Conference Report

Power, Welfare and Democracy

Lessons from Indonesia in Comparative Perspectives, especially Myanmar and Scandinavia

University of Oslo, 29-30 November 2017

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Preface

The present report documents the conference “Lessons from Indonesia in Comparative Perspectives,” held in Oslo on 29-30 November 2017. The event was the closing conference for the Power, Welfare and Democracy project, which was conducted by the University of Oslo (Norway) and the Universitas Gadjah Mada (Yogyakarta, Indonesia) from 2012 to 2017. Kristian Stokke and Olle Törnquist at the University of Oslo were the chief organisers of the event.

The report is based on recordings of the presentations and plenary discussions at the conference. The transcripts have been revised for readability by myself, the organisers, and some of the participants. We have tried to edit out highly context-specific passages and oral language; nevertheless, the finished product inevitably is closer to a verbatim transcript than a prepared manuscript. Hopefully, the reader will be able to look past the oral language and occasional odd phrasings, which are due to the nature of the transcript, not to the participants. Additionally, although every participant was invited to revise the transcripts of their own contributions, some unclarities and errors will inevitably persist.

In addition to the transcripts, the report contains the introduction to the conference, written by the organisers; and a list of publications from PWD and its predecessor projects. This list was compiled by Loly Fitri at UGM, and subsequently revised by Olle Törnquist and myself.

Oslo, 19 June 2018

Vegar Arnesen
**Introduction**

*Circulated before the conference*

Scholars at the University of Oslo (Norway) and Universitas Gadjah Mada (Indonesia) have since 2012 conducted collaborative research on “Power, Welfare and Democracy (PWD)”, based on previous studies with research organisations in civil society, and funded by the Royal Norwegian Embassy in Jakarta. The PWD project has examined the character and challenges of democratisation in Indonesia, and how it relates to power relations and social welfare in society. The project has included a baseline survey on the development of democracy; a thematic study on politics of citizenship; a thematic study on welfare regimes; a thematic study on local regimes; and comparative anthropological studies of UN-REDD+ (Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation). As this research project comes to an end in 2017, a two-days conference will be held at the University of Oslo to summarise major findings and to discuss the implications for domestic and international policy making.

**Learning from Indonesia**

The PWD project and related collaborative research have benefitted from reading the Indonesian challenges against those in other countries in the Global South as well as in Scandinavia. When summarising the results, it is time to reverse the perspective by asking what can be learnt from Indonesia. What are the lessons for studies of other key countries in South and Southeast Asia, especially Myanmar? And what insights should Scandinavia consider in trying to support democratisation towards equity and sustainable development in these and other Asian countries?

The main focus of the PWD studies have been the problems and option of democratisation in terms of institutional development as well as the political capacity of the powerful actors and those striving for more inclusive democracy. After the collapse of the Suharto regime, Indonesia and its international allies agreed on promoting economic freedom, good governance, decentralisation and liberal democracy through agreements among moderate elites and by fostering civil society. The assumption was that these elites would turn democrats by adjusting to the new institutions and that pro-democrats would foster change from their positions in civil society. In terms of reduced military influence, freedoms, elections and stability, this has been remarkably successful – but not in terms of governance and representation of various interests and ideas. These shortcomings are closely linked to the character of the democratic transition,
and especially how it accommodated old elites while referring organised pro-democrats to civil society. Additional factors include biased institutions of representation and poor political capacity of the democratic actors of change. More recently, populism and demands for public welfare reforms has come with opportunities for change, but also informalisation and authoritarian identity politics. These core characteristics and dynamics have had a formative influence on post-transition politics of citizenship, the character of welfare regimes, the nature of decentralisation and local regimes, and the implementation of international sustainable development initiatives such as UNREDD+.

The concluding project conference will examine what lessons can be learnt about these dynamics and challenges of democratisation and inclusion in Indonesia. It will also discuss their broader relevance for related experiences of elite-led transition in especially Myanmar. Finally, it will address the question of what lessons that can be learnt for international support of social rights and democracy?

The conference will include presentations by the key scholars of each PWD sub-project:

1. Democratisation and substantial democracy (the PWD Democracy Survey)¹
2. Politics of citizenship on how citizenship is produced and practiced through diverse movements for cultural recognition, social redistribution and political representation, and contentious interactions between popular movements and political elites in different sectors, political spaces and scales²
3. Welfare regimes on varieties of welfare production processes and mechanisms in different social and political contexts³
4. Local regimes in the context of decentralisation⁴
5. Anthropological studies on UN-REDD+⁵

The research results from Indonesia will be presented in sections addressing six crucial and timely themes:

1. Dynamics of democratisation, assessments of outcomes
2. Politics of power-sharing and conflict resolution

¹ The methodology and findings are published in Törnquist 2013 and Savirani and Törnquist (eds.) 2016. For a brief summary, see Törnquist et al. 2014.
² The key findings and analyses are published in Hiariej and Stokke (eds.) (2017).
³ A report is due in face of the conference.
⁴ A report is due in face of the conference.
⁵ Main findings from student projects in anthropology have been compiled in a report by Howll (2015).
3. Politics of resource extraction and sustainable development
4. Politics of citizenship
5. Banking on Popular Leaders and Facing Right-Wing Populism
6. Implications for International Cooperation

In each theme, leading scholars and experts on South- and Southeast Asia (especially Myanmar) and Scandinavia will add their insights and discuss the wider relevance of the results.

The conference is open to scholars, policy-makers and practitioners.


Opening Session

Chair: Kristian Stokke

Kristian Stokke: Introduction

Welcome to this event. I am very happy to see all of you here. Many of you have travelled long distances to come. For us, this is a rather big occasion. This is the end-of-project event for the “Power, Welfare and Democracy” project, which has been a major undertaking in collaboration between the University of Oslo and the Gadjah Mada University in Indonesia, funded by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs through the Embassy in Jakarta.

PWD also fits into a bigger picture. There is a history of collaboration between UiO and UGM that goes back long before PWD. And at this end-of-project conference we have also tagged on two extensions: A comparative perspective with Scandinavia, and also with reference especially to Myanmar/Burma. It is great to see lots of good old friends and partners from Indonesia, and a strong delegation of interesting voices, competences and hopefully future partners from Myanmar.

Before I hand it over to the next speakers, I want to draw your attention to the display of books, which have come out of PWD, or are related or spinoff publications. Some are conceptually oriented, some are comparatively oriented, and some are further work by the teams that have been working on PWD.⁶

I have two distinguished gentlemen up here, who are the leaders and founders of PWD: Professor Purwo Santoso from UGM, and Professor Olle Törnquist from the University of Oslo. They are going to offer us some introductory comments on what this project is, what it has tried to achieve, and maybe also what we have achieved.

⁶ See the appendix for a comprehensive list of PWD publications.
Olle Törnquist and Purwo Santoso: The Background

Olle Törnquist

As Kristian said, time has come to conclude, but also to proceed in new ways. Yet, how did it start in the first place? In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the democracy movement in Indonesia began to take shape, and there were efforts by some activist scholars, primarily the legendary Arief Budiman. He had been doing his Ph.D. on Chile, so he was a comparativist. At the Universitas Satya Wacana in Salatiga, in Central Java, he was trying to build up a master education on the problems and options of democratisation in Indonesia. He wanted to do that in cooperation with activists and his friends among international comparative scholars. I was happy to be one of them.

A few years later, in 1994, you could say there was an end to the very partial opening for some space for public discussion in Indonesia that had evolved after the fall of the wall in Europe. This was marked by the closing down of three very important magazines: Tempo, Detik and the Editor; and there was a crackdown at the Satya Wacana University. So Arief was thrown out, and I followed him, of course. We decided that we were not giving up, so we decided that if we could not stay within the framework of mainstream academia in Indonesia, we would work in civil society. We did that together with human rights activists and committed investigative journalists related to the three magazines that had been closed down, not least Tempo.

As Kristian indicated, we were then supported by comparative studies and likeminded scholars in a number of countries, including the Philippines and from South Asia. Joel Rocamora was in touch with us almost from the beginning. He is here today, while unfortunately, the one we particularly wanted to have here from South Asia, Professor P.K. Michael Tharakan from Kerala, India, was unable to attend. There were also people from South Africa, people doing research on Brazil, and later on Burma. And there were of course comparative studies of Scandinavia.

The Indonesian study that we did from the beginning was called Aktor Demokrasi. There is an English translation available, but it was never published. (It is available on my homepage, http://folk.uio.no/ollet/) We did that in the years just before the fall of the regime. It was published immediately afterwards, but the manuscripts were discussed and made some sense before the fall of the regime. The main conclusion was that building up civil society organisations is insufficient. There has to be more organised actors.
Immediately after the fall of Suharto, we started a follow-up project together with the investigative journalists and a number of committed scholars and reflective activists. This resulted in an extensive book called *Indonesia’s Post-Soeharto Democracy Movement*. It contains studies of the various branches of the democracy movement, together with the activists themselves. The main conclusion was that the activists had become “floating,” with very little organisational basis, tiny organisational and social basis. So something had to be done. In addition, they had already become quite marginalised in the liberal strategy of democratisation in Indonesia.

One of the conclusions was that we had to do a kind of alternative assessment of this ongoing new liberal democratisation. By contrast to the mainstream assessments, we wanted our assessment to be done all around the country, not just in Jakarta, and on the basis of the knowledge of the activists themselves, not just the elitist actors and their experts. And we wanted to develop and apply a new approach to the problems and options of more genuine democratisation. Our work was co-ordinated through a new research NGO called Demos, the Indonesian Centre for Human Rights and Democracy Studies. Demos was formed by the leading pro-democratic organisations in Indonesia, appointing the late former secretary general of the Indonesian Human Rights Commission, Asmara Nababan, as the executive director, and myself as the co-director of research; I did this as part of my professorial position at the University of Oslo.

All our work for democratisation so far had been founded from Sweden, from SIDA, and partially the Swedish Embassy to Indonesia. Now the Norwegians came in as well, and from around 2003 most of the studies were supported by Norway. Some minor funding did also came from Ford Foundation and the Tifa Foundation. I would like to mention that Helena Bjuremalm from SIDA, who is with us today, was very important in the initial funding of the survey.

We will soon turn to some of the results of the assessment studies. But as a supplement, we were also doing an in-depth study of Aceh. After the tsunami and the peace agreement in Helsinki, we were thus trying to support the possibilities for civil society actors, not just the former rebel leaders, to get into the new process of democracy and government in Aceh. This was not public at the time, but I can say it now: It was a kind of deal with the Olof Palme International Centre in Stockholm. The Olof Palme Centre would stand for the education of former rebel leaders who wanted to turn democratic. They would teach them in how to engage in the election that had been agreed upon in the Helsinki peace accords. Meanwhile we would try to support the civil society actors to also get into politics in Aceh. Hopefully the democratic
former rebels and the civil society activists would thus link up and win the elections and rebuild Aceh. Actually, they did come together and they did win the first elections in late 2006 – but thereafter things went less well. Hopefully, we can return to that tragedy later on during the conference.

Meanwhile in Java, however, 2007 was a very important year. This was because we finally succeeded in, sort of, reclaiming academic freedom. We had been thrown out in 1994, but we came back in 2007, now in cooperation with UGM. We were trying to foster education and continue the research with the democracy movement. Many of the activists had been more or less forced to give up their education during the process of democratisation. Hence we wanted to add possibilities for them to continue their education, together with new concerned students. An additional educational program and cooperation was thus added to the research. And finally, in 2012, we ventured into this cooperation program on the Power and Welfare research.

That’s about the background story. Pak Purwo, please tell us: What did we do?

Purwo Santoso

Thank you very much. Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. As Professor Törnquist mentioned, UGM became the latest partner in the journey. This is why he made the earlier presentation on how it was put up. And as the project came to UGM, it fit with the endeavour of bringing together academia and activism. On the one hand, we have a good community of academics who want to foster democracy or democracy movements on the ground, but many of the academics there are lacking of field experiences. On the other hand, there has been activists who have been having a lot of experiences and a lot of energy to bring about changes, but they lack a big map.

What we do, then, is blending together the two kinds of activism: Conceptual engagement and methodological strengthening on the one hand, experiences and problems on the ground on the other. The democracy assessment that we set up was meant to, on the one hand, meet the international standards of democracy. This is why we use the term “democracy assessment.” But on the other hand, we want to make sure that the standard, the agenda, the frameworks are there for us, for academia, and for the activists to bring about democracy. Therefore, we have a strong spirit of making the assessment contextualised, meaning that the assessment has been conducted at the local level, and locally based. Even though we are making a democracy assessment, we ask the opinion-makers and the activists on the ground, so that it’s a local perspective. And we bring together the national picture.
Secondly, when we set up the instrument for democracy assessment, we kept many things in mind, given the fact that there are special setups which we needed to bring to attention. One is the fact that Indonesia is a huge country in terms of size, cultural diversity and so forth. When we want to bring about real changes, we have to take into account the specificity and characteristics of the context. For example, Gadjah Mada in Yogyakarta was founded by the king – the local king, so to speak. That kingdom is still in power. No matter what people say, no matter what the constitution says; the kingdom, or the sense of kingship, is shaping the idea at the local level. Or when you look at Papua, for example. Papua has a completely different setup than Java. The cultural context is very strong there, and if we are insensitive to the cultural context, then the agenda of bringing about democracy for our end, for our own system, is very difficult. Therefore, the spirit in conducting democracy assessments is to ease us in bringing about democracy and, on the one hand, to make sure that the systems that we are developing meet the standards at the international discourse. Secondly, people have been longing for what we call (inaudible): Democracy which links to welfare. Therefore, when we assess democracy, we also assess what people have in mind. It turned out that the aspiration for linking democracy not only with freedom, with the liberty of the people, but also with welfare, is having a big relevance.

At the same time, when we talk about democracy, we start with definitions. Democracy is about popular control. Based on this idea, we conduct follow-up studies. We have what we call subprojects on citizenship to measure up how the sense of popular control, citizen movements and so forth link to democracy. At the moment, democracy has become like a top-down system implemented from international standards down to the village, which is very difficult for people on the ground to comply with. Therefore, we measure citizenship and how citizens and peoples’ movements are really having the space in order to bring control over public affairs. When we do the democracy assessments, we have in mind what the sense of the public is in the imaginations of our citizenry. The in-depth study of this is produced in the book *The Politics of Citizenship*.

When we talk about democracy, however, it’s not only about the citizens’ political rights. It is also collective welfare. This is the idea that we take from Scandinavian countries, the idea of welfare regimes, which is very important for us to take into account. As we hypothesise and get the evidence from the surveys of democracy assessment, we do have different kinds of welfare regimes which are in fact shaping the process of democracy transformation. And therefore, we
prove that unless we link welfare creation, welfare accumulation, and welfare redistribution; we likely fail to continue our project of democratisation.

This is linked with the current affairs, in which the idea of populism as an electoral gimmick has been on the fore, because of the primacy of welfare as a means of getting popular support, and because of the elitist nature of democratisation in the country. What leaders or would-be leaders tried to do was to co-opt citizens with welfare distribution. As it happens, what our current President, who was schooling up from local leadership to national leadership, did was to provide with a welfare system which is immediate to the people, but he did not really restructure the economy. He did not establish the agricultural background to support the project of improving people’s welfare situation. However, the point we gather from this project is that by linking the idea of democracy with welfare, we have more confidence in proposing a more practical agenda to link democracy with welfare creation, welfare accumulation, and welfare redistribution. In the following discussion, I think we will go deeper into that.

The third aspect of the project has been about specifying the context and its diversity. Because of the size, the cultural background, and the history of the nation-state in the country, which have been the foundations of the idea of democracy, we focus our attention on the locality: How locals have been taking part in the project of democratisation. We call this project “Mapping the Local Regime.” We try to map it out in order to correct the process, to incorporate more public participation in the locally sensitive contexts. Hence, the idea of welfare regimes is linked together with the idea of citizenship, and both of them are placed in the particular setup of the local regime. By making a clearer picture of each locality, we have the characteristics of the regime at the local level. We are in the process of optimising the local strategy to achieve the national goal of Indonesia as a democratic and welfare-promoting country.

Each of these three projects has produced a book. One is already out of press. Two of them, on welfare regimes and local regimes, are still on press, but hopefully we can bring this about to the public before the end of the year. To sum up, the project promotes full engagement between academically competent experts in the universities and civil society activists on the grassroot level, and in-depth networking among us; which allows us to have a clearer picture of what to do in order to complete the democratisation project which currently, according to our assessment, is at halt. We do have a good progress, but we are in a stagnant situation, and unless we do have a clear assessment, a clear understanding of what has been going on and what next to be done, then the democracy project is likely to even move backwards. And a critical assessment, a contextual understanding of what has been going on, especially to link the
citizenship, the welfare, and the need to make a bottom-up, asymmetrical process of democratisation is very important.

The last note: Indonesia has been reshaping its structure to be highly decentralised. If the democratic process has not matched with the decentralised setup, then we will lose the momentum. And, finishing up, the second note is that the fact that democracy is in a stagnant situation has become public awareness, and therefore, unless the academics speak up and map out what has been happening, then the project of democracy is at risk. Thank you.

Kristian Stokke

Thank you. Then we move from the overarching program, ideas and the organisation of the project to its substance. Purwo has already explained to you how PWD started out from a core subproject of democracy assessment: How do we assess the substance of democracy in Indonesia? From there, there have been spinoffs: Subprojects on citizenship, on local regimes, and on welfare regimes. In addition, there has also been a subproject on natural resource extraction and sustainable development with special reference to REDD+, from the disciplinary perspective of anthropology. You will find that this structure is reflected in the program for today and tomorrow. The first session will start with democracy assessment in Indonesia, and then move straight into comparative reflections on Burma.
Dynamics of Democratisation, Assessments of Outcomes

Chair: Olle Törnquist

Olle Törnquist: General Results from Democracy Surveys

Please bear with us for a few more minutes, before we will have a discussion. It is not by accident that we have Indonesia and Burma in the same session. It is fruitful even on a theoretical level.

The Indonesian democratisation was shaped, of course, by the collapse of the Suharto regime, and then a process of elitist liberal democratisation, very much shaped by the theories of Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan and the group of generalists within political science who were parachuted into Jakarta in August 1998, a few months after the fall of the Suharto regime, for a conference arranged by the Indonesian Academy of Science and Ford Foundation on how to craft democracy in the country. There were other participants as well, including myself, but generally the generalists managed to sell their perspective. Much of what happened thereafter in Indonesia took the form of the framework they recommended, to a large extent on the basis of the elitist transition from Franco’s fascism to democracy in Spain.

As for the similar experience of parachuting democracy in the case of Burma, it is of course the return of Samuel Huntington that matters, these days in the shape of his student Francis Fukuyama. Their idea, which turned crucial in Burma, was that democratisation calls for a stable regime. Instead of regime collapse, there must be a stable regime, which gradually, hopefully, one way or the other, turns more democratic. Hence, these two paradigmatic perspectives on democratisation – the elitist liberal and statist respectively – are standing against each other in this comparison.

Let me try, then, to briefly summarise the major results from three democracy assessments in Indonesia. The assessments were based on interviews with experts around Indonesia, around 900 people in each survey. Each interview took between 6 and 7-8 hours. Hence, it is a very extensive expert survey, done over about 14 years. So how does one summarise it? Anyway, as I mentioned, we were aiming at an alternative assessment of the elitist liberal democratisation that gained hegemony in late 1998. Alfred Stepan stood up in that conference and answered to the critique of whether Indonesia should follow the recommendations from Spain. He said: “We are just offering you the framework. You fill it in.” I will never forget that remark. That was
the provocative challenge that turned a starting point for us. We wanted to have a theoretically and contextually open approach.

To develop such an approach, we tried to consider not just the institutions, the rules and regulations, but also the actors and their capacity to foster substantial democracy. Very briefly put, we looked at the performance of a number of institutions over the years. We looked at how the actors related to these institutions. And we looked at the capacity of the actors, especially the pro-democratic actors, to foster and use democracy. In doing that, we drew on a number of theories on institutional development, not so very different from the mainstream assessments. But when it came to the actors and their capacity, we related to other theories. What kind of actors were present? What were their interests and strategies? Not just political parties, but also social movements, trade unions, etc. Regarding their capacity, we were drawing quite extensively on social movement theories.

Then there was the question of sources. Most of the conventional assessments had been based on people coming together in airconditioned premises in Jakarta to assess what they thought about the situation. We did not want to do that. We felt we had to be around the country, to be inclusive and “go wide.” We decided that we had to go out and ask the people with real experience on what had been going on. So in a very extensive process of assessing expertise, together with leading democracy activists in the country, we selected about 900 experts within the major frontlines of pro-democratic work around the country. These experts were fairly public persons, so people could criticise whom we had selected. Perhaps most remarkably, almost none of them dropped out, in-spite all the time it took for them to participate.

The main results, then, in four brief points, are as follows.

First, Indonesia was very successful in containing the return of central authoritarian governance. We can have all kinds of opinions about the decentralisation program in Indonesia – how it has generated new bosses, new local rajas, and so on. But it did really undermine the possibilities for a quick and speedy return of a centralist, authoritarian regime. However, many of the powerful actors were still on the ground. That was actually the basis for the strategy itself: That it should be possible to accommodate most of the already existing powerful actors. In addition to decentralisation, economic liberalism did also undermine dictatorship. The economic liberalisation was extensive and swift, but while the state lost out and much of the remaining public resources were privatised, powerful actors continued to dominate the economy as well as politics. Increasingly, unfortunately, this applies to media as well. Indonesian media and
journalists, many of whom were so immensely important in the process of democratisation, are now facing very serious challenge in the form of co-optation, commercialisation and capture by the oligarchs. The same applies to many of the civil society organisations and leaders that fostered democracy.

Second, the rules of the game are biased. It is indeed fair to say that the institutions that were deemed vital within the framework of liberal democratisation were introduced. In practice, however, they turned quite biased. The whole idea was that mainstream actors that did not reject reform would participate in this process – and the way they participated was of course by defending their own interests. So, for instance, the electoral system is entirely drafted in order to protect the mainstream parties and actors. It’s incredibly difficult for any kind of alternative actors to engage in meaningful participation with a new party or group of actors. So many of the “right” rules and regulations are there, but they are biased. They do not foster deeper representation in Indonesia. We see it daily. Yesterday, when we were having dinner, we were for example googling what happened to one of the most famous pro-democracy activists, Abdon Nababan of in the indigenous people’s movement, who was trying to run as an independent candidate in North Sumatra. He had to collect at least 700,000 signatures to be able to do that. He failed by “only” having collected 500,000. So he’s out.

Third, there are more freedoms than democratic governance. Much to the surprise of many of those who supported the surveys, we got very positive notes on the new freedoms. And the elections are there. By contrast to the Philippines, Indonesian elections are pretty free and fair on the election day. While in the Philippines there is much more cheating in the process of the elections themselves, in Indonesia, when the election day comes, it’s reasonably well organised. There is cheating ahead of the elections, though. Also, civil society is definitely expanding, especially in comparison with the New Order. Perhaps most remarkably, the political system is more coherent. Do you remember 1998, 1999, 2000? Almost daily, journalists called me up and asked when Indonesia was going to collapse, when it was going to turn the new Balkans. That was what most people said. However, I objected. On the basis of our results. Indonesia did not collapse! It kept together, and it was very much thanks to the introduction of a universal, democratic system in the country, which even the rival forces in Aceh could accept, after some time.

However, in spite of this, the development of the rule of law and governance has stagnated. There were some achievements initially, but very little has happened during the last decade. Most seriously, the quality of representation remains very poor. Why is that most serious?
Because if you want to improve the rule of law and fight corruption in a democratic way, you do have to have better representation. This is one of the main conclusions from the survey: Don’t just focus on corruption and the poor quality of rule of law. If one wants to change things in a democratic way and not by autocrats, then there has to be better representation.

Yet more serious; the democratic capacity of those who could foster change is weak. That is the irony of the Indonesian process of democratisation: While most of the elites were accommodated in a successful way, they have come to also contain the possibilities for the genuinely progressive groups and actors from business as well as civil society and trade unions and other places in society to enter into the game in their own capacity, not just being co-opted. The civil society organisations remain fragmented and floating in the sense of poor basis, the trade union people’s organisations continue to be weak and segmented, and alternative parties hardly exist.

Thus, you could say, tragically, that the efforts by the pro-democrats to build alternatives from below have not been particularly successful. Certain things happened around 2003-05, though. What is going to happen is still a subject of debate, but there is an opening. This was through decentralisation and the system of new, direct elections. Earlier, Indonesia had proportional elections to central and regional and local parliaments, dominated by elitist political parties. Hence the President, Governors and Regents and Mayors were appointed by the parties in the parliaments. Now there are instead direct elections of all these political executives. The village leaders were already elected directly, of course, but not the higher officials. The direct elections made it necessary for the contesting elites to seek broader support. You cannot simply try to get support for your party, your faction of people and then negotiate in the Parliament. You have to have broader majorities. That made it necessary for these people to add populist methods to previously predominant clientelism. Populist methods implied that they had to get slightly better reputations, also among people who were not their core supporters. Therefore, they were fishing around for reputed people. Suddenly, thus, many of the local elites became interested in forging alliances, agreements, even with progressive groups and their reputed leaders in civil society, and from trade unions in places where industrialisation had been intensive. In turn, progressive actors could therefore come together around what they believed to be reformist leaders and behind demands for more welfare policies.

The first and most powerful opening evolved around 2004-05 in the royal country town of Solo in Central Java. Eventually the result was the election ten years later of the current President Jokowi. In Solo, alliances were forged between the urban poor and the political establishment.
The second opening was related to the campaign for universal health reform, around 2010-12. We will return to some of the experiences of these campaigns, but in both these processes the problem was that the advances were not really followed up. There was no strategy to use the populist agreements to foster democratic representation. The discussions were person-to-person and informal, and nothing was institutionalised. Hence, this was far from democratic. Rather it was about more or less secret agreement between individuals. Moreover, there was no attempt to develop additional broad welfare reforms and to try to forge demands for how to implement them in more impartial way, beyond clientelism. More recently, these weaknesses have made it possible for dominant political and economic elites who are against President Jokowi to broaden their support opposition by way of populist identity politics. We shall return to this later on in the discussion.

Finally, let me relate these results to the major recommendations regarding democratisation that I mentioned in the beginning of my presentation. Firstly, the out-on-the-market, elitist liberal democratisation, which quite well illustrated by the case of Indonesia. Secondly, those arguing that there is a need for more ground-breaking structural change. Radicals call for the altering of the fundamental relations of power. Moderates argue instead in favour of strong institutions of state and politic ahead of liberal democratisation – as in Burma. By contrast, we are saying instead that there is a need for transformative politics, meaning political agendas and strategies that use the advances so far to introduce politics and policies that can enhance progressive actors’ chances to really improve democracy. The Scandinavian experiences have been important for us in developing these recommendations. We will return to a discussion of them, I think, later on.

These are the overall, general results. Willy Purna Samadhi will follow up now with results from the local level.
I should say that Willy is the veteran in this case. Willy has been there from the beginning of these surveys, 14-15 years ago. He masters most of the data, but recently he has also been involved in the project previously introduced by Purwo about local regimes.

Willy Purna Samadhi

Good morning, everyone. My presentation is based on our research about local regimes in Indonesia. This research was designed as a follow-up study of the baseline survey. The research started from 2015 to 2016, and we did our fieldwork in 11 regions in Indonesia. The main argument of this research is that local democracy is influenced by both formal and informal elements, and interactions between the two, that altogether constitute a particular regime, which to some extent is autonomous, and therefore differ from one local context to another.

Before I continue, I have to say to you that I am not alone in presenting this. Professor Purwo will join me later on. I hope that in these first ten minutes, I can explain what we have done with the research, and Professor Purwo will continue to explain on how we read the data we have, and how we should consider the variance of local regimes in the next agenda for democracy in Indonesia.

Now, let me take my turn. As I mentioned before, this is research following up the baseline study. This research was started, of course, with the conclusion of baseline survey research. In the survey we find that in general, Indonesian democracy is characterised by populist politics. The elites dominate all procedures of electoral democracy, and make use of almost all the institutions to run and win elections. In order to win elections, they tend to use welfare-related issues during their campaigns to attract voters. They offer welfare schemes such as free education, free health services, and other social security services. In addition, in some cases, the candidates use identity politics approaches to develop ties between them and the people, the voters. And this tendency, not only to replace the old (inaudible), but also to bring the political figures or candidates closer to their supporters. Organisational based politics, such as parties and even legislative bodies, both central and local, no longer have significant roles in such processes. I will go further into details about that, as Olle has already covered this topic.

So the question, then, is: Do politics in various local arenas show the same tendencies? If so, how do they operate? If not, why? These questions relate to the fact that there are different
informalities in different regions or contexts. In the democratic atmosphere, those informal institutions have more local (*inaudible*) to be expressed and played as political instruments by the local people. So now the politics in the local context is more characterised by the interaction between formal institutions of democracy coming from the national level, top-down, and the existing formal institutions locally.

The same situation is seen on the actors involved in political processes in the local context. The actors are now coming from various backgrounds, including those who come from non-formal political institutions. There are more actors from cultural and religious institutions taking roles in the election of candidates, both for executive and legislative positions. Moreover, there are several new formal institutions constituted, that also invite participation from society. All these developments open space for people at the local level, particularly informal figures, to take a role in the political activity. Hence, the interaction between formal and informal actors is now becoming more prominent in local politics in Indonesia. Candidates and actors from political and economic societies are no longer dominant, because there are other figures with informal backgrounds, from society, from religious organisations, to be active in politics in terms of electoral processes. Through the research on local regimes, we want to see how formal and informal institutions, and formal and informal actors, interact with each other. If we put it as a question: How do informal elements in the different local contexts influence the democratisation process at the local level? Do these informal elements improve the potential for democracy at the local level, or do they hinder the development of democracy? And in which conditions do these informal institutions influence the development of democracy?

Before I explain the findings, let me first tell you about the regions we selected to be our cases. I mentioned in the beginning that this research involved 11 regions: Ten case studies at the local regency city level, and the Special Administrative Region of Yogyakarta. These administrative territories have been selected arbitrarily. From the beginning, we have recognised that local regimes are influenced by informal factors that may go beyond regional administrative boundaries. As such, research sites have not been selected specifically in accordance with government administrative boundaries. We rather define the local as a shared cultural identity, one that goes across administrative boundaries. To follow up the PWD baseline survey, the case studies in this research have been selected in accordance with the survey area. Limited by our resources, we have had to select only 8 out of 31 regencies or cities in which the survey was conducted before. They are Pontianak, Ambon, South Aceh, Sidoarjo, Kutai Kertanegara, Kabupaten Belu in Nusa Tenggara, Jayapura, and Yogyakarta. And to provide a greater breadth
of information, three additional areas that were not part of the survey were selected as case studies. They are Tana Toraja, North Lombok, and Gorontalo.

Be aware that these research locations, whether they were involved in the survey or not, were selected not on the basis of representativeness, because we recognised fully that this or that research site cannot be considered to be the face of Indonesia. It is necessary to present a comprehensive examination of local regimes in the country. So, in this research we have focused our attention on regions that we consider to have unique characteristics as compared to other parts of the country. Although this selection clearly has its limitations, it offers an opportunity for examining and comparing the diverse local regimes in Indonesia. For example, the reason why we selected Tana Toraja and North Lombok is that both regions have populations that exhibit a high degree of genuine and deep-rooted traditions. The difference between the two regencies is that Tanja Toraja has been influenced by Christianity, while North Lombok has been influenced by Islamic tradition. Gorontalo was selected based on two considerations. First, because it is a relatively homogenous area, both in terms of ethnicity and religion, but for a long time occupied a subordinate position as a part of North Sulawesi province. The other eight regions were previously involved in the PWD survey.

In this scheme, cross between institution and actors, there are at least four possible clusters, represented by quadrants. Two on the top, and two below. Two on the left and two on the right.
And interestingly, our data show that of the case studies we conducted match with all four quadrants we have in the picture. There are Kutai Kertanegara, North Lombok, and South Aceh in the above right corner, indicating that in those regions, the politics and the democratisation process are dominated by the elites who are in formal positions, and they tend to make use of formal institutions in their actions and politics. In the below left corner, politics are dominated by informal actors who tend to use informal arrangements in responding to the democracy process. We can read the same way with the two other quadrants, but there is one special case, Yogyakarta, which we place between the two quadrants at the top. Because in this Special Region, formal actors play important roles by using both formal and informal institutions. So, to explain more about this research, I am now asking Purwo to continue the presentation.

**Purwo Santoso**

I want to share with you the analysis to characterise the regimes when we look at the local level. I would like to start with the top left [informal institutions, formal actors]. Jayapura. The case of Jayapura triggered the idea of consociational (inaudible). Because of the conflict situation, the community has been in a very intense discursive engagement. In many conflict-prone areas, the discourse among elites is the safeguard of democracy. An interesting finding from Jayapura has been that the elections have been prearranged, so to speak. Jayapura is the headquarter of the Papua province, and people from every ethnicity, Papuan and non-Papuan, blend together there. Hence, Jayapura has the potential of conflict, and we do also have the problem with the independence movement. Therefore, the tense dynamic lets the elite try to make informal arrangements, and interestingly, those who are potentially losing the elections are the ones who (inaudible) to become the winner. (inaudible) that there has been a strong capacity to enhance collective (inaudible) among elites, to maintain stability. The election, which was meant to be a free competition, has been prearranged. For example, when I interviewed the Vice Mayor, who represents the non-Papuans, he said: “Well, if we use our capacity to mobilise the non-Papuans, we will win. But what is the use of winning if then we engage in a very tense conflict?” The risk of conflict is so high, and therefore the (inaudible) is used to set up who will win. And there is a transactional process, deciding who will be the winner, and they’re still meeting the standard of competence and so forth. So the informality out of (inaudible). This is the point that I want to share with you. And for that reason, we use the idea of consociational model, in order to go deeper into how to upon democracy because of the capacity of the local elite to negotiate and to share the responsibility of administering the region.
Another extreme [formal institutions, formal actors] is Kutai Kertanegara. Kutai Kertanegara is a resource-rich regency, and it is permitted a huge amount of money because of the decentralisation arrangement. At the time, local leaders demanded to have a proportional share of natural resources, and because this is a resource-rich regency, the local government benefitted with huge amounts of money. However, civil society capacity was very weak, and the leader, Syaukani, deftly mobilised popular support. He became the strongman, with huge amounts of money, able to enhance popular support immensely. I think he was the one who won the largest amount of votes in the local election in the country – around 98%. Due to his generosity to distribute money to gain support, everybody agree that he should become the leader. Because this arrangement has been so formalistic, he had to set so many administrative rules. Then, interestingly, his daughter easily succeeded with the same strategy. And thus, the civil society activist who were challenging Syaukani, challenging her father, became a supporter of the daughter, to take up a series of lucrative positions. And then the daughter now kept the anti-corruption institutions. The formality, then, is unable to sustain. This is a contrasting situation between formal and informal arrangements. One is because it is different by conflict, one is different by the eagerness of the … the motive to control money in the name of democracy and decentralisation.

At another extreme is Tana Toraja [informal actors, informal institutions]. Tana Toraja is a very interesting tourist destination. The cultural capacity of the leaders, and the structure of the customary law is so well institutionalised and well preserved. Some of the villages have a clan-administrated system. Everyone in the region has to know the second generation upward, through the administration, meaning that they know the family. When there is a conflict, they will ask where you come from, which locality you are from. Then they will map out the networks, and they will go through the family network to resolve the conflict. The network hence has capacity to manage conflict, but when the election comes, this becomes (inaudible). Because each institutionalised network is consolidating itself, and they mobilise the huge capacity of customary systems to confront one another. The capacity to mobilise people is global, because people have a system of connecting people in the village with where they are, so even in Yogyakarta they mobilise their capacity. It is a nation-wide, if not global, conflict among the competing parties when an election comes. Mobilisation of customary law then allows the conflict to be extremely huge, much beyond the locality. This, then, justifies the idea of making the locality not strictly correspondent to the administrative boundary.
We have another example [$informal$ $actors$, $formal$ $institutions$] in Ambon, which was engaged in deep conflict in the past. Again, the conflict experiences shape how local politics work. Because of the inability to make a breakthrough at the informal level, then the compromising elite becomes the (inaudible).

What this means is that we have characteristic local regimes, and when we want to have context-specific or local-specific strategies, then this is the basis of setting up local strategies. We do have a national project, but because we start from different situations, we have to amplify and dig down the strategy based on this map. I cannot go further, but this is just the idea of how we are to proceed in the future. Thank you.
Kristian Stokke and Soe Myint Aung: Democratic Transition or Autocratic Reforms?

Kristian Stokke

First of all, I think that I should apologise to everyone in the room who knows much more about politics in Burma than I will probably ever achieve. There are quite a few of you. But in this spot, I am going to try to set the framework, providing a big picture with sweeping generalisations and simplifications. Hopefully, that will also help those of you who may know even less about Burma than I do to understand what the more specific contributions seek to do within the general framework.

Olle has already talked about the big debates about what happened in regard to democratisation in Indonesia. And we have been through a period of change in Burma/Myanmar, but also quite a lot of grappling, of trying to find out what is going on. What is the nature of the ongoing reform process or opening? Is it about a democratic transition, as Olle just talked about? Or is it about what we could call an autocratic top-down reform, emphasising stability and order? In this presentation, I am basically following the logic of Soe Myint Aung’s forthcoming Ph.D. dissertation in political science at the University of Oslo, and adding things that I have written for a Myanmar country study commissioned by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. So it is Soe’s logic, my words, and my misunderstandings! Soe is here to correct me, and maybe add new answers and details to my broad-brush painting.

One core question in this presentation – and, I think, in Soe’s dissertation – is: What is it that is happening? What characterises the democratic opening? Is it a democratic transition, or is it an institutionalisation of semi-authoritarian rule? And, following from that core question, how can we understand outcomes in terms of three sets of power relations? What happens in terms of civil/political power relations? What is the outcome of this particular kind of reform process in terms of central/local or majority/minority relations? And what happens in terms of the power relations between state and society? These are the core questions in my presentation, and I think these are the overarching question, within which we are going to discuss in much more detail later today and tomorrow.

The first thing I want to say is that what we have seen challenges the received wisdom, the parachuted theories and scholars. It challenges structure-oriented explanations. It cannot be explained with reference to socioeconomic development, class formation or class politics, or even collective movements of other kinds. And it cannot really be explained by international
sanctions either. All of these have been important, but none of them can really make us understand why we got an opening and why we got it at the time that it came. There are some things that fit uneasily. We have had a somewhat heated debate, also between practitioners, about how to understand this. The debate has then turned to actors, to agency, and especially elite actors. How do we understand the key players at the elite level?

The dominant perspective is what you could call a transitional discourse of a Burmese kind. Basically, the argument is that the driving actors have been an alliance of sorts between what is said to be a reform-oriented regime – the President and the USDP government – and an engagement-oriented civil society segment, called the Third Force, and its international sponsors. These have been seen as the new players, pushing a democratic transition; against hardliners within the military, but also those that were depicted as hardliners among political parties, civil society, ethnic armed organisations, and so on. The agenda was, it is argued, to create a move towards softline positions on both sides. I think we can say that this was the core rationale, or at least the way it is presented in the discourse on transition, of the key players, not least the supporting international actors, including Norwegian diplomats.

The alternative perspective is one that emphasises autocratic reforms. Reforms come from above, initiated by the military, or the military rulers. And not because they were pushed to. They had their operational problems, but it was not a military that was about to be kicked out, and it was not a regime that was about to fall apart, like the Suharto regime in Indonesia. It may rather have been a regime that felt it had to implement reforms in order to secure its future, economically and politically. This autocratic reforms discourse does not accept the idea of a division between soft-liners and hardliners within the military. Yes, there are some different positions, but it is not a main split or conflict. The military has actually been a relatively coherent force. It is their coherence, rather than their fragmentation, that is most striking. And against the transition perspective, there are few signs of negotiations. Yes, there are speculations about meetings and so on and so forth, and maybe also shared understandings, but you cannot really talk about a negotiated process. And there are very few signs of formal or even informal pacts. It is difficult to really pinpoint informal agreements or pacts. This perspective also brings in the importance of understanding changes within Myanmar in a larger international relations perspective, i.e. that we have to avoid the territorial trap, or the methodological nationalism of analysing Myanmar as an island. You have to understand it in the context of changing international relations, and especially the leverage that the military could get by seeing that the West was increasingly concerned about a rising China.
I think we can say that for a while – from 2011 and into 2013 – the transition perspective held a dominant position. That was the talk of the town, especially among practitioners and diplomats. But from 2013, when the reform process started to stall, and especially now, with the crisis in the Rakhine State and other things, we see the character of the process more clearly. I think the autocratic reform perspective has become more common, at least in the academic literature, including in the West. So then, the question is: If we think of this as an autocratic, top-down, military-led process, what does that mean in terms of these three sets of power relations that I mentioned at the beginning?

Well, the first thing is that, as Olle said, this is an example of a sequencing logic. One that is very much focused on state-building, first and foremost in the sense of the stability and authority of the state. It is a gradual opening and political liberalisation, but with numerous constitutional and political guarantees for continued military power built in. You have all heard about the 25% in Parliament, but there is much more to it than that. It is also about controlling key ministries, the Security Council, and not least public administration. And, of course, extensive power for the military in emergency situations. The continued dominance of the military is a key here. Although you have a democratically elected government under the leadership of State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi, you cannot talk about political control of the military. And this is really a key. This is the reason why you have all the talk about the need for constitutional reform. That is really the core of the continued problematic civil/military relations.

Second, regarding central/local power relations, or majority/minority power relations. As you probably know, Myanmar is a multiethnic society with a plurality of ethnic armed organisations. Sai Kyaw Nyunt is going to talk more about this soon. This is a country that has had intrastate conflicts somewhere in the country since independence in 1948. Although there is much talk about entrepreneurialism, the greed and the economic opportunities of armed organisations, we have to remember their core political grievance, which is really the essence, and is about self-determination, ethnic equality, and representation of minorities. This goes back to the 1947 Panglong Agreement, and it remains the core. Then you have added grievances, conflict-driving mechanisms, in the course of the protracted conflict, including opportunities for resource extraction, and of course people’s suffering and livelihood destruction in the course of war.

So if this is the core of the central/local relations, at least in a majority/minority sense, what does this autocratic reform do? Again, to put it very simplistically: On the one hand, Myanmar now has formal decentralisation, written into the Constitution from 2008. This means that there
are Regions in majority areas, and ethnic States in minority areas, with their own State and Region Parliaments. There is an element of decentralisation, but very little devolution of power. You can say that it fits into the agenda of legitimising strong, centralised rule within the unitary state, rather than being a case of radical decentralisation. Since 2010-11, there has been a number of bilateral ceasefire agreements and a process of creating a national ceasefire agreement, which we will hear more about in the next presentation. These, however, have been about constructing what we could call negative peace, the absence of warfare, rather than political conflict resolution through negotiations addressing the core political grievances. Since the election of the NLD government, there has been a shift towards a new peace process, where political negotiations are supposed to be central. But even then, we find problems regarding inclusivity, for example the precondition that the ethnic armed organisations have to sign the national ceasefire agreement in order to be included, and regarding the substance of the negotiations. Many ethnic organisations feel that this process is again top-down, even though it comes from the new, democratically elected government. They see it as a deal that is presented to them, rather than one that comes out of negotiations.

Quickly to the third and final power relation. What about state and civil society? All of us were amazed that the 2015 election was held, and that it gave the result that it did. We should never forget the importance of the reintroduction of electoral democracy and parliamentary politics in Myanmar, set against the five decades of authoritarian rule by the military. This is a big thing! But at the same time, this is a democracy that has flaws at all its level of the democratic chain. What comes under democratic decision-making? What are the mediating links of popular representation? How about the capacity of people to actually engage in not just elections, but other ways of having a democratic control of public affairs?

We should also recognise that there has been a deconcentration in public administration. An institutional deconcentration, including in terms of scale, towards the local level. That means that there are some access points. There is a certain space for people to engage with public administration. But at the same time, in terms of substance, there is the continued dominance of the military in public administration, especially visible in this General Administration Department, which is under one of the ministries controlled by the military. And of course especially in the areas where you have continued conflict, where you have direct military rule. There is definitely a broader discursive space. You can talk about things that you couldn’t mention five years ago. But at the same time, as you will also hear from Zayar Hlaing and others, there are also limitations that remain or have been reimposed on free speech.
Soe Myint Aung

I would like to add only a few things. I will be very brief. Thank you so much, Kristian, for giving me credit for my ongoing Ph.D. work. It is a collective work of my supervisors and I, trying to make sense of what has been going on in Burma/Myanmar since 2010-11. I was also inspired by Olle Törnquist.

I have a few observations. Journalists and academics generally describe the political transformation in Myanmar since 2011 as an elite-driven, top-down process. In the terminology of the transitologists, there are two variants under this elite-driven top-down process. One is called imposed transition, the second one is pacted or negotiated transition. These two are different. Imposed transition involves violence, political violence such as conflicts and wars, whereas the pacted transition is mainly about the elite agreement of reaching the unwritten pact between the authoritarian rulers on one hand and the pro-democracy opposition on the other.

Up until the end of 2011, the military regime had tried to impose transition. Starting from 2008-09, the Myanmar Armed Forces tried to make ethnic armed organisations transform into border guard forces. When they were not successful in reaching this imposed transition, then they tried to shape it into a more of a pacted, negotiated transaction somewhere at the end of 2011. At that time the ceasefire with the Kachin broke down, and President Thein Sein showed his public defiance to China, and then the international actors started to come into Burma’s political transformation. The point is that it has always been about the controlled transition, from the beginning. Kristian called it the autocratic reform. This is my first observation.

The second observation is that it is also in the practice of the authoritarian rulers to play one actor against another. It could be playing one group of political prisoners against another group of former political prisoners, or playing one international actor against the other, or among the Bamar political parties and minority ethnic parties. So that observation concerns the role of the international actors and factions.

At the time of the 1962 coup, General Ne Win, the dictator, also tried to manage a transformation into a civilian rule in a controlled and managed way. The present transformation differs from that one in that this time, the military regime, and the nominally civilian regimes, were more immune to international practice. There is also a legacy with the democracy movement that spread over 20 years. These are the three main observations I have made, and would like to add.
Sai Kyaw Nyunt: Challenges in Myanmar’s Democratization and Peace Process

First of all, thanks to Kristian for inviting me here, and also the University of Oslo. My name is Sai Kyaw Nyunt, I am Joint General Secretary – 2 of Shan Nationalities League for Democracy, SNLD. You can say that apart from the majority Bamar, we are the strongest ethnic party. I am also one of the secretaries in UPDJC, the Union Peace Dialogue Joint Committee, which monitors the peace process. I am one of the secretaries representing the political party group. Firstly, I want to say that I am not an academic or a researcher. I am here as a politician, and I am going to tell you a story.

(shows map) So here is our Myanmar. Here we see China, India, Thailand, Laos, Bangladesh … Just to imagine where our Myanmar is.

(shows map of ethnic groups and militias) And here, as the professor already presented, here is how diverse we are in our country. We are also diverse in that we have so many ethnic armed organisations. There are 21 ethnic armed organisations, just listed ones, which are engaged in the peace process, and still more. We have hundreds of peoples’ militias and other groups.

And now, what we are facing: Constitutional crisis/problem. Peace building process. We are also in a democratisation process. We are struggling for a federal union. And securitisation and civil supremacy. Sure, we now have an elected government, yet still the military is too strong. The priority for the military is securitisation, and the other is building civil institutions. And revolution vs. reform. We fought for more than 50 years, so we only know the way of revolution. Now we are in the middle of reformation and reform, but we don’t know how to do that. And weak institutions. Our institutions – CSOs, political parties, in the government and everywhere – are weak. There is also the rise of nationalism. We are quite diverse, we have so many ethnicities. And now, they are all saying “I’m Shan,” or “I’m Kachin.” You know, the rise of nationalism. We are facing international pressure, the pressure of the international community. We are also in the middle of geopolitics. And we have some business projects which are a bit problematic.

From 2011 to 2015, the ethnic armed organisations, and the military and ex-military generals called the National Ceasefire Agreement. They are drafting, negotiating, and we got a National Ceasefire Agreement in text. And with that single text, out of 21, eight EAOs signed the National Ceasefire Agreement. So we still have 13 non-signatories, and that group is the strongest one, including SSPP, TNLA, NDAA, and so on. Most of them are on the
China/Myanmar border. Nagaland is another issue, where they just fight for freedom, not for a federal union.

With the signatory group and the government, we called the Union Peace Conference. We did it three times, but how did we discuss there? Look at this. (shows image) Somewhere around 700 participants. So where is the dialogue space? Here we have UPDJC, the Union Peace Dialogue Joint Committee. One group is the government group – and quite funnily, in our country, when we are saying “government,” we have to say three: Executive government, Parliament, and the military. The other groups are ethnic armed organisations and the last one is political parties. And here, (points at image) the chair is the Lady, Aung San Suu Kyi, and I’m one of the secretaries in this, in UPDJC.

Let us turn to some difficulties, some problems in our country. In our 2008 Constitution, the role of the military is too strong. You see, they have 25 % of the seats in the Union Legislature. They are not elected; they are appointed by the Commander-in-Chief. Three Ministries – Defence, Home Affairs, and Border Affairs – are also appointed by the Commander-in-Chief. And the General Administration Department (GAD) is under the Ministry of Home Affairs. This means that our country is not ruled by the democratic government, but by the Commander-in-Chief. Of course, the General Administration Department is the one that does all the administration. Furthermore, the military does not represent ethnic diversity.

The State of Emergency Provisions are also quite dangerous. During a state of emergency, the President shall hand over power to the Commander-in-Chief. Then Parliament stops, everything stops. That is the State of Emergency Provision. And the military is not under the control of the civilian government. We have state and regional governments, but they are too weak. Even there, there are 25 % military seats. So that is the 2008 Constitution. That is why we want to amend the Constitution, or if possible, even write a new one.

Because of this Constitution, there is a somewhat dual government. (points at images) You see the Lady, State Counsellor; and the President, Htin Kyaw. The President is easy to forget. He rarely appears in the media. (shows visualisation of division of power) Here you see the Commander-in-Chief. So that is the problem of the 2008 Constitution, and that’s what we are facing.

Currently we face much pressure because of the conflict in Arakan State. Nearly a million are displaced to refugee camps in Cox’s Bazar. But it is not the first time. In 2012, it happened once, although not that much. For us, you know, this Rakhine/Arakan conflict is just one of the
issues in our country. Why? You will see. (shows maps of conflicts in Ethnic States) Here. In Ethnic States, over 50 years … And just recently, 2011 until now, you see in Kachin State, Shan State, Karen State … So many of them. In 1996, in my state, Shan State, 300,000 were displaced to Thailand. At the time we didn’t get international approval or help. In 2012, 150,000 Karen people were displaced, also to the Thailand border. It is very hard for us to even reach the UN Security Council. We never have that chance.

So what happened in Arakan Sate is quite usual. In Shan State, hundreds of villages were ground zero, and then displaced, and also in Kachin State, Karen State … So it’s just usual for us. So what happens is that here (points at map) China/Myanmar border, refugee camps, IDP camps, and here, Thailand/Myanmar border, so many refugee camps, still. Now the international community is going to cut the funding. That is not the proper way. For so many years, over 20 years, there have been internationally funded education programs. If you cut off, surely Myanmar’s government will not fund our ethnic educational help or other programs. So I suggest to still support cross-border aid.

Let us turn to another sector: The business sector. We have Shwe Gas and Oil Pipeline, Kyauk Phy Deep Sea Port, Letpadaung Copper Mine, Myitsone Dam on Irrawaddy River, dam on Salween River, coal mines in Shan and Mon State. Nearly of all of these were Chinese projects. (shows map) Here is Shew Gas and Oil Pipeline, from Kunming to Sittwe in Arakan State. So what is the connection between the Arakan conflict and the Shwe Gas Pipeline? They will even have trains along this pipeline. Seven cargo and one passenger, every day. But it is still not agreed. As you see, for China, the best way to access the Indian Ocean is through Myanmar. Here is the East-West economic corridor. And Letpadaung Copper Mine … (shows images) Up there is our people, not liking it, so they protest.

And finally: We have to know our historical background. (shows timeline) Here we got independence, and we got the 1947 Constitution, but it was not what we wanted. The second is the attempted constitutional amendment in 1961, but military coup in 1962. And we got another Constitution: Burma Way Socialism. In 1988, uprising in Myanmar, and then the government collapses, and then the General Election in 1990. NLD wins, at that time, a landslide, but there is no power handover. So they had a National Convention, and then they drafted the 2008 Constitution, which I just presented to you.

(shows map) Pre-independence, you could say we really had four colonial territories, and the independent Karenni State. This state voluntarily joined the Union. So we came together in the
Panglong Agreement, and we had the inquiry, where what was called the Frontier Area at the time joined hands with proper Burma and got independence, took independence. General Aung San drafted a Constitution and founded the Constitution Drafting Committee and the First Constitutional Assembly. However, he was assassinated, along with ethnic leaders. And so, we got the 1947 Constitution.

*(shows visual comparison)* So what is the difference between the draft of Aung San and the 1947 Constitution? His federal Constitution allowed State Constitutions. Four colonial territories and one independent state were to form a federal government. Instead, it became a unitary Constitution. We only got this assembly in the flag *[six stars]*. But in reality we got this *[one star]*. In 1961, an attempt was made to amend the Constitution, asking for state equality, complete autonomy, true bicameral system, right to secession. But in 1962, we had a military coup. And with that we got the 1974 Constitution. Just read article 11 of that Constitution: “The State shall adopt a single-party system. The Burma Socialist Programme Party is the sole political party and shall lead the State.” And then, what we are seeing, “equality”: Seven States and then seven Divisions. This is the way they give us equality. So, as I mentioned, there was a nationwide rising and the 1990 election. And then we wait, for no transfer. There was a National Convention, which the ethnic political parties left. And we got the 2008 Constitution. And, so, we are coming together, and we try to get eight States, together, equality. What get instead is the seven Regions.

Challenges: Constitutional crisis, historical legacy of ethnic people, development of Ethnic States, military rule, weak government, weak Parliament, weak civilian institutions, weak freedom of press, weak democratic culture … When we are saying “democratic,” when can democracy happen? Where is democratic culture? I don’t know. No rule of law, corruption everywhere, no transparency still. Then there are world geopolitics, problematic business projects, environmental problems … As usual, we have cronies, who are ex-military generals … Mass extraction of natural resources … And ethnic conflicts, ethnic minority affairs, extreme religion, the rise of nationalism.

So am I pessimistic? Let’s see. We do have a quasi-democratic government. A national ceasefire is still in progress. The peace process is in progress. We have the will for constitutional changes. Policy debates are everywhere in our country. That is the stronger point, I think. And international attention. We got it – good or bad, anyhow, we got international attention. There are business opportunities, but we do not know if they constitute an opportunity or a threat. We
still have untouched eco-tour sites. And there is progress in education. Many universities engage with our country.
**Discussion**

Discussant: Helena Bjuremalm

**Olle Törnquist**

We are presented two quite problematic processes, so to say. We have asked Helena Bjuremalm to kick us off. We are running a bit short of time, but Helena will certainly have to use a few minutes.

**Helena Bjuremalm**

It is a privilege to be here, and it is very hard to give justice to these excellent and very rich presentations from two very complex countries. I am going to make three general observations, and then pose one or two questions to each speaker.

My first observation is that it is really intriguing to see that individual human rights, in particular civic and political rights, seem to have improved in both countries. This may be because these individual-oriented rights are not as threatening as economic and social rights would be. There is not as much progress, as Olle said in his presentation, when it comes to substantive rights and democracy, that is, good governance, rule of law, and equal access to justice. This points to the importance of impartial administration in transforming individual human rights into actual, substantive democracy.

This finding actually also corresponds to a finding by a previous workplace of mine, International IDEA, which recently launched a report that points to the fact that a lot of democratic rights and freedoms have improved globally, although with a density in some countries, but when it comes to impartial administration, there is no change whatsoever (IDEA 2017). I think that is a very important aspect to look into.

My second general observation regards what is called the frustration paradox. As we all know, transformative change is a very long-term endeavour. Just look at the research projects that all of you have been involved with, over 20-30 years, where you have had such rich results and findings. Politics is inherently short-term, though. With the medialisation of politics, the attention span of politicians becomes very short-term by nature. From the way you describe the Indonesian example in particular, it seems like civil society, social movements, interest groups may be falling into that trap too, by opting more for fixing problems here and now through personal contacts than spending their time on organising and mobilising to achieve victories in
10 or 15 years. I think that is human. Nobody can blame them for opting for that sort of short route, but it is a route that’s going to undermine the long-term prospects for transformative change. I do not know how to resolve it. This is the frustration paradox: We have the knowledge, but it is not applied. Why is that, and how could that change?

Speaking of knowledge, my third observation regards something was alluded to in some of the background papers, and discussed by Kristian in particular, namely the question of how to develop and sustain knowledge production and management within the international donor community, among diplomats, and among the media. Some of developments may not have been surprising if you know the countries, even though they are very complex. But for diplomats, for the donor community to which I belong, and for the media … I’m thinking about the recent developments in the terrible Rohingya exodus, and how Aung San Suu Kyi got the blame, so to speak, rather than blaming the military or at least seeing the proportions on who is blamed for what. I think there is a lot that my community can learn from the cumulative learning that you have in academia. You learn something, and then you move on, and you improve the knowledge like this. Whilst with diplomacy, media, and the donor community, we keep forgetting as we learn new things. If that could change, that would be brilliant.

These are my three general observations. I have a couple of questions for the presenters. Question first to Kristian and Soe: It would be interesting to know your assessment of whether it would be possible for the key actors and alliances that strive to democratise the civil-military relations, state-society relations, and majority-minority relations without getting co-opted or marginalised, as we have seen happened to some of their peers in Indonesia. My second question: In your paper, you refer to the agency approach of democratisation theory. Leaning to that theory, how would you assess the military’s ability, capacity, and space to continue to craft its own fate? The way military is depicted here, they seem to have excellent resources, strategies, and access. I find this intriguing. Can someone have that knowledge and those skills to craft their own destiny? The world is very complex, and Burma is no exception. Can they really continue to have that ability, capacity, and space?

A question to Olle: Could you enlighten us on the prospects of alternative actors in building and sustaining their space and capacity while forming social contracts regarding urban development? I think you referred to one example. Do you think they are more likely to be successful at that level than at the national level, where they have rather tended to be co-opted or marginalised? My second question to you has to do with how you define political capacity. I do not think you equate political capacity to merely being represented, but could you expand
on whether you also include the skills, the tactics, and the strategies needed to really become influential? Being in that space is certainly not sufficient. You also need to have clout.

Then I have a question to Willy and Purwo. Regarding the fascinating four fields that you shared with us, it would be interesting if you could say something about where you saw the tendencies. Do you see some of the regions or communities that you covered moving along that scale? Or are they, because of structural factors, more or less stuck in each and one of those four squares?

And lastly, a question to Sai, the last presenter. Do you see a transformation, or possible transformation, in the source of the military’s political authority and legitimacy? Away from physical force, and a security narrative – “without us, there will be no stability” – into more of a top-down development-oriented agenda, perhaps? Or are they too stuck in the benefits of the war economy to ever move anywhere? And if so, if that would happen, could that open up opportunities, like you listed on your slide?

**Olle Törnquist**

Thank you! I forgot to say that Helena started her work at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, and then to SIDA, and then to International IDEA, and now she’s back in SIDA again, doing a lot of good work. I think we should open up for a few questions before we return to the presenters. Anyone who would like to raise any issue, please come forward. First, Arild Engelsen Ruud, Professor of South Asian Studies at the University of Oslo.

**Arild Engelsen Ruud**

Thank you. Very interesting. I work on Bangladesh, so I do not know much about Indonesia and Burma, but I learned a lot today. On Indonesia, you spoke about elites, to a considerable sense. And on Burma, you did not speak about elites, but about the military. Where is the military in Indonesia? Has it just gone away as a political factor? And what about elites in Burma? You speak about the military and civil society and the democratic forces as if they were homogenous entities. With regard to Indonesia, you mentioned Syaukani, the former regent in Kutai Kantinegara, East Kalimantan, and his daughter Rita Widyasari turning regent too, though accused of corruption, a dynasty trying to establish itself. I think that was extremely interesting. An elite is trying to survive in different ways. Is that not happening in Burma? Is Burma all meritocratic forms of leadership selection?
Olle Törnquist

Thank you so much. Joel Rocamora, please. As many of you know, Joel just concluded his service with the former government in the Philippines, the Aquino III government. Joel was head of the anti-poverty commission and part of the cabinet. But way back in time he started his career as a member of the Maoist groups in the Philippines, and thereafter turned to the most impressive party-building experience in Southeast Asia: The citizen action Akbayan party, a social democratic oriented party. Akbayan was part of the recent liberal party led government that lost out last year to Duterte, the Trump of South East Asia. Joel, please.

Joel Rocamora

My question is to the three speakers on Myanmar. I doubt that all three of you are Catholics, but you all follow the book. You did not mention the word “Rohingya” at all. I understand that using of the term is in itself to take a position on the problem there now, because the Myanmar government does not recognise that the Rohingya exist. Neither am I interested in contributing to the attacks on Aung San Suu Kyi. What I am really interested in is the way in which the crisis now is a perfect illustration of the broader political problems of Myanmar. The power of the military, the limitations to the power of Aung San Suu Kyi and NLD. The whole ethnic conflict issue that was the focus of the third presentation. Whatever position one takes on the issue, I think it’s important to take it up.

Olle Törnquist

Next speaker is Joash Tapiheru, who has also been part of the Local Regime project at UGM.

Joash Tapiheru

This is probably a bit of a comment, but also a question. The term “autocratic regime,” mentioned in Kristian’s presentation, kind of reminded me of what has been happening in the last couple of years with the Arab Spring, and what we now see in Zimbabwe. Linking it with the cases in Myanmar and Indonesia … I’m just trying to raise this reflection. Could we think of this kind of autocratic reform as the normality of reforms, so to say, in countries such as Indonesia, Myanmar, Zimbabwe or Egypt – countries that previously had a strong, centralised, autocratic regime? One of the most principal ways to initiate a reform is this autocratic reform. You could say top-down reform, although it is not exactly top-down, because you also have representation. It will always have problems with representability. I mean, we can question and debate about this representability till the Kingdom comes, but let’s think about this.
Olle Törnquist

Thank you. We will of course be able to return to many of the issues that have been brought up in this first session later on, so please bear with us. For now, I ask the presenters to be as brief as possible in the final comments.

Kristian Stokke

There are some interesting things here, and I’m going to run through them. Thank you for very useful comments. To Helena: Possibilities for civil society to engage in transformation without being co-opted and marginalised. Yes, that is a risk. But I think that if you ask most civil society activists, or ethnic civil society activists now, they will say the problem is lack of access and inclusion, rather than co-optation. It is more about disappointment with the democratically elected government not including them. It is very different with the experience after the transition in South Africa, where everyone who had been in opposition were included.

About the military, the capacity to continue to craft its own fate, and related to Arild’s question on whether the military is an elite, or whether there is another elite: Yes, we have a tendency to portray the military as a huge monolith. But in the case of Myanmar, that is not completely unjustified. After so many decades of military rule, the military has become a movement. It is not just a military: It has had its own educational system and welfare system, and it has been the basis for class formation, including the economic elite. It is actually not so easy to find an alternative elite. Yes, we probably tend to downplay a little bit in our eagerness to get the point across, but do not think that is completely unjustified in this case.

Quickly to Joel and the Rohingya. Yes, certainly that is the big issue right now. The reason the Rohingya issue is not on the program today is not because of its sensitivity. It is rather that we have been discussing it a lot in various events lately, including here in Oslo. Today we also wanted to bring back some of the other core issues. Furthermore, by talking about what we could call the core political issues, we can also add depth to our understanding of the Rohingya crisis. I think that if you want to go behind the current humanitarian crisis, we have to understand the core questions of what kind of transition this is, of the nature of the civil-military relations. I think that is really what is driving this.

As for the comment from Joash, I think that we have been thinking about Myanmar as an exception. It has been seen as a case that does not fit the model, namely the pacted transition model. However, a few years down the line, although it may not have become an ideal type –
not in the sense of being an ideal, but a model of something – I think we may not see it as an exception. It is an autocratic reform that might exemplify what reforms are increasingly about today, in the post Third Wave period.

Purwo Santoso

Thank you for some very interesting comments on our project. With regard to the local regimes, I did not have enough time to make a presentation from the beginning, but it was a map of the characteristics of the challenge, and we are inherently troubled with the idea of “regime” itself. When we characterise the regime, we are stuck with the institutional setup. Therefore, we have to figure out the leeway of getting around it. Yet there are different trajectories of the locality when democracy is put forward. For example, when we talk about Papua: Initially, it was part of the negotiation between the pro and con on the independence movement there, but then they can also manage the local politics, and therefore, the room for negotiation is there. With the amount of money sent to Papua, the room for (inaudible) was there, but the frustration is also there, so surely the regime changes over time. Then the strategy is to go into the characteristics of the regime itself. For example, when we go to East Java, where the so-called traditional Islam to which I belong dominates, then we have to go to the scripture of the Quran, and also the way of Islamic people to understand their reality. Unless we go into to the local discourse, we cannot bring forward movement from within. When we go to the deep core of customary law in Tana Toraj, we have to go down to the structure of customary law itself, before we figure out the structure or characteristics of the regime. Then, unless we also engage with local people, allowing them to develop their instruments for a democratic movement, then democracy will be stuck.

Secondly, with regard to the elite and military. With the Big Bang of reform undertaken after the crisis in 1997-98, we pushed out the military, so to speak. What I do not understand is why they were silent for so long. Recently, though, we have noticed the comeback of the military from within the government. There is the appearance of the military within the government, and the emergence of retired military officers running political parties. They use political parties and their own money, wherever it comes from, as a way of going back to politics. We use the term “elite” rather than “the military,” because the re-emerging military wears a different hat.

Sai Kyaw Nyunt

I just want to highlight that, you know, according to our history, you may see that our conflict is just between the military and civilians. In 1947, General Aung San and ethnic leaders were
going to form a union. They were assassinated by the other side. That attempt to come together to build a real federal union became a mess. In 1961, when a reform initiative was organised by the democratic government of Prime Minister U Nu, the military took power a second time. I think the present scenario is the same.

In our country, the ethnic people is just an additional one. The Bamar majority are over 60% of the population, so we will never become a government. Basically, the conflict between the majority and minorities, between the military and civilians, is our history.

Previously, General Aung San was a role model, idol, the titan of our country. And next, U Nu was also like that. And now, it’s become the Lady. Our culture is like that. It is as if we are expecting a saviour. I think we should stop this. I want to tell the international community to stop creating another giant, another monster. Support us in CSOs, institutions, political parties, to get a right institutional form, to strengthen our institutions. I want the international community to support that, so we may have not only single leaders, but one collective leadership. We can have many leaders, and they can work together. This is the only way to solve our democratic problems. If we are going to create another monster, it will go the same way. That is my comment.

Olle Törnquist

Thank you so much. Just a few responses to Helena, on basis of the presentation I was involved in. First on the local actors, where would they be able to make a difference? Social contracts seem to work on a local level, such as in Solo. Scaling up citizen participation, however, has not proved feasible, neither in Indonesia, nor in the best cases of Kerala or Brazil. Second, the broad alliances in favour of public health reform presupposed a reform proposal! It presupposed that there were politicians who were able to put forward a specific policy that people could rally behind. This made broad alliances feasible on a general, national level.

Finally, on the capacity of the actors. In the survey, we operationalised their capacity in six categories, primarily based on social and political movement related theories but also general political science. One, the opportunities for the actors, including with respect to citizenship. Two, their capacity to transform their sources of power into authority and legitimacy. Three, their ability to put issues on the political agenda and in what way, for instance by way of single issues or more general programmes. Four, their ability to mobilise and organise people. Five, about their capacity to become representative and build related institutions. Six, about their more or less democratic strategies of fostering their aims.
Politics of Citizenship and Welfare

Chair: Kristian Stokke

Eric Hiariej: Politics of Citizenship in Indonesia

Kristian Stokke

For this session, we have a tight schedule with four presentations and two discussants. The first presentation takes its point of departure in the second subproject of PWD that Purwo talked about. It is in some ways a summary of the recently published Politics of Citizenship in Indonesia, edited by Eric Hiariej and myself.

Eric Hiariej

Good afternoon, everyone. Thank you for having me here. I have actually been visiting Oslo almost every year in the last four years. And only in November, with this lovely grey sky. Apart from the snow, it is actually the same as what we have right now in Yogyakarta, with the start of the rainy season.

From 2014 to 2017, Kristian and myself led a research project called “Politics of Citizenship in Indonesia.” It is a follow-up project, part of the big umbrella project we call “Power, Welfare and Democracy.” In this research project, we worked with seven great research teams, including Olle Törnquist, Luky Djani, and also Joash Tapiheru. The teams were working in seven different sectors of citizenship politics in Indonesia.

Now, where did we start? As I have mentioned, this is a follow-up from baseline survey. If I can put Olle’s nice presentation in a few words, the survey shows us very clearly that Indonesia now is arriving in what we call stagnated democracy. What we mean by a stagnated democracy is that, firstly, in terms of developing formal democracy, we are quite successful. Indonesia is probably among the few countries in the world that ratify all rules and regulations about human rights. We have hundreds of regulations on these things, but that’s all we have! We have these institutions, but when it comes to the real implementation of those rules and regulations, then you start to see the problem. So we have formal democracy, but at the same time, we still have a very strong oligarchy. They control everything. Most importantly, they are in the best position to benefit from this formal democracy. They can bend the rules and regulations. They can even behave like democrats. They are involved in the election, preaching as if they are democratic heroes. So you have formal democracy with a very strong oligarchy, and at the same time you
have a very weak pro-democracy movement, as have been explained nicely by Olle. You have strong democracy and a very weak pro-democracy movement. We have all these rules and regulation, and that’s all we have.

We think that what we need now is to open the way for more active citizens. We want to transform this stagnated democracy into a democracy based much more on popular representation. But to do that, we need to have a very active citizen. And when you start to talk about citizens, then we in Indonesia realise that we never think about citizenry. That is ironic, because the educational system of the old New Order government always emphasised the concept of citizenship. However, the way they taught us they wanted us to be a specific kind of citizen, based on their own interpretation. So “citizen” comes to us like something very formal, and we take it for granted. We never see it as a problem.

However, when we had these series of baseline surveys, beginning in early 2000, we realised that it was time for us to talk about citizenship. Based on the survey results, we did these subprojects. What we did was to set up a collection of studies that tried to examine the struggle for citizenship claims and rights in Indonesia. We tried to understand what peoples’ claims about their citizenship rights are, and we wanted to put it in a larger structural context, especially the historical development of democracy in Indonesia.

Then we had to choose the sectors, namely which citizenship movements we were going to study. There are a lot. If you look to everywhere, then you will find people struggling for citizenship claims. We had to make a decision, though. That decision was largely based on the resources that we have. We chose these sectors based on our previous works. Hence, we worked with sectors and activists we already knew, having already made a number of research on their activism.

We focus on five sectors. The first is the pro-democracy movement. As Olle mentioned before, he has been working with this kind of movement since around 1997. We cannot do study citizenship politics in Indonesia without looking into this movement. Thus, we focus on this sector, especially in their concern about popular representation, which they, in the last five years, tried to combine with welfare rights, with welfare provision.

The second sector is, we can say, emerging forces within popular based movements. One of them is domestic workers, which may be a very Indonesian phenomenon. We have millions of domestic workers, working in middle-class homes, including those of myself and most Indonesian delegates here. These groups of workers are becoming new forces, fighting for their
rights, mostly in the big cities in Java, but also in a few cities elsewhere. Another emerging movement is of course the urban poor.

The third sector covers environmental justice movements. Back in the early 1990s, this sector was a very important part of the pro-democracy movement. After the fall of Suharto, however, this movement became more specific. They only put concern on their issues, which are mostly about environmental degradation, rights to local customs, livelihood for the local communities, and so on. In this sector we worked on movements around palm oil plantations in West Kalimantan, and mining sectors in four different Regencies.

And then we have youth movements. When we selected these next two sectors, there was a big debate between us on whether we had to put as a part of these citizenship politics in Indonesia, because they do not really assemble political movements. The youth movement in Indonesia is blossoming. There are numerous youth-based mobilisations, especially in the big cities. We decided to study three specific groups from the youth sector: Young Chinese Muslims; waria, the transgendered; and tattooed Balinese men.

The final sector is probably the most intriguing one. We study what I here call post-fundamentalist Islamist groups. These are former members of Islamist groups, who made some changes in behaviour after doing their sentences, or after the war in Poso and Ambon. One of the most important changes was that they tried to look like democrats, like us. Hence, they are beginning to claim citizenship as well. They see themselves as a minority, and feel excluded by us, the majority. They have long beards and a specific kind of physical appearance, which automatically brings something to our mind that we have to be careful, that they might be planning some explosion. This leads to all kind of discrimination. People do not want them in their neighbourhoods. This kind of exclusion brings them to us, to study them as a kind of citizenship politics in Indonesia.

We started with three main research questions: What are the citizenship claims? What are strategies? And how are collective identities constructed and how are dominant identities challenged?

How to define citizenship? There are numerous different definitions, different experiences. So we just put it this way. *(shows visualisation)* When you talk about citizenship, then you have, first, two main dimensions. On the left hand side, it is about membership. There, you have legal-based membership, and control-based membership. On the right hand side, that is entitlement and responsibilities associated with membership. Which one comes first? I think it depends.
We start with this definition, but the most important thing is that we want to see it as political. It is not a matter of whether citizenship is there according to this definition. If we did it that way, then we go back to rules and regulations, back to this stagnation. What we are trying to do is to try to see this struggle to achieve citizenship. What kind of movements we can see in the field that struggle for citizenship rights.

By looking this way, there are three types of citizenship politics in Indonesia. The first one is citizenship politics based on struggles for cultural recognition. The second one is the struggle for welfare redistribution. And the third one is the struggle for popular representation. These are the three main citizenship politics dimensions we were looking for.

Firstly, citizenship politics in Indonesia is something produced and practiced through movements against injustice. It takes the form of struggles by people at the grassroots level and their middle-class representatives. They struggle for cultural recognition, welfare redistribution, and political representation. Secondly, all these struggles ended up engaging with the state through discursive and non-discursive processes. And finally, as Olle has emphasised, these struggles for citizenship are fragmented struggles. There is no big, unitary movement of citizenship in Indonesia. Rather, it is a sector-based movement with different kinds of claims. They all talk about the importance of recognition, but recognition in one sector is different from recognition in another sector. And they can end up contradicting each other.

Before we look at the current citizenship struggle in Indonesia, let us start with a brief history of citizenship politics in Indonesia. I tried to put three different stages of the historical development of citizenship politics in Indonesia. The first one relates to politics in the beginning of the 20th Century, when we began to have a modern independence movement. Nationalism emerged, as a struggle for a new Indonesian country. It was all about how to build a nation, about Indonesia. There is a lot of debate on what being Indonesian means. One the one hand, you have some dominant figures that believe we can have this kind of Indonesian ethnicity. These figures believe we can make a strict definition of what Indonesia is by combining people like me, from the east, with people like Purwo, from the west. On the other hand, you have more modernist figures that believed that Indonesia should be defined based on what we do now. We should define who we are based on modernisation and development. The most important thing is that this first stage laid out the foundation for us to talk about Indonesia. Up until the present, this first stage of citizenship politics becomes the basis of our national community.
The second stage of this historical development is the post-independence, strong communist movement that focused much of their attention on social justice. After independence, the debate about nation-building continued, but thanks to PKI – the Communist Party of Indonesia – we started to think about welfare redistribution. That is the main issue in the second stage of our history.

Finally, in the late 1990s, we started to have a struggle for citizenship which is largely based on pro-democracy movement asking for democratic institutions, popular representation, and so on.

What about the current state of citizenship politics? In general, if we look at the five sectors I mentioned, we can define them into two different kinds of citizenship movements. One focuses on welfare issues, the other on cultural recognition. Bear in mind, however, that this is not a very sharp division. Note that even though the welfare-based movement talk about the importance of welfare redistribution, they ended up believing that they needed some cultural recognition to achieve that. Take for example the domestic workers. Their main concern is their salary and the safety of their job. The problem is that they are never seen as workers. We sometimes call them our relatives. Calling them that means we can pay them tips. In that sense, to be able to have a good salary, first they have to make sure that they are workers. Hence, they get welfare through fighting their identity.

The same thing happened to the identity-based movements. Take for example the post-Islamist groups. As I mentioned before, they have this problem of discrimination, and they fight for being recognised as normal Indonesians. They want to do this because they just want to have access to decent jobs. Very often, they do it by getting access to state resources. Now, either based on welfare issues or cultural recognition issues, all movements pay similar attention to the importance of political representation. They see the best way to claim their citizen rights by being represented.

Very often, these movements have to involve themselves in a discursive battle. This concerns all the movements, not only when involved in conventional kinds of political movements, especially for the domestic workers, for the post-fundamentalist groups, but also for the youth movements. What they do is, rather than just bring up any kind of demands into the public, they struggle in a process much more cultural, in terms of how they appear in the public, and so on.

Now for our second finding. As I mentioned, when we talk about citizenship politics in Indonesia, we talk about fragmented struggles. The way citizenship is understood and practiced
differs across sectors, issues, and spaces. This is to be expected, because it is based on different experiences of oppression and exclusion. Now, more importantly, this fragmentation leads to a multiplication of the social. What I mean by multiplication of the social is that there is a plural collective base for the struggles. There is no singular, unified kind of historical agent. There is no shared class identity. The struggles could be based on ethnicity, on gender, on sexual orientation, on religiosity. Fragmentation itself is not the problem. It’s normal. But then you need some kind of collectivity. The question then becomes how to build a chain of solidarity between these different sectors.

In the current history of citizenship politics in Indonesia, we have tried to build this chain of solidarity among different sectors. We tried to do it around the emergence of Jokowi, first as a local Mayor in Solo, later as President in Jakarta. Then we tried to build this kind of solidarity for universal welfare schemes too. However, if you look at these two cases, nothing really happens. None of these efforts to develop a chain of solidarity succeeded in setting up a universal citizenship struggle.

If you look at citizenship politics in Indonesia, it largely mimics the pro-democracy movement. The fragmentation that I talked about is a fragmentation within the pro-democracy movement itself. The other thing you see is an elitist strategy adopted by these activists claiming citizenship rights. They have protest involving masses, but very often they just use these protests to increase their political leverage. As the next step, they will use mass protests to show people that they are leaders with a following, who have to be reckoned with.

Secondly, they engage with the state. This is very interesting. Around 1998-2001, we saw the state as the enemy. Everything bad came out of the state, so we avoided the state. Now, however, everyone tries to engage with the state, even though they do it by penetrating the state, rather than being represented in the state.
Kristian Stokke

Moving quickly from the subproject on citizenship within PWD to the one on welfare. These are in practice not completely separate themes. Welfare is a core issue that comes out of democracy assessment. It is central in the study of citizenship politics. But now we will hear more specifically about what Purwo described as welfare regimes, presented by Joash Tapiheru and Wawan Mas’udi.

Wawan Mas’udi

Thank you very much for having me and Joash here to present one of our subprojects in “Power, Welfare and Democracy,” namely welfare politics, or welfare regimes. In this research, we gathered inspiration from the survey on popular democracy that was already conducted by Olle and our colleagues at UGM. We realised that one most important issue when we discuss Indonesian democratic developments, is that it is insufficient to see it from the perspective of what we call a positivistic approach, or institutionalist approach, that is the belief that all that is needed is the setup of institutions and the process of elections taking place.

We realise that in understanding the current Indonesian democracy, first we need to elaborate the dynamics of social policies in Indonesia and how they have been shaping the Indonesian citizenry. In this regard, welfare distribution will be very important, to understand to what extend, democracy in Indonesia is deepened over time.

Secondly, it is very important, in our opinion, that nation-state building in the Indonesian context differs highly from its European counterpart. In Indonesia, local communities are stronger, and, as Eric already mentioned, local identity is also part of the political history. It is impossible to understand welfare politics in Indonesia without identifying the locus of welfare solidarity and, secondly, the interactions of those spaces of solidarity, especially at the local level. Why that is important I will explain later.

Another thing that we need to consider as well, regarding the liberal democracy already adopted in Indonesia: We found so many dislocations because of the practice of this particular democracy. We have elections and political parties, but although the elections run fairly well in terms of procedure, the process of elections is a different story. We do have plural political parties, even though communism is kind of not of acknowledged in Indonesia. However, when
we discuss political parties, we need to understand that all parties in Indonesia actually serve as political machineries of patrons, strongmen, and political patricians. That is why it is central to address the issue of welfare within the democratic framework if democracy is to thrive in Indonesia.

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<th>Framework: Locus of Solidarity</th>
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| **Community** | **Cultural/identity – based:**
Intimacy, voluntary and value-oriented, social sanction, social organisations (both religious and customary) as the main provider, individuals as member of community  

**Humanitarian:**

Humanity, voluntary & beyond state-border, trans-national communities & organisations as main provider, Individuals in vulnerable situation |

This is a framework that we tried to adopt in the study. We all know that in discussions about welfare regimes, at least in Indonesia people will always point to the European reference, with Espin-Andersen’s three modes of solidarity and three modes of welfare regimes: Either state-based, market-based or communally based. Also, when we discuss welfare in an Asian economy, we use to refer to what we call the Asian productivity-based and protective welfare regime. In this research we started with *(inaudaible)* in that sense, but then we also tried to get deeper into whether the locus of solidarity in the study that we did was linked with these kinds of solidarity.

We conducted in-depth case studies for welfare politics in seven areas of Indonesia. The selection of the areas is actually not based on the region, but on the dominant mode of welfare
politics in the region. For example, we have one study in the West of Kalimantan, wherein the communal-based welfarism is quite strong. There is an organisation with a long history of what we call a credit union. Emerging around the 1970s and 80s, this credit union system was set up by the community in order to fill in the gap of the national government not feeling their responsibility to the community.

We have two cases from Java, selected in order to understand the importance of what we call religious-based welfarism. The religious community in Indonesia is considered very strong, not only in terms of number, but also by managing the welfare process, which they have done for a long time. Take for example Muhammadiyah, one of the biggest modern Islamic institutions in Indonesia. For a long period of time, the Muhammadiyah set up education and health institutions, providing welfare for the community. Religious-based welfare is very important. Not only Islamic organisations, but the Catholic Church as well. The Church plays a very important role in North Sumatra, for example.

We also have one study in Bojonegoro in Java, wherein new resources are supporting this district. Because of its oil industry, Bojonegoro is one of the richest regions in Indonesia at the moment. The area now produces 20-25% of Indonesia’s oil, which provides a lot of income for the local government.

We also look at two very specific cases regarding post-crisis society, namely Merapi in Yogyakarta and Sinabung in North Sumatra. In these two areas, there have been volcanic eruptions. We observe at what extent the community redeveloped welfare in the area, whether state- or community-based.

We are actually finished with the first book based on this in-depth study. The first edition will come out in two or three weeks, edited by Cornelis Lay and myself. In this book, we draw up four conclusions about welfare regimes or welfare politics in Indonesia. The first: From our local case studies, we found that it is impossible to define a single Indonesian welfare regime. Perhaps one could talk about a Scandinavian, Italian, or Korean welfare regime; but in Indonesia the welfare regime has a different meaning in every community. We found that the diverse local power structures and the capacity of institutions at the local level shape local welfare politics. That is why, in this study, we tried to avoid talking about the so-called “welfare state,” because welfare is not necessarily provided by the state. It could also come from the community or from religious organisations.
This relates to the second conclusion, about the role of the state. With the emergence of populism and the new emphasis on the health sector, as Olle mentioned, the state is seen as an important source of welfare, but its role is not necessarily dominant. Why is it so? Let me give one illustration. In one area that we studied, the (inaudible) District, which is not too far away from UGM, welfare is really state-based. What I mean by state-based is that the local government tries to develop new welfare schemes. In doing so, however, the local government in fact cannot need to talk with the community, they need to use CSR (corporate social responsibility), and other sources, including the Zakat. Zakat is the traditional Islamic institution of charity, and the government depend on such sources as well. As we see, while the state is very important in many areas, it is not always dominant. This is really explicit in the post-crisis cases, wherein the state tries to come in with its full capacity, but the implementation of the process depends on the community capacity as well.

The third conclusion we find from this study – Joash will return to this point later on – is that the two main generators of welfare are vulnerability because of crises and politicians seeking legitimacy. Welfare could be developed from crises such as the economic crisis in the 1990s or natural disasters; or from politicians seeking a more popular base of legitimacy, as Eric already mentioned. It is not an output of citizenship development, as we discuss in Europe in the Marshall literature or even Esping-Andersen. In terms of policy, the welfare is accessed; in terms of resources, the welfare is developed; but legitimacy is the motivation behind that. It is not necessarily linked with what we call the citizenship development, something that we can perhaps discuss later on.

The fourth thing I mean to emphasise is that welfare development links closely with democratisation. I think this is very important when we discuss democratisation. At the moment, there is a demand for more effective democratic governance, by which I mean the capacity of the government in providing what the people needs. In this work, we witnessed that the local populists or popular leaders in Indonesia try to develop their legitimacy based on programmatic policies. Promises to give people welfare is a widespread phenomenon at the moment. Jokowi, who has already been mentioned, is part of that. In Solo, when he was Mayor, what he did was very simple: He just provided the thing that never existed in the city, that is, subsidies for health services and education. From a total budget of around one billion rupiah, Jokowi spent no more than 20 million on these programs. It is a very small amount of money, but nothing like it existed before. So that is why such politics are very important sources for creating legitimacy.
This, as I already mentioned, we drew from the local studies, while at the same time we did a national study on the history of the welfare system. Joash will continue with the national level. The time is yours, Joash.

Joash Tapiheru

Thank you. The part that I did for this research is more on the theoretical framework. You could say the scope is national because the things I elaborate in this research are easier to identify on the national level. As mentioned by Wawan, and previously Eric, we start with the presupposition that we do not have a single fully closed structure. Instead, we have multiple structures, which are each never fully closed. In all these dynamics, each of those single structures is struggling to achieve a hegemonic position, in order to stabilise this rather contingent, fluid situation.

From the cases at the national level, we found that this struggle had its roots early in the colonial era, when the Dutch colonial administration tried to organise what we now call Indonesia as one single political-administrative entity. Before the advent of Dutch colonialism, there were nine kingdoms warring each other, kidnapping each other’s people, selling them into slavery. That was the situation that we had before colonialism. Then the Dutch colonial power came to Indonesia and tried to organise them into a single political-administrative entity, which they tried to do within the narrative of industrialisation. They came with a policy called Ethical Politics. The grand narrative in this Ethical Politics is making the Dutch East Indies part of the global market. In doing so, they need a certain kind of subject. And in order to constitute this particular kind of subject, they come with various policies, which connect to each other. Politically docile, technically skilful, to maintain Rust en orde – order, like Kristian mentioned at the start of this session. Order for the sake of economic development and industrialisation. By the end of the late 19th Century, we have a growing industry in Indonesia.

Then this narrative changed slightly with the independence of Indonesia in 1955. A Keynesian model is introduced, and nationalism becomes one of the main elements in the grand narrative. Still, however, economic development and industrialisation were the main imagery of ideal society in Indonesia. Of course, we also have additional elements here: An affluent and harmonious society. In this case, I don’t any see any big difference between Sukarno’s Guided Democracy and Suharto’s New Order. Both regimes place the state as the main authority on how to conduct all these projects. The main difference was only the magnitude of foreign capital investment for the achievement of this goal. In term of goals, I don’t see any difference between
them. With this goal, they had their own social policies, as part of the project constituting the certain kind of subject that they needed to achieve this project.

In post-1998 Indonesia, the Keynesian model was happily criticised. The state was criticised for its heavy involvement and intervention in the market. Under pressure from the IMF and World Bank, the Indonesian government signed structural adjustment programs where the state reduced the subsidies and its intervention in many public sectors. The social policy of welfare distribution does not necessarily disappear at this time, but it comes as elements of a different narrative. We talk about the beneficiaries who receive this kind of welfare distribution, we come with different labels attached upon them: “The poor” and “the destitute,” instead of citizens. So in this social policy, you have social stratification. The beneficiaries are part of a social layer, a social class of its own. It is below the social pyramid, so to speak. The practice of receiving social benefits define who they are, how they relate to the other social agents. Because they receive these social benefits, they are defined as poor and destitute.

In all of these situations, this state structure is never fully closed. We still have social, religious-based, or ethnically based structures, with their own social policies, or their own structures of welfare distribution. They all connect to each other, shape each other, still struggling for hegemony on the issue of welfare.

These are the reflections of this research: First, methodologically, the study of welfare regimes needs more explorative approaches, rather than starting with certain theoretical assumptions, which lead to verification of existing perspectives. Second, sub-national or local case studies would enrich our understanding about pluralistic welfare schemes in the context where the national state is still struggling to deepen its grip in the society. Third, scholars need to explore the perspective of welfare development in the context other than capitalist economy – which, as a structure, is never fully closed either – or the emerging democracies and economies of East Asia, with their productivist and protective welfare. Fourth, the development of welfare regimes is deep-rooted in emerging democracies like Indonesia. The PWD survey revealed that Indonesia has entered a new phase which has gone beyond electoral democracy, as citizens demand for more welfare provision.

So, if democracy is to thrive in Indonesia, it cannot copy the liberal movement by making the state with the smallest possible role in welfare provision. In contrast, if we want democracy to thrive in Indonesia, the state has to address this issue in whatever ways.
Thomas Mung Dan: Human Rights Situation in Kachin and Northern Shan State

Kristian Stokke

We are now going to go quickly, without interruption, from the politics of welfare and redistribution in Indonesia to questions of fundamental civil and political freedoms in Myanmar. The first presentation is by Thomas Mung Dan, who is at the Human Rights and Legal Aid Centre within the Humanity Institute in Myitkyina in Kachin State. For those of you who are less familiar with Myanmar, I should just add that Kachin is the northernmost state, where after 17 years of ceasefire, from 1994 to 2011, there was a resumption of armed hostilities, beginning as a quite aggressive military campaign that is still going in. So Kachin State was a state that experienced a return to hostilities exactly at the time when we were talking about a democratic opening and ceasefire agreements in the rest of the country. Thank you for coming, Mung Dan, and I look forward to listening to you.

Thomas Mung Dan

Thank you. I will be brief. I am not an academic, so my points will be quite straight. Further analysis will be up to you. So, just as Kristian introduced me, my name is Mung Dan and my organisation is the Humanity Institute, based in Myitkyina. We have a couple of programs, both providing education and engaging in research programs, especially on legal and political reform in Kachin and Northern Shan State. That is where we are active so far. So today, my presentation will be a bit descriptive, and then I will talk about a few things, just to give you a more general idea on the human rights situation in Kachin and Northern Shan State.

First, some general background. The armed conflict is the root cause of human rights violations, so I will briefly describe that. As Kristian said, we had 17 years of ceasefire before armed conflict resumed in June 2011. We are still finding ways to end this conflict. In Kachin and Northern Shan State, we have six parties to the conflict. There is the Tamadaw, the army; and five ethnic armed organisations.

Because of the conflict, we currently have about 200,000 IDPs in Kachin and Northern Shan State. Those people left their homes, and now they are staying at camps. A few families got resettled. That means they can go back to their homes, or some would be sent somewhere else, not to their homes.
Just to give you some idea of what happened. Most of the time, the situation in Northern Rakhine State was well reported in international communities, but the situation in Kachin and Northern Shan State is quite underreported. But the scale and the intensity of human rights violations would be quite the same, we feel like that, so just to give you some idea, this is a church, a school, and also some residential buildings that have been destroyed. And this is the situation of the IDP students, who are studying in makeshift camps.

Just to give you some idea, because we have been in conflict for over six years. This shows you just one specific area: The conflict between the Army and the Northern Alliance. This is in Munggu Township in Northern Shan State. During 30 days of fighting – sporadic fighting, not the whole month – we had over 16,000 IDPs, who fled to China and became IDPs. A couple of people got tortured and killed, and over 100 people were kept by the military and used as human shields. And then churches and other buildings were destroyed, and even some citizens who spoke to journalists and news agencies got arrested and sentenced to prison. 20,000 people were victims of the conflict, and they also suffered human rights violations. That gives you just one specific case of human rights violations as well as a humanitarian situation.

Beside the fighting, we have other human rights violations that are associated with mining, natural resource extraction, and other investment activities in Kachin and Northern Shan State. For example, in the electricity sector, we have problems with coal power plants and hydropower plants that cause mass displacement. There is also land confiscation and other issues with investments.

There is a recent call for the international community to address the human rights and humanitarian situation in Northern Rakhine State. There Human Rights Council passed a resolution, and a fact-finding mission was formed with a mandate and scope that they can investigate what type of human rights violations occurred. That would be mass killings, excessive use of force, etc. These would be the types of human rights violations they would cover in their investigation. They are human rights violations committed by military and security forces since June 2011. The mandate would be to have direct engagement with the victims. Likewise, my own organisation has collected and categorised human rights violations that fit under the scope and mandate of the fact-finding mission. We have found almost 500 victims of human rights violations. According to the mandate, those people have to meet with the fact-finding mission. But we have a practical issue: So far, the fact-finding mission has not been allowed to enter into the country. For Rohingya people in Bangladesh, the
fact-finding mission can visit at any time they want to. The Bangladeshi government is open to that. So they can collect all the testimonies, and they can really meet with the victims. But to talk with victims of human rights violations in Kachin and Northern Shan State, we cannot go to Bangladesh. It is a long way. The easiest place for us would be China, but it is not possible for victims to come to China and meet with the fact-finding mission. This is one of the scenarios that show why it is hard for us to get to know about the exact situation for township communities as well as to address the issues.

The State Counsellor, however, always sticks to the issue that all of these crises are due to the lack of the rule of law. So here are my four points about the rule of law, and some of the concepts that we have concerns about. The purpose of rule of law is to deliver justice. But what is justice for people in Kachin? We have been living so long under the military regime, and then we have no proper legal system set up in our part of the country. We have been more accustomed to our own Kachin customary laws. So I just want to have a glance at Kachin customary law. This is something that might be quite new for you. This is the law of the land from before the British colony. During the British colonial time, a couple of laws were introduced, including the Kachin hilltribes regulations. In those, civil and criminal jurisprudence is totally stated as the Kachin customary law. That means all criminal and civil cases can be dealt with Kachin customary law. After independence, we have had three constitutions, and up until the present there is no constitutional recognition of Kachin customary law. But up to now, 70% of civil and criminal cases are dealt with in Kachin customary law. So whatever you mention – homicide, traffic accidents, or whatever – they deal with Kachin customary law. That is the precedence. There is still the case precedence that was used during British colonial times. Now, there is still discussion on whether customary laws are favourable to human rights or not. The fact is that state agencies and a lot of people use customary law to avoid the formal legal system, to avoid punishment. And then maybe there would be times when they use this as a tool to commit other human rights violations. This is the issue I think we have to overcome.

So this is an initial assessment of how Kachin understands justice and the rule of law approach, and then we have some conflicts in the understanding of rule of law. Kachin customary law is based on the kinship system. We have a clan and kinship system. We do not have a concept of state. There would be more the individual and the community. You commit a crime, and then you are responsible for that. The main thing would be to bring social harmony back in the society, in the community. It is a customary law with a combination of restorative, retributive, and distributive all included.
So they are more accustomed to the concept of customary law. And it’s quite easy for police in a modern legal system. Let me give an example. One person in the family is arrested for some alleged crime. In a modern legal system, he or she alone would be responsible for that. But in our sense of community, parents are responsible, in the customary sense. And then relatives and brothers are sisters are also responsible. This concept is abused to extort money from the family. So if you want a reduced sentence, laid off sentence for the crime for the charges, then corruption and bribery may happen.

In Myanmar, when we talk about human rights violations, justice, and the rule of law, then we need to have more research and understanding of different ethnic communities, their concepts of justice and their concepts of legal system in civil society. I will conclude here. I just want to raise some different topics, just to have more understanding on Myanmar, and then I would welcome any questions later.

I want to conclude with this: “Peace requires justice and respect for human rights.” Pope Francis said that in Myanmar yesterday. I would just refer to it. Thank you.
Zayar Hlaing: The Politics of Media Reforms and Freedoms in Myanmar

Kristian Stokke

Another core human rights issue in Myanmar at the moment is about freedom of speech and media regulation. To guide us into this set of issues, we have the good help of Zayar Hlaing, founder and editor of *Mawkun Magazine*.

**Zayar Hlaing**

Thank you. I would like to speak a bit about media freedom processes in Myanmar. I am the editor and founder of the *Mawkun*, an investigative magazine. It was established very recently, four days after press censorship was abolished in our country, after over half a century.

I would like to give you a bit of a brief history of press freedom in Myanmar. Myanmar gained independence from British colonialism in 1948. From then, there was a quite free media sector under a parliamentary democratic system. But in 1962, there was a military coup. After that, the military banned everything. They set up media censorship, monopolised by the military junta. Since then, the media lost their freedom. We have had two military regimes. One regime was from 1962 to 1988, another from 1992 to 2011. Under the second-generation military era, the 2008 Constitution said, in paragraph 354(a), that citizens have the right “to express and publish freely their convictions and opinions.” But I will speak a bit about hinders to press freedom according to the law.

After the reform process began in 2011, media associations could be founded. Under the military junta, no association could be founded without the knowledge of the military junta. Under the new democratic government, media associations have been formed, such as the Myanmar Journalist Association, the Myanmar Journalist Network, and the Myanmar Journalist Union. I am the general secretary of the Myanmar Journalist Network, which is the second largest journalist association in Myanmar.

In August 2012, press censorship was abolished. My magazine came out four days after that. And in 2013, private dailies were allowed. Before, there was only private weeklies. In 2013, in April, private dailies came out. And in 2015, according to the media law, Myanmar Press Council was formed. I am also a councillor of the Press Council. I have several hats: I’m a publisher, I’m a journalist, I’m a member of MJN also, and a councillor of the Press Council. And at the same time I train journalists in training.
In 2017, very recently, five private television channels were allowed. Before, only the government, the military, and some cronies were granted television channels.

*(changes slides)* These are laws related with the media, in brief. This is a very old law that was enacted by the British colony: The Burma Wireless Telegraph Act of 1933. The British colony ruled Myanmar for 100 years, but there was only one law regarding media freedom. In 1962, right after the General Ne Win coup, the Printers and Publishers Registration Law was enacted. It says that without any prior censorship by the government, there will be punishment.

In 1988, the student-led uprising happened. After the military coup, the second generation of military leaders issued the Martial Law Order in 1989. It banned the publication of any document without prior registration without prior registration from the Home and Religious Affairs Ministry. In the 1988 uprising, most publications were hand-made, so the military regime tried to stop that kind of publications.

In 1995, the Television and Video Act was enacted by the military regime. The Motion Picture Law of 1996 was also concerned with media freedom. And in 2004, the Electronic Transactions Law. This is a very notorious law in Myanmar, and it also impacted the political movement. Because it said that if you violated that law it is 15 years in prison. Under this law, dozens of political activists were arrested and given sentences of 90 or 120 years. However, they were released by the Thein Sein government, and now some of them are in Parliament.

This law was amended in 2013: The revised Telecommunication Law. In 2012, Telecommunications Law 66D, concerned with media freedom … Also, in 2014, the Printer and Publisher Law and News Media Law came out. This law is different from the 1962 Printer and Publisher Law. This is a new one. In 2016, the Brokers Law was enacted. That is why, this year, five new channels were allowed by the government.

Now we are working on the Right to Information Law. We are debating this law with MPs, the government, and media people. We have very different views on that law.

Now, some laws regarding media freedoms. The Unlawful Association Law was enacted by the British colony, it remains in use under the new, elected government. Three journalists were arrested, in June, I think, because they reported from the ethnic armed group area. At the time they tried to cover the opinion in the ethnic area of Northern Shan State. When they came back from that ethnic area, the military stopped and arrested them with that law. They spent nine weeks and jail, and then they were released. This is also hindering press freedom.
The State Secrecy Act is also quite funny. It is very dangerous for Myanmar journalists. Five journalists from the Unity weekly paper were jailed in 2014.

Contempt of court is also a major concern. When we report certain cases or some opinions, it might link with contempt of court, or with defamation. As I said earlier, the Telecommunication Law 66D is also linked with defamation. If you write about a story, and it is found to defame any person or any group, you may be jailed for at least three months to three years. It is criminal, so the police can arrest you immediately after a case is filed. This is a very notorious law, and I will explain how many cases I know are linked with this law later.

Then, the media manual for court reporting. From the judiciary system, the Chief Justice tried to push back reporters and journalists from the court. These are rules and regulations that journalists follow. It was very silently released.

(shows images) These show journalists being arrested under Telecommunication Law 66D. 11 media CEOs and one Chief Editor. He wrote opinion pieces regarding the Regional Chief Minister from the NLD party, shortly after it entered government. After that, the Chief Minister filed a case under 66D, so the Chief Editor and CEO were arrested. As was the Chief Editor of The Voice daily, and one of the satire writers. They wrote satire regarding the military. The military have their annual video and films, so the satirist wrote about those films, quite funnily, and after that was charged under 66D.

These are two journalists from DVB and one from Irrawaddy. These three came back from the ethnic area, and were arrested under the Unlawful Association Law.

So, what is 66D? In November this year, there were five cases with 66D. Under the previous, quasi-civilian government, there were only 11 cases. The rest of the 105 cases happened under the new, elected government. Seven cases were Military, seven cases were the NLD party, and ten cases were related to the State Counsellor, Aung San Suu Kyi. A couple of months ago, that law was amended by Parliament, so they reduced the three-year sentence to a two-year sentence, maximum. It is slightly reduced. And it is no longer possible to file a case on behalf of a third person. So it has changed a bit.

(shows image) So this is a very funny case among the later cases. The 1934 Burma Aircraft Act. Three journalists and their driver are now in jail, because they tried to take pictures of the Parliament building by drone. When they tried to set up a drone, the police saw it and stopped them. One of the journalists is from Singapore, one is from Malaysia, and one is from Myanmar.
They are working for Turkish media. They, and their driver, were arrested. We do not think about that law as linked with media freedom, so now the tactics are changing. More journalists are trying to take pictures by drone, and the Aircraft Act is becoming relevant for media freedom.

Media education is also part of political reform. Before the political transition, we could not have any discussions or training regarding journalism in the country. After the political reforms, however, we can set up training. There is also a government-initiated journalism department at the National Management Degree College. Earlier, we did not have journalism subjects in college and universities. Now, we can take a bachelor’s degree in the university.

The Myanmar Journalism Institute is the only independent media education institution, and also the biggest one in the country. There is also the Myanmar Institute of Theology. They are teaching Christian theology along with subjects like social sciences and political science, but three years ago they also added journalism as a course. There are also media education NGOs, like the Yangon Journalism School, Internews, and Center for Myanmar Media Development journalism school. These are funded by international organisations such as USAID, NED, OSF, IMS, FOJO, and SIDA.

Media reform is part of political reform. *(shows images)* These are the military guys. They tried to meet with the Press Council. I’m there. They discussed press freedom in the role of the military. They said that they are trying to understand the media. After they understand, trust will be built again. We, however, feel that they are just using the knowledge, and that actually they are threatening us.

*(shows image)* This is an international media conference, led by the EU, and also UNESCO, and the Ministry of Information. We invited international experts. Before, there were no discussions regarding the media. *(shows image)* This is a media development conference. Six media conferences have been held. This is what we call the Four Pillar Meeting. The Press Council organised it with the executive, along with the judiciary, Parliament, and media people. We sat down together and discussed media freedom. These are the sorts of developments that we have seen after the political reforms.

There is no government censorship, but there is other censorship. Media owners are very important in this regard. Most of the media is owned by cronies, related to military leaders. There is also government- and military-owned media. And there is public censorship. It is quite obvious. If you write sensitive words, or a sensitive story, your media will be in trouble. Just
like the man this morning who asked why you didn’t use the word “Rohingya.” It is quite sensitive. But in my magazine we use both terms. The government says they are Bengali, and the UN say they are Muslims from Rakhine State. So we put it together.

Other types of censorship include belief censorship, linked with religions; cultural censorship; and business censorship. There are some stories that the business owners do not want disclosed. Then there is law censorship, as I already explained to you. Threats and warnings from illegal businessmen. A couple of journalists were killed by some illegal loggers last year. And also government officials and Tatmadaw, the military. We, as journalists, need to meet with ethnic armed groups and their officers. So when we meet with the leaders of ethnic armed groups, we cannot use terms like “general of the KNU” or “general from the Shan State Army.” Such terms are used only for the Tatmadaw, according to the Constitution. If you do not follow that, there will be some punishment, but we don’t know clearly what sort of punishment will be on us.

(shows facsimiles) This is an advertisement for my magazine. We cover opium cultivation, China-Myanmar pipelines, the Rakhine issue … Our reporter went to the IDP camps in Rakhine State. This is the Muslim community. Those sort of pictures are quite sensitive to publish.

In 2011, Myanmar’s Press Freedom Index ranking was 169. Now it is 131. Higher than before. Burma now has 14 daily papers, including private, political party, government, and military papers. Weekly papers number around 250, and monthly magazines around 200. There are around 64 news agencies, including internationally funded agencies running in the country. The biggest one is Chinese.

Key challenges for media: Access to information. The military stops journalists. In the Rakhine issue, I sent my reporters to an area where there has been conflict. On the way, military officers stopped two of my journalists. They said it was in terms of security, so they stopped them.

Next the narrow channel for the ethnic media. We have a big ethnic conflict around the country, but we have very few channels for ethnic media. There is also the ownership issue, which I already mentioned. Monopolisation by government media, in terms of market, in terms of access to information. During very important events, like when the State Counsellor met with the Chinese Ambassador, only government and military media can access that information. The rest of the media is banned by government officials.

Fake news is also very challenging for our new emerging media freedom. We cover some true issues like the Rakhine issue, then there are some groups creating fake news and spreading them
around the social media. After that, the public cried for the military to clamp down on the journalists.

Business survival is also important. Private media can be quite small, while government media monopolise everything. Capacity building is also a challenge for Myanmar media and Myanmar journalists.

Thank you.

Kristian Stokke

Thank you. I think it is Nick Cheesman who has written a book called *Opposing the Rule of Law*, where he makes an important distinction between rule *by* law and rule *of* law. I think what we have seen here is quite an example of rule by law in the media sector.
Discussion

Discussants: Fredrik Engelstad and Nwe Nwe Aye

Kristian Stokke

We have two appointed discussants. I will invite, first, Professor Fredrik Engelstad, who is a sociology professor at the University of Oslo, and who has been involved in the PWD welfare regime project and also in a related project on comparisons between Scandinavia and India. He is also a colleague of me in the same department.

Fredrik Engelstad

Thank you so much for inviting me here. My contact with South Asia and Southeast Asia has been rudimentary, I have to say, but it has been very interesting to me. One of the things that I have learned from it has to do with the relationship between democracy and welfare regimes and welfare policies. As a social democrat from Scandinavia, I am committed to democracy, and actually I had not thought that much about welfare state policies before coming to Asia. But it became clear to me that welfare development may be the foremost source of development in politics as well. On the other hand, it is very important to see that welfare policies and democracy are not the same thing. You may have comprehensive welfare policies without any democracy. Of course, as we know, Bismarck was the one who introduced the active welfare policy in order to keep democratic forces out of politics. We see the same thing in other parts of the world today – in China, for instance, where welfare policies are much more developed than they are in India, which is a democracy. So it is important here to see that there is no necessary link between democracy and welfare policy. At the same time, I still believe that there is a potentially very important link here between these two.

One of the points of departure of the presentations has been that Indonesia has a stagnant democracy. I think that is an interesting thesis. Somehow, it is easy to not quite go into the realities of that thesis. On the one hand, as far as I can see, like India, Indonesia has a well-functioning democracy on the surface. Elections are held, and they are relatively free and fair, so that is not the problem. The problem is that of expanding democracy into the community, into society. How can this be done? There is no clear answer to this. I believe that the charming idea of social movements repairing or widening democracy is an illusion. I, at least, don’t believe in it. Not because I don’t believe in social movements. They are, of course, important – but they are one-issue movements. What they may achieve is simply to establish their field of
policy within the general political field, and not much more. The other side of this, which also
was mentioned, is that these movements are fragmented. Of course they are! It is their nature
to be fragmented. So they will not, in the long run, constitute a political party. If we want to
change the functioning of politics concerning representation, these problems have to be solved
within politics, not by social movements. Therefore, it is important to see the difference
between what is called high politics on the national level, and these more one-issue political
movements. This is one point that I want to make.

Another has to do with elites. I have been studying elites for quite a few years, and one of the
basic ideas in the thinking about elites is that elite compromises are a precondition for the
development of democracy. It is not that elite compromises create democracy, but they are a
precondition. The reason for that is simply that when elites go into coalitions, or into some sort
of pact, they set up the rules of the game. These rules of the game may of course deteriorate,
but they may also be developed further on, into democracy. Democracy very often starts this
way, with elites come together and seeing their common interest in setting up some rules of
behaviour between them. The important thing here is that elites are and will remain the
powerholders. Even if they are killed, they will not disappear, because new people will assume
exactly the same power. Hence, you have to somehow engage with the elites in order to develop
democracy. And I think that in order to engage with the elites, you have to talk their language.
If you don’t do that to some extent, they are not willing to talk.

I believe that the first thing you can do with elites is to warn against what I would call the trap
of populism. Populism is a threat to the long-term interests of elites. Not a threat to specific
people or groups, but if you take the elites in a society as a whole, populism is exactly what
they do not want. Making that clear is one of the important things, I think, in order to develop
democracy. Another thing has to do with pointing to productivity, that democracy and
productivity to a large extent are linked together. So why not buy that package? Moreover,
democracy is a precondition for long-term social and economic development. I also believe that
if you have a constellation of different elites, they have to talk together. Elites talking across
sectors is, in many ways, a good thing for democracy. I do not think this is as authoritarian as
it may sound. It has to do with what kind of counterweighing powers do exist alongside elites.
These counterweighing powers will, of course, be found in the population.

So how does one engage the population through welfare provisions in order to strengthen the
counterweighing power? I believe that the system of rights sketched by T. H. Marshall – civil,
political, and social rights – is a good starting point. Focusing on social rights, I believe the
most important social rights in Marshall’s conception are those of education and healthcare. In a society like the Indonesian, health is to a large extent taken care of by decentralised forces: Voluntary associations, or different civil society actors. In the short run at least, thus means that health care is not so salient to democratization. This is not because health is not important. It is very important, also as a democratic asset. It is linked to the body of every single person. Whereas education, on the other hand, is a precondition for a general talk in society, general communication. At present, that makes it more potent as a port into democratisation that I don’t think health is. Thirdly, Marshall did not talk about rights in working life, but that is also a very important aspect of democratization.

How, then, to engage with the state? An interesting contribution here is that of Bo Rothstein, on the abolition of corruption in Sweden. What he points to is the combined effect of professionalisation of the bureaucracy, of professionalisation of the media, and establishing relationship to the social movements. These three things may then also make the state into a more democratic, a more powerful actor in democratisation. Thank you.

Kristian Stokke

Thank you, Fredrik. And then Nwe Nwe Aye, who is a media scholar and a board member of the Yangon Centre for Independent Research.

Nwe Nwe Aye

Thank you, Kristian. My observations will be brief. I am one of the board members of the Yangon Centre for Independent Research, which is a very newly established initiative with our likeminded people. I will mainly be talking about Myanmar issues that have been raised by our colleagues.

As our colleague who is working on the media has already mentioned, we have deficiencies in three major forces of the media environment, which are the effective public sector, the dynamic private sector, and the engaged society. And in this regard, when we talk about media development in Myanmar, it cannot be successful just to provide technical approaches, assistance, and remedies. What is more important is that because politics matter, we who desire the development of the media in our country, and the donors, have to consider the political support in a wide range of sectors, including the public sector. We have to see the public sector as a vital partner in helping to effect change in media development.
As you noted, the government is now rushing too much on enacting the anti-hate-speech law, because of the Rakhine issue, and from both sides there is widespread hate speech on social platforms. That is why the government wants to control such kinds of hate speech, but on the other hand this will affect freedom of expression. The definition of hate speech is very broad, and it will add to the list of laws that have been misused by the various authorities and individuals. We have more than 500 laws that can be misused. As Kristian has mentioned, there is not a rule of law, but rule by law. The laws are applied depending on the individuals. So there are a lot of stakeholders misusing the laws. The authorities themselves, the government and the military, may be misusing the laws. As are influential businessmen, who misuse the laws to jeopardize media freedom.

These are the challenges. At the same time, this can be an opportunity to help improve the situations of the three pillars; public sector, private sector, and society itself. That is my observation. Thank you very much.
Politics of Resource Extraction and Sustainable Development

Chair: Desmond McNeill

Desmond McNeill: Introduction

I will be chairing the final session today. I have been involved in the REDD program, which I will briefly introduce for those of you who do not know what it is. REDD stands for “Reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation.” It is a massive program to try and combat climate change by paying people lots of money. Norway has been a huge supporter in financial terms, in fact accounting for about half the total amount of money spent, committing themselves to half a billion dollars, largely to Indonesia. This is why it is an interesting topic for us. When I say “us,” in fact, it is primarily the Department of Anthropology on the University of Oslo and the Department of Anthropology at Gadjah Mada. Agder has also been involved. In (inaudible) it was a separate program, a much smaller, more modest program; and it lasted just five years, in contrast to this massive program. We were also supported by the Norwegian Embassy. For administrative purposes they found it convenient to put us together in this program, but we found it actually quite constructive and useful to be part of it, and we are happy to have the opportunity here to present at least the first two presentations this afternoon will be about REDD. And then we move on to others, which have more to do with Kristian and Olle’s project. First out is Pujo Semedi from Gadjah Mada.
Pujo Semedi Hargo Yuwono: Betting on the Weak Horse – Local Elite and REDD+ in West Kalimantan

Thank you, Desmond. And thank you for having me in this meeting. My presentation is titled “Betting on the Weak Horse” and deals with the REDD+ Program in Kapuas Hulu District of West Kalimantan. Why do I discuss this particular district? The reason is, first, because the REDD program got the full support of the local government. Back in 2003, they declared the district as a conservation district. The second reason is the participation of the traditional local elite in the implementation of the program at the local village level. For these reasons, if the REDD program in Indonesia is to gain a high rate of success, Kapuas Hulu District is their best chance. Seven years into the program, however, REDD has hardly reached any of its goals of reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation. Forest degradation is still there, deforestation is still there, and REDD is not there.

REDD is implemented through a neoliberal approach of involving civil society institutions, rather than government bureaucracy or market networks. Through national level NGOs, the program establishes elite level instead of community empowerment. In Upper Kapuas, farmers are willing to engage in the REDD program to protect the forest. However, farmers’ participation has not been supported by sufficient funding. From 28.5 million euro of grants from the German government, only around 80,000 euro went directly to the farmers’ association in Upper Kapuas. The capital is not for the farmers, but for small skilled enterprises and production activity, such as rubber planting, rice, and handicraft. These things technically have little relevance for REDD. Giving money to farmers to start a small-scale business has nothing to do with REDD.

Also, the district government receives almost no benefits from REDD funds. Back in 2003, when the district declared Upper Kapuas as a conservation district, they were convinced that the district would receive sufficient funds for environmental services to finance part of the district’s annual budget. Years passed by, and the district government received no payments. Realising that REDD fails to bring money to the district government, the district head changed his environmental policy. They opened Upper Kapuas for palm oil and mining companies. In 2003, there was ran 8300 hectares of palm oil fields in the district. In the next three subsequent years, the number were stagnant at that level. But after 2007, the size of plant oil production steadily increased. By 2016, it reached 86,000 hectares in Upper Kapuas. The numbers are still
increasing. The fields come from conversion of forest area into the so-called “land for other types of use.”

At the village level, in 2008, some farmers sent a request to the district head, asking permission to open their area for palm oil cultivation. In effect, this split the community into pro and against REDD. Why did this happen? First, because REDD funds are spent mostly at the national level, on managerial courses, training, monitoring, capacity building, on so on. Only a little of the money is spent in the villages where real REDD work is taking place. Without enough support or funding, real REDD activities become very weak. They lack the power to do their job. Secondly, the size of REDD funds is very small. In order to make REDD really work, it must provide at least zero opportunity costs for farmers and local governments to convert forest areas for palm oil fields and mining areas. For your information, palm oil cultivation in Upper Kapuas in 2016 brought just roughly 1.5 trillion Indonesian rupiah of revenue every year, which is 300 billion rupiah bigger than the annual district budget. 1.5 trillion rupiah is around 1.5 billion US dollars – a lot of money. So if the REDD program would like to have success in Upper Kapuas, it has to be supported at least by that size of money. Otherwise, the local governments and farmers will go to palm oil, because it is more productive. So the REDD program is based on the assumption that somebody is willing to pay the bill through carbon-trading schemes or something else. And the annual cost of the REDD program all over the world is around 10 to 30 billion US dollars per year. So far, the assumption has proven to be unrealistic. No one is willing to provide the funds. Dozens of academic articles on REDD, are based on the assumption that there is money, but the money is actually not there.

Just last week, *The Economist* conveyed a sombre picture. I will read it:

> Developing countries would be understandably loth to bankroll any of this to tackle cumulative emissions, most of which come from the rich world. The latter would doubtless recoil at footing the bill, preferring to concentrate on curbing current emissions in the mistaken belief that once these reach zero, the job is done.

In conclusion, REDD is a good idea that has been promoted everywhere, but lacks sufficient energy to really make it work, even in the districts where it has had very big chances to reach success. Thank you.
Signe Howell: Studying REDD – Learning from the Cooperation Between UiO and UGM Scholars

REDD stands for “Reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation.” This a climate mitigation project, which was designed incentives to protect and restore forests. Forests, as you all know, contain carbon. Therefore, there was going to be an international carbon market, which (inaudible) agreed to. Curbing deforestation was identified as a highly cost-effective method to reduce carbon emissions. There were huge hopes attached to this around 2008-10. However, it has not really come to anything, neither in Indonesia nor in any other country with a tropical forest.

Indonesia is actually one of the largest greenhouse gas emitters, after USA and China. Thus, Indonesia was very quickly focused upon as a country to put a lot of effort. And the Norwegian government, which was very early on the scene through then-Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg. At the Bali Climate Conference in 2008, he committed Norwegian engagement in REDD, to the tune of one billion USD per year to Indonesia, provided that Indonesia fulfilled certain of the obligations. In 2010, a Norway-Indonesia Letter of Intent was signed. Part of that was a moratorium on cutting trees. That sounds wonderful, of course, but it was not quite that simple. There were a lot of already signed contracts for deforestation, with large mining and palm oil companies, as Pujo said. Mining and palm oil are the two major causes for deforestation in Indonesia.

There was a lot of attention to this Norway-Indonesia collaboration, so when we were studying REDD, we thought that would be a very good focus. This was also because of previous anthropological research interest in that country. Central Sulawesi was chosen as the UN REDD Demonstration Area for what they called the Readiness Scheme. Central Kalimantan was chosen as a pilot province for the Norway-Indonesia cooperation. These were the two provinces that most of our master students did their fieldwork in, although we also had master students in Jambi, and one in West Papua.

If you go to Central Kalimantan, you will see that there is actually not a lot of forest left. So it was a very strange choice of pilot study. This was not a Norwegian choice, I have to say. It was an Indonesian choice.

From an anthropological point of view, this has been an extremely interesting, although rather disheartening project. For a very long time, although you can notice a shift, the notion of forest
protection has been to see forests as sort of natural spaces. In fact, though, forests are full of people. It took a very long time before anybody took account of that. I am not even sure if they actually do now.

As Desmond mentioned very briefly, we were lucky enough to manage to get some support from the Norwegian Embassy in Jakarta. This was after I had made contact with Pujo and his colleagues in the Anthropology Department, and we realised that there was a potential for interesting collaborative research – which it certainly turned out to be.

Anthropologists do microstudies. We wanted to go and see what actually happened on the ground in areas that are designated somehow as a current or future REDD project area. And because almost everybody works at the macrolevel, we wanted to see what actually goes on in these villages. What is their traditional relationship to the forest? What do they know about REDD? What kind of hopes do they have from REDD?

For our students, there was a twofold aspect to the research. One was to find the relevant village or area, live there, and participate in the community. The other regarded NGOs. We discovered very quickly that NGOs – mainly local, but also international and even bilateral – were extremely important in the world of REDD. They were very important participants in the discourse and practice or REDD. Therefore, we also wanted our students to locate one important NGO in the regional capital, where they were working. The students were to become friendly with them, find out their perception of what REDD was, and see what sort of work they were doing and how they interacted with the local community.

This was the overall idea. We had Indonesian master students and Norwegian master students. The Norwegian master students began their fieldwork with about four or five weeks in Yogyakarta. There, they took intensive language learning every day: Six hours, one to one. They also got to know the anthropology department and their Indonesian colleagues. Then we selected between us sites where they should go, and at least one of each nationality went together. Often two or three. And they spent some time in the regional capital to get to find out about REDD, found the local NGOs, and then eventually found the community. In the community they were one by one, while in the regional capital they were together. There, they visited NGOs, local government offices, the local forestry department offices, etc. Once a year, Desmond and myself went together with Pujo and a couple of his colleagues to one of the regional capitals. All the students came there, and we had a week-long workshop, where they
presented their findings, we had discussions about their findings, we gave them tips about how to do the next half of their fieldwork, and they talked to each other and so on.

We had never done anything like this before, but we found it very productive. I have to give credit to the master students. We did not have funds for Ph.D. students, so we had to use master students. I don’t know what will come after that, but because it was as well planned, and they had so much interaction with our staff and each other, they produced extremely good master theses. We have about nine Norwegian master theses and about 15 UGM master theses. I don’t think that’s bad. And of course they did real fieldwork, and real research to a certain extent.

That was how we did the collaboration. And of course, we came up with quite different findings from the sort of findings that we heard in the UN offices or in the offices and corridors of the Ministry of Forestry, of local authorities, and of NGOs in Jakarta and in the regional capitals. Things were not quite as wonderful as the discourse tended to indicate. Most of the local communities had had very little contact with anybody coming the regional capital to tell them about REDD. They heard rumours about REDD, and started to get high expectations about the money they were going to receive and what they could do with it. But nobody ever told them anything concrete about the money, what the project was going to do, or what they had to do in order to get money. By the time our period finished, there was a huge disappointment and demotivation. They lost interest in it. No money was coming, no concrete projects were forthcoming. Or, there were a couple of projects, such as an Australian project in Central Kalimantan, but they did not really do what REDD had set out to do.

The key, in a sense, to where this failure of communication between the REDD offices of all kinds and the local community came out of what was called FPIC: “Free, prior, and informed consent.” Everybody talks about FPIC as being absolutely vital. It is part of the human rights discourse. The principle was that no decision should be taken in the local community without free, prior, and informed consent. Now, in order to make FPIC, the idea was that NGOs would go out and teach the local communities what this actually meant. FPIC, of course, is absolutely at the centre of democracy. However, as has already been said several times, in the rural areas of Indonesia or Myanmar there is not a lot of understanding of democratic processes. The implementation of FPIC, I am sorry to say, was rather dismal. There were very few instances where there was any kind of attempt to go out and talk to them about FPIC. Of course, this sort of information did not come through in official discussions about REDD in this country. Nor, I have to say, in the countries in Latin America where there was also REDD, and where I did some studies as well. It was no better there.
FPIC is very difficult to suddenly throw into these rural areas, because the democratic ideal is very little developed. The notions of transparency and consultation, which are very important in this discussion, are very unfamiliar. In Indonesia, they have a notion of “sosialisation,” which actually was used for FPIC. However, sosialisation is very different from FPIC. It is just information from the government, informing about which laws have been passed and what the population has to do. That is of course the opposite of FPIC, so it is interesting that the word was used. The implication for local communities, thus, was extremely vague. I have to say, in the local community, trust in the agents of the state and NGOs was virtually non-existent. This was not just because of REDD; it was also based on previous experiences of various projects that had come to these communities. These communities were not “virgin communities.” They had already been involved with the outside world to some extent, but there was very little trust.

The other thing we looked at was NGOs and their role in development. That was extremely interesting, because they were so central. As we all know, NGOs are now firmly embedded in contemporary concepts of development. Donor governments very often prefer to use NGOs locally to going through national departments, because processes in NGOs are more informal and less bureaucratic, and hence faster. Thus, in a sense, they sidestep government, which of course is not unproblematic. There is also a recent, huge increase in the growth of NGOs, both internationally and locally in Indonesia. Just in the regional capital of Sulawesi we counted more than 30 local environmental NGOs at one point. These people were engaged. They usually had a degree from the local university, and were politically very aware and astute. They wanted things to change, to be part of this new democratisation. But they were not trained to do that kind of work. The little money they had very often stopped. On our terms, I think it was very unprofessional. They did go to villages from time to time, but not in the way that I think was expected from central or international hold.

Nevertheless, environmental and human rights NGOs in Indonesia became very active, and REDD became something they somehow could hold on to in their work. They did this to a lot of good ends. In some cases, they successfully activated local communities to protest, and protests of a kind previously unknown to Indonesia began to emerge. People even went to Jakarta with banners and protested. “We want a place at the table” became a sort of slogan. They wanted a place at the table of the negotiations, at the higher-up tables, and they began to get it.

One can say that REDD also became a means to fight for land. What is really important in Indonesia and many other countries is land ownership, access to land, and use of land. This
became extremely pertinent in the whole REDD discourse. Forests are land, people have lived there for generations and used it in all different kinds of ways, but it transpired that they had no legal rights to it. Who owns forests in Indonesia? Well, the state owns all forests, and they can do what they like. They can lease it out and give concessions as they like, either to companies or to local authorities. The complexity of land ownership and leasing is shown in one subdistrict in Central Kalimantan, where as many as 27 overlapping concessions and land claims existed. A lot of the NGOs – notably AMAN, the NGO for indigenous peoples – became very loud and very insistent that some kind of new land law has to be worked out, that gives rights to the people who live on the land. That has really become very powerful and very important.

What I have been arguing is that REDD started off as a project with a rather simple notion of forests, of finding mechanistic rules and regulations to save the forest. Mainly through the work of NGOs, it evolved into a project that was about the people in the forests. At the beginning, the project had an essentialised notion of nature. Nature to be acted upon by outsiders, wilderness, preservation biodiversity, these sort of things. Technocratic solutions: Measuring, monitoring, payment upon results, and so on. Today, it has moved from a project about saving trees and carbon containment, to a project concerned with safeguarding rights of people who live amongst them. Today, there are another two pluses to REDD+, which are about the rights of people.

Some of the main findings from our project: First of all, it takes time, and progress on the ground has so far been very limited. On the other hand, it is a very revolutionary project, and one must not be too impatient. I still have some hopes for it, because something has to be done. We need to contain emissions. But it takes time. And because it is no longer just a technocratic project, but a project that involves so many different people, it takes time. It also involves all different kinds of local and national authorities. So many people are involved here. It has become, then, mainly an issue of people and tenure rights. Public and private stakeholders are often in conflict over selection of sites, and business as usual remained very strong. Local NGOs have become empowered. In terms of this particular project here, I should emphasise that they have also been important in the quickening, if you like, of the process of democratisation in Indonesia. They have initiated a movement from below, so to speak, that has come up everywhere. I would argue that something like that can be observed. You can see that the self-confidence of these NGOs also has increased a lot during this time. They have been empowered, but local communities really have not. Local people are therefore confused and very ambivalent about REDD, and have lost faith in it. Last night, when we talked about this, Pujo said that
REDD used to be very high on the agenda in Indonesia’s public debate, but now that no longer is the case. So that also indicative of something. Meanwhile, I think the Norwegian government still wants to go on giving money, but they have actually given very little. Thank you.
Ne Lynn Aung: Natural Resources and Conflicts in Myanmar

Good afternoon. My name is Ne Lynn Aung, and I am currently working for the Myanmar Institute for Peace and Security. At the same time, I also work for the Joint Ceasefire Monitoring Committee. It is a tripartite body comprised of government representatives, ethnic armed groups that signed the initial ceasefire agreement in Myanmar, and some civilians. Today I am going to talk about the relationship between natural resources and conflict in Myanmar.

(Shows maps) Recently, ARENA institute released these two maps of militias and border guard forces in Myanmar. The institute said that these are conflict-affected areas. These sort of maps and data presentations are very dangerous to our country. If I was a foreign investor who wanted to invest in Myanmar, and if I looked at these maps, I would get out! I would leave the country and never make investments there, because the country is conflict affected.

In reality, how do we measure the conflict affected villages and conflict affected townships? That is a very complicated and very technical issue. So today I am going to talk about how we can relate conflict affectedness in Myanmar. Firstly, I will give an overview of armed conflict in Myanmar. Myanmar gained independence from the British in 1948. Soon after independence, communists staged a rebellion against the government. At the same time, some minority groups also fought against the central government. These communist rebellions and ethnic insurgencies plunged the country into a vicious cycle of conflict. The country is still at war. However, we do not have sufficient information or sufficient data about the conflict in Myanmar. We do not know how many people have been killed during the 60-year long internal conflict. We do not know how many people were affected by the conflict.

Basically, we can divide the armed conflicts in Myanmar into two groups. One is ideologically motivated armed conflicts, like the communist rebellion and the armed struggle of the pro-democracy movement by the All Burma Student Democratic Front (ABSDF). The other, more complicated group is the ethnically motivated conflicts, such as the conflict in Kachin State. We have armed conflicts in all the minority regions.

At the beginning of armed conflicts in the 1950s, the intensity of the conflicts was very low, because most armed groups did not have strong weapons systems. However, during the Cold War era, the conflicts intensified as the armed groups received arms from smugglers in Southeast Asia, particularly from Cambodia after the Indochina War and Cambodian War. That changed the landscape of conflict in Myanmar. At this time, some armed groups also had their own arms factories, producing their own guns for their cause.
Myanmar is a resource-rich country in Southeast Asia. Some people even consider Myanmar to be a resource-curse country. So we need to find out whether Myanmar really is under the spell of natural resources.

Basically, we can group natural resources in Myanmar in five groups: Oil and gas, mineral resources, precious stones and gems, timber and forest product, and hydropower projects. If you look carefully at these natural resources, we can also divide them into two groups. One is what I call lootable. Those are natural resources that can easily be looted. The other group is unlootable natural resources, like forests, oil, and gas. If you are not a state actor, you cannot control oil and gas production. Small armed groups cannot control forest product, that is for sure.

*(shows map of oil and gas fields)* This is an oil block map of Myanmar. You can see the oil blocks in the central area and the coastal area. There are also still some unexploited oil blocks in Myanmar. *(shows map)* And this is a map of precious stones. As you can see, we have so many stones. We have rubies in this area, we have jade in this area, we have gold along the Irrawaddy River. We also have some industrial mining in this area.

*(shows map)* These are the coal mines. The coal mines along the Irrawaddy River. These are very important for some local businesses, and for some armed groups. *(shows map)* These are the timber and forest areas. There the government allows forest resource extraction, however there are also some illegal timber businesses in that area. *(shows map)* This is the river network. We have the long Irrawaddy River, we have the long Salween River, and we also use other rivers for hydropower project, as well as for trade and other activities.

If we look at the funding of armed groups, as well as the Tatmadaw (Armed Forces of Myanmar), we see that some armed groups extract so-called revolutionary taxes from the community. They also collect revolutionary tax from mining companies, timber business people, and border trade. Some groups control very profitable border checkpoints where they can make huge amounts of money.

Some insurgent groups are also involved in drug trafficking. That is a very serious problem for the country, as well as for the region of Southeast Asia. Some armed groups also control casinos. They own what they call “amusement parks.” Some armed groups also receive foreign assistance, and some receive assistance from more powerful armed groups, which act as the godfathers of other armed groups. And also some Tatmadaw officers. We have more than 800
militias in the country at the moment. We also have so many border guard forces, which are really powerful. They are warlords of sorts in their regions.

At the Myanmar Institute for Peace and Security, we have developed a system called township-based conflict monitoring system. According to our dataset, we found that within the last three months there have been 164 incidents, including clashes and attacks all over the country. Incidents are very complicated. Some people think there only is fighting between what we call ethnic armed organisations (EAOs) and the Tatmadaw. In reality, it is not. We have armed conflicts with Tatmadaw and ethnic armed groups, and we also have clashes between EAOs and EAOs, like in Northern Shan State. And we also have another problem that is very dangerous for the country. We have an armed group called NSCN, the Naga group. They do not want to be in Myanmar, they want very authentic freedoms. They want to create their own socialist republic. They also have a very serious problem with India. So within the last three months, we have had so many conflicts, and that is very dangerous for both the domestic and international relations of Myanmar.

*(shows diagram of clashes)* These are clashes between NSCN and the Indian Army. That is very dangerous because it can also affect the relationship between the Indian government and Myanmar government. Then there is the conflict between TNLA and RCSS. Both are minority groups. They had two clashes. If you look at these sort of things, it is very complicated. DKBA splinter groups are fighting ethnic armed groups. And BGF, border guard forces, can also be involved. They always have a problem in Kayin State. And there is also conflict between two Rakhine armed groups, ALP and AA. Both are fighting each other. The most significant group is ARSA, the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army. There were 119 incidents of clashes between the government and ARSA in the last three months.

*(shows map of clashes)* I drew these maps using Geospace software. This is the geospatial analysis that we are doing at this moment. We use buffer analysis, we draw a 10-mile radius circle around an incident point. And we use the clip method, extracting the villages than fall within 10 miles of an incident. Then we intersect the two layers.

*(shows maps)* These are the villages or forests where the conflict between Tatmadaw and EAOs happened. These are what I call conflict affected areas. These villages fall within ten miles of incidents. These are where the troops, both Tatmadaw and EAOs, would manoeuvre within 24 hours. They can move their troops within a ten-mile radius. So these areas are very vulnerable to armed conflict.
When I ran another spatial analysis, I put the conflict points and all natural resource areas on the map. (points) This conflict is very close to the forest area. But this is very far from the conflict area. At least 20 miles from forest area. Another interesting thing is, (points) this forest area, where there is no conflict. I don’t know what happened to this forest.

What we can say is that some people overstate to which degree natural resources cause conflict in Myanmar. What I found is that natural resources do not cause conflicts in Myanmar, but they do influence the duration and the intensity of conflicts. Powerful armed groups that control forests and other natural resources can procure modern and very complex weapons systems from neighbouring countries and from other parties in the war. Another interesting thing is that some groups are also using natural resources for their military campaigns, but they are not very powerful. The ones who produce drugs are the most powerful armed groups in Myanmar. Hence, I would say drug trafficking is the main driver of conflict in Myanmar.

At MIPS, as I mentioned, we developed the Township-based Conflict Monitoring System. We are collecting data dating back to 2011, and we are going to synchronise our dataset with the Uppsala War Dataset. We collected more than 120 conflict and peace indicators, so that we know how the conflicts are moving. That is very useful for peacebuilding.

At this moment we are still developing our dataset, but at the same time we also share our analytics with key stakeholders in the country. We are also going to produce a very comprehensive geodata resource, so that later we can contribute more geospatial analyses in our conflict prevention and peacebuilding activities. We also have a plan to contribute our new knowledge or new findings to evidence-based conflict prevention and peacebuilding in Myanmar. Thank you.
**Aung Myo Oo: Kyauk Phyu SEZ – Issues and Concerns**

I am going to present about Kyauk Phyu SEZ and its issues and concerns. These are issues and concerns I tried to find out from research I conducted on the ground for three months. These are the preliminary results that I found from my research. I am still in the process of writing the report, so the findings that I am giving you here are not the exhaustive list.

In this presentation, I am going to talk mainly about where the SEZ is located; what are the main features in these zones; how is it significant for Myanmar to develop these; and why China does engage. I focus on China because a Chinese company, CITIC, won the bid from Myanmar government, and this project actually plays a very significant role for the Chinese OBOR project. After that, I will explain a little bit about our research methodology, and then I will present the issues and the concerns as well.

*(shows map)* Kyauk Phyu is in Rakhine State in the Western part of Myanmar. Kyauk Phyu is at the tip of Ramree Island, which is the largest island in Myanmar.

What is significant about this economic zone is the inclusion of the deep-sea port, *(points)* around here. This is the island where they put the oil and gas. They have a big oil and gas terminal there. The deep-sea port is where the biggest portion of money goes into in the SEZ. These are fishers and residential areas, and industrial park.

So why is it significant for Myanmar to have SEZ? Obviously, SEZ brings money. In Myanmar we have three SEZ: Thilawa, Dawei and Kyauk Phyu. Kyauk Phyu is going to be the biggest investment from China. Thilawa has been managed by Japanese, and the management of Dawei was Thai-based, although I think it is stalled now, because of a lot of environmental protests coming from CSOs on the ground. So why are SEZ significant? Because they are going to create a lot of jobs. That is at least what the government is saying. The deep sea port will bring a lot of taxes for the government.

China basically has the gas pipeline from Kyauk Phyu to Kumming. It is up and running right now. The Chinese will bring cargo from the Bay of Bengal to China. I think that is the main intention of the Chinese people to invest in Kyauk Phyu, because they want to bring freights to China through the road. This proposal for construction of the road was stalled by the previous government, but I think the Chinese government will still propose building this high-speed railway to transport Chinese goods. And of course, the oil and gas pipeline has already been constructed and is already operating. The gas has been transported all across Myanmar.
On the ground, we want to find out what are the issues surrounding this SEZ among the locals. We used a mixed approach. We conducted 380 household surveys, and we also interviewed key informers and did focus group discussions to find out the issues and concerns.

The main issue is lack of communication. A lot of people in Kyauk Phyu do not know what SEZ includes. When you say Special Economic Zone, people except that a lot of factories will come, which will create jobs, so the people will get a lot of jobs from this. But the government did not give a lot of information about what is going to be in the SEZ. There is this miscommunication between the government and the local people.

Another issue is corruption, mainly related to the land issue. A lot of rich people are already buying land in Kyauk Phyu, because when the SEZ comes, the company has to acquire the land through the government. They will raise the price of the land, and these people will get a lot of money from the compensation for the land. Staff officers of the Land Record departments are cooperating with rich people to sell the land, and there has been a lot of complications in the land processes. Also, when they acquire the land, the government has to go through the General Administration Department. People allege that these officials from GAD are also practicing corruption.

Another issue is trust. There has been a general lack of trust among different stakeholders. For example, when I conducted interviews with the civil society people, I found that they think that the government does not trust them. When the government tried to engage with the people, they did not include the civil society organisations (CSOs). The CSOs even say that after the 2015 election, when the NLD government came in, the trust between the CSOs and government has eroded – the government does not trust the CSOs anymore. And the general public do not trust the government. There has of course been a lot of abuses by the government in Kyauk Phyu. For example, when they constructed the navy headquarter, they acquired a lot of land without any compensation. So people do not trust the government. For its part, the government does not trust the people either. They think that the people do not know anything. When the government wants to construct a project, that is for the good of the whole country, but at the cost of the local people. The government thinks that the local people should help the government introduce this project, to get money for the Union.

Now, to the concerns. As I said before, land is the main concern, as far as I found out from my research. (shows table) The SEZ has 4289 acres of land. That is not much, if you think about other areas in Myanmar. Some projects in Kachin, for example, cover much larger areas. In this
SEZ, the land is smaller, but the issue is this: When you look at the breakdown of the type of land, we found that the VFV land, which is fallow and vacant land, is actually very high. According to the 2012 land laws, VFV land cannot be registered by the farmers. But in the customary land practices, these fallow and vacant lands were used by the farmers as pasture and other purposes. They have been using these lands. As you can see, this is a very big area. 43% of the total area is labelled as VFV land by the government. We can see that this will be the bone of contention when the SEZ comes into Kyauk Phyu.

What the farmers say is that there is no vacant land in their land. (shows illustration) They claim that they have used these lands since the time of their ancestors. But they can only register their farmland, according to the 2012 land law.

And there is a lot of concern for the laws of livelihood as well. The area in the Kyauk Phyu area is actually very complicated, because there are a lot of creeks surrounding the area. The farmers, when they grow rice during the season, they will go to the creeks and the sea to catch fish. Their livelihood is thus an amphibious livelihood pattern. When the deep sea port comes, a lot of ships come into the port, and the government will block the waterways for the fishermen. So the fishermen cannot fish in the sea and in the creeks. That basically rips their livelihoods in the summer. According to the SEZ Law, when the SEZ is implemented; the company, in cooperation with the government, has to ensure that the peoples’ situation cannot be lower than the current situation. But a lot of farmers think that is not going to happen.

Another big concern from the farmers is that there is going to be a big influx of people in the Kyauk Phyu area. Right now, the population is only 160,000 in Kyauk Phyu. The government claims that 200,000 jobs will be created, so people are speculating that maybe 500,000 people will come to live and settle down in Kyauk Phyu. That will create a lot of tensions with the locals. Related to that, when foreign people come, people claim that they will bring their cultural practices, they will bring foreign practices, so that will basically create tensions between the locals and the foreigners, and then there will be a lot of clashes. Cultural clashes and ethnic clashes.

A possible saving endeavour for the SEZ is the introduction of the Environmental Act in the assessment. In 2015, the NLD government introduced the EIA procedures. What that means is that CITIC, the Chinese company has to go through EIA to get an environmental conservation certificate. Which means that SEZ will be a little bit delayed. People, farmers and CSO people
are hoping that this will give some time for them to advocate their concerns for the government. So EIA is going to be the saving time for them.

That is all from me.


**Discussion**

**Desmond McNeill**

Thank you very much. Everyone has been extremely disciplined, so we actually do have some time for comments and questions. I will simply open the floor. Yes, please.

**Thomas Mun Dan**

Thank you. I don’t know if this will be a question or comment. I am not really familiar with REDD, but anyhow I think this is a good initiative to conserve the forests, and also good for the community. There is also the EU initiative: Legalizing timber to EU markets. My question, or my concern, would be: I think that preserving the forests through grant money from the government and international community seems to be less sustainable. Legalising the timber and then getting a better price for selling it in a EU market would be more sustainable. Is that more realistic for the community? Keeping forestry would be less beneficial for the community than selling following rules and regulations and getting a good deal for the timber.

**Desmond McNeill**

I could try to answer. First, of course, they are two different exercises with very different purposes. One is to preserve tropical timber, and the other is to reduce climate change. Related to that, the economic payoffs are very different. And unfortunately, there may not be any payoffs at all, because there may never be effective carbon-trading agreements. But even if there were, it looks as if the amount of money one could earn from that would be very small. So the payoff for preserving forest, unfortunately, is pretty low. Would you like to add anything?

**Signe Howell**

As you said, they are very different. I mean, the preservation of forests for *inaudible* – there very, very little of that in Indonesia. The problem in Indonesia is not for the wood, but making revenue for palm oil foundations, which is huge. They burn the wood, which is why you get these enormous clouds over Southeast Asia. They are burning all the newly cut forest.

**Pujo Semedi Hargo Yuwono**

*inaudible* because while the European market require licences, then the domestic market in Indonesia and the Southeast Asian market do not care about the licenses or the certificate. As
long as the price is OK, then timber is timber. The market always asks for cheaper prices for timber, and if we enforce the licence, the certificate, then that will make the price higher, much higher, and no one is willing to buy it. The market is still the problem in this control of forest production.

Desmond McNeill

Other comments or questions? Yes?

Marco Mezzera

My name is Marco Mezzera, from the Norwegian Centre for Conflict Resolution. I have a question for the last presenter. It is about the Special Economic Zones, related to the current dynamics, concerning the Rohingya. You gave a presentation about what this project was about. I read that there are also other Special Economic Zones that are under consideration. So I was wondering whether you noticed any pattern in terms of the eruption of violence or specific military operations in areas close to these economic development zones. Whether there are any sorts of relations there, that may play into the situation in local Rakhine State? Thank you.

Aung Myo Oo

I do not think there is any link between the violence in Rakhine State and the implementation of the SEZ. This SEZ has of course been much earlier than the current violence. For example, the gas pipeline was conducted way before the conflict in Rakhine State. Akyab or Sittwe, the capital of Rakhine State, that is a project supported by the Indian government. But I think that the new SEZ will be related to the conflict, because I think the government is intentionally trying to build SEZ in to stop the conflict. That’s still the suspicion. But the new SEZ will be much smaller compared with the SEZ in Kyauk Phyu. The invested money in Kyauk Phyu is about 9 billion dollars, while the new SEZ will be like 20 million dollars. Sizewise, it is very small.

Kristian Stokke

My question is to Ne Lynn Aung. You are kind of asking for it when you venture into geospatial analysis. I’m a geographer, so I just have to ask something.

You pointed to the importance of differentiating between different kinds of natural resources, and you started to do a differentiation between two main types of ethnic armed organisations. I fully agree, but I also think that maybe there is a need for more. Because even if you just talk
about you call the ethnically motivated armed organisations, I think that there are quite a few
different kinds there. And when it comes to natural resources, they have very different economic
relations to natural resources. Some engage in what you could call shady business on natural
resources, some don’t.

You also said that drug trafficking is really the most important thing. There are some armed
organizations that clearly engage in smuggling, but there are also some that, as far as I know,
have very strong stands on not doing that, and are actually fighting it. I think that there is a need
to go into the EAOs in order to also understand the relationship between EAOs and resources.

Ne Lynn Aung

Well, thank you for your suggestion. For our dataset, it is very complicated information. When
one conducts both qualitative and mixed research, one can see the dynamics, specifically the
particular EAOs. Some EAOs also have their own natural resource policy. So we also need to
look at it.

Desmond McNeill

If I can allow myself a comment, extending that point. I think, regarding the relationship
between quantitative and qualitative data … It seems your research goes up into a sort of
(inaudible), so you need to ground footing, to see what actually happened on the ground. And
that might then again inform a more quantitative work. But I think you certainly need both. You
need the interaction between the geospatial view from the satellite and what is actually
happening on the ground in this interactive process, I would say.
Politics of Power-sharing and Conflict Resolution

Chair: Kristian Stokke

Kristian Stokke: Introduction

Thank you for coming back. Yesterday, we had a great, and quite intense, program. Today we also have some real treats lined up. We have less stress in time management, at least in the session in the morning. This first session is under the heading of “Politics of Power-sharing.” This is an important issue both in Indonesia and in Burma, and many other places. I think it was Olle who mentioned yesterday how in Indonesia after the transition, when there was also a parallel process of decentralisation and local politics and mobilisation, there was an expectation that Indonesia would break up. That the lid that had held the pressure under control for many, many years, when it was lifted, things would fall apart. That did not happen, and that begs the question: How did you do it? What is the lesson, in terms of models, and not least, what are the dynamics in terms of politics, of creating it, renewing and maintaining it, and keeping it going? After Purwo Santoso has talked about resource sharing and elections, we will turn to Myanmar, where we have two very well placed presenters on parallel issues.
Purwo Santoso: Resource Sharing and Elections

Thank you for letting me come back to the session. My presentation is a follow-up to many things. First, it is a follow-up to the big ideas of the “Power, Welfare and Democracy” project, namely that we need to uncover power relationships within the process of democratisation, and we take very seriously the power of welfare, and more specifically resources. And as Kristian triggered us into thinking: What makes Indonesia unique in not breaking down like Yugoslavia and other countries in Eastern Europe? It was because we loosened the control of resources at some point, so resources reached provinces that were demanding independence at the time. The way they did it was with a Big Bang of decentralisation, which also decentralised the resources. Loosening control of resources keeps the country united. In a narrower sense, we argue that when we define democracy as a matter of popular control, and we uncover power relationships, then presumably we can enhance the process of the democracy movement. We may take for granted that we are working with a particular welfare regime, but eventually we discover the other pictures, that the composition of welfare does in fact matter. In a bigger sense, context does matter in our analysis of Indonesian politics and Indonesian decentralisation.

My brief presentation this morning will underline the significance of bringing the resources to the foreground rather than the background. We will give you hints on how the study has been going, and then the findings. Basically, the findings concern the games of resource distribution within the process of decentralisation. As the main finding from our democracy assessment said, state institutions are weak, but they pretend to be formalistic and Weberian. However, the informality does matter, and the resource game takes place in an informal way. Therefore, we need to take this idea very seriously. If we take welfare regimes seriously, and more specifically, resource distribution as a critical element within the process, we see that a reshaping of power and citizenship has been taking place. And because elections are taking place in a cyclical way, then there is a cyclical game of resources. Therefore, when we want to make the democracy movement more effective, we to take part in the game. That is the main message that I want to convey.

The findings suggest that although formal democratisation succeeded in Indonesia, and the idea of popular control does exist; the resource game mainly relies on the elite, while the citizens are having limited public space. Their idea of the public is so limited, and therefore the game is basically set by the elite. Hence, the presumptions that a there is a right for everyone to get elected should be taken to in-depth scrutiny. *(shows animation of elites competing over control)*
of the state) This is where the resource game is taking place. One by one, some groups are trying to influence the state. Some succeed, some do not.

The idea of state is not as tidy as you have in the Western countries, where the idea of the nation-state comes from. We have one state with many nationhoods. Then we have to deal with ethnicity, with local grievances, and scattered local movements. If that is the case, then, elections are basically a mobilisation of resources for contestation. The elites are contesting one another, in order to get state power. This is the game. Therefore, resources is a key element in understanding the dynamics of democracy, more specifically structures of power.

How the parties or the elites are mobilising resources differs from one region to the other, from one group to the other. There is no uniform way of running politics. Let me give you an example. One day I was doing research on local politics in Sulawesi, and I was asking a local leader why he quit one party to join another one. He answered that it was because his enemy was moving. It has nothing to do with the party platform. We cannot take the idea of political parties as set institutions too seriously, because the way people play on the ground has nothing to do with the party structure. It is a matter of conflict between themselves, and the competition between themselves. The struggle for resources is especially important.

If that is the case, then we have the elite dominance in the process of democratisation, we have weak sense of citizenship, and what we do is basically to fill the gap. The state allocates resources, like forest, mining, and so forth, and then different groups are trying to get alliances with elites to gain control of resources. Therefore, our puzzle now is to look in more detail into the game of distribution of power and wealth. This relates to our comment yesterday. Rather than suggesting that welfare has nothing to do with democracy, we say it is the other way around. This is because state institutions are not as well institutionalised as what you have here. The state itself is weak, because the institutions are easily captured by the elites.

When we look at it in more detail, when we talk about democracy as a cycle, an election is only one event. But this is the event when the parties are so dependent on voters. And some smart voters are clever enough to mobilise pressure on the political parties. That is why transactional politics are inevitable. Parties understand that they are vulnerable. They are really keen on having peoples’ support, but people keep asking what they will get in return for their support, before the politicians come into power and forget them.

Hence, the timing in the resource game is important. The formality of political parties has been exploited in many ways by pro-democracy activists. One way is to run campaigns for
contractual politics, but it is very difficult to get a contract between the entire citizenry and the candidate. Society is heavily fragmented, and because of the lack of unity of voters, distribution of resources on a modern, rule-of-law basis has been difficult. When the resource game is undertaking, what really matters is to get the timing right, and because of the decentralisation among them they are changing the game. Ten years ago, when elections were taking place, there was an idea of what we in Indonesia we call “Serangan Fajar,” which means “dawn attack.” The idea is that before people get to the ballot, those who try to bribe to get votes give them money. But as they vote, many of them are not really loyal to the money. They call it the “Serangan (inaudible),” the attack that’s undertaken when the sun is already high, but before noon; because those who want to buy votes have to observe who has no affiliation. There is an increase of the citizens’ awareness of the right of the vote. Citizens understand the value of their vote, and because they are granted the right to vote, they believe they have the right to sell it. So transactional politics have become normal ideas, because this is the best way to settle the supply and demand of rights.

So this is the situation. The other features are (inaudible). The profile of local regimes differs, as I presented yesterday. In a resource-rich area, like Kalimantan for example, the game is to take control of natural resources like forests and mining. Therefore, those big bosses who have access to natural resources are in control of politics. Even if decentralisation allows local allocation of resources, what they get is much less than what elites at the national level gain. Therefore, the strategy is setting up whoever is winning the election so they are under the capitalists’ control. Thus, in many cases the capitalists distribute money in accordance with the possibility of winning. Hence, those who are likely to win get more money from the big boss. This is also restricting (inaudible), because the money is so huge anyway, so there is no problem as to redistributing below them.

The tactic is different where the resources are not that many, like in Yogyakarta, for example. In Yogyakarta, the community is more educated, the resources are much fewer, and the capacity to organise is much higher. Then there is no way of targeting support based on the distribution of resources.

In the areas where customary law is so powerful, it is also the logic of the resource game. They use customary law as a means of making pressure on the capital. So the game is different from one place to another, and who’s targeting who is different.
The other thing is the competition over resources. In an area where what I would call social
capital is strong, and natural resources are not that important, then mobilising social support,
networking, and so forth is very important. But in areas where resources are abundant, civil
society is weak, and social capital is easily co-opted, there is no means, no use of making
competition. Getting the competition right is, I think, one of the keys in order to gain access to
the state.

If we understand that resources is the basis of the competition in order to win state power, I just
to want to iterate that Indonesia has been considerably successful in its democratisation, but it
is stagnant, and (inaudible) contestation. The problem in making democracy flourish is the
problem of running the system of competition. Because the law is not well established, and
access to resources is very much setting up the game, and therefore the difficulty of running
(inaudible) politics is there. So the state has been weak, and (inaudible) marginalisation because
of civil society activism, and because of the fragmentation within civil society, the game is not
always the same from one place to another. Furthermore, because the sense of public among
citizens is weak, resources become more important than having major popular control. And it
takes much more time for us to have a strong basis for public control. And there are different
kinds of resources, and diversity is important.

Let us go into more detail. There are setups in which elites and control of financial capital is
the main game, but also there are setups where social control is more important. So then when
we blame money politics, it’s not always … I mean, the context is different from one place to
the other. There are also contexts in which (inaudible), and the idea of populism, as I mentioned
yesterday, is basically the ability to craft solidarity on the one hand, and allocate some amount
of resources to get distributed, the same as in the features of technocratic public services, like
health and education, but the structure of capital control has been changed. And therefore, then,
we are not (inaudible) with has been happened.

So if this is the case, the use of capital control is very important in the areas where resources
are heavily concentrated, the concentration of resources is very important, and politics are
getting brutal when social capital is unable to match the context. The situation in Kutai
Kertanegara, which I presented yesterday, emerged because the size of capital is so huge, while
social capital there is so easily manipulated.

So there are two main games in the distribution of power of wealth. In one, the distribution of
patronage is the main element. Therefore the patrons distribute resources to gain loyalty. That
is the game. But these features have been less popular in some cases, and as civil society as well as the enlightened elites are able to describe public affairs in more rational ways … This is the better step in making democracy work. What we do need is the ideology in which people are getting access to resources. Now, the trick is that resources have been organised at the communal level through religious organisations, as Wawan presented yesterday, and we do not really link the distribution of wealth organised by community with the attainment of public control within the state. So then if we want to follow up democratisation through resource gain, then we have to map out where the resources have been used, what they are using, who is playing the game, and then matching up the demand for access is important. So the further study that we propose to link how resources are really sensitive to reshape the election, so then more tactic oriented process of election should be undergone, and it creates a collective sense of citizenship, which is not really readily available there. Thank you for the attention.
Zo Tum Hmung: Developing Ethnic Policies on Power-sharing and Peace in Myanmar

Kristian Stokke

The next speaker is Zo Tum Hmung. He is the Executive Director of the Ethnic Nationalities Affairs Center, based in Chiang Mai, which is an ethnic think tank for the armed organisations who have not signed the national ceasefire agreement. ENAC has been very much involved in trying to create a dialogue around policy in preparation for peace negotiations, bringing together the competence of civil society and the position of ethnic armed organisations. One key issue in this is of course the question of power-sharing, how to arrange it and not least how it relates to natural resources.

Zo Tum Hmung

Good morning, everyone. In this book, The Natural Resources of Myanmar, we did case studies. The case of jade in Kachin State, and of natural gas in Rakhine State. And then we have this report we call “Sectoral Policy Recommendations for the Future of the Current Dialogue,” for a future federal democratic union. This was presented by the United Nationalities Federal Council (UNFC), at the first session of the 21st Century Panglong.

How did we do? We have been developing policies as part of our approach, together with civil society groups, community-based organisation, ethnic armed organisations, and ethnic political parties inside the country. What is the purpose? The policy is developed to be useful for national political dialogue. We have political dialogue at the state, regional, and also union level, which we call the 21st Century Panglong.

Our objective is political change, or constitutional reform. As you know, the State Counsellor has run the election on “time for change.” So our objective is also political change or constitutional reform. There are two different paths to change. Are we going to do the change within Parliament, or through the peace process? Once we have a peace effort, that will be submitted to Parliament, and then the peace effort will become Constitution. Our approach is that although we recognise that one path goes through Parliament, we choose the second approach, which is through the peace process. Why? Change through constitutional reform through Parliament is highly unlikely. Please look at section 436 (a) in the 2008 Constitution. It requires more than 75 % support in Parliament. Some translations have been incorrect. They say 75 %, which is not correct. It requires more than 75 %. The military controls 25 % of the
seats of Parliament. So we think that even if the State Counsellor wanted to implement constitutional reform, going through Parliament is highly unlikely, unless one of the military guys defected. We think that is highly unlikely. That is why we chose the second approach, which is through the peace process. It is not only for the ethnic armed organisations. This is for the political reform for the whole country.

We have a national ceasefire agreement, which was introduced in 2015, under the President Thein Sein government. As Sai Kyaw Nyunt mentioned yesterday, of about 21 armed organisations, only eight have signed. Since Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD took power in 2016, no ethnic armed organisations have signed the ceasefire agreement.

Under the national ceasefire agreement, what we call a Framework for Political Dialogue (FPD) is actually the agenda. At the political dialogue, at the state level and regionally, which issues are we discussing? One, politics. This is directly related to the Constitution. What kind of federal democratic union we would like to have. Power-sharing. What kind of power should go to the state level? What kind of power should go to the federal level? Power-sharing between the state and the federal level. How about concurrent power?

Secondly, we have the social sector. The social sector includes education, health, IDPs, refugees, and so on. The third sector is the economy. How about taxation policy? How about fiscal federalism? How are we going to do that? The fourth sector is security. What kind of national security policy are we going to have in a future federal democratic union? Sector five is land and environmental conservation. Under land and environmental conservation we have the subject of natural resource sharing. The sixth sector is the general sector.

ENAC has conducted a series of workshops with CSOs, CBOs, and political parties, in Thailand and inside the country. We brought them together. This is a bottom-up approach. We try to cover sectors 1 to 5 under the framework for political dialogue. Number one is that, at the national level political dialogue, we think that we should not talk in detail about peace agreements. Let us talk only about key principles and characteristics.

This covers sectors 1 and 4, politics, and security. Then sectorial recommendations 2, 3, and 5. Then we have in-depth analyses, like the draft report “Key Principles and Characteristics for a
Federal Union of Burma,” which is available on our website. We presented it at Mai Ja Yang, Kachin State conference. UNFC also presented this at the first Panglong conference.

Let me give you a couple of examples. Number one, the name of the country. “B: When establishing a genuine federal union and realizing the principle of equality among all ethnic groups, the Union’s name should represent all peoples living in the country.” The Panglong agreement has already been mentioned by Kristian Stokke and Sai Kyaw Nyunt. We, the Chin, are one of the co-founders of the Union. As are the Kachin and the Shan. We wanted to live together with the Burmese. We would like to live together with the Shan and the Kachin. But how are we going to live together? As of now, the name of the country does not represent all of us.

Legislature. Firstly, the Federal Democratic Union Parliament should be composed of a Chamber of Nationalities and a Chamber of People’s Representatives. Secondly, the Chamber of Nationalities and the Chamber of People’s Representatives should be equal in legislative power. Currently, there is no equality of chambers. We don’t have any say.

Member States. The Member States of the Federal Democratic Union should freely draft and enact their own State Constitutions. We do not currently have a Chin State Constitution. There is no Kachin State Constitution, and there is no Ayeyarwady Region constitution either. So there should be state constitutions.

Division of power. For example, we have the power of the union (the federal level). Defence, of course, should go to the federal level, along with foreign affairs and currency. We have a list here. The States should have power over police and State security forces, and over education. Currently, education is fully under the control of Naypyidaw. In Kachin State or Chin State, we do not have our own education policy. The Chin language is not taught in our state.

Armed forces. All armed forces should be subject to civilian control. Currently, all the armed forces are, as you know, under the control of the Commander-in-Chief. In a future democratic union, all armed forces should be under civilian control.

We have developed these key principles, and UNFC adopted them and presented them at the first session of the Panglong Conference in August 2016. Then, how did we do? We are very inclusive. *(shows visualisation)* CBOs, CSOs, ethnic political parties, grassroot level, ethnic armed organisations …
(shows visualisations) This covers the framework of political dialogue agenda 1 and 4. Here is another one: Sectoral policy recommendation. The format is quite simple and easy. We intended to do that, because for our political leaders or stakeholders, this is easier to look at.

These recommendations covers sectors 2, 3, and 5. We have policies on health, education, land, natural resources, agriculture, IDPs and refugees, humanitarian aid, taxation, trade and investment, forests and environmental preservation, energy policy …

Let me give you an example: Education policy. The education system in a federal democratic union must include the rights of the ethnic states to govern, manage and allocate budget for the education sector in each respective state. We do not currently have this power at the state level. Management, budget, government … nothing. Number two: Decision-making power to govern and manage education must be in the hands of relevant states, and also local authorities and schools. We would like to have these authorities at the state level, but also at the local level, and at the school level, which we do not have now.

Trade and investment policy examples. Number two: The power to fully make decisions and manage trade and investment within the state must be guaranteed to respective State governments. We don’t have that under the 2008 Constitution.

So this has been adopted by the UNFC. We officially presented and distributed this at the first Panglong Conference. Also, recently the United Nationalities Alliance, which is comprised of 15 political parties inside the country, and SNLD is one of the leaders, adopted this in principle.

Then we have in-depth analyses. We have several in-depth analyses on each case study. For example, we have an analysis called “Natural Resources of Myanmar.” At the Panglong Conference, they are going to talk, negotiate about natural resources in Burma. How are they going to discuss about that? We frame it as ownership, management, revenue sharing, and impacts. As you know, Burma is rich on natural resources. We chose to focus only on natural gas in Rakhine State and jade in Kachin State.

Research objectives. Ownership. Who should own jade produced in Kachin State? The Union, the federal government, or the Kachin people? Management. Who should manage this? Revenue sharing. This is a really big issue, I think, in the case of jade. The report, “Natural Resources of Myanmar (Burma),” is also available at our website.
In the current 2008 Constitution, section 37 says: “The Union is the ultimate owner of all lands and all natural resources above and below the ground, above and beneath the water and in the atmosphere of the Union.” The Union is the owner, not the Kachin, not Rakhine.

(shows map with Rakhine State and the China-Myanmar pipeline) I think you are familiar with this map. Look here. (points at map) Shwe Gas, Kyauk Phyu. I have visited Kyauk Phyu during the course of our research. It is closely linked linked to China. The interest of China in Burma is not only in the northern part of Burma, which is Kachin and Shan. No, China has deep interests (points) here as well. This is not only the economic interest. They have political interests too. Because this is bordering to India.

According to the Memorandum of Understanding, 80 % of natural gas from offshore Rakhine State goes to China. 20 % remains in Burma. Who did this? The people from Naypyidaw. Did our government know about this? No. I talked to the government, the current official of the Rakhine State government. The local people in Kyauk Phyu were not consulted. They were not part of the decision-making in terms of the MoU.

(shows image of a hovel) So in Kyauk Phyu Township, we visited several villages. And I saw this house. I am from Chin State, which borders Rakhine State, and I know the situation. Under the UNDP, Rakhine State is the second poorest state in Burma. Chin State is number one. When I looked at this house, I thought about why has this been happening? This should not be the case, because there are huge natural resources in Rakhine State. But they do not have any say at all.

OK. I am taking you to Kachin State. Hpakant. Jade. Jade is very popular in our country. (shows different estimates of jade revenue) Look at this one. Within 2013 and 2014, according to official statistics, the revenue from jade alone is 1.15 billion USD. China has their own official publications: 12.3 billion. Global Witness did a really good job: 31 billion USD in 2014, which is 48 % of Myanmar’s GDP. Ash Center, Harvard University: 8 billion. We did not look at the revenue part of, the revenue aspect of the jade industries. But when we are looking at these numbers … Take the Ash Center’s figure of 8 billion. The government states it’s only 1.15 billion, so where is the remaining 7 billion?

So from our context, I’m quite curious about the case of Indonesia and civil-military relations: how did they get the military out of politics? How did they do that in Indonesia? In Myanmar, they have 25 % of the seats in Parliament. This is our situation. I think the number 1.15 can explain that.
(shows images) Look at this. How the jade mining is happening in Hpakant. Look at this infrastructure. I was trying to call my wife from Hpakant, but I could not, because there is no proper telephone or Internet access there. This is the bridge. The river is polluted, and they do not even have a proper bridge. If they could spend only 1% of the revenue from jade alone, then at least I think they could build a good bridge in Hpakant. Why is this happening? Because Kachin State has no power in terms of resource management and resource sharing. The local government in Hpakant has no power in terms of resource management.

So we came up with our report, and then we presented it to the ethnic armed organisations, and then also to civil society organisations and ethnic political parties, and we got their feedback and comments. Our general recommendations … Ownership: Ownership should go to the Kachin people. Management: Exclusive management rights of the State or Region. The State should have the right of management.

Then there is revenue sharing. During the course of consultations in Rakhine State and Kachin State, we came to the conclusion … We have looked at other cases, such as the case of Aceh, and how they’re doing in other countries, like Canada … 70% should remain in the State, and 30% should go to the federal government. The producing local areas must be entitled to a larger share than the non-producing local areas within a State or Region. I am actually interested in learning more about how Norway is doing. I talked to Kristian about it. You have the oil fund. How did you do that?

So here are the recent remarks by the State Counsellor on October 15, 2017: “At the upcoming sessions of the Peace Conference” – which will be held in late 2018 – “I urge all of you to finalize all the fundamental principles on Federalism … We will need to continue our dialogue on the division of power, allocation of resources and revenue between the Union, States and Regions … If we are able to conclude the discussion on fundamental principles during the upcoming sessions of the Peace Conference, we would have a strong foundation for the Federal Union.”

This remark is indeed encouraging. Previously, during the first two sessions, she never mentioned any key principles or fundamental principles for building a future union. This is really encouraging. However, we have not seen any specific proposal or recommendations from her yet. The State Counsellor has been talking about a federal democratic union, which is great, but we need substance! What kind of system we should have, what kind of power we should
share. What power should go to the Regions and States, and what power should remain at the federal level.

Another issue is not only the division of power, but the separation of power. The separation of power within the executive branch between the judiciary branch and legislative branch. She has to come up with specific proposals and recommendation. I hope she will do that in 2018. Unless we have an agreement at the 21st Century Panglong Conference on the power-sharing between the States and federal government, I don’t see any sustainable peace in the country.

This is what we have been doing. We have come up with specific proposals and recommendations. As of now, we haven’t seen any specific proposals from the government.

Thank you.

Kristian Stokke

The final speaker in this first session is Seng Raw. She is the founder and director of Metta Foundation, which comes out of Kachin, but is a Union-wide foundation, and one of the biggest, most prominent, and important civil society organisations of its kind in Myanmar.

Lahpai Seng Raw

Thank you. Good morning, everyone. I thank the organisers. This my first visit to Oslo, and I appreciate also coming with the younger generation from my country. You have been very helpful. I also appreciate that we have two diplomats from the Myanmar Embassy with us here, since yesterday. That is a very positive sign. My colleagues have already given so much knowledge, shared so much about the situation, the complexities of our country. But I still have a lot on my plate, that I would like to share with you.

So today, I will talk about how we are to perceive power, welfare, and democratic reforms in line with our vision of a Union of Burma where we would be proud to be member states. I will start with Kachin aspirations for power. “Power” here refers mainly to power-sharing and self-determination. Kachin power is to have the capacity to define our own destiny and society based on our culture, values and traditions; setting the key policies in all relevant societal matters, including education, natural resources and economy, among others. So, are we close to that? I don’t think so.

If we look at the 2015 elections, 6 ethnic parties contested in 18 townships in Kachin State, and only two ethnic parties won in three townships in Kachin State. In the Kachin State Legislature, Kachin-dominated parties hold only 13% of the seats. The rest are NLD, the military, and USDP.

My colleague before me also talked about wealth-sharing, including state mines in Hpakant. And I would also like to take this as one case study. There are about 300,000 to 500,000 migrant workers in the Hpakant jade mines at all time. (shows image) They scavenge jade pieces, risking their lives, such as in this picture. Many national and international organisations and individuals are focusing on the work conditions for migrant workers. The NLD has also opposed household registration cards for them in Hpakant.
So the question arises: What about the native Kachin, who no longer dare to live in the
government-controlled jade mine areas? What is also very troubling and disturbing is that where
the Kachin are not able to vote, the non-natives, who do not have much interest in development
of the local areas, would be able to vote, and can even become representatives in the Kachin
Parliament. We are talking about a quarter of the Kachin population, because they are over
300,000, voting for the military or NLD, and not for the Kachin parties. That means, potentially,
going against Kachin interests and visions.

My colleague already mentioned that the Kachin are excluded. Under the current law, revenue
is handled centrally by the federal government. Social justice and fairness have always been
important in Myanmar’s history of unabated welfare. Currently the government controls 88 %
of all public expenditure, transferring only 12 % to States and Regions. So how have the central
government allocated the wealth accumulated from the borderlands? We have to realise that the
borderlands are rich in natural resources. These lands are the ethnic co-founders of the Union.
Compared to countries at similar levels of income, Myanmar spends a larger share of its GDP
on defence, and a smaller share on health, education, and social protection and economic
services. The World Bank has argued that Myanmar could benefit from a gradual rebalancing
toward non-defence priorities. But how could they do it? How could they rebalance this? It will
not be that easy.

In yesterday’s presentations, we also talked about that we have 21 armed groups at this point
of time, and only eight have ceasefire agreements. Unless the government accepts dialogue,
“the Panglong process will remain a half-baked dream,” as an article I just read this morning
said. In Kachin State, the army of the Myanmar government has 154 battalions. And as many
as 28 posts have been abandoned, to be taken over by Myanmar government troops, just
between April 2016 and August 2017. This is during the NLD era. Why? Because there are 546
fighting or skirmishes that occurred in the KIO controlled area in Kachin and Northern Shan.
KIO troops are still active in this area, but more as a guerrilla movement, and not stationed as
before. In fact, the KIO now has a total of eight brigades, from a previous total of four. What I
want to say is that we have to imagine the life of the civilians under such a military movement
area where we have to live. We have not just the government troops. We have the KIO, we have
the border guard troops, militia troops, and so on.

To cover expenses of war, non-state actors depend on their natural resources, and border trade
as well. (shows list of China-EAO border trade posts) If we look at this, we do not have to say
much. The EAOs on the China-Burma border are economically autonomous.
At the same time, there is the issue of state militias. We have 35 militias in Kachin State alone. That is a great burden for the community, for the civilians, who are very poor. 75% of the population in the borderlands are so poor they have no way they can pay taxes. That is also an issue, because civilians do not enter a relationship with the government, as they cannot pay taxes. It highlights the importance of wealth-sharing as well. Conflict resolution, economic advancing, and democratisation need to be approached together. They cannot be separated. The war has to stop, if we are to move forward, and then really take on the democratic reform. Unless the root causes of the armed conflict are resolved, and unless we can stop the war, there is no transition.

Participant

One question. Is this showing that most of the militias are loyal to the government, and the military regime?

Lahpai Seng Raw

Yes. Because in the 2008 Constitution, article 340 said very clearly that peoples’ militias are under the control of the police, government, or Tatmadaw. It depends. So you can see that the more fighting you have, the more increase in the peoples’ militia troops, and the economic burden on the people as well.

Let us now look at welfare. For us, when we talk about welfare, like any other country, we would say that we would like to enjoy a social system which takes care of all the essential needs of people living in Kachin State, with no distinction of any kind – whether along ethnic or religious lines – and with special attention to the most vulnerable groups, especially elders and children. This is our ideal vision, for an ideal time that we meant to reach, but we are currently in a humanitarian emergency crisis. Funds from international donors has been drying up since the country’s peace process started. And the least among us are struggling to survive on on-and-off support of 300 MMKs, about 20 cents, per person per day. But they are also not regularly receiving it.

And the very phenomenon here is that you see more people in the ethnic armed controlled areas. That means people are fleeing from the government troops. (shows image) So there are 167 refugee camps like this, along the China-Burma border. The majority of them are children or elderly. Many are entering their seventh winter. I would like to bring to your attention one case study of the most vulnerable among them, namely teenage girls. One particular project working
with displaced children is called “Children Overcoming Conflict and Displacement Through the Arts.” It is about arts as a survival tool. It involves children aged 7 to 17, and the theme of the artwork comes from their talks and expressions.

(shows children’s artwork) So how do the children see their homes, or what they call “homes” at the moment? They see them as boxes. We adults need to see how their drawings display the environment in which these young people live. A girl who was six years old when she was displaced by the conflict six years ago is now 12 years old. It is no longer convenient for her to keep sleeping in the same room, the same 10 by 10 house, with her siblings and parents, as she has done into adolescence. But in the camp, she has no choice. So some girls want to leave the camp. Another reason is that they do not want to mention that they are from the camps when they introduce themselves to new friends. This is particularly true for children in the government-controlled area. Some of them cross over to China, deciding to walk, taking the risk of being put on an unsafe migration road, and become prey to human trafficking. And some girls start to use these, making tattoos with the ink, using the geometrical compass. Of course they have no other choice, they cannot decide anything, so they are desperate. They influence each other, making group decisions such as making cheap tattoos or migrating out together. So the situation of girls and women in conflict areas is quite depressing. And here I omitted the rapes and extrajudicial human rights abuses.

When we talk about democracy, like any other provinces or States within the Union, we look for a way of ruling society which is participatory, transparent, and where everyone has the capacity to express her or his opinions with freedom and without fear of repression of any kind. A system in which political parties are one of the tools that ensure political debates, is not exclusive but open to all societal stakeholders, and where divisions of power are clearly separated and respected.

Yesterday Mung Dan brought the Kachin customary law to attention. This is not new to us. It is in keeping with the Kachin tradition of societal accepted justice, outside of the formal court system, that has been practiced for years to solve disputes among our own people. Yesterday, when I heard that, I thought this also an opportunity for us to really work on it. We could set up our own courts and appoint judges who are respectable and accepted by the public. Then we would also learn how to resolve conflicts by civil mediators so that we don’t have to go to the police and court. Anyway, we do not have faith in them. So that is one avenue that we have to take very seriously.
With the democratisation process too, we have so much against us: The 2008 Constitution, the electoral system, unresolved political grievances, the war, and a culture of impunity. The democratic reform looks like a Mission Impossible. But we have to think and take every opportunity, like the Kachin customary law, and the CSOs must continue work addressing the issues on the ground like citizenship, migration, land issue, true parliaments, and bringing elections to our fore. That is also bringing elections to our foreground.

So this is what I call the 2020 Vision. By 2020 we may not have perfect vision, but we could start there. This is going to happen in three short years, and there will be another election. This is for us to exercise democratic reform. And I would say, like in any other project, we need to look at process. How participatory it could be, how consensus decision-making is among stakeholders, how institutions can be built, and how can we be responsive to the need of our constituents. And we need to develop a collective mindset. All this. I will not go into details here. I just want to say that we are actually working on that. Mung Dan is also involved in this.

On my last slide, I would like to quote Aung San Suu Kyi. What she said: “Until we have a system that guarantees rule of law and basic democratic institutions, no amount of aid or investment will benefit our people.” Now, it may not be that diplomatic, but here I would like to put another point, that we have heard already a number of issues that we are facing, and a question always asked is what Norway should do. To say it very directly: Norway has already gone out on a limb on Myanmar. If this is to mean anything, it has a special responsibility not to be an on-and-off friend, but a committed voice to support good. Like 1991 Nobel Peace Prize to Aung San Suu Kyi, government funding to the Norway-Burma Committee, and support for DVB (Democratic Voice of Burma), and then initial support and encouragement to President Thein Sein to Myanmar peace, support for the initiate. What is Norway’s policy now? We all know that when problems have shown themselves, they are to be resolved. And potentially, it could get worse if we don’t do it. The question is if Norway’s only interest now is business. Norway used to be the best friend we had among international governments. You have supported change in the past for the people. It is hoped that you will continue on that. And I would very much like to see that you come on board with this when we realise the 2020 Vision.

Thank you very much.
Discussion

Kristian Stokke

Thank you so much to all the presenters. We do have time for questions and comments, and I think there is a lot to discuss to here. It is of course also possible to revisit issues that we discussed yesterday.

Olle Törnquist

I want to add a few remarks to Purwo’s fine presentation. I want to share some of the experiences in Aceh, because our Burmese friends seem to be interested in the experiences from the peace process on that northern tip of Sumatra. Generally, I think the obvious answer to why Indonesia was relatively speaking successful in handling the regional grievances and conflicts can be summarised in four points.

First, as Purwo mentioned, the radical decentralisation to local elites. Then there were certainly problems with the local elites, but that is another matter, which we have to save for later.

Second, the extensive economic liberties. In other words, the enormous privatisation of public resources. This removed several conflicts from the realm of the state and politics to, formally speaking, the marketplace. Of course, the marketplace is quite political, but that too is a slightly different matter.

Third, the strategy to exchange business opportunities for peace. In other words, some resources for the military campaigns were transformed to project opportunities for the local commanders, local rebels and other people involved in the struggles. So the word was: “Stop fighting, we’ll give you funds and the chance to make profits instead. We’ll give you all kinds of business opportunities, all kinds of projects. Just apply for them, and we’ll fix it.” The current Vice President, Jusuf Kalla, was the head of that effort under the previous president SBY, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono.

Fourth, the elections. In Aceh there was an attempt to combine decentralisation and elections with the right to participate with local parties. In Aceh, moreover, there were attempts to focus on this forth factor and to reduce, in comparison with the Moluccas and Poso and Tentena (in Central Sulawesi) the importance of privatisation and ‘business for peace’. Unfortunately it was only partially implemented and successful. The two major problems were the following: Firstly and most remarkably, the depoliticisation of the enormous support for reconstruction after the
tsunami. The Western donors, including Sweden and Norway, refused to find ways of combining support for the reconstruction with the fostering of local good governance and democratisation in Aceh. It is shameful, what was done, and it was done under social democratic governance in Sweden, which is terrible. We offered them opportunities, but they refused.

Secondly, as you may know, the peace treaty was quite the opposite of what Zo told us about in Burma. Extensive peace negotiations with an enormous agenda, of the kind that was presented by Zo, would be avoided. The secret behind the Helsinki Agreement and Ahtisaari’s negotiation was to say “no, we don’t take it up here. We provide you with a democratic framework, which you can agree on, and then you discuss and solve the other issues by way of democratic processes.” This worked reasonably well – minus the fact that there was no representation of issue groups, interest groups, etc. What was offered was a very idealistic liberal-democratic framework. And within that framework, so many groups and vested interests could not find a meaningful way of participating and of making a real difference. Consequently, the democratic process to foster both peace and development started to break down. The deterioration is a tragic and frustrating story that we cannot expand on here. But the reason for success in Helsinki was that there was not the kind of extensive agenda that you suggested. I do not know enough of your context to say that you do wrong. But what I argue is that this was a vital reason for the success in Helsinki. And I would add that the decision to try the democratic roadmap was that previous NGO-led negotiations with extensive agendas had collapsed. Nobody could handle them.

Yet, even if the very peace negotiations were successful because of the focus on democratisation there were, as I said, two problems with the democratic framework that was provided: One, that we did not get a proper framework for the interest organisations, interest groups and so on to participate and act democratically. Hence they too began to undermine democracy. Second, the shameful handling of the international aid for reconstruction. Proportionally, the funds for reconstruction were even larger than the Marshall aid to Europe after the Second World War – but that aid programme was combined with support for democracy.

**Eva Hansson**

Eva Hansson, Stockholm University. I work primarily on Vietnam and Thailand. Having heard these interesting presentations now – I am not at all an expert on Burma/Myanmar, but it raises many questions as to how to understand democratisation and democratisation processes. I think these thoughts go back to theories like Rustow’s theories of democratisation, which commence
with a kind of natural control of national territory. According to this old theory, pre-conditions then come in several stages, and finally end up in democratisation.

I think that there probably could be something in this. I am especially thinking of the penetration of the state across geographic territory. The cases of Burma and Indonesia raise questions about that. What kind of state are people actually meeting in the different states of Burma, for example? It was mentioned that some areas are not under the control of the government at all. So my question is that perhaps we must think of also the different types of power of the state. Perhaps we can think of the state in terms of infrastructural and despotic power. Do citizens need that kind of state, or do they need another state, with daycare centres and hospitals? So I think the penetration of the state is really interesting to know more about.

I also wondered about what possibilities you think that formal democratic institutions at the national level in Burma have to allow for conflict transformation in conflict areas. Is it even possible to think that conflicts may be transformed, so that they could be handled in formalistic democratic institutions? Or should one rather think about democratisation at the state level, and not at the national level?

Another question that puzzles me is the different languages in Burma. I wondered what are the consequence of linguistic diversity for the possibilities to campaign in a meaningful way at a national level. I am thinking, for example, of Malaysia, where this is a huge problem, because some people simply do not understand what certain parties are talking about when they are campaigning.

**Tore Lindholm**

I am Tore Lindholm. I am 76 years old. I mention that not because it’s very impressive, but I want to tell you very briefly, but pertinent to today’s discussion, what happened in my life, 22 years ago. At that time, I think it was 1995 … I have been a member of the Norwegian Burma Council since 1992, and after three or four years, there was a huge international conference with representatives from all ethnic peoples in Burma in the capital of the Philippines. I was there, and it was very interesting, but also conceptually frustrating. I will now just recount some of my frustrations from 22 years ago.

There were many proposals. The conference was actually devoted to the topic of the future Democratic Federal Republic of Burma. That idea is not a new invention. The point of the conference was not to reach a final agreement, but to have a discussion, to air problems: What
should be the relationships? How should you structure the relationship concerning authority and citizenship between the various States of Burma? One thing was the problem of the border. That was the least. How about citizens? The people of Burma are not ethnically subdivided, so that all and only Shans live in Shan State, for example. People live mixed. So how should we organise access to citizenship? Who should have voting power? And could you freely move from one state to another? How about intermarriage? I don’t have to go into all these problems. You must have met them. And they are severe. And how should political life, parties, be organised? How should you think about the political process? What should be the balance? Because there has to be a balance between federal power and state power.

I have heard very many interesting things today, particularly because it was so fantastically clear. Although I was also confused by Zo Tum Hmung from ENAC. Wonderful, but I didn’t hear much about a understanding of how relationships between States in Burma should be. How demarcation lines should be worked out and so on. And I think that even if Aung San Suu Kyi’s pious words do come about, these problems have to be identified, and they have to be faced. I am sure you have discussed them, I am not pretending I understand something you haven’t thought of. But I haven’t heard much about how difficult these things are, a sense of that, and how you are going to address them.

Ellen Stensrud

I am Ellen Stensrud from the Center for Studies of Holocaust and Religious Minorities. My question is shifting the attention a bit from the forces that we have been discussing today, the forces that want democratic and political change. I would like to challenge those of you who are either from Myanmar or experts on Myanmar to think about what the military interest is in this. How could it be possible to push the military toward accepting federalism or peace? If I were the military, I would think that both federalism and peace would challenge my interests in the sense that it would challenge my importance as a guardian of stability, and my access to natural resources. My question, which I am asking out of ignorance and curiosity, is: Are there any carrots at all that can tempt the military to move? And what is the history of this? I am thinking of the previous peace agreements. What has been the military’s role in those cases? Has the military been willing to meet and to compromise in those cases? Is there anything we can learn from that, in convincing the military that federalism and genuine power-sharing, particularly in the resource field, is a good idea? Do they want national recognition? Do they want recognition from Western states, or is Chinese recognition enough? What about
international trade, international trade, and top-notch weapons? Is that something that could tempt them into compromise, from the point of the military, what’s in it for them in this process?

Knut Asplund

I am Knut Asplund from the Norwegian Centre for Human Rights. When it comes to the issue of natural resources and conflict, that is of course a never-ending discussion, but with the issue of Aceh, of course, at the point of the peace agreement, you had a situation where the gas fields, the main source of revenue in Aceh, were about to dry out. There was not much more money to be gained from the gas industry. Additionally, the relation between the military and ExxonMobil had turned a bit sour on issues you had before, there … So the prospect of gaining continued revenue was (inaudible). And as for the case in Shan … of course, if you had seven billion USD as a modest estimate of revenue, you could just (inaudible). It’s a very tempting place to be in control.

Ingvill Plesner

Ingvill Plesner, of the Holocaust Center. My question is regarding education. I know it is a big question, but you both touched upon it: How would you approach the challenge for an education system that reflects both some kind of common identity within a Union of Myanmar and Kachin culture and power in Kachin State? In other words, an opening for the plurality that Tore referred to – within Kachin State and among the various states. So that people who are not Kachin but live in Kachin State can also feel at home.

Lahpai Seng Raw

I just want to come with a short answer. As I showed in the slide, when we say “Kachin,” it is not just Kachins per se. It is the people living in Kachin State. Which I also mentioned: Not to discriminate against any background, religions, or ethnicities. I feel that when the government allows that the State Constitution to be drafted, I think this is also a good opportunity for us to reflect on that issue, and to bring in more stakeholders.

Participant

My name is (inaudible). I am from the Rainforest Foundation Norway. My question is directly to Purwo. Very interesting about how the distribution of resources affects elections. From our point of view, we can see that, for example, forest fires always happen in a political cycle, because it is linked to land concessions being dealt out. There are a lot of such catastrophic consequences of this distribution of resources. My question, to you and also to the gentleman
who had the presentation on benefit sharing in resources, is: Do you have any insights into how ownership of resources can be made more democratic, when it is already very tied in to the political cycle? If you have any solutions, or any insight.

**Kristian Stokke**

I have one comment myself. It is especially to Zo Tum Hmung. I think that the ENAC exercise is very fascinating and exciting. It is an exercise that to some extent seeks to grapple with what we talked about yesterday, in terms of fragmentation, lack of policy or some kind of shared agenda and program. And it is a critique that has been charged against ethnic actors, but, as you say, also the pro-democracy main party, NLD. I think that this is a very interesting, exciting, and promising initiative – with lots of constraints. But my question is really about the reception: Apart from NLD, when this was presented at the first session of the Panglong in August 2016, how was it received by the military? My impression is that the military have done their homework. They come to these negotiations with their positions worked out. But it seems to me it is not full stop on all issues. There are some core issues that are non-negotiable, and some issues that where might be some room for negotiation. So I am just curious about how this is played out when you try to take it to Panglong, or when you try to engage and challenge the military.

**Purwo Santoso**

Thank you for the question on the ownership of resources. This is a big question. But let me give the big picture first, before going deeper into the election-related issues. Indonesia used to gain a lot of money from oil in the 1970s. There was some corruption at some point, but the technocratic approach under military control, I think, was useful in collecting money and transforming the money for state-led economic development. So to some extent, the technocratic approach was successful, and apart from the corruption issues, the state was able to invest in infrastructure, like education, health, and so forth. The authoritarian governments gave simple instructions: Make sure that in every village, we have minimum one school. In every subdistrict, we have minimum one health centre. This centralistic approach was able to transform economic gain from the oil boom from the time into infrastructure or development, and also of fostering economic development. But then, in detail, there was a problem of proper distribution of money. Therefore, there was a lot of criticism at the time.

Now, let’s go deeper. In term of forests, the government has been very vague in managing the forests. The need for concessions to the big businesses was part of the problem, and it creates
conglomerations of the private, as Olle mentioned. Then it creates a problem within the state-controlled forest management. Later on, when it comes to decentralisation, the same problem appears, and it has gotten worse because the demand from local communities of autonomy, of gaining access to the forests. The direct elections create another problem. The demand for mobilising money for winning elections gives incentive to concessions to the businesses to gain money, and then pay out after the election. All of the mess-up is taking place, but the Ministry of Forests has been seriously negotiating with the customary law system and sat side by side with them.

In terms of mining, the situation is more or less the same. Companies are dominating. This is the private ownership, later on, operating on a very large scale, and again, it is not really benefitting the local community. And then, at some point there was a (inaudible) for the customary law at the constitutional challenge. Then customary law gained more firm ownership of the land. I am not really convinced that the allocation of resources to the private or to the customary law is safe. The customary law has strict rules for using the resources. But from the environmental studies I have been undertaking, I think the problem is to make sure that the negative effect of the exploitation of natural resources is what really matters. Typically, the environmental effect is taking place much later than the economic gain, allowing whoever controls the resources to simply give the negative effects to somebody else later on in the process. Because of this game, the actors at the local level are asking why they should not use up the resources for their own, since the central government did so in the past. There is an ongoing collective stupidity, or narrow interests taking advantage of natural resources. And social capital and so forth is so narrowly organised, and therefore still losing the big picture. Interlocal effects is something that is not really addressed.

**Zo Tum Hmung**

First of all, thank you to Olle. You mentioned a case in Indonesia, a privatisation issue and business for peace. Our Centre has research on what to do. This is a very interesting case for us, because it relates to ENAC.

You talked about what the interest of the military is. So, I wanted to go back to Chin as a case study. The statistics, in 2013 and 2014. Official information: Only 1.15 billion USD. The Chinese government: 12.3. The difference is almost 11 billion. Then, Global Witness: 31 billion. 48 % of the GDP. Where did this huge amount of money go? I think this is something that needs to be thought about.
Here, the presentations of the United Nationalities Federal Council, which was at the time led by KIO vice-chairman. If you have time to look at our website, you will not see any demand about the right of secession. At the Panglong Conference, Aung San guaranteed the Kachin, Chin, and Shan the right of secession at any time. In the 1947 Constitution, chapter 10, it clearly mentions the right of secession. And then before he was assassinated, Aung San drafted the Constitution, which recognizes the same … That is section 4, the right of secession from the Union. But now, our leaders do not demand the right of secession. They are simply asking for power-sharing.

What is the Tatmadaw’s interest? In Burma, there are two key stakeholders. One is of course the State Counsellor, Aung San Suu Kyi. She has the power of the people, but the military has the constitutional power. Because they control the Home Ministry, they control the Defence Ministries, they control the Border Affairs Ministry. And then one of the Vice Presidents is from the military. More importantly, they control the National Defence and Security Council, which is comprised by 11 members. The military has six members, while Aung San Suu Kyi has only five.

So I think, in our country, there are two issues. The civil-military relations and then our ethnic armed organisations. How she is going to handle that. This is not an easy one. This is very challenging and difficult for her.

A little bit to Kristian’s comment. For the first and second Panglong, the military prepared and delivered a thorough paper on their positions. If you look at their presentation, they always say that the 2008 Constitution is a federal constitution, and that any constitutional reform would have to go through the 2008 Constitution. That is their position, very clearly. And then, related to ethnic armed organisation, they call for DDR – disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration – asking them to surrender their weapons and enter into elections under the 2008 Constitution. So the military, they have specific positions. Their positions are clear, in terms of their politics.

But so far we have not seen any substance from the government, the way they want to share power between the federal and the states. Also, how they want to divide power, or separate power, between the judiciary, the executive branch, and the legislative branch. Because currently the Tatmadaw is everywhere. They are at the executive, they are at the judiciary branch. Not only at the federal level, but also at the States and Regions level. Unless we have a proposal, how are we going to discuss? How are we going to negotiate, how are we going to
talk? Ours is just a recommendation proposal. We are open to discussion and dialogue. But again, she is in a very tough situation. She has, of course, the power of the people, but she does not have the constitutional power.

**Lahpai Seng Raw**

Does the military have the political will to transform? I would say no, I do not think so. But I think it is very important that we do not give the military free reign. That is for all of us, domestic as well as international, who care about the issues. Now, how can we bring about change? I do not think that Aung San Suu Kyi has the political will for federal democratic reform, even if she may have the capacity. Where we should look for our strength is civil society. At the moment, though, civil society is weak. We have our own shortcomings, and we are divided on the Rohingya issue. So I think we really need to strengthen civil society at this time. There are many things that we can test, whether the military really has the political will. For example, there should be a time allocation, when the 25% allocated seats could be changed into elected seats. This kind of things. But we need to find a dignified exit strategy for the military.

There was also one question, whether we are more close to China or to the West. Speaking for the Kachin, I don’t think we have much of a choice. We really need to have a workable relationship with China. And China is changing. I just got an email last night that a friend wrote. The advisor to the China Development Bank had claimed to him that the loans for several projects, including the road to the border, were rejected, in cause of risk due to the Myitsone Dam issue. He is quite sceptical regarding if the China-Myanmar Economy Corridor will be successful. That is talking about the China Bank, the way the China Bank sees it now. As, in his words: “China has to give up on the project first, and recognise that it just will not happen.” That is on the Myitsone Dam. “Myanmar also needs to be more direct and inform China so that the two sides can negotiate a settlement.” I think that is good news for us. Also, at the moment, there are more Chinese CSOs working with us than five years ago, although most of them are created by the government. We also have one project working with Jingpo, that is Kachin on the Chinese side, who are orphans of IDP parents. And there we have 350 children from the Kachin state, that are IDPs. So I think we always have to find a good relationship with our neighbours. There is no other way. And I think in the meantime, if we want to see transformed, like the EAOs, there could be lots of international support, like building the capacity, like police, like immigration, forestry … When we are really going to have a federal state, we also need the capacity.
Banking on Popular Leaders and Facing Right-wing Populism

Chair: Olle Törnquist

Olle Törnquist: Introduction

Welcome back to the afternoon session. We shall turn to the conjunctures, to the political struggles. We turn to the problems that pro-democrats try to overcome by linking up, in many cases, with popular leaders – and the process stumbling over new obstacles. We start with a brief account of the recent developments in Indonesia, which Luky Djani and I will give together. Then we turn to the Burmese scene, presented to us by Audun Aagre; and to the Philippines, where there are so many experiences in this regard, which Joel Rocamora will reflect on. In addition, Eva Hansson will point to the Thai experiences. And finally, we shall get a comment from an Indian point of view, by Kenneth Bo Nielsen.
In 1999, the liberal democratisation strategy gained hegemony. However, while it is true that devolution of resources to the local level generated local strongmen, there were also direct elections and some space for new leaders. To get wider support in the new majoritarian rather than proportional elections, these leaders added populist methods to old clientelism. This in turn was also an opening for a number for a number of pro-democrats that had been marginalised and fractionalised in the struggles for more democracy in the context of liberal elitism.

This generated social contracts from below that carried, among others, Jokowi to presidential powers. The social contracts were, however, populist and informal in nature, much along the lines presented by Purwo in his presentations. That meant that everything was person to person, negotiations were individual. Jokowi himself could sit in the morning with one urban poor organisation, in the afternoon with a civil society group; and having done that he might take on the business community in various rounds of negotiations. So this was far from democratic, and there were ample opportunities for him and other leaders to divide and rule.

This was also very difficult to scale up from Jakarta to larger contexts, and of course even more difficult to scale up on a national level. There were no institutions for representation. It was direct relations only. You cannot handle that on a national scene with all kinds of divisions and the need to cover large areas. Like so many other countries in the South, Indonesia does not have a widespread system of national civil society organisation with subunits, etc.

It was also hard to combine the ideas of this social contract with anti-corruption, which we had good experiences of from New Delhi. In New Delhi the anti-corruption movement expanded from nailing famous politicians and businessmen to issues of interest for ordinary people, the abuse of power related to evictions, electricity, and water.

Back in Indonesia, the problems of representation, and of linking up with and further develop the struggle against corruption, meant that many of the concerned organisations focused on individual negotiations with the political leaders that could offer best possible deals for the specific groups and leaders. One of them was Prabowo, the former general, now oligarch with a party of his own, and a competitor of Jokowi.
There was also another attempt to form broader alliances, among labour. In 2010, many activists with different specific interests came together in support for an attempt to enact a universal public health reform. Such a reform had become increasingly important for labour, because after the Asian economic crisis there were more informalised or “flexible” neoliberal employment relations. Hence, labour in quite different sectors had to supplement their regular union and similar forms of struggle with labour market legislation, minimum wages and public welfare policies. Even organised labour turned to politics to affect these things, and to link up with other organisations, including urban poor organisations and domestic workers. This was successful in 2010-12, and really served as an umbrella for many groups to come together.

There was, however, no long-term strategy, and Jokowi was not initiating and fighting for a system of interest-based representation on economic development, labour market issues, welfare policies, and so on. So once the various groups in the beautiful alliance had managed to enforce a positive decision in parliament, and began to implement it, there was no follow-up on how to proceed with similar reforms as a second step of sorts. There were no demands for how these groups would be able to affect and influence further policy negotiations. So these groups too returned to the previous ways of affecting politicians by way of individual negotiations and horse-trading. Even the best organised union, among the metal workers, linked up in the 2014 presidential elections with Indonesia’s Trump, ex-general Prabowo, rather than Jokowi. Hence, we were back on square one. And Luky will now analyse what happened thereafter.

**Luky Djani**

Thank you, Olle. It has really become the driving force for the Jokowi administration that he has to deal with the very dynamic as well as volatile political and economic agencies. Jokowi handles it by building a tactical alliance with different political elites, including elites from political parties that become his coalition. He has to give a certain privilege, handouts, and compensation to these political leaders, so that they will keep supporting him. The same structure goes to the dominant economic actors, the oligarchs. Jokowi has to surrender a couple of economic policies in order to maintain their support.

Having said that, the CSOs and peoples’ organisations then become marginalised once again, as before. Even though we do have a couple of NGO activists in the palace, friends who are working closely with Jokowi; it must be understood that if they don’t have a solid membership support, their presence becomes less relevant.
Also, in talking about Indonesian politics at the moment, we cannot forget the rise of these Islamic groups and Islamic politics, who are able to mobilise a sectarian sentiment against both the central government and the Jakarta Governor.

When Jokowi became President, the new Governor, Ahok, who comes from a Chinese, non-Muslim background, had a different vision on how to govern in Jakarta. He adopted what we can call a New Public Management style of governing. He tried to transform Jakarta into a modern city, like Singapore or even Oslo, where everything is in order. It has captured the imagination of a middle class of Jakartans, who used to travel to Singapore, Hong Kong, or Tokyo, and wanted Jakarta to become like those cities. They support Ahok’s policy to change the urban slums into so-called business districts or as real estate. The urban poor then became marginalised. They were evicted to housing provided by Ahok, but in doing so, Ahok actually withdrew the social pact between the urban poor and the Jokowi government. When Jokowi ran for Governor, he promised that he would not evict urban poor from the slum area. He said he would build housing in that area. Ahok, however, in the name of order, and in an attempt to try restructure the city architecture, evicted these slum-dwellers. This opened up an opportunity for political rivals to engage with these urban poor and engage with the people who are dissatisfied with Ahok’s policy.

Interestingly, the previously marginalised political Islam groups are now becoming the centre of political dynamics. They speak in terms of social justice, in terms of trying to empower the urban poor, so that they would be normal citizens. Then they would not be evicted. Previously, the majority of Muslims were disengaged with politics. Now they become active, and they were able to mobilise thousands on thousands of people. They claim seven million people gathered in December last year. We think this is the biggest mass mobilisation in Indonesian history. Because of that, Ahok lost the election, and worse, he was sentenced in a blasphemy case.
In this diagram, we can see the social economic inequalities. Years of inequality, which is still there, but the most important is the assets inequality, in terms of land accusation. The number is very high, even compared with income inequality. Hence, we think the next step for the current Jokowi administration should be to move away from focus on building physical infrastructure, and try to build a broader alliance for social infrastructure. The current government initiative is to give handouts, just like the previous Susilo government. The previous government gave 300,000 rupia every month to each government. The current government will double it, starting next year, to 700,000 rupia per household. This money will supplement the economic difficulties faced by these poor households, but we also think is a handout scheme would not create social solidarity among different groups and classes. Therefore, our proposal to the current government is to integrate the scattered social welfare provisions that are already in place into one scheme that could generate social solidarity among Indonesians. And secondly, if we talk about this Islamist politics, the current response from the government is to provide or to produce a counter-narrative. Narratives like Pancasila, or narratives like “Bhinneka Tunggal Ika” (“unity in diversity”). Diversity or plurality is less effective, because this group was mobilised not only because they think that Indonesia is a monolithic society, but because they think that they’ve been marginalised socially and economically. Therefore, the current administration should initiate a broader dialogue with many groups to give them a channel to have a voice in the policy-making process.
Audun Aagre: Political Spaces and Strategies of Civil Society Organisations After the 2015 Election in Burma

It is a privilege to be here on this conference. I have learned so many things from the Indonesian experience, and also from the Burmese experience; which puts me in a difficult situation. We have had experts from civil society, political parties, and ethnic organisations, so I have no other choice than to fly high and try to see things in perspective. I was inspired by Olle’s introduction yesterday, talking about the floating civil society. So I tried to make some bubbles of the actors in Myanmar, and tried to explain a little bit about the positions and spaces for civil society in the current context, based on the interests of different groups.

First, I would like to travel into the local context by my own experience and try to see how Burma/Myanmar is perceived from different perspectives under the presidency of Thein Sein. Seen from the West, sitting at a Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Europe or the US, it is obvious that the reforms we have seen are really unique. A military regime transforming into some kind of democratic society, apparently admitting their wrongdoings in the past and their need to improve. In a bigger picture it is also about geopolitics, framing China, the US, and the West in different roles and interests. Seen from Yangon the vibrant civil society is an indicator of genuine change, and dominated by Bamar or Burman organisations. Seen from the diplomatic missions in Yangon, highly influenced by Bamar scholars from the US and Yangon based analysts, they acquainted an understanding that was unrecognizable for the minorities and the opposition.

Of course, there is a totally different perspective in the different states. I will just take one example here from a recent visit to the north. To travel to Kachin State is at first like digging into a jungle of confusion. First you meet the Jingpaw, the majority group in Kachin State. But you move further on, and meet other minorities, like the Lisu, Rawang, and the Shan people in Kachin State, and you get a totally different perspective. In this jungle, you need to navigate, and go all the way into the detail to understand all the different layers of conflict, positions and interests.

First, I would like to talk about a couple of bubbles I would like to see burst. We need to understand that the reforms were not necessarily a military exit strategy, as the narrative we have seen the previous five years would suggest. It is in fact more like a survival strategy. We have not seen any evidence that the military would actually like to voluntarily move out of
politics. They are clinging to the political sphere very strongly, safeguarded by the Constitution. It is very hard to see any kind of military move away from the political domain.

Olle talked about how the Spanish model was used to explain the Indonesian opening. I think that many academics still hold on to this “open the lid” idea from Yugoslavia and Tito. If a regime opens up, all these negative things come out. That is of course true. Nevertheless, in Burma we see that there is a very much controlled troublemaking, where the military is involved in militia groups, through thugs directly under the control of the military, and are in close touch with the extreme nationalism evolving in the country.

I also would like to say one thing about “lost in translation.” The West listened to those that spoke the same language. These were people trained from abroad. We have seen a narrative of ethnic spoilers, those who would not go along with the idea of a peace process promoted by the military, the previous government, and also the incumbent government. In my opinion, this narrative has been greatly exaggerated, actually making it more difficult to find reconciliation and common understanding.

In an overall perspective, we are seeing a move from ideal politics to real politics in the West, where China has thought us that political suppression goes well with market economy and trade. The unfortunate outcome of the Arab Spring strengthened the fear of popular uprisings and a weak state. We are more willing than ever to see business as a tool for long term change, and hence more willing to accept authoritarian elements.

I will try to just very briefly look at some different positions. What was the military’s interest? They have been running the country for 60 years. They were very strong, by military means. At the same time, they needed to get more credibility, which they lacked. They had no popular support before in the country, so they needed that. Due to the sanctions, they were also squeezed toward China. Their political and economic dependency of China was seen as a disgrace. USDP, the military main party, evolved from USDA, a civil society branch of the military, and then became a political party that drew the reforms after the 2010 election, led by Thein Sein, and based on military’s 2008 constitution.

I just mentioned the USDA, civil society branch of the military. There is also the most amusing term, GONGO: Governmental Non-Governmental Organisations. There were many such organisations, consisting of some crony elements, and some pro-governmental pro-military elements, that tried to internationally advocate for the military and USDP’s reform role in the transition.
Seen from the pro-democratic side, with NLD at its core, they knew well the military government partly depended on NLD and Aung San Suu Kyi for their legitimacy. NLD tried to trade with amending the constitution, without success.

The objective of the ethnic side, the minorities, is self-determination and a federal union, an objective apparently shared with NLD.

The internationally supported civil society had its starting point after Cyclone Nargis. Evolving from the humanitarian field, they became more and more political. And the Sangha, nationalism, is playing a really important now, as we will see.

I tried to make it very simple. This was the situation after 1990 as seen from abroad. The NLD and ethnic armed organisations belonged to a greater alliance or movement for democracy. The Sangha was taking a clear stand against the military. The Western countries were on the same page. The CSOs in Myanmar and in exile were in the same position. And here we had the military side with the GONGOs and the business interests driven by the military people, and China as a supporter behind this.
What we saw in the reform process was a movement of the floating bubbles. Civil society still worked very closely with the opposition; and the NLD, the ethnic parties, and ethnic organisations worked against the military interest. However, the Buddhist Sangha were drifting closer to the military, partly because of what happened with the Rohingya crisis in 2012-13, where an association led by prominent monks, MaBaTha, proposed law amendments to Parliament, restraining the rights of the Rohingya people.

So what are the positions now? What we see is that NLD has moved up the ladder, as the first legitimate government in five decades. The military is still playing inside and outside politics, both as a part of the government and as a semi-independent army. The so-called extreme Buddhists are still going strong, and politically in line with military and the USDP, but there
are different opinions within the Sangha. NLD cannot afford to lose substantial support from
the Sangha.

The CSOs are also floating around, mainly due to the Rakhine crisis, where many organisations
share the governments frustration on how the international community has responded to the
Rakhine crisis. The ethnic side is still in a very difficult position. The peace process is a bumpy
road where the gap between the NLD and the ethnic side grows bigger, which is unfortunate
and a huge disappointment with the current government.

Spaces: 2010-15

Let us talk about the spaces during the reform process, from 2010 to 2015. There was a clear
alliance between the military and USDP. However, there were some differences. Thein Sein
announced a unilateral ceasefire. It was rejected by the Commander-in-Chief, and Thein Sein
stopped pushing. It was evident that Thein Sein as a President and superior to the Commander-
in-Chief did not have the power to rule over security issues.

Spaces: 2017

NLD + military: Legitimate government needs to improve civil-military relation.
Nationalism: Rakhine/Robingya + international response
Peace process? View on EAOs close to China.
How are the spaces now? The main difference is that NLD has the legitimacy they need, so they do not feel that they need civil society in the same way the previous government did, and reluctantly dealt with civil society organisations. It is a paradox, that you have an elected government ignoring civil society, and a previous non-elected government giving concessions to NGOs. Due to the Rakhine or Rohingya crisis, we see that the international community, the pro-democratic forces in the country, and civil society are partly floating apart.

Since the subject for this session is nationalism, it should be observed how growing nationalism is affecting the peace process, especially when it comes to the Northern Alliance, which depends on China. There is a strong anti-Chinese sentiment in Burma, and we saw that the previous government played the Crimea card actively regarding the Wa and that they should not lose any territory to China. It was rather effective.

As I have mentioned, the floating factors are many. Nationalism. What happened in Rakhine State, and the international response. The division of power among the elites in Burma between the military side and the civilian elected government. How the international community accused Aung San Suu Kyi for crimes committed by the Commander-in-Chief, which provoked many Burmese. We see the peace process, the relationship between the minorities and the majority, and we see a nationalism that is developing on both sides. On the Bamar Buddhist side, but also on the minority side. And the main thing is the civil-military relation. What the NLD tried to do after they were elected into government – they tried to prioritize improved relations with the military. Because that would create stability and deepen the reforms. I think it is right to say that this strategy has failed. And it is a strong need of re-igniting the alliance and network with NLD, civil society and ethnic minority, depending on a political will.

Thank you.
Joel Rocamora: Philippine Experiments and Dilemmas

Olle Törnquist

Joel Rocamora has a long experience of trying to build democracy and social change from below – and from the top down. In the mid-1990s, he was part of building up Akbayan, a social democratic oriented party. This party entered into government six and a half years ago. Thus Joel found himself in a cabinet position, in charge of the anti-poverty commission, not with huge funds at his disposal, but in charge of coordinating the government’s efforts in fighting poverty. Unfortunately, though, the liberal-left government lost out last year in the election to the Philippines’ Trump, Rodrigo Duterte. This remind us of the battle in Jakarta, when Ahok failed too – and perhaps it gives us idea of what may happen in 2019, when Jokowi may lose out.

Joel Rocamora

Let me start by connecting with your presentation. Jokowi is not a true populist. He is not crazy like my President or the President of the United States. I am serious about that, but I also have some analytical points later.

Populism would not be possible without what I consider the most important anchor of democracy worldwide, which is the principle of single person, single vote. We do not think about the importance of that, because it is accepted everywhere. Even dictators pretend to accept the principle. But one person, one vote can be a serious problem under certain conditions. And the conditions now are precisely the conditions that make the principle dangerous. I am not saying we should do away with it. But it is important to understand that the current conditions. Internationally, mind you, not just in Third World countries like the Philippines and Indonesia, but also in the West, we have been going through a period of rapidly changing inequality. In the West, especially in the United States, the middle class has been decimated. Wage rates have gone down. In the next few days, we will find out whether Trump will succeed in this so-called tax reform, which essentially is giving more money to the American rich.

These trends obviously have to do with globalization. But it is important not to blame globalization alone, because then we will be agreeing with people like Trump and likeminded right-wing groups in Europe, who blame globalization and say now we need to become nationalists. It is not as if you can put globalization back into the bottle. It is not just that it is impossible, I also do not believe that globalization per se is a problem. What is a problem is
neoliberal globalization. It is a globalization with a very specific policy and even proposals, but imposed policies, especially under the Washington Consensus. It is these policies that have made inequality a very serious problem. Now, part of the Washington Consensus pushes for less government, for less capacity of the government to control the economic process, to organize the economic process. Also, especially in Western Europe, there is the rapid erosion of social security, of the welfare state.

The reason I do not think that Jokowi is a true populist is that true populists have to be anti-establishment. At the core of populism is the very deep frustration by large sections of the populations in the West, and especially in countries like my own. It is one thing if economies are not growing. But when you are very poor, and you see that the economy is moving, and there are people who are getting rich while you are just getting poorer and poorer; then the level of unhappiness is very, very high. And you have a situation where people look to government, and in the case of my country, they see that the government is the base of the rapid economic growth, and the mile-high profits of the economic elite. So it is a combination of unhappiness with their economic condition, their poverty; unhappiness with the economic elite; and unhappiness with the government, because the government has not been able to provide.

This is the genius of Trump and Duterte. I always link Trump and Duterte. They are both crazy. One of the reasons I dislike Trump is that he makes Duterte look good. Duterte was Mayor of Davao City in the South, a medium-sized city by Philippine standards, for 22 years. He built a reputation as a tough Mayor. He built a team which they themselves called the Davao Death Squad. They literally just killed people. They killed people who used drugs, they killed political enemies … and Duterte was able to develop a reputation in his city for good, solid no-problems type of administration. That was actually not true. If you look at the numbers, the extent of crime, and the extent of drug use in his own city, it is quite high. It is number four among all the cities of the Philippines in crime.

But the main opponent of Duterte in the election last year, Mar Roxas, is the son of a former President, and a member of one of the richest families in the Philippines. They own a piece of real estate that must be worth four or five billion USD. Not peso, but dollars. Also, the whole (inaudible) area in Manila is owned by the Roxas. Mar is actually a nice guy, but he is more comfortable in San Francisco, Manchester, and Amsterdam than in the Philippines. He was educated almost completely in the US, he spent seven years working on Wall Street. He is not really a Filipino. People cannot identify with him. Duterte realised that the best way to defeat him is to take this populist, anti-establishment, anti-elite political stand.
Academic friends ask me which political science theory we can use to understand Duterte. To that I answer that I have been looking for a long time, I have read all the textbooks, and found that there is no political science theory to explain Duterte. The best way to explain him is an Indonesian term: He is a *preman*. He never grew up from being a teenage, macho, misogynist (*inaudible*). That is the way he deals with government. That is the way he talks.

After a year and a half, he has zero achievements to point to. Even if you just look at the list of things that he said he would focus on, he has achieved nothing. Nevertheless, in the latest survey, for the third quarter of 2017, his popularity rating is 86%. Donald Trump is very envious. But I do think Duterte’s popularity will slowly decline. There is one survey that shows that it has declined almost 20%. Unfortunately, other surveys have not confirmed it. But at a certain point, even people who voted for him are going to start asking what he has done for them.

Anyway, the opposition to Duterte has been slow to mobilise, because people are intimidated by his popularity numbers, and quite a few people are scared of being killed. That is a simple, understandable human reaction, given the extrajudicial killings in the Philippines. Duterte beats Suharto, because Petrus in Indonesia, which was a similar campaign by Suharto to just kill people, was only counted in the hundreds. In the Philippines, human rights groups have counted 13,000 victims of extrajudicial killings. During the Marcos period, which was 14 long years, extrajudicial killings amounted to about 3,500. That too is a lot, but Duterte beats all of them. What has happened, especially in the last two, three months, during the martial law (*inaudible*), is that the opposition to Duterte and extrajudicial killing is slowly, but steadily getting ramped up. Duterte made the mistake of going against the Catholic Church. It takes a while for the Catholic Church to get angry enough to move, but now they are actively going against the Duterte regime.

Then there is the US influence on the armed forces. This is very significant, because I am sure that if I said nice things about the military in Burma or the military in Indonesia, I would be lynched. People would not like me. However, in the case of the Philippines, at this point in time, the Army is an important obstacle to Duterte’s dictatorial ambitions. He is so frustrated with martial law in the Constitution being so limited, so he has been talking about declaring a revolutionary government. What he does not understand is that the military will not support that, and you cannot have a revolutionary government without military support. Just a few weeks ago, the Secretary of National Defence and the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines organised a meeting with the Vice President, who is an opponent of Duterte. In a
big media event, they declared that they would not support a revolutionary government. The fact that this was done with the Vice President is a very strong political message. And then somebody reminded Duterte that if he declares a revolutionary government, he is not President anymore, because he is abolishing the whole government. If he declares there to be no Constitution, he is not President anymore. He has to make sure that the military will support him in a future role in a revolutionary government.

Civil society is active. Interestingly, millennials, kids in their twenties, have been a very strong influence, operating in ways very different from the old youth movement. They are mobilising through the Internet. The Left in the Philippines has been very grim and determined. If you attend their rallies, their placards are all very fun. They are clearly anti-Duterte, but fun.

Relating to the previous presentations and to the future, I think that the institutional base in support of democracy in the Philippines is quite strong, certainly compared to Indonesia or Burma. Media, academia, the Church, civil society … It’s there. But it would not be as strong as it potentially is, except for the fact that the Aquino administration showed that there is a significant chunk of bourgeoisie in the Philippines that is anti-rent-seeking. They do not want to continue the old way of doing business, which is mainly through rent-seeking. So the base, I think, of the future of democracy in the Philippines, is the kind of alliance we saw under the Aquino government, between the modernising segment of the bourgeoisie and the democratic Left. If you want, we could talk about the Maoist Left, my old party, later.

So my point is: Countries like the Philippines are vulnerable to anti-establishment populism. I do not know if I can say that Indonesia is, because Indonesia is so complex. However, I doubt that you can get that significant enough nation-wide support for an anti-establishment candidate. Let me end there.

**Olle Törnquist**

Just to follow up on Joel’s remark about the Maoists in the Philippines. The Maoists have supported Duterte, and very reluctantly criticise the extrajudicial killings.
Eva Hansson: Thai Predicaments

Olle Törnquist

Eva Hansson started her career by writing her Ph.D. thesis about labour in Vietnam. She wanted to write about Indonesia as well, but stumbled over Thailand and developed very exciting analyses in comparative perspective.

Eva Hansson

Olle assigned to me this title, “Thai Predicaments,” so will try to talk about that. I want to use my minutes to talk about political representation, about welfare development in Thailand, and about civil society as a source of both authoritarianism and of democracy.

Right now Thailand is under what could be called a military-populist government. They have announced that they will bring back happiness to the Thai people. Soon after the last coup, they showed the Thai population that they were going to do this by flying balloons in the central areas in Bangkok business districts, and so on.

The last military coup has been very problematic in Thailand, because it has probably had more consequences than any military coup has had before. This time, the military has managed to permeate institutions in another way than they managed to do in 2006 and before.

I am going to get back to that, but I want to start somewhere else. Yesterday evening, I received the most astonishing news from Bangkok. High level leaders of the main contending parties in Thailand, the Pheu Thai Party and the Democrat Party – the former is the known as Thaksin’s party, the latter is the conservative party – announced that they would perhaps have the intent to form a coalition in the coming election next year. An election has been promised by the military to be held in November next year. These two parties could be considered the party-political representatives of two huge movements, the Red Shirt movement and the Yellow Shirt movement. The Red Shirts have been tightly connected to the Pheu Thai Party and its predecessor parties under other names, while the Yellow Shirt movement is tightly connected to the Democrat Party. The meaning of this coalition would be to keep what they brand as outsiders – a representative of the military for example – out of the post of Prime Minister after the election. However, it also means that the ongoing conflict in Thailand will not be possible to handle in an election.
Few think, however, that the coming elections, if they are actually held, will have any significant meaning. Under the current Constitution, installed by the military, parties will probably not be able to campaign in a meaningful way. The Constitution was promulgated after a profoundly undemocratic referendum in August 2017. It was approved by 61% of the voters, and it resulted in what the military junta has called a “Thai-style democracy.” It tightened military rule in Thailand in many ways.

During the campaign period before the referendum, the people on the “no” side were actually not allowed to campaign. For example, seminars in universities were closed down if they were going to discuss negative consequences of the new Constitution. The result was that we got this new Constitution, which means that the political system has moved from one where the Senate – Thailand has a bicameral system – was at least partially elected, and Parliament was elected; to one in which the Senate is now appointed, consisting of so-called “good men.” At this moment, the Senate is dominated by military men. According to the new Constitution, the Senate must approve any coming Prime Minister. This means that no-one that would not be desired by the military would actually be able to come to power.

I think it is fairly indicative to look at the map showing the referendum results. This is a somewhat crazy map of Thailand. I had to change the size to fit it in. But anyway, the red areas are those where people voted “no” to the Constitution. Even if there were no campaigning on the “no” side, there were several provinces in which the no vote dominated. These are the Northeast area, the Northern area, and also some provinces that are usually referred to as the Deep South. What is interesting about this map, is that it is also a map of the geography of the
basis of contention in Thailand. In these same areas, the support for the Red Shirts is the strongest. These are also areas where inequality is very high. Looking at subnational levels in Thailand, one could see that inequality varies over the provinces. In these red areas, inequality is particularly high. In some areas, even so high, so that in Gini terms, it is at the same level as South Africa, which is among the highest levels in the world.

I want to move back a bit in history. Yesterday, we discussed a little bit about how movements may not be so important for democratisation and welfare development. The Thai case, however, shows that they are really important. In fact, the reforms over the last 20 years have their roots in the 1932 revolution. In 1932, a party called the People’s Party overthrew the absolute monarchy. For the first time, “Thai citizen” became a concept in a Thai Constitution. At this time, a famous person in the People’s Party called Pridi also wrote a program that contained six principles. These principles were on land reform, on progressive tax, on building a welfare state, and so on. This push by the left wing of the People’s Party led to the first military coup in Thailand. Pridi’s ideas later inspired the student movement of the 1970s, as well as those that came into Parliament by the late 1990s, offering programs of welfare policies and so on. They were all inspired by Pridi’s writings.

Not very much welfare developed during the 1930s. In the 1950s and 60s, the military managed to seize and hold power, mainly with US support, and with support from the Democrat Party. There were actually some welfare policies during these decades, but they were mainly to be seen as anti-communist programs. They were developed in order to try to prevent support for the growing Communist Party. During this time, a strong conservative alliance developed between the military, the Democrat Party, and King Bhumibol. Selected welfare reforms were introduced during this period, but they were directed toward certain groups, such as civil servants and military staff. It was a kind of welfare-for-loyalty program. A sense developed among many Thais that to get employment in the civil service or state would also grant you some basic welfare.

Then I need to take you into the 1970s, when a student movement inspired by Pridi’s ideas emerged. After this movement emerged, we saw a period of reform between 1973 and 1976, a period of actual democracy in Thailand. The idea of welfare was now launched by several political parties. Even the Democrat Party declared that the party now shared a social democratic ideology. For the first time in the country, a significant labour protection law was introduced. However, the period ended abruptly with the 1976 massacre at the Thammasat University in Bangkok. A military coup and an extreme right-wing government followed. For
the next four years, the government fought a massive civil war against the Communist Party of Thailand. Many of the movement people in Bangkok fled to the jungle and joined the guerrilla.

The solution of this crisis did not come from the extreme right-wing government itself. Rather, the government was saved by the global economy. In fact, it was not until the mid-1980s that this question was actually solved, with a treaty known as the 1985 Plaza Accord. The Thai economy, after this point, benefitted enormously from new trade with Japan. The period that followed was one of very intensive industrialisation and fairly peaceful relations between lower classes and the middle class. Welfare rights were actually never really introduced, not even during this time. We have to wait until Thaksin enters into the power game at the end of the 1990s to see the introduction of general welfare.

The 1990s were dramatic. There was a period in May 1992, called the Black May, in which the military again went in and shot demonstrators who protested for democracy. But the 1990s also included a very intensive period of trying to create a new electoral system with the help of civil society. A lot of civil society actors contributed to this process. And we finally got what was called the 1997 People’s Constitution. This People’s Constitution, along with the economic crisis by the end of the 1990s, produced Thaksin and the Thai Rak Thai Party. Thaksin and his party not only emerged from the economic crisis; they were also a direct consequence of democratisation in Thailand. For the first time, there was a party campaigning with a program that actually addressed the general population of Thailand and their particular problems. A very famous Thai economist, (inaudible), says that at the end of the 1990s, in the midst of the economic modernisation process, as many as 30% of Thai people did not even have access to clean water. Inequality was immense, in every sense of the word. Inequality in education, inequality in healthcare, and so on, and so forth.

Thaksin’s party promised poverty reduction and a fight against drugs, as well as generalised welfare. This is what he immediately went on to do after being elected, leading to his landslide victory in 2005. People were voting for the Thai Rak Thai Party because they represented their interests. Thaksin has been called a populist. Well, in the US context, Obama was called a populist for saying that the welfare system should be changed. In Thailand, the election result with the Thai Rak Thai Party in power actually changed the system. There was a general welfare program called the 20-baht Program, that meant that anyone could get healthcare for 20 baht. For large sections of the population, this had never been possible before. There were a lot of other programs, that also contributed to this. So when the military decided to throw out Thaksin,
people went out on the streets and refused to accept it. The problem was that civil society was divided between these anti-democratic and democratic forces. This conflict still exists.

I want to conclude that I think the most important consequences of this long period of public protests that followed after the military coup, is how people have started to think in different ways about themselves as bearers of rights. I think the disposition of people has changed, and therefore I think it would be difficult in the long run to keep the military in power, because people will simply not accept it. It was only in the last 15 years that elections started to mean anything. To cast your ballot actually started to mean something, and I do not think that people will let go of that.
Discussion

Discussant: Kenneth Bo Nielsen

Olle Törnquist

At some point of time after the Second World War, a division was made between South Asia and Southeast Asia. South Asia, of course, existed since long and had often include the entire South; but now Southeast Asia was constructed, largely by the Americans. That has caused many students of Southeast Asia to neglect the possibilities of learning from comparing with South Asia. However, the two areas have again come closer. With the democratisation in Southeast Asia, we have very much indeed to learn from the South Asian experience.

Hence, we have asked Kenneth Bo Nielsen to reflect on it. Kenneth is a senior scholar of India, at the Department of Culture Studies and Oriental Languages, in the unit for South Asian studies.

Kenneth Bo Nielsen

Thank you, and thank you for the interesting presentations. I think I detected elements in all of them that resonated with what I know from India. From the Indonesia presentation: The continued importance of patronage and transactionalism in establishing relations between leaders and followers. From the Philippines case: The concluding optimistic remark on the robustness of democracy thanks to a vibrant civil society and the presence of counter-hegemonic forces, both secular and religious. From the Thai case: The key importance of social movements as drivers of democratic deepening, and the consolidation of pro-poor politics. I think that is very important. We know this from India. For 70 years, that has arguably been the key determinant in whatever progress has been made on the welfare front. Even from the Burma case, many interesting comparisons came up when I started to think about the situation in Northeast India: A region that is marked by continued conflict, ethnic mobilisation, a military operating with impunity, hostility towards Bengali Muslims, and of course the whole region as a resource frontier that is rich in minerals and hydropower. Many parallel dynamics.

I thought I should bring up four themes or areas of discussion that we maybe could discuss further. The first concerns the role of media and business in the making of popular leaders. One theory is that when the media becomes increasingly commercialised, business gets a former grip on the media, of course, but also the terms of public debate. That leads to the emergence of somewhat mixed right-wing leaders, who are anti-establishment in rhetoric but neoliberal in
economic policies. I think for the US that does not quite work. Trump matches the description in a way, but then again the US media is deeply divided in how it views Trump. And then, of course, US business is deeply divided on how it views Trump. There is a large segment of US business that would rather have seen Hilary as President. If you go to India, I think it matches better. You have an authoritarian developmentalist, so to speak, in office as Prime Minister, who is profoundly pro-neoliberal and who has the full support of Indian business, and hence the full support of all leading Indian media houses. That relationship between media and business in the making of political leaders is something I would to know more about from the different countries.

The second theme concerns relations between politicians and their parties. The Indian experience has shown us that at least in India, parties are crucial. That is why you rarely see independent candidates elected for higher office. Without a party that has an organisation and grassroots workers, it is almost impossible to be elected. Furthermore, I think we can safely say that Trump would not have been elected had he not been the formal candidate of the Republican Party. He might have ended up as a kind of Ross Perot. But since he had a party backing him, he had the full resources to run successfully. Now, the situation in India is that there is no regular system for party funding. They are not funded by the state, and although there are mechanisms for business funding for parties, the main mechanisms for party funding are illicit business funding and parties recruiting politicians who can fund their own campaigns. Therefore, we have had an increasing number of very rich people entering politics. They are rich either because they are in business, or because they are criminals, and sometimes the two overlap. I think this whole nexus of party organisations, politicians, and the importance of money for campaigns could also give us some interesting comparative perspectives on some of the countries, if not all of them.

From the opening paper, I thought about the role of transactional populism in politics, and redistributive populism as well. This relates to the personalised distribution of resources that functions as relations of dependency, and not as relationships of rights or citizenship. On the one hand, this does ensure some access to resources for some people, in spite of the fact that we may not like this way of organising relations between politicians and citizens. Perhaps that also raises the counterfactual question: What would one have if one did not have redistributive populism? You may have a fully responsive, open state; but you may also have a totally unresponsive and elite-captured state that did not respond to any kinds of popular demands. That also poses certain challenges. I was reminded of the situation in the North Indian State of
Bihar, which is of course just one sub-state within India. It does however have a population of more than 100 million, so it is not a small state. For a long time, that state was controlled by upper-caste, upper-class elites, who were both elected politicians and in control of the administration. However, through social movements, gradually political power passed into the hands of the lower castes and lower classes. But the elite grip on the administration remained. And the thinking on the part of these lower castes was that the only way to make the state administration responsive, was to get rid of these upper castes that controlled that apparatus. That, however, turned out to be impossible. In India you cannot easily fire bureaucrats. They are there basically for life. You can transfer them to other places, but they remain in place. So the solution they came up with was a total, across-the-board weakening of the state, by leaving key posts unfilled when people retired, by refusing the funding that was required for maintenance. Now, that leads to a substantial weakening of the state, but it also frees up resources for informal distribution, which leads to some kind of dent on elite power. This is another way of making the state responsive.

The last point relates to what I liked about the last presentation, which took, I think, the voters’ point of view seriously. I think that is crucially important in understanding first of all, why do people vote in the first place? What do they expect to gain by voting? Why do they vote for particular people? And why do they repeatedly vote for politicians that we may think do not behave in a responsible manner? There are crucial questions to explore here, which I think has partially been done in India, and I think that the last presentation also enabled us to think about the voters’ point of view in all of this.

Olle Törnquist

We have obviously democracy-oriented movements, many of which are popular-rooted. And as we have noticed so many times, they are quite scattered. Nevertheless, they can generate change at certain times, like in Burma against the military, like in Thailand when turning against the military, as when turning against Suharto in Indonesia, and during the EDSA revolt in the Philippines. However, they have not been able to consolidate an institutionalised movement.

Then we have liberal forces, which Joel pointed to. Even Philippine oligarchs like Mar Roxas come forward in defence of a more liberal, modern oriented capitalism. But as you also noticed, these groups, these middle-class oriented groups, remain relatively weak. And as we have seen, the democracy movements and the liberal movements can at certain points come together. Yet
it is a very difficult marriage, as Joel must have experienced in government during six years in the Philippines.

Then there the rent-seekers and traditional capitalists, in many cases based on extracting resources and richness, not least illustrated earlier today in the Burmese case, the last frontier in the attempts to exploit nature and thus make money.

All these actors are now trying to gain votes and compete by using populist methods. Some of the actors come from the democracy movement, realising that they too have to make a difference in elections. Others come from liberal circles, making use of populist methods although they are not necessarily anti-expert and establishment oriented. Yet other are from the conservative and neoliberal oriented circles, like Modi in India. On the one hand he is quite neoliberal, on the other hand he abuses identity politics. All this is complicated, but I think there is a similar pattern.

Are there any comments, questions?

Joash Tapiheru

This is probably a half comment, half question for Joel, regarding populism, specifically in the Philippines nowadays. You mentioned that Jokowi is not a populist leader, because he is not anti-establishment in a more explicit way like either Trump or Duterte. But again, I am familiar with the concept of populism through Laclau and his post-structuralist discourse theory. He argues that establishment does not carry a meaning of its own. What do we mean when we say “establishment?” It could mean anything. In specific cases, like in the Philippines, the US, or the UK during Brexit, “establishment” means something specific; but it may differ from one case to another. And I think you were right when you said that Trump and Duterte have their own genius by presenting what this establishment is, and that they are representing what it is not. By doing so, they do what the pro-democracy and grassroots movements have not been able to do so far. In the Indonesian case, yesterday we emphasised the point that the movements are fragmented. I think we need to learn something in this respect from Trump and Duterte when it comes to the way in which they create the concept of “establishment” and “anti-establishment” in order to connect all of these diverse elements into a political bloc.

Marco Mezzera

Marco Mezzera from the Norwegian Centre for Conflict Resolution. I have a series of questions, but I will focus on just one, for Joel. I would be interested in hearing a bit more about the role
of the military. I think that in the Philippines it deviates somewhat from the pattern that we can find in other countries in the region. Everybody were expecting for today the announcement of a revolutionary government. I have not seen the news yet, but you said that the military clearly indicated that if that were to happen, they would oppose it. Could you elaborate on where this position is coming from? Is it part of the professionalisation of the military in Philippines? Or does it maybe have more to do with the populism that Duterte advocated? Or does it have something to do with the promises in his electoral campaign of promoting the peace process with the Maoist movement – something the military establishment may not be so keen on?

Ellen Stensrud

I want to thank Eva for bringing the perspective of political parties back into the conversation. We have not heard about in the presentations on Indonesia. It has of course been discussed regarding Myanmar, but what is the role of political parties in Indonesia? We have been discussing social movements, the demands for welfare, and the floating characteristics of social movements and their difficulties in breaking through in politics. And we on the other hand, we have been told of directly elected political leaders. This combination of weak parties and direct elections sounds like a recipe for identity-based populism, as in the US. OK, Trump had the party apparatus, but he was not really a party candidate. He was an outsider. Combined, of course, with primaries, you get extremists. So my question is: Are there any initiatives to strengthen political parties in Indonesia and their potential to break through the politics of clientelism and populist redistribution? Because without political parties, you are going to be stuck in this clientelism forever.

Olle Törnquist

Very good. We should have mentioned that. Thank you for bringing it up. Final comment or question?

Participant

My name is (inaudible). I am a student revolutionary. I would like to ask two questions to Mr. Joel. How were the current peace talks between the Filipino Communist Party and the government carried out? Also, what is the role in society of the Filipino armed forces today?

Olle Törnquist

I want to make a very brief comment on the question about parties in Indonesia. Pro-democrats had different positions on this issue. Those on favour of alternative parties and party system –
a position that was recommended on the basis of our initial studies after 1998 – lost out. A
majority within the pro-democracy movement opted for supporting direct elections as a way of
undermining the oligarchic family- and clan-dominated existing parties. I think that this is a
common tendency in similar contexts. One exception is India, with a long history of parties and
a majoritarian British election system and without the otherwise experiences of dictatorial post-
colonial rule and related parties. In contexts like Indonesia, established parties are very much
dominated by families and elites, and more recently by oligarchs. So many progressives argue
that to make a difference, they have to advance outside these parties by way of alternative
avenues and approaches, and to make deals with the parties and their leaders on the basis of a
independent position in civil society or popular organisations such as trade unions. Joel may
have a number of additional comments on this issue, but first to Eva on Thailand.

Eva Hansson

I want to quickly address what is meant by “populism.” I think that we must be very careful not
to buy it when the media brands someone or some party as “populist.” We need to understand
why we talk about populism in a structured way. Because this is also something that is used as
a derogatory term for people who people who actually do policies that appeal to the general
population as well.

Olle Törnquist

Yes, we need to precise about it. The main critique in Indonesia is of course that people turning
to populism totally ignore the issue of representation. Joel?

Joel Rocamora

OK. Let’s talk mainly about Trump. If you look at Trump, it is possible looking at the results
of the election to show where his base is, what made him win the election. It is basically the
Rust Belt, the parts of the US where industries have been decimated. Wisconsin, Michigan,
Pennsylvania, Ohio. Up in the north. In the case of the Philippines, the electoral results for
Duterte do not have the same kind of political economy explanation. Language, region, and so
on.

But I think we have to look at language to discuss what populism means, because the whole
point of successful populists is that they are able to connect with the discourse of the poor and
dispossessed. A lot of politicians do not know how to do that anymore.
Participant

But is that a positive thing?

Joel Rocamora

It depends. If you look at Trump and Duterte, they use indecent, misogynist, and irresponsible language. I mean, Duterte, pardon my French, uses “son a bitch” every other sentence. He has called Barack Obama, the UN Secretary-General, the whole EU established, and, most importantly, the Pope, as “sons of bitches.” But we have to understand that for poor people, that kind of irresponsibility strikes a chord. Because if you resent the establishment, you also resent their language, their discourses.

On the military: I think the military’s attitude toward Duterte has a lot to do with a certain kind of professionalism that has managed to seep into the military in the Philippines. Probably 90% of the combat ready troops in the Philippines are in specialised units – Scout Rangers, Marines, and so on – where the training is much tougher. The second is the influence of the United States. I would say 95% of officers who go above Major have had training in the United States. Additionally, the whole military training set up in the Philippines is a perfect copy of the US. And the military is an establishment force. Defending the status quo is deep within the DNA of any military. Finally, it has a lot do with specific individuals. The Secretary of National Defence is an ex-general, but he is very, very courageous, and he has publicly gone against the President on 12 different issues. Somebody made the count.

The Communist Party is in the midst of peace talks with the government. When Duterte was Mayor of Davao, he had a successful arrangement with the Communist Party and the New People’s Army. He was able to limit the military activities of the New People’s Army in Davao. But he does not understand that the Communist Party does not intend to seize state power in one city. When he was Mayor, they did not necessarily have to be against him. But now he is President of the whole country, and they mean to seize state power in the whole Philippines. So that’s the clash. Duterte tried to replicate his success in Davao by appointing three party members to cabinet positions. Later on, when things did not work out, he did not stop members of his party from not confirming them, so the three had to leave. Where will the peace talks go? It is hard to say. I have a very cynical view of the peace talks. The only thing I am hoping for is that the peace talks will split the underground movement once again. I do not think you can get the whole underground to work for them.
Olle Törnquist

Thank you very much, Joel. We have to remember that the armed part of the Communist movement is still relying on so-called revolutionary taxation. That adds to the question of how they survive, and how negotiations with them will be carried out. This probably takes us back to complicated questions about the situation in Myanmar/Burma as well.

With this, we will close, and I thank everybody who have been participating in this very interesting discussion.
Implications for International Cooperation

Chair: Olle Törnquist

Panelists: Joel Rocamora, Eva Hansson, Kristian Stokke, Luky Djani, Michael Hauer

Olle Törnquist

What are the implications for international cooperation given the research results that have been discussed, and what we think, then, that progressive actors of change would, could, or should be interested in? We have asked Joel Rocamora, Eva Hansson, Kristian Stokke, Luky Djani, and Michael Hauer from Olof Palme Centre to kick off the discussion.

Joel Rocamora

I worked for ten years in an institute called the Institute for Popular Democracy. People would always tease me and say: How do you know you are popular? And my answer was always that they did not understand that we used the Latin meaning of “popular;” “For the people.” Populism is a challenge not just for democrats. It is a challenge specifically to the Left. Because of the unhappiness with the establishment, and with poverty and powerlessness, it is something that the Left should be able to respond to. If they cannot respond to it, they will disappear.

In Western Europe, there are good examples of attempts of the Left to respond to the roots of populism. Unfortunately, Syriza had to deal an impossible situation, so at this point I am not sure if Syriza is still a Left party. I do think it is, though. You also have Podemos in Spain, the Five Star Movement in Italy, and, significantly, a developing Left even in England.

This is the challenge I think Olle and his partners have responded to by putting together a book about how to rebuild social democracy. Once, somebody from the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, which is associated with the German Social Democratic Party, asked me whether I consider myself as a social democrat. I said yes, if we restore Rosa Luxemburg to her place in social democracy. Unfortunately, it is Die Linke that has succeeded in that regard.

But I think that the current crisis of capitalism is unprecedented, and I think that the attempts by the Left to respond to this crisis are going to continue. Even in the United States you see things like that happening. If the international challenge comes from the same roots in the North...
as in the South, then you have a new basis for cooperation. But I think it means that in the
North, we have to rethink some of the ways that we think about South, whether it is in relations
to research, or official development assistance. And really take seriously the fact that the Left
in the North and in the South are dealing with the same problems, and should be able to identify
ways that they could work together in order to deal with the challenge of neoliberal
globalisation.

Olle Törnquist

Thank you very much. If I interpret you briefly, what you are saying is that there should be a
possibility to discuss a common agenda. And that agenda has not been addressed. It is about
neoliberalism, and it is about threats to democracy at both ends.

Eva Hansson

I am going to speak more from the perspective of scholarship. I think that in the present
situation, with a global democratic backlash, we see the same developments in all regions of
the world. At the same time, we see another form of civil society emerge, which also includes
authoritarian forces that reinforce authoritarian rule. These are not the kind of civil society
forces that are often envisioned in democratisation theory, but they are in existence in all
national civil societies nowadays. Just a couple of weeks ago CIVICUS, the global monitoring
agency of civil society space, published their report. They concluded that only in 22 countries
of the world today, they assessed that civil societies are under what they term as “open
conditions.” Only in 22 countries of the world.

I think these twin challenges mean something for engaged scholarship. At the same time, we
see that Western embassies in particular are more or less starting to work as chambers of
commerce for their countries; rather than trying to actually see what we as small countries can
do to influence and reproduce a future that we would want to see.

Hence, I think the problem is at several levels. At the same time, research funders are not
particularly interested in democracy and democracy questions anymore. These are seen as
somewhat outdated questions. I think that we need to think strategically, and perhaps lobby
research funders to fund this kind of research. It is important that this history is also
documented, analysed and understood. Furthermore, how research is actually representing the
developments we see in the world, also contributes to reproduce a kind of understanding of the
world. So I think we need to think closely about how we can proceed to both work politically
to lobby funders to better understand that this is a critical question everywhere. This is also to raise awareness among international actors. Nowadays, donors are withdrawing their support from most countries in Southeast Asia, when it is probably needed more than ever. Not because people die of poverty to the same extent, but because forces for democracy have no international support today. I just came from Hanoi, with interviews of the democracy movement people in Hanoi and in Ho Chi Minh City. And they see no international support whatsoever. No-one talks to them. I think we have a big role in educating public opinion.

Olle Törnquist

Thank you, Eva. Briefly, if I get it, the prime point is this: Insist. We are doing the right thing, we just need to get the money. So we need to lobby for it. Particularly important, the people working for democracy are getting less and less money. We have to secure their funding. As we have seen, this relates to Indonesia, to Burma, and partly to the Philippines as well. Indonesia and the Philippines were at some point deemed successful democracies. It was believed that one did not have to support the pro-democrats in these countries anymore. Joel’s party, Akbayan, for example, suffered from less support, while the Maoists could sustain their revolutionary taxation, benefit from international peace talks and make advances.

Kristian Stokke

I may have read you question slightly differently. Maybe I did not get past the first bullet point, “implications for international cooperation.” I am going to talk not so much about what we should do as scholars and scholar-activists, but about Norwegian international cooperation. That is something that I, given that I have worked in Sri Lanka and in Burma, have been forced to think about. Because these are two places where Norway has tried to do a lot with the money bag, often based on problematic understandings and strategies. I am going to use that to raise five issues, posted as question.

The first point is about the question of approach to democracy assistance. If we use Thomas Carothers as a helper along the way, he makes a distinction between what he calls political and developmental democracy promotion. In the case of Norway in Burma, it is very clear, as we have heard today, that there has been a shift to developmentalism. Foreign direct investment, especially in the resource sector, coupled with selective state capacity building in the same sectors. You send in a Norwegian hydropower company, and at the same time, a Norwegian directorate to work on the regulatory regime in the energy sector. That is really something that has been very striking since about 2011. The idea is that this would safeguard against the return
of authoritarian rule and create preconditions for democratisation in the long run. But I think we have learned from Burma that it might also contribute to the consolidation of semi-authoritarianism, of a hybrid form of rule. So the first question is that of approach.

The second one is the question of sequencing in transitions from war to democracy. Norway’s engagement has also been very much about a developmental peace building when you enter into a conflict situation. Development and peace-building has been used as a trust-building precursor to political conflict resolution, or sometimes as a substitute. I think that in Sri Lanka, it was meant to be a precursor. In Burma, maybe you can say that it looks like a substitute for not talking at all. This is in very sharp contrast to what we heard about Aceh today, with the four-point summary that Olle did of the process, where job number one was political conflict resolution. It was only as additions that business, privatisation, and maybe international aid for peacebuilding entered the picture. That is the opposite sequence of what we have known in Sri Lanka earlier, and in Burma in the USDP period. This is the question with sequencing. Much more could be said, but I think that kind of indicates something.

The third question I want to raise is the question of inclusivity, which is also very important in this kind of international diplomatic, aid, and cooperation relations. I think what we find is that Norway’s peace engagement in Sri Lanka, and also in Burma, has had a tendency to see inclusion as a little bit of a problem. If you are too inclusive, the process may get derailed. It gets too complex, it may take too much time. Sometimes it is easier to have a narrow, small group of likeminded actors get together. That sounds nice, but it is a very problematic notion. Those who are not deemed to be likeminded end up being treated as the “hardliners” or “spoilers,” as the ones that we have a bit of a problem with. That may very easily become a self-fulfilling prophecy. Those who are excluded on the basis of being “the spoilers” may in turn become exactly that. At least that was what I think happened in Sri Lanka. So a narrow design in terms of inclusivity may facilitate speed in a designed process, but it is not all that likely to build an inclusive kind of democracy as an outcome.

The fourth thing I want to mention is what I would call the question of politics. It is the implication of the first point that I would look for a more balanced approach between a developmental and a political approach to democracy promotion. That means, to put it simply, that you have to tackle politics. It requires careful attention to political actors, strategies, political spaces, and all these things that we have talked about at this conference. It also requires a smart design and a good understanding of where the cracks are. Where is the potential for transformation, and how do we get into that? I think there is a tendency, even when you start to
talk about political democracy assistance, to go with the usual partners without really thinking about whether these are the best partners for the task at hand. We may say that we need to work through civil society, but civil society is not one thing. Civil society is a highly differentiated sphere, and working with developmental civil society organisations or NGOs is a very different approach than working with a politically oriented civil society. You may also have a civil society that is also engaged in political relationship, in partnerships with state institutions and so on. So I think that to take politics seriously is to really think about what our political theory of change is, and where we can intervene effectively?

The last point I want to raise is about the question of contextual knowledge. I think that if you are going to do democracy assistance more politically and smarter, then you really need knowledge. You need contextual knowledge. You need to know the complexity of actors, and all those acronyms in Burma. We have heard a lot of information that has demonstrated the complexity of understanding a country. So it requires knowledge of complex situations. And I think that it has been a strong and valid criticism of Norwegian peace engagement in Sri Lanka and in Burma that there has not been enough attention to this complexity, and there has been insufficient investment in building that knowledge. My point is not to plead for funding for my own research, but for the very simple purpose of serving the goals, even if that is business investments, you need to know the complexity you’re working with. I feel that there has been a somewhat stubborn resistance at times against contextual knowledge among Norwegian actors, especially in Burma.

**Olle Törnquist**

So, in one word: It’s about politics, stupid! Democratisation is about politics, it is about people putting up resistance and building alternatives. If we are going to support it, we have to know what we are doing, and get involved in it.

**Luky Djani**

Basically, I want to reflect with my own experience in the last five years or so. I want to follow up on Kristian and Eva’s points. I think we have to understand that the situation has changed now, in regard to the relationship with the international community and donors and local forces in the recipient countries. Several years ago, one of the senior activists in Indonesia said that 20 or 30 years ago, when they wanted to have cooperation against Suharto, they could have a discussion over a beer with the donors, setting out their ideas. Then the donors said “OK, I will
give you funds,” without them having to make a long proposal with milestones, logistical framework, etc. But this was 30 years ago. Now you can’t do that.

Many of the international agencies use so-called contractors. They are the private companies who implement their programs, in Indonesia, in the Philippines, in Burma, in Cambodia. That is a kind of pattern now, so you have to speak with people from the private sector, who run development programs.

A couple of months ago, I met with one of the aid agencies in one of the embassies in Jakarta, who had been merged with these foreign ministry plus their economic arms. And it seems there are constant struggles within these new … we now call it (inaudible). There is a constant struggle within the organisation between the development studies groups, the international relations people, and the foreign trade people. And they seek local organisation assistance in order to redefine what has really happened in Indonesia for example, and where the agency should go. In that sense, there is an opportunity within this agency’s internal dynamic, but internationally there is a structure, what is called the Paris Declaration, whereas the donor country has to work closely with recipient country government. Whatever the recipient country government needs, the donor country has to meet with this need.

In Indonesia at the moment, the four biggest projects are about anti-extremism, anti-corruption, environmental funds, and village funds. The anti-extremism project is called CBE, “Counterbalance to Extremism.” There are huge funds for this, in order to tackle these growing political Islam groups. Then of course there are anti-corruption funds, but only on the prevention side. The village projects are a continuation of a worldwide initiative, the so-called Kecamatan Development Project, that has been replicated by the World Bank as a success story. These four main pillars of international programs dictate to the local institutions that we have to redefine our mandate or our strategy into CBE, anti-corruption, environmental topics, or the village plan. That has changed all the politics of donor relationships.

Kristian mentioned bringing back politics. I think that even the current administration in Indonesia, which we can consider as progressive, see politics as formal politics, as electoral politics. And they say that Indonesia has been successful in managing four free and fair elections, so we don’t need another political project. What we need are economic projects. That is how the Indonesian government responds to the international proposal.
Olle Törnquist

Thank you. Implicitly, you are very critical of this, is it? You are giving us a picture of it, by saying that donor support has become focused on what has been negotiated with the government. So you line up a little bit with Eva’s point that pro-democracy has to some extent been abandoned in this, and we may add that, you are also signalling that many of these groups in Indonesia, in order to survive, have to go into these four channels of anti-extremism, anti-corruption, village funds, and the environmental sector, to survive. Which is deplorable. Thank you. Michael, what do we do with this? Or what are you going to do? Michael Hauer, from the Olof Palme Centre.

Michael Hauer

That is a very good question. I had a very interesting lunch yesterday, and the gentleman we were eating with was also posing two questions to us. I think answering those questions would help me navigate answering the two questions from you, Olle. His first question, which I think it relevant to use at least one minute of my time to answer it, was: “What is the Olof Palme International Centre?” He did not know, and maybe you do not know either, so I am going to give you a very quick picture of what it is. The Olof Palme Centre is an umbrella organisation for the Swedish labour movement that works in the spirit of our late Prime Minister, Olof Palme, for democracy, human rights, and peace. The Swedish labour movement, as you know, has a long tradition of development cooperation and solidarity work. The same goes for Norway. We are very proud to keep that spirit and that tradition alive.

His next question was: “Why are you here?” That is, I think, what would be the answer for your first bullet there, Olle. So why are the Olof Palme Centre here? We think it is very interesting to tap into the discourse within academia, to use that as food for thought when it comes to critically assessing our own strategies, or our own theory of method, as we would say, within development cooperation. To some extent, Swedish – and perhaps also Norwegian – development cooperation has been influenced by the Scandinavian models of member-based organisations with good internal democracy claiming rights on their members’ behalf. But that model needs certain preconditions to be fulfilled. Listening to these presentations that have been here, I think we can already say that we have enough evidence to question and critically assess that theory of change. I, for one, am going to use the same word as Kristian was using: We need to resequence a little bit how we think we can change the world. That goes for active citizenship; for welfare policies; and for how civil society can claim accountability, claim transparency, try
to form some kind of influence on policy development. Maybe that could be a good answer of the implications for the Palme Centre. We need to go home, we need to do our homework, and we need to be prepared.

I am not an expert on Southeast Asia or Burma, but I was recently there. That was my first visit to the region, from which I would like to share some observations, which could be an addition to the discussion. We visited some of our partners, especially those within trade union work. When listening to how our partners describing the situation, we could clearly see that there was a very fragmented picture of the trade unions in Burma. We had, on one hand, the trade unions that have been there throughout the military regime; and then we had the trade unions who came in after exile. They were founded in exile. They may lack legitimacy, but on the other hand they are quite good with the development lingo, and they seem to very good at attracting donor funding. So my question would be, to the researchers here: Could it be that new elites are coming in, challenging those who are already in place and want to continue the way everything has been structured so far?

My second thought from it was that civil society organisations in Burma tend to be more or less co-opted by donor-driven agendas. This was also the Palme Centre’s experience from the Western Balkans in the mid-1990s. The CSOs become dependent on development funding, and then they start paying attention rather to the policies of development actors, rather than their members and working with a bottom-up approach.

My last point is the gender aspect. I have been reflecting through all the presentations that this has been surprisingly gender-blind. Looking at power-sharing, the welfare system, and democracy; the gender aspect would add an extra layer of analysis. So I would like to send the question back to you scholars, if there is research that you have not presented, or if it is actually the case that you do not take gender into consideration when you do your research.

Olle Törnquist

So, in the spirit of Olof Palme, the Centre would do what increasingly few people doing: to stand up for the importance in politics of intellectual analysis. That was one of the major things that Palme stood for. It’s important that you stress it, including because the room is remarkably empty of anyone from the ministries for foreign affairs in Sweden and Norway. They were invited.
Stina Oskarsson

I am also from the Olof Palme Centre. I was very inspired by Joel’s comment that there is an opportunity to discuss a common political agenda. I think that is something that at least we at the Palme Centre should really try. We have in our member base the Swedish Social Democratic Party. Combining this political party with the sister parties and the civil society, I think we should think a lot about how we can create those spaces. And maybe to add to the gender comment: We have talked a lot about social protection, social welfare, which is really crucial, we have talked about the crisis of neoliberalism, and I would also put climate change and all those challenges on the table. I think that is also something that we really need to give priority to.

Helena Bjuremalm

I just have some scattered comments on what my colleague from Indonesia, Luky, said about what happened twenty years ago. The way that cooperation was initiated is not something I think would have been possible today. Those who suggested an alternative assessment of democratisation had really good ideas, and I could see the potential, with full respect for your autonomy and integrity, that what you planned on doing could actually be helpful for democratization processes. I said: “Sure, we can help with this. I’ll just talk with my boss.” And he said: “I trust you. That sounds like a good idea.” There was of course paperwork, but nothing at all like the paperwork you need to go through today. I would like to emphasise that point. I hope the pendulum has reached its extreme, that it will start gradually to turn back. But my message on that point, also to those who seek funding, is that there is a wide range of funders, and they all come with various degrees of rules. I think some of the bilateral development agencies may be even worse, because they have more rules. But there are also the private foundations, which can be much more open minded. So, do not give up, because there are different sources.

I would like to support what Eva said about research funding. When I started there, SIDA ran a ten-year research program on support for democracy and human rights. For some reason, that ended. I find that sad. I really support this approach to research, where narratives and experiences are shared across countries. It really is essential, and it is very far away from the religious adherence to big data research. This sort of down-to-earth, empirical approach, with a lot of respect to local ownership of how to find research questions and your commitment to feeding back the findings to the communities whose time you actually took by asking them a
lot of questions … I think that is really commendable, and if I were to be Minister for Research, I would definitely make sure that there was funding for this.

I would also like to support what Michael and Stina said about the gender aspect. In hindsight, this is something I really should have told Olle and his team while they were preparing their survey interviews. I am sure there were some questions about gender in the very rich questionnaire you prepared, though. Nevertheless, this is a strong message for you researchers. Women activists face different challenges when it comes to spare time, norms, spaces, and influence, and who is listened to. It is something you cannot ignore.

Lastly, I said at the beginning that I could see the importance of this from SIDA’s point of view, and I think that these expectations have definitely been fulfilled. I have to say that I am sad to say that my colleagues working with these countries were unable to come. I am here, though. I am going to share these findings with them, and with our relevant Embassies. And even though the embassies – maybe not the Swedish ones – were referred to as having turned into more chambers of commerce, then given the chance, there might be one or a few staff members there who might be interested in talking to you. So at least turn to them and let them know that you exist. If they do not respond, it might just be because they are too busy. It is not necessarily a rational decision; they do not necessarily actively decide on not speaking to you. And give them tips about which people they should discuss with, point them to the democracy activists, and let them know that the activists do not just need monetary support, but also moral support.

Olle Törnquist

I should respond on the gender issue. One of the reasons why we, at least from the Indonesian horizon, have not ventured into any particular sector in our analysis is because there has been a problem of many of the civil society organisations and groups to “go politics,” as they say, on the basis of their sectoral interest. They have not done what Fredrik suggested in his comment, namely to enter into politics. They “go politics” with their separate issues. And therefore it is so important, also with regard to the gender aspect, to discuss in terms of what broader alliance we can foster. To bring domestic labour into the mainstream, we have to think broader alliances. We cannot just think domestic labour. So that is, I think, at least one kind of an answer to why we did not put up these sectoral issues.
Ellen Stensrud

Thanks to Joel for bringing up the great idea of seeing a common agenda across this North-South divide, or whatever you might call it. I think that within development politics framework, there is a very fine line between idealism and patronisation, really. By having a common agenda, you avoid that. Then there is general cooperation.

I would to start with Eva’s point about the embassies, the European embassies starting to resemble chambers of commerce. With that as a background, I want to challenge Kristian. You suggested that another, better way of engagement would be more political, maybe; understanding context, not putting politics in the back seat. You are suggesting that the political conflicts have been downplayed, and that Norway has been prioritising economic development instead. So I would like to challenge you to be a bit more specific regarding Myanmar, what a more politically smart kind of engagement could be in a democratic politics perspective. If the goal is to strengthen the development of democracy in Myanmar, what could a smarter, more politically sensible engagement be?

Lahpai Seng Raw

(inaudible) I feel that it is human nature to respond to what is threatened, or what you value. So in the West, maybe, gender, you feel threatened. It is an issue, so you talk more on gender. But for us, it is ethnic identity being threatened, so we talk more on ethnic issues. Sometimes, it is the understanding of the country context as well. Very often, we are asked if we talk too much about ethnic issues. Why can’t we just talk about Myanmar? I think that is the issue, how you feel what you value is being threatened, and then you talk about it. In Myanmar, in the cabinet, we have only one woman, out of 18 ministers. That is not a big issue. But what I immediately noticed, is that they are all Buddhists. That was what I noticed, as a Christian.

Participant

A couple of issues related to the presentations on welfare, resource-sharing and populism. I am quite interested in Indonesia and your transition from Suharto to the current era. Normally in a transition, there is a close agreement. Like, state-owned enterprise under the military would be … (inaudible) back to the government, like civilian, they say. How could you manage that? That would be something … State-owned enterprise would be kind of a bureaucratic structure, and then that’s been like some (inaudible). Like a business. This is run by the military like a business. We have the same in Myanmar, we have state-owned enterprises and military-owned
enterprises, a really big business enterprise. It has been very powerful so far. And so the military can have their own budget that they don’t have to get from Parliament. They can generate revenue from all these enterprises and businesses.

You would also notice how bureaucratic institutions are also part of the system, still in favour of military institutions and the military. The reason, in 2014 and 2015, there’s a (inaudible). Even in the (inaudible) measures, Norway stands as the first country in the world. But you have (inaudible), revenue and, from the government, and from the (inaudible), then they have like a (inaudible) revenue. At least there’s a discrepancy. But for Myanmar, I mean, in 2015, we did that. We had a 0.01 % discrepancy. So we are a lot more (inaudible) than Norway.

So there were issues of whether the bureaucracy is really involved in all these issues. And I just want to hear more about development. How bureaucratic … In the transition, there is no purge, or kicking-out of the former officers from the old regime, but are they somehow loyal to the previous regime? That sort of issues. So is there any issue in the Indonesian transition with the bureaucracy?

And then there would be, I think, for Myanmar, for international cooperation there would be some area (inaudible) that international community can engage. Not only with the government, not only with them, but also through a program, somehow, to improve bureaucratic efficiency.

**Olle Törnquist**

With regard to state efficiency and anti-corruption. A major problem is that, as in the case of the gender issue, there is compartmentalisation in the sense that sectoral issues are separated from each other. You can go for an anti-corruption campaign, or a campaign for good governance, but it turns abstract. It turns almost into intellectual exercises rather than being related to the real challenges for people, such as the problem of delivery of public services. I am sure Luky can give more comments on this; he was for some time the deputy director of the Indonesian Corruption Watch.

Finally I might use the prerogative of being the chairperson for this conclusion session to add a few words of my own on the issue of implications of the research for international cooperation. Given the results from Indonesia, The Philippines and India that I have been experiencing, I think the major conclusion is the need to facilitate broader alliances of very scattered organisations and forces if the pro-democrats shall be able to make a difference. And like Fredrik Engelstad said earlier, I think that what we have seen so far is that such broader alliances
can primarily come about in campaigns for social rights, work rights and related welfare reforms. Also, I think there is a need for so-called donors or people like the Olof Palme Centre, to get better reviews of experiences in this regard.

**Joel Rocamora**

I worry about the depoliticisation of key words in our discourse: Democracy, human rights, conflict resolution. I am more interested in us paying more attention not to conflict resolution, unless there are very serious ongoing peace talks, but conflict promotion. Whether in research, or in our NGO relations with countries like Indonesia and the Philippines and so on, I am interested in us relating more to contentious politics, to the resistance being put up by victims of globalisation and so on. In the end, what we need to do is to support the groups that are fighting for their rights. For example gender. I think the #metoo campaign is fantastic, but most of what at least I see in the media is middle-class and upper-class women coming forward. Whereas we already know that it is in urban poor communities that you see the worst of sexual harassment and violence against women. And maybe, as part of our support for the campaign, we see if we can encourage discussions among urban poor women of the way that they have been victimised. Yes, look at gender, but also put a little bit of class analysis into it.

**Eva Hansson**

I think we need to focus more on the formal and informal parts of civil society in different contexts. This is also something that is a problem within the donor community, which tends to support formal civil society, with actors that are protected by laws, even in authoritarian contexts. Meanwhile, informal civil society organisations who challenge the authoritarian regime, who live every day in danger, receive no support from the international donor community. They are ignored. I think this is something we need to explore more, and something we need to change.

**Olle Törnquist**

We could add that the beautiful alliance in Jakarta that Luky talked about between unions, urban poor, domestic labour, and progressive politicians in Parliament, which managed to enforce the universal public health reform, was partly facilitated by the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung. Hence, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung was almost closed down by the government.
Kristian Stokke

What could Norway have done differently in Burma? It is a long story, but I will try to be brief. I think that the most basic idea is that of conflict sensitivity. At least, there should be a checkpoint: Do no harm. Try to do something good. One thing I hear from ethnic and pro-democracy activists is that Norway is not to be recognised anymore. Norway is seen to have switched sides. That is in itself doing harm. Norway is seen to have changed the balance of power in all these three relations that I tried to talk about yesterday. In favour of the USDP over NLD, by the very fact of focusing on development rather than a political approach to democratisation. So that means that we feed directly into a developmentalist understanding of the problem, which is the USDP agenda; rather than a political-constitutional rule of law understanding of the problem, which is the NLD agenda.

Concerning central-local relations, when you do state capacity rather than political capacity building, you not only strengthen those who hold state power, but Norway has also strengthened the power of the state at the Union level, not at the ethnic State or Region level. And this is in a situation where the sovereignty of the state is contested. That is not conflict sensitive; it is actually deepening a very contentious thing. No-one is against the need for a capable state, but state capacity should also have been built at the local level.

Likewise, peacebuilding can be good, but not as a substitute for political negotiations. And when peacebuilding is done in a top-down, delivery fashion, rather that used as an opportunity to draw on and strengthen local institutions that do exist, like for instance ethnic departments of education, or something like that; then you undermine those institutions. Likewise, if you think in state-society terms: If you build the capacity of the state, and you don’t do political capacity-building of political civil society organisations, political parties, or alliances between civil society and political parties and state institutions; then again you shift the balance of power in the direction of the state over society. I am not conspiratorial enough to say that Norway has deliberately done this, but I think that it has in an unacknowledged way ended up doing it. One contributing factor to that is the lack of sensitivity to these conflict constellations, political constellations, and so on, and so forth.

One simple example: The very fact that we can think of investing or supporting a state-owned hydropower company to plan a big dam in Shan State in an area that is conflict-affected in itself, and in a state that is striving to acquire self-determination, in a situation where the ethnic organisations have fought, as we heard from Zo Tum Hmung, for a moratorium on investments.
Should there not be some red lights flashing here, regarding conflict sensitivity? I think so. And the alternative, then, would not necessarily be to withdraw, but to find smarter ways of engaging. More balanced, more sensitive to these power relations.

Luky Djani

I will try to respond to the question about the Indonesian military role. If we see the military role from the social and political sphere in Indonesia, it was because they were guaranteed at the time, in 1998, that the new democratic government would not prosecute them, would not take away their economic privileges from their hands. The generals were willing to march back to their barracks, knowing that they would not be prosecuted for their gross violations of human rights from 1965 to 1998. Only a couple of lower and middle officers were sentenced, for kidnapping pro-democracy activists; and the head of the Special Force, Lieutenant General Prabowo, got dismissed from his position. A couple of years later, however, we understood that those officials that had been dismissed from the military services were returning to power. They became commanders on the district or province level. They are still there. In fact, the former Commander-in-Chief during the Suharto period, General Wiranto, is now the Coordinating Minister under the Jokowi administration; and Prabowo himself was the contending presidential candidate in the 2014 election. There is no threat to their careers or economic interests. Yes, all the military foundations should undergo a proper accounting, scrutiny; but it is a way in order to transform this military foundation to semi-private firms that can be operated under Indonesian rules. Foundations that used to be under the Marines or Special Forces were transformed into semi-private companies, ensuring that the military leaders did not lose anything. Therefore, they were willing to march back to their barracks. Of course, they are less privileged now that under the Suharto period. Under Suharto, they could be nominated as a mayor or governor without having to undergo a competitive election. Now, if they want to become a mayor or governor, they have to retire from the military and run as a candidate. That is the only difference. But otherwise, they still have their privileges. They still enjoy the impunity.

Another thing is about the civilian bureaucracy. Yes, there was an attempt to transform into a Weberian type of bureaucracy, but the initiative was going nowhere. In fact, one of the Australian programs a couple of years ago named it as “reform the reformers.” Why should you do that? If they are the reformers, why should you reform them? This is a clear sign that the bureaucratic reform initiative in Indonesia has actually failed.
Olle Törnquist

Just a minor follow up on the military: In spite of the crucial problems that Luky rightly pointed to, it has to also be concluded that the military as a coherent force is not at all as strong as it used to be.

Luky Djani

Nevertheless, a couple of recent surveys show that the military as an institution regained their popularity. Now they have become the number one most trusted institution by the Indonesians. It means that Indonesians think that the military should have a larger role. Perhaps not as before, but they should be more active. We don’t know how they interpret that, but the recent surveys clearly show that they have regained their popularity.

Michael Hauer

I have to go back to gender. I just want to thank you, Joel, for pointing out the class aspect of this. I want to add some figures, just so we know what we are looking at here. These are worldwide figures. They are estimations, they are definitely questionable, but let us use them for discussion. There are estimations that 66% of all the work that is being carried out worldwide is carried out by women. However, they only receive about 10% of the wages. And they only own about 1% of the property worldwide. This shows the magnitude of the gender dimension. If you go down to the urban poor, of course the risks are much bigger, but I think the patriarchal structure and patterns are the same across the globe and across classes.

My final comment would be provide evidence for what Helena was bringing up, that activists have different conditions depending on gender. Male and female activists are facing different challenges. I was in a panel debate in Yangon, discussing why women were not as organised in the trade unions as the men were. There was another man who started saying that the women are not interested, they do not see the benefits. There were lots of explanations. But then, when it actually came to a female witness, also in the panel, she said: “Well, the reason is that the trade union activism is being off-duty, often in the evening time. I cannot participate. I have to care for my family. If I go there, the chances that I would have influence, that people would listen to me are quite small. I’m also exposing myself to risks when it comes to sexual harassment and rapes.” Her analysis was that women do not want to join the trade unions because they do not find the union to reflect the workforce, and they do not think that the union representatives also represent the interests of the women. I think that was a sharp analysis by
this woman. I think we need to take those kinds of examples into account when we think about peace negotiations, for example. Women are affected severely by conflicts, but they are rarely a part of the solution.

**Olle Törnquist**

Just a footnote: there was one woman in the Helsinki negotiation. Shadia Marhaban. By now she is marginalised in the political process in Aceh. Ironically, you could say that the international development people who gave up on democratisation in Aceh have rescued her. By now, she is running around the world, giving advice to others. But that is another thing.

Finally a few concluding remarks. One, there wasn’t so many people here from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, NORAD, or SIDA, minus Helena. So it is even more important that we produce some kind of report.

Two, thank you, Kristian and Vegar, for doing so much good work with the organisation of the meeting. Thanks to all of you for coming, and participating so actively, yet helping us to hold on to the tight time schedule.

Three, this is a kind of roundup. There have been a lot of water under the bridge since the early 1980s, when I was first asked to share analyses with the Indonesian democracy movement. Later on, we have tried to benefit from and contribute to the work of likeminded friends, such as in Burma, the Philippines and Indonesia. I hope that this conference is not the end of such joint efforts. But indeed it is the end of this particular form of joint work. We have had many quarrels, but most of them have been productive. And we have had a lot of fun and, primarily, done a lot of good work. I thank all of you for that.
Appendix: PWD Publications and Literature

1. PWD predecessor projects (1998-2012)

Main publications from preceding democracy research and surveys in co-operation between the University of Oslo and ISAI (Indonesian Institute for the Free Flow of Information) and Demos (Indonesian Centre for Democracy and Human Rights Studies).

Books


Prasetyo, Stanley Adi; A.E. Priyono; and Olle Törnquist (eds.) (2003). Indonesia’s Post-Soeharto Democracy Movement. Jakarta and Singapore: Demos and ISEAS.


Journal Articles and Anthology Chapters


Törnquist, Olle (2000). “Dynamics of Indonesian Democratisation,” in Third World Quarterly: 21 (3); also in Economic and Political Weekly 35 (18).


**Popular Presentations of Research**


**Academic Texts**


Törnquist, Olle; Purwo Santoso; Amalinda Savirani; Eric Hiariej; Hasrul Hanif; Willy Purna Samadhi; Debbie Prabawati; and Wening Hapsari M. (2014). *Executive Summary. Democracy Baseline Survey Power Welfare and Democracy (PWD)*. Jogjakarta: Universitas Gadjah Mada and University of Oslo. PDF available at [http://folk.uio.no/ollet/](http://folk.uio.no/ollet/).

**Monographs**

Hiariej, Eric; Rizky Alif Alvian; Muhammad Irfan Ardhani; and Agustinus Moruk Taek (2016). *Sejarah Politik Kewargaan di Indonesia*. Monograph on Politics and Government 10 (1).


**Books**


**Journal Articles and Anthology Chapters**


Haryanto; Cornelis Lay; and Bambang Purwoko (forthcoming). “Asymmetrical Decentralization, Representation and Legitimacy (Case Study of Majelis Rakyat Papua, Indonesia).” Submitted to *Asian Survey.*


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3. Non-PWD Publications Referred in This Volume


