BRIEFING PAPER ON THE CURRENT POLITICAL AND HUMAN
RIGHTS SITUATION IN BURMA 2002
For the 57th Session of the UN General
Assembly’s resolution on ‘the human rights situation in Myanmar [Burma]’
Prepared by the Burma
UN Service Office of the National Coalition Government of the Union
of Burma, 2 October 2002
Contents
Summary 3
Suggested Language for the Resolution 8
The Move Towards a Genuine and Substantive Dialogue 8
Political Prisoners and Political
Activities 9
The Judicial System and Unjust Laws and
Orders 9
The National Convention 12
Continued violations of human rights and
widespread discriminatory practices
against ethnic
and religious minorities 13
Forced displacement 15
Women 16
Children 18
Refugees and IDPs 21
Landmines 24
Forced Labor 26
Restrictions on religious
freedom 29
Humanitarian concerns 31
The Economic situation 35
Appendix I: Aide Memoire – Impact of Armed Conflict
on the Children of Burma 37
SUMMARY
There have been positive developments in Burma
following the United Nations General Assembly’s (UNGA) adoption by consensus of
the resolution on the human rights situation in Burma on Friday 30 November 2001. On 6 May 2002, Daw
Aung San Suu Kyi, the 1991 Nobel Peace Prize Laureate and General-Secretary of
the National League for Democracy (NLD) was
released from house arrest by the State Peace and Development Council (the
SPDC). Since her release the authorities have granted permission
to re-open NLD offices and have released over 300 political prisoners since
January 2001, including over 60 after Daw Aung San Suu Kyi was released. The
SPDC has continued to cooperate with the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General
Ambassador Tan Sri Razali Ismail and the UN Special
Rapporteur on Human Rights in Burma,
Professor Paulo Sergio Pinheiro, and has agreed to the establishment of an ILO Liaison Office in Burma.
Unfortunately
there have also been negative developments. There has been no progress towards
a substantive dialogue between the SPDC and the NLD or discussion as to how
this will incorporate the ethnic nationalities into a tripartite process;
students were arrested in August on suspicion of organizing a protest (two
remain in detention); two youth-wing members of the NLD were sentenced on 5
September to three years in jail for
possessing a journal published by exiled dissidents; restrictions on political
activity remain; forced labor and other egregious human rights violations are
still occurring, mainly in the non-Burman ethnic nationality areas; unjust laws
and orders have not been repealed; there remains a deadlock in the discussions
concerning the appropriate modalities to enable the provision of humanitarian
assistance for what is now widely accepted as a crisis situation; and the
economic situation has continued to deteriorate.
These positive and negative developments illustrate the
need for the international community to again adopt by consensus a resolution
on the human rights situation in Burma. The
NCGUB believes international pressure was instrumental in securing Daw Aung San
Suu Kyi’s release and could assist in furthering the progress towards the
transition to democracy and national reconciliation.
The international community must continue to pressure the
regime to:
- start an irreversible, genuine and
substantive dialogue with the NLD and to include the leaders of the
non-Burman ethnic nationalities;
- unconditionally release all political
prisoners;
- allow political parties to engage in
normal activities;
- repeal unjust laws and orders to
foster an atmosphere conducive to national reconciliation;
- end violations of human rights and
impunity of members of the military who commit human rights atrocities in
the ethnic areas, including rape;
- end hostilities in the non-Burman
ethnic nationality areas; and
- allow a nationwide humanitarian
cease-fire to enable
the provision of humanitarian assistance to the most vulnerable
populations.
LANGUAGE
THE NCGUB URGES THE UN MEMBER STATES TO INCLUDE IN THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY 2002
RESOLUTION
Towards
a Genuine, Substantive Political Dialogue
- Expresses its concern over the slow progress in
resuming the talks between the Government and Aung San Suu Kyi since her
release.
·
Strongly urges the Government to take urgent and concrete measures to ensure the
establishment of democracy in accordance with the will of the people as
expressed in the democratic elections held in 1990 and, to this end, engage in
a genuine and substantive political dialogue with Aung San Suu Kyi,
General-Secretary of the National League for Democracy and other political
leaders, including representatives of ethnic groups, with the aim of achieving
national reconciliation and the restoration of democracy, and to ensure that
political parties and non-governmental organizations can function freely, and,
in this context, notes the existence of the Committee representing the People's
Parliament.
Political Prisoners
- Expresses
its grave concern at the continued imprisonment of elected
members of Parliament for peacefully exercising their freedom of assembly,
association and expression.
- Expresses
its grave concern at the continued restrictions that hamper the
exercise of political parties with regard to freedom of assembly,
association, expression, information and movement, as reported by the
Special Rapporteur, and the recent arrests of students and NLD members.
- Deplores
the deeply unsatisfactory conditions which still exist in prisons, labour
camps and other detention centers in Myanmar,
such as cruel and degrading treatment, lack of medical assistance,
inadequate nutrition, prolonged solitary confinement and detention in
excessively small cells, the discriminatory treatment of political
prisoners, as well as the high mortality rate among labour camp inmates.
- Strongly
urges the Government to release immediately and
unconditionally those detained or imprisoned for political reasons, with
special urgency with respect to those who are old, sick, imprisoned beyond
the terms of their sentence or for forwarding information on prison
conditions to the UN, and to offer guarantees to released prisoners that
they will not be arrested again or subjected to harassment and to allow
them to participate freely in the political process and national
reconciliation.
Judicial System and Unjust Laws and Orders
- Deplores
the lack of independence of the judiciary from the executive and the wide
disrespect for the rule of law, including for the basic guarantees of due
process, especially in cases involving the exercise of political and civil
rights and freedoms resulting in arbitrary arrests and detentions, the
absence of judicial control over detentions, sentences passed without
trial, keeping the accused in ignorance of the legal basis of the charge
brought against them, trials held in secret and without proper legal
representation of the accused, continued instances of detention and
sentencing of people for political offences, the failure to inform the
family and counsel of the accused about the sentence, and arbitrary
extension of completed sentences.
- Deplores
the severe restrictions on the freedoms of opinion, expression, assembly
and association, the restrictions on citizens' access to information,
including censorship of all forms of domestic media and many international
publications, movement both within the country and abroad, including the
denial of passports on political grounds, and gross interference in
private life, family, home and correspondence.
- Urges the Government to disband
special courts and repeal unjust laws and orders to ensure full respect
for the freedoms of expression, association, movement and assembly and the
right to a fair trial by an independent and impartial judiciary and to end
the impunity of and bring to justice any perpetrators of human rights
violations, including members of the military, and to investigate and
prosecute alleged violations committed by government agents in all
circumstances.
The National Convention
- Expresses
its grave concern at the composition and working procedures of
the National Convention that do not permit either members of
Parliament-elect or representatives of the ethnic groups to express their
views freely and urges the Government to intensify political dialogue both
with the opposition and with all the ethnic groups, to search for new
procedures to allow the promotion of genuine national reconciliation based
on cooperation and the adoption of joint measures that could build
confidence among all parties, and to establish a chronological framework
for so doing.
Women
- Deplores
the continued violations of the human rights of
women, especially women who are forcibly relocated, internally displaced
or belong to ethnic groups or the political opposition, in particular forced
labour, trafficking, sexual violence and exploitation, including torture
and rape by the armed forces and urges the Government to end such
violations, to allow an independent investigation on sexual violence by
the armed forces and take immediate action to end impunity.
- Urges
the Government to fulfill its obligations under the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women by bringing
national legislation and practice into conformity with the Convention, to
consider ratifying or acceding to the Optional Protocol to the Convention
and to implement fully the recommendations made by the Committee on the
Elimination of Discrimination against Women, in particular the request to
prosecute and punish those who violate the human rights of women.
Children
- Expresses its grave concern at
the continuing violations of the rights of children in Myanmar, in
particular though the lack of conformity of the existing legal framework
with the Convention on the Rights of the Child, the use of children for
forced labour by the armed forces, sexual exploitation of children,
discrimination against children belonging to ethnic and religious
minorities, and high rates of infant and maternal mortality and
malnutrition.
- Deplores
the recruitment and use of children as soldiers, including the widespread
forced recruitment of children, including those under fifteen years of
age, by the national army and their use in combat.
- Strongly
urges the Government and other armed groups
to immediately end all recruitment and use of children as soldiers, to
immediately demobilize children from their forces, to cooperate with
appropriate international agencies to reunify children with their families
and ensure their rehabilitation and reintegration.
- Urges
the Government to adhere and abide by its obligations as a State Party to
the Convention on the Rights of the Child and to sign and ratify or accede
to the Optional Protocols to the Convention.
- Strongly
urges the Government to negotiate humanitarian cease-fires
in areas of armed conflict to allow immunization and assistance to
children and for all
parties concerned in the conflict to put children on the agenda for
dialogue since children are most affected by armed conflict.
Refugees and IDPS
·
Strongly urges the Government to end the systematic enforced displacement of persons
and other causes of refugee flows to neighboring countries, to allow unhindered
humanitarian access to displaced populations and to create conditions conducive
to their voluntary return and full reintegration in conditions of safety and
dignity.
Landmines
·
Strongly urges
the Government to cease the laying of landmines, in particular as a means of
ensuring forced relocation, and to desist from the forced conscription of
civilians to serve as human minesweepers, and to consider becoming a party to
the 1997 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling and Transfer of
Anti-personnel Mines and on their Destruction.
Forced Labour
- Expresses
its deep concern at the ongoing practice of forced labour,
especially in the ethnic areas, the increasing use of prison labourers in military operations as well as
development projects.
- Urges
the Government to take the necessary executive, legislative, judicial and
administrative measures necessary to end the practice of forced labour.
Restrictions on Religious Freedoms
- Deplores
reports of restrictions on the exercise of freedom of religion, such as
restrictions on the building of new mosques and churches and forced
conversions, notably of Muslims in Arakan State
and Christians in Chin State.
Humanitarian Assistance
- Expresses
its grave concern at the ever-increasing impact of HIV/AIDS on
the population, urges the Government to recognize further the gravity of
the situation, the need to commit adequate resources and the need to take
measures, in cooperation with the National League for Democracy, ethnic
groups, non-governmental organizations and women’s groups, in particular
preventive measures, to fight this epidemic including through the
effective implementation of the UN Joint Action Plan which must reach the
communities that are most affected by HIV/AIDS and therefore most
vulnerable to it.
·
Strongly urges the Government to support, negotiate
and facilitate humanitarian cease-fires to enable the provision of humanitarian
assistance in conflict areas by establishing appropriate modalities in
cooperation with all relevant political, ethnic, women’s groups, community
organizations, international agencies, and the UN, with a view to reaching the
most vulnerable populations affected by armed conflict.
The Economic Situation
The NCGUB urges UN
Member States to ensure that the UNGA resolution on the human rights situation
in Burma notes that a lack of respect to the rights
pertaining to democratic governance in Burma has lead to the deprivation of Economic, Social
and Cultural rights, a declining living standard and a real risk of famine
within the coming year.
The Move Towards a Genuine and Substantive
Dialogue
On 6 May
2002, the Government released Daw Aung San Suu Kyi after 19
months of house arrest. Her release is reportedly unconditional. Since her
release, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi has made it very clear to the Government that she
is willing to cooperate if they engage in a political dialogue with her. She
commented that her release marked the end of the confidence-building phase of
secret talks between herself and the SPDC. However substantive talks on policy
issues have yet to start. Daw Suu stated, “the process must begin as soon as
possible…it’s already been 14 years and we’ve made very little progress.”
Despite this call, the regime has reiterated that it will move at a pace
designed not to destabilize the country.
Before Special Envoy Razali began his first visit
following the release of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi in early August (his eighth
mission), U.N. spokesman Fred Eckhard said that the
visit would hopefully "provide the (reconciliation) process with an added
momentum so that the two sides can start their substantive dialogue in the near
future." According to his office’s statement following Razali’s 5-day
mission, "Mr Razali believes
the national reconciliation process will continue to evolve positively along a
number of fronts and in a way that corresponds with the spirit of the
home-grown process that has developed thus far."
It is well accepted that the talks process has stalled.
The SPDC continues to state it is committed to democratic reform but has given
no timetable. General Khin Nyunt promised Special Envoy Razali that Senior
General Than Shwe and he would begin a “Family Chat” with Daw Aung San Suu Kyi
in the near future. The NCGUB’s concern is that in
the Burmese context this is perceived as condescending and avoids entering into
a genuine and substantive dialogue with Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. In September, Daw
Aung San Suu Kyi was more blunt about the need for “speedy change” and appealed
to the international community to do everything possible to bring about that
change.
Once the two parties start a substantive dialogue on
policy issues, minimum requirements should be established to address the
imbalance in power between the parties. Such requirements could include: the
ability for each party to select its own advisers; equal access to media,
information and resources; that the talks deal with substantive political
issues; and, that the parties make regular joint statements/declarations
regarding the talks. These requirements must be implemented within a specified
timeframe. This would enable an assessment as to whether the dialogue has
progressed and would ensure its irreversibility.
The process must, as soon as possible, include the
participation of representatives of non-Burman ethnic nationalities in order to
ensure a satisfactory political settlement and to avert a future constitutional
crisis. Eight non-Burman ethnic nationalities have formed an organization, the
United Nationalities Alliance (UNA), which regularly meets to discuss issues
such as how to participate in any dialogue between Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and the
SPDC. As
pointed out by the Special Rapporteur, the ceasefire groups continue to be
hampered in meeting, discussing, exchanging and peacefully conducting their
legitimate activities.
Therefore, such exchanges between cease-fire and non-ceasefire groups are even
more difficult. The UN General Assembly must again call for the inclusion of
representatives of ethnic groups in such discussions in the interest of the
democratic and national reconciliation process. This entails lifting
restrictions on fundamental freedoms and basic human rights so that the people,
all political parties, ethnic groups and NGOs can enjoy the freedoms of
association, assembly, expression and information.
Political
Prisoners and Political Activities
When Daw Aung San Suu Kyi was released
from house arrest on 6 May, the ruling generals promised a new page in Burma's
political history, stating, "We shall recommit ourselves to allowing all
of our citizens to participate freely in the life of our political
process." To ensure this was not just for international consumption, the
SPDC should be held to this promise.
The
authorities have allowed some NLD offices to re-open. However, restrictions on
NLD and other political parties continue to hamper their legitimate activities.
Restrictions on their “fundamental rights to assemble, travel, express their
opinions, and produce and communicate information continue to hamper their
legitimate activities.”
Remaining political prisoners are yet to be released and
there has been a spate of recent arrests. The total number of political
prisoners released by the SPDC since January 2001 at the time of writing is
just over 300, including around 62 since Daw Aung San Suu Kyi was released. As
of 1 January 2002, at
least eighteen journalists are imprisoned in Burma.
According to Reporters Without Borders this is the world record for the number
of journalists in prison.
There remain 18 elected MPs and approximately 1,500 political prisoners in
prison. If the release of
political prisoners continues at this rate, it would take another decade before
all those unjustly imprisoned gain their freedom.
That appears to be the
best case scenario, as the regime recently began a new crackdown on dissidents.
Two
members of the NLD’s youth wing were sentenced on Thursday 5 September to three
years in jail for possessing a journal published by exiled dissidents. The two,
Aung Thein and Kyaw Naing Oo, were arrested on August
22 and tried successively on August 23 and 26. They were found guilty under a
1950 emergency provision act and sentenced, even as seven other NLD members
were released from jail in a gesture designed to mark a European Union
delegation visit to Rangoon from 8-10
September.
On 18 August two law students from Rangoon University, Khin
Maung Win and Thet Naung Soe, were arrested for staging a two-person protest handing
out pamphlets calling for the release of all political prisoners and for the
start of a meaningful dialogue between Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and the regime.
They have reportedly been sentenced to seven years imprisonment.
At least 30 people have been detained since 25 September.
Members of the group were reportedly arrested and books and leaflets were taken
from their homes by arresting officers. The reason for their arrest is not
known. All but four of those named above are known to be former political
prisoners, who since 1990 have already served prison sentences from between 3
to 10 years, on account of their political activities. It is not known where
they are being held or if they have been charged. Amnesty International issued
an urgent action on 2 October, stating they fear the detainees may be at risk
of torture and ill-treatment by Military Intelligence.
These fresh arrests
raise fears of a new wave of repression of opposition activists and of the end
of progress towards a substantive dialogue.
In the words of the Special Rapporteur, the release of all remaining political prisoners is an “indispensable
dimension of political transition.” In a
message produced to coincide with the international launch of the Free
Political Prisoners in Burma Campaign on August 7, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi stated:
"The release of political prisoners is important, because it
means a return to political normalcy. Unless political organizations are free
to go about their work unhindered and unintimidated
by the authorities, we can never say that we have started the process towards
changed democracy…we insist that the
release of political prisoners is necessary if the process of reconciliation is
to go forward to a point where it becomes truly irreversible.”
Major concern is expressed for those prisoners who are old
and sick, imprisoned beyond the terms of their sentence (which is both illegal
and arbitrary), and for attempting to communicate human rights information to
the UN.
There are
many political prisoners who are ill and not receiving adequate medical
treatment. Political prisoners who need medical treatment have to obtain
permission by military intelligence which can often take too long. The deaths
of 61-year old U Aung May Thuu from a
perforated gastric ulcer on 17 September and 40-year old Mai Aik Pan,
Joint Secretary of the Palaung State Liberation Front
(PSLF), on 31 July illustrates this concern.
According to available records kept by the Assistance Association for Political
Prisoners Burma (AAPPB), there have been 72 deaths in custody since 1988.
Win Tin, Burma's most
famous journalist and a leading opposition member, who is serving a total of 21
years in prison on a variety of subversion charges, including anti-government
propaganda and telling the UN about ill-treatment and other bad prison
conditions, has repeatedly been hospitalized. Win Tin has haemorrhoids,
heart problems and high blood pressure. His situation has apparently
deteriorated in the last few months. According to Aye Thar
Aung, Secretary of the People’s Parliament who was released on 16 August (and
is receiving treatment for liver cancer), the conditions in Rangoon
hospital are “worse than in the prison.”
Dr Salai Tun Than’s health condition has also deteriorated. He requires
an operation for his eyes otherwise he will go blind. The 74-year old professor
was sentenced to seven years imprisonment after being arrested in front of Rangoon City hall
on 29 November
2001, during a peaceful solo protest.
Article 10 (a) of the 1975 State Protection Act is still
being used to justify continuing detention of person who have served the
maximum term of their sentences. To our knowledge, over 30 political prisoners
are currently being held in this manner. The most well known of these is Min Ko
Naing, a prominent student leader during the pro-democracy uprising of 1988,
who remains in detention three years after he completed his ten-year prison
sentence in 1999 (the latest extension occurred in January 2002). No new charges have been brought against
him.
The Judicial System and Unjust Laws and
Orders
Prior to the coup of 1962 leading to military rule, the
judiciary in Burma was
generally considered to be competent and independent, especially at the
appellate level. The 1974 constitution formalized single party rule by the
Burma Socialist Program Party (BSPP), and established ‘People’s Courts’, which
enshrined BSPP control of the judicial system especially in political cases, as
the courts acted as another arm of the BSPP government, rather than as a
defender of rights. The judicial system continued to deteriorate through the
1980s as party connections, not professional skills, became the primary
criteria for personal advancement.
All civilian government institutions, including the
judicial system, were abolished after the military takeover on 18 September 1988. The
1974 Constitution was suspended and the military regime immediately implemented
martial law and assumed all executive, legislative and judicial powers.
Military tribunals were established in July 1989 to try
criminal offenses. It is estimated that several hundred people were tried and
convicted by these tribunals and some 24 people were sentenced to death in the
first three months of their functioning. An overwhelming majority of those
brought before the tribunals were students, members of the NLD or other
political parties, Buddhist monks and other pro-democracy activists.
The military tribunals were abolished in September 1992. The civilian courts do
not guarantee the people of Burma a fair
trial as most cases are tried in a summary manner and verdicts are determined
in advance of the trials. Appeals are rare.
Professor Pinheiro discusses at
length the justice system in his report to UNGA this year, focusing on
developments since the Judiciary Law was promulgated in 2000. His observations
include:
- Some
confusion among law enforcement and judicial officers, not to mention the
public, about what laws are currently in force, to what extent, and how
conflicts are to be resolved in practice;
- Independence of
the judiciary is not respected;
- Widespread,
subjective implementation of the law – a high degree of arbitrariness in
the process as applied to political prisoners;
- Political
prisoners are imprisoned in an arbitrary manner;
- Widespread
use of torture by security personnel against suspected political critics,
civilians and prisoners in insurgency areas has been documented beyond
reasonable doubt;
- Handling
of political offenses in “special courts” as a major concern.
Professor Pinheiro recommends “a
systematic review of all existing legislation that criminalize the exercise of
the most fundamental internationally recognized human rights, with a view to
amending it or bringing it into conformity with both the principles stated in
the Judiciary Law and international human rights standards. Allegations of
abuse of power should be investigated and the persons found responsible brought
to trial. Special courts should be disbanded – as were military courts.”
Freedom of expression, information and association is
controlled by more than half a dozen laws, the violation of which, may be, and
in fact is, widely sanctioned by 3 to 20 years in prison.
The reason there is such a large number of political prisoners is that people
have been detained and sentenced for having peacefully expressed their views
verbally, through participation in peaceful demonstrations or in activities of
political parties, for having written about human rights or political issues in
the country, or for reading or possessing written materials deemed illegal (as
the recent sentencing the two NLD youth-wing members illustrates).
It is imperative for these unjust laws and orders to be repealed for Burma to move towards the restoration of the rule of law, peace and democracy.
The National Convention
It is especially important at this time, following Daw
Aung San Suu Kyi’s release and the hope that steps will be taken to enter into
a genuine and substantive dialogue, that the international community continue
to express concerns surrounding the National Convention and call for a new
constitution-making procedure that is democratic and participatory, thus paving
the way for the development of a national consensus in the building of the
Union.
Continued violations of human rights and
widespread discriminatory practices against ethnic and religious minorities
Despite the political developments in Rangoon, all
the violations of human rights and widespread discriminatory practices against
ethnic groups and religious minorities (which comprise some 40% of the
population), listed in previous UNGA resolutions have continued in the past
year. This is particularly true of
ethnic groups and religious minorities living in areas where ethnically-based
armed opposition groups are fighting against the Burmese army. Such groups live
primarily in the Tanintharyi (Tenasserim)
Division and in the Shan, Mon, Karenni (Kayah), and Karen (Kayin) States in the
east of the country. The army maintains an increasingly large presence in these
areas, particularly in the so-called “black” or “grey” zones where armed
opposition groups are active. Burma’s various
ethnic-based armed groups no longer control any significant territory, but
operate in mobile units around the countryside. Shan, Karenni, Mon and Karen civilians are targeted
for punishment by the SPDC because of their ethnicity and presumed support for
armed groups operating near their villages.
The Burma army commits a wide range of human rights violations
in the context of its counter-insurgency activities. These
violations trigger large-scale displacement of persons and flows of refugees to
neighboring countries, as well as an increasing number of internally displaced
persons.
Amnesty International released a report on 17 July 2002
entitled, Myanmar: Lack of Security in Counter-Insurgency Areas, (ASA 16/007/2002).
The report states
that human rights improvements in Rangoon have not been matched in ethnic
areas where resistance groups are still fighting the regime. Forced labor,
extortion and land confiscation by the Burma army are continuing to have a
grave impact on the lives of civilians.
In
February and March 2002 Amnesty International interviewed some 100 migrants
from Burma at
seven different locations in Thailand. They
were from a variety of ethnic groups, including the Shan; Lahu;
Palaung; Akha; Mon; Po and Sgaw Karen; Rakhine; and Tavoyan ethnic minorities, and the majority Bamar (Burman) group. They originally came from the Mon,
Karenni, Shan, and Arakan (Rakhine) States, and Bago, Rangoon and Tanintharyi Divisions. All said they left their homes because they could no longer
survive. Many of those interviewed had been subjected to unpaid forced labor in
the last 18 months. Types of labor included construction work on roads and in
military camps, working on military farms, and acting as porters for soldiers
for days or even weeks at a time. The migrants also faced constant demands for
money and goods by the army. The army taxed the rice crop in kind which often
meant that subsistence farmers were required to give or sell at well below the
market rate a fixed amount of their rice, regardless of yields. This meant that
farmers often did not have enough rice left over to feed their families.
The report describes how civilians
continue to be killed and tortured in counter-insurgency operations. Security
for civilians is further compromised by a proliferation of various armed groups
who also target civilians and are responsible for human rights abuses such as
unlawful killings.
The report also describes the life
of Burmese migrant workers in Thailand, who face various threats as they
make their way from their homes in Burma to Thailand. Migrant workers face abuses on
both sides of the border, often at the hands of human smugglers. In February
this year, Thai police found 20 bodies of Karen migrants near the border which
were blindfolded, had their wrists tied and their throats cut.
Instances of extrajudicial and summary executions,
extortion of money, property and land confiscation, and forced labor, forced
portering, forced relocations and displacement, rape and torture have
documented this year by a number of human rights organizations, including the
Shan Human Rights Foundation (see http://www.shanland.org/shrf/shrf_frame.htm),
Karen Human Rights Group (see www.khrg.org),
the Chin Human Rights Organization (see www.chro.org),
the Mon Human Rights Forum and EarthRights
International (www.earthrights.org).
A new and shocking set
of photographs reveal a massacre of 12 civilians on 28 April 2002 by the Burma army. The photos were obtained by the
Free Burma Rangers, an organization that secretly provides medical supplies,
food, education, toys, and spiritual encouragement to refugees and internally
displaced persons inside Burma.
The disturbing
photographs show the aftermath of a massacre of 12 villagers who were
attempting to flee to Thailand after their villages were forcibly
relocated by the military. 30-40 villagers had stopped to sleep for the night
at two huts in the forest when the military came upon them, lined up in front
of the hut, and opened fire. Ten were killed immediately including children
aged 2, 5, 7, and 14. A pregnant woman and her unborn child died two days
later. The photos show the ten bodies of the victims, including the children,
and the dead pregnant woman. One photo shows a six year-old boy who was shot in
the arm but survived the attack. To date, the regime has not commented on the
report and photographs.
Forced displacement
Forced displacement continues to be used for both military
and development purposes in urban and rural areas. On April 5, the army, riot
and local police raided a residential neighborhood in Rangoon’s Kamaryut township destroying several homes and detaining
people. Twenty-five families refused an order to leave. Authorities separated
children and adults before sending both groups to different detention centers.
Officials ordered the remaining families to vacate their homes by April 7. No
reasons were given for the forced eviction and it is unknown whether those
apprehended are still in detention.
On June 11, dozens of houses were demolished and at least
13 people were arrested, including 3 children, in Rangoon’s Shwe Leikpyar quarter near Rangoon University. The
demolition was ordered by authorities to allow construction of new apartment
blocks. Residents were only given 24 hours notice to leave.
Authorities have recently ordered residents to vacate
their houses in Tamu town, Sagaing Division before
October. The residents are to relocate to a nearby village. There will be no
compensation or reimbursement for expenses incurred.
There continues to be displacement in the civil war areas
of Papun, Taungoo and Nyaunglebin Disticts
of Karen State, in
central Shan State, Mon State and
Arakan (Rakhine) State.
Thirty-nine families from a village in north-western
Arakan state were relocated between 7-16 June. They have been dumped in
inaccessible areas in Maungdaw township where there
are hardly any roads and materials for building houses are not available. These
villagers were apparently relocated in response to the murder of four Na Sa Ka
(border security) members last November in a camp close to the village. The Na
Sa Ka accused the villagers of being accomplices.
In August, the Burma army
confiscated 2000 acres of land from villagers in Northern Ye township, Mon
state (a cease-fire area) for construction of artillery battalions and military
bases. The army has already confiscated, without compensation, more than 1,000
acres in farmland in southern Ye and 2,050 acres in northern Ye in 2000-1 for
military purposes.
A report by the Lahu National Development Organization estimates
that since the end of 1999, over one-quarter of the entire Wa population
(approximately 126,000) has been forcibly resettled from their homes near the China border
to southern Shan state. The United Wa State Party (UWSP) and the regime have
officially stated that the resettlement program is aimed to eradicate opium
production by enabling villagers to grow alternative crops in the more fertile
lands of southern Shan State.
However, the report evidences that the resettled villagers are planting new
opium fields with the support of UWSP and regime officials. The real motive for
the resettlement has yet to be confirmed. The report documents the abuses not only
on those resettled but on the villagers in the south who lost their lands to
the new arrivals. The report estimates that the number of original inhabitants
affected by the resettlement program is approximately 48,000. Of these, at
least 4,500 have fled to other areas of Shan state, while another 4,000 have
fled to Thailand. They
cannot access protection or humanitarian assistance as Shan, Lahu and Akha villagers are not
permitted access to refugee camps or humanitarian organizations by Thai
authorities.
On 17 September, approximately
300 Karen villagers fled to the jungle after the Tatmadaw torched three
villages in Pa-An province (Mae Thamuhta, Wuntho and Kyelupu), after troops
accused the villagers of assisting the Karen National Army who are active in
the area.
Women
Women remain highly vulnerable to human rights violations,
especially in the ethnic nationality areas and those who have been displaced.
There are numerous reports of gross human rights violations of civilians living
in areas of conflict between the Burma army
and armed groups, particularly in eastern Karen and Karenni States,
southern Shan State,
northern Sagaing Division, Arakan and Chin States.
Humiliation and violence against women has been documented
repeatedly as a tool used to terrorize communities. Women have been tortured,
raped and killed, and women who speak against injustice have also been subject
to similar violence as examples of what happens to ‘trouble-makers’.
A recent
report has received a lot of international attention for its well-documented
account of widespread rape as a weapon of war by the Tatmadaw in Burma’s Shan State. The
report entitled ‘License to Rape’, by the Shan Women’s Action Network and the
Shan Human Rights Foundation, documents 173 cases of rape and sexual violence involving
at least 625 girls and women by Burma army soldiers from 1996 to 2001
in Shan state, Burma. Most of the rapes took place in Central Shan State where
over 300,000 villagers have been forcibly relocated from their homes since 1996
as part of an anti-insurgency campaign.
The report found that the majority of the rapes were
committed between 1996 and 2001 by soldiers from 52 different battalions. 83%
of rapes documented were committed by officers, in most cases in front of their
troops. The rapes often involved extreme brutality and torture, 61% were
gang-rapes, 25% ended in the murder of victims and in some cases, women were
detained and raped repeatedly for periods of up to four months. The youngest
victim was only five years old. These crimes took place within
military bases and in forced relocation sites. Given the stigma surrounding rape, this is probably the tip of the
iceberg. Of the 173 documented incidents, in only one case was a perpetrator
punished by his commanding officer. More commonly, the complainants
were fined, detained or tortured by the military. These crimes have been
committed with impunity.
The report concludes that the Burmese military, as
part of its campaign to bring ethnic areas under its control, officially
condones rape as a "weapon of war" against civilian populations. The
regime insists that it has no control over regional commanders and thus is not
liable for their actions. It should be noted however, that reports of rape are
too frequent, too widespread and have been occurring for far too long to be
either incidental or accidental.
The argument by central authorities that it cannot be held
liable for subordinate’s actions is not new, many dictatorships have used this
as a defense for allegations concerning human rights violations. Accountability
of central authorities is hard to prove, since it is highly unlikely there is a
paper trail of orders for soldiers to rape ethnic women and girls. However,
given the level of discipline in the military, it is inconceivable that these
rapes were occurring without the knowledge of the military leadership, and were
probably part of a deliberate campaign to terrorize the ethnic communities -
who are treated with contempt by the armed forces.
It may be difficult to prove command responsibility before
the release of the report (19 June
2002) but now that the central authorities have been informed
of these allegations they have a duty to respond appropriately. Their inaction
will evidence state-sanctioned violence for which they can be held responsible
and accountable.
Acting appropriately could include
calling the regional commanders to Rangoon (as they did following the alleged
coup attempt earlier this year) and stating that such acts will not be condoned
and those who violate the laws, regulations and relevant paragraphs in the
military code (which they say exist to outlaw sexual violence), will be held
responsible and punished. These orders should be disseminated at the regional
and local level (as the forced labor orders have been).
The military regime at
first categorically denied the report and sought to denounce and discredit its
authors. Following pressure after the release of the report in June, the regime
stated on 30 July that it will punish any troops found to have committed rape.
Further, on 2 August Burma's state
press reported that a team led by the deputy home minister left for Shan state
to investigate the claims. The deputy home minister stated "to refute them
[the allegations], inquiries are to be conducted". It was therefore no
surprise that the regime at a news conference announcing the results of its
investigation on 23 August, stated it found
the claims "groundless and malicious."
Following this press
conference allegations have been made that SPDC authorities investigation
was carried out in an intimidatory manner. Local
people in central and southern Shan State were
forced to sign prepared statements in Burmese language declaring that no sexual
abuses had been committed by the armed forces in their area. It is clear that
under the SPDC, with no rule of law and no faith in its institutions, no-one
will dare testify against perpetrators who have absolute power in their
communities.
Allegations of rape by the
military have been made in other ethnic nationality areas. Credible
international human rights organizations such as Amnesty International have
reported on the use of rape by the armed forces. The International Labor
Organization raised this issue in the context of its investigation into the use
of forced labor. Previous Special Rapporteurs on the
Human Rights Situation in Burma have addressed this issue in their reports to the UN.
Language adopted by the U.N. General Assembly and the Commission on Human
Rights resolutions by consensus addresses this problem.
Unfortunately, there is no reason to believe that the use
of rape by the military ended in 2001. Incidences have been documented this
year, and following Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s release on 6 May, in Shan, Karen,
Karenni, Mon and Arakan states. Information can be provided upon request.
Whether they take
place in Burma, Bosnia, or Eastern Congo, rape as a weapon of war is a grave
violation of the Geneva Conventions and a crime against humanity. It
deserves a response by the international community.
The international
community must voice its concern about the contents and findings of the report.
An independent investigation into these serious allegations is required.
The UN
Secretary-General should be requested to employ his good offices, through his
Special Envoy Ambassador Tan Sri Razali Ismail and through the Office of the
High Commissioner for Human Rights to investigate the contents and the findings
of the report.
The U.S. State Department’s second annual “Trafficking in
Persons Report 2002”, released on 5 June,
notes that Burma is a country of origin for women and girls trafficked to
Thailand, China, Taiwan, Malaysia, Pakistan, and Japan for sexual exploitation,
domestic and factory work. Burmese women and girls are sold into sexual slavery
at an alarming rate, and the regime does not comply with even the most minimum
standards for the elimination of human trafficking, earning the nation the
ignominy of a "Tier III" designation. The regime does not cooperate
in international efforts, including extradition, investigations, or conferences
and has not signed or ratified related treaties and conventions. The regime is
not actively involved in protection of victims, or in funding of NGOs to
provide assistance to victims. Victims of trafficking for prostitution may be
treated as criminals and incarcerated or fined in some cases.
Children
Who would want to be a child in Burma?
Four decades of military rule, mismanagement and armed conflict have resulted
in widespread poverty, poor health care, low educational standards and
widespread and systematic human rights abuses.
A report on the affect of armed conflict on Burmese
children prepared by this Office, in consultation with the Human Rights
Documentation Unit of the NCGUB, was submitted to the Office of the Special
Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict for
the preparation of the Secretary-General’s third report to the Security Council
on children and armed conflict. The report will address the implementation of
resolution 1379 (2001). The UN Secretary-General, Kofi
Annan, will present his report to the Security
Council and there will be an open debate in the Security Council in November.
The report evidences that the regime is not adhering to Security Council
resolutions on children and armed conflict (1379, 1314 and 1261).
The report calls for humanitarian cease-fires in these
areas to allow immunization and assistance and for all parties concerned in the
conflict to put children on the agenda for dialogue since children are most
affected by this protracted armed conflict.
The report entreats the Office of the
Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict
to make specific reference to the deplorable situation facing the children of Burma
in the Secretary-General’s report to the Security Council. It is hoped that
Member States will raise the deplorable state facing the children of Burma
during the Security Council’s open debate.
The government spends 40% of the national budget on the
military, while spending on healthcare and education is one of the lowest in
the world at under 1% (US$0.60 and US$0.28 per capita respectively). The World
Health Organization’s 2000 report graded Burma 190th
overall in health system of 191 countries surveyed. According to UNICEF, of the
1.3 million children born every year, more than 92,500 will die before they
reach their first birthday and another 138,000 children will die before the age
of five. The main causes of death are malaria, TB, HIV/AIDS, acute respiratory
infections, and diarrheal diseases. More than 1 in 3
children under 5 will be malnourished.
These health problems are exacerbated
by the on-going armed conflict, which disproportionately affects ethnic groups.
Children from ethnic groups have extremely limited access to health care and
immunization as UN agencies do not have access to many of ethnic areas. Nor do
they have access to internally displaced persons (IDPs)
- of which a large proportion are children. Military violence coupled with
displacement, forced relocations and resulting food insecurity are the main
causes of malnutrition and other related illnesses. These children are also
most at risk of serious human rights violations including sexual assault and
trafficking. Rohingya children do not enjoy the right to a nationality and are
therefore stateless according to the Citizenship Law of 1986.
Low educational
attainment is a serious social, economic and political problem. Only 30% of
Burmese children get proper primary school education let alone secondary and
tertiary education. Female students are disproportionately affected by high
dropout rates as fewer than one third of all girls who enroll make it through
primary school.
The U.S. State Department’s second annual ‘Trafficking in
Persons’ report notes that Thailand is believed to be the primary destination
with an estimated 40,000 Burmese women and children - most of them from ethnic
groups working as sex workers. A
new trend shows that trafficked girls are increasingly virgins who are in
demand due to the belief that young girls are less likely to the HIV positive.
In practice, young girls are sold as virgins several times until the amount for
which they can be sold steadily decreases. When girls are no longer profitable
because of pregnancy or disease they are often turned out on the street.
Child labor has become increasingly
prevalent and visible. Approximately one quarter of children in the age group
10-14 are engaged in paid work and there is a growing number of street children
in concentrated urban areas. Street children and orphans are particularly
vulnerable to forced recruitment into the armed forces.
Burmese law does not specifically prohibit child labor and
children are forced to labor on infrastructure development projects and income
generating projects for the military, especially in ethnic areas. Children are
also forced to serve as porters in combat areas, and frequently suffer
beatings, rape and other mistreatment. Porters are used as human minesweepers
and human shields during military operations and children are no exception.
The number of landmine casualties, although unknown, is now believed to surpass
even that of Cambodia. There
is more chance of fatality if a child steps on a mine. The ILO documented the
abuse of children in the context of military operations.
According
to a new 220-page report by Human Rights Watch, “My Gun was as Tall as Me:
Child Soldiers in Burma,” 20% or more of active
duty soldiers in the Burma army may be children under
the age of 18. Although there is no way to precisely estimate the number of
children in Burma’s army, it appears that
the vast majority of new recruits are forcibly conscripted and there may be as
many as 70,000 soldiers under the age of 18. This makes Burma the largest recruiter and
user of child soldiers in the world, and the number is growing.
Recruiters
for Burma’s army frequently
apprehend boys at train and bus stations, markets and other public places,
threatening them with jail if they refuse to join the army. The boys are given
no opportunity to contact their families, and are sent to camps where they
undergo weapons training, are routinely beaten, and brutally punished if they
try to escape. HRW received several accounts of boys who were beaten to death
after trying to run away.
Once
deployed, boys as young as 12 engage in combat against opposition groups, and
are forced to commit human rights abuses against civilians, including rounding
up villagers for forced labor, burning villages, and carrying out executions.
Governments
should strongly condemn the recruitment and use of child soldiers by the SPDC
and use diplomatic and other appropriate means to end the use of child soldiers
in Burma.
In
2000, the UN General Assembly adopted an additional protocol to the Convention
on the Rights of the Child that raised the minimum age for participation in
armed conflict to 18, and prohibits all forced recruitment of children below
18. Burma is a party to the
Convention but has not yet signed and ratified the optional protocol.
The regime acceded to the Convention on
the Rights of the Child in July 1991. They submitted their initial report to
the Committee on the Rights of the Child in 1995. The Committee met to
scrutinize the regime’s initial report in January 1997, and issued concluding
observations and recommendations. The Committee’s report had 19 paragraphs
devoted to principal subjects of
concern and 20 paragraphs on suggestions and recommendations in order for the
regime to comply with the Convention.
The recommendations
included: to undertake a comprehensive review of the
national legislation to bring it into conformity with the principles and
provisions of the Convention – especially in the areas of non-discrimination,
citizenship, freedom of association, child labor and the administration of
juvenile justice; to launch a systematic information campaign, for both
children and adults, on the Convention; to incorporate the Convention in the
school curriculum; to take all appropriate measures to provide access to health
services throughout the country and to all children, including the ones living
in the most remote areas as well as the ones belonging to minority groups; to
take all appropriate measures to reduce the rates of school drop-out and
repetition; to allocate resources to translate school materials into minority
languages; to rapidly, impartially, thoroughly and systematically investigate
all reported cases of abuse, rape and/or violence against children committed by
members of the armed forces and apply appropriate judicial sanctions to
perpetrators and give wide publicity to such sanctions.
The regime’s second
periodic report was submitted in June 2002. It is
doubtful that the Committee will find an improvement on the implementation of
the Convention and the situation facing the children of Burma.
Refugees & IDPs
An estimated 400,000 refugees are currently living in
neighboring countries (Thailand, Bangladesh and India). Some
are provided with temporary shelter and protection. Others live outside the
camps and without assistance support and have to look for means of subsistence
as illegal immigrants, with the constant risk of being exploited, trafficked,
or forcibly returned to Burma.
Trafficking in persons, particularly in women and girls mostly for the purposes
of sex work, is widespread.
Attacks on IDP settlements are ongoing. In the month of
March alone, over 30 settlements were reportedly attacked and torched in Karen
and Karenni states.
Independent monitoring or humanitarian assistance to IDPs
has so far not been authorized by the regime and it is very difficult to verify
their number.
Latest estimates suggest that at least 2,500 villages have
been abandoned or forcibly relocated since 1996. Estimates of the total number
of IDPs in Burma range between one and two million,
with around 300,000 in north-eastern Shan State, 100,000-200,000 in Karen
State, 70,000-80,000 in Karenni State, 60-70,000 in Mon State and about 100,000
in Arakan State.
Bangladesh border
Discrimination,
violence and forced labor practices by the regime triggered an exodus of more
than 250,000 Rohingya Muslims between 1991 and 1992. This population is
predominantly concentrated in the northern part of Arakan State. Approximately 232,000 refugees have been repatriated under the
supervision of the UNHCR and today 21,600 remain in two camps. The voluntariness of the repatriation was questioned by relief
agencies.
The majority of
refugees in the camps in Bangladesh are malnourished and do not have sufficient food
to feed their families, nor are they allowed to work or farm. As a result, 58%
of Burmese refugee children suffer from chronic malnutrition, exposing them to
disease and hampering their physical and mental development.
New refugees have continued
arriving in Bangladesh. In Burma, the Rohingya Muslims are deprived of citizenship,
freedom of movement is highly restricted, their land confiscated to accommodate
Buddhist settlers, and they continue to be subjected to forced labor and
arbitrary taxation. The combination of those abuses creates the push-factor for
a constant trickle of new refugees.
Since 1995, access to
the refugee camps has been denied to new arrivals. They are forced to survive
as irregular migrants in Southern
Bangladesh without protection
or humanitarian assistance, at risk of arrest and deportation. The local press
reported that as many as 200,000 undocumented Rohingya are living outside
camps.
The Government of
Bangladesh is not a signatory to the 1951 Refugee Convention and has labeled
the new arrivals as economic migrants. In early June 2002, the Government of
Bangladesh declared that it was taking all measures to complete repatriation of
the remaining Rohingya refugees by June 2003 and had instructed border forces
to check further influxes from Burma.
Indian border
There is limited information about Burmese asylum seekers
in India.
Approximately 55,000 Burmese nationals, mostly Chins, are currently in India. Of
that number, only about 467 are recognized by UNHCR as its mandate to protect
and assist refugees extends only to those living in New
Delhi. Most of the UNHCR-recognized refugees are student
activists who left Burma during
the 1988 uprising.
The majority of these asylum seekers live unprotected in Mizoram State along
the Indo-Burma border where the Government of India, not a signatory to the
1951 Refugee Convention, does not permit access to UNHCR. They have joined the
local labor market but local tensions and anti-foreigner feelings makes them
vulnerable to deportation. In March 2002, Chin refugees were forcibly evicted
from Lunglei District by the Young Mizo Association.
Thai border
Burmese asylum seekers started arriving on Thai soil in
1984. Refugees continue to flow into Thailand. At the
end of June 2002, there were over 143,000 asylum seekers and refugees receiving
relief assistance from the Burmese Border Consortium (BBC) along the Thai-Burma
border.
This is an all time high. Most of the asylum seekers arriving in Thailand had
previously lived for some time as IDPs. They became
displaced either as they were forcibly relocated, or in anticipation of forced
relocation, or else they fled when human rights abuses or military threats
become intolerable. In urban areas, massive forced relocation has reportedly
taken place for purposes of "land development planning" and other
urban works.
IDPs are now finding it increasingly difficult to
flee Burma and
seek asylum in neighboring countries as the Burmese Army now controls most of
the border, the number of land mines in use has substantially increased and
they face an uncertain welcome from neighboring authorities. Despite these
obstacles, asylum seekers have been arriving in Thailand at an
average rate of around 900 per month for over three years.
These flows suggest continued high incidences of human
rights abuses by the Burmese army against villagers in the non-Burman ethnic
nationality areas (especially in northern Karen State,
central Shan State, Mon State and Arakan State). The
new arrivals give the same reasons for leaving, which are mainly to escape
forced village relocations, forced labor and other human rights abuses.
There are some 100,000 Shan refugees in the border region
who do not have access to international protection or the camps. The Shan
survive by seeking employment in the Thai labor market. They are most at risk
during periodic deportation sweeps by Thai authorities. Many with genuine
claims for refugee status have been deported and this practice continues.
Another major concern is that those who are HIV/AIDS positive will be deported
under a separate program. The details of this program are unknown.
For the last several decades Thailand has
been host to thousands of refugees from neighboring countries. In general the
Thais have shown tolerance and compassion in allowing most of the refugees to
stay until a durable solution is found. However, on several occasions they have
forcibly returned refugees from Burma.
The fact that the Thailand is not
a party to the 1951 Refugees Convention means there is little to prevent the
Thai government from doing so.
UNHCR became fully operational
in the early part of 1999 with the opening and staffing of three offices along
the border. Its role is principally one of monitoring and protection. It has no
permanent offices in the camps, which continue to be administered by the Thai
authorities with the assistance of refugee committees. NGOs continue to provide
and coordinate relief services to the refugee camps under bilateral agreements
with the Royal Thai Government.
The
sixth meeting of the Thai-Burmese Joint Commission held in early January this
year, failed to resolve differences on the issue of repatriating the Burmese
refugee population. Burmese Foreign Minister Win Aung said Rangoon had agreed in principle to
take back all Burmese working illegally in Thailand. But he stopped short of
committing to the joint repatriation of the refugees. While Thailand wants the
so-called "displaced people" to be repatriated with a third party
monitoring the process to ensure they are not sent to danger zones, Burmese
officials said the two countries must first define who could be considered
"displaced".
A white paper on how
to handle the sensitive issue was given to the SPDC and the matter was expected
to be further discussed this year. However due to recent tensions between Burma and Thailand this has not yet occurred.
It is imperative that
any repatriation program is conducted in conditions conducive to their
voluntary return and guarantees full reintegration in conditions of safety and
dignity. The international community, UN agencies and humanitarian personnel,
intergovernmental NGOs and local NGOs must be granted safe and unhindered
access to facilitate and monitor the program. The program must include
returnees who have not been granted rights of full citizenship and children who
have been rendered stateless.
Landmines
Landmine pollution is now believed to affect 9 out of 14
of the states or divisions of Burma, in
areas near its borders with Bangladesh, India and Thailand, with a
heavy concentration in eastern Burma. Karen,
Karenni and Shan States are the
worst affected. Landmines are placed by the Burma army
and ethnic resistance groups. Mines are
laid close to areas of civilian activity by the Burmese Army, allegedly to
prevent people from returning to their native villages after a forced eviction
during counterinsurgency campaigns. Villagers and forcibly
conscripted porters are known to be used as human minesweepers by the Burma army in
counter-resistance campaigns.
The Landmine Monitor Report 2002: Burma, noted
the military has continued laying
landmines inside the country and along its borders with Thailand. As part of a new plan to “fence the country,” the
Coastal Region Command Headquarters gave orders to its troops from Tenasserim
division to lay mines along the Thai-Burma border.
In a joint operation with the
Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA), the Tatmadaw laid mines as part of
offensive operations in Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) areas of Karen
State (Pa-an and Dooplaya district). SPDC bases in southern Shan State across
the border from Chaing Rai have reportedly had their perimeters mined.
Previous Landmine Monitor reports
documented use of mines by the Na Sa Ka (Burma’s border security force) on the
Bangladesh-Burma border, and even inside Bangladesh. However, this practice may
have abated in the past year thanks to several meetings between the officials
of the border security forces of the two countries. Nevertheless, in March 2002
there were several newspaper reports of mine use by Na Sa Ka forces, and an
armed opposition group leader told Landmine Monitor that on 17 March 2002, Na
Sa Ka men were seen carrying basketfuls of mines to the no-man’s land and
emplacing them.
The number of landmine victims in Burma remains unknown. There is currently
no centralized agency collecting statistics on landmine incidents or survivors
within Burma. Systematic collection of data remains difficult, especially in
relation to those who are killed rather than injured in an incident. Landmine
casualties appear to have increased in the past five years according to surveys
conducted by Handicap International, Thailand Landmine Impact Survey data, the
Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) emergency medical clinic in Mae La refugee camp,
and Nonviolence International.
Limited information is
available on landmine casualties in 2002. Handicap International has
established a reporting system with Thai border hospitals in order to improve
data collection on landmine casualties in Tak province. In the period January
to April 2002 nineteen new casualties were reported, including two people
killed and seventeen injured. Fourteen of the casualties were the result of
incidents on the Burma side of the border.
There is no systematic
marking of mined areas within Burma. There is no humanitarian demining
in Burma. Mine survivors receive little assistance. Unless a victim can pay for
treatment, no care is available. Burma still
produces mines, allows its Army to lay them and has not acceded to the Mine Ban
Treaty. The regime did not respond to an
invitation by the government of Malaysia to an informal meeting, held on the
side of the January 2002 intersessional meetings in Geneva, to discuss the
issue of landmines within the ASEAN context (other ASEAN non-signatories, such
as Vietnam, did attend). Burma was one of the two ASEAN countries that did not
participate in the seminar, “Landmines in Southeast Asia,” hosted by Thailand
from 13–15 May 2002.
Forced Labor
Forced labor is one of the most prevalent forms of human
rights abuse in Burma. The local military units have a great deal of
autonomy and for the last few years have been forced to be self-sufficient due
to Burma’s deteriorating economic situation but also for economic benefit.
Cultivation of military farms (e.g., shrimp), construction of military camps,
fortifications, and other projects related to the economic support of military
units continues at rates consistent to or slightly greater than past years.
Military units continue to use sentry duty, forced portering and human
minesweeping in the civil war zones.
The ILO
concluded in 1998 that forced labor was generalized and systematic in Burma. In November 2000, the ILO determined that the regime had
not taken effective action to deal with the ‘widespread and systematic’ use of
forced labor and, for the first time in its history, called on all ILO members
to review their relations with the regime and take appropriate measures to
ensure that the regime would not be able to take advantage of such relations to
perpetuate or extend the system of forced labor. In September and
October 2001, the regime permitted a high-level team appointed by the ILO
Director-General to travel extensively in the country to review the status of the
regime’s efforts to eliminate forced labor. The team found that forced labor
was continuing, especially in the ethnic areas near the border and in villages
near military camps, and that legislation introduced by the junta last year has
had a limited practical impact.
The ILO Committee of Experts noted in short that:
“none of the three
recommendations formulated by the Commission of Inquiry and accepted by the
Government have so far been met. Despite longstanding promises, as well as the
Government’s assured good will, the Village Act and Towns Act have not yet been
amended. While Order No. 1/99, as supplemented, has been widely publicized and
may for the time being have affected certain civil infrastructure projects, by
itself the order has not stopped the exaction of forced labor, in particular by
the military. There is no indication that the necessary specific and concrete
instructions and budgetary provisions have been adopted or even prepared with a
view to effectively replacing forced labor by offering decent wages and
employment conditions to freely attract any workers needed. Finally, there is
no indication that any person responsible for the exaction of forced labor and
often concomitant crimes was sentenced or even prosecuted under section 374 of
the Penal Code or any other provision, in conformity with Article 25 of the
Convention."
On 15 November 2001, the
ILO Governing Body adopted conclusions after examination of
the report of the High-Level Team. The Body recommended the authorities disseminate
the Orders to all the media and translate them into appropriate languages (the
orders have not been translated into other major ethnic languages). It
expressed profound concern regarding the very limited impact of this new
legislation to date and, in particular, the persistent impunity with regard to
criminal prosecution of persons who have committed violations, despite the
provisions of this legislation. The Body stated that urgent efforts should be
undertaken by the SPDC to rectify this situation and provide more convincing
evidence of their willingness to achieve this by the next session of the
Governing Body to be held in March 2002. The conclusions supported the
recommendations of the High Level team that an ombudsman should be appointed
(who has national and international credibility) to whom complaints regarding
forced labor could be submitted and who would be able to conduct direct
investigations along with a form of permanent presence of the ILO in Burma.
In March, the Governing Body addressed
the ongoing debate on the allegations concerning six victims in Shan state,
reportedly murdered on 15 July 2001 after lodging a complaint with the military
authorities about the increase use of forced labor (after having been informed
by an official that forced labor had been banned). According to the Shan Human
Rights Foundation, the villagers were killed by Burma
army troops based in Kun-Hing. Their bodies were
dumped in the Nam Taeng river, Kaeng
Tawng area, Murng-Nai
township.
The ILO requested the authorities to investigate the matter and received a
report refuting the allegations in January. The SHRF sent a letter responding
to the authorities report.
The Governing Body stated in March that it “acknowledges the efforts made by
the authorities to shed light on this particularly disturbing case. It notes,
however, that these efforts have not definitely closed the debate. It hopes
that in order to dispel all doubts or questions that might remain, the
authorities will of their own volition wish to follow up on the proposal
formulated during the discussion, whereby the enquiries would be confirmed by
an external, independent authority acceptable to all parties.”
The Conference Committee noted in June that no practical effect had yet been
given to this important proposal.
On 19 March 2002, the ILO and the SPDC
signed an understanding in Geneva which
allowed an effective ILO representation in Burma from,
at the latest, June 2002. An interim liaison officer was appointed in May and
in September it was announced that Ms Hong-Trang Perret-Nguyen, who is director of the ILO‘s
industrial relations department, will take up her new post in Rangoon in early
October. The understanding provides that she will cover all activities relevant
to ensuring the "prompt and effective" elimination of forced labor in
the country. Under the mandate, the liaison officer, in cooperation with the
authorities, "will have to help establish strategies to effectively
address the root causes of the forced labor situation in Burma".
This is a welcome development. The next meeting of the Committee of Experts
will be at the end of November.
Unfortunately
there continue to be reports of forced labor, especially in the rural ethnic
nationality areas. For example, EarthRights
International (ERI) has collected credible reports regarding the use of forced
labor to construct a new hydroelectric dam on the Shwe Gin River, near Kyaut Nagar in Eastern
Burma. This predominantly Karen area, north of Shwe Gin Township, is
home to thousands of IDPs who have been repeatedly
forced out of their homes by the military’s activities. The dam project will
eventually displace them once again.
Villagers interviewed said that in May 2002, soldiers
routinely force them to work on the construction project. According to one
local man, “We can only come back after we finished the work in the camp. In
the camp, they don’t have water and food for the workers. The military orders
the villagers to do what they want. The soldiers don’t have any sympathy for
the workers.”
The Human Rights Foundation of Monland
have reported consistently on the use of forced labor and portering this year
in Mon state. More recently, on 25 June about 20 villagers were arrested from
Yin-ye village and forced to serve as porters for military offensives in
southern Ye Township. The commander of the battalion had previously requested
the village headman to collect 2000 kyats from each
household (400) as a porter fee but forcibly took 20 porters after receiving
the money. On 20
June, 40 porters were arrested including women, from two
villages in Kya-inn-Seikyi township, for portering in
a military offensive against the Karen National Liberation Army. They were
forced to porter for two weeks. One woman said she was beaten when she could
not climb the mountains as quickly as the men, and that she saw Karen villagers
being killed by the soldiers in rural villages in Kyaik-done
township.
The Shan Human Rights Foundation has documented several instances
of forced labor this year. Their August monthly reports documents the forced
portering of 41 villagers from Paang Kiu village tract, Kaeng-Tung
township for a week in June.
There are reports of new incidents of extensive use of
forced labor in and around Maungdaw township, Arakan
state, Western Burma. Over seven hundred
people were forced to labor between 1-28 July in constructing a new model
village in Na Sa Ka area #2, and 135 men and women were used between 25 July
and 4 August to build a new Na Sa Ka security forces camp in Khamaung-hseik village. UNHCR raised this issue with the
authorities and were assured the workers were being paid. UNHCR’s
inquiries found this to be false.
According to recent
reports, forced labor is also occurring in cease-fire areas. SPDC authorities
reportedly intimidated Kachin villagers in Machanbaw
town who had passed information about forced labor in surrounding villages to
exile-based broadcasters Radio Free Asia and the Democratic Voice of Burma.
When the news was leaked that villagers were being forced to labor on constructing
firms and buildings owned by the military, the military battalions in the area
summoned the villages’ headmen and threatened them as well as teachers and
other individuals. The authorities warned the headmen that all villagers would
be severely punished if this kind of information reached exiled news agencies
in the future.
Prison labor camps continue to operate with little outside
scrutiny in Sagaing, Rangoon, Irrawaddy and Tenasserim Divisions and in Mon, Karen and Kachin States.
However, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) visited three
labor camps in Tamu district near the Indian border
in September. The ICRC suggested 120 prisoners return to prison due to their
age or health condition. The death rate of prisoners in these camps is between
24-30% per year due to inadequate food, unsafe drinking water, malaria,
ill-treatment and insufficient medical care.
Prisoners are increasingly being used as porters by the
military rather than civilian villagers. In order to comply with Regional
military commanders request for porters, the Department of Prisons
formed prisoner service units. Inside sources report that longer prison
sentences are being given for minor crimes as the demand for prison labor
increases.
Restrictions on Religious Freedom
In September 1999, the U.S. Secretary of State designated Burma as a
"country of particular concern" under the International Religious
Freedom Act for particularly severe violations of religious freedom. The
International Religious Freedom Report on Burma, released
in October 2001, provides a comprehensive overview of the religious demography
and the status of religious freedom in Burma
(including restrictions and abuses), and societal attitudes.
It stated, "There was no change in the status of the limited respect for
religious freedom during the period covered by this report. Through its
pervasive internal security apparatus, the Government generally infiltrated or
monitored the meetings and activities of virtually all organizations, including
religious organizations. It systematically has restricted efforts by Buddhist
clergy to promote human rights and political freedom, has discouraged or
prohibited minority religions from constructing new places of worship, and, in
some ethnic minority areas, has coercively promoted Buddhism over other
religions, particularly among members of the minority ethnic groups. Christian
groups have experienced increasing difficulties in obtaining permission to
build new churches, while Muslims report that they essentially are banned from
constructing any new mosques anywhere in the country. There also was a sharp
increase in the level of anti-Muslim violence during the period covered by this
report, some of which the Government may have tacitly supported, contributed
to, or even instigated.”
A Human Rights Watch report found that various factors
sparked last year's confrontations between Buddhists and Muslims, including
anger over the destruction of Buddhist images in Bamiyan, Afghanistan, in
March 2001. Military authorities confiscated pirated photos and videos of the Bamiyan statues being blown up by the Taliban,
fearful they would enflame Buddhist sentiment. But in some cities outside Rangoon, there
were credible reports of military intelligence officers stirring up anti-Muslim
violence and of local mosques being destroyed at the order of local military
commanders in Arakan state.
The September 11 attacks in the U.S. fueled
further communal violence in cities outside Rangoon, such
as Taungoo, Prome and Pegu,
leaving Muslim houses destroyed and burnt, and Muslim-owned shops looted. In Taungoo, 9 Muslims reportedly died. Muslims were subjected
to travel restrictions and increased police and military surveillance.
A Karen Human Rights Group report notes
that while extensive reporting has been done on the persecution of Rohingya
Muslims in Arakan State, very
little attention has been paid to the persecution suffered by the thousands of
Muslim communities which exist in villages and towns throughout Burma. Muslim
communities are forced to endure the denial of all citizenship rights,
restrictions on travel, work, and education, prohibitions on practicing Islam,
and the systematic destruction of their mosques. This report looks at the
systematic way these communities have been persecuted, impoverished and scapegoated by the military regime and by local populations
culminating in the anti-Muslim riots and massacres of 2001.
The Christian minority also experiences many difficulties
in practicing their religion. Particularly in Chin State, the
military regime has desecrated churches and graveyards, disturbed religious
ceremonies, prevented evangelists from preaching and imposed restrictions on
attendance at religious gatherings. Christians have also been forced to build
Buddhist pagodas in their own villages and to donate money for Buddhist
festivals whereas they are prohibited from building new churches or printing
Christian materials.
A three-day Baptist Convention scheduled to be held in Shan State on 4 April 2002 was cancelled
by order of the regime. On 5 April 2002, two respected Christian ministers,
Reverend Htat Gyi and his son-in-law, Pastor Lian Za Dal
were arrested together with 8 other extended family members for failing to file
guest registration. However it is believed the real reason is for their
criticism of the authorities for closing their churches.
HUMANITARIAN CONCERNS
‘We
have always said that assistance to Burma should depend on accountability,
transparency, and independent monitoring, which is to say that assistance
projects, aid projects must be opened to scrutiny. Our policy with regard to
sanctions will not change until such time as political dialogue has begun. But
also we have said everything that we do, we do only with the benefit of the people
in mind, which is why we insist that assistance and aid must be opened to
scrutiny to ensure that the right assistance is getting to the right people in
the right way, ensure that our people are really benefiting from whatever aid
or assistance is given to the state’ – Message from Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, 19
July 2002.
In a letter dated 30 June 2001,
all nine UN agency representatives in Rangoon
collectively called on their respective headquarters and the international
community for a ‘dramatic overhaul of the budget allocations’ for Burma
because the country is ‘on the brink of a humanitarian crisis.’ UNICEF wrote to
the UN Secretary-General in March 1992 describing the situation facing the
children of Burma
as a ‘silent emergency’ and proposed UN-supervised humanitarian cease-fires to
enable humanitarian relief activities in war-torn areas. A lot of time has
passed since then.
The
Secretary-General’s Special Envoy Ambassador Tan Sri Razali Ismail and the UN Special
Rapporteur on Human Rights in Burma, Mr Paulo Sergio Pinheiro have discussed
with the regime and Daw Aung San Suu Kyi the possibility of greater UN
humanitarian assistance to deal with the challenge posed by HIV/AIDS and other
health-related issues, including TB, malaria and the lack of immunization
programs in certain areas. Both Razali and Pinheiro have raised the idea of a
functional committee with mixed composition and oversight by the UN.
Language
in the Commission on Human Rights resolution 2002/67 concerning the ‘Situation
of human rights in Myanmar,’ reflects this idea of a joint mechanism and the
need for cooperation and consultation with all relevant players on the
provision of humanitarian assistance.
Agreement has not yet been reached with the regime on modalities to enable the
provision of such assistance.
The NCGUB shares the concern of the UN and the
international community regarding the rapidly deteriorating humanitarian
situation in Burma.
The democracy movement is concerned about the long-term consequences for the
country and believes the problems need to be addressed immediately. However,
the root cause of the humanitarian crisis in Burma is the
lack of an accountable democratic government. The international community needs
to hold the regime accountable for failing to shoulder responsibility for their
citizens, since that failure is what has precipitated the humanitarian crisis.
Better governance is ultimately the answer to Burma’s
humanitarian disaster.
Without taking the root causes and political context into
account, and without careful planning and thought, humanitarian assistance is
likely to aggravate the humanitarian crisis by failing to provide urgently
needed protection and assistance to the most vulnerable populations. The
concern is that humanitarian assistance may unintentionally exacerbate the
conflict rather than contribute to peace. Well meaning cannot suffice for
well-conceived or well-done.
Of concern is that an increase in humanitarian assistance
by donor countries may substitute political pressure for democratic change. The
World Bank in a recent report stated that without political change, economic
change cannot occur. The same is true for the humanitarian crisis. Political
strategies must be pursued together with humanitarian. In response to those who
say the humanitarian crisis cannot wait for political change, Daw Aung San Suu
Kyi states “Burma cannot
wait for political change, we need it now!”
Daw Aung San Suu Kyi has strongly advocated for the need
of accountability, transparency and independent monitoring of humanitarian aid
since her release: “Unless there is accountability and transparency, you can
never say what happens to all that assistance. It may not go to help the
people, on the contrary, it may go into schemes that harm the people. So unless
there is accountability and transparency we cannot say that humanitarian aid is
assisting the people.”
It is of vital importance that the military regime
acknowledges the crisis if an increase in humanitarian assistance by donor
countries is to have a positive impact. Otherwise the regime will only accept
aid if there are no strings attached. This will decrease the likelihood that
there will be accountability, transparency and independent monitoring of
humanitarian assistance. It will also contribute to ‘fungibility’
– resources will be freed up to allow an increase in military spending or for
other purposes that do not benefit the people. For example, the regime signed a contract in May with Washington lobbyists DCI Associates worth US$550,000
plus expenses for the year ending 15 May 2003. The fee to DCI is over 18 times the
regime’s budget for HIV/AIDS in 1999.
The international community, the holders of the purse
strings, must actively engage the regime in a dialogue to confront the
humanitarian needs in the country and continue to push for appropriate
modalities to enable the provision of humanitarian aid in a transparent and
accountable manner. This will mitigate the potentially adverse consequences of
such aid.
The NCGUB believes there must be consultative
mechanisms to discuss the humanitarian needs in the country and the most
appropriate way to address them. The NCGUB believes the following should be
considered as appropriate humanitarian assistance: food, clothing, shelter and
health care (including immunization and HIV/AIDS).
There should be four main bodies to oversee the provision
of humanitarian assistance.
1. A Joint
Consultative Forum at the national level consisting of representatives of
the NLD, the regime, the ethnic nationalities and the UNDP Resident
Representative (as coordinator of the UN country team). It would primarily be
mandated to formulate policy and review progress.
2. A Joint
Committee on Humanitarian Action to coordinate humanitarian assistance,
from needs assessment to ensuring unhindered access for its delivery.
3. A Joint
Committee on Security Modalities, mainly in order to guarantee the absence
of offensive military actions in the areas where humanitarian assistance is
being provided. Representatives of the armed forces and insurgency groups would
need to be represented on this Committee.
4. An international
NGO Council (INGO) to act as a clearing-house for exchange of information.
Members adhere to an agreed code of conduct and has an
accountability/monitoring committee to oversee implementation.
These consultative mechanisms would
facilitate humanitarian aid in areas in need countrywide. This would include
areas that have not experienced armed conflict, cease-fire and non-ceasefire
areas.
For the non-cease-fire areas the NCGUB proposes that the
international community strongly urges the SPDC to negotiate humanitarian
cease-fires (HCF) in cooperation with the ethnic groups, other relevant
political and community-based groups. Such interventions should occur to enable
humanitarian relief activities and to promote confidence-building measures
towards achieving a peaceful solution to the conflict. HCF should be negotiated
in order to access vulnerable populations in Karen, Karenni and Shan States.
HCF are attempts to get the much-needed humanitarian space
in the midst of violent armed conflict. In the 1990s HCF were extensively
applied to allow the provision of health and humanitarian assistance, such as
immunization campaigns (e.g., the Global Polio Eradication Initiative) and food
supplies to populations in need. They became a relatively common practice in
current conflicts and constituted one of the few ‘entries’ into long-standing
and particularly violent conflicts, in conditions otherwise inaccessible for
other types of international actions.
In different forms – HCF, Days of Tranquility and
Safe/Peace Corridors – have been carried out in the midst of wars in 19
countries since 1985: Afghanistan, Angola, Bosnia,
Chechnya/Russia, Democratic Republic of
the Congo, El
Salvador, Guinea-Bissau, Indonesia, Iraq, Lebanon, Mozambique, Philippines, Dominican
Republic, Sierra
Leone, Somalia, Sri
Lanka, Sudan, Tajikstan, and Uganda. Why
not in Burma?
The UN is leading a new trend in the direction of
considering the humanitarian access to needy populations as a strong imperative
to the international community and a right of the individuals in need.
Many HCF case studies illustrate attempts to promote a space for humanitarian
aid in the midst of civil armed conflict show how they achieved their
humanitarian objectives but did not contribute to shortening the conflict
(e.g., El Salvador and the
Sudan).
HCF needs to have a political aspect to make them more
effective in their response to contemporary challenges. It has been demonstrated
that the need goes beyond humanitarian space to the creation of political space
– this is a space for setting up conflict resolution processes and for
promoting a dialogue, which goes beyond the armed elites and horizontally
involves local actors.
Armed ethnic groups are ready to participate in HCF and
cooperate with UN agencies and international NGOs, for the purpose of launching
emergency humanitarian operations in their areas.
Monitoring
In order to ensure respect for human rights and
international humanitarian law, transparency, accountability and
non-discrimination in the delivery and distribution of humanitarian aid, proper
monitoring mechanisms must be established.
Monitoring teams should be established to assess the
implementation of the humanitarian action and of the security modalities. The
teams:
- Should
be composed of both internal and external actors.
- Must
report periodically to the Committees and INGO Council.
- Must
monitor and report on abuses – in delivery, violence and human rights violations
witnessed during implementation - and what proportion of deliveries
actually reached the intended beneficiaries.
- Must
consult with local actors and beneficiaries as to the magnitude of abuses
committed by factions and whether to impose conditions or terminate
assistance.
- Must
monitor and analyze the impact of action taken on the root causes of the
conflict.
In terms of external monitors, donor governments could
nominate technical experts that have no links to implementing agencies, to
partake in an independent evaluation mission or as part of the mixed monitoring
team.
Donors and the international community
The donor and international community must:
- Highlight
the root causes in dialogue with the regime to ensure the success and
sustainability of any humanitarian aid effort. The regime must be
pressured to undertake political and economic reforms;
- The
regime must be pressured to acknowledge the humanitarian crisis. Otherwise
the regime will only accept aid money if there are no strings attached.
Then consultative mechanisms won’t be established and aid will contribute
to ‘fungibility’;
- To
mitigate ‘fungibility’, the regime should be
asked to match funds as a means to ensuring it spends more on social
priorities;
- Should
regularly consult with the joint mechanisms;
·
Should not fund any
UN agency or INGO that does not participate in good faith in the proposed
consultative mechanisms.
Such participation will ensure that the donor forum will
have a constructive role to play in the reconstruction of Burma when
democratic transition takes place.
THE ECONOMIC SITUATION
Burma is a
land of immense economic potential, rich in natural resources. During British
colonial rule from the 1820s to 1948, some infrastructure was built to tap Burma’s vast
agricultural and mineral wealth, and the country became one of the world’s
leading rice exporters. A period of steady growth under a democratic government
followed independence, but the military-dominated regime installed after an
army coup in 1962 crippled economic growth by pursuing the isolationist “Burmese
Way to Socialism” until 1988.
Desperate economic conditions and years of repression sparked massive
pro-democracy demonstrations in 1988, the year Burma was
declared one of the world’s least-developed countries. The army crushed the
uprising and took direct power as the State Law and Order Restoration Council
(SLORC), pledging economic reforms and free elections. In November 1997, the
SLORC renamed itself the State Peace and Development Council in hopes of improving
its international profile. However, the generals have allowed neither democracy
nor a true market economy. Army-run companies dominate much trade and industry
and the economy has been propped up to a large degree by cash from the illegal
trade in opium and methamphetamines, which some
observers say constitutes 20% of all business.
The Asian Development Bank (ADB) criticized the SPDC for
delaying reforms and making haphazard policies in its Asian Development Outlook
2002 report. The report states: “There are no clear prospects for the
introduction of necessary widespread economic reforms by the government of Myanmar to
correct macroeconomic imbalances and reduce poverty. It lacks the necessary
policies, and its strategies are ad hoc and respond to a variety of problems
in, at times, contradictory ways. Moreover, the capacity to implement policies
is lacking”.
The local currency, the kyat, is at an all-time low. The
kyat is pegged at a rate of 6.90 to $1, which the ADB states is “grossly
overvalued”. It has slipped to the street rate of more than 1,260 to $1 as of
24 September, a record low. Analysts predict this free-fall is likely to
continue for some time.
This dual exchange rate system is problematic since it distorts prices and
resource allocation and stunts growth.
As the kyat continues to plummet, the prices of most
imported goods are sky-rocketing as a result. The prices of meat, vegetables,
eggs and palm oil are all rising alarmingly. The cost of medicines, petrol and
diesel have nearly doubled in the last three months. Analysts estimate that
inflation is running at more than 50% a year. Wages and salaries are not rising
as prices increase. Most families can only afford to eat one meal a day. A wave
of violent crime has been reported as spreading across the country as people
are becoming more and more desperate.
The price of rice in Rangoon has
doubled since the beginning of the year. In some rural areas, residents report
a three-fold increase in the price of rice over the past three months. Rice
shortages in the past have brought people out on to the streets in protest
against the government. The authorities, nervous about the prospect of civil
disturbances as a result of rice shortages, has been selling rationed low grade
rice at subsidized prices, especially in urban areas. There are long queues at
these government stalls.
Despite this prospect, the regime is committed to
exporting even more rice than it did last year; and increasingly the regime is
trying to finance its importers through bartering, particularly rice, even for
petroleum and oil. Sensitivity to potential social unrest is illustrated by the
fact that special military units have been formed and trained to control civil
disturbances.
It is feared there will be a major rice shortage within
the next year. There is a real risk of famine because of the likelihood of rice
crop failures due to massive soil degradation, as a result of over-cropping and
an acute lack of fertilizers. UN officials estimate that one child in three
under the age of five is already suffering from malnutrition, this could double
within the next 12 months.
As the ADB has stated in previous reports, Burma’s
economy needs thorough reform. Without it, there is little prospect of reducing
the widespread poverty in the country. Government expenditure on education and health is low -
amongst the lowest in the world says the bank, while the country's state
economic enterprises are inefficient and a drain on the economy.
Concern should also be
expressed about the SPDC’s decision to dedicate scarce resources to military
acquisitions, rather than to providing essential services to the people of Burma. Military spending soaks up at
least 40% of Burma’s
estimated public sector spending, and the regime continues to expand its army
despite an absence of external enemies. This
is exemplified by the fact that the SPDC decided to spend
U.S. $150 million on twelve MiG fighter planes and a
nuclear reactor from Russia in
2001.
The last thing the world needs is another pariah regime with lots of
radioactive material on hand. It is uncertain
how this expansion in military capacity is compatible with the national
reconciliation process.
APPENDIX I: AIDE MEMOIRE – IMPACT OF
ARMED CONFLICT ON THE CHILDREN OF BURMA
The Office of the Special Representative of the UN
Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict is preparing the
Secretary-General’s third report to the Security Council on children and armed
conflict. The report will address the implementation of Security Council resolution
1379.
This Office authored and submitted a report on the impact
of armed conflict on the children of Burma to the
Special Representative’s office.
We hope the situation facing the children of Burma will be
mentioned in the body of the report.
The Secretary General’s report will be presented to the
Security Council in early November. Following the presentation there will be an
open debate on children and armed conflict.
We urge your government to mention the situation facing
the children of Burma in your
statement to the Security Council on this issue. The following issues could be
highlighted:
- The
government spends 40% of the national budget on the military, while
spending on healthcare and education is one of the lowest in the world at
under 1% (US$0.60 and US$0.28 per capita respectively).
- Only
30% of Burmese children get proper primary school education let alone
secondary and tertiary education. Female students are disproportionately
affected by high dropout rates as fewer than one third of all girls who
enroll make it through primary school.
- According
to UNICEF, of the 1.3 million children born every year, more than 92,500
will die before they reach their first birthday and another 138,000
children will die before the age of five. The main causes of death are
malaria, TB, HIV/AIDS, acute respiratory infections, and diarrheal diseases. More than 1 in 3 children under 5
will be moderately to severely malnourished.
- Burma
stands perilously close to an HIV/AIDS epidemic. UNAIDS estimated in June
2000 that 2% of the population is infected with HIV, making Burma one of
only three countries in Asia to have an HIV epidemic considered to be
‘generalized’ throughout the population. There are at least 14,000
infected children and some 43,000 AIDS orphans.
- Ongoing
armed conflict in Burma
disproportionately affects children from ethnic groups. Children from
ethnic groups have extremely limited access to health care and
immunization as UN agencies do not have access to many ethnic areas. Nor
do they have access to internally displaced persons - of which a large
proportion are children. Military violence coupled with displacement,
forced relocations and resulting food insecurity are the main causes of
malnutrition and other related illnesses. These children are also most at
risk of serious human rights violations including sexual assault and
trafficking.
- According to a recent Human Rights
Watch report, 20% or more of active duty soldiers in the Burma army may be children under the age
of 18. It appears that the vast majority of new recruits are forcibly
conscripted, and there may be as many as 70,000 soldiers under the age of
18. This makes Burma the largest recruiter and user of
child soldiers in the world, and the number is growing.
- The
Government should negotiate humanitarian cease-fires in areas of armed
conflict to ensure increased access of humanitarian assistance to children
and all parties
concerned in the conflict must put children on the agenda for dialogue
since children are most affected by armed conflict.