Please visit this
page and sign the petition for Mr. Soe Myint, the Editor (Founder) of Mizzima
News
http://www.petitiononline.com/soe123/petition.html
-----------------------------------------------------------------
BURMA RELATED NEWS - April 01,
2003.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
HEADLINES
-----------------------------------------------------------------
AFP - US lashes
China, "axis of evil" and Israel and Palestinians in rights
report
AFP - US showers
praise on Myanmar democracy heroine Aung San Suu Kyi
AFP - Activists ask
India to scrap hijacking case against Myanmar journalist
AP - Amnesty joins
U.N. envoy in asking for Myanmar to release political
prisoners
Reuters - U.S.
slams human rights abuses across Indochina
Asian Tribune -
ABBL participates in Bangladesh Trade Fair in Yangon
ABC online - US
says Burmese troops use rape as a weapon
AI - Myanmar:
Limited human rights improvements -- serious concerns persist
Bernama -
Participating Status Accorded To Myanmar In Business
Activities
U.S state
department - Burma - Country Reports on Human Rights Practices -
2002
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Tuesday April 1,
2:55 PM
US lashes China, "axis of evil" and Israel and Palestinians
in rights report
WASHINGTON, March 31
(AFP) - The United States accused
China's rulers of greviously suppressing basic freedoms and rapped "axis of
evil" foes Iraq, Iran and North Korea for what it said were gross abuses of
human rights.
The State Department published its annual survey of
global human rights with the Bush administration embroiled in a war with Iraq,
military clashes in Afghanistan and a global anti-terror
campaign.
A angry response is always guaranteed from targeted
governments, but extra controversy could be generated, with the Bush
administration accused of causing civilian deaths in Iraq and criticised for its
treatment of detainees from its anti-terror war.
But Secretary of
State Colin Powell said Washington would not shrink from its commitment to point
out human rights abuses wherever they occur.
"Our country was
founded on the precept that freedom is the birthright of every human being, and
America is proud to serve as a force for freedom across the globe," he said,
unveiling the congressionally-mandated report which covers
2002.
China is no stranger to US criticism on human
rights.
This year's report said its record was still "poor" but
highlighted several areas where repression had eased slightly, noting the
communist government's permission for senior envoys from Tibet's spiritual
leader the Dalai Lama to visit Beijing.
But "late in the year,
these positive developments were undermined by arrests of democracy activists,
the imposition of death sentences without due process on two Tibetans, and the
trials of labor leaders on 'subversion' charges," the report
said.
"Authorities were quick to suppress religious, political, and
social groups, as well as individuals, that they perceived to be a threat to
government power or to national stability.
A new broadside of
criticism was aimed at Iraq.
"Saddam Hussein's regime is a classic
illustration of the fact that such regimes, which ruthlessly violate the rights
of their citizens, tend to pose the greatest threats to international peace and
stability," said Powell.
Israel and the Palestinians both endured a
ticking off.
The report noted "problems" with Israel's treatment of
Israeli Arabs while it accused the Palestinian Authority of having a "poor"
human rights record and continuing "to commit numerous, serious
abuses."
The report said members of the Palestinian security forces
and Yasser Arafat's Fatah faction of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)
took part in anti-Israel violence and terrorist attacks.
More
criticism was heaped on Central Asian states, including Turkmenistan,
Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan, all accused of sharpening state control over
dissent, more than a decade into the post-Soviet era.
Myanmar, a
frequent target of US scorn, earned new black marks, as the report lauded the
bravery of democracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi.
"Her tremendous
strength of character stands boldly in the face of the military regime's
disregard for human rights and democracy, a disregard that extends to abuses
such as extrajudicial killings, rapes, disappearances, forced labor and forced
relocations."
With the United States locked in a nuclear showdown
with North Korea, the report took the opportunity to highlight what it said was
the use by Kim Jong-Il's regime of torture, forced abortion and capital
punishment as instruments of state power.
The human rights record
of the third member of President George W. Bush's "axis of evil" Iran, "remained
poor and and deteriorated substantially during the year, despite continuing
efforts within society to make the Government accountable for its human rights
policies," the report said.
"Systematic abuses included summary
executions; disappearances; widespread use of torture and other degrading
treatment, reportedly including rape; severe punishments such as stoning and
flogging; harsh prison conditions; arbitrary arrest and detention; and prolonged
and incommunicado detention."
The report also ripped into
Zimbabwe's human rights record, accusing President Robert Mugabe's government of
conducting an intentional, systematic campaign of abuses.
The
report accused the government of extrajudicial killings as well as beatings,
rapes and torture, restricting freedoms of speech and the press, undermining the
judicial system and failing to crack down on blatant rights
abuses.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Tuesday April 1, 00:39 PM
US showers praise on Myanmar democracy heroine Aung San
Suu Kyi
WASHINGTON, March 31 (AFP) - The United States praised Myanmar
opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi on Monday and castigated her bitter enemies
in the country's junta, in a withering analysis of the country's human rights
situation.
"Even after years of on-and-off political arrest,
harassment and constant surveillance, Aung San Suu Kyi is still wholly committed
to bringing democracy and a humane rule of law to the Burmese people," the State
Department said in its annual human rights report.
"Her tremendous
strength of character stands boldly in the face of the military regime's
disregard for human rights and democracy, a disregard that extends to abuses
such as extrajudicial killings, rapes, disappearances, forced labor and forced
relocations."
The United States engages in frequent rhetorical
battles with the junta, and is a strong supporter of Aung San Suu Kyi,
maintaining an array of investment strategies to protest her exclusion from
politics.
It said that 1,300 political prisoners remained behind
bars, in conditions which were often harsh and life-threatening.
Aung San Suu Kyi, a Nobel peace laureate, was released from house
arrest in May 2002 and has been engaged in UN-brokered talks with the junta
since October 2000, but they are yet to progress beyond a confidence-building
stage.
US officials have made no secret at their disappointment
that the consultations have made little progress so far.
The
report, part of the broader Country Reports on Human Rights Practices covering
196 nations, slammed the ruling State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) for
its "extremely poor" rights peformance in 2002.
"The regime's
human rights record remained extremely poor, and it continued to commit numerous
serious abuses," the report said.
It resuscitated allegations that
Myanmar troops had raped women from ethnic minorities, especially in Shan,
Karenni and Karen states, which drew international condemnation and fierce
denials from the junta last year.
The ruling junta's security
forces, it said, "continued to commit extrajudicial killings and rape, forcibly
relocated persons, used forced labor, and conscripted child soldiers."
"Disappearances continued, and members of the security forces
tortured, beat and otherwise abused prisoners and detainees."
It
also said the SPDC continued to restrict freedom of speech, press, assembly,
association and religion, and that people suspected of pro-democratic activity
were subjected to surveillance and harassment.
It noted how Aung
San Suu Kyi's National League for Democracy was allowed to open 90 of some 300
offices nationwide last year, but said the SPDC did not allow domestic human
rights organizations to function independently and remained hostile to outside
scrutiny of its human rights record.
Myanmar, the former Burma,
has been ruled by authoritarian military regimes since 1962.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Tuesday April 1, 4:29 PM
Activists ask India to scrap hijacking case against
Myanmar journalist
NEW DELHI, April 1
(AFP) - India-based Myanmar
activists asked New Delhi Tuesday to withdraw a long-pending case against a
journalist from Myanmar who allegedly hijacked a plane.
Around 150
people held a demonstration here to pressure the government to scrap the case
against Soe Myint, the founder of Internet news agency Mizzima News, who is
accused of commandeering the plane to draw attention to the plight of his people
under Myanmar's military regime.
The case is due to open Wednesday
in the eastern state of West Bengal.
In 1990 Soe Myint, along with
another activist, diverted a Thai Airways Bangkok-Yangon flight to Calcutta, the
capital of West Bengal.
The activists say the two did not use
violence during the incident and gave themselves up to the Indian authorities.
No charges were made against them at the time and they were freed
soon after.
But 13 years later, the West Bengal government
suddenly decided to revive the case against Myint last month and charged him
with hijacking. Activists had previously claimed the charges were brought under
pressure from Yangon.
"If he is found guilty, he could get life
imprisonment," said demonstrator Ko Moe.
"Free Soe Myint; We need
India's support," the protestors shouted.
The other activist had
left India long ago.
In 1998 hundreds of thousands of people from
Myanmar fled the country, then called Burma, during a crackdown by the regime
after an uprising against 30-year-old military rule.
According to
estimates, there are more than 50,000 people from Myanmar living as refugees in
India.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Amnesty joins U.N. envoy in asking for Myanmar to release
political prisoners
BANGKOK, Thailand
(AP) _ The human rights group
Amnesty International on Tuesday renewed its call for Myanmar's military
government to release political prisoners, which it said number more than 1,200.
The London-based group's call came a day after a similar plea from
the special U.N. envoy to Myanmar on human rights, Paulo Sergio Pinheiro.
The envoy told the U.N. Commission on Human Rights in Geneva on
Monday that the pace of prisoner releases, begun in January 2001, had slowed in
recent months.
He said the government had implemented several
moves to safeguard human rights, but that it might be using prisoner releases as
a bargaining tool in its talks with the opposition National League for
Democracy.
``If this is true, it is unacceptable and cruel,
especially for elderly prisoners, some of whom are in their 70s and whose poor
health is aggravated by long and harsh prison sentences,'' he said in a prepared
statement.
Amnesty International sent researchers to Myanmar for
the first time earlier this year, and the group said that since then it
``welcomed some limited improvements in the human rights situation,'' but was
also disappointed the junta ``has not released prisoners who are ill, elderly,
or are imprisoned with their young children.''
Myanmar, also know
as Burma, has been ruled by a military government since 1962. In 1988, the armed
forces suppressed pro-democracy demonstrations and has ruled by decree since.
The opposition National League for Democracy party won a 1990 general election,
but the military barred it from taking power, instead embarking on a campaign of
political repression.
The junta began closed-door reconciliation
talks with NLD leader Aung San Suu Kyi in late 2000, but they have had no
significant result aside from the piecemeal release of some political prisoners.
The talks are now at a virtual standstill.
2003-04-01 Tue 07:28
-----------------------------------------------------------------
U.S. slams human rights abuses across Indochina
By Chris
Johnson
BANGKOK, April 1 (Reuters) - Governments across Indochina torture,
harass and lock up their citizens to maintain control in the impoverished
region, the United States said on Tuesday.
In an annual report on
human rights around the world, the U.S. State Department detailed serious abuses
last year in countries from Myanmar to Vietnam, which it said suppressed
dissent.
The military junta in Myanmar, formerly known as Burma,
came in for the toughest criticism. It was accused of denying its 50 million
people even the most basic human rights.
``Control was implemented
through surveillance of government employees and private citizens, harassment of
political activists, intimidation, arrest, detention, physical abuse, and
restrictions on citizens' contacts with foreigners,'' the State Department said.
``In ethnic minority areas, security forces continued to commit
extrajudicial killings and rape, forcibly relocated persons, used forced labour,
and conscripted child soldiers.''
The report noted the military,
in charge for over 40 years, released from house arrest Nobel Peace laureate
Aung San Suu Kyi in May 2002 and loosened restrictions on her National League
for Democracy (NLD) party, releasing hundreds of activists.
But it
said Myanmar still had 1,300 political prisoners and conditions in jail were so
harsh as to be life-threatening.
The NLD won Myanmar's last
elections in 1990 by a landslide but has never been allowed to take power. The
generals say the country is not ready for democracy and would splinter if they
gave up control.
KILLINGS
The State
Department accused Cambodian authorities of an array of abuses, including
torture of prisoners and suspects and trafficking women and children into the
sex industry.
The government of Prime Minister Hun Sen had failed
to tackle corruption and abuses by military and police.
``The
military forces and police were responsible for both political and non-political
killings,'' the State Department said.
It said the remnants of the
communist Khmer Rouge, which ruled between 1975 and 1979, had ceased to be a
threat but most citizens had yet to see any significant peace dividend.
An estimated 1.7 million people died under the ``killing fields''
regime of the Khmer Rouge as the movement led by Pol Pot tried a radical
experiment to create a utopian agrarian economy.
Cambodian and
U.N. officials last month agreed a framework for a trial for genocide of former
Khmer Rouge leaders but no one has yet been jailed for the crimes committed
during their rule.
Officials from none of the governments in the
region were available for immediate comment on the report. All the governments
concerned say they respect human rights.
DETENTIONS
The State Department said the communist governments of
Vietnam and Laos both had poor human rights records with a series abuses by the
authorities, including arbitrary detention.
Vietnamese police
sometimes beat suspects during arrests, detention and interrogation, it said,
adding: ``Several sources also reported that security forces detained, beat, and
were responsible for the disappearances of numerous persons.''
The
State Department said Thailand generally respected human rights but police had
killed a number of criminal suspects.
The report, focusing only on
2002, made no mention of a crackdown this year on drug traffickers by the
government of Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra.
Rights groups say
more than 1,000 people have died this year in a blitz on illegal narcotics, many
in shoot-outs between police and gangs selling drugs imported from the lawless
Golden Triangle region on the borders of Thailand, Myanmar and Laos.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Asian Tribune
Date : 2003-04-01
ABBL participates in Bangladesh Trade Fair in
Yangon
Dhaka, April 01: A 4-day long Bangladesh
Trade Fair in Yangon has concluded in Myanmar recently. Prime Minister Begum
Khaleda Zia inaugurated the fair. Among other companies.of Bangladesh, Arab
Bangladesh Bank Ltd also took part in the fair. AB Bank Ltd has a representative
office in Myanmar, according to the Bank source.
Foreign Minister M
Morshed Khan, Acting Chairman Faisal M Khan, Sr Executive Vice President Ali
Reza Iftekhar and Mahmudur Rahman Bakul were present on the
occasion.
- The Independent -
-----------------------------------------------------------------
US says Burmese troops use rape as a weapon
01/04/2003 12:19:59 | ABC Radio Australia
News
Burma's opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi has
been praised by Washington.
The State Department's annual human
rights report says she still wholly committed to bringing democracy to the
Burmese people even after years of political harassment and constant
surveillance.
It castigated the ruling junta for abuses such as
extrajudicial killings, rapes, disappearances, forced labor and
relocations.
The State Department says 1,300 political prisoners
remain in Burma's jails in conditions which were often harsh and life
threatening.
It alleges that government troops use rape as a
weapon against women from ethnic minorities, especially the Shan, Karenni and
Karen.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Amnesty International , Tue 1 Apr 2003
PRESS
RELEASE
AI Index: ASA 16/013/2003 (Public)
News Service No: 075
1
April 2003
Myanmar: Limited human rights improvements --
serious concerns persist
Almost two months after
its first-ever visit to Myanmar, Amnesty International welcomed some limited
improvements in the human rights situation, but at the same time expressed
disappointment that other urgent steps have not yet been taken by the State
Peace and Development Council (SPDC), the military government. The SPDC has told
the organization that political prisoners now have access to reading materials
and social contact, which are positive developments. However over 1200 political
prisoners are still held in prisons throughout the country, and the pace of
releases has decreased considerably in the last four months.
"We
welcome our ongoing dialogue with the SPDC and look forward to future visits to
Myanmar, when we will investigate the human rights situation further. However we
are disappointed that the SPDC has not released prisoners who are ill, elderly,
or are imprisoned with their young children," Amnesty International said
today.
"During our visit, we submitted a number of lists of
political prisoners, whose releases should be a first priority for the SPDC. Yet
to our knowledge none of these people have been released," the organization
added.
People on the lists include imprisoned members of
parliament-elect; people who should be released on humanitarian grounds; and
those held under the administrative detention provisions of the 1975 State
Protection Act.
Among those whom Amnesty International asked to be
released as a matter of urgency is U Htwe Myint, a 73-year-old prisoner of
conscience with multiple health problems; and Ma San San Maw, a prisoner of
conscience held at Insein Prison with her 19 month old child.
At
the time of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi's release in May 2002 the SPDC publicly renewed
its commitment to release political prisoners. They had begun to release
political prisoners in January 2000, and hundreds have subsequently been freed,
including a group freed in mid March 2003.
However many of them
were not released unconditionally, and since July 2002 arrests of people for
their peaceful political activities have begun again. Amnesty International has
recently submitted a list of 27 such people to the SPDC, and is seeking further
information about them.
At this time Amnesty International renews
its call for the SPDC to release all prisoners of conscience immediately and
unconditionally.
Background
Amnesty International's
first ever visit to Myanmar took place from 30 January until 8 February 2003.
After the trip, the organization publicly welcomed the SPDC's cooperation in
facilitating the visit, and the open and cordial discussions between government
officials and AI.
The SPDC has taken a number of positive steps in
the last three years. These include permission for an International Labour
Organization (ILO) presence in Myanmar to work with the SPDC on the elimination
of forced labour of civilians by the military. Amnesty International has also
noted an improvement in prison conditions during this period.
The
SPDC has permitted Professor Paulo Pinheiro, the UN Special Rapporteur for
Myanmar, to visit the country five times to investigate the human rights
situation. He has recently concluded a mission there, and addressed the UN Human
Rights Commission on 31 March. Ambassador Ismail Razali, the UN Secretary
General's Special Envoy to Myanmar, has also travelled to the country several
times a year, although he has not visited since November 2002. Amnesty
International hopes to return to the country before the end of
2003.
Public
Document
****************************************
For more information
please call Amnesty International's press office in London, UK, on +44 20 7413
5566
Amnesty International, 1 Easton St., London WC1X 0DW. web:
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Malaysian National News Agency
April 01 , 2003
19:12PM
Participating Status Accorded To
Myanmar In Business Activities
By Mohd Razman Yaacob
and Adnan Jahaya
KANGAR, April 1 (Bernama) -- The Joint Business Council (JBC) of
the Indonesia, Thailand and Malaysia Growth Triangle (IMT-GT) agreed to accord
`participating status' to Myanmar to participate in business activities in the
IMT-GT.
The JBC chairman, Datuk Seri Abdul Rahman Maidin said the
decision to invite Myanmar's chamber of commerce was made in the meeting which
held last Saturday and Sunday, here.
He said the step was taken to
make use of our barter trade centre in order to help distribute and market
Myanmar's product within the IMT-GT and Asia Pacific market.
"The
IMT-GT region has a lot of barter trade centre. We have commodity and businesses
which can accommodate Myanmar's requirement," he told reporters after presenting
the JBC's report at the 10th Senior Officials' Meeting (SOM) here Tuesday.
Abdul Rahman said the JBC would like to capitalise and bring in
Myanmar's private sector to interact with the private sector of the IMT-GT in
order to explore and to make the IMT-GT + Myanmar as a big Asia Pacific barter
trade centre.
Referring to the ongoing war in Iraq, he said, it
had forced businesses to be re-focussed within this region.
"The
JBC would draw the attention of local investors within the region to invest in
the IMT-GT projects," he said.
Earlier, in his presentation, Abdul
Rahman said that Malaysia and Indonesia would be introducing a smart card,
`Frequent Traveler's Card', soon and hoped this mechanism could also be extended
to Thailand.
He said the JBC was in accord with the decision to
include Riau, Bengkulu and Jambi in Indonesia, and Selangor in Malaysia into the
IMT-GT.
All the new IMT-GT provinces and states have been actively
participating and contributing at the JBC meeting, he said.
--
BERNAMA
-----------------------------------------------------------------
U.S. Department of State
Burma - Country Reports on
Human Rights Practices - 2002
Released by the Bureau of
Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor
March 31, 2003
Burma
is ruled by a highly authoritarian military regime. In 1962 General Ne Win
overthrew the elected civilian government and replaced it with a repressive
military government dominated by the majority ethnic group. In 1988 the armed
forces brutally suppressed prodemocracy demonstrations, and a junta composed of
military officers, called the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), led by
Senior General Than Shwe, took control. Since then the SPDC has ruled by decree.
The judiciary was not independent, and there was no effective rule of law.
The regime reinforced its firm military rule with a pervasive
security apparatus, the Office of Chief Military Intelligence (OCMI). Control
was implemented through surveillance of government employees and private
citizens, harassment of political activists, intimidation, arrest, detention,
physical abuse, and restrictions on citizens' contacts with foreigners. The SPDC
justified its security measures as necessary to maintain order and national
unity. Members of the security forces committed numerous, serious human rights
abuses.
The country had a population of approximately 50 million.
The country was extremely poor; the estimated annual per capita income was
approximately $300. Four decades of military rule and mismanagement resulted in
widespread poverty, poor health care, and declining educational levels.
Primarily an agricultural economy, the country also had substantial mineral,
fishing, and timber resources. Extensive state influence over the economy,
widespread corruption, and poor infrastructure has led to rapidly deteriorating
economic conditions.
The regime's human rights record remained
extremely poor, and it continued to commit numerous serious abuses. Citizens did
not have the right to change their government. In ethnic minority areas,
security forces continued to commit extrajudicial killings and rape, forcibly
relocated persons, used forced labor, and conscripted child soldiers.
Disappearances continued, and members of the security forces tortured, beat, and
otherwise abused prisoners and detainees. Citizens were subjected to arbitrary
arrest without appeal. Arrests and detention for _expression_ of dissenting
political views occurred on numerous occasions. The SPDC arrested approximately
45 persons, including some NLD members, for political activities during the
year; most were released within days. The Government also released approximately
550 political prisoners since talks began with the NLD in 2000. By year's end,
an estimated 1,300 political prisoners (including members and supporters of
ethnic armed groups) remained in prison. Prison conditions remained harsh and
life threatening, although conditions improved in some prisons since the
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) was allowed access. The
judiciary was not independent.
The SPDC continued to restrict
severely freedom of speech, press, assembly, association, and travel. During the
year, persons suspected of or charged with prodemocratic political activity were
subjected to regular surveillance and occasional harassment. The junta
restricted freedom of religion, coercively promoted Buddhism over other
religions, and imposed restrictions on religious minorities. The regime's
control over the country's Muslim minority continued, although acts of violence
against Muslims decreased from last year. The regime regularly infringed on
citizens' privacy; security forces continued to monitor citizens' movements and
communications systematically, search homes without warrants, and relocate
persons forcibly without just compensation or legal recourse. The SPDC also
continued to forcibly relocate large ethnic minority populations in order to
deprive armed ethnic groups of civilian bases of support. The regime continued
to restrict freedom of movement and, in particular, foreign travel by female
citizens. On May 6, the regime released opposition leader and National League
for Democracy (NLD) General Secretary Aung San Suu Kyi from almost 20 months of
house detention and has allowed her to travel within the country since that
time. The regime also loosened restrictions on NLD activities and generally
allowed Aung San Suu Kyi to meet representatives of foreign governments and
international organizations. The regime closely monitored NLD activities at NLD
offices as well as the activities of other political parties throughout the
country. The junta recognized the NLD as a legal entity; however, it restricted
their activities severely through security measures, harassment, and threats.
The NLD was permitted to reopen approximately 90 out of 300 offices countrywide.
The SPDC did not allow domestic human rights organizations to function
independently and remained generally hostile to outside scrutiny of its human
rights record. However, in 2001 and during the year, it allowed the U.N. Special
Rapporteur on Human Rights in Burma to conduct missions to the country. It also
allowed the International Labor Organization (ILO) to establish a liaison office
in Rangoon. Violence and societal discrimination against women remained
problems, as did discrimination against religious and ethnic minorities. There
were no policies that discriminated against persons with disabilities. The
regime continued to restrict worker rights, ban unions, and used forced labor
for public works and for the support of military garrisons. Other forced labor,
including forced child labor remained a serious problem, despite recent
ordinances outlawing the practice. The forced use of citizens as porters by SPDC
troops--with attendant mistreatment, illness, and sometimes death--remained a
common practice as did recruitment of child soldiers by the SPDC. Trafficking in
persons, particularly in women and girls mostly for the purposes of
prostitution, remained widespread, despite increased regime efforts to publicize
dangers to potential victims.
Ethnic armed groups including the
Karen National Union (KNU), the Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP), and
the Shan State Army-South (SSA) reportedly also committed human rights abuses,
although on a lesser scale; abuses included killings, rapes, forced labor, and
conscripted child soldiers.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom From:
Arbitrary or Unlawful Deprivation of Life Amnesty
International (AI), and groups like the Shan Human Rights Foundation (SHRF) and
the Karen Human Rights Group (KHRG), which have been associated with armed
ethnic resistance groups, reported numerous cases throughout the year of
military troops killing civilians in border areas and areas of ethnic
resistance, often after confiscating property or torturing the individuals (see
Sections 1.g. and 5). Interviews by foreign observers documented similar abuses.
In a July report entitled "Myanmar: Lack of Security in
Counter-Insurgency Areas," AI cited a January 30 killing of six Shan State
civilians near the Thai border. The six villagers, who had been relocated
forcibly from their original homes by SPDC troops in 1996-97, were attempting to
cross into Thailand illegally when reportedly they were robbed and killed by
SPDC troops. According to the report, the killings did not appear to be related
to counter-insurgency activities. On April 28, the KHRG reported that villagers
who recently had been forced from their homes in Karen State were attacked by
SPDC troops while sleeping. Ten persons were shot and killed, six of whom were
children; and nine others were injured, including a pregnant woman. On May 10,
one of the injured died. The regime contended that the casualties were caught in
a crossfire during a fight with armed ethnic groups. The SHRF reported that on
September 21, a SPDC unit raided a village in Kholam, Shan State, killing 10
villagers in retaliation for an earlier attack by the Shan State Army (SSA)
against SPDC troops, which killed one soldier. These reports were not confirmed
by independent sources.
Brutal treatment by soldiers also caused
deaths among those conscripted as military porters and laborers. There were
unconfirmed reports by various groups indicating that porters and laborers who
no longer physically were able to work sometimes were abandoned without medical
care or were killed (see Section 6.c.).
In 2001 according to one
report from the KNU, at least 200 prisoners from the Tavoy prison in Tenasserim
division were conscripted by SPDC troops as laborers to construct a front line
camp. The prisoners were tied together in groups of 5 and were guarded by 40
soldiers. As prisoners weakened and no longer could work, 11 of them were shot
and killed. During the year, there were similar credible reports of the military
taking over 300 prisoners from jails in Shan State for use as porters. There
were no reports that soldiers involved in past killings or other abuses were
investigated or punished during the year.
Inmates died in prisons
and labor camps, or shortly after being released from them, due to harsh
treatment and lack of adequate medical care (see Section 1.c.). On July 31, Aik
Paung, Secretary of the Palaung Liberation Front, died in Moulmein prison.
Although his stomach reportedly was bloated and swollen for 3 days, he was not
hospitalized or provided with any type of medical attention. In September
political prisoner Aung May Thu died from a bleeding ulcer while in custody (see
Section 1.c.). In October an NLD Shan State Vice Chairman, U Sai Hpa, died in
custody, reportedly from cerebral malaria (see Section 1.d.).
Some
armed ethnic groups also reportedly committed killings. On April 15, according
to the SPDC, the KNU blew up a trishaw in Myawady, Karen State, killing 5
persons and injuring 31 persons. The KNU denied responsibility for the killings.
b. Disappearance
Private citizens and political
activists continued to "disappear" for periods ranging from several hours to
several weeks or more, and many persons never reappeared. Such disappearances
generally were attributed to government authorities detaining individuals for
questioning without the knowledge of their family members, or the SPDC troops'
practice of seizing private citizens for porterage or related duties, often
without the knowledge of their family members (see Section 6.c.). In many cases,
the individuals who were detained for questioning were released soon afterward
and returned to their families. However, the whereabouts of persons seized by
SPDC units to serve as porters, as well as of prisoners transferred for labor or
porterage duties, often remained unknown. There also were reports of private
citizens who were killed while serving as porters (see Section 1.a.). Family
members generally learned of their relatives' fates only if fellow prisoners
survived and later reported information to the families. According to the SHRF,
in August a villager returning from gathering wild vegetables allegedly
disappeared after being taken by three SPDC troops to the military camp at Naa
Kawng Mu village in Mung-Ton township.
During an interview with
the Democractic Voice of Burma, Ko Tait Naing, the Secretary of the Association
for Assistance to Political Prisoners (AAPP), alleged that several political
prisoners were executed secretly by the junta. Naing stated that in July 2001,
seven prisoners were taken away from the prison in Beik and that there were
unconfirmed reports they were executed. Naing also alleged that in April six
prisoners who were taken away from the prison in Kawthaung, were executed at
Ngapyawjoaw village tract to the east of Zatekyi naval base.
c.
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
There are laws that prohibit torture; however, members of the
security forces reportedly tortured, beat, and otherwise abused prisoners,
detainees, and other citizens. They routinely subjected detainees to harsh
interrogation techniques designed to intimidate and disorient. There were
reports in past years that prisoners were forced to squat or assume stressful,
uncomfortable, or painful positions for lengthy periods. There continued to be
many credible reports that security forces subjected citizens to harassment and
physical abuse. The military forces routinely confiscated property, cash, and
food, and used coercive and abusive recruitment methods to procure porters.
Persons forced into porterage or other labor faced extremely difficult
conditions, beatings, and mistreatment that at times resulted in death. From
June 7 to June 20, SPDC troops forced more than 130 civilians to serve as
porters near Keng Tung, Shan State. According to the SHRF at least seven persons
died due to mistreatment (see Section 6.c.). SPDC soldiers beat, raped, and
killed persons who resisted relocation or forced conscription and forced labor.
There were numerous reports that SPDC troops looted and confiscated property and
possessions from forcibly relocated persons, or persons who were away from their
homes; these materials often were used for military construction. There were
reports of SPDC troops who confiscated privately owned vehicles for military
transport without compensating the vehicle owners.
During the
year, there were complaints of government mistreatment and exploitation of
farmers. In the past, numerous farmers were held in custody for failing to meet
local production requirements, although there were no such reports during the
year.
In early March, in downtown Rangoon, residents of 25 homes
in Weggi quarter were ordered by the regional military commander to vacate their
houses by the end of the month. These persons, many of whom were long time
residents, appealed the order to senior SPDC officials to no avail. Under
military threats, many accepted relocation to apartments estimated to be worth
approximately 10 percent the value of their vacated homes. On April 5, armed
military authorities forced remaining tenants to leave their houses, arresting
those who refused. The homes were destroyed, reportedly to make way for
construction of new residences for families or companies connected to the
regime.
In May according to the KHRG, SPDC troops attempted to extort money
from villagers in Karen State prior to a forced relocation. The troops
reportedly burned homes, tortured a village headman by shooting him in the
thighs and cutting tendons in his legs, and beat other villagers (see Sections
1.f. and 2.d.).
The KHRG reported that on July 11, soldiers opened
fire on Saw Poe Tot, a villager looking for his elephant, in Kameik village in
Tenasserim division. He was taken to a hospital by relatives and survived.
On August 17, Captain Zaw Min Oo reportedly entered Yusomoso, a
mainly Catholic village in Timoso township in Kaya State (east of Karen State)
where, according to a reliable source, the Captain raped a 4-year-old child.
Military authorities reportedly offered the villagers approximately $20 (20,000
kyat) to drop the case. In October the SHRF reported that two SPDC soldiers used
their rifle butts to beat and rape a woman who was doing her laundry by the
river in Kaen-Tung township. They allegedly threw her into the river while she
was still unconscious. The woman survived and she and her husband complained to
their village headman and the community leader. No action was taken due to fear
of the police and SPDC township authorities. Also in October, a group of six or
seven SPDC troops reportedly raped two women in Murng-Khark township.
SPDC troops raped women who were members of ethnic minorities,
especially in Shan, Karenni, and Karen States (see Section 1.g.).
Corruption among local government officials was widespread and
included complicity in the trafficking of persons (see Section 6.f.).
During the year, both men and women were conscripted to serve as
forced laborers and some of the women subsequently were raped at gunpoint by
military personnel (see Section 1.g.).
Prison and labor camp
conditions generally remained harsh and life threatening. The regime's
Department of Prisons operated approximately 35 prisons and approximately 70
labor camps throughout the country (see Section 6.c.). In the prisons, food,
clothing, and medical supplies reportedly were in very short supply. Bedding
consisted of a single mat on the floor. Prisoners were forced to rely on their
families, who were allowed to visit once every 2 weeks for 15 minutes per visit,
for basic necessities. HIV/AIDS infection rates in prison reportedly were high
due to communal use of single syringes for injections. During the year, the
health of several political prisoners deteriorated, and at least three political
prisoners died in custody (see Section 1.a.).
During the year,
some prisoners were denied adequate medical care while in prison. In one case,
authorities did not provide a prisoner with proper medical attention, and the
prisoner subsequently died (see Section 1.a.). There were reports during the
year that the health of U Win Tin, a 72-year-old journalist who has been in
prison since 1989 for his political activities, continued to decline. Similarly,
there were serious concerns about the health of Min Ko Naing, a student leader
also arrested in 1989 and subjected to years of isolation and torture. The AAPP
reported that on May 17 and 18, prison authorities severely beat two political
prisoners in Bassein prison because they submitted a complaint to the prison
superintendent. AAPP also reported that 22 political prisoners were moved from
Kalay prison to Kathar prison, because they smuggled out letters documenting
conditions in the prison.
According to the regime, political
detainees were separated from common criminals, juveniles from adults, and men
from women. According to the ICRC, the regime stated that political prisoners
should not be subjected to hard labor.
During the year, the ICRC
conducted periodic visits to all prisons in the country, attempting to visit
each one a minimum of once a year. ICRC visits to labor camps began in March
2000 and continued during the year. There reportedly were approximately 70 of
these camps, but many were temporary, existing only long enough to complete a
specific work project. The regime allowed the ICRC to perform its traditional
services, such as providing medications, delivering letters to and from
prisoners, and providing support for family visits to prisoners.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
There is no
provision in the law for judicial determination of the legality of detention,
and the SPDC routinely used arbitrary arrest and incommunicado detention. The
Penal Code allows authorities to extend sentences arbitrarily after prisoners
have completed their original sentence.
From September 2000 until
May, Aung San Suu Kyi was held under house detention without charge. Although
the regime allowed visitors to meet with her, the visits were controlled.
The regime has released an estimated 550 political prisoners, as
well as another 380 political prisoners on humanitarian grounds, since talks
began with the NLD in October 2000. However, it also arrested some political
activists. In August approximately 20 activists were arrested for distributing
pamphlets. There were reports that at least some of the 20 students were beaten
during interrogation before being released approximately 10 days after their
arrests. Two students arrested for a protest at Rangoon's city hall were held
incommunicado for several weeks and then sentenced to 14 years in prison for
subversive acts against the state. Family members and the NLD continued to make
inquiries to the SPDC regarding their status but to no avail. On August 22, two
NLD student members were arrested in Rangoon for possessing an illegal
publication. They reportedly were not allowed adequate legal representation at
their trial and were sentenced to 3 years in prison. On September 13, two NLD
executive members, U Sai Hpa and U Saw Nan Ti, were arrested in Kengtung, Shan
State, apparently for discussing the regime's rice quota increase with local
citizens. On October 10, they were scheduled to stand trial but one, Shan State
NLD Vice Chairman U Sai Hpa, died in custody on October 9, reportedly of
cerebral malaria. Tu Saw Nan Ti was sentenced to 7 years in prison. In September
the regime arrested at least 30 political activists in Rangoon. Among those
arrested was, U Hla Tun, an NLD Member of Parliament (M.P.) elect from the 1990
elections who had not been active in the NLD since he was released from prison
in 1999. As with other arrests, there was incomplete information on these cases.
There was no official announcement of the arrests and information was only
available from those who witnessed the arrests or from family members who were
notified by authorities of relatives who were arrested.
Prior to
being charged, detainees rarely had access to legal counsel or their families.
Even after being charged, detainees rarely had the benefit of counsel. Political
detainees were not released on bail. Some political detainees were held
incommunicado for long periods.
In September Aung May Thu died in
custody while serving the sixth consecutive extension of his sentence, as
permitted under the Penal Code (see Section 1.a.). At year's end, there were
approximately 50 political prisoners serving extended sentences, including Min
Ko Naing, a former political activist and student leader who reportedly was in
deteriorating health (see Section 1.e.). In Mandalay 11 prisoners sentenced for
political reasons, including Zaw Min, Ne Win, U Tin Aye Yu, U Tin Myint, U Tin
Aye, U Khin Maung Thant, U Zarni Aung, U Thein Than Oo, U Kyaw Sein Maung, U
Naing Myint, U Htay Nyunt, and Soe Myint completed their terms, but were not
released.
Since October 2000 when confidence-building talks
between Aung San Suu Kyi and the SPDC began, the SPDC has reduced its campaign
of detention and intimidation against the NLD. In June 2001, the regime began
releasing NLD political prisoners from "guest houses" and prisons. By year's
end, the releases totaled approximately 550, including most NLD detainees and
all members of the NLD's Central Executive Committee (CEC). However, at year's
end, according to ICRC, there were more than 1,300 "security detainees,"
including approximately 170 NLD members, still incarcerated, 17 of whom were
elected (NLD) M.P.s. Included among the 1,300 political prisoners were ethnic
leaders, supporters of ethnic opposition groups (some of which were armed),
non-NLD politicians, lawyers, journalists, and students (see Section 1.e.).
Authorities continued to detain private citizens and political
activists, some of whom disappeared, at times temporarily, at the hands of
security forces (see Section 1.b.).
During the year, the
authorities did not detain or deport any foreign journalists.
The
Constitution does not provide for forced exile, and the regime did not use
forced exile.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
The
judiciary is not independent of the military junta. The junta appoints justices
to the Supreme Court who, in turn, appoints lower court judges with the approval
of the junta. These courts then adjudicate cases under decrees promulgated by
the junta that effectively have the force of law. The court system includes
courts at the township, district, state, and national levels.
During the year, the regime continued to rule by decree and was
not bound by any constitutional provisions providing for fair public trials or
any other rights. Although remnants of the British-era legal system formally
were in place, the court system and its operation remained seriously flawed,
particularly in regard to the handling of political cases. The misuse of overly
broad laws--including the Emergency Provisions Act, the Unlawful Associations
Act, the Habitual Offenders Act, and the Law on Safeguarding the State from the
Danger of Destructionists--and the manipulation of the courts for political ends
continued to deprive citizens of the right to a fair trial. Pervasive corruption
further served to undermine the impartiality of the justice system.
Some basic due process rights, including the right to be
represented by a defense attorney, generally were respected in criminal cases,
but not in political cases that the regime deemed especially sensitive. In
criminal cases, defense attorneys generally were permitted to call and
cross-examine witnesses; however, their primary purpose was to bargain with the
judge to obtain the shortest possible sentence for their clients. Reliable
reports indicated that senior military authorities dictated verdicts, regardless
of the evidence or the law. In addition, in political cases, trials were not
open to the public. However, during the year, two high profile cases, one
involving Ne Win's grandchildren and the other involving Aung San Oo and Aung
San Su Kyi, were opened to the public. The press attended and reported on both
trials.
In March Professor Salai Tun Than, a 74-year-old academic
was sentenced to 7 years' imprisonment for staging a peaceful protest in
November 2001; the details of his trial, or if he even had a trial, were not
public.
During 2000 the regime initiated an extensive campaign to
remove independent lawyers who were capable of providing advice and counsel to
the NLD. The regime arrested and sentenced under fabricated charges nearly every
lawyer with a perceived connection to the NLD. Cases included those of U Soe
Han, a 77-year-old highly respected and nonpolitical lawyer, who was arrested
with several others and sentenced to 21 years in prison for sending a letter to
Senior General Than Shwe and Secretary One Khin Nyunt, urging the regime to
release political prisoners and begin a dialog with the NLD. In 2001 the regime
discontinued its campaign against independent lawyers. During the year, there
were no new arrests of lawyers perceived to have NLD connections, and NLD
members appeared to be able to retain the counsel of lawyers without fear of the
lawyers being imprisoned. However, approximately 20 of the more than 40 lawyers
jailed in 2000 remained imprisoned at year's end.
During the year,
the regime slowly continued to release NLD members from prison and also began
releasing a small number of student activists, many of whom had been in prison
since 1989-90. The majority of the releases were of prisoners who had completed
or almost completed their sentences or who were in poor health. Several
political prisoners, who were convicted of crimes against the regime, were
required to sign an agreement accepting to serve the remainder of their current
sentences if they were rearrested for any reason. Prisoners who were being held
in detention, but who had not been convicted of a crime, were not required to
sign an agreement. In addition, political prisoners who were released shortly
after the October 2000 talks between the regime and Aung San Suu Kyi began, were
not required to sign any pre-condition agreement.
The ICRC
reported that as of October there were 1,300 "security detainees" in the
country. The AAPP estimated that there were approximately 1,400 political
prisoners. It also found that some political prisoners remained in custody
despite having completed their sentences (see Section 1.d.). Of the estimated
1,300 political prisoners, 17 were NLD M.P.s elect from the 1990 elections.
Among prisoners released this year was U Aye Tha Aung, who represented four
large ethnic groups in the Committee Representing the People's Parliament
(CRPP). In August the regime released U Aye Tha Aung, who was arrested in 2000
and whose health was deteriorating rapidly while serving three 7-year sentences.
He immediately underwent an operation for a lung tumor. Another prominent
political prisoner, U Win Tin, a noted journalist and writer, arrested in 1989,
still was in prison at year's end. He was 72-years-old and also reportedly was
in poor health. Another high-profile political prisoner, Min Ko Naing, a student
leader whose sentence was extended under the Penal Code and whose health was
deteriorating, was released. Three political prisoners, Aung May Thu, U Sai Hpa,
and Mai Aik Pan, a leader of the Palaung ethnic group, died while in prison
during the year (see Sections 1.a., 1.c., and 1.d.).
Opposition
political parties have attempted to use the courts to enforce their political
rights, thus far without success. In April 2000, the Supreme Court dismissed an
appeal by the NLD against the regime for illegally detaining and libeling M.P.s
elect. The Supreme Court ruled that a case could not proceed against a
government official--in this case the head of military intelligence--if the Head
of State did not grant permission. In September 2000, lawyers for the NLD began
a suit against General Than Shwe and the Chairman of the Election Commission for
failing to fulfill commitments made in regard to the transition to democracy. In
2001 the suit was dismissed without a hearing.
In November 2000,
the regime allowed Aung San Suu Kyi's brother, a foreign citizen, to file a suit
against her seeking half ownership of the family compound in which she resided.
The case widely was believed to be motivated politically, because the regime
generally did not allow foreigners to file claims for property against citizens.
In fact the regime had to grant a special authority to the brother for the case
to be filed at all. The trial was public and lasted for several months. The case
eventually was dismissed for having been filed improperly, however, the regime
granted the brother authority to file a second suit, and in October the judge
presiding over the case ruled that Aung San Suu Kyi's brother had the right to
inheritance of the property under Buddhist customary law. The case continued at
year's end.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home,
or Correspondence
The Constitution does not provide for these
rights, and authorities infringed on citizens' privacy rights. The military
regime interfered extensively and arbitrarily in the lives of citizens. Through
its pervasive intelligence network and administrative procedures, the regime
systematically monitored the travel of all citizens and closely monitored the
activities of many citizens, particularly those known to be active politically.
The law requires that any person who spends the night at a place
other than his registered domicile inform the police in advance, and that any
household that hosts a person not domiciled there to maintain and submit to the
police a guest list. There were reports that this restriction, which appeared to
be relaxed somewhat last year, was enforced strictly this year. At least 30
arrests reportedly occurred following house-to-house searches.
Telephone service also was controlled tightly. Security personnel
regularly screened private correspondence and telephone calls. The authorities
generally continued to discourage citizens from subscribing directly to foreign
publications (see Section 2.a.). However, in 2001 the regime loosened controls
over the use of satellite television that allowed the general population to
register satellite receivers for a small fee. Previously only a few businesses
and individuals with special connections to the regime were allowed licenses for
satellite receivers.
The regime continued to control closely the
licensing and rationing of all electronic communication devices, which were
monitored closely. Possession of an unregistered telephone, facsimile machine,
or computer modem was punishable by imprisonment (see Section 2.a.). In April
2000, an Indonesian citizen, Irawan Sidaria, and two local technicians were
arrested under the statute for having installed an Inmarsat satellite telephone
unit at the Asia Plaza Hotel in Rangoon. In August 2000, Irawan Sidaria was
deported to Indonesia. In June 2000, according to the SHRF, SPDC troops
confiscated approximately 30 mobile phones in Murng-Ton. Although no arrests
were reported, troops threatened to punish citizens severely if they refused to
turn over their mobile phones. In June 2000, Myanmar Posts and
Telecommunications also announced that users of nonregistered cordless
telephones in the country would face up to 3 years' imprisonment, and/or a fine
of approximately $75 (30,000 kyat).
Weak private property rights
and poor land ownership records facilitated involuntary relocations of persons
by the regime. The law does not permit private ownership of land; it recognizes
only different categories of land-use rights, many of which are not freely
transferable. Postcolonial land laws also have revived the precolonial tradition
that private rights to land were contingent upon the land being put to
productive use.
For decades successive military regimes have
applied a strategy of forced relocation against ethnic minority groups seeking
autonomy in an effort to deny support to the armed ethnic groups; such forced
relocations continued during the year, particularly along the Thai border. The
forced relocations often were accompanied by alleged rapes, executions, and
demands for forced labor to build infrastructure for villagers and SPDC units.
To make way for commercial or public construction and, in some cases, for
reasons of internal security and political control, the SPDC forcibly relocated
citizens to "new towns." This practice has become somewhat less common in recent
years. Persons relocated to new towns generally suffered from greatly reduced
infrastructure support. Residents targeted for displacement generally were given
no option but to move, usually on short notice (see Sections 1.c. and 2.d.).
A September report by a highly respected private citizen in
Thailand estimated more than 2,500 villages have been destroyed or forcibly
relocated by SPDC troops since 1996, displacing more than 600,000 citizens. The
report estimated that more than 350,000 of these citizens were moved to
SPDC-controlled "relocation centers," while the remainder lived in hiding. This
practice was particularly widespread in the Shan, Kayah, and Karen States and in
areas of Mon State, and Pegu Division. In these areas, thousands of civilian
villagers were displaced from their traditional villages, which often were
burned to the ground and moved into settlements tightly controlled by SPDC
troops in strategic areas. In other cases, villagers who fled or were driven
from their homes, found shelter in the forest, frequently in heavily mined areas
without adequate food, security, or basic medical care.
The forced
relocations often generated large refugee flows to neighboring countries or to
parts of the country not controlled by the regime. In some areas, the junta
replaced the original ethnic settlements with settlements of ethnic Burmans. In
2000 in Rakhine State, the regime forcibly relocated several largely Muslim
villages and resettled the area with Buddhist Burmans, who were forced to move
from Dagon township in Rangoon division. In other areas, army units forced or
attempted to force ethnic Karen to relocate to areas controlled by the proregime
Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA).
Military units also
routinely confiscated livestock, fuel, food supplies, fishponds, alcoholic
drinks, vehicles, or money. Such abuses have become widespread since 1997, when
the junta ordered its regional commanders to meet their logistical needs
locally, rather than rely on the central authorities. As a result, regional
commanders increased their use of forced contributions of money, food, labor,
and building materials throughout the country (see Sections 1.c. and 6.c.).
In violation of humanitarian law, both army and insurgent units
used forced conscription, including conscription of children (see Sections 1.g.
and 6.c.).
Government employees generally were prohibited from
joining or supporting political parties; however, this proscription was applied
selectively. In the case of the regime's mass mobilization organization, the
Union Solidarity and Development Association (USDA), the regime used coercion
and intimidation to induce many persons, including nearly all public sector
employees, both to join the union and to attend meetings in support of the
regime (see Section 2.a.).
In the past, government officials,
including senior officials, repeatedly made statements warning parents that
authorities could hold them responsible for any political offenses committed by
their children; however, there were no reports of this practice during the year.
The regime's intelligence services also monitored the movements of
foreigners and questioned citizens about conversations with foreigners.
Government employees generally were required to obtain advance permission before
meeting with foreigners. During the year, international NGOs officially were
required to ensure that a representative from a government ministry accompanied
them on all field visits (at the NGOs' expense). However, the requirement
appeared impractical and was not enforced fully (see Section 4).
Marriages between female citizens and foreigners officially were
banned; however, the ban was not enforced.
g. Use of Excessive
Force and Violations of Humanitarian Law in Internal Conflicts
Since independence in 1948, SPDC troops have battled a variety of
ethnic insurgencies. Ethnic insurgent groups have sought to gain greater
autonomy or, in some cases, independence from the ethnic Burman-dominated State.
Since 1989, 17 groups have concluded cease-fire agreements with the regime.
Under the agreements, the groups have retained their own armed forces and
performed some administrative functions within specified territories inhabited
chiefly by members of their ethnic groups. However, a few groups remained in
active revolt. The KNU continued to conduct insurgent operations in areas with
significant Karen populations in the eastern and southern regions of the
country. In Kayah State, the KNPP resumed fighting against the regime since the
breakdown of a cease-fire negotiated in 1995.
In May the SHRF and
Shan Women's Action Network (SWAN) alleged the military used rape as a
systematic weapon of war against the ethnic populations in Shan State. The
report described 173 incidents of rape or sexual violence against 625 women and
girls committed by soldiers from 52 military battalions between 1992 and 2001.
Given the brutality of the rapes, (the report stated that 25 percent of the
rapes resulted in death), the incidence of rapes by officers (83 percent), and
the impunity with which they were carried out, the report concluded that the
rapes were condoned by the military regime in order to terrorize and subjugate
the Shan. There were corroborating reports on rapes and sexual violence, by the
military in Shan State and elsewhere, including first hand accounts from rape
victims documented by credible foreign observers. According to a report by
Refugees International, rape of ethnic women by the SPDC troops similarly was
prevalent in Karen, Mon, and Karenni regions.
The SPDC denied the
report and ordered three internal reviews. In August the junta claimed that no
soldiers were involved in the rapes. In October the regime stated it continued
to investigate the allegations and had found evidence of five cases of rape
similar to those described in the SHRF/SWAN report. The regime stated it
provided copies of its report on the investigations to the international
community and to the U.N. Special Rapporteur, Paulo Sergio Pinheiro. However,
according to Pinheiro, the investigations were undertaken by military and other
SPDC personnel with no special skills or experience in investigating human
rights allegations. The investigations reportedly consisted of prearranged,
large, collective, and public meetings with local officials, organized by
military personnel. There has been continued international pressure on the
regime to allow an independent assessment of the allegations and to take
appropriate actions to prevent rape and sexual abuses by the military.
In central and southern Shan State, government forces continued to
engage the SSA. The military maintained a program of forced relocation of
villagers in that region to SPDC-controlled sites, that reportedly was
accompanied by killings, rapes, and other abuses of civilian villagers.
According to AI, 90 percent of the civilians from Shan State whom it interviewed
in Thailand in February said they had been subjected to unpaid forced labor by
the military within the last 18 months.
Border disputes with
Thailand during the year exacerbated the plight of civilian populations along
the Thailand border (see Sections 2.d and 6.c.).
In January 2001,
according to a credible but not independently confirmed report, in Murng-Nai,
military troops beat to death a Palaung villager, raped his wife, and stole his
property. In March 2001, according to the SHRF, SPDC troops gang-raped a woman
in Murng-Ton township after troops had tortured and killed her uncle. Also
according to the SHRF, in April 2001, SPDC soldiers encountered four villagers
near Naa Ing, Shan State. The soldiers found packets of rice, which they claimed
the villagers were going to give to the SSA. The soldiers tied up the men and
took the woman to a different location, where they reportedly raped her. They
then reportedly required the villagers in the area to pay a substantial fine for
the release of the four persons.
According to Human Rights Watch
(HRW), SPDC troops conscripted children as young as the age of 11, especially
orphans and street children (see Section 5).
Active insurgent
groups included the Chin National Front, the Naga National Council, the
Arakan-Rohingya Solidarity Organization (ARNO), the SSA-South, and the KNU
(including its affiliate the Karen National Liberation Army). Some members of
the insurgent groups committed serious abuses. For example, according to the
regime, in December 2001, the KNPP killed seven villagers who refused to join
their ranks in Loikaw township. The regime also accused the KNU and the SSA of
killings and bombings throughout Shan and Karen States and of recruiting and
using child soldiers. UNICEF, AI, and HRW reported that both SPDC troops and
insurgent groups recruited child soldiers (see Section 5).
Section
2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and
Press
The law allows the regime to restrict freedom of speech and
freedom of the press and, in practice the junta continued to restrict these
freedoms severely and systematically during the year. The regime continued to
arrest, detain, convict, and imprison citizens for expressing political opinions
critical of the junta, and for distributing or possessing publications in which
opposition opinions were expressed (see Sections 1.d. and 1.e.). Security
services also monitored and harassed persons believed to hold such political
opinions.
Legal restrictions on freedom of speech have intensified
since 1996, when the junta issued a decree prohibiting speeches or statements
that "undermine national stability." In all regions of the country, the regime
continued to use force to prohibit virtually all public speech critical of it by
all persons, including persons elected to Parliament in 1990, and by leaders of
political parties. The regime has pursued this policy consistently since 1990,
with few exceptions.
There was an unconfirmed report from the
Democratic Voice of Burma that in August 2001, military security personnel
arrested a monk for delivering a sermon criticizing the economic and political
conditions in the country during a ceremony at the Mahamyatmunni Payagyi Pagoda
in Mandalay. The monk, Ashin Pandita, reportedly was derobed and detained at the
police station. No additional information was available at year's end.
The regime permitted the NLD to resume some public meetings during
the year. In keeping with the confidence-building that has surrounded the talks
between the regime and Aung San Suu Kyi, the NLD moderated its criticism of the
regime in these meetings. The NLD continued to press for substantive dialog with
the regime as quickly as possible, and has refrained from any direct attacks on
the policies or actions of the regime.
Many prominent writers and
journalists remained in prison for expressing their political views. The
Paris-based organization Reporters Sans Frontieres reported that at least 18
journalists remained in prison at year's end, including Ohn Kyaing, better known
by his pen name Aung Wint, who wrote articles in favor of democracy and also was
a NLD M.P, elect from Mandalay. He has been in prison since 1990. Government
censorship boards prohibited publication or distribution of works authored by
those in prison, although in 2000 the regime allowed former political prisoners
Ma Thida and U Sein Myint (also known as U Moe Thu), to write several magazine
articles following their release from prison. In 2001 at least one well-known
publisher, Tin Maung Than, departed the country for fear that his activities
would lead to imprisonment.
Between April and June 2000, the junta
arrested 11 persons for distributing antijunta leaflets and allegedly planning
attacks on government buildings. In September 2000, the junta sentenced Chein
Poh, a highly respected, 77-year-old lawyer in Rangoon, for allegedly
distributing foreign publications with antiregime annotations written on the
back. Although the regime presented no credible evidence to prove the charge,
Chein Poh was sentenced to 14 years in prison. Chein Poh was released from
prison early in the year and died approximately 6 months later.
The regime owned and controlled all daily newspapers and domestic
radio and television broadcasting facilities. These official media remained
propaganda organs of the junta and normally did not report opposing views except
to criticize them. The only partial exception was the Myanmar Times, an
expensive English-language weekly newspaper, targeted at the foreign community
in Rangoon, which occasionally reported on criticisms of regime policies by the
U.N. and other organizations.
All privately owned publications,
including the Myanmar Times, remained subject to prepublication censorship by
state censorship boards. Due in part to the time required to obtain the approval
of the censors, private news periodicals generally were published monthly.
However, since 1996 the regime has given transferable waivers of prepublication
censorship for weekly periodicals. As a result, weekly tabloids proliferated.
Regime controls encouraged self-censorship, and publications generally did not
report domestic political news.
Imported publications remained
subject in principle to predistribution censorship by state censorship boards,
and possession of publications not approved by the state censorship boards
remained a serious offense. Cases involving prodemocracy literature, including
two such cases during the year, were punished by imprisonment. The regime also
restricted the legal importation of foreign news periodicals and discouraged
subscriptions to foreign periodicals. However, foreign newspapers may be
purchased in Rangoon. Prior to August 2000, such foreign newspapers and
magazines were censored regularly at the airport on arrival, but starting in
2001 they were distributed uncensored.
Since 1997 the regime
issued few visas to foreign journalists and has held only a handful of press
conferences on political subjects. Journalists occasionally were blacklisted. In
previous years, several journalists who entered the country as tourists were
detained and deported by the regime. During the year, the regime began holding
more frequent press conferences and invited foreign journalists to the country,
including some who previously were blacklisted. Cable News Network, the British
Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), and other foreign news organizations filed
reports from the country during the year. However, the regime refused visas to
Australian reporters seeking to cover Australian Foreign Minister Downer's visit
to the country in October.
Due to widespread poverty, limited
literacy, and poor infrastructure, radio remained the most important medium of
mass communication. News periodicals rarely circulated outside urban areas. The
junta continued to monopolize and control the content of the two domestic radio
stations. Foreign radio broadcasts, such as those of the BBC, Voice of America,
Radio Free Asia, and the Democratic Voice of Burma, remained the principal
sources of uncensored information.
The regime continued to
monopolize and to control tightly all domestic television broadcasting, offering
only a government channel and an armed forces channel. However, in 2001 the
regime loosened restrictions on the reception of foreign satellite television
broadcasts by allowing new licenses to be purchased. Previously, new licenses
were not available and the operation of an unlicensed satellite television
receiver was a crime punishable by up to 3 years in prison and or a fine. The
Television and Video Law makes it a criminal offense to publish, distribute, or
possess a videotape not approved by a state censorship board.
The junta
systematically restricted access to electronic media. All computers, software,
and associated telecommunications devices were subject to government
registration, and possession of unregistered equipment was punishable by
imprisonment (see Section 1.f.).
The Ministry of Defense operated
the country's only known Internet server and offered expensive, limited Internet
services to a small number of customers. During the year, a cafã?»that was billed
as a cybercafe opened, but it did not have access to the Internet, only CD-ROM
and other such games.
The regime continued to restrict academic
freedom severely. University teachers and professors remained subject to the
same restrictions on freedom of speech, political activities, and publications
as other government employees. The Ministry of Higher Education routinely warned
teachers against criticizing the regime. It also instructed them not to discuss
politics while at work; prohibited them from joining or supporting political
parties or from engaging in political activity; and required them to obtain
advance ministerial approval for meetings with foreigners. Like all government
employees, professors and teachers have been coerced into joining the USDA, the
regime's mass mobilization organization. Teachers at all levels also continued
to be held responsible for the political activities of their students.
In June and July 2000, the regime reopened the remainder of the
institutions of higher education that were closed in 1996 following widespread
student demonstrations. However, the regime took a number of special measures to
limit the possibility of student unrest. Campuses were moved to relatively
remote areas, teachers and students were warned that disturbances would be dealt
with severely, and on-campus dormitories were closed, which disrupted university
life. There was evidence that many students chose to continue with self-study
because the quality of education deteriorated to such an extent that many
students opted to stay with self-study or tutoring. The regime tightly
controlled the limited number of private academic institutions in the country as
well as what they were allowed to teach.
b. Freedom of Peaceful
Assembly and Association
The law limits the freedom of assembly,
and the regime restricted it in practice. An ordinance officially prohibits
unauthorized outdoor assemblies of more than five persons, although the
ordinance was not enforced consistently. The 10 existing political parties also
are required to request permission from the regime to hold meetings of their
members; nevertheless, meetings occurred without regime permission.
The military junta continued its decade-long policy of preventing
the Parliament elected in 1990 from convening. During the year, the regime
loosened its restrictions on the activities of the main opposition party, the
NLD, and allowed 90 of NLD's 300 offices to reopen (see Section 3).
In May and September 2001, the regime forced the closure of three
Shan National League for Democracy (SNLD) offices in townships near the capital
of Shan State. In September 2001, the regime reportedly told the SNLD Chairman
to disregard the regional authority's directive and to continue with normal
operations.
In previous years, authorities used force to prevent
prodemocracy demonstrations, punish participants and organizers in prodemocracy
demonstrations and meetings, and detained or imprisoned persons suspected of
planning and organizing such demonstrations. During the year, there were no
reports of such practices (see Section 1.c.). However, authorities did attempt
to prevent the public from coming out to see Aung San Suu Kyi when she traveled
to Rakhine State, ostensibly on the grounds that outdoor political gatherings of
any type were illegal. Organizations affiliated with the SPDC handed out
leaflets that questioned Aung San Suu Kyi's patriotism and discouraged citizens
from showing any support for her. The authorities blocked off streets and told
citizens to stay home. Her party experienced similar, though less pronounced,
harassment on visits to Mon and Shan States during the year (see Section 2.d.).
The regime at times interfered with the assembly of religious
group members (see Section 2.c.).
The Government restricted
freedom of association, particularly in regard to members of the main opposition
political party, the NLD. The law prohibits more than 5 persons from meeting
outdoors without prior government approval. In the past, while the regime
allowed the NLD to celebrate certain key party events with public gatherings, it
restricted the size of the gatherings and the individuals who were allowed to
attend. For example, in September 2001, the NLD held a ceremony to commemorate
the third anniversary of the CRPP and the regime responded with Military
Intelligence (MI) personnel surrounding NLD headquarters. In 2000 the regime
prevented Aung San Suu Kyi from traveling to Rangoon to attend party meetings.
During the year, the regime lifted most of these restrictions on NLD activities
but, through mutual agreement, the NLD attempted to avoid large gatherings in
order not to alarm the regime.
Since the initiation of talks
between Aung San Suu Kyi and the junta in October 2000, there have been no
reports of coerced resignations or recall motions. The regime-controlled media
ceased its campaign against the NLD, and the regime loosened some restrictions
on NLD party activity.
In general the right of association existed
only for government-approved organizations, including trade associations and
professional bodies, such as the Forest Reserve Environment Development and
Conservation Association. Few secular, nonprofit organizations existed, and
those that did took special care to act in accordance with government policy.
There were 10 legal political parties but most were moribund.
c.
Freedom of Religion
The 1974 Constitution permits restrictions on
religious freedom, stating that "the national races shall enjoy the freedom to
profess their religion... provided that the enjoyment of any such freedom does
not offend the laws or the public interest." Most religious adherents duly
registered with the authorities generally were free to worship as they chose;
however, the regime imposed restrictions on certain religious activities. In
practice the regime restricted efforts by Buddhist clergy to promote human
rights and political freedom, and coercively promoted Buddhism over other
religions in some ethnic minority areas.
The regime's pervasive
internal security apparatus sought to infiltrate or monitor meetings and
activities of virtually all organizations, including religious organizations.
Religious activities and organizations also were subject to restrictions on
freedom of _expression_ and association. In addition, the regime controlled and
censored all publications, including religious publications (see Section 2.a.).
Although a government directive exempts "genuine" religious
organizations from registration, in practice only registered organizations were
allowed to buy or sell property or open bank accounts. In addition, the regime
provided some utilities at preferential rates to recognized religions. There was
no official state religion; however, the regime continued to show preference for
Theravada Buddhism, the majority religion. For example, the regime funded the
construction of the International Theravada Buddhist Missionary University in
Rangoon. State-controlled news media frequently depicted junta members paying
homage to Buddhist monks; making donations at pagodas throughout the country;
officiating at ceremonies to open, improve, restore, or maintain pagodas; and
organizing ostensibly voluntary "people's donations" of money, food, and
uncompensated labor to build or refurbish Buddhist religious shrines. Buddhist
doctrine remained part of the state-mandated curriculum in all elementary
schools; however, individual children generally were permitted to choose not to
receive instruction in Buddhism. There continued to be widespread reports that
regime officials compelled both Buddhists and non-Buddhists to contribute money,
food, or uncompensated labor to state-sponsored projects to build, renovate, or
maintain Buddhist religious shrines or monuments. However, there were no known
reports of forcing persons to build pagodas during the year.
The
regime has attempted to control the Buddhist clergy ("sangha"). The regime
authorized military commanders to try members of the sangha before military
tribunals for "activities inconsistent with and detrimental to Buddhism," and
imposed on the sangha a code of conduct that was enforced by criminal penalties.
The junta also subjected the sangha to special restrictions on freedom of
_expression_ and freedom of association (see Section 2.a.). The military junta
prohibited any organization of the sangha other than nine state-recognized
monastic orders under the authority of the State Clergy Coordination Committee
("Sangha Maha Nayaka Committee," SMNC). The regime prohibited all religious
clergy from being members of any political party.
The regime
continued to restrict the building activities, education, and proselytizing of
minority religious groups.
Christian groups continued to have
difficulties in obtaining permission to build new churches. The regime
reportedly denied permission for churches to be built along main roads in cities
such as Myitkina, the capital of Kachin State. In 2001 in Rangoon, authorities
closed more than 80 home-churches because their operators did not have proper
authorizations to hold religious meetings. There were no reports of authorities
closing home-churches this year.
Muslims reported that they
essentially were banned from constructing any new mosques during the year. Early
in 2001, local authorities in Rakhine State scheduled approximately 40 mosques
for destruction because reportedly they were built without permission. Thirteen
mosques were destroyed before the authorities intervened at the request of the
UNHCR. To ensure mosques were not rebuilt, they were replaced with government
owned buildings, monasteries, and Buddhist temples.
In most
regions of the country, Christian and Muslim groups that sought to build small
churches or mosques on side streets or other inconspicuous locations at times
usually were able to proceed, but only based on informal approval from local
authorities. These groups reported that formal requests encountered long delays
and generally were denied.
The Government discriminated against
non-Buddhists at upper levels of the public sector. Only one non-Buddhist served
in the Government at the ministerial level, and the same person, a Brigadier
General, was the only non-Buddhist known to have held flag rank in the armed
forces since the 1990s. The regime actively discouraged Muslims from entering
military service, and Christian or Muslim military officers who aspired to
promotion beyond the middle ranks were encouraged by their superiors to convert
to Buddhism. In some ethnic minority areas, such as Chin State, there were
reports that SPDC troops offered financial and career incentives for Burman
soldiers to marry Chin women, teach them Burmese, and convert them to Buddhism.
The regime discourages proselytizing by all clergy. Evangelizing
religions, like Christianity and Islam, are most affected by these restrictions.
In general the regime has not allowed permanent foreign religious missions to
operate in the country since the mid-1960s, when it expelled nearly all foreign
missionaries and nationalized all private schools and hospitals.
Religious publications, like secular ones, remained subject to
control and censorship (see Section 2.a.). Translations of the Bible and Koran
into indigenous languages could not be imported legally; with the regime's
permission, Bibles in indigenous languages were allowed to be printed locally.
In the past, there were credible reports that in Karen State's
Pa'an township, SPDC units repeatedly conscripted young men as porters who were
leaving Sunday worship services at some Christian churches, which caused them to
avoid church attendance. Soldiers led by officers repeatedly disrupted Christian
worship services and celebrations. In 2000 local government officials reportedly
ordered Christian Chins to attend sermons by newly arrived Buddhist monks who
disparaged Christianity. In addition, there were reports that Christian Chins
were pressured to attend Buddhist seminaries and monasteries and were encouraged
to convert to Buddhism. Local government officials reportedly separated the
children of Chin Christians from their parents under the pretense of providing
them free secular education, and lodged the children in Buddhist monasteries in
which they were instructed in and converted to Buddhism without their parents'
knowledge or consent. Reports suggested that the regime sought to induce members
of the Naga ethnic group to convert to Buddhism by means similar to those it
used to convert members of the Chin to Buddhism.
Religious
affiliation at times was indicated on government-issued identification cards
that citizens and permanent residents of the country are required to carry.
There appeared to be no consistent criteria governing whether a person's
religion is indicated on his or her identification card. Citizens also are
required to indicate their religions on some official application forms, such as
passports.
For a more detailed discussion see the 2002
International Religious Freedom Report.
d. Freedom of Movement
Within the Country, Foreign Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
The regime restricted freedom of movement. Most citizens were able
to travel within the country, although their movements were monitored and they
were required to notify local officials of their whereabouts (see Section 1.f.).
Movement was limited in areas of armed conflict. Urban and rural residents were
subjected to relocation.
In past years, the freedom of movement of
opposition political leaders also was curtailed rigorously. Between 1995 and
2000, the junta allowed NLD general secretary Aung San Suu Kyi to travel outside
the capital only once, on a visit to a monastery, and until May 6, she remained
under house detention. While the Government has relaxed restrictions on Aung San
Suu Kyi, generally allowing her freedom of movement and association, some
restrictions remained. Since her release from house detention in May, Aung San
Suu Kyi has traveled to Mon, Shan, and Rakhine States, as well as to Mandalay,
Magwe, and Irrawaddy divisions. Although she generally was allowed to meet with
international visitors, including the foreign ministers of Japan and Australia,
the Government did not allow either Malaysia's Prime Minister Mahathir or the
Malaysian Foreign Minister to call on her when they visited in August. Aung San
Suu Kyi and her party also were harassed by government-affiliated groups on some
of her visits to various regions of the country (see Section 2.b.). During the
year, the regime loosened travel restrictions on all NLD members including the
most senior members. NLD M.P.'s elect who were released from prison were able to
travel between their electoral districts and Rangoon to coordinate with NLD
leaders.
During the year, the regime reportedly implemented
policies to consolidate the border with Bangladesh and to further control the
movement of Muslim Rohingyas in Rakhine State (see Section 6.c).
The regime refused to accept Burmese deportees from other
countries, but accepted the return of approximately 4,000 illegal migrants from
Thailand. The regime allegedly refused to document Burmese seafarers who were
stranded abroad due to the sinking of their ship or bankruptcy of the ship
owners.
The regime also carefully scrutinized prospective travel
abroad. Such control facilitated rampant corruption, as many applicants were
forced to pay large bribes. Bribes for passports were sometimes as high as
$3,000 (approximately 3.6 million kyat), the equivalent of more than 10 years'
salary for the average citizen. The official board that reviews passport
applications has denied passports on political grounds. All college graduates
who obtained a passport (except for certain government employees) were required
to pay a special fee to reimburse the regime for the cost of their education.
Citizens who emigrated legally generally were allowed to return to visit
relatives, and some who lived abroad illegally and acquired foreign citizenship
also were able to return.
Residents unable to meet the provisions
of the citizenship law, such as ethnic Chinese, Arakanese, Muslims, and others,
must obtain prior permission to travel internally. Since the mid-1990s, the
Government also has restricted the issuance of passports to female citizens (see
Sections 5 and 6.f.).
The regime prohibited foreign diplomats and
foreign employees of U.N. agencies based in Rangoon from traveling outside the
capital without advance permission. All residents, foreign and local, were
required to apply for authorization to leave the country.
Restrictions on foreign travelers to the country were eased as
part of an effort to promote tourism. Burmese embassies now generally issue
tourist visas, valid for 1 month, within 24 hours of application. However,
certain categories of applicants, such as foreign human rights advocates,
journalists, and political figures were denied entry visas regularly unless
traveling under the aegis of a sponsor acceptable to the regime and for purposes
approved by the Government.
There was a large number of internally
displaced persons (IDPs) in the country. NGOs based in Thailand estimated that
the regime moved forcibly more than 250,000 citizens from their villages and
districts to live near or along the Thai border (see Section 5). These NGO
estimated that more than 350,000 IDPs resided in SPDC relocation sites.
During the year, the military continued to abuse thousands of
villagers and drove them from their homes, including during the course of
military campaigns in Karen, Kayah, and Shan States (see Section 1.f.). In
January AI reported that a 75-year-old Shan man said that he and his family fled
to Thailand after SPDC troops and United Wa State Army (UWSA) troops confiscated
all their land, arrested villagers, looted homes, raped numerous women, and
drove them out of their village. He reported that between 500 to 600 UWSA troops
occupied the area, and that he received no compensation for the loss of his
woodlands, orchards, or fields.
Ethnic minority areas previously
affected by conflict, such as the large Karen areas of Irrawaddy division,
experienced tighter controls on personal movement, including more frequent
military checkpoints, closer monitoring by military intelligence, and larger
military garrisons. "Informal taxes", or bribes, were extracted from all
nationalities at checkpoints in border areas. In Rakhine State, many controls
and checkpoints applied only to the Muslim population (see Section 5).
Harassment, fear of repression, and deteriorating socio-economic
conditions continued to force many citizens into neighboring countries and
beyond. In the border regions populated by minority ethnic groups, the regime
continued its policies of forced labor, confiscation of lands, compulsory
contributions of food, and forced relocations. These policies produced thousands
of refugees in neighboring countries such as Thailand, China, and India. One
report from Kachin State alleged that in May 2001, 3,000 Naga villagers fled the
country into northeastern India when SPDC troops launched an offensive against
Naga separatists. The security forces reportedly burned villages and laid
landmines to discourage villagers from returning. Harsh conditions in Shan State
compelled an exodus to Thailand, with unconfirmed estimates that approximately
10,000 Shan citizens may have relocated there during the year (see Section
1.f.). There were approximately 150,000 persons in refugee camps on the
country's borders. Of these at least 135,000 Karen, Mon, and Karenni resided in
refugee camps in Thailand. In addition, there were tens of thousands of Shan
refugees in Thailand not living in camps. On the country's western border,
22,000 Rohingya Muslims remained in refugee camps in Bangladesh (see Section 5).
More than 100,000 Rohingyas lived outside the refugee camps in Rakhine State
with no formal documentation as refugees. In addition, Rohingyas who have
returned to Rakhine State claimed that they faced government restrictions on
their ability to travel and to engage in economic activity.
The
regime did not allow refugees or displaced persons from abroad to resettle or
seek safe haven in the country and has not formulated a policy regarding
refugees, asylum, or first asylum. There were no reports that persons formally
sought asylum in the country during the year. There were no reports of forced
repatriation.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of
Citizens to Change their Government
Citizens did not have the
right to change their government. The junta continued to prevent the Parliament
elected in 1990 from convening.
Since 1962 active duty military
officers have occupied most important positions in both the central Government
and in local governments. Since 1988 a military junta has held all state power.
All members of the regime have been military officers on active duty, and the
junta has placed military or retired military officers in most key senior-level
positions in all ministries. At year's end, active duty or retired military
officers occupied 37 of the 39 ministerial-level positions.
Following the
NLD's victory in the 1990 elections, the military junta refused to implement the
election results and disqualified, detained, or imprisoned many successful
candidates (see Sections 1.d. and 1.e.). Many other M.P.s elect fled the
country. Following an aborted effort from 1993-96 to draft a new constitution
assigning the military the dominant role in the country political structure, the
military junta continued its systematic use of coercion and intimidation to deny
citizens the right to change their government.
In September 1998,
the NLD leadership organized a CRPP on the basis of written delegations of
authority from a majority of the surviving members elect of the 1990 Parliament,
in view of the junta's refusal to allow the entire Parliament to convene. The
committee was empowered to act on behalf of the Parliament until the Parliament
was convened. In retaliation the junta launched a sustained and systematic
campaign to destroy the NLD without formally banning it; the authorities
pressured many thousands of NLD members and local officials to resign and closed
party offices throughout the country. Military intelligence officials also
detained more than 200 members elect of Parliament in 1998. At year's end, a
total of 19 M.P.s elect remained in prison. According to AAPP, two of these
M.P.s elect have been in prison since 1990 (see Section 1.d.).
In
October 1999, the Multiparty Democracy General Election Commission announced,
that of 392 NLD members elected to Parliament in 1990, only 92 remained both NLD
members and M.P.s elect. It claimed that 105 had resigned their parliamentary
status, 139 had been disqualified by the commission, 27 had resigned from the
NLD, and 31 had died. In contrast, in September 2000, the CRPP claimed to enjoy
the support of 433 of the 485 members elect of Parliament.
Late in
2000, with encouragement from the U.N. Special Envoy Razali Ismail, the regime
initiated talks with Aung San Suu Kyi that produced some relaxation in the
restrictions on the NLD. In subsequent years, the NLD was able to resume some
normal party activities. Press attacks on the NLD and Aung San Suu Kyi also
ceased. However, since 2000, the regime has not opened a substantive dialog with
the NLD and still held more than a 1,000 political prisoners at year's end.
Women were excluded from military leadership. There were no female
members of the regime, ministers, or Supreme Court judges.
Members
of certain minority groups also were denied full citizenship and a role in
government and politics (see Section 5).
Section 4 Governmental
Attitude Regarding International and Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged
Violations of Human Rights
The Government did not allow domestic
human rights organizations to function independently, and it remained generally
hostile to outside scrutiny of its human rights record.
The
regime's restriction on travel by foreign journalists, NGO staff, U.N. agency
staff, and diplomats; its monitoring of the movements of such foreigners; its
frequent interrogation of citizens concerning contacts with foreigners; its
restrictions on the freedom of _expression_ and association of citizens; and its
practice of arresting citizens who passed information about government human
rights abuses to foreigners all impeded efforts to collect or investigate
information regarding human rights abuses. Reports of abuses, especially those
committed in prisons or ethnic minority areas, often emerged months or years
after the abuses allegedly were committed and seldom could be verified with
certainty.
There were approximately 25 nonpolitical, international
humanitarian NGOs working in the country. A few others have established a
provisional presence while undertaking the protracted negotiations necessary to
establish permanent operations in the country. Beginning in 2001, international
NGOs sometimes were required to have a government ministry representative
accompany them on all field visits, at the NGOs expense (see Section 1.f.).
The regime permitted the U.N. Special Rapporteur, Paulo Sergio
Pinheiro, to visit the country three times during the year. In his reports,
Pinheiro cited instances of positive change and pledged to work with the regime,
the opposition, members of civil society, and the international community to
promote human rights in the country. He also cited problems, including the
denial of fundamental freedoms of assembly, association, _expression_, and
movement, and encouraged the regime to correct these deficiencies. He also
called for the release of all political detainees. In addition, he cited "the
gross violations of human rights of civilians" living in areas of conflict in
eastern Karen and Kayah States, southern Shan State, northern Sagaing division,
Rakhine, and Chin States.
In 2001 the regime announced the
creation of a Human Rights Committee, chaired by the Minister of Home Affairs
and including the Chief of Police as one of the members. Several human rights
workshops that targeted abuses and were sponsored by the Australian Government
were held in Rangoon.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex,
Disability, Language, or Social Status
The military junta
continued to rule by decree and was not bound by any constitutional provisions
concerning discrimination.
Women
Domestic violence
against women, including spousal abuse, appeared to be relatively infrequent,
although there was little data available. The regime did not release statistics
regarding spousal abuse or domestic violence. Married couples often lived in
households with extended families, where social pressure tended to protect the
wife from abuse.
Rape is illegal; however, spousal rape is not a
crime unless the wife is under 12 years of age. The regime stated that rape was
not common in populous urban areas but occurred more often in remote areas. The
Government did not release statistics regarding rape.
Prostitution
is prohibited by law and punishable by 3 years in prison; however, it was
becoming an increasing problem, particularly in some of Rangoon's "border towns"
and "new towns," which were populated chiefly by poor families that were
relocated forcibly from older areas of the capital. There were credible reports
that a large number of female prostitutes were imprisoned and often subjected to
abuse while incarcerated. One estimate put the number of women detained for
prostitution at 400 at any given time in Mandalay prison alone.
There were no laws against sexual harassment.
In
general women traditionally enjoyed a high social and economic status and
exercised most of the same basic rights as men. Consistent with traditional
culture, women kept their names after marriage and often controlled family
finances. However, women remained underrepresented in most traditional male
occupations, and women continued to be barred effectively from a few
professions, including the military officer corps. Poverty, which was widespread
in rural areas, affected women disproportionately. Women did not receive equal
pay for equal work on a consistent basis. Women legally were entitled to receive
up to 26 weeks of maternity benefits; however, in practice these benefits often
were not accorded them.
There were no independent women's rights
organizations. The National Committee for Women's Affairs in the Ministry of
Social Welfare was responsible for safeguarding women's interests. The
Government and at least one international NGO operated schools and other
rehabilitation programs for former prostitutes. The Myanmar Maternal and Child
Welfare Association, a government-controlled agency, provided assistance to
mothers. A professional society for businesswomen, the Myanmar Women
Entrepreneurs' Association, provided loans to women starting new businesses.
Children
The regime continued to allocate minimal
resources to public education. According to the latest available statistics,
government expenditures for all civilian education were equivalent to less than
1 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) during the year and have declined by
more than 70 percent in real terms since 1990. According to government studies
conducted with U.N. assistance, only 37 percent of children finished fourth
grade in urban areas and only 22 percent did so in rural areas. Rates of school
attendance and educational attainment decreased during the year, largely due to
rising formal and informal school fees as the junta diverted expenditures from
health and education to the armed forces. On average teacher's pay was equal
only to approximately $7.00 (10,000 kyats) a month, far below subsistence wages
and has forced many teachers to quit teaching out of economic necessity. Only
relatively prosperous families were able to afford to send their children to
school, even at the primary level. In ethnic minority areas, the regime often
banned teaching in local languages. In some areas where few families were able
to afford unofficial payments to teachers, teachers generally no longer came to
work and schools no longer functioned. In response to government neglect,
private institutions began to provide assistance in education, despite an
official monopoly on education.
Children also suffered greatly
from the junta's severe and worsening neglect of health care. The junta cut
government expenditures on public health care even more sharply than it cut
spending for education. Government expenditures for civilian health care in
1998-99 were equivalent to only 0.3 percent of GDP. Government studies sponsored
by U.N. agencies in 1997 found that, on average, 131 of 1,000 children died
before reaching the age of 5 years, and that only 1 out of 20 births in rural
areas was attended by a doctor. Those same studies indicated that, among
children under 3 years of age, 37 percent were malnourished, and 13 percent were
malnourished severely. The World Health Organization considered the country's
health care system to be extremely poor.
Child abuse is prohibited
by law. The Government stated that child abuse was not a significant problem;
however, the regime did not release supporting statistics.
Child
prostitution and trafficking in girls for the purpose of
prostitution--especially Shan girls who were sent or lured to
Thailand--continued to be a major problem (see Section 6.f.).
The
official age of enlistment in the ostensibly all-volunteer army is 18 years.
However, the authorities reportedly rounded up orphans and street children in
Rangoon and other cities and forced them into military service. An October HRW
report entitled My Gun Was As Tall As Me, alleged widespread forced conscription
of children into the SPDC army, and, to a lesser extent, into armed groups
fighting against the regime (see Section 6.c.).
Several
international NGOs and agencies promoted the rights of children in the country,
including World Vision, Save the Children UK, CARE, UNICEF, UNDP, and foreign
governments.
Persons with Disabilities
In principle
official assistance to persons with disabilities includes two-thirds of pay for
up to 1 year of a temporary disability and a tax-free stipend for permanent
disability; however, in practice assistance was limited severely. There was no
law mandating accessibility to buildings, public transportation, or government
facilities. While there were several small-scale organizations to assist persons
with disabilities, most must rely on their families to provide for their
welfare. Military veterans with disabilities received available benefits on a
priority basis. Because of landmine detonations, there were a large number of
amputees in the country.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities
Wide-ranging governmental and societal discrimination against
minorities persisted. Animosities between the country's many ethnic minorities
and the Burman majority, which has dominated the Government and the armed forces
since independence, continued to fuel active conflict that resulted in serious
abuses during the year. These abuses included reported killings, beatings,
torture, forced labor, forced relocations, and rapes of Chin, Karen, Karenni,
and Shan by SPDC soldiers and the armed ethnic groups (see Sections 1.a., 1.c.,
1.f., and 1.g.).
The Government continued to discriminate
systematically against non-Burmans. Because the regime reserved secondary state
schools for citizens, Rohingya Muslims did not have access to state run schools
beyond primary education and were ineligible for most civil service positions.
There were reports that forced labor of Muslims occurred in
Rakhine State (see Section 6.c.)
Since only persons who were able
to prove long familial links to the country were accorded full citizenship,
nonindigenous ethnic populations (such as Chinese, Indians, and Rohingya
Muslims) were denied full citizenship and were excluded from government
positions. Members of the Rohingya Muslim minority in Rakhine State, on the
country's western coast, continued to experience severe legal, economic, and
social discrimination. The Government denied citizenship status to most
Rohingyas on the grounds that their ancestors did not reside in the country at
the start of British colonial rule in 1824, as required by the country's highly
restrictive citizenship law. Persons without full citizenship faced restrictions
in domestic travel (see Section 2.d.). They also were barred from certain
advanced university programs in medicine and technological fields.
Ethnic minority groups generally used their own languages.
However, throughout all parts of the country controlled by the regime, including
ethnic minority areas, Burmese remained the language of instruction in state
schools. Even in ethnic minority areas, most primary and secondary state schools
did not offer instruction in the local ethnic minority language. There were very
few domestic publications in indigenous minority languages.
There
were reports that the junta resettled groups of Burmans in various ethnic
minority areas (see Section 1.f.). There were ethnic tensions between Burmans
and nonindigenous ethnic populations, including Indians, many of whom were
Muslims, and a rapidly growing population of Chinese, most of whom immigrated
from Yunnan Province and increasingly dominated the economy of the northern part
of the country. Both groups tended to be more commercially oriented and hence
more prosperous and economically powerful than Burmans.
Section 6
Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
The 1926
Trade Unions Act, which remained in effect, permits workers to form trade unions
only with the prior consent of the Government; however, no free trade unions
existed in the country, and the junta dissolved even the government-controlled
union that existed before 1988.
In June 2001, the Committee on the
Application of Convention and Recommendations of the International Labor
Conference once again expressed profound regret regarding the persistence of
serious discrepancies between the law and practice with respect to freedom of
association. The committee criticized the regime for not implementing the
provisions of the ILO Convention 87 on Freedom of Association and Protection of
the Right to Organize, which the Government ratified in 1955. In 2001 a
government representative testified to the committee that the Trade Unions Law
was being revised, but that he could not provide the draft text at that time.
The International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU)
reported that in August, army troops killed an official of the Free Trade Union
of Burma (the Kawthoolei Education Workers Union). U Saw Mya Than, a village
headman who was widely known for his trade union activities, forcibly was
recruited as a porter by the army and then killed in retaliation for an attack
by opposition forces.
No unions in the country were affiliated
internationally. The Government forbade seafarers who found work on foreign
vessels through the Seafarers Employment Control Division from contacts with the
International Transport Workers' Federation and the regime often refused to
document seafarers who were stranded abroad (see Section 2.d.).
b.
The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
Workers did not
have the right to organize and bargain collectively. The government's Central
Arbitration Board, which once provided a means for settling major labor
disputes, has been dormant since 1988. Township-level labor supervisory
committees existed to address minor labor concerns.
The regime
unilaterally set wages in the public sector. In the private sector, market
forces generally set wages. However, the regime has pressured joint ventures not
to pay salaries greater than those of ministers or other senior government
employees. Some joint ventures circumvented this with supplemental pay or
special incentive systems. Foreign firms generally set wages near those of the
domestic private sector but followed the example of joint ventures in awarding
supplemental wages and benefits.
According to the law, workers
generally are prohibited from striking, although a small number of workers
purportedly are accorded the right to strike. The last reported strike was in
2000, when an employer retracted a promise to pay piece rates. Subsequently 30
employees were detained, many for up to 3 months. All employees lost their jobs.
There were no export processing zones (EPZs). However, there were
special military-owned industrial parks, such as Pyin-Ma-Bin, near Rangoon,
which attracted foreign investors. Another example was the 2,000-acre
Hlaingthaya Industrial Zone in Rangoon; at least four companies were known to
operate on its premises (see Section 6.c.).
c. Prohibition of
Forced or Bonded Labor
Forced or bonded labor remained a
widespread and serious problem. Although the Penal Code provides for the
punishment of persons who imposed forced labor on others, there were no known
cases of the application of this provision. Throughout the country,
international observers verified that the regime routinely forced citizens to
work on construction and maintenance projects. The law does not specifically
prohibit forced and bonded labor by children, and forced labor by children was
also a serious problem.
In 2000 the ILO determined that the regime
had not taken effective action to deal with the "widespread and systematic" use
of forced labor in the country and, for the first time in its history, called on
all ILO members to review their relations with the regime and to take
appropriate measures to ensure that the regime would not be able to take
advantage of such relations to perpetuate or extend the system of forced labor.
Initially the regime rejected the ILO's actions and statements; however, during
the year, it began to work with the ILO by allowing visits and a liaison office
to be opened in the country. In February an ILO team visited the country and an
agreement was reached to establish a permanent ILO office in Rangoon to assist
in dealing with continued problems of forced labor. In August the ILO began
field visits to sites along the Thai border which were identified by AI and
other organizations as "hot spots" for forced labor and SPDC abuse of ethnic
populations. In 2001 when the regime allowed an ILO high-level team to visit the
country to assess the situation, the team concluded that the regime had made "an
obvious, but uneven" effort to curtail the use of forced labor, and that forced
labor persisted, particularly in areas where the regime was waging active
military campaigns.
Human rights groups and the ILO continued to
receive allegations of forced labor from around the country, including Rangoon
division, Rakhine State, and areas along the Thai border. In an October report,
the ICFTU reported that the military continued to use forced labor on a massive
scale. The ICFTU report echoed allegations contained in a July report by AI,
Myanmar: Lack of security in counter-insurgency areas, which contained a number
of specific allegations of human rights abuses by the armed forces, including
forced labor. The AI allegations related primarily to areas of Shan, Karen, and
Mon States, and Tenassarim division.
The ICFTU reported that
women, children (including orphans and street children), and elderly persons
were required to perform forced labor; that porters often were sent into
dangerous military situations, rarely received medical treatment, and almost
never were compensated; that forced laborers frequently were beaten; and that
some women performing forced labor were raped or otherwise abused sexually by
soldiers. The ICFTU reported several cases of the military pressuring civilians
to conceal the incidence and extent of forced labor from the ILO investigation
team during the year. Government authorities often allowed households or persons
to substitute money or food for labor for infrastructure projects, but
widespread rural poverty forced most households to contribute labor. Parents
routinely called upon children to help fulfill their households' forced labor
obligations (see Section 6.d.). According to SHRF, in June 2001, SPDC troops
forcibly conscripted 250 civilian porters, including 108 women and children,
many of whom were between the ages of 8 and 16 years. Some children were forced
to carry 6 cans of milk and some were forced to carry 10 mortar rounds each.
Many of the children were kicked and beaten when they could not move fast
enough.
According to an HRW report, Crackdown on Burmese Muslims,
there was increased repression of Muslims and increased use of forced labor in
Rakhine State. According to Forum Asia, the establishment of new "Model
Villages" resulted in a higher demand for forced labor and land confiscation.
However, other credible reports suggested that forced labor in Rakhine State had
declined overall; however, army demands for forced labor reportedly continued to
occur in selected townships, as did demands for porterage and other army
services. There also were reports of further control on the activities and
movements of Rohingyas in Rakhine State (see Section 2.d.).
There
were no accurate estimates of the number of citizens forced to provide labor
each year but the practice was common. The regime has taken some limited
measures toward eliminating the practice; however, the measures did not appear
to have reduced significantly the use of forced labor, especially by the
military. The regime has established a committee to implement measures against
forced labor and has allowed the ILO to open an office in Rangoon and to travel
throughout the country. The implementation committee, however, has not
identified or prosecuted any instances of forced labor and did not appear to
have the authority to intervene in allegations of military use of forced labor.
The committee has not implemented adequate mechanisms for the reporting,
investigation, and prosecution of incidents of forced labor.
d.
Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for Employment
Although the law sets a minimum age of 13 for the employment of
children, in practice the law was not enforced. Child labor has become
increasingly prevalent and visible. Working children were highly visible in
cities, mostly working for small or family enterprises. In the countryside,
children worked in family agricultural activities. Children working in the urban
informal sector in Rangoon and Mandalay often began work at young ages. In the
urban informal sector, child workers were found mostly in food processing,
street vending, refuse collecting, light manufacturing, and as tea shop
attendants. According to government statistics, 6 percent of urban children
worked, but only 4 percent of working children earned wages; many were employed
in family enterprises.
The law does not specifically prohibit
bonded labor by children; while bonded labor was not practiced, forced labor by
children occurred (see Section 6.c.). The authorities reportedly rounded up
orphans and street children in Rangoon and other cities and forced them into
military service. Children also were forced to serve as porters in combat areas,
during which beatings and other mistreatment reportedly occurred (see Section
6.f.).
The Department of Social Welfare provides support and
schooling for a small number of children (approximately 3,000) who were orphaned
or in some other way estranged from their families.
The Government
has not ratified ILO Convention 182 on the worst forms of child labor.
The military regime reportedly used children as porters, in
infrastructure development, and in providing other services to military forces.
Children often built or repaired roads and irrigation facilities. Households
reportedly satisfied forced labor quotas by sending their least productive
workers (usually children). In recent years, there have been reports that
military units in various ethnic minority areas either forced children to
perform support services, such as fetching water, cleaning, cutting bamboo, or
cultivating food crops, or allowed households or villages to use children to
satisfy SPDC orders to perform such services (see Sections 5 and 6.c.).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
Only government
employees and employees of a few traditional industries were covered by minimum
wage provisions. The minimum daily wage for salaried public employees was $0.10
(100 kyats) for what was in effect a 6 hour workday. Various subsidies and
allowances supplemented this sum. Neither the minimum wage nor the higher wages
earned even by senior government officials provided a worker and family with a
decent standard of living. Low and falling real wages in the public sector have
fostered widespread corruption. In the private sector, urban laborers earned
approximately $0.20 (200 kyat) per day, while rural agricultural workers earned
approximately half that rate. Some private sector workers earned substantially
more; a skilled factory worker earned approximately $4.00 (4,800 kyat) per day.
Surplus labor conditions, a poor economy, and lack of protection
by the regime continued to dictate substandard conditions for workers. The 1964
Law on Fundamental Workers Rights and the 1951 Factories Act regulate working
conditions. There are legally prescribed 5 day, 35-hour workweek for employees
in the public sector and a 6 day, 44-hour workweek for private and state
enterprise employees, with overtime paid for additional work. The law also
allows for a 24-hour rest period per week, and workers were permitted 21 paid
holidays per year. However, in practice such provisions benefited only a small
portion of the country's labor force, since most of the labor force was engaged
in rural agriculture.
Numerous health and safety regulations
existed, but in practice the regime did not make the necessary resources
available to enforce the regulations. Although workers may in principle remove
themselves from hazardous conditions, in practice many workers could not expect
to retain their jobs if they did so.
f. Trafficking in Persons
Trafficking in women and children was a serious problem during the
year. There reportedly was widespread complicity among local regime officials in
trafficking in persons.
The law does not prohibit trafficking in
persons and there were reports that persons were trafficked from and within the
country. There are laws which are used against traffickers such as the Penal
Code which prohibits kidnaping; the Suppression of Prostitution Act; and the
Child Law, which includes provisions against the sale, abuse, or exploitation of
children. According to the regime, traffickers have received sentences of
between 3 and 14 years for trafficking in persons. According to the regime's
figures, investigations have resulted in jail sentences being handed out in
approximately 90 cases. Between 1999 and June, the Myanmar National Committee on
Women's Affairs and other NGOs held more than 10,000 village-level seminars to
educate families regarding the dangers of trafficking. In Mon State, eastern
Shan State, and Kayin State, these seminars were carried out in cooperation with
the U.N. Inter-Agency Project on Trafficking in Women and Children in the Mekong
Sub-region (UN-IAP). In two reports during the year, the regime highlighted the
prevention, repatriation, and prosecution actions taken under a newly formed
Working Committee for the Prevention of Trafficking in Persons, chaired by the
Minister of Home Affairs. While there were still many weaknesses in the program,
the regime has made progress, particularly in the area of prevention and
prosecution, and to a lesser extent, repatriation. Regime officials recognized
the need for continuing engagement on preventing trafficking and the prosecution
of traffickers. Although the regime was active on these fronts, its
effectiveness still was unclear by year's end. In addition, the regime reported
that it was in the process of gathering data on the incidence of trafficking and
expanding cooperation with international and local NGOs. However, during the
year, the regime did not cooperate with neighboring countries, most
significantly Thailand, on trafficking in persons.
Trafficking of
women and girls to Thailand and other countries, including China, India,
Bangladesh, Taiwan, Pakistan, Malaysia, Singapore, Japan, and countries in the
Middle East, for sexual exploitation, factory labor, and as household servants
was a problem. Shan women and girls were trafficked across the border from the
north; Karen and Mon women and girls were trafficked from the south. There was
evidence that internal trafficking generally occurred from poor agricultural and
urban groups to areas where commercial sex work flourished (trucking routes,
mining areas, and military bases) as well as along the borders with Thailand,
China, and India. Men and boys also reportedly were trafficked to other
countries for sexual exploitation and labor, but this appeared to be a small
percentage of overall trafficking. While most observers believed that the number
of these victims was at least several thousand per year, there were no reliable
estimates of the total number.
While laws exist against child
prostitution and child pornography, they were not enforced well. Reports from
Thailand indicated that the rising incidence of HIV infection there increased
the demand for supposedly "safer," younger prostitutes, many of whom came from
Burma. Trafficking in persons within the country appeared to be a growing
problem; however there were no reliable statistics regarding its extent. The
regime has begun to help locate families of freed child trafficking victims and
to assist in their repatriation from Thailand.
In recent years,
the regime has made it difficult for women to obtain passports or marry
foreigners in order to reduce the outflow of women both as victims of
trafficking (see Sections 1.f. and 2.d.). In addition, there are regulations
forbidding girls under the age of 25 from crossing the border unless accompanied
by a guardian. However, most citizens who were forced or lured into prostitution
crossed the border into Thailand without passports.
Corruption
among local government officials was widespread and included complicity in the
trafficking of persons. The regime's efforts to stop international and internal
sex and exploitative trafficking were limited given the magnitude of the
problem.
A number of NGOs offered poverty alleviation and
education programs designed to counter trafficking. Reportedly these programs
have been moderately successful.
While the Government has made
limited progress on trafficking in persons during the year, baseline information
on the extent to which trafficking occurs and the success of the government's
activities is not available. The government's pervasive security controls,
restrictions on the free flow of information, and lack of transparency prevent a
meaningful assessment of trafficking in persons activities in the country. For
example, while experts agree that human trafficking from the country was
substantial, no organization, including the Government, was able or willing to
estimate the number of trafficking victims.
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