BURMA ALERT - 01/03

The Associates to Develop Democratic Burma Inc, Canada, has agreed to let the Euro-Burma Office, Brussels, re-institute the 'Burma Alert', which was discontinued in November 1997. The new 'Burma Alert' will feature analyses of current events and opinion pieces in electronic form. The following is a piece by Harn Yawnghwe of the Euro-Burma Office

HAS THE SPDC WON THE 'DIALOGUE WAR' ?

SPDC Chairman Senior General Than Shwe is visiting Vietnam. He visited China in January and secured a US$ 200 million loan. Foreign Minister Win Aung also visited Bangladesh and India to strengthen bilateral ties. Deputy Foreign Minister Khin Maung Win even visited Brussels on 28 January to attend the EU-ASEAN Foreign Ministers' Meeting. This in spite of an EU visa ban.

High level visits to Burma in 2002 are too numerous to list. Since the new year, Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra and HRH Princess Maha Chakri Sirindhorn of Thailand, Vice Premier Li Lanqing of the State Council of China, Deputy Foreign Minister Hitoshi Tanaka of Japan and Amnesty International have visited.

Some Burmese democracy advocates, viewing these developments, are very uneasy. Combined with the increased restrictions and seeming determination of Prime Minister Thaksin to bring 'peace' to the Thai-Burmese border at all costs, some activists are beginning to question the wisdom of engaging in a dialogue with the SPDC. They are convinced that the SPDC has won or is winning the 'dialogue war'.

Many activists were also concerned by the SPDC's charm offensive in the USA spearheaded by DCI, a Republican lobby firm. The fact that Colonel Kyaw Thein was invited to Washington last year to discuss SPDC drug eradication plans in spite of a US visa ban was also viewed with alarm.

The SPDC seems to remain strong in spite of the economic crisis and the unease over the toppling of Ne Win. An anti-Aung San Suu Kyi campaign was started by the SPDC's civilian arm, the Union Solidarity Development Association (USDA) in 2003, reminiscent of early 2000 when SPDC moved to 'eliminate' ASSK and the National League for Democracy. More people have been arrested after the relaxation last year. Forced relocation, forced labour and the human rights abuses including rape and summary executions continue unabated in spite of the presence of the International Labour Organization (ILO) in Rangoon.

The military seems to have been emboldened to such an extent that the USDA has said that the SPDC would not talk to the NLD and would never hand over power to the election winning party. General Soe Win, the new SPDC Secretary 2, has also said that the SPDC is not afraid that the US will intervene in Burma as in Iraq because China is a friend and will protect it.

From the beginning of the talks between the SPDC and ASSK in October 2000, many Burmese democracy advocates were skeptical about the SPDC's intentions. They suspected that the SPDC would use the talks to buy time to enable it to continue to survive by gaining international legitimacy and financial assistance. The international community's dialogue policy as expressed by UN Special Envoy for Burma Malaysia Ambassador Tan Sri Razali Ismail and UN Special Rapporteur for Human Rights in Burma Paulo Sergio Pinheiro, was seen as an appeasement policy. Given that the talks in Rangoon have stopped since ASSK's release in May 2002, some activists fear that the SPDC is consolidating its position. Disillusioned and frustrated, some are beginning to hit out at the UN, calling the UN representatives clowns, and attacking their personal integrity. Some are also considering other options.

WHAT ARE THE FACTS? WHAT IS THE REALITY?

The facts are that the SPDC has not succeeded. It is in even more trouble than when it started the talks with ASSK in 2000. No country believes the generals. They have zero credibility. For example -

China - The SPDC claims that China is a friend and will protect it. The US$ 200 million loan is shown as proof. China is a friend of Burma, not the SPDC. China is concerned because the SPDC has not been able to solve Burma's problems. China does not want external forces to interfere in Burma. That was why China invited Than Shwe and said very clearly that it wants to see national reconciliation in Burma.

Malaysia - Many Burmese activists were concerned when Prime Minister Dr Mohammad Mahathir showed an active interest and exchanged visits with Senior General Than Shwe several times. The SPDC again played on the fears of the activists by highlighting the 'friendship' and business deals that were supposedly made. Dr Mahathir is not a fool. The business deals the Malaysians made are insignificant. The Malaysians can make much more money elsewhere and that was what Dr Mahathir was about. He saw that if the Burma problem is not resolved, it will continue to be a black spot for ASEAN. This will turn away serious investors from Malaysia given that the world is now so competitive. He also felt responsible for the fact that he brought the SPDC into ASEAN in 1997. He did not succeed because he was trying to persuade Than Shwe that Burma could prosper as a multi-ethnic federation. The SPDC could have used Dr Mahathir's experience and leadership within ASEAN and in the non-aligned world to gain support for any reform program they wanted to launch. They have lost a potential friend and Dr Mahathir now has no time for the Burmese generals. If the Burmese democracy movement can come up with a viable solution to the Burma problem, Dr Mahathir could be a valuable ally.

Japan - The SPDC makes a great show of its friendship with Japan. Activists get very concerned every time Japan provides aid to Burma. Once again, it must be remembered that Japan is a friend of Burma, not the SPDC. The aid given is about US$ 20 million at a time. This money does not go directly into the hands of the generals and it is miniscule compared to what Burma needs. For some years now Japan has been working closely with the SPDC to research what needs to be done to develop Burma economically. The conclusion is that the SPDC is not capable of implementing the necessary economic and political reforms that are required. Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi has, therefore, repeatedly told Than Shwe that Burma needs to democratize and that Japan is willing to help.

The USA - The SPDC-DCI campaign was unable to convince the Bush Administration that it was doing enough to eradicate the production of drugs. On 16 February 2003 the US Government said that it was highly skeptical that Burma's military is serious about reform, and warned that it was considering further sanctions against the junta. US Secretary of State Colin Powell on 5 March also designated Burma, China, Iran, Iraq, North Korea and Sudan as countries of "particular concern" on freedom of worship, keeping in place the possibility of punitive sanctions against them.

The European Union - Burmese activists were dismayed by the EU's decision to invite the SPDC to the EU-ASEAN meeting in Brussels. But the EU made it clear that it was not relaxing its position on Burma. On 18 February, the EU Greek Presidency expressed its concern over the lack of progress and warned that it will take the situation into close account in considering the renewal of the Common Position in April 2003. Meanwhile on 13 March, the European Parliament adopted a resolution calling for more sanctions.

The United Nations - While the UN Rapporteur did call for a relaxation of sanctions, the UN was equally frustrated by the lack of progress in Burma. The UN Burma meeting in Tokyo on 15 February strengthened Razali's position. All are now aware that the SPDC is not willing and not capable of implementing change.

Thailand - The new restrictions on the border are worrisome. But Prime Minister Thaksin's initiative to mediate between the SPDC and the ethnic nationalities has potential. It could possibly break the deadlock in Rangoon. But the SPDC's rejection of the ethnic nationalities offer to talk as a group is a clear indication that it is not really interested in solving the problem. If the Thais want to stop the flow of drugs into Thailand, they will need to be prepared to play hard ball with the SPDC, not with the ethnic nationalities, as called for by the Defense Minister. The fact that the European Parliament has passed a resolution recognizing the Thai effort means that the EU will be watching how Thailand handles the issue of the ethnic nationalities.

India, Bangladesh & Pakistan - These neighbouring countries are trying to improve ties in order not to be left out should conditions improve but none of them is in a position to be of real help to the SPDC.

Asian Development Bank - In a rare comment the ADB in its Asian Development Outlook 2002 report said, "There are no clear prospects for the introduction of necessary widespread economic reforms by the government of Myanmar to correct macroeconomic imbalances and reduce poverty." It said the military junta "lacked the necessary policies, and its strategies are ad hoc and respond to a variety of problems in, at times, contradictory ways. Moreover, the capacity to implement policies is lacking." Combined with the current banking crisis, this shows that the SPDC is heading for disaster with no way out and no idea of how to get out.

WHY DO BURMESE ACTIVISTS THINK THE SPDC IS WINNING?

First, many activists forget that Senior General Than Shwe's favorite weapon is psychological warfare. They have fallen into the trap set up for them by believing exactly what the SPDC wants them to believe.

Second, some Burmese activists thought that a dialogue meant the SPDC was going to negotiate a surrender. They did not expect the SPDC to use the talks to its advantage. That was why they kept saying that they did not believe in the SPDC's sincerity. When the SPDC did not surrender, they were outraged and felt betrayed, believing that the international community had also been misled as they have been.

Third, like the SPDC, some Burmese activists are very Burma-centric. The world has to revolve around Burma and if it does not, something is wrong. All foreign interest in Burma is viewed with suspicion since they believe that only the Burmese are sincere about Burma and all others are seeking to exploit Burma. In this view, the world must do right by Burma. For example, the US should be intervening in Burma like in Iraq. It is not doing so because 'people' want to exploit Burma. Given these perspectives, the activists feel helpless and angry. They feel they have to do something to stem the SPDC's advances.

THE SPDC's STRATEGY

The SPDC never wanted a dialogue. ASSK had asked for a dialogue as early as 1988. The SPDC believes that engaging in a dialogue is a sign of weakness. It started the talks with ASSK because it had no other option. Since then, it has been trying to get out of the talks without appearing to do so. The idea is to make ASSK so frustrated that she will break off the talks.

In order to survive, the SPDC also needs to convince the people of Burma, especially the Army, that it is invincible. It is even more crucial now that the SPDC has discredited Ne Win. The Army's belief in the rightful role of the military to rule, which was embodied in Ne Win, has been shaken. If the Army loses faith in Than Shwe, a coup by a younger generation of generals is not an impossibility.

In the SPDC's view, the ideal scenario is to convince everyone that it is winning. ASSK then will break off the talks in frustration, and Burmese democracy activists will resort to acts of violence. If this happens, ASSK will be blamed for the failure of the dialogue and the democracy movement can be cast as international terrorists. This will then allow the SPDC to get into the good books of the Bush administration. Military aid would then flow into the SPDC's coffers (Note - SPDC does not want humanitarian aid which does not directly benefit the military. If it cannot get military aid, it wants aid for drug eradication which has to go through the SPDC's infrastructure for implementation).

IS THERE A FUTURE FOR DIALOGUE ?

The SPDC in spite of the brave face it is trying to show is in deep crisis. SPDC Chairman Senior General Than Shwe is 70 years old and becoming increasingly erratic. He is micro-managing everything without having the slightest concept of the magnitude of the problems facing Burma.

Vice Senior General Maung Aye, Vice-Chairman and Army Commander-in-Chief, is 65 years old and undergoing emergency treatment for prostate cancer in Singapore. He may not have long to live.

General Khin Nyunt, SPDC Secretary-1 and Intelligence Chief is 64 years old and increasingly unsure of his grip on the new generation of rising generals.

The new generals led by Lieutenant-General Shwe Mahn are in their late 50s and early 60s. None of them has been abroad and they have no idea how the world works.

Burma needs billions of dollars to reverse the 40 years of economic decline. No government will bail the SPDC out or bank roll the much needed reforms without a credible plan. Both the Asian Development Bank and Japan have said that the SPDC is not capable of implementing the major reforms needed. The SPDC has no way out except to engage ASSK in a dialogue. But given the Burmese concept of dialogue as a losing proposition, a strong mediation effort by the international community is needed.

End