussels, EU. Both the US and the EU have policies that persons aligned with the SPDC shall not be given visas of entry. There are also allegations that the banks are connected to drug networks.

[147] Myanmar Representative to ADB (May 2001)

[148] see Appendix 2 in ALTSEAN-Burma (September 2000)

[149] Beyrer, C. et al (25 June 2001)

[150] Such a high prevalence rate means that in the region Burma is 2^nd only to Cambodia (approximately 4% of adults).

[151] Burma Courier (14 May 2001) ‘UNICEF Triples Spending on HIV/AIDS Education in Burma’

[152] Mail & Guardian, South Africa (10 August 2001) ‘Hopes rest on dialogue in Rangoon’

[153] Myanmar Information Committee, SPDC (28 June 2001) Myanmar News Bulletin No. 3/2001 [Denying regime ignores AIDS] News Release, Embassy of Myanmar, London

[154] In Shan State these include Medecins Du Monde & Save the Children.

[155] see AP (26 June 2001) ‘Myanmar AIDS response called grossly inadequate by health experts’

[156] This project is part of a global UN aim to reduce the number of HIV infected infants by 20% by 2005 & 50% by 2010, by focusing on the prevention of mother to child transmission. Similar programmes are run by the Myanmar Red Cross & Myanmar Maternal and Child Health Association (both associated with the SPDC). [Myanmar Times (7-13 May 2001) ‘Spending to be tripled as UNICEF ups effort on AIDS’]

[157] Xinhua (5 July 2001) ‘Myanmar Makes Efforts in Fight Against HIV/AIDS’

[158] According to the report, the sex trade is growing due to increasing income disparities leading impoverished women to engage in sex work. Increased mobility & consumerism provide the demand.

[159] The ‘original’ or ‘old’ Patpong being in Bangkok.

[160] AFP (1 June 2001) ‘Up to 95% of HIV+ Probably Ignorant of fact/UNAIDS’

[161] It is believed that most commercial sex in Asia occurs without the use of condoms.[AP (26 June 2001) ‘Women in Hard-Hit Areas Afraid to say No to Unsafe Sex, Experts Say’; WHO, Western Pacific Region, Press Release (13 August 2001) ‘Sex Trade expanding in Asia’]

[162] Beyrer, C. et al (25 June 2001)

[163] Asian Development Bank, UNDP (2000)

[164] In 1994, over 40% of Thai brothel sex-workers (the lowest class) were ethnic Shans. This is expected to have increased over the years.

[165] The sex industries in both Burma and Thailand have high rates of HIV infection, and are fertile grounds for transmission.

[166] Beyrer (2001:545)

[167] see Nation (18 May 2001) ‘Girl, 20, shackled for trying to escape’

[168] US Rep. Juanita Millender-McDonald (D-Calif); quoted in AP (26 June 2001) ‘Women in Hard-Hit Areas Afraid to say ‘No’ to Unsafe Sex, Experts say’

[169] WHO, Western Pacific Region, Press Release (13 August 2001) ‘Sex Trade expanding in Asia’

[170] see Beyrer (2001:548)

[171] This means that trafficking will continue after a political resolution emerges.

[172] The Voluntary HIV Counseling and Testing Efficacy Study Group (2000) has demonstrated that voluntary HIV testing and counseling can be effective methods of prevention. [Beyrer (2001:546)]

[173] AFP (30 March 2001) ‘Low Status makes African and Asian Women more vulnerable to AIDS: UN’

[174] Beyrer (2001:547)

[175] There have been reports of some HIV+ women returning to isolated and abusive camps.

[176] Asian Development Bank, UNDP (2000)

[177] ADB, UNDP (2000)

[178] Illegal migrants lack access to healthcare & legal migrants often find it cost prohibitive, there are also problems in terms of language & cultural factors.

[179] Bangkok Post (22 June 2001) ‘Burma joins health campaign-Agrees to battle deadly diseases’

[180] Bangkok Post (22 June 2001)

[181] The statement highlighted HIV/AIDS, the excessively high infant mortality rate (79 per 1,000 live births) and the facts that 25% of all newborns are underweight and 1 in 3 children are malnourished before they are 5 years old.

[182] Burma’s total annual foreign aid is equivalent to about US$1 per capita, compared with $35 for Cambodia and $68 for Laos. [BBC (7 August 2001) ‘Appeal for huge Burma aid increase’] The Myanmar-UNAIDS project is reportedly being implemented on a small scale as only 28% of the funding (US$16 million over 2 years) is available. [Xinhua (5 July 2001) ‘Myanmar Makes Efforts in Fight Against HIV/AIDS’]

[BBC (7 August 2001) ‘Appeal for huge Burma aid increase’]

[183] BBC (7 August 2001)

[184] The Nation (8 August 2001) ‘Watchdog slams call to lift sanctions’

[185] For example see Karen Human Rights Group (25 June 2001) ‘KHRG releases largest set of SPDC orders to date’; KNU (18 May 2001) ‘From Prison to The Death Way’, Mergui-Tavoy District Information Department

[186] For example see Shan Herald Agency for News (6 August 2001) ‘Shans fleeing from annual rice purchase’; Burma Courier (7 June 2001) ‘Relief Team Reaches Nagas Burned out of Their Homes’

[187] ANA Inter Press Service (9 July 2001) ‘Momentum Builds for Criminal Tribunals in Asia’

[188] AFP (12 June 2001) ‘Amnesty, Human Rights Watch say forced labor persists in Myanmar’

[189] Although the HLT report will be taken into consideration when discussing the removal of sanctions, an ILO senior legal advisor has said that measures taken by the ILO against Burma cannot be changed until at least mid-2003.

[190] The New Light of Myanmar (SPDC) (18 May 2001) ‘The attitude of ILO’

[191] ILO spokesperson; quoted in BurmaNet (14 June 2001) ‘Regime seeks to eject chief accuser at ILO’

[192] AP (posted on BMA 26 May 2001)

[193] The Advertiser, Australia (8 August 2001) ‘Companies join Burma ban’

[194] Burma Media Association (May 5 2001) ‘Unocal Grilled in Seattle’; for history see ALTSEAN-Burma (March 2001:35)

[195] Some activists are attempting to make UNOCAL pay compensations through legal means to force them out of Burma by making it economically unviable. [Los Angeles Times (22 May 2001) ‘Unocal’s Shareholders Reject 2 Resolutions on Myanmar’]

[196] The Burma Campaign, UK (28 May 2001) ‘ Fuelling Oppression’

[197] AP (31 July, 2001) ‘Myanmar journalists' plight remains alarming, says press freedom’

[198] Bangkok Today (1 August 2001) ‘Myanmar Govt. Rejects Criticisms’

[199] WAN (4 June 2001) ‘The Golden Pen of Freedom’

[200] U Win Tin was the editor of the daily Hanthawati newspaper, vice-chair of the Burmese Writers Association and a founder of the NLD. Despite increased sentencing, poor treatment and ill health, U Win Tin continues to defy the junta in his struggle for press freedom and democracy. San San Nweh, the 1^st female Burmese journalist, was imprisoned for providing ‘anti-government reports’ (aka human rights reports) to French journalists and the UN Special Rapporteur. [AFP (18 July 2001) ‘Prominent Myanmar journalist San San Nwe released from jail’]

[201] Myo Myint Nyein has been in solitary confinement since 1995 and in jail for 11 years. He was integral in the press freedom movement in Insein Prison, providing weekly news bulletins and information reports on human rights abuses in prisons to the former UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights for Myanmar, Yozo Yokota. In July he was suffering from gastritis, migraines, neurosis and hypertension. [for further information see Zin Linn (BMA) ‘Freedom of Press Movement in Insein Prison (1992-1996)’; nomination for International Press Freedom Award 2001]

[202] Myanmar Perspective (April 2001) ‘Secretary 1 Attends First General Meeting Of Academy Of Arts And Science’ Vol. 7, No. 4 <http://www.myanmar.com/gov/perspec/2001/4-2001/YANGON.HTM>

[203] for example, there is only about 1 primary school to 5 villages in Burma heartland, ranging to 1 to 25 in border regions.

[204] for example see New Light of Myanmar (22 May 2001) ‘e-English Summer Courses launched’

[205] for example see BBC (30 May 2001) ‘Myanmar & Global Affairs programme’, 20:15 GMT

[206] Daw Tin Tin Myaing (a ‘Myanmar lady’); BBC (30 May 2001)

[207] A further US$20,000 was donated by Kyodo News correspondent, Sein Win. [Kyodo (18 August 2001) ‘Japan-donated high school building opens in Myanmar’]

[208] Although teachers officially need a university degree, many have only basic High School education. According to SPDC (Myanmar Ministry of Education 1998) figures, 57% of primary school teachers, 58% of junior secondary school teachers and 9% of senior secondary school teachers have no teacher training.

[209] Newsweek (9 July 2001) ‘School's open - but only for docile techies’

[210] BurmaNet (19 August 2001) ‘Official refugee population in Thailand tops 136,000’

[211] Churches and relief organisations and individuals are providing some aid.

[212] The extremely arduous jungle life would be compounded at this time by the rains. [Burma Courier (7 June 2001) ‘Relief Team Reaches Nagas Burned out of Their Homes’]

[213] 50,000 Wa families, approximately 200,000 people, since late 1999 as part of the SPDC’s mass migration policy.

[214] Deutsche Presse-Agentur (7 June 2001) ‘Shan people become refugees in their own state’

[215] Since October 2000, at least 15 Shan village headmen & civilian leaders from 3 villages have been arrested & imprisoned in Mong Hsat jail.

[216] Approximately 400,000 Shans have been displaced by the military and Wa since 1996.

[217] Japan Times (30 April 2001) 'Myanmar's Shan State: a complex tragedy'

[218] There has also been a report the military are encouraging drug addiction amongst the Shans. [Shan Herald Agency for News (26 June 2001) ‘Villager: Junta waging war of drugs on Shans’]

[219] South China Morning Post (24 June 2001) ‘A war with no front’

[220] Deutsche Presse-Agentur (7 June 2001)

[221] Mizzima, India (28 May 2001) ‘MP asks UN to help Burmese asylum seekers’ <www.mizzima.com>

[222] Thanks to staff at Mizzima News Group for their assistance in this research matter.

[223] AFP (9 June 2001) ‘Thai PM vows to close Myanmar dissident and refugee centers’

[224] The figure does not include people who fled their homes but remain inside Burma or refugees in Thailand who live outside the camps; if included the number would be much higher, up to 1 million.

[225] AP (18 July 2001) ‘Refugees flee to Thailand after clash at Myanmar border’

[226] AFP (19 August 2001) ‘Thai official blasts UN over stance on Myanmar illegal immigrants’

[227] While the SPDC have repeated willingness to allow refugees to return, they must provide proof of genuine Burmese nationality. This will continue to obstruct the return of some refugees, particularly the Rohingya as they have no citizenship rights.

[228] UNHCR requested, unsuccessfully, that some 4,300 illegal immigrants be allowed to stay in Thailand. [AFP (19 August 2001) ‘Thai official blasts UN over stance on Myanmar illegal immigrants’]

[229] Labour & Social Welfare Minister; quoted in AFP (24 August 2001) ‘Thailand seals border in attempt to stop influx of illegal workers’

[230] Bangkok Post (26 August 2001) ‘Illegals scamper for alien permits’

[231] Only a small number of migrant workers had registered by 21^st August. [Bangkok Post (24 August 2001) ‘Foreign Labour - Employers seek further reprieve’]

[232] AFP (24 August 2001) Thailand seals border in attempt to stop influx of illegal workers

[233] The high cost of registration is particularly clear when compared to that for a work permit for ‘skilled’ foreign nationals. This permit requires no payment by the worker, and Bt10,000 by the employer. The differentials in wage and salary packages, safety standards and working conditions render the high cost of registration incongruous.

[234] Bangkok Post (9 April 2001) ‘Alien workers to get better protection’

[235] The Nation (13 July 2001) ‘Reprive for immigrants’

[236] Bangkok Post (26 August 2001) ‘Illegals scamper for alien permits’

[237] FTUB (22 August 2001) ‘An exhortation to the migrant workers from Burma to register at the offices of the Thai Labour Ministry’

[238] Bangkok Post (12 July 2001) ‘Illegal Labour to be completely banned’

[239] Mizzima (23 July 2001) ‘Mizoram wants border with Burma to be fenced’

[240] Due to their lack of protection, Burmese mobility continues as people try to find ‘safe’ ‘living’ spaces. This is not only true of migration from Burma to 2^nd countries, but also from 2^nd countries across other borders; migratory patterns are multiple and repetitious. For this reason, 24 Burmese were arrested while trying to cross the border from India into Pakistan. [The Hindu, India (27 June 2001) ‘24 Myanmar nationals held Jopur, June 26’]

[241] Bangladeshi Police say 6 Arakan Army members have been detained since April and 2 ‘communist rebels’ were detained in June. [Reuters (14 June 2001) ‘Bangladesh detains Myanmar communist rebels’] Burmese migrants, along with Indian and Indonesian nationals, were sentenced to 5 months imprisonment in August for overstaying their visas and not having valid travel documents. After serving their sentences they will then be deported. [AP (14 August 2001) ‘Malaysia sentences Indian, Indonesian, Myanmar illegals to prison’]

[242]The Star (17 May 2001) ‘Myanmar man source of outbreak’

[243] The Star (17 May 2001)

[244] San Francisco Chronicle (3 July 2001) ‘A cruel welcome in Thailand’

[245] Thai refugee camp conditions were recently condemned by Mary Robinson (UNHCR).

[246] The NSC have clearly stated that the international community should not be allowed to monitor the standards of refugee camps as Thailand is ‘different’. [Bangkok Post (12 August 2001) ‘Talks on new site to replace overcrowded Tham Hin’] There appears to be little motivation to provide good – often basic – services. This is often left to international governments and funding agencies. One such body is the European Commission which has allocated 4.5 million euros (US$3.84 million) in humanitarian aid to refugees on the Thai-Burma border. The following quote demonstrates that basic needs are currently not being met: “The aid allocated for 2001 will be used for basic food aid, including the provision of drinking water, and health care, including community health programs and education in health and sanitary issues.” [AFP (6 June 2001) ‘EU earmarks funds for Myanmar refugees in Thailand’]

[247] The only reason that Thai officials appear to be interested in moving Tham Hin camp is that refugee movements could then be more easily controlled.

[248] ABC (7 June 2001) ‘Refugees Granted Asylum in Guam Despite HIV Status’

[249] Conflicts between DKBA & KNLA continue, mostly with guerilla attacks consisting of small ambushes. [KHRG (May 2001:43)]

[250] The Independent (Bangladesh) (4 July 2001) ‘Tribal separatists reject Myanmar’s truce offer’

[251] see CNF (18 May 2001) ‘Battle news from CNF’

[252] see BBC (4 May 2001) ‘Burmese recapture camp from Shan rebels’ 08:46 GMT; Shan Herald Agency for News (10 August 2001) ‘Shan attack fails to net drugs’; Reuters (16 August 2001) ‘Interview-Myanmar Warlord Says He's Fighting Drugs’

[253] Freedom News (SSA) (20 June 2001) ‘Situation at border’

[254] Shan Herald Agency for News (1 June 2001) ‘Curfew for cease-fire groups imposed’

[255] Shan Herald Agency for News (10 June 2001) ‘Shan militia leader grabbed and beaten’

[256] Shan Herald Agency for News (13 July 2001) ‘Mobiles phones confiscated from Shans’

[257] Freedom News (SSA) (20 June 2001)

[258] BurmaNet (30 May 2001) ‘Advisory to Burma media outlets re forged news releases’

[259] Arakan News Agency (1 August 2001) ‘Massive demolition of mosques being carried out in N. Arakan’

[260] see Arakan Rohingya National Organisation (ARNO) (7 June 2001) ‘On Recent Anti-Muslim Riots and destruction of mosques in Burma’; AP (22 May 2001) ‘Reports: Religions Clash in Myanmar’; Bangkok Post (23 May 2001) ‘Four Muslim Leaders Die in Clashes’; Muslim Information Center of Burma (14 July 2001) ‘Brutal killings of Muslims in Burma’

[261] In the February anti-Muslim riots curfews were imposed, 3,500 Muslims were evicted (labelled as ‘Bengalis’, ‘rioters’ and ‘troublemakers’) and 7 anti-SPDC political activists were arrested.

[262] DVB (23 May 2001) ‘Junta claims Toungoo riots "not instigated" by Military Intelligence’

[263] DVB (23 May 2001) ‘SPDC blames internal, external destructive elements for Toungoo religious riots’

[264] The Dawn (23 May 2001) ‘10 die in Myanmar communal clashes’

[265] DVB (22 May 2001) ‘Inter-religious clashes spreading’

[266] ARNO (7 June 2001)

[267] see ALTSEAN-Burma (September 2001:50-51)

[268] DVB (23 May 2001) ‘SPDC blames internal, external destructive elements for Toungoo religious riots’

[269] CHRO (10 July 2001) ‘Female Pastor Sentenced For Two Years With Hard Labour In Haka’

[270] Burma Courier (15-21 July 2001) ‘Junta Swaps One Woman Political Prisoner for Another’

[271] Amnesty International (26 July 2001) ‘Fear of torture/ill-treatment--Pastor Gracy [f], aged 27’

[272] Before World War II, over 2,500 Jews lived in Burma, mostly in Rangoon. By 1969, numbers had fallen to 500, and now only 8 families remain. Migration has been mainly to the US, Australia, India and Israel. [Bangkok Post (29 May 2001) ‘Keeping the Faith, Jews in Buddhist Burma live freely but for how long?’]

[273] Amir Shariv, American Joint Distribution Committee; quoted in Bangkok Post (29 May 2001)

[274] Xinhua (6 June 2001) ‘Myanmar Calls for Enhanced Cooperation to Overcome Environmental Problems’

[275] for history see ALTSEAN-Burma (September 2001:8-9); Bangkok Post (25 June 2001) ‘Army powerless to stop material for lignite plant-Chief urges talks on factory’s location’

[276] Earthlinks International (2001) ‘Fatally flawed, the Tasang Dam on the Salween River’

[277] The monitoring group Rainforest Network estimates that just 30% of the country is wooded today, down from a peak of more than 70% after World War II. [The Scotsman (11 July 2001) ‘Scouring the Mountains for Burma's Brown Gold’]

[278] Officially, Burma supplies 10% of the logs used in China but the real figure is thought to be much higher. [The Scotsman (11 July 2001)]

[279] Xinhua (6 August 2001) ‘Myanmar Exports Less Teak, Hardwood in First Quarter’

[280] Bangkok Post (20 May 2001) ‘Illegal logging and drugs worry border people most’

[281] Friends without Borders (2001)

[282] According to Medicins Sans Frontières there has been a moderate increase over the past 2 years. [Landmine Monitor Burma (2001:8)]

[283] ‘Burma and Anti-Personnel Landmines, A humanitarian crisis in the making’ (26 September 2001) <http://www.igc.org/nonviolence/burmamines/crisis.html>

[284] Landmine Monitor Burma (2001:8)

[285] Interview with Dr. Cynthia Maung; cited in Landmine Monitor Burma (2001:5). The Dooplaya district shares a border with Thailand where armed clashes with insurgent groups continue, often including landmine usage by the SPDC and rebel groups. Heavy logging and ‘protection’ of this industry has also led to mines being laid.

[286] Landmine Monitor Burma (2001:9)

[287] Landmine Monitor Burma (2001:6)

[288] Burma Courier (7 June 2001) ‘Relief Team Reaches Nagas Burned out of Their Homes’

[289] Landmine Monitor Burma (2001:2)

[290] The 2 main mines used by the SPDC are the MM1 and MM2, both made in Burma in factories supplied by the Chinese; copies of the Chinese-made PMOZ-2 and PMN mines respectively.

[291] Based on numerous interviews with ethnic militias, military officers, refugees, aid workers, governmental authorities and other observers; cited in Landmine Monitor Burma (2001:4)

[292] Landmine Monitor Burma (2001:5-6)

[293] ‘Burma and Anti-Personnel Landmines, A humanitarian crisis in the making’ (26 September 2001) <http://www.igc.org/nonviolence/burmamines/crisis.html>

[294]ICRC Physical Rehabilitation Unit Health and Relief Division (2000); cited in Landmine Monitor Burma (2001:10)

---

[01]Reuters: June 26 Myanmar's generals seek power with legitimacy

[02]AP (12 May 2001) ‘Malaysia mulls expanding military ties with junta’

[03]AFP (26 July 2001) ‘EU asks UN to push democratic reforms in Myanmar’

[04]AFP (23 May 2001) ‘UN Envoy Razali To Visit Burma 1-4 Jun, Likely To Hold Talks With Suu Kyi’

[05]International Herald Tribune: July 5 Some Prisoners Freed as Junta and Opposition Talk

[06]Suara Timor Lorosae (East Timor): 21 June 2001Xanana declares solidarity with Aung San Suu Kyi

[07]AP (19 Aug 2001) ‘Diplomats say senior Japanese official met Aung San Suu Kyi’

[x8]Deutsche Presse-Agentur (7 June 2001) ‘Myanmar reclaims crown as world's opium king’; South China Morning Post (24 June 2001) ‘A war with no front’, US Text of Senator Harkin's July 31 speech to the Senate, AUS AFP (24 July 2001) ) ‘Australian FM detects signs of movement from Myanmar’, Swiss Bangkok Post August 16, 2001: A hundred arrested in huge Swiss bust--Wa smuggling pills with help of Triad

A huge drug bust of 450,000 methamphetamine pills in Geneva early yesterday revealed that the Wa-Chinese Triad drug cartel has begun smuggling speed abroad.

Thai drug experts said there was no doubt the drugs were made by the United Wa State Army. Officers said they had only mid- and lower-level dealers in custody, with apparently no big fish in

the net.

[x9]Bangkok Post: May 7, 2001 ‘Burma talks set to centre on drugs’

[M10]The New light of Myanmar (SPDC) 24 May, 2001Perceiving the truth

[x11]civilian, arrested in burmese water. Bangkok Post (19 May 2001) ‘Detainees in poor health in Burmese cells Government urged to seek their release’

[x12]Bangkok Post: Rangoon raises religious flag to end skirmishes June 04, 2001.

[013](http://www.adb.organisation/Countries/Highlights/Mya.asp)

[x14]FTUB (May 2001); Burma Courier (15-21 July 2001) ‘Agriculture Sector Hit by Sky-high Oil and Gas Prices’

[x15]PlanetRice.net (16 June 2001) ‘Thai-North Korea Deal Fails; Myanmar May Export 300,000 Tons’

[x16]BBC (22 August 2001) ‘Burma's Economy in Crisis’

[x17]Burma Media Association (26 June 2001) ‘Regime Tightens FECs with New Order’

[018]Khin Maung Thein (SPDC) (May 2001) ADB Annual Meeting

[x19]DVB (July 2001) ‘SPDC opens four new border trade posts’

[x20]AFP (19 August 2001) ‘Myanmar's economy remains hopelessly mired in crisis’

[x21]BMA (13 June 2001) ‘The US Lawmakers Introduce a New Legislation in the Capital in Washington, DC to Ban Exports from Burma’

[022]The Irrawaddy August 15, 2001: Cooking Oil Shortage Continues-People are in line for cooking oil

[023]for text box got to Reuters: Aug 14 Myanmar says bad publicity hit tourism industry

[024][www.intrepidtravel.com]

[x25]Other countries penalised are Belarus, Colombia, Ethiopia, Sudan and Venezuela.

[x26]Asia Times (12 May 2001) ‘Myanmar barred from EU initiative’

[027]Altsean-Burma report card (March 2001) p15

[028]Burma Courier (14 May 2001) ‘UNICEF Triples Spending on HIV/AIDS Education in Burma’

[029]AP (26 June 2001) ‘Myanmar AIDS response called grossly inadequate by health experts’

[030]AP (26 June 2001) ‘Myanmar AIDS response called grossly inadequate by health experts’

[031]AP (13 August 2001) ‘Asia’s Sex Industry is Growing Rapidly, Threatening AIDS Efforts, WHO says’

[032]US Rep. Juanita Millender-McDonald (D-Calif); quoted in AP (26 June 2001) ‘Women in Hard-Hit Areas Afraid to say ‘No’ to Unsafe Sex, Experts say’

[033]AFP (16 May 2001) ‘‘Single Issue’ AIDS Fund for Poorest Countries not Answer, Says Nielson’

[034]WHO, Western Pacific Region, Press Release (24 August 2001) ‘Asia’s AIDS efforts need to change direction’

[035]BBC (12 June 2001) ‘Forced labour mission off to Burma’

[036]AFP (21 Aug 2001) ‘Former governor general of Australia to held Myanmar forced labour probe’

[037]BurmaNet (19 June 2001) ‘ILO prepares for mission to Burma’

[038]AP (23 July 2001) ‘Watchdog protests Myanmar blacklisting of two foreign journalists‘

[M39]See briefing note

[040]NLD notification – see Eudora

[041]Saarbruecker Zeitung, Germany (8 August 2001) ‘Group donates computers to Burma government schools’

[M42]see briefing note

[043]Children’s labour is needed to ensure economic survival of the family, and school fees are not affordable.

[044]This contradicts SPDC’ statements. “Since 1988, there has been a sea change away from a rigid, examination oriented system of education to a system of competency, applicability and recognition of prior learning attainments.” Myanmar Perspective (April 2001) ‘Secretary 1 Attends First General Meeting Of Academy Of Arts And Science’, Vol. 7, No. 4 <http://www.myanmar.com/gov/perspec/2001/4-2001/YANGON.HTM>

[045]Increase access to education and prevent the flow of children to refugee camps for an education.

[046]DVB (30 July 2001) ‘Education Ministry issues order on strict security measures at schools’ in Burmese 1430 gmt

[047]Lwin, T., 2001, p14

[048]Bangkok Post (13 June 2001) Maneeloy to close

[049]Reuters: May 24 Thailand to close Myanmar student camp by year-end

[050]AP: June 27 ‘300 Myanmar People At Thai Refugee Camp Face Legal Action’

[051](USCR)

[052]Bangkok Post (15 August 2001) ‘God’s Army duo ask to stay’

[053]AFP (9 June 2001) ‘Thai PM vows to close Myanmar dissident and refugee centers’

[054]AFP (6 June 2001) ‘EU earmarks funds for Myanmar refugees in Thailand’

[055]TheNation June 26, 2001: Refugees to gain from FM's idea – more in August

[056]The Irrawaddy (21 August 2001) ‘Bad News for Asylum Seekers’

[057]Mizzima, India (28 May 2001) ‘MP asks UN to help Burmese asylum seekers’ <www.mizzima.com>

[M58]Rohingya National Army (28 May 2001) ‘Battle news’

[M59]Chin National Front (CNF) (18 May 2001) ‘Battle news from CNF’

[M60]DVB (14 June 2001) ‘Army allegedly takes 10 girls hostage after 5 soldiers die in clashes’