Roadmaps and Political Transition in Burma:
the Need for
Two-Way Traffic
by Ashley South
Transition in Burma may come abruptly - perhaps as a result of a
1988-style peoples’ uprising - or more gradually, and with less bloodshed. The
latter scenario may involve a power-sharing arrangement between the SPDC and
the opposition, or a gradual process of ‘regime
reform’, with little direct in-put from the wider society or opposition forces.
Although opposition tactics will vary according to the circumstances, a
number of strategic considerations remain the same. However and whenever change
occurs, members of Burma’s diverse social groups must be ready to act.
In general, opposition strategies have focused on elite-level politics,
rather than grass-roots democratisation. However, both approaches are necessary
- while neither is sufficient in itself. Change at the national level is
urgently needed, but sustained democratic transition can only be achieved if
accompanied by local participation and
‘development from below’.
Among the three parties to any tripartite negotiations in Burma, the
ethnic nationalities in particular could benefit from a combination of
elite-level, blueprint-type solutions and a grass-roots,
participatory approach, aimed at strengthening civil society. Although overseas-based activists and Burma-watchers have
sometimes assumed that there is no civil society in the country, this far from
true. The re-emergence of local networks within and between
ethnic nationality communities over the past decade has been one of the most
significant - but under-reported - aspects of the social and political
situation in Burma. Efforts to build local democracy are already underway - in
government-controlled areas, in some ethnic nationality-populated ceasefire and
war zones, and in neighbouring countries. However, these 'bottom-up'
initiatives will not bring about substantial change, without accompanying
'top-down', national-level reforms.
Since 1990, the military government has resisted all
options but a managed (by the military) transition to some type of
‘disciplined’ or ‘guided’ (by the military) democracy. The recently-appointed
prime minister (ex-SPDC Secretary One), General Khin Nyunt, announced in late August that the government will
restart the National Convention, to draw up a new constitution. This will not
convince the opposition - or most western nations - that the regime is
committed to political transition in Burma. Nevertheless, Khin
Nyunt’s statement may be an important move in a
complex political ‘game’, perhaps indicating that the military is positioning
itself to participate in some kind of transitional process, the success and
legitimacy of which will depend on who participates in constitution-drafting,
and under what conditions. If the NLD and ethnic nationality parties are
included in the process, this may yet prove to be a watershed in Burmese
history. The stakes are high, and some analysts suggest
that Khin Nyunt (the ‘good
cop’) is merely being set up to fail - while
protecting Senior General Than Shwe
(the ‘bad cop’) from the need to reform.
While the NLD and most Burmese democracy groups have
consistently demanded recognition of the 1990 election results, they have come
to accept the necessity for compromise and dialogue with the SPDC. However,
when Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s efforts to mobilise her supporters came to a bloody end on 30th
May this year, international efforts to foster bi-partite dialogue between the
SPDC and NLD also came to an abrupt halt.
There is however a third set of political actors in
Burma, which have been largely side-lined within the UN-brokered ‘peace
process’. The 1994 and all subsequent UN General Assembly resolutions on Burma
have called for a tri-partite solution to the country’s problems, involving the
government, NLD (and other parties elected in 1990), and the ethnic
nationalities.
Many ethnic nationality cadres are wary of the NLD leadership, which is largely
composed of ex-Tatmadaw officers, who share a
common political culture and conceptions of state-society relations based on a
strong, centralised state. However, most ethnic
nationality leaders have trusted Daw Aung San Suu Kyi
to demand their inclusion in any negotiations which may come out of talks in
Rangoon.
This was a risky strategy:
if an agreement had been reached between the SPDC and NLD, the international
community would have responded enthusiastically, and the process gained
considerable momentum, before any ethnic nationality representatives were
brought into the picture. In this case, the ethnic nationalities risked further
marginalisation, their leaders faced with two
options: either be co-opted into endorsing an
agreement which they had little part in negotiating, or insist on a nation-wide
ceasefire, followed by a possibly lengthy intra-nationalities consultation
process, and then a pan-Burmese Panglong-type
tri-partite constitutional convention. Such demands, in the context of
pre-exiting deal between the NLD and SPDC, might have exposed the ethnic nationalities
to accusations of obstructing national reconciliation. Either scenario would
suit the 'divide and rule' strategy of elements in Burman
political society.
However, the brutal events of 30th May
have provided an opportunity to re-present the importance of ‘the ethnic
question’, and the role that ethnic nationality politicians might play in
breaking the current political deadlock. This historic opportunity is also
fraught with danger.
The key challenge facing Burma’s ethnic nationality
leaders is how to co-ordinate their positions. In doing so they risk being
exposed as divided over key issues, and once again
consigned to a marginal role as crucial decisions over the future of the
country are made by the urban political elite.
The ethnic nationalist community is composed of three
elements. Most of the sixty-five ‘ethnic’ candidates elected in 1990 are
represented by the United Nationalities Alliance (UNA, previously the United
Nationalities League for Democracy), which has always worked closely with the
NLD. Then there are the fourteen armed ethnic groups which have agreed
ceasefires with Rangoon since 1989 (plus ten-or-so other ex-insurgent groups
with local agreements with the Tatmadaw). The
third sector of the ethnic nationalist community is composed of those insurgent
groups still at war with the military government, which are members of or
allied with the National Democratic Front (NDF).
There is a fairly high degree of cohesion between the
positions of the main UNA parties and the NDF. More problematic are the
positions of various ceasefire groups. The Kachin
Independence Organisation (KIO), New Mon State Party
(NMSP) and other NDF allies have participated in the Ethnic Nationalities
Solidarity and Coordination Committee (ENSCC; established in 2001), to agree
common positions among the ethnic nationality groups, in preparation for
tri-partite negotiations. The NMSP in particular plays an important role here,
with a foot in all three camps of the ethnic nationality community: it is the
closest of the ceasefire groups to the rump NDF, and also enjoys good relations
with the UNA leadership. However, the positions of a number of ex-Communist
Party of Burma (CPB) and other ceasefire groups in northern Burma are far from
clear. The Wa, Kokang, PaO and others may feel
that there is more to be gained by following the SPDC line, and staying clear
of politics, in order to concentrate on local community and economic
development programs (including in some cases the drugs trade).
Since 1989, the military government has repeatedly
stated that it will negotiate only with individual armed groups, refusing to recognise joint fronts, such as the NDF or DAB. These
‘divide and rule’ tactics have served successive regimes in Rangoon well, and
some observers expect the SPDC to offer further concessions to some ceasefire
groups, in exchange for their continued support (or at least, quiescence) in
efforts to complete the National Constitutional Convention. Alternatively, the
military may attempt to divert attention from the current political crisis, by
turning against groups involved in the drugs business, in order to mobilise domestic support, and perhaps gain some credit
with the Thai and American governments.
Ethnic nationality parties must also assess the risk
of alienating the urban- and exile-based Burmese democracy movement. By
launching an ‘ethnic initiative’ at a time when the NLD is weak, ethnic
nationality politicians may be accused of undermining Daw
Aung San Suu Kyi, and abandoning Burmese democracy groups in exile.
In response to
recent events, and especially Khin Nyunt’s revival of the National Convention, on September 5th
the ENSCC announced its own
'Roadmap for Rebuilding the Union of Burma’. The ENSCC first
called for the immediate release of Aung San Suu Kyi.
According to the
ENSCC plan, a tri-partite body (the ‘Congress for National Unity’) should be
established, and charged within two years with drafting a new constitution (or
‘National Accord’). The ENSCC ‘road map’ requires the Congress to ask the
international community for humanitarian assistance and - once the Accord is
finalised - for the formation of an interim ‘Government of National Unity’.
In the second
stage, the Government of National Unity would call for sanctions to be lifted
and for further international development assistance. A referendum would then
be held on the new constitution,
followed by general elections. This process would obviously need to preceded -
or at least accompanied - by a relaxation of restrictions on civil and
political rights, and a probably nationwide ceasefire.
Could elements of this
platform be incorporated into the regime’s National Convention? Could the SPDC
be persuaded to establish an interim administration (or Government of National
Unity) - or at least a Panglong-like Congress for
National Unity, to be tasked with drafting a new constitution? One obvious
sticking point is the representation of different parties in any such bodies:
what proportion should come from the SPDC/Tatmadaw,
the NLD/ 1990 parties (including the UNA) and the armed ethnic groups?
Furthermore, could the opposition accept the ENSCC’s
proposal that the SPDC continues as the government for the first two years of
the road map - presumably with Khin Nyunt as interim premier?
Another sticking point is the issue of federalism.
Although the ‘f-word’ is anathema to the generals in Rangoon, most ethnic
nationality parties in Burma are committed in principle to a federal solution
to Burma’s protracted constitutional crisis. However, there are different ‘federalising’ and ‘federating’ processes, various kinds of
relation between the states and the federal union, and different types of
federal structure - e.g. symmetrical and asymmetrical (different states and
sub-states enjoying different levels of autonomy or divisions of power), or
‘corporate federalism’ (in which citizens enjoy certain group rights, wherever
they happen to live). In recent years, ethnic nationality leaders and Burmese
democracy groups in exile have begun to discuss such arrangements in detail,
paying special attention the situation of minorities within ethnically-defined
states (e.g. the Wa and
others within Shan State). Another key issues is who should represent which
ethnic groups at what stage in negotiations, and with what degree of legitimacy
(e.g. who should represent the non-Christian, non-S’ghaw
Karen?). Such discussions need to move beyond sometimes simplistic statements
of principle, to grapple with concrete issues. Other important questions
include how to address Burma’s complex social, economic and humanitarian
problems, and what to do about past human rights abuses, particularly those
committed by the military (amnesty, or a truth - and reconciliation? – commission).
The Limits of a One-way (Top-Down) Route
This leaves unanswered the question of how to bring
about serious negotiations between the government and opposition in the first
place. Most likely, a combination of domestic and international pressure - and the provision of some kind of ‘exit
strategy’ for the generals - is necessary, to persuade the military to
engage in genuine dialogue. The fact that the opposition (and the ethnic
nationalities in particular) have very limited
leverage vis-à-vis the government explains the conciliatory nature of the
‘ethnic initiative’, which accepts that Burma will remain under military rule
for the first two years of the transition process.
However, the regime may well refuse to address explicitly political
issues, such as (federal) constitutions and power-sharing,
or even sensitive areas like human and group rights. In this case, it may be
worth considering whether social welfare and humanitarian issues could be used
to facilitate processes of dialogue - and eventually social and political
transition. In addressing subjects like education, HIV/AIDS or displacement
(refugees and Internally Displaced Persons) in the first stage of any
'confidence-building' process, stake-holders might be brought into needs analysis,
planning, implementation and monitoring-evaluation activities, which could be
used to foster models of collaboration. Cooperation in the humanitarian sector
might later be expanded, and developed into broader, more explicitly political
discussion of state-society and centre-periphery relations. A focus on IDPs in particular, would help to ensure ethnic nationality
participation in the process, as most displaced people are from these
communities.
This approach to negotiation on the basis of concrete
issues would require consultation with and participation from affected
communities, local and international NGOs, and UN agencies. This is one example
of how elite-level 'blue-print'-style politics might be complemented by more
participatory approaches, empowering a wider range of actors, including civil
society groups. Given the government’s
lack of incentive to engage in dialogue, such ‘bottom-up’ approaches may be
considered valuable in their own right, and constitute an alternative vehicle
for gradual democratisation.
Other Road Users: Local Democracy and Civil
Society
Overseas-based
activists and Burma-watchers have sometimes assumed that there is no civil
society in Burma. This is far from true.
The
term 'civil society' denotes associations and networks which are intermediate
between the state and the family. These include a broad range of
community-based social welfare organisations, as well as religious and cultural
groups (traditional and modern), and more overtly political organisations.
However, political parties seeking to assume state power (such as the NLD, and
NDF or UNA members) are not part of civil society - although they may promote
or inhibit its development.
Functioning civil society networks are essential for
sustained, ‘bottom-up’ social and political transition
in Burma, and for conflict resolution at both the national and local levels. It
is essential that the country's diverse social and ethnic communities enjoy a
sense of ownership in any transitional process, and equip themselves to fill
the power vacuum that may emerge, either as a result of abrupt shifts in
national politics, or of a more gradual withdrawal of the military from state
and local power. The ability of people to re-assume control
over aspects of their lives, which since the 1960s have been abrogated by the
military (including insurgent armies), will depend on such grass-roots
mobilisation.
Popular
participation and civil society networks are necessary, whether change in Burma
comes suddenly, or is more incremental. Indeed, the failure of the 1988
'Democracy Uprising' in Burma - like that of the 1989 'Democracy Spring' in
China - can in part be attributed to the suppression
of civil society. A lack of democratic culture prevented
powerful gestures from initiating sustained political change. Unlike those in
Eastern Europe in the late 1980s, the Philippines in 1986 and Thailand in 1992,
the Burmese and Chinese democracy activists had little social space within which
to operate, or to build upon the people's evident desire for fundamental
change. In particular, Burma and China had no counterpart to the Catholic
Church or trades unions, which played important roles in the Polish and
Filipino democracy movements. The Ne Win regime had
succeeded in denying social groups a foothold in mainstream politics or the
economy, except under strict state control. Potential opposition was thereby
marginalised, and could emerge only in times of crisis and upheaval, presenting
the military with a pretext to clamp-down on 'anarchy' and 'chaos' (thus the
State Law and Order Restoration Council).
Tatmadaw ideologues have long viewed their task as one of
‘national salvation’: the defence of a centralised, unitary state, which emerged from the struggle
for independence. The military has sought to impose a model of state-society
relations, in which the (ethnic minority) periphery was dominated by a strong (Burman-orientated) centre. As pluralism was suppressed, it
was replaced with a state-sponsored nationalism. The process of ‘Burmanisation’ saw diverse (and according to the military,
divisive) indigenous cultures, histories and aspirations subsumed under a
‘national’ identity, derived from the Burman
historical tradition.
As the state extended its
control over previously autonomous aspects of social life, many civil society
networks could no longer operate independently. Meanwhile, opposition to the
regime was either eliminated, driven underground, or
forced into open revolt. After the military coup of 1962, the existence of
renewed armed opposition to the military government provided a pretext for the
further extension of state control, and suppression of diverse social groups.
Under
the 1974 constitution, all political activity beyond the strict control of the
state was outlawed. Particularly hard hit were trades unions and most
professional associations (e.g. journalists’ groups). Nevertheless,
elements of civil society survived and - among ethnic nationality communities
in particular - have in recent years begun to re-emerge.
Civil
Society Actors
Civil society capacities among ethnic nationality
communities in Burma will be examined in relation to the remaining armed
opposition groups, and in ceasefire zones and areas under government control.
In practice however, local networks often extend across the ‘ceasefire front
line’.
The political culture of the 'liberated zones' has often
reflected the extractive nature of many insurgent groups' relations to natural
resources and the peasantry (their ethnic brethren, in whose name the war was
being fought). Although, since 1988, most opposition groups have claimed to be
fighting for democracy in Burma, this ideal is not always reflected in their
practices. In fact, many aspects of life in the 'liberated zones' have been characterised by a top-down tributary system, similar to
that in government-controlled areas, aspects of which recalled pre-colonial
forms of socio-political organisation. Insurgent
leaders have tended to discourage the expression of diverse opinions, and
initiatives beyond the direct control of militarised
hierarchies have often been suppressed, causing many talented cadres to leave
the armed struggle. Meanwhile, for most armed ethnic groups, insurgency became a way of
life - rather than a means to an end.
Since
the 1980s (if not earlier), ethnic insurgent groups in Burma have declined in
military and political significance. Ironically however, the decline of the old
insurgent paradigm has opened the space for the emergence of new and more participatory forms
of social and political organisation among ethnic nationality communities in
the border areas. In the 1990s a number of local NGOs were organised along the
China and India borders, and particularly in Thailand and overseas. Chin, Kachin, Shan, Lahu, Karenni, Karen, Tavoyan, Mon and
all-Burma student and youth, women's, environmental and human rights groups
began to occupy the political space created by the declining influence of
mainstream armed ethnic groups. Similar trends are apparent among the Karen, Karenni and Mon refugee committees, established by dominant
factions within the insurgent hierarchies in the 1980s and early '90s. As the
insurgents lost ground throughout the 1990s, the number of refugees in Thailand
grew annually, and assumed a new importance as civilian support base, source of
recruits and safe haven for the armed groups. However, as the refugee situation
along Thailand border was gradually internationalised, with the presence of
more INGOs - and since 1998, UNHCR - the refugee
committees have been obliged to become more responsive to (if not more
representative of) their clients - the
refugees.
These
new models of political organisation constituted one of the most dynamic aspects
in an otherwise rather bleak political scene. As a result of their activities,
all those engaged in the struggle for ethnic rights and self-determination in
Burma have been obliged to acknowledge the importance of women's rights,
community-level participation and democratic practices - not just as distant
goals, but as on-going processes.
Although
the state inhibits the growth of civil society, the past decade has
nevertheless seen a tentative re-emergence of local networks among and between
communities 'inside' Burma - beyond the zones of on-going armed conflict. This
is a complex phenomenon, owing much to the political space created by the
ceasefire process.
Despite
the existence of ceasefires, the Wa
and Kokang areas of Shan State are characterised by
an underdeveloped civil society sector, as is much of Rakhine
State. Meanwhile, across war-torn southern Shan State, and in large tracts of Karenni and Karen States and in Tenasserim
Division, local societies and economies continue to be undermined by armed
conflict. Nevertheless, in Chin, Kachin and parts of
Shan, Mon and Karen States local groups are able to provide limited
humanitarian and community development assistance from the ‘inside’, in ways
which strengthen human capital and build local capacities.
Although
villagers in many ceasefire and adjacent areas continue to be subject to a
range of human rights abuses, the ceasefire process has generally resulted in a
slight improvement in conditions on the ground, while increasing opportunities
for travel and trade. The ceasefire groups have retained their arms, and some
still control sometimes extensive blocks territory. However, the ceasefires are
not peace treaties, and generally lack all but the most rudimentary
accommodation of the ex-insurgents' political and developmental demands.
Nevertheless, various ceasefire groups' stated commitment to develop former
zones of armed conflict have created some
opportunities for the reconstruction of war-torn communities. However, many
ethnic nationalist cadres are more familiar with the 'top-down' approaches used
in military and political campaigns, than with 'bottom-up' development and
conflict resolution methods. As elsewhere in the country, local initiatives are
frequently undermined by parallel exploitative practices, and lack of strategic
planning and implementation capacities.
Nevertheless,
there are a number of success stories. These cannot be described in detail, due
to the need to protect vulnerable groups and individuals working ‘inside’
Burma.
The key players in the tentative re-emergence of civil society networks
over the past decade have often been members of religious and social welfare
networks. Many of these were established in the 1950s, only to be suppressed by
the military government after 1962. However, in recent years, Chin, Karen, Mon,
PaO, Shan and other Literature and Culture Committees
have been among the few specifically ethnic organisations tolerated by the
government. As the state school and higher education systems have continued to
deteriorate, such groups have pioneered alternative community education
approaches. For example, 55,000 school students (70% of them girls) attended
Summer Mon Literature and Buddhist Teachings Trainings in 2003.
Thus
far, only a few indigenous Burmese NGOs have been allowed to register legally
with the authorities. The two most well-known were established after the KIO
ceasefire, and although their importance to the broader scale of development
initiatives in Burma should not be overestimated, both are often seen as models
which other fledgling local NGOs might emulate.
The Metta Development Foundation was established in 1998, and
by 2003 had a budget of over $500,000, and 13 full-time staff, active in parts
of Kachin, Shan, Karenni,
Karen and Mon States, and the Irrawaddy Delta. Metta projects include Farmer Filed Schools, income
generation programs, health worker training, water and sanitation projects, and
a number of rural development schemes. The Metta
approach is participatory, stressing the empowerment
of community-based groups, and their eventual coalescence into local NGOs.
The
Shalom Foundation was founded in 2001 by the Reverend Saboi
Jum - a key figure in the KIO ceasefire process. It
employs 12 full-time staff, and works on mediation and conflict resolution
issues, building local capacity in these key sectors.
New
organisations like Metta and Shalom are not
countrywide institutions or membership groups, but often act as facilitators
and innovators for longer-established associations. In many cases these are
religious bodies - among the few non-government controlled social institutions
allowed to exist in Burma.
Although
emergent civil society networks are often associated with Christianity, many
Buddhist associations exist too, and the sangha
has great potential as a catalyst in civil - and political - affairs. Local
Buddhist associations tend to be focussed on merit-making, which can include
social and community welfare and educational activities, as well as
pagoda-building. In many parts of Burma, mosque and temple associations assist
the poorest of the poor. However, such non-formal, traditional networks tend to
more localised, and centred on individual monks, who may not conceptualise or
present their aims and objectives in a manner readily intelligible to western
agencies. Such initiatives are therefore often 'invisible' to western (and
western-trained) staff, and the dominance of Christian groups in the welfare
sector is potentially divisive, in a mainly Buddhist society.
It is
vital that donors and international agencies entering Burma - either via
refugee communities, across the border, or through Rangoon - realise that they
are not operating in a void. Impressive local initiatives do exist, and
are often worthy of support. Although the role of foreign aid is limited, it
can contribute towards the creation of an enabling environment, strengthening
local efforts to achieve peace and development, in ways which have generally
been neglected by outside observers.
Foreign
aid to Burma is
not a zero-sum scenario: donors do not have to choose between supporting
democracy or development in Burma.The
challenge is how to support local civil society, without overwhelming its
limited absorption capacities.
Having it Both Ways:
Two-Way Traffic on the Road to Transition
Efforts to empower civil society and support
‘bottom-up’ democratisation in Burma have often been
hostage to other political agendas - in particular, the struggle for
national-level political change. The NLD and other stake-holders want to see a
national/ elite-level political settlement in place, before they endorse local
development activities.
It is argued that relief and development work
‘inside’ the country will ‘let the SPDC off the hook’, by providing goods and
services that are the responsibility of the government, and by endorsing and legitimising the regime’s policies. Such concerns should be
taken seriously. However, if provided via
local NGOs and community organisations, humanitarian and other forms of assistance can be
delivered in ways which build local capacities, and contribute towards
grass-roots democratisation - both ‘inside’ the country and in border areas.
In the current political climate, with
national level-dialogue between the NLD and SPDC stalled, re-emergent
civil society networks represents an important vehicle for long-term,
‘bottom-up’ democratisation in Burma. As well as their
intrinsic value, these local networks can form the base for democratisation at the national level. The promotion of
civil society therefore relates to the constitutional concept of ‘countervailance’, in which sovereignty resides in plural
points of power, with functional checks and balances to preclude the centralisation of authority.
However, the re-emergence of civil society networks
is not in itself sufficient to produce political transition. This still requires
concerted, explicitly political actions.
Ashley South is
an independent consultant, specialising in ethnic
politics, displacement and humanitarian issues in Burma. He has visited the country more
than 50 times, and is the author of a political history of lower Burma - Mon
Nationalism and Civil War in Burma: The Golden
Sheldrake (RoutledgeCurzon 2003). His current
research on IDPs in Burma is funded by the MacArthur Foundation.