

Burma Issues

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GROWING IN PEACE?



... PEACE TALKS SOUND
GOOD TO MANY PEOPLE ...
PEACE MUST COME TO-
GETHER WITH JUSTICE

- Behind the Ceasefires, p2

Information for Action +++ International Campaigns for Peace +++ Grassroots Education and Organizing

CIVIL WAR

BEHIND THE CEASEFIRES

Saw Thu War

The Karen National Union (KNU), Burma's largest ethnic rebel group, held their third set of cease fire negotiations with the Burmese military regime (Slorc) on July 28, 1996. Despite these animated talks, the four-decades-old conflict over the right of ethnic self-determination remains in a political stalemate. During the last dialogue, the issues of unequal status, a positional approach rather than pursuing common interests, and a lack of commitment to the process were the key inhibiting factors to finding a solution to the political conflict.

Following cease fires between Slorc and fifteen of the allied armed ethnic groups, most of whom were members of National Democratic Front (NDF), the KNU has been facing strong military pressure from the SLORC. Subsequently the SLORC launched massive military campaigns against the KNU in order to take military and political advantage of the situation. The split between a Buddhist Karen faction, the Democratic Karen Buddhist Organization (DKBO) and the Christian dominated KNU at the end of 1994, gave the SLORC an additional advantage. The DKBO affiliation with SLORC gave the military the political pressure needed to take the KNU's jungle headquarters of Manerplaw, along with some other strategic areas.

The rapid growth of this internal military pressure pushed the KNU to reluctantly enter ceasefire dialogue with the SLORC despite being at a distinct disadvantage in the negotiations. This reluctance was further exacerbated by previous experience in negotiations with the Burmese government in 1949, 1960, and 1963. All of these negotiations ended in failure because of the Burmese government's uncompromising demand for the unconditional surrender of the KNU.

A preliminary delegation composed of twelve members left for Rangoon

on December 12, 1995 to initiate the first in the latest round of ceasefire talks. In this meeting, SLORC insisted that the KNU follow the same procedures that were used with ceasefire agreements with other ethnic groups: first agree to a "ceasefire" and second to cooperate in a "local development program". Slorc did not express any interest in discussing the ethnic issues, which the KNU asserts are at the heart of the conflict.

On February 15, 1996, the KNU and SLORC held a second round of talks in Rangoon. Both sides agreed to keep all information about the talks confidential until a final agreement was reached. However, the international media reported that the KNU presented an agenda of twelve items for discussion. Several key items submitted by the KNU were 1) a call for SLORC to officially announce a nationwide ceasefire, 2) a halt to all military activities including road construction in the KNU's operative areas, 3) the immediate end to all human rights abuses by the Burmese army, and 4) allowing the United Nations to monitor any ceasefire. SLORC accepted none of these key items and continued to insist on a total surrender instead.

The third round of ceasefire talks was held on July 28, 1996. This time the KNU proposed to SLORC that a tripartite dialogue between KNU, SLORC, and the National League for Democracy (NLD) be held thirty days after a ceasefire agreement to discuss important political issues. SLORC again turned down the proposal and requested that the KNU propose agenda items relevant for discussion by the two sides only. SLORC reminded the KNU that it would only dialogue with KNU alone and maintained its position to talk on the issues of a ceasefire and local development programs, while refusing any further dialogue on political issues. As a justification for this, the SLORC stated that since they are a non-elected military government, they have no right to

discuss political issues. Yet the SLORC made a political demand that the KNU promise to abandon their armed struggle and return to the legal fold.

Tactically, SLORC's continuing massive military reinforcements on the ground was a clear signal to the KNU that they had no options except a ceasefire and cooperation in local development. The KNU views SLORC's development program with much suspicion, feeling that it is designed to neutralize the masses through offering them benefits from the development program. These suspicions could be well founded. Lt. Gen. Khin Nyunt, chief of the military intelligence of the SLORC, is in charge of the local development program. His plans to construct roads in the development program is a tremendous threat to the KNU, as these roads could be used for military purposes in case a ceasefire broke down. The SLORC further insisted that after a ceasefire the KNU's troop must stay within limited-designated areas and stop new recruitment and taxation in its operative areas. The KNU sees this as SLORC's strategic attempt to cut them off from the political and material support of their people. However, as an alternative way for the KNU to support its troops, the SLORC offered to allow them to run businesses such as mining, logging, and trade.

Peace talks sound good to many people, including the international community. However peace does not only imply an end to armed fighting. Peace must come together with justice. Peace talks are a way to move towards justice, but the balance of power for equal dialogue is a key point for this to be possible. The collective voice of the ethnic groups is essential in balancing power with SLORC for truly open dialogue. Despite the fact that fifteen armed ethnic groups have already accepted cease fires, the groups still have time to create a common voice in dealing with SLORC. (continued next page)

BRINGING IN THE LABOUR

by Naw Lalor and Naw Ronsam

There are more than 700,000 foreigners presently entering Thailand illegally in search of work. They come from many countries around Thailand including Burma, Sri Lanka, Laos, Vietnam, India and Bangladesh. Until recently they had absolutely no legal status or rights. Most come to Thailand because of serious economic problems or political unrest in their home countries.

The Thai Labour and Social Welfare Ministry, in a report published in February of this year, stated that of the 700,000 plus illegal workers in Thailand, over 500,000 come from Burma. They are brought into Thailand through an illegal system which involves a variety of Thai sectors including local civil servants. Police Lieutenant Colonel, Shinaphan Thontikhul, assistant immigration officer of Tak Province on the Thai/Burma border says that there are three major sectors involved in bringing in illegal labor. The first is civil servants including police, border police, navy, and even government school teachers. The second sector are merchants who have established an office in Mae Sot which is actively recruiting illegal workers from Burma. Finally there is the local private business sector which hires the illegal workers. These three groups coordinate together very closely and form a national-level network. Confirming this, Police Colonel Kaisri Amornkaisri from Ranong said, "The sale of illegal labor in Ranong is indeed a reality. It is a very systematic process. At least 10% of those involved in the business are police."

(continued from previous page)

Reunification of all the ethnic groups, in fact, will be necessary to counter SLORC's new strategy of "Cut and Clear" (See *Cut and Clear* in this issue). At the same time, the acceleration of international pressure will also help build the ethnic status in dialogue with SLORC.

In the past, illegal workers seeking jobs in Thailand, especially in the lower northern regions, had to pay at least 3,000 baht to local officials as protection money. In the Bangkok and Samut Prakan areas they had to pay up to 5,000 baht. Now the price has increased to nearly 7,000 baht. This money must be paid to local officials immediately upon arrival in the area or, in some cases, it is subtracted from their salaries once they have jobs. In addition, each factory or plantation hiring the illegal labor usually has to pay the officials another 40,000 to 50,000 to guarantee that the workers will not be arrested.

In the southern Thai province of Phuket, the police recently arrested more than 10,000 workers in an attempt to crack down on the illegal labor market. One hundred of these illegal workers were involved in the Panthep Condatown project belonging to Nai Uthai Suksirisampan. They were arrested after he stopped paying the protection fees to the police. Nai Uthai claims that the Phuket police receive at least six million baht a month in payments related to illegal workers.

Providing a shelter for foreign laborers to work in Thailand legally is the responsibility of the Thai Labor Department. They have established a new policy which would allow foreign laborers to take jobs in Thailand. However, these foreign laborers must meet three conditions first:

- 1) they should not compete with Thai laborers

- 2) they must help ease the labor shortage in Thailand
- 3) they must be seeking refuge from human rights abuses rather than simply seeking economic advantages.

This policy has created a conflict between the Thai labor organizations and the local private sector which wants cheap labor. Thai labor organizations claim that there is a large pool of unemployed in Thailand and the factory owners overlook this pool of labor because they are more interested in the cheap labor of the foreign workers. The private sector claims that in reality there is a shortage of labor in Thailand and it is hard for them to find all the workers they need. Ms. Arunee Sritho, Chairperson of the Thai Women's Labour Union says there is not a labour shortage in Thailand as claimed by local factory owners, but Thai workers are not applying for work because there is no security in employment. Usually they are only hired as temporary workers with no financial or social benefits and are paid the most minimal salaries.

The Thai Labour and Social Welfare Ministry also confirms that 1.2 million Thais are now jobless. Still the private sector in Thailand argues that they can not find the workers they need. In the past 2 or 3 years the demand of the industrial sector for permission to use foreign labor has caused the Thai Cabinet to pass a resolution on 25 June 1996 giving permission for the 700,000 workers who entered Thailand before 25, June 1996 to work (continued next page)

The ethnic groups should no longer agree to SLORC's gag order during negotiations and release all information about peace talks to the mass media as a way of drawing in support for their strategy to bring peace to Burma. The ethnic groups also need to prepare a clear strategy and process to deal with, not only current issues, but also a system level. And last of all, presenting

interests rather than positions will be a pro-active plan in dealing with SLORC and placing them more at a disadvantageous position.



AGRICULTURE

THE MORE WE GROW, THE MORE WE EAT?

by Alice Davies

Production for domestic and export markets is a significant factor in raising agricultural growth and employment and expanding food supply, all of which are central to poverty alleviation... there may be trade-offs among these various benefits and policy orientations can exercise a powerful influence on their income. - ILO

This apparently obvious statement appears to have little relevance to many of the rural poor in Burma today.

Agriculture accounts for 69.05% of the workforce (with workers labouring for 360 minutes to produce one kilogram of staple cereal) and more than half the GDP.

Rice exports have risen and are estimated by the Government of Myanmar (GOM) to be 18,812 million tonnes for 1994/95, of which some 11.1% will be officially procured. The implicit taxation through the official procurement of paddy (procurement rates are usually about one third of the market price) and the state monopoly over sales and prices has not lead to commensurate increases in income to the producers, despite some trade-offs in the form of distribution of inputs at below market prices, free irrigation services and credit with delivery contracts

The GOM has undertaken major rural development works, with the 1962/63 expenditure of 19.4 million kyat, rising to the 1994/95 provisional figure of 296.8 million kyat. Of this, in 1994/95, 159.9 million kyat was provided by the further implicit taxation of people's contributions, in cash, kind or services. This extra taxation reduces household income by forcing those who were rice-sufficient into the cash economy and, if taken as service, by reducing the amount of time spent in their own fields, maintaining self-sufficiency.

In 1994/95, the Myanmar Agricultural Trading Produce (MATP) estimated procurement equivalent to 1.25 million tonnes of rice. 500,000 tonnes of this was for defence force and government employee consumption, with the balance of 750,000 tonnes exported. Burma accounts for 3% only of the world's rice exports, so can have little influence on global market prices.

The FAO, further to the 1992 Rio Declaration and Agenda 21, has stated that: food insecure people do not consistently produce sufficient food for themselves or have the purchasing power to buy food from other producers. Burma's rural poor are producing the necessary excess crops for sale, but are constrained by domestic policy biases - even excluding the well-documented forced relocations (leading to

landless labour or refugees), confiscation of land for army barracks and crops, further even to the official procurement policies.

Burma's people earn an estimated 1410 kyat annually. When the small farmers are unable to fulfil their 'obligations' for labour or crops, they are required to contribute through cash or service, further reducing the time spent to produce their crops and depleting what small reserves of cash they possess and which may be used to purchase the extra food required for more than survival.

Burma's rural poor: the very small farmers, of whom 33% have less than 0.8 hectares and 29% between 0.8 and 2 hectares and the landless permanent or seasonal wage labourers are endemically poor through these domestic policy biases and the domestic reality of the population growing at twice the pace of production and the overall international processes, among them the forthcoming trade liberalisation.

Sources:

ILO, FAO, GOM Annual Review 1994/95



(continued from previous page)

legally in factories in 39 Thai provinces. The jobs they can hold are in the fields of agriculture, fishing, and construction. However on July 16 of this year, the Cabinet added 4 more provinces to this list and also lowered the registration fee of these workers from 5,000 baht to 1,000 per person. At the same time they increased the kinds of jobs these workers can hold to include transportation and industry. This law resulted in more than 5,000 Thais demonstrating against the resolution. They presented a letter to the prime minister to demand that the govern-

ment reconsider these two resolutions. The letter said the resolutions were not clear on the conditions for bringing in foreign labour and provided loopholes for illegal labour to be exploited. This, they claimed, could result in serious problems for Thai labourers, the Thai society and could harm the economy.

Thai academics have also criticized this action by the cabinet saying it shows that, under pressure from the private sector which wants cheap labour, the government is simply trying to solve immediate issues rather than seeking long-term solutions to the serious problems facing the country.

They further predict that the cabinet's decision to allow foreign labour to work in Thailand will result in a strong negative reaction from Thai labour which will have a negative impact on the Thai government and society in the future.

Sources

PKK, SP, KTK June to August, 1996



CUT AND CLEAR

by N. Chan

In Burma's capital city of Rangoon, military "justice" is carried out swiftly and without opportunity for defence. Win Htein, a former Burmese army captain and now the personal assistant to pro-democracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi can testify to that from firsthand experience. In May of this year he was arrested along with 262 of Suu Kyi's supporters in an attempt by the military regime to derail a congress of her National League for Democracy. In August he was sentenced to seven years in Insein prison for allegedly taking part in a conspiracy to smuggle a videotape out of Burma purporting to show the failure of the summer rice crop in the rural area of Henzada. Early this month, the military authorities suddenly doubled his prison sentence to 14 years.

Far away from this bustling capital, deep in the interior of the Shan State, military "justice" is also swift and brutal.

They took everything - all our belongings, down to the tongs we use for cooking. They also burned seven houses, including my own, because we had run away. After the army had come through, we stayed one month in the village and then returned to our own village and rebuilt our houses. One month after we had returned, the army came again. This time there were 100 soldiers. They beat four villagers...Three of them were beaten while working as conscripted porters: the other while [he] was in the village. *From an interview with an Akha village headman from Mong Hsat township, Shan State.* Two separate and very different incidents, but they point to a new military and political strategy designed by the Slorc to cut their own losses while at the same time limiting the options of the opposition groups and weakening their negotiating power.

In the past, the military made use of a political and military strategy some

observers began to call the "total annihilation strategy". This strategy made use of brute force to destroy opposition forces. On the political front they arrested Daw Aung San Suu Kyi along with many other leading political opposition figures. While this removed these political leaders from the public eye and ended their ability to influence political opposition in the country, the cost to Slorc in terms of international criticism and lost economic aid was very high. Even their closest ASEAN friends were putting reluctant pressure on them to ease off.

Militarily, the policy was even more ruthless. Massive military campaigns were launched against Mannerplaw, the headquarters for the Karen National Union and most of the political opposition groups seeking refuge along the Thai/Burma border. Other major military targets were also attacked. While the military won many of these strategic positions, they suffered extremely high losses both in terms of men and finances. These campaigns also attracted much international attention, bringing more and more sympathy to the struggling opposition forces.

To cut their losses on both fronts and to weaken opposition strength for the long term, the military has adopted a new strategy which can be termed "cut and clear strategy". This strategy no longer focuses on directly confronting opposition political leaders or attacking ethnic insurgent strongholds. Rather it emphasizes tactics to cut these centers of opposition off from their support base, and neutralizing the masses. Political opposition leaders, such as Aung San Suu Kyi, are not directly threatened with arrest, but rather arrests and harassments are directed towards her close aids and associates such as Win Htein. The crowds of people who have been flocking to hear her weekly talks are also slowly being cleared out as military intelligence members harass and arrest them. Since the international

movement has focused their campaigns almost totally around Aung San Suu Kyi, the arrests of people around her does not result in much international criticism. Slorc has cut their losses and gained political ground.

Large military campaigns against insurgent strongholds has given way to smaller offensives to cut off the trade routes the ethnic groups need for their survival. Other campaigns are launched against the civilian populations, driving them away from their village areas into Slorc-controlled camps so they can no longer provide food or information to the insurgents. In case of cease fire agreements, the insurgent forces are forced into very limited designated areas where they can not build up their strength, or re-arm. The civilian populations are further neutralized through pseudo-development programs which give them a sense of improvement while allowing the military to maintain its total control over them. As the military cuts the ethnic forces off from their sources of funds and information, and as the military clears villagers out of strategic areas, their losses decrease and international criticism lessens.

The Burmese military has learned much in terms of strategy since 1988. They have adopted new strategies as they learn more how the opposition forces and how the international community operates. This "cut and clear" strategy, while appearing quite simple, is proving to be rather effective and it is essential that all the forces for change study it carefully in order to develop proactive responses to it which will return more options for survival to the people.

Sources:

Amnesty International report ASA 16/38/96

TN960904, BP960904



Bottom of the Barrel: The Destruction of Burma's

Subsistence Economies

Across southeast Asia, rural households counter the extremities of climate by catching and storing rainwater in enormous earthen jars. The monsoon brings extra rain to be stored for later use in the ensuing hot and dry parts of the year. These Volkswagen-sized vessels can be compared to some traditional rice economies in Burma and the upheaval that are draining them away. Burma's civil war and military rule have been recently redescribed as essentially economic conflicts rather than political or ideological struggles (*Global Economic Warfare*, BI XX XX).

by CAC

Official corruption, increased natural resource exploitation and regional economic trends are responsible for nationwide changes to the ways people organize their economic survival.

The most radical changes can be seen in those economies which have traditionally existed isolated- or insulated- from larger or competing systems. People who survive on their own subsistence rice production first, with limited exchange next and, finally, a very limited use of cash, have had their entire economies attacked by the demands placed on them by military rule. Largely self-sufficient economies exist on two fundamental elements: equal land distribution and collective labor.

Provided with enough arable land to meet a community's needs, each household assumes stewardship over a plot, considered both its own and communal property. There is little incentive to claim a plot much larger than the neighbors' because there would not be enough labor to make it productive. The collective labor system organizes the entirety of the village's work capacity and applies it equally to all farms belonging to the village on a rotating basis. Ideally, all families have enough rice and the surplus can be used for communal purposes and trading for items not immediately available in the village. An important corollary is that the immediate environment also provides raw materials to meet other basic needs: bamboo and wood for homes, clean water and animal proteins to name a few. Collective labor offers social security for members of the village

whose own households could not field a work force large enough to grow the rice needed to survive. Families with young children only, or those cut off from traditional extended family ties, do not suffer as weaker competitors in a labor market.

Furthermore, people may have the opportunity to enjoy a certain amount of political control over their immediate resource needs. Land apportionment, planting and harvesting schedules, and the use of communal surplus are political issues in which the village workers earn the right to participate by virtue of their labor contribution to the community. While such systems may not be democratic in the Greek sense, nor are they dictatorial.

This subsistence economy is much like a village water tank. Equal land distribution, communal labor and a finite demand maintain its vital level. The vicissitudes of agricultural life:

poor harvests and natural disasters, are partially offset by a slight overproduction of rice and the communal ownership of the excess as are unforeseen emergencies. These caveats usually present only a slight or temporary danger to the integrity of the overall economic system; hairline fractures in the economic jar which may let out a little water but certainly don't threaten to empty it. Where land is fertile, the labour force strong and external demands such as taxes relatively light, the jar stays nearly full.

Today, many of Burma's traditional rural economies are under a severe three-pronged attack. First and most powerful, is the massive increase in demand from the rural economy. The military's rice orders must be met, along with crop taxes (paid in paddy). No longer is the land and collective labor force required to produce for only their own needs and a small surplus.



Additionally, cash "porter fees" and "taxes" are arbitrarily lodged by the military. In some cases cash is an acceptable substitute for paddy. This burden introduces a hitherto unknown emphasis on cash to what have always been subsistence-first economies. Now, along with rice it is expected to be a principle export. Cash, as the saying goes, cannot be found on trees, and so a desperate scramble begins to raise it.

While these requirements from an essentially closed economic system are being greatly increased, land is being confiscated. Appropriated for army barracks, designated for infrastructure development or taken for military-run agriculture projects, the economic resource base expected to meet these increased demands shrinks rapidly.

Lastly, the labor force is similarly "reassigned" to work outside the requirements of the traditional economy. Forced road-building, tending crops on army plantations and portering loads for the army all deduct from the amount of time the village work force can devote to either its own survival.

Workers used to be responsible for the productive capacity of the entire village. Now, the external demand for resources is administered on a house-by-house basis, introducing a separation of communal and individual labor responsibilities. Punishment for failure to comply is delivered by household, so village workers are forced away from the collective labor system to a more individual struggle to survive. This explains why most victims complain about forced labor in terms of their own economic survival, rather than a loss of civil rights such as freedom of movement.

Nevertheless, where the demand for cash is very great, the only answer is

for some members of the labour team to seek paying jobs outside the community, perhaps across borders, remunerating their wages not for their families' supplemental enrichment but in an effort to patch the widening cracks - in some cases gaping holes - which drain the vitality of their formerly self-sufficient economy.

This process helps to explain many of the social trends one sees in Burma today: an enormous unskilled and unprotected migrant labour force streaming over the border to Thailand,

One critical question has yet to be answered: where does all the money go?

often ending up as exploited factory workers, prostitutes or farm hands; rural poverty on a hitherto unknown scale, compounded by political instability; a dilapidating education structure lacking both teachers and students, let alone money; and a growing disempowerment of a rural population which formerly enjoyed control over its own economic base and to more modest, political institutions.

Land apportionment, planting and harvesting schedules and the use of communal surplus are political issues in which the village workers earn the right to participate by virtue of their contribution to the community. While such systems may not be exactly democratic, nor can they be considered dictatorial; certainly they are more pluralistic than what replaces them.

One critical question has yet to be answered: where does all the money go?

Surely all the rice and cash turned over to the military in taxes would result in some local benefit. The last fatal blow to the survival of traditional rural economy in Burma is the vacuum which drains cash out of rural areas and into urban centers. Labour and rice are converted to cash and devoted to export. Corrupt military officers collect "taxes" to enrich their families waiting back in Rangoon, Moulmein or Mandalay. Confiscated paddy is sold for export, with the farmers receiving absolutely nothing. The effect is that people face an even more difficult struggle to provide the cash now requested of them.

The economic results are disastrous, as is the new social status of rural workers. Formerly well off, they are now poor; once self-reliant, they are now wholly dependent on the whim of authoritarian demand; once party to communal politics, they are now absorbed into the lowest strata of a dictatorial national political pyramid. Once self-sufficient, they are now candidates for national, bi- and multi-lateral schemes to relieve their economic misfortune, their "underdevelopment." In short, the bottom has been completely knocked out of the water tank which has provided stability, egalitarianism and a measure of progress for centuries.

Sources in this issue include:

PKK = *Phu Chat Karn* (Thai), SP = *Siam Rat* (Thai), KTK = *Krueng Thep Thuraket* (Thai), TN = *The Nation* (English), BP = *Bangkok Post* (English), ILO = International Labour Organization, FAO = Food and Agriculture Organization, GOM = Government of Myanmar

IN THE NEWS

NEWS BRIEFS

The Wa State Army has sold land to Chinese residents of Yunnan. Meanwhile, the Burmese government announced that it is doubling its war against heroin production and that production decreased after Khun Sa was apprehended and SLORC troops had better access to Shan State. Experts say that there has actually been a drug explosion in Burma as other drug lords fill Khun Sa's place, and the SLORC has confiscated a very small amount of heroin relative to the amount that is produced (2,340 tones in 1994-1995 season). **FER 960902 BP 960910**

A Unocal spokeswoman said that the law suit filed by NCGUB and the Federation of Trade Unions of Burma (FTUB) would not affect the construction of the gas pipeline — "everything is on schedule." The suit calls for Unocal to divest and compensate the villages in the pipeline's path and accused Unocal of relying on the SLORC to provide and maintain all military operations and repression in the pipeline region. Unocal has de-

nied all allegations and claims the suit is politically motivated. **AW 960913 FER 960912 TN 960905 BP 960905 BP 960904**

Ohn Gyaw said that Burma's road to ASEAN membership was being eased by close high-level contacts with governments in the region. He anticipated joining ASEAN "the sooner the better." The Thai Foreign Minister Amnuay Viravan said that Burma must meet the minimum requirements for the Southeast Asian Nations free trade area (AFTA) before it can become a full member of ASEAN, including tariff reduction to 20% and a reduction of trade and non-trade barriers. Amnuay said that ASEAN looks beyond scoring political points and considers the actual realities of a country that applies for membership. **TN 960903 BP 960903**

According to Aung San Suu Kyi and Tin Oo (vice chairman of the NLD), the SLORC has doubled Win Htein's jail sentence from 7 to 14 years. The recent pressure against the

NLD has decreased attendance at ASSK's weekend meetings to about 1,500 people. In May and June around 10,000 people would gather at her home. **TN 960904 BP 960904**

Brigadier-General David Abel stated that Burma has been looking for investments from the East as an option if western countries pass sanctions against Burma. Abel is confident that Burma can divert its markets so economic sanctions will have no effect. He also says that Burma is slowing economic growth to avoid a short-sighted boom economy. This year's growth fell to 6% from 9.8%. **BP 960830**

The Public Health Ministry of Thailand has required that illegal aliens must be examined for mental disorders, leprosy, tuberculosis in its dangerous stage, elephantiasis, syphilis in its final stage, alcoholism, and drug addiction. **TN 960908**



Burma Issues

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THAILAND

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