


NLD-LA

A1

Naisoi Refugee Camp in Thailand. Villagers fleeing SLORC attack on Karenni areas are given temporary refugee here.

NLD-LA



Payaw Refugee Camp in Mon area. The camp was forced to move to a new site in December 1995 for security reasons.

A3

NLD (LA)

Karen Refugees flee into Thailand as DKBA/SLORC troops attack Manerplaw in January 1995.

A4

Images Asia

Shan refugees: Mother feeds her daughter while waiting for relocation to a new village after fighting in Tachilek. (21 March 1995)

Images Asia

A pregnant woman walks by a charred village that, before an attack by the DKBO, was her home.

Burma Relief Centre

The village's stockpile of rice still in flames a day after the DKBA attack.

B2

B2a

Images Asia

Two Karen men salvage the bare remains of what once was their home.
Maramuklo Refugee Camp (30 April 1995)

B4

B5

Images Asia

Victims of DKBA attack on 23 February 1995, at which 3 died and 11 others wounded. A Thai driver and two Karen women refugees were killed during the attack on a truck by DKBA.

B6

KHRG

Karen refugee who was accosted by a group of SLORC soldiers on the Thai side of the Moei river between Huay Kalok and Huay Bone in December 1995. He and his friend were tied up, beaten, stabbed and thrown into the Moei river. His friend died. He escaped to a refugee camp and was hospitalised at a clinic there.


From BKK Post

Some of the thousands of illegal immigrants from Asia, mostly Burmese, who were detained in Bangkok . The men had their shirts removed to deter them from escaping when they were taken to the Immigration Division compound.



B7

Burmese workers find it easier to work illegally in Thailand than to face SLORC troops. Some of them were burned and hospitalised when a truck smuggling them caught fire on the way.



B8

Rosalie T. McKernan

B9

Thai police spare no one. A disabled Moe Kyaw who lost both his eyes and hands in a land-mine explosion was arrested by Thai police on 22 June 1995 during a raid in Nonthaburi, Thailand. Fourteen others, including two pregnant women and four babies were also arrested. This photo was taken in January 1995 while Moe Kyaw was in Mae Sot.

HURFOM

Illegal immigrants before being deported from Halockhani Refugee Camp.

(XIV) THE REFUGEE SITUATION AND FORCED REPATRIATION

14.1. Refugees in the West

Due to the harassment of SLORC army, 40 households from Khone-roa, 60 households from Poonhyongwa, 30 households from Pagawa, 25 households from Loundadv and 20 households from Theimoat-wa, Ngoaylak-wa and Quandaums, numbering a total 225 households with about 1,200 people fled into the Triangle area of Indo-Burmese-Bangladeshi border in southern Mizoram State of India. Over 180 families who fled in different waves into India in 1994 are scattering at the villages of Takpoat-che, Upper Khaki, Lower Khaki, Maungbuwas and at Musa area without having a name in the remote area of Indo-Burmese-Bangladeshi border. [Source: ASC]

14.2. Recent Refugee Influx into India

In January 1995, more than 300 Chin refugees fled into Bangladesh after the village head was executed by SLORC IB 376. They were not recognised as refugees by the Bangladeshi government. As they were taking refuge at CNF headquarters, CNF had to provide them with food and medicine. [Source: *Independent Chin Report*]

Due to the brutal killings of villagers by SLORC IB 376, more Arakanese people have recently poured into Mizoram State, India, as refugees. From February to May 1995, more than 60 families with 400 population fled from Arakan State to escape the killings of SLORC Army. Most of them are taking shelter in the Parava Camp in the southern-most area of Mizoram State, which is situated in the triangle area of the Indo-Burmese-Bangladeshi border. [Source: ASC]

On 8 February 1995, Burmese military and Indian authorities met at Rih Khuadar village, in Falam Township of Chinland. They issued a statement saying that all Chin refugees (who are all citizens of Burma) who have escaped to India should be forcibly sent back to Burma. [Source: *Independent Chin Report*]

On 1 June 1995, the only refugee camp in Mizoram, located in Champhai Town, was closed down by the Indian government. And on 15 June 1995, the Mizoram government started forced repatriation of all the Chin people who had taken refuge in Mizoram State. It was the third time the Indian government had deported Chin refugees to Burma. Hundreds of Chin refugees were handed over to the SLORC Army. [Source: *Independent Chin Report*]

In a statement released on 13 August 1995, Mr Ran Naing, representative of the Arakanese refugees at Parava Camp in India said:

"These refugees have been resettled in Parava Camp by the concerned local authorities. But assistance in the form of food and medicine is not still provided by anybody. When they (the refugees) fled into India, they could not bring anything with them except some essentials. They could not bring even enough pots for cooking. Now many of them have no pots, no plates, no blankets and no mosquito nets. They build their own makeshift bamboo huts for sheltering at their temporary locations. Children are dying of malaria, diarrhoea, dysentery and malnutrition in deteriorating conditions. Epidemics are threatening everybody. To keep them alive, they are in urgent need of emergency aids, medicines, food and clothing." [Source: ASC]

In recent months, about 1,000 villagers have fled their homes and made their ways through formidable jungles into Mizoram State in India. As Bangladesh is not much willing to accept and provide help to the Buddhist Rakhine refugees, in contrast with the Rohingya Muslim refugees, the escape to Bangladesh is still insignificant. [Source: ABYMU (Arakan)]

[See also under "Eyewitness Accounts", interview, 19-21, 149-156, 293-294]

14.3. Chief Justice Systematically Executed by Indians

At the invitation of Indian intelligence service, SIB, to a meeting at their outpost in Parva village, which lies at the southern tip of Mizoram State, on 31 March 1995, Salaing Sang Hlun and other two CNF officers — Mr Kung Ling and Mr Thawng Mang — went to SIB office. After a short conversation, the Indian authorities told them to come back the following day. However, the Border Security Forces (BSF) arrested them in that evening. The following day, the BSF handed over them to the Assam Rifles, who picked them up from Parva. The whereabouts of Sang Hlun, Kung Ling, and Thawng Mang was not known by the relatives and friends until 25 April 1995 when a friendly Zo soldier informed their relatives that the Indian Army (Assam Rifles) had a dead body, at the Aizawl hospital morgue. The soldier also informed that the Indian Army was planning to bury the body in secrecy. The Assam Rifles had dug a big hole in their compound and explained that they were going to bury a cow. That was how the friendly soldier found out how the body was to be buried. When the relatives including Sang Hlun's sister were shown only the lower part of the body at the hospital, with no doubt they could identified the body was Sang Hlun's. Sang Hlun's mother had come to Mizoram on hearing that her son had been taken away by the Indian authorities and his whereabouts was not known. What a shock to see her son's body! She had not seen him since he joined the CNF in 1988.

They learned from the hospital staff that Sang Hlun died on 23 April 1995 and an autopsy was done on his body on 24 April. When the people went back to the hospital the following day, the hospital was guarded by army personnel. At first they were not allowed to see the body but after pleading with the soldiers, the relatives were allowed to see the body. They were instructed to look only from a distance,

but they went and looked at the body closely. They were told that Sang Hlun had died of malaria. When the relatives of Sang Hlun insisted on knowing the cause of Sang Hlun's death, because he was very healthy before he was taken away, some soldiers gave the account of how he died.

Sang Hlun, Kung Ling and Thawng Mang were kept in the army barracks in Aizawl and they were allowed to talk freely with anybody in the barracks. They were questioned often by the authorities. Sang Hlun was very communicable and the soldiers liked talking to him as he knew a lot of things.

On 23 April, a dinner with mutton curry was served at 6:00 p.m. After a few bites Sang Hlun complained of stomach pain. So he asked for salt and said: "If I swallow salt I'll throw up all the poison, please give me salt." The Assam Rifles refused to give him salt, instead they took him to the hospital where he died at 8:30 p.m.

After the relatives pleaded with the Indian authorities, by applying to the Mizoram government, they were allowed to take the body for burial. They could see that there was no evidence of physical harm. The only strange thing they noticed was all the tip of his fingers were darkened. When Sang Hlun's sister asked for the belongings of her brother, the Assam Rifles returned his bag-pack, however, a note book and diary Sang Hlun kept constantly, were not among the returned belongings.

After the relatives went to court the hospital released the autopsy report, which stated the cause of death as cerebral malaria.

Born in Farrawn, Thlantlang District, Chin State, 38 year old Sang Hlun was a graduate of the University of Rangoon. Sang Hlun fled to India in 1988 from Rangoon to escape the brutal crack down on participants of 1988 pro-democracy movement. He immediately joined the Chin National Front and was elected vice-president of the CNF. He served until 1992 in that function. At the time of his death he was in-charge of the justice department (Chief Justice) of CNF and commander of CNF northern command.

The whereabouts of Thawng Mang and Kung Ling is still a mystery. The relatives of both of them believed, however, that the stench coming from the Assam Rifle's barracks, where the two persons were kept, to have come from the body of Thawng Mang. They believed that the big hole which was dug at the Assam Rifle's compound must have been dug for them. Sang Hlun, Thawng Mang, and Kung Ling were having the same dinner on 23 April 1995. [Source: ZO CENTER]

14.4. Rohingya Repatriation

In 1991-92 SLORC mounted a religious campaign against Muslim Rohingyas in Arakan State. It is unknown how many were massacred, but at least 300,000 fled to Bangladesh to become refugees. At least 200,000 of them have now been forced

back to Burma by Bangladeshi authorities with the support of the UNHCR. UNHCR made agreements with SLORC and the Bangladeshi government (but not with any representative of the refugees) to support this forced repatriation and tell the world it is “voluntary” as long as they can get a monitoring presence on both sides of the border. They now have that presence. On the Bangladeshi side, UNHCR cancelled the process of interviewing refugees to find out if they want to go back, instead holds mass “information sessions” encouraging refugees to go back. At these sessions they fail to mention forced labour, as they consider it to be an isolated occurrence. In its June 1995 Bulletin, UNHCR stated that SLORC had promised them to use returnees for forced labour only four days per month, and later said that SLORC had promised not to use returnees for forced labour in their first two months back home (i.e. while they still have their returnees allowance money to pay off the troops). However, there are reports that returnees are being used for up to five days per week of forced labour on road construction and other duties in the north of Buthidaung Township. UNHCR still does not mention this in its “information sessions”. The vast majority who express personal fears of persecution upon return are rejected as not having “valid reason” to be afraid. Furthermore, refugees being sent back to Burma are not being told that UNHCR will only stay in Arakan for one year after the repatriation (this is standard UNHCR policy). Many are going back with a misguided belief that UNHCR plans to remain in Arakan until the situation becomes safe and stable.

Now there are still about 50,000 refugees in the camps in Bangladesh. Many are there because SLORC, with or without reason, has refused to take them or one of their family members back. UNHCR now plans to start splitting up these families in order to cut down the number to 20,000, sending back anyone SLORC will accept (with the exception of the spouse or children of those specifically rejected). In Asian society, breaking up the extended family like this is completely unacceptable.

In Bangladesh, UNHCR states that they have injected US\$3 million into local communities. However, much or most of this money appears to have been spent donating four-wheel drive Land Cruisers to Bangladeshi officials and building a large and fancy new building in Cox's Bazaar to house the “Office of the Refugee Relief and Repatriation Commissioner”. This impressive building was completely paid for by UNHCR and inaugurated in December 1995, with most of the refugees already repatriated.

In Burma, UNHCR has 14 expatriate staff, but only four of them are protection officers — the rest are development consultants. They work through SLORC, and people from the area said that most returnees with problems would never dare to be seen entering the UNHCR office in Maungdaw. Land was confiscated at only 10% of its value to build these offices, and villagers nearby have lost their second annual paddy crops because the irrigation water has been diverted to UNHCR. In response, UNHCR reportedly paid only 5,000 Ks one-time compensation for the farmers — only enough to buy the equivalent of one-third of an acre's crop at current prices.

Buddhist Rakhines in the area say that UNHCR is fuelling racial tensions by favouring Muslims for all jobs and contracts. Meanwhile, UNHCR is claiming that the Rohingyas who fled Burma never owned their own land, and therefore should not all expect to have their land returned to them (the return of their land was promised to them before their repatriation). Rohingya sources claim that since September-October 1995, SLORC has been issuing new identity cards in Arakan State: red ones for Burmans and Rakhine Buddhists, which is a full citizenship, and white ones for Muslims, which is a provisional ID card stating that the holder is not the national of any country. They report that some Muslims who received National Registration Cards between 1955 and 1962 have now had these confiscated and replaced with a white card, thus losing their citizenship rights. UNHCR admits that forced relocation of villages for military camps and to avoid Rakhine/Muslim clashes has occurred, but claim that SLORC has promised to stop doing this. Both Rohingyas and Rakhines have reported that SLORC is forcibly relocating Muslims from other townships to Maungdaw and Buthidaung areas, and that Buddhists are also being forced to move to border areas.

Some returnees have subsequently fled again to Bangladesh. Most of them go into hiding and do not bother trying to report to UNHCR, but some have tried. UNHCR refuses to discuss them. Rohingya sources report that there are also new refugees and that they also go into hiding in the towns. UNHCR says that some new arrivals have come to their office with "false claims" of persecution in Burma. [*Source: KHRG*]

14.5. Karen Refugee Movements

Even before the main Manerplaw offensive began in January 1995, refugees were already fleeing into Thailand. For example, Sho Klo Karen refugee camp (110 km north of Mae Sot, Thailand) reported the arrival of 75 new families in December 1994 and January 1995, primarily from Hlaingbwe area in Pa-an District. The families were a mixture of Buddhists and Christians, and they said that people were fleeing primarily because of SLORC troops' sweeping villages for porters, though some villagers (Buddhists and Christians) were also fleeing because they were afraid of the growing DKBA-KNU conflict. One woman commented that more families wanted to come but that it was difficult because SLORC was deliberately blocking the way.

Particularly since the fall of Manerplaw in January 1995, the refugee situation has become increasingly confusing, but it can be divided into three main aspects: new refugees arriving, the movement of existing refugees, and the return of some refugees to Burma. At the beginning of 1995, there were an estimated 10-12,000 new Karen refugees who arrived in Thailand from the area north of Kawmoora. Majority of them were from villages from the Manerplaw area northward all the way to the Karenni border. Many of them fled before SLORC arrived in their villages because they dread of being taken as porters and life in general under SLORC domi-

nation; others tried to stay in their village only to witness it terrorised or destroyed when SLORC arrived, so they fled; while others fled because they feared religious persecution or forced relocation by the DKBA. Another small group of the new refugees fled from non-fighting SLORC-controlled areas because SLORC troops swept all such areas for porters. According to official figures, at the end of November 1994 there were 14 Karen refugee camps along that part of Thai-Burmese border with a total registered population of 50,356. By the end of February 1995, refugees from six of these camps fled to new locations further inside Thailand. Eight new camps were formed: some camps were totally filled with newcomers and some camps were occupied with the already-arrived refugees who had moved while others sheltered a combination of these two. A total registered population of those 16 camps was 61,257, an increase of 10,901. That number excluded hundreds of new refugees who did not register, and the numbers have continued to rise since then. This increase in the total has also occurred despite the return to Burma of about 1,500 refugees. The number of those in Thailand were only the tip of the iceberg; many more had fled into the forests or to homes of relatives, while new refugees estimated that at least 700 families were trapped west of the Salween River.

As new refugees keep arriving, existing refugee camps had also been on the move further into Thailand. All Karen refugee camps are unofficial, recognised neither by the Thai Government nor the UNHCR. The existing of those camps subject to understanding between Karen refugee leaders, local Thai villagers and officials, and the Thai Ministry of Interior. As such, they are not "closed camps" and have little or no security. They were all located within a few kilometres of the Burmese border; some of them were located right on the banks of the border rivers, in places where the KNU controlled the opposite bank. When SLORC occupied the Burmese side of the border, the civilians there felt no longer safe. SLORC troops have never shown respect for international borders, and since the end of January 1995 armed and unarmed SLORC/DKBA units have been crossing the border almost every day. Refugees from some camps moved in fear of being attacked while others moved after being shelled or penetrated by SLORC/DKBA troops. The situation has been getting worse than ever before as SLORC sends its troops across the border and then responds to any Thai Government protest by saying it is DKBA, which SLORC claims it does not control in any way. Witnesses have confirmed that SLORC troops have been involved in most of the border incursions. The Thai Army had almost no presence along this section of the border because it was never necessary while KNU controlled the other side. However, SLORC and DKBA have been taking advantage of the absence of Thai forces to cross the border with arms and with impunity, and to carry out their campaign to control the villagers in the refugee camps. Using threats, coercion and violence, SLORC and DKBA have been trying to frighten the refugees into returning to Burma. In some cases it is working as evidenced by the steady trickle of refugees who have fled the camps to return, usually crossing the border at Mae Ta Waw. There they are met by SLORC trucks and taken away either to DKBA areas or villages where SLORC chooses to keep them. SLORC has claimed that over 9,000 refugees have already returned, but the real total is more like 1,500-2,000, primarily from two of the largest camps, Baw Noh and Sho Klo.

Ever since the DKBO was first formed it tried to coerce Buddhist refugees into returning, seeing the refugee camps as a source of support for KNU and wanting the refugees as DKBA recruits. At first, their tactic was gentle suggestion combined with promises of an untroubled life at the Myaing Gyi Ngu "refuge", as promised to other villagers. Of course, only Buddhist refugees were invited. The refugees already felt insecure because of indications that Thailand and the UNHCR may have been preparing a forced repatriation programme for Karen refugees, so gradually about 350 people from Baw Noh camp made their way across the border. However, after the fall of Manerplaw the DKBA was not satisfied with those numbers, and in unison with SLORC their tactics changed to threats and attacks on the camps in an effort to terrorise the refugees back to Burma. In February 1995 the DKBO widely distributed a letter stating that "In order to dismantle the refugee camps, we have various plans. Therefore all nationalities must leave the refugee camps and return to Myaing Gyi Ngu. If you do not comply with this document, you will be considered as anti-Buddhists and KNU and we are going to uproot you." While this has worked to a certain extent, driving more people to return even as others were fleeing DKBA and SLORC areas for their lives, it has also backfired. At least some refugees who were planning to return changed their minds after the camps were attacked, while many Buddhists who were adopting a "wait and see" attitude because they are determined to stay in Thailand at all costs. After that Thailand has provided some limited security in the camps, many refugees feel they are safer with the Thais than taking chances with the DKBA. Most Christian refugees in particular feel that to return to Burma now would be suicide.

Table 9. Movements of Karen Refugee Camps

Camp abandoned (November 1994)	Population	Moved to	Remarks
We Gyi	1,737	Meh Ya Hta	Moved to location several kilometres inside Thailand
Bon Ya Hta	1,152	Meh Sa Ger	Moved to site of a 15-minute walk inside Thailand
Ka Htee Hta	2,891	Mae Kong Kha	Moved three times due to attacks; now three hours walk inside Thailand, but was attacked there as well
Mae Paw Mu Hta	2,624	Huai Heng, Mae Ra Ma Luang	Moved three times due to attacks
Mae Po Hta	919	Baw Noh, Ber Lu Ko, Sho Klo	Population scattered
Kler Thay Lu	802	Baw Noh, Ber Lu Ko, Sho Klo	Population scattered
Klay Mu Hta	3,224	new Klay Mu Hta (Thai side)	Camp was on the Burmese side of Moei River, has now fled to Thai side

Baw Noh 9,374 Sho Klo, other, (*)
 Thai towns, etc.

(*) Figure of Baw Noh camp was as of February 1995. All but about 2,000 of them fled the camp in March 1995 due to escalating armed attacks on the camp by DKBA, but many later returned again.

Of the aforementioned abandoned camps, the first four were along the Salween riverbank. Mae Po Hta was on the Moei riverbank, and Kler Thay Lu was about one kilometre from Moei River inside Thailand. Klay Mu Hta was a refugee camp set up on the Burmese side of the border due to a Thai decree that no more Karen refugees would be allowed. Baw Noh is less one kilometre inside Thailand, but is east of a main Thai road and in an area populated by Thai citizens.

Table 10. New location of Refugee Camps

Name	Population	Location	Remarks (February 1995)
Meh Ya Hta	1,737	East of upper Salween	Relocated refugees
U Da Hta	1,137	"	New refugees
Klo pa	505	"	New refugees
Meh Sa Ger	1,313	"	New & relocated refugees
Mae Kong Kha	2,817	3 hrs. east of Mae Sam Lap	Relocated refugees
Huai Heng	1,800	2 hrs. east of lower Salween	Relocated refugees
Mae Ra Ma Luang	4,900	3 hrs. east of Manerplaw	New & relocated refugees
Klay Mu Hta (new)	3,659	Moei river near Mae Salit	Relocated refugees

14.6. Attacks on Refugee Camps

Attacks on Karen refugee camps in Thailand by groups of SLORC and DKBA soldiers have grown increasingly common and serious since the fall of Manerplaw in January 1995. Initially many of these groups crossed without arms, but later they were almost always heavily armed — with assault rifles and on many occasions with M79 grenade launchers or even RPG's (rocket-propelled grenades). The initial incursions were primarily for the purpose of looting by SLORC troops. Then the campaign of terror against the refugees camps began. The SLORC has long wanted to wipe out these camps, which are an international embarrassment to them and which provide civilians with a way to escape from SLORC control, while also providing a mean for information on the reality of political and human rights situation to the outside world. But destroying these camps was impossible until the DKBA came along. Now the SLORC can use the Karen DKBA to infiltrate the camps, and can send its own troops into Thailand under the cover of the DKBA. A major campaign to destroy the camps was introduced, first by gently persuading refugees to return, but since February 1995 by changing tactics of using threats, fear and violence, by SLORC/DKBA troops. The following is translation of a letter in Burmese

received in several refugee camps in February 1995:

Stamp: Hlaing Bwe Township, Myaing Gyi Ngu Old Town

To: _____ refugee camp

Date:—95

Subject: All Buddhist people from the refugee camps are to leave and go back to Myaing Gyi Ngu

We will take care and responsibility for the family needs of all Buddhists who return from the refugee camps. You will be accepted as the families of Myaing Gyi Ngu. Already many families from the refugee camps are joining us every day. We have learned from people who have returned that the KNU is harassing and frightening the Buddhist community in the refugee camps.

To continue living in the refugee camps means to prolong the existence of the KNU and its harassment of the Buddhist community, and is a hindrance to peaceful resolution. In order to dismantle the refugee camps, we have various plans. Therefore all nationalities must leave the refugee camps and return to Myaing Gyi Ngu. If you do not comply with this document, you will be considered as anti-Buddhists and KNU and we are going to uproot you.

Families who return will be received at Myawaddy and will be sent to Myaing Gyi Ngu free of charge.

Soe Thit Sa Ti (Kyaw Win)
DKBA (Special Forces)

SLORC and DKBA troops have learned that they can move into Thailand at any time without being attacked. At present, the number and intensity of attacks against the camps is increasing, and at the same time cross-border robberies are happening every night all along the Thai border from Mae Sot to Mae Sariang. Rather than limit these robberies to impoverished refugees, the SLORC/DKBA troops are increasingly committed robberies on Thai citizens at gun point in the areas such as Meh Dan and Mae Ta Waw.

Making the situation worse, most of the new refugee camps are in remote areas which is completely cut off from outside access by road or river (now that SLORC controls the rivers) in rainy season from June to October.

The following report details some of the significant border incursions since January

1995, confirmed by KHRG. This is by no means a complete list.

14.6.1. Manerplaw Area

Several days before SLORC overrun Manerplaw itself, much of the civilians in Manerplaw area had already sought refuge in Pway Baw Lu, a village two kilometre. Even so, as soon as SLORC took a hill from which they could see Pway Baw Lu, most families began fleeing further into Thailand, fearing a ground attack or artillery barrage. The day that SLORC troops arrived in Manerplaw, they immediately began a mortar barrage against Thai territory on the other side of the Moei River as a form of pursuit of the Karen soldiers who had withdrawn to Thailand and disarmed themselves. Thai soldiers from Task Force 35 had already been flown in to take up positions to secure their border, but this did not affect the SLORC troops' actions. As the concentration of Thai troops increased, many of the refugees trickled back into Pway Baw Lu, but the atmosphere was very tense. Most refugees felt that if a massive SLORC forces crossed the river, the Thai troops would simply withdraw to avoid fighting. SLORC/DKBA units began crossing the Moei River to loot abandoned villages on the Thai side such as Htoo Wah Lu, Ka Paw Lu and Mae Po Hta. There were reliable reports that they opened fire on a refugee trying to recover some belongings in Ka Paw Lu, and that they had come across to have lunch with Thai troops in Htoo Wah Lu. Then there was a rumour that the SLORC/DKBA troops were about to launch ground attack on Pway Baw Lu, and the village was completely evacuated further into Thailand. The refugees camped along dusty roads near a Thai Karen village of Meh Taw La and eventually established a camp, about three hours' walk into Thailand, at Mae Ra Ma Luang (also called Mae Ra Mu Klo). The continued strong presence of Thai military and Border Patrol Police between the camp and Manerplaw has thus far prevented any attacks on the camp.

14.6.2. Mae Paw Mu Hta/Huai Heng Camp

Mae Paw Mu Hta camp, with a population of 2,624 in November 1994, was on the bank of Salween River less than 10 km. south of Mae Sam Lap. SLORC occupied the opposite bank of the Salween and shelled this refugee camp on 4 February 1995. At least three shells landed in the camp, followed by about 10 minutes of machine gun fire. The refugees fled the camp in a panic together with Thai Border Patrol Police who had been stationed there. On the same day, as SLORC troops crossed the Salween a few kilometres further downriver and looted a shop in a Karen village of Pu Mya Lu (displaced Karen from Burma who farmed on the Burmese side of the river, but not a refugee camp), the villagers there had to evacuate as well.

The Pu Mya Lu villagers fled to Mae Ra Ma Luang camp, while the refugees from Mae Paw Mu Hta fled inland an hour's walk to Meh Po Kee, which was a temporary shelter. As that place was unsafe, on 22 February, aid organisations sent five small cargo trucks to help move the refugees and their belongings to a 30-minute-drive to

southeast permanent site at Huai Heng, further inside Thailand. The move continued throughout 22-23 February. At 5-5:30 p.m. on 23 February, when most people had already been moved, one of the trucks left Meh Po Kee with 4-6 families and some of their belongings. A few minutes along the road, it was forced to stop by a group of uniformed and heavily armed soldiers, who appeared out of the forest and immediately opened fire on the truck with AK47 assault rifles and one M79 grenade launcher. The Thai driver and two women on the truck were killed and 11 others wounded, including a five-year-old boy who had to have surgery in the field before being referred to Mae Sariang hospital, but survived.

Following were casualties of the shooting.

Name	Sex	Age	Remarks
Udorn Khieumool	M	40	Killed by multiple bullet wounds
Naw Peh	F	60	Killed by gunshot in the back, large exit wound in the belly
Naw May Paw	F	36	Killed by gunshot in the head
Saw Ma Lay	M	5	Bullet wound in the left chest; bullet punctured the pleura and the spleen, then came to rest in the stomach. Doctors on site had to perform a field transfusion and splenectomy and removed the bullet from the stomach, then referred to Mae Sariang hospital. Saw Ma Lay is Naw May Paw's son.
Naw Mu Heh	F	25	Wounded on right shoulder, piece of M79 shrapnel embedded
Naw Krit Heh	F	27	Wounded behind left ear, three small wounds on the back
Pa Nga Bya	M	35	Superficial wound on the right cheek
Nay Hta Ghay	M	3	Wounded superficially by flying glass
Pa Naw Mu	M	7	Superficial wound on the left cheek
Naw Shwe Roh	F	42	Wounded on right knee, also hematoma
Saw Kwa	M	49	Multiple wounds on the back, including one deep wound
Naw Meh Ta Ker	F	17	Superficial wounds
Saw Wih	M	30	"
Naw Nya Gu	F	30	"
Saw Ber Cher Ler	M	47	"

All of those who suffered were Karen refugees, except Udorn Khieumool, who was the Thai truck owner/driver, a well-respected resident of Mae Sariang Town in Mae Hong Son Province. The other Thai national on the truck, the conductor, escaped without serious injury. The shooting appears to have been an act of pure terrorism

to intimidate the refugees, although there has been speculation that it was also a form of warning to aid organisations to leave the camps, because the trucks had been hired by aid organisations.

The rest of the refugees fled that evening to Huai Heng on foot, where the atmosphere became one of extreme fear. Saw Maw Si, an educated and soft-spoken medic in his mid-forties who served as camp leader, had been targeted for execution by DKBA in December 1994, when he had to live in hiding in the forest for a week. After the attack on Mae Paw Mu Hta and shooting of the truck, he was close to a nervous breakdown and was no longer able to function as a camp leader. Without guidance, many refugees fled to Mae Ra Ma Luang on foot or by small truck.

14.6.3. Ka Htee Hta Camp

Ka Htee Hta refugee camp, with a population of 2,891 in November 1994, was located on the bank of Salween River about one hour's walk north of Mae Sam Lap. On 7 February 1995, SLORC troops started shelling Oo Thu Hta, on the Burmese side of the river opposite Ka Htee Hta. They entered Oo Thu Hta in the late afternoon on the same day. At that point most of the villagers had already fled Ka Htee Hta to Meh Wih Kloh, five kilometre further inside Thailand. By 10 February, everyone had left main Ka Htee Hta camp and only about 50 families remained in Section 1 (Meh Wih Der). That afternoon, a group of armed soldiers — about 15 SLORC and three DKBA — crossed the river. The DKBA men went up the hill and spoke to the refugees telling them to go to Khaw Taw (Myaing Gyi Ngu) without threat. Fifteen families went with them. From 10 to 12 February, armed SLORC troops then came across the river and looted Ka Htee Hta, taking all the livestock and belongings they could find, 400 fifty-kg. sacks of rice from the storehouse and 100 sacks which had already been distributed to the houses. The refugees had planned to return for these, but became too afraid once SLORC had occupied the other side of the river. Soldiers, porters and conscripted refugees had to carry the rice to three stolen cattle-boat which SLORC used to transport it to Oo Thu Hta. After this period, the remaining families in Section 1 also left the camp for Meh Wih Kloh. On 12 February, three armed DKBA men went to Meh Wih Kloh and forced five more families to go back with them at gun point, threatening to shoot anyone who refused. They told the rest of the refugees they had better return to Burma or the SLORC would shell their camp. The refugees panicked and fled to Meh Paw Kloh, another one hour's walk into Thailand. They later learned from a monk who was still staying in Ka Htee Hta that SLORC shot dead two men — Win Oo (28) and Than Myint (20) — who returned on 10 February and three more — Meh Ka La (26), Maw Bee (38) and Pa Da Kee (32) — who returned on 12 February. One 18 February, the same monk came and told the refugees that 30 SLORC soldiers were preparing to attack Meh Paw Kloh at night if the refugees didn't return right away. The refugees fled again, this time to Mae Kong Kha, near a Thai Karen village, three hours' walk from Salween River. SLORC troops never came to Mae Paw Kloh. On 21 February, it was reported that a young woman, Ma Nyay (18), who

had crossed back to Burma on 10 February was sent back across the river at Mae Sam Lap for treatment after being raped by 20 SLORC soldiers.

At 2:00 a.m. on 10 March, armed DKBA soldiers came to Mae Kong Kha and abducted the camp leader, Saw Ghay Ploh (in his late forties, a Christian) and the camp security leader Aung Lay (a Buddhist). In the process, Aung Lay was beaten up and suffered one rib broken as the DKBA men disarmed him. Both victims were taken back to Burma with their families, totalling nine people. They have reportedly been taken to Kyaw Taw and not too badly treated along the way because Ghay Ploh knew the DKBA soldiers involved. Two days later, 54 more families left the camp for Burma, either with the idea of following the camp leaders or in fear of further attacks.

14.6.4. U Da Hta Camp

At U Taw Hta near U Da Hta on 8 February 1995, SLORC and DKBA reportedly crossed the Salween River, looted rice, pigs and buffaloes and burned down five houses.

14.6.5. Ber Lu Ko

Ber Lu Ko is a Thai Karen village just north of Mae Ta Waw, but when several refugee camps had to be evacuated, 27 refugee families from Kler Thay Lu and Mae Po Hta camps came to stay there. At about 9:00 p.m. on 2 March 1995, six armed DKBA men entered the village while an estimated 20-30 DKBA or SLORC troops waited around the village perimeter. DKBA sought out Pu Kyaw Li (or "Jolly"), who had been a former KNU official and camp leader of Kler Thay Lu. He, in his late 60s, is a Christian Seventh Day Adventist, a religion particularly hated by the DKBA because it is Gen Bo Mya's religion. When they found him, they beat him with a torch-light and kicked him, tied him up and took him away. They also left a letter saying that everyone must leave the camp by 5 March or it would be burned down. They took Pu Kyaw Li across the river to Burma. His daughter and his bodyguard followed him the following day, and when his bodyguard returned he reported that Kyaw Li was held at Meh Baw Plaw and was still alive. The 5 March deadline passed with no action being taken against Ber Lu Ko camp. No further word has been received regarding Kyaw Li, and there is strong fear that he might be executed because of his religion.

14.6.6. Baw Noh (Mae Ta Waw) Camp

Baw Noh camp with a population of 9,374 in February 1995, just south of Mae Ta Waw, had increased in population by about 3,000 because it was a well-established refuge for people fleeing camps such as Kler Thay Lu and Mae Po Hta. However,

it was a prime target of the DKBA and SLORC because of its large population, its proximity and accessibility from the SLORC border post of Mae Ta Waw, and its mixed Buddhist/Christian/Muslim population. Even before the fall of Manerplaw and shortly thereafter, a total of about 350 refugees from Baw Noh were persuaded or coerced into returning to Burma by DKBA supporters who infiltrated the camp. DKBO leaflets were distributed encouraging people to go back. However, in February 1995 they introduced a new tactic of armed incursion and fear in Baw Noh as well as elsewhere.

At 1:15 a.m. on 28 February 1995, about 30 armed men from SLORC and DKBA came to the camp. Nine of them entered the front section of the camp while the others stayed in the surrounding small hills. The nine came to the main gate and found people there sleeping. Other witnesses later said four of them were Karen in DKBA uniform and five were Burmese in SLORC uniform. They captured San Htun Kai (age 57-58 years, Buddhist and married with three children) who had formerly been a low-level KNU official in Burma. As they were capturing him, two people walked into the camp from the direction of the main road. They were Thai Karen traders — Thai citizens who sell goods in the camp while their families live in Mae Ta Waw village. When the traders saw a group of people at the gate, they shone a torch-light at them, and two of the soldiers opened fire. Both men were wounded in the legs. Ah La (21, married with no children) was hit by one bullet in the ankle and Pa Dee Thu (35, married with four children) was hit by several bullets: one in the lower leg, one just above the knee and one hit his hip from the rear and exited from the front beside his groin. The armed men then left, abducting San Htun Kai to Burma and leaving the two wounded men laying there on the ground. Ah La was later sent to Meh Dan Hospital, while Pa Dee Thu was referred to Mae Sot Hospital. No news has been heard of San Htun Kai.

According to camp officials, "They left behind a letter that said, 'Buddhists must all come back between now and 15 March. If you stay you'll be considered bodyguards of Christians and under their command. On 5 March, we'll come and burn the whole camp. All the Christians will be buried here.'"

On 2 March 1995, an armed group robbed a shop in Klu Me Nee Hta, between Baw Noh and Mae Tha Waw. At about 9:00 p.m. on the same day, three people — two armed and one with a radio — were seen carrying a red sign with black letters was found posted in Baw Noh saying (according to camp officials), "After 6-7:00 p.m. you can't cross the river. Anyone crosses the river will be killed. If we come to the camp don't shoot us. If you do, we'll burn the whole camp. If you shoot, you'll see what happens.", signed by "Soe Thein, Soldier of Religion". Some of the former sawmills across the Moei River from Baw Noh had already been burned after 28 February attack. Less than one kilometre east of the river is the north-south Mae Sariang-Mae Sot highway with a Thai police post, and the camp started on the eastern side of this road, stretching east about one kilometre where the camp ends and open paddy-fields begin. Between 28 February and 5 March, the front part of the camp (nearest to the road) had largely been cleared out. Many people were

staying in their houses by day but leaving at sunset to sleep in the bush and the paddy-fields to the east of the camp. Some had sent their families to stay in nearby Thai Karen villages. People in the back end of the camp had many of their belongings packed. Everyone was waiting to see what would happen, afraid but also somewhat defiant. Every day small trucks carried people moving south to Sho Klo camp, as well as those going to Mae Ta Waw to return to Burma. Thai authorities kept promising to send security forces and everyone was hoping for this, but they were slow to arrive. People were doubtful of the DKBA's threats but unsure what to believe. About noon on 4 March, a large number of SLORC troops appeared on the Burmese bank of the Moei River directly opposite Baw Noh, and the fear increased. Finally, a few Thai soldiers arrived on 5 March, but not nearly enough to defend the camp. However, the threatened attack did not happen. As with most of the DKBA's threats, its purpose was only to intimidate people into fleeing the camps.

At about 5:30 a.m. on 15 March, a heavily armed group of about 20 Karen and SLORC soldiers entered Section 2 of the camp, coming out of the forested hills and across the paddy-fields. It appeared that they might have already been encamped in Thailand for one or more days, as they had passed through a Thai Karen village and told the villagers not to say anything. The armed men approached the camp leader's house, which faced onto the paddy-fields. The camp leader and his family were staying in another house, but there were some camp security (refugees on security duty) outside the house. The soldiers shot and killed a camp security man who was sleeping on the ground outside the house, then opened fire on the house. Two other security guards were wounded — one in the back and another in the hand. The soldiers fired an M79 grenade which hit the house to the left of the camp leader's, totally destroying the front wall. Fortunately the house was empty. Then they entered the camp leader's house, shot it up, took the Bible and tore it into pieces as they ran away. They ran up a hill behind the house shooting, and hit a woman and child in one of the houses, wounding her in the arm and the hip and the child in the neck. People in the houses on the hill fled their houses and ran away from the armed men and down into the paddy-fields. The soldiers arrived at the pastor's house and opened fire on it, but the pastor and his family had already run. Then the soldiers ran in the same direction as the refugees, but more camp security and some Thai soldiers arrived and fired on them, killing one DKBA soldier and wounding two or three other Karen and SLORC soldiers. They captured an M1 rifle from the dead man. Camp security witnesses said the armed men were definitely a mixture of DKBA and SLORC, armed with AK47 and M79. Some carried two weapons. The soldiers then fled onto the hills. The armed men made their way 10 km. to the north through the hills and crossed the Moei River into Burma just south of Mae Ta Waw. At 3:00 p.m. on that day there was further panic in the camp because a rumour said that DKBA and SLORC were coming back to retrieve the dead body of their comrade, but this never happened. One of the four wounded refugees died that afternoon.

After this attack, about 2,000 refugees fled Baw Noh, most of them going 20 km. south to Sho Klo camp, scattering to Thai Karen villages or the hills and forests, or

camping in the paddy-fields immediately surrounding the nearby Thai Army position. Later an order was issued asking all Baw Noh refugees at Sho Klo to return to their former camp. Many had already done so, especially among the Muslim community. Some said as they could no longer stand the cramped conditions where they were all kept in two open warehouses in Sho Klo, they returned to stay at Baw Noh whatever was the cost. As the camp leader dared not return, a new camp leader has been appointed in Baw Noh. Another letter was then received at Baw Noh, threatening to burn the entire camp on 27 or 28 March.

At about 7:30 a.m. on 28 April 1995, Baw Noh camp was attacked by a group of about 100 men, most of them DKBA but apparently with a few SLORC soldiers among them. The armed men launched attack from two directions: one came from the south and across the highway while the other came down the highway from the north and brazenly marched right across a large highway bridge just in front of the camp. Without provocation, they then opened fire on the Thai police post along the highway in front of the camp. The post was manned by its usual contingent of five police, plus an additional seven Border Patrol Policemen. They exchanged fire with the attackers for five minutes, wounding two DKBA, but Thai police had to flee because DKBA were outnumbered. Two policemen ended up having to hide under the highway bridge while one Border Patrol Policeman, Sgt Thawatchai Wanond, was captured, tied up and taken to Burma as a prisoner when the attackers withdrew. He was released unharmed the following day. The attackers later burned down the police post, destroying an estimated 200,000 baht (US\$ 8,000) worth of equipment and personal belongings.

They then advanced to the front part of the camp, while troops (probably SLORC) on the Burmese side of the Moei River (one kilometre to the west) began shelling the back half of the camp with 81 mm mortar, probably to stop the refugees escaping into the paddy-fields behind the camp and to deter any attempt at defence by the camp security force. Over ten mortar rounds hit the back half of the camp, wounding two people. As the attackers entered the camp, they fired RPGs (Rocket-Propelled Grenades) and small arms. They began looting and then burning houses. They arrested three refugees but released them before leaving. They looked for the camp leader but he was up the road in Mae Ta Waw village, and they looked for Saw Abraham (also known as Ah Kya), the Seventh-Day Adventist pastor. He and his family had to hide in two covered holes under their house, and did not come out in fear of being shot. Their house was then set on fire. As the house began to collapse, the pastor, his wife and their youngest son managed to escape with bad burns, but their 18-year-old daughter Naw Geh Moo Paw, a 10th standard high school student, was alone in a separate hole. The house collapsed on her and she was burned to death. Her screams were heard by people throughout the camp.

The attackers stayed in the camp for about one hour. They set half the camp on fire and then the fire spread to the whole camp. An estimated 700 houses were burned, including the school and the camp hospital. Only the monastery and a few houses were left standing at the front of the camp and on the low hills surrounding. They

threatened the refugees that they would come back again in a few days, and next time they would kill everyone who remained.

Five refugees were wounded and one (Naw Geh Moo Paw) was killed. Pastor Abraham (47), his wife (39-40) and their youngest son (12) suffered from burns and were sent to hospital. Two others were wounded by shrapnel from 81 mm mortar shells — one was hit by fragments in both shoulders and the nose, and the other was hit by two or three fragments in the lower leg. They were also sent out to hospital for treatment.

At 8:00 p.m. the night before the attack, Karen camp security already had notification that DKBA troops were in the monastery directly across Moei River and were preparing to attack the camp, and they immediately notified the Thai police at post. Thai police said they had notified their superiors repeatedly and in detail that the camp was about to be attacked, but their superiors had never responded or sent reinforcements. Instead, the policemen were notified to disarm the Karen security at the camp. The evening before the attack, they told the camp security leader that a senior Thai Army officer was coming and that on 28 April all houses would be searched for weapons, so camp security must either hand over or bury their weapons (the then Thai Army Commander-in-Chief Wimol Wongwanich did in fact visit the camp two days after the camp was burned). At 5:00 a.m. on 28 April, the Thai officer in charge again notified camp officials to get rid of any weapons. As soon as the camp security had finished disarming themselves, the attack began.

14.6.7. Mae Salit (Tala Thaw, Gray Hta) Camp

Mae Salit, with a population of 3,573 in February 1995, initially seemed to be quieter and safer than the other camps. The relocation was 119 km. north of Mae Sot, between Sho Klo and Baw Noh, about 30 minutes walk into Thailand from Moei River. However, later on it was the subject of threats and reported infiltration by DKBA posing as refugees. At 1:30 a.m. on 9 March, armed soldiers came to a hut alongside the Moei River near Gray Ht, the home of a refugee family that had farms on the Burmese side of the river but they used to sleep in Thailand for safety. The elderly couple and two of their sons were there. Three men stayed under the hut while three others, armed with an AK47 and two knives, entered. They threw away the family's Bible and went through the house, stealing jewellery and the family's entire savings of 10,140 baht. When Saw Htoo Htoo (61) swore to God that this was all they had, the man said, "There is no God any longer" and shot him twice, killing him. The perpetrator then shot his son Tamla Htoo twice and killed him. The younger son had already had already escaped from the back of the house when the men arrived. They then left without harming the boys' mother.

On 20 March, another house, located at one end of Mae Salit camp, was looted. Two or three men came with guns and a grenade at night but they did not shoot. They robbed 7,000 baht and a radio/cassette recorder.

14.6.8. Sho Klo Camp

Sho Klo camp, with a population of 8,523 in February 1995, is 110 km north of Mae Sot, a short walk from the Moei River. Although DKBA sent a lot of leaflets and propaganda to the camp's monastery with orders to the monks to distribute it, no serious attacks was reported as of March 1995. Letters threatening to destroy the camp if everyone does not return have also been sent. At night on 2 December 1995, about 60 armed men from DKBA attacked this refugee camp, robbed the people there, taking an estimated 10,000 baht and seized three KNU officials. The raiders also threatened to burn down the camp before they fled. At 1:00 p.m. on 26 December, about 30 armed men from DKBA led by Chit Nu entered Section 7 of Sho Klo refugee camp and committed a robbery. Because of shootings, Saw Aye Tun, in charge of Section 7, and his two- year-old daughter was wounded. Some houses were destroyed and all the valuable belongings which worth more than 510,000 baht were taken away.

14.6.9. Mae La (Beh Klaw) Camp

Mae La camp, with a population of 6,907 in February 1995, is 60 km. north of Mae Sot and the back end of the camp is about one hour's walk from a major SLORC base at Maw Pa Thu. About 9 p.m. on 9 February, seven armed men entered this back section of the camp and went to the house of Pado Mahn Yin Sein (55), former KNU governor of Pa-an District. Armed men abducted him, his nephew Saw Sim Bo, Sia Jed (a former of KNU judge) and Aung Maung Aye, who is Mahn Yin Sein's son-in-law and second vice-governor of Pa-an District. The perpetrators tied up them and at gun point they took Mahn Yin Sein's pickup truck, parked in a shelter near the house, and forced Aung Maung Aye to drive them southward along the main road toward Moei River opposite Maw Pa Thu. They told Aung Maung Aye that if Thai police stopped the car, they would shoot them. Unused AK 47 cartridges were later found in the car shelter, and the soldiers also had an M79 grenade launcher. Aung Maung Aye, a Christian, tried to stop the kidnapping by driving the car off the road into a tree. He then managed to escape with a wounded leg, and was later admitted to hospital. However, the kidnappers escaped with Mahn Yin Sein and the others on foot. There has been no further news of those abducted.

After the kidnapping, families stopped sleeping in the outlying section of the camp near Mahn Yin Sein's house and the car shelter and moved their belongings to houses in other parts of the camp. At 4:00 a.m. on 28 February, people saw the light of a fire from that part of the camp but dared not go to inquire. At daybreak they found that the house of U Pa Dwa (40, married with four children) was completely razed to the ground. The family had already abandoned the house at that time. But after it was burned, U Pa Dwa was so afraid that he was targeted and he took his family back to Burma.

At night on 2 March, some DKBA members reportedly entered the camp to force

some of their relatives to go back to Burma. However, the women refused to set off with the children in the middle of the night, and when other refugees arrived on the scene the men fled. Since then there have been several reported incidents of families being robbed at night in outlying sections of the camp, and automatic rifle fire has been heard throughout the camp on at least two occasions. There is a report that one refugee was injured in one of these incidents; however, camp authorities have been trying to prevent general panic by withholding information on such incidents.

14.6.10. Huay Bone (Don Pa Klang) Camp

Huay Bone camp, with a population of 2,919 in February 1995, is 19 km. north of Mae Sot near Moei River. It has also been the subject of threats, and at some time in March 1995 there are reliable reports that two men were arrested in the camp by security and found to be carrying one or more hand grenades.

14.6.11. Huay Kalok (Wan Kha) Camp

Huay Kalok camp, with a population of 4,448 in February 1995, is only five kilometre north of Mae Sot and is three kilometre. from Moei River and the former KNU stronghold of Kawmoora (Wan Kha). During the final assault on Kawmoora on 20 February, SLORC fired several artillery shells three kilometre into Thailand at a Thai Army artillery position just outside the camp. No one was hurt. The day after SLORC occupied Kawmoora on 21 February, SLORC soldiers in civilian clothes started coming into Huay Kalok camp every day after about 11:00 a.m. At first they only came to the market on the outskirts of the camp, but then they started wandering around the camp, looking around the clinic, the school and other parts of the camp, in some cases even asking people question in Burmese. Refugees recognised them without a doubt as SLORC soldiers, and sometimes they were accompanied by Thai Border Patrol Police. Camp officials and religious leaders began sleeping in different houses every night, general panic began to spread through the camp, some families began fleeing to other refugee camps and talks began with Thai authorities about moving the camp. Then after about ten days, the incursions suddenly stopped. Presumably, Thai authorities had given SLORC a strict warning. However, there is still a lot of fear and uncertainty in the camp. By 27 March, some Thai citizens had erected makeshift drinking stalls on the Thai bank of the river opposite Kawmoora, less than three kilometre from Huay Kalok. SLORC soldiers have been coming across to these stalls every day to get drunk, in uniform but with their epauletts undone and hanging over their shoulder badges. At least some of the soldiers were from LIB 3 of LID 44.

14.6.12. Mae Ra Ma Luang (Mae Ra Mu Klo) Camp

Mae Ra Ma Luang camp was newly formed in 1995 to house refugees from

Manerplaw area and the lower Salween who had fled SLORC's Manerplaw offensive. It is home to about 5,000 refugees and is about 10 km inside Thailand, with hills and Thai forces between it and the Moei River borderline. It was not attacked until 25 April 1995, when 40-60 soldiers entered it from the north along the main stream which passes through the camp. They crossed the Moei just upriver from its mouth at the Salween River and followed a main path for 2-3 hours to the camp, taking a few villagers as captives along the way. Despite the fact that there were heavily armed Thai and Karen security deployed to protect the camp, the force was not attacked and the refugees had no warning of their approach. They arrived at noon or 12:30 p.m., probably having planned to arrive in the heat of the day when houses burn most easily. Most of the attackers were Karen and spoke to their captives in Karen, but there were a few who looked Burmese and never said a word, only pointing and signalling. They entered the Section 1 end of the camp and immediately began looting, taking refugees and shooting. They quickly opened fire on the Thai army station at the other end of Section 1. The Thai forces fled, and later the attackers stole their radio set and took it with them. While refugees fled into the surrounding forested hills or were taken captives, the attackers advanced slowly through Section 1 and into Section 2, telling refugees they were going to burn the camp shortly. After looting half of Section 2, they began an orderly retreat back to Section 1, one group setting the houses afire while another group covered them, shooting all the time and taking the refugees as they went. Houses were set afire by cigarette lighters on the roofing leaves or burning tracer rounds fired from assault rifles.

By the time they got back to the place where they had entered the camp, they had at least 100 refugees, young, elderly, women and men. They told these people they were taking them to DKBA headquarters at Khaw Taw (Myaing Gyi Ngu) and set out back along the path with villagers interspersed with soldiers to act as a human shield. Along the way a few people were released and a few escaped, then when they reached Tee Ler Baw there was a brief burst of fire from camp security forces in the surrounding hills. In the confusion, many villagers escaped. By the time they reached Moei River and crossed back into Burma, the attackers reportedly had only two refugees left: Deh Mu (about 60, a Christian), who used to be a KNU official in Papun District and Johnny (personal details not available). These men were tightly tied with rope, and DKBA specifically wanted to take them back. They had also planned to take back Hla Tin, a former Karen Army training officer, but he managed to escape.

Ten people were wounded during the attack; eight by gunfire & shrapnel and two by burning:

No.	Name	Sex	Age	Remarks
1.	Aye Day	M	42	Hit in the right upper back and the bullet was lodged inside. Referred to Mae Sariang Hospital.

- | | | | | |
|-----|------------------------------|---|-------------|--|
| 2. | Sa Mya | M | 32-33 | Deep flesh wound across the back muscle. Referred to Mae Sariang Hospital. |
| 3. | Ma Aye | F | 21 | Shot in the back of her left shoulder while trying to run away with her three-month old infant. The bullet went through her shoulder and exited out the front, leaving a hole the diameter of a finger. Being treated in the camp. |
| 4. | Kyaw Myint | M | 32 | Hit in the thigh with M79 grenade shrapnel which became lodged inside. He was having great difficulty in walking but was treated in the camp. |
| 5. | Hla Aye
Kyaw Myint's wife | F | 30 | Small wound in her left heel from M79 shrapnel, was treated in the camp. |
| 6. | Name not
available | M | about
22 | Hit by an exploding M79 shell while running away, many wounds on his right upper body and head. Referred to Mae Sariang Hospital. |
| 7. | Hsa Po Htoo | M | 24 | Hit by the same shell as No. 6 and suffered one bone broken in his right forearm. Referred to Mae Sariang Hospital. |
| 8. | Name not
available | M | about
15 | grazed on one toe, was treated in the camp. |
| 9. | Mya Maung | M | 84 | Badly burned across his forehead, elbow, but tocks and heel. Mya Maung is deaf, cannot see well and cannot walk on his own. He did not know what was happening and was caught in his house when they set it on fire. He was treated in the camp. |
| 10. | Pu Pu | M | 82 | Badly burned on his face, back, arms and all over his body. Pu Pu is blind. He was under his house when they set it on fire. He reportedly died of his wounds on 27 April. |

In the attack, 170 houses were completely destroyed — all of Section 1 and half of Section 2 (the camp has seven sections). Storehouse of Section 1 was burned, completely destroying 905 sacks (90,500 kg.) of rice, 1,500 kg of salt, 2,640 blankets, 1,760 mosquito nets, fish paste and other miscellaneous items. The food supply had just been stockpiled for rainy season (until November 1995), because the monsoon rains were about to wash out the road to the camp and it would be inaccessible. Since the attack, Thai security forces have been slightly increased to a total of 10 or 20 in the camp, but there is no evidence that any further security measures are being taken. The camp could easily be attacked again.

14.6.13. Kamaw Lay Ko Camp

Kamaw Lay Ko camp was a long-established camp on the west side of the main

north-south highway 76 km north of Mae Sot. As of February 1995, its official population was a relatively stable 3,961.

At 5:00 p.m. on 25 April 1995, four Thai Border Patrol Policemen assigned to guard the camp received information from a KNLA officer operating on the Burmese side of the border that DKBA would attack the camp at 11:00 p.m. that night. The police immediately reported this to the Thai Army base near Mae Dan, only ten minutes by car, but there was no response and no reinforcements were sent. At 11:00 p.m. approximately 100 soldiers attacked the camp from at least two directions: the southwest end, entering near the school, and the northeast end, entering from the highway past the Thai post. Refugees claimed up to half of them were uniformed SLORC soldiers. All the soldiers, SLORC and DKBA, were wearing SLORC Army hats, boots, and SLORC-cut uniforms. Four Thai guards, grossly outnumbered, hid inside their post. The group from the northeast went into a shop beside the Thai post owned by a Thai Karen and looted it. Among other things, they stole some beer and paused to drink it while they argued over whether or not to burn the camp. According to the shop owner, Karens with local accents argued against burning it while some with Irrawaddy Delta accents wanted to burn it. They then went into the camp, and later came back to burn the Thai Karen's house and shop. Meanwhile, the other group stopped by the school (which is on a hillside) and began firing small arms, RPGs, M79 grenades and 60 mm mortars down the camp. They then went into the camp and began setting houses ablaze with tracer bullets and lighters to the roofing leaves. The fire spread among houses. One refugee reported that the DKBA soldiers let people try to stop their houses burning, but the SLORC soldiers did not let them. Only one man, Eh Pree Pa, age about 32, was slightly wounded in the leg by RPG shrapnel. All other refugees managed to escape to the surrounding hills, while some took refuge in the camp monastery. About 300 houses were completely destroyed. The soldiers arrested three teenage boys, took them to the camp cemetery and then released them after giving them the message that all the refugees must return to Burma within three days or they would come back and kill all those remaining. They then left at about 12:30 a.m. with no refugees, carrying the items they had looted by themselves.

14.7. In Search of a Heaven

There have been reports of attacks of various kinds at every Karen refugee camp north of Mae Sot. In summary, every camp north of Mae Sot has been received written and verbal threats by DKBA coercing them to return to Burma or their camps will be destroyed. The refugees whose homes have been destroyed or who felt insecure in their former places have scattered into the hills surrounding their camps, where they always face great difficulties. Many of them joined their fellow refugees in other camps at which once again they seem safer enough for them. As of December 1995, six Karen refugee camps — Huai Heng, Baw Noh (Mae Tha Waw), Mae Salit, Mae Plu So, Klor Kho and Kamaw Lay Kho camps — once each

of which housed thousands of refugees has already turned into place with no inhabitant. Most camps still do not have enough and effective security provided by the Thai authority, instead the Thai forces there are even under orders to evacuate if the camp is attacked as the Thai military wants all the Karen refugees be forcibly repatriated as soon as possible.

[See also under "Eyewitness Accounts", interview 22-36, 47-58, 72-82, 89-100, 256-260]

14.8. New Influx of Karenni Refugee

Despite the cease-fire agreement reached between KNPP and SLORC— less than three months later on 15 June 1995 — Rangoon's troops started collecting porter fees in SLORC-designated areas of Karenni State. The Tatmadaw also started rounding up porters, horses and tractors for corvee service. The first round of fighting between KNPP and SLORC which started in the last week of June 1995 prompted a fresh exodus of some 1,500 Karenni refugees — adding to the toll of the displaced Karenni by more than 6,000 at refugee camps on the Thai side of the border. [Source: ABSDF]

[See also under "Eyewitness Accounts", interview 276-283]

14.9. BPP Orders for Repatriation of New Arrivals

On 25 April 1995 the officials from Thai Border Patrol Police ordered leaders of Halockhani Mon refugee camp to quickly repatriate the refugee families of new arrivals who built their houses along the edge of the camp in Thai territory of the border.

Because of the consistent human rights abuses in Mon areas by SLORC troops and hardships for survival, hundreds of local inhabitants had to flee to the refugee camps on the Thai-Burmese border during February and March 1995. But since the location of the refugee camps along the Thai-Burmese border is very far from their native villages, only a few of them arrived at the camps. Nearly 200 new comers arrived during the second week of April and May. As the location of Halockhani is at the edge of Mon and Karen states, many new arrivals were from Kyaikmaraw and Kyar Inn Seik Kyi townships.

The Halockhani camp has not had enough space for new arrivals to build their huts as the camp is situated in the mountainous area which has already been occupied with the houses of the refugees. During the first week of May, some BPP officials said the new arrivals could build their temporary shelters in the site, which is at the edge of camp, in Thai territory, without fencing them. They were also barred from the right to cultivate on the land temporarily provided to them. During the second

week of May, after the houses were built and the families settled, a different order saying to move from Thai territory to Burmese soil as soon as possible was issued. After they issued the order, the camp leaders and MNRC had appealed them not to move those refugees until the next dry season. But their suggestion was refused. Although the refugees did not have any desire to move, being afraid of measures taken by Thai authorities, they had no alternative. During the second week of May, about 40 families moved from Thai territory to unsafe Burmese territory, causing the refugees facing with hardships to build new shelters again.

Most of them moved to Halockhani main camp. Though the site is inconvenient to build many shelters there, the camp leaders have arranged possible settlement for those new arrivals. Then they cleared and dug hillside areas in the main camp. Because of the narrow space in Halockhani main camp, very few families of refugees who have no choice for making shelters went to Baleh Dunphai section where they would have enough space for buildings but less safety, as the site is very close to the route which connects Three Pagoda Pass and SLORC military headquarters in Mon State or Tenasserim Division. As that route has been used by SLORC for military purpose, they are living in Baleh Dunphai in fear of another attack by SLORC troops.

Baleh Dunphai is one section of Halockhani camp and about four kilometres from the main camp. In July 1994, Baleh Dunphai section was attacked by IB 62 of SLORC troops and the whole Halockhani refugees fled and attempted to seek refuge in Thai territory.

On 5 April 1995, when 200 SLORC troops from LIB 403 retreated to their headquarters in Tavoy, there was a small fighting between Mon troops and Burmese army. The fighting broke out near Baleh Dunphai and many refugees had fled to the main camp because they were afraid of another attack and arrest by the SLORC troops as in July 1994. After the Burmese troops moved down to their headquarters and the situation came to stable, the refugees returned to their former site again. [Source: MNRC April/May 1995 Report/ HURFOM]

More than 1,000 local people from Tavoy District escaped to Payaw where they thought it was safer than that of Halockhani refugee camp. Local people in Tavoy District were also subjected to atrocious human rights violations committed by SLORC troops. Payaw Camp is situated more than 50 km from Sangkhlaburi, while Bee Ree camp is far about 80 km. [Source: MNRC April/May 1995 Report/ HURFOM]

[See also under "Eye-witness Accounts", interview 106-108, 110-114, 117-120, 123, 125-128, 133, 136-142, 144-148, 206, 221, 238, 255, 208, 261-263, 267-275]

14.10. Enforcing Immigration Act: Crackdown on Refugees and Illegal Immigrants

At 3:00 p.m. on 19 April 1995, Thai police came in a very violent way and captured “illegal emigrants” in Wat Prok, the Mon monastery in Yannawa District, Bangkok. Two victims’ heads and another person’s leg was broken as a result of violence practised by the Thai Police. Altogether 13 people, including the wounded persons, were arrested and brought to the police station. After that they were subsequently sent to the Immigration Detention Centre (IDC) on Suanplu Road. Brother John Beeching, a Canadian Maryknoll father, went to the police station and asked for allowing at least some assistance to the wounded but he was not taken in account. Among those who were subjected to arrest were Naing Bai and her eight-month-old baby girl, We Lai. Naing Bai was separated from her desperately ill baby who was listed in serious condition at Lertsin Hospital. She had symptoms of illness at time of raid. She was diagnosed as suffering from pneumonia, malnutrition and other complications after spending several days at IDC where the temperature soaring to 43(C during the day. She was noted to have a high fever and was breathing in great difficulty. The baby was rushed to hospital after immigration authorities thoroughly checked her documents. She was then placed in an oxygen room with a nurse to assist her breathing.

Although Naing Bai’s husband is a Thai national, he was said to suffer from mental illness and was unable to support the family. We Lai and her five-year-old brother are Thai citizens. But Naing Bai did not have a resident permit nor was being recognised by UNHCR as a person of concern. On 25 April, Naing Bai was transferred to the detention centre in Kanchanaburi as a the first step of her deportation.

Also arrested was Maung Kyan — a Mon national who lost both arms and both eyes in a land mine explosion ten years ago — along with his wife and two children. Before arrest, Maung Kyan underwent a cornea transplant operation to regain some of his vision. Since Maung Kyan had been officially listed as a “person of concern” by UNHCR, he and his family were the Safe Area for Burmese refugees in Ratchaburi Province, Thailand. [Source: MIS]

14.11. More Arrests on Burmese Asylum-seekers

At night on 1 May 1995, there were raids on the residences of the Burmese refugees in Bangkok and 29 were arrested by Thai Special Police Force 191. Most of them were recognised by UNHCR Bangkok office as person of concern, bearing their papers for refugee status in Thailand, while others applied at the UNHCR for recognition as refugees. Their papers were refused and most of them, who were former members of NLD and ABSDF, were handcuffed and sent to a police cell of 191 in Bangkok.

Name	Age	Organisation	Sex
1. Tun Tun Oo	25	NLD-LA	M
2. Tin Saw	27	"	"
3. Thaung Tan Cho	24	"	"
4. Ko Ko Nai	28	"	"
5. Kyaw Nyunt	25	"	"
6. Myint Htay	28	"	"
7. Banyar Aung	25	"	"
8. Kyaw Soe Moe	25	"	"
9. Ma Myain	32	ABSDF	F
10. Zar Ni	23	"	M
11. Maung Win	31	"	"
12. Ma Than	19	"	F
13. (Their one-year-old son)			
14. Soe Nai	28	"	M
15. Mar Mar Aye	18	"	F
16. (Their eight-month-old son)			
17. Nai Nai	23	"	M
18. Kyu Kyu Win	20	"	F
19. (Their nine-month-old daughter)			
20. Chit Ko	27	"	M
21. Mya In (Pregnant)	21	"	F
22. Soe Chit	25	"	M
23. Ma Thaung Yin	19	"	F (Pregnant)
24. Hla Win	38	"	M
25. Aung Nai Soe	27	"	"
26. Aung Nai	29	"	"
27. Soe Myint	31	"	"
28. Soe Lwin	29	"	"
29. Ngwe Htun	33	"	"

14.12. Life in IDC of Thailand

Following story was told by one of the detainees who was arrested during the raid.

"The cell was only 15 x 40 ft wide and at that time, there were nearly 240 detainees including 40 women. The smell from three toilets in the cell made us very impatient and we were not able to take a bath. Later we were detained in an outside room with 40 Khamer women. In the evening, as the room was full, we had to stay with other illegal immigrants who were arrested on that day. Unfortunately, there was no toilet in this room and when we asked for using toilets in the next room, we were scolded by the policemen. We slept there at that night.

The following day, 2 May 1995, approximately 300 detainees, including us, were lined up according to the areas where we were arrested and feed on the floor. Then, all of us were ordered to get on to three air-conditioned buses which headed to 191 police headquarters. When we arrived at their headquarters, we were lined up in the scorching sun for an hour while police chief and officers were checking us and a video crew was making records. When they reached in front of our line, we talked to them that we are Burmese students and we have got the refugee status from UNHCR. After showing our papers, we were sent to IDC in Bangkok.

At about 2:30 p.m., we arrived at the floor of IDC in Bangkok and had to wait for something that we did not know. As it was in the afternoon, we felt thirsty and we asked the policemen for water. The police responded that if they could survive without drinking water in the afternoon, why not us. Then, one policeman, carrying some plastic water bottles, asked who felt thirsty. As soon as we replied, we were beaten by another policeman. And then, all of us were lined up according to our numbers. Some refugees who did not understand what the police were talking about or calling their names in Thai were repeatedly beaten. Then, we were put in a cell under the main IDC. They took our shirts off and made our finger-prints in the record book. That room was too crowded for those 300 people, no fresh air nor enough space to sit down or squat. Fifteen minutes later, some people fell down after being suffocated. Until 6:00 p.m., we were not given any food. At that time, a policeman came to us and asked us to sit down. As there was not enough space for everybody to sit down, some of us were subjected to beatings.

Late in the evening, all the detainees were put in different cells depending on the areas where they were arrested. My friends and I myself were detained in Cell No. 6. Our cell was only 20 x 80 ft wide and normally it was suitable only for 100 people. But, at that time, exactly 318 people were there.

Two toilets in this cell was only for urinating because all were broken. When we arrived, we found that there was no drinking water in the room. Every detainee was getting bad smell from the toilets and suffocating. Dinner was not provided until 10:00 p.m. A refugee who fell down on sight because of lack of fresh air was moved to down stair and was never seen again.

At about 6:30 a.m. on the following day (3 May), police gave us some pea-milk for breakfast. But, most of the people in the room have suffered from sore throat because of no water and bad smell from the toilets. At about 10:30 a.m., we were given some prison-typed sticky rice for breakfast. But no drinking was given. Neither was water in the toilets, we were not able to use them in that morning.