

CRISIS OVERVIEW

It has been just over two years since Myanmar's military staged a coup in February 2021 and established itself as the military junta in power, officially known as the State Administrative Council (SAC). Since then, the country has been in a state of emergency, which was extended for an additional six months on 31 January 2023. The state of emergency has enabled the military to assume all government functions and gives the head of the military junta, Min Aung Hlaing, legislative, judicial, and executive powers (AP 01/02/2023).

Mass protests against the military junta started immediately after the coup and became part of a wider peaceful civil disobedience movement, which included strikes and road blockages across the country (BBC 22/02/2021 and 17/02/2021). The opposition to the junta eventually grew into organised armed resistance, as several local ethnic armed groups separately fought the junta in a multifront conflict, partnering to different extents with the People's Defence Force (PDF) (UK Parliament 17/04/2023).

As at 14 April 2023, the country had reported more than 34,400 casualties and 18,300 incidents of political violence since the February 2021 coup. Of the incidents of political violence, 4,200 involved violence against civilians, and 7,100 involved explosions and remote violence, such as air strikes (ACLED accessed 20/04/2023 a). Between February 2021 and January 2023, there were at least 600 reported incidents of air strikes (ACLED accessed 20/04/2023 a; BBC 31/01/2023; IISS 15/11/2022). The air strikes and clashes have damaged schools, medical facilities, sites of religious significance, civilians' homes, and other infrastructure (Fairplanet 23/03/2023; The Guardian 21/09/2022; BNI 05/10/2022).

Countrywide, an estimated 17.6 million people are in humanitarian need, including 4.5 million with severe needs, mainly in rural conflict-affected areas (OCHA 06/04/2023). Compared to other regions, Sagaing has had the highest increase in the number of people with humanitarian needs in 2023, with the number reaching 2.6 million as at January 2023. This is already a 35% increase from the 900,000 people in need reported in 2022 (OCHA 15/01/2023 and 31/12/2021).

Myanmar ranks the highest for hazard and exposure in the INFORM Risk Index, scoring 9.2/10. The country scores 10/10 for hazards and exposure to human conflict and has a vulnerability score of 5.5/10, with development, deprivation, and inequality being the highest concerns. It has a 6.1/10 lack of coping capacity, which is largely institutional. The country ranks 16th on the INFORM risk list because of high hazard and exposure, vulnerability, and a lack of coping capacity (INFORM accessed 14/04/2023).

About this report

Aim: this report provides an overview of Myanmar's humanitarian situation since the military coup in February 2021. It aims to provide a broad understanding of the current context, highlighting humanitarian developments, needs, access constraints, and information gaps.

Methodology: the analysis in this report is based on the secondary data review of publicly available sources. The report considers access constraints as instances where the affected population cannot access information, services, goods, and assistance, along with the physical restrictions or obstructions imposed on humanitarian responders to reach people in need.

Limitations: operational constraints and political sensitivities hinder data and information gathering among humanitarian responders, resulting in information gaps.

Terminology: 'military junta' collectively refers to the individuals and associates who staged the military coup on 1 February 2021.



KEY PRIORITIES

17.6 million

PEOPLE WITH
HUMANITARIAN NEEDS

+34,000

CASUALTIES
(POST-COUP)

1.5 million

IDPS
(POST-COUP)

+84,400

REFUGEES IN
NEIGHBOURING
COUNTRIES
(POST-COUP)

6.8/10

INFORM RISK SCORE

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HUMANITARIAN ACCESS

- Insecurity issues constrain access in Myanmar, particularly in the northwest of the country, where the most IDPs have been reported (OCHA 06/04/2023). In areas with active conflict, humanitarian responders face access constraints in reaching affected communities, worsening people's difficulties in accessing livelihood activities and essential services.
- Since the coup, the SAC has changed the legal and judicial systems, significantly affecting freedom of speech and information access. These changes have severe consequences, such as long-term detention and imprisonment for journalists, protesters, civil society organisations, and humanitarian organisations under defamation and obstruction charges (RFA 04/04/2022; IFJ 04/08/2022; RSF 01/04/2022; HRW 02/03/2021).
- A new registration requirement imposed on NGOs, known as the Organisation Registration Law, requires NGOs to (i) register with boards that include government representatives, (ii) comply with unclear regulations, such as no "mentioning false data" or "interference on the internal affairs of the state of politics", and (iii) declare their funding sources and areas of operation, which challenges the humanitarian principle of neutrality and could include information that is risky to share with the SAC (AI accessed 02/05/2023; Devex 15/02/2023). If NGOs are caught without registration, they are likely to face financial penalties and potential imprisonment, highlighting the country's increasing constraints on humanitarian organisations (OCHA 06/04/2023; The Diplomat 06/04/2023; Insecurity Insight 01/02/2023). There are also reports of military attacks against local NGOs and their resources, such as ambulances.
- Martial law imposed on certain townships, as well as insecurity and the presence of armed entities, will likely prevent humanitarian responders from reaching the affected people in those areas (The Irrawaddy 15/10/2022).

- Disruptions to internet and communication services severely constrain information access nationwide (GCR2P 28/02/2023). Shutting down the internet was one of the first actions of the military after the coup; in 2022, they ordered all telecom operators to suspend service 'indefinitely' while doubling the price of mobile data (The Irrawaddy 15/10/2022; The Japan Times 29/09/2022; Al Jazeera 11/02/2022). Providers have restored internet in military-controlled areas like Yangon, but blockages and disruptions remain in anti-junta stronghold areas (The Japan Times 29/09/2022; Al Jazeera 11/02/2022). As at September 2022, 54 of 330 townships nationwide faced internet blackouts (The Japan Times 29/09/2022). These internet and communication disruptions typically follow an escalation of the military's raids on villages (The Japan Times 29/09/2022; Access Now 23/06/2022; Myanmar Now 04/03/2022). Communication disruptions also hinder the transportation of basic goods, medicine, and food to the affected areas, as truck drivers cannot assess how safe roads are to travel on. In Rakhine and Chin states, conflict between the military authorities and the Arakan Army (AA) has shut down internet services since June 2019 (ACAPS 26/08/2020).
- Since the coup, soldiers have been patrolling major roadways to restrict and control the entrance of goods, including medicine. Checkpoints throughout the country, especially in areas with increased armed resistance, combined with extortion at the main checkpoints, curfews, and movement restrictions, hinder the movement of people (The Irrawaddy 24/02/2023).
- Main roads connecting anti-junta cities and townships are frequent targets for military attacks, disrupting food, trade, and medical supplies (The Irrawaddy 23/02/2023 a and 15/10/2022). Damage to roads and bridges, especially those connecting townships, has affected transportation around the country (Crisis24 16/03/2023; The Guardian 21/09/2022; BNI 05/10/2022).
- There are reports of the military destroying roads that connect the main city of Sagaing with remote villages. This destruction affects the whole community, particularly local farmers, who depend on them for access to markets. It also affects humanitarian workers, who cannot access villages without roads (Myanmar Now 06/10/2022).
- Anti-regime groups have staged bombings on military and other government facilities in various urban areas, including Bago, Mandalay, and Yangon. Clashes have affected transport, especially along roads connecting townships (Crisis24 16/03/2023).
- Although access will remain constrained, the monsoon season from mid-May to October could open a potential access window as the heavy rains slow down the army's ground forces and air support, decreasing military air strikes during these months (WB accessed 21/04/2023; VOA 09/06/2022; BNI 24/06/2020). This change could give humanitarians a chance to access people in need and build their resilience for the period after the monsoon when conflict is likely to increase again. At the same time, the heavy rainfall accompanying the monsoon season may further hinder people's access to assistance and humanitarian responders' access to affected people.

ANTICIPATED SCOPE AND SCALE

- Continuing hostilities have caused a steady increase in displacement and humanitarian needs across the country. As the military regime continues to fight a multifront war, internal and cross-border displacement numbers will likely increase (*The Irrawaddy* 10/04/2023 a).
- Political tensions and hostilities will likely increase across Myanmar in the coming months, particularly in anti-junta stronghold areas. On 1 February 2023, Myanmar's junta leader, General Min Aung Hlaing, extended the junta's illegitimate rule by six additional months to August 2023, acknowledging that the military does not yet control enough of the country to administer an election (*USIP* 09/03/2023).
- The risk of further crimes against humanity continues. Myanmar's military budget has increased by over USD 1.76 billion to around USD 2.7 billion for the 2023–2024 fiscal year (*The Irrawaddy* 10/04/2023 a). On 27 March 2023, during an Armed Forces Day parade, General Min Aung Hlaing stated that the military would take action against “terrorist organisations”, including armed resistance groups, as “martial law is increasingly being imposed in important townships that need to be controlled during the second phase of the State of Emergency”. The state of emergency started after the coup in 2021 and is expected to end in August 2023 (*CNN* 27/03/2023). As the junta struggles to maintain control, impose martial law on many townships, and have an increased military budget, there is an elevated risk of arbitrary arrest and detention for civilians and an increase in the number of clashes, checkpoints, and destruction of properties to suppress anti-junta resistance (*UNHCR* 17/04/2023; *VOA* 01/02/2023; *GCR2P* 28/02/2023). For more on the risk of a heightened military response in Myanmar, see ACAPS' Global Risk Analysis report (March 2023).
- Between May and mid-October 2022, the rainy season temporarily slowed the rate of SAC air raids and aerial attacks, but the return of the dry season has been linked to a resurgence of intense violence (*CASS* 01/02/2023). This pattern will likely occur again in 2023 during the upcoming rainy season, expected to start in May.

INFORMATION GAPS

- There are information gaps on the needs of displaced people and humanitarian needs in remote areas that humanitarian workers cannot reach.
- Gaps remain in the understanding of shelter needs for the affected population.
- There is a lack of up-to-date information on the planned closures of IDP camps around the country before the polls, which are scheduled to take place in August 2023. It is also unclear how the camp closures will affect those displaced before the coup.
- Many displaced people are sheltering with other community members, such as family

and friends. It is unclear how the host community's needs differ from those of IDPs, as the overall conflict situation affects all of them.

- There is insufficient data regarding returnees and their immediate needs in areas of return.
- There is a lack of understanding of the impact of particular protection risks, such as forced recruitment.
- Gaps remain regarding the impact of the conflict on food security across the country and which areas and populations are most affected.

CRISIS IMPACTS

Displacement

Since the coup in February 2021, as at 10 April 2023, the conflict had displaced an estimated **1,477,000 people across the country** (*UNHCR* 17/04/2023). Before the military coup, conflict had displaced roughly 328,000 people internally across Myanmar, predominantly in Chin, Kachin, Rakhine, and Shan states (*OCHA* 06/04/2023). Sagaing state accounts for over 50% of the country's 1.47 million post-coup IDPs (*UNHCR* 11/04/2023 and 14/03/2023). As at 10 April, there were 752,500 IDPs within Sagaing region. As at 27 March, the regions with the second and third highest numbers of post-coup IDPs were Magway (183,000) and Kayin (113,100) (*UNHCR* 11/04/2023; *OCHA* 06/04/2023).

Despite increasing displacement across the country, there are **planned IDP camp closures** before the polls in August (*OCHA* 06/04/2023; *UNHCR* 17/04/2023). IDPs are already sheltering in precarious conditions in camps and makeshift settlements, often in jungles and forests. Authorities are also closing displacement camps in various parts of the country, including Chin, Kachin, Rakhine, and Shan (*OCHA* 06/04/2023). As at February, the junta listed nearly 25 camps for closure in Myitkyina, the capital of the northern Christian-majority Kachin state, and the army ordered their inhabitants to leave by the end of March. Reports indicate that the camps housed more than 11,000 people. As at 1 May, the status of the closure of these camps was unknown. As at February, more than 101,500 people lived in IDP camps in Kachin state, of whom 11,900 had been displaced since the coup (*UCA News* 17/02/2023).

In Rakhine state (Central), **many IDPs are forced to return to areas with persisting protection risks**, including landmines, explosive remnants of war (ERW), and a volatile security situation (*Myanmar Now* 05/01/2023; *UNHCR* 14/04/2023). Some IDPs will likely face multiple displacements because of insecurity, a lack of access to basic services, and the closure of IDP sites (*OCHA* 06/04/2023).

As at 30 June 2022, there were over 1,086,000 refugees and asylum seekers from Myanmar in Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand, of whom an estimated 84,400 had arrived since the coup (UNHCR 17/04/2023). The post-coup displacement to neighbouring countries compounds the protracted refugee situation in the area. Since 2017, almost one million refugees belonging to Rakhine state's Rohingya community have been sheltering in Bangladesh and around 200,000 in Malaysia and India (UNHCR accessed 01/05/2023).

Shelter

The 2022 Humanitarian Needs Overview reported that around 1.7 million people needed shelter, NFI, and camp coordination and camp management services (OCHA 31/12/2021). There are reports of SAC forces setting fire to villages, particularly in anti-junta stronghold regions (Centre for Information Resilience 17/03/2023). Between 1 February 2021 and 28 February 2023, **junta forces burnt an estimated 60,000 houses**, of which between 50–75% were in Sagaing region (OCHA 06/04/2023; The Irrawaddy 15/10/2022; The Diplomat 06/04/2023).

On 11 April 2023, Myanmar's military junta shelled Pazi Gyi village in Kanbalu town (Sagaing), killing around 133 civilians (CNN 11/04/2023 and 13/04/2023; The Guardian 11/04/2023). A jet fighter dropped two bombs, and a combat helicopter shot several rounds of gunfire at a house in the village, where residents and anti-junta village defence members were holding a ceremony (The Irrawaddy 11/04/2023). On 31 March 2023, the military set fire to more than 200 civilian homes in Nyaung Pin Thar village in Tigyaing township, Katha district (Sagaing) (Insecurity Insight 13/04/2023). The military has carried out other more frequent small-scale attacks in many areas of Sagaing and other anti-junta states.

Protection

As at 6 April 2023, ACLED had recorded over 34,000 **political violence-related deaths** nationwide since the coup (ACLED accessed 20/04/2023 b; The Diplomat 06/04/2023). Around 60% of recorded post-coup deaths were in northwestern Myanmar, in Chin, Magway, and Sagaing states, which are anti-junta strongholds (GCR2P 28/02/2023; The Diplomat 06/04/2023). Following the coup, Karen state reported over 6,000 clashes with junta troops before September 2022, including attacks against army outposts and police stations (The Irrawaddy 15/10/2022).

Since the coup, the military has **arbitrarily detained and convicted in unfair trials** ousted National League for Democracy (NLD) members and other supporters of the anti-junta movement. Reports also suggest that the SAC has tortured detainees and arbitrarily detained children as proxies for their parents or adult relatives (AI accessed 02/05/2023). New regulations in the legal and judicial systems have enabled military authorities to arrest and detain

journalists and other protesters under charges of obstruction and defamation to impede access to information. Since the coup, the junta has arrested over 19,000 journalists and political prisoners while cracking down on anti-coup protesters and executing several pro-democracy activists (The Irrawaddy 23/02/2023 b; CNN 15/03/2023 and 27/03/2023). The Assistance Association for Political Prisoners reported more than 16,000 people still in detention for resistance as at 28 February 2023 (GCR2P 28/02/2023). According to the 2022 Annual Prison Census of the Committee to Protect Journalists, Myanmar had the third highest number of jailed journalists, globally (CPJ 14/12/2022 and 13/12/2022). The actual figure of detained and imprisoned journalists could be higher, as many news organisations hesitate to identify their staff and freelancers, particularly those who were working undercover, to prevent the detainees from receiving more severe sentences (CPJ 13/12/2022). SAC authorities do not disclose many details about some detainees, such as their whereabouts, raising suspicion of enforced disappearances (AI accessed 02/05/2023).

The military authorities have used multiple checkpoints across the country, plain-clothed informants, and closed-circuit television cameras with facial recognition to **impose strict surveillance** on people, hindering free speech, privacy, and other human rights, such as free movement and access to information (AI accessed 02/05/2023).

Landmines and ERW present protection risks to civilians and limit their access to farmland for livelihoods. An escalation of conflict, combined with the presence of ERW, has prevented displaced people from returning to their areas of origin, particularly in the states of Bago, Kayah, Kayin, Mon, Shan, and Tanintharyi (UNHCR 17/04/2023).

There have also been reports of protection risks, such as **forced recruitment**, in Shan state, but there is a lack of information and understanding around the situation of forced recruitment, including information on who the most vulnerable people are and what their particular humanitarian needs are (UNHCR 17/04/2023).

The Myanmar military has been previously reported to use **rape and sexual violence as weapons of war**, particularly towards ethnic minority communities, such as the Rohingya (UN 19/06/2022; AA 23/08/2019; TIME 27/03/2019; DVB 24/07/2014). These reports indicate that the military targets, beats, burns with cigarettes, rapes, and holds as sex slaves in military bases Rohingya women and girls. The military has also targeted men and boys for rape and sexual torture, mostly as a form of humiliation (AA 23/08/2019). Given disruptions in internet connection and communications, combined with the lack of any accountability mechanism, accounts of gender-based and sexual violence are likely underreported. Survivors are also likely to fear retaliation from perpetrators if they report the crimes.

Health and mental health and psychosocial support

Access to healthcare was already poor before the coup and has become more constrained since. At the same time, health needs are likely to have increased since the coup, as attacks and fighting have become more frequent. After the coup, the **price of medicine and healthcare-related supplies increased** by three to four times their pre-coup price, but the availability of supplies has decreased. The inaccessibility of medical supplies forces people to travel farther distances to access medicine and seek medical help, exposing them to protection risks (Chen et al. 11/01/2023).

Attacks on healthcare staff and facilities are frequent and are mainly attributed to the SAC junta forces. In some instances, anti-junta forces have also attacked health facilities that junta troops are using for treatment (Insecurity Insight 01/02/2023). Along with houses, public health centres and hospitals have been burnt in acts of political violence (Insecurity Insight 13/04/2023 and 19/02/2023).

Between April 2021 and May 2022, fighting resulted in the death of 29 health workers, arrest of 535 health workers, 118 raids on health facilities, and attacks on 28 ambulances (Insecurity Insight 11/07/2022). As part of the military junta's strategy to reduce opposition to the coup, they continue to target health workers and health facilities to prevent access to healthcare for injured protesters and anti-junta people (Insecurity Insight 01/02/2023). The risk of physical insecurity to staff, damage to healthcare facilities, and lack of access to healthcare services, combined with a deteriorating mental health situation for healthcare workers, is likely to significantly reduce the quality of Myanmar's healthcare system in the long term. Between April–September 2022, most reports of incidents affecting healthcare providers, excluding those associated with NGOs, came from Sagaing region, but there were also reports from Kayin state, Magway region, Rakhine state, and Yangon (Insecurity Insight 01/02/2023, 13/04/2023, and 19/02/2023). These incidents include raids and attacks, the seizure of health workers' homes, the denial of access to ambulances through checkpoints, and the theft and confiscation of ambulances.

After the most recent and large-scale air strike in Kanbalu (Sagaing), the nature of the attack prevented the identification of many of the bodies (The Irrawaddy 11/04/2023). Combined with protection needs, the **mental health needs of affected people are likely very high**. Myanmar only has two dedicated mental health hospitals, both in Yangon, and distance and insecurity likely make them inaccessible. The country only has eight clinically trained psychologists for a population of 54 million (Frontier 14/01/2023; Tea Circle 28/06/2021; WHO/MOH 2006). Mental health was already significantly neglected before the coup; as people struggle to access healthcare post-coup, they are not likely to address mental health needs, which will continue to deteriorate. Across various IDP sites, the provision of psychosocial services remains inadequate (CCCM Cluster/UNHCR 27/01/2023).

Food insecurity

As at October 2022, an estimated **15.2 million people faced acute food insecurity across the country** (WFP 26/10/2022; OCHA 06/04/2023). There is a lack of up-to-date understanding of the food security situation, but it has likely worsened since the WFP's latest report from October 2022. The current political crisis, combined with pre-existing poverty, inflation, the devaluation of the Myanmar kyat, global supply chain issues, and the impact of COVID-19, has constrained people's ability to meet their basic food needs (WFP accessed 21/04/2023; The Borgen Project 03/10/2022; OCHA 06/04/2023). A lack of supply and high demand means military blockades in some anti-junta areas have increased food prices (The Irrawaddy 28/11/2022).

As a result of the inability to meet food needs, people are skipping meals as a negative coping mechanism. This mechanism disproportionately affects women, whose role within the household is to meet their family's daily needs, making them likely to prioritise ensuring that their children and husband have food first (OCHA 06/04/2023). The loss of farmland and crops and the displacement of farmers from conflict also aggravate the food security crisis (Bloomberg 27/10/2022; The Irrawaddy 28/11/2022). This crisis particularly concerns rural areas, where military junta forces are involved in organised crime, including destroying crops, stealing livestock, and confiscating civilian property (Tea Circle 30/11/2022; Myanmar Now 10/02/2022).

DRIVERS OF THE CRISIS

Military coup and political instability

On 1 February 2021, the Myanmar military, known as Tatmadaw, staged a coup led by General Min Aung Hlaing, overthrowing the democratically elected Government of Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD and seizing power as the SAC military junta (CNN 27/03/2023 and 10/03/2021; The Diplomat 06/04/2023). The military arbitrarily detained the ousted Aung San Suu Kyi on 1 February 2021, and, as at December 2022, she faced up to 33 years in prison on corruption charges from the SAC (AI 30/12/2022). The Tatmadaw and the elected Government had shared power since the 2015 elections, but heightening tensions after a second win for the NLD in the 2020 parliamentary elections led to the military coup (CNN 09/11/2020).

Before a democratically elected Government in 2012, the military ruled Myanmar for around 50 years following a similar coup in 1962. The military ruled under martial law for the first 12 years after the coup, and this increased the military's role in the national economy, politics, and the legal system, as it has in the current context (CFR accessed 02/05/2023; Al Jazeera 01/02/2021). In 1974, following the adoption of the second constitution in Myanmar, the country elected

the Burma Socialist Programme Party into government, although the military founded the party in 1962. In 1988, the military took power again following a nationwide pro-democracy uprising and reinstated the junta administration. The junta administration ruled until 2011 when a military-backed political militia won elections that the NLD boycotted. In 2008, the military junta drafted a constitution ensuring that the military would have significant political and economic influence regardless of the administration in government (CNN 10/03/2021).

Reports indicate that the junta has conducted massacres and widespread human rights abuses against civilians, including war crimes and air strikes, especially in regions where insurgencies against the junta have grown (CNN 15/03/2023; HRW 04/07/2022). As at February 2023, the military junta had imposed martial law in 47 townships across eight regions and states (The Diplomat 06/04/2023; The Irrawaddy 23/02/2023 a). As at 10 April 2023, more than half of the townships (26) under martial law were in Sagaing and Magway regions in the northwest (UNHCR 17/04/2023).

In April 2021, ousted NLD lawmakers and leading anti-junta activists established a parallel government known as the National Unity Government (NUG), which declared war on the SAC in September 2021 (CFR accessed 02/05/2023). The NUG's objectives have been to create a political and military alliance with the different anti-junta ethnic armed groups, create a plan for a post-junta Myanmar, and gather foreign support (ICG 12/01/2022). The NUG also has an armed wing known as the PDF, which are anti-junta resistance forces across townships and states. The NUG and several ethnic armed groups have established joint command systems to operate the PDF (IISS 16/08/2022). The SAC have charged both the NUG and the PDF with high treason and pronounced them terrorist organisations (GCR2P 28/02/2023). Under the PDF, Local Defence Forces and People's Defence Teams operate as community-based militias (USIP 03/11/2022; BBC 05/02/2021; The Guardian 12/02/2021; Reuters 02/09/2022; ACLED accessed 16/02/2023). Some of the first militias formed in Sagaing region and have since grown prolifically across the country (The Irrawaddy 15/10/2022; IISS 15/11/2022). With alliance and capacity support from major ethnic armed organisations (EOs), such as the Karen National Union, Karenni National Progressive Party, Kachin Independence Army, Chin National Front, and the All Burma Students Democratic Front, PDF units have strengthened over time, posing as viable threats to the military in many areas (IISS 16/08/2022, 23/09/2022, and 15/11/2022; The Irrawaddy 14/02/2022 and 09/01/2023). These major EOs jointly have around 45,000 troops and have publicly cooperated with the NUG, provided military training and weapons to PDF units, and conducted joint military operations against the junta. Other EOs, such as the AA, Ta'ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), and the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army, have established bilateral alliances, providing military training and weapons to other armed resistance groups while engaging with the NUG and PDF to some degree (The Irrawaddy 09/01/2023).

COMPOUNDING AND AGGRAVATING FACTORS

Poor economic conditions

During 2022, fuel price increases and the depreciation of the kyat considerably increased inflation in that fiscal year. The Consumer Price Index inflation increased to 19.5% in July 2022 from 6.5% in July 2021, and non-food inflation rose to 21.4% in July 2022 from 7.2% in July 2021 (WB 30/01/2023). Since the coup, the Myanmar kyat has devalued by 50% against other currencies (The Diplomat 06/04/2023).

A sharp depreciation in the exchange rate, combined with fuel scarcity that has particularly affected Myanmar's remote areas, largely explains the increase in domestic fuel prices (WB 30/01/2023). Fuel sanctions have also affected the country. The US, UK, and several other Western countries have imposed sanctions targeting jet fuel supply to Myanmar to prevent future air strikes. There are also sanctions against junta members, the military Government's organisations, and military-run companies seeking to curb their ability to raise money (Reuters 24/03/2023; NPR 11/04/2023).

Many figures from Myanmar are unavailable. For instance, as the Government does not publish the workforce participation rate, there has not been any available data since 2020. Despite this, the low rate of urbanisation suggests that many workers engage in subsistence agriculture or are not looking for jobs. As at August 2022, the ILO calculated that 1.1 million fewer women and men were employed compared to 2020 (Statista accessed 09/02/2023; ILO 01/08/2022). For some businesses, production has decreased by 70%, and the income for workers has decreased by 30% (DW 24/03/2023).

Ethnic conflicts

Localised ethnic conflict has characterised Myanmar for decades, and the Bamar ethnic group has dominated politics in Myanmar since the founding of the country in 1948. The military coup has changed the nature of conflict from being exclusively ethnicity-related to mainly being related to armed opposition against the military junta (NYT 30/04/2021). Myanmar has around 20 EOs or groups that have historically been in conflict with each other or with the military over autonomy and control of territory, drug trades, and natural resources (Al Jazeera 07/01/2023). Before the coup, a Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) had halted fighting between the military and various EOs who wanted greater autonomy for their communities. The NCA allowed them to participate in political talks with the central Government and the military. Conflict between the military and EOs was mostly limited to the states of Kachin, Rakhine, and northern Shan, with only three major armed groups engaged (the AA, TNLA,

and the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army) (ICG 12/01/2022). The military coup ended any negotiations taking place between signatory EAOs and the military under the NCA, and several EAOs have launched attacks on the military as a result of the coup (DMG 20/02/2021; TNI 20/04/2023; ICG 12/01/2022). Since the coup, the EAOs have fought the junta troops to different extents, either as part of PDF units or independently.

Though most of the conflict in Myanmar is between the junta and resistance groups, some ethnic groups remain in conflict over control of territory. For example, in northern Shan state, the TNLA, Shan State Progress Party (SSPP), and Restoration Council of Shan State (RCSS) have been in conflict with each other over the control of central and northern Shan state (Frontier 04/05/2022; ICG 12/01/2022). After the NCA signing in 2015, the RCSS aggressively pushed north towards the Chinese border, seizing a considerable portion of territory from the TNLA and SSPP, resulting in an alliance between these latter two ethnic armed groups. The fighting between the TNLA and SSPP on one side and RCSS on the other has displaced entire communities, leaving more than 20 village tracts deserted. Before the coup, in January 2021, an escalation of fighting between the RCSS and TNLA/SSPP in northern Shan displaced almost 30,000 people, many of whom were displaced for over a year (Frontier 04/05/2022).

Since Myanmar's independence in 1948, the military has persecuted the Rohingya people in Rakhine state, a predominantly Muslim community previously known as Arakan (Al Jazeera 28/10/2017). Since 1982, the Rohingya have been technically stateless, as Myanmar has not recognised them as one of the country's 135 official ethnic groups, and the military authorities have denied them citizenship (Al Jazeera 18/04/2018). Since 2015, the AA, the armed wing of the United League of Arakan, has been fighting the Myanmar military forces in Rakhine state for self-determination for the Arakan/Rohingya people (The Irrawaddy 10/04/2023 b). The AA and the military junta agreed to a ceasefire in late 2020. The ceasefire lasted until August 2022, when fighting escalated (ICG 23/12/2020; Jamestown 16/12/2022). The two sides agreed to another ceasefire in November 2022, but heightened tensions have remained since (The Irrawaddy 28/11/2022 and 10/04/2023 b; OCHA 06/04/2023).

Military crackdowns against the AA and the Rohingya community since 1977 have resulted in mass displacement in Rakhine state and to countries bordering the region, with August 2017 seeing the largest exodus of Rohingya refugees (over 605,000 people) fleeing to Bangladesh. Freedom of movement and access to healthcare, education, and other essential services are still heavily controlled for the Rohingya population in Rakhine, and insecurity risks and protection concerns remain in areas where IDPs have returned (OCHA 31/12/2021; UNHCR 17/04/2023). Rohingya communities living in Rakhine state are not allowed to leave the state without permission from the governing authorities (Al Jazeera 18/04/2018). Rohingya refugees have reported cases of the Tatmadaw committing rape, torture, arson, and murder during military crackdowns, which the International Court of Justice is investigating (France 24 31/03/2023; Al Jazeera 18/04/2018; HRW 16/11/2017 a and 16/11/2017 b). The coup further

complicated prospects of the safe, dignified, and voluntary repatriation of Rohingya refugees from Bangladesh (GCR2P 28/02/2023).

Monsoon season

Cyclones, storms, floods, storm surges, landslides, earthquakes, tsunamis, and periodic droughts frequently affect the country. Myanmar has a tropical climate and experiences different seasons:

- dry inter-monsoonal period (mid-February to mid-May)
- rainy southwest monsoon (mid-May to late October)
- cool, relatively dry northeast monsoon (late October to mid-February) (WB accessed 26/04/2023).


The rainy southwest monsoon season has typically severely affected the country and has caused floods, landslides, the proliferation of contaminated water, and infrastructure damage, resulting in constrained humanitarian access (OCHA 28/06/2022). The monsoon season is linked to the increased spread of communicable diseases, such as malaria, diarrhoea, and skin infections (OCHA 28/06/2022; IFRC 22/08/2019). Security issues and military-imposed mobility limitations are likely to constrain the 2023 response to the monsoon season, but needs are likely to be higher as a result of the pre-monsoon challenges that the affected population is facing, particularly in anti-junta areas.

FUNDING AND RESPONSE CAPACITY

As at 14 April 2023, only 9% of the USD 764.3 million required for Myanmar's Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP) 2023 had been funded. In 2022, only 42% of the entire HRP (USD 825.7 million) was funded; since then, the required funding has more than doubled. Before 2022, the total required HRP funding for each year was less than USD 276.5 million (OCHA accessed 14/04/2023).


Of all the clusters, the necessary funding for coordination and support services in 2023 has been the most met, at around 88.2% as at April 2023. During the same period, the protection cluster was only 10% funded out of a required USD 124.3 million and the food security, nutrition, WASH, and education clusters each had only up to 7% of their required funding. The 2023 HRP will not fund the health and shelter/NFI clusters (OCHA accessed 14/04/2023). As at 27 April, only 28% of the required USD 375.9 million for the UNHCR 2023 Myanmar response was funded (UNHCR 27/04/2023).

OVERVIEW OF DISPLACEMENT WITHIN AND FROM MYANMAR, AS AT 10 APRIL 2023




Source: ACAPS using data from UNHCR (17/04/2023)

HEATMAP OF BATTLE EVENTS RECORDED IN MYANMAR SINCE THE MILITARY COUP, AS AT 30 APRIL 2023




Source: ACAPS using ACLED data accessed 02/05/2023

HEATMAP OF EVENTS OF EXPLOSIONS/REMOTE VIOLENCE RECORDED IN MYANMAR SINCE THE MILITARY COUP, AS AT 30 APRIL 2023



Source: ACAPS using ACLED data accessed 02/05/2023

HEATMAP OF EVENTS OF VIOLENCE AGAINST CIVILIANS RECORDED IN MYANMAR SINCE THE MILITARY COUP, AS AT 30 APRIL 2023



Source: ACAPS using ACLED data accessed 02/05/2023