SLORC'S "INTEL-NET" BURMA'S INTELL (r)

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SLORC'S "INTEL-NET"

BURMA'S INTELLIGENCE APPARATUS

By  ANDREW SELTH

from BURMA DEBATE
Vol. IV, No 4
September/October 1997

(Posted without notes or figures)

An excerpt from a Working Paper published by the Strategic ~ Defense Studies
Center of the Australian National University, Canberra, June 1997. The
author is a former Visiting Fellow of the Center and the author of
Transforming the Tatmadaw: The Burmese Armed Forces Since 1988.

POST - 1988 

It was perhaps inevitable that, after the armed forces formally took back
the reins of government in September 1988, Burma's intelligence apparatus
would once again be reviewed. Yet, in many respects, its structure appears
to have remained the same. The greatest change has been in the size and
scope of its operations, and the means by which they are conducted.
Under the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) [Editor's note:
As of November 15,1997 the regime has changed its name to the State Peace
and Development Council (SPDC)], the National Intelligence Bureau (NIB) has
been retained as the country's highest intelligence organ, deciding broad
policy and overseeing the activities of the country's other intelligence
agencies. The NIB reports directly to the SLORC, and possibly consults the
Council's National Security and Management Committee.  If not actually an
extension of the Director of Defense Services Intelligence (DDSI), the NIB
once again appears completely dominated by it. The DDSI is still a part of
the Defense Ministry, but provides the Bureau's Director General (Brigadier,
later Lieutenant General Khin Nyunt) and its staff, all of which are members
of the armed forces.  The Criminal Investigation Department (CID), Special
Investigation Department (SID), and Bureau of Special Investigations (BSI)
all seem to have been retained by the SLORC and, generally speaking, still
appear to exercise their earlier functions. These three agencies are now
formally under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Home Affairs. The other
intelligence functions exercised by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the
Ministry of National Planning and Economic Development do not seem to have
changed significantly. The Ministry of Immigration and National Registration
was abolished in 1974, but was recreated as the Ministry of Immigration and
Population in 1992. It continues to have certain intelligence functions. All
these agencies maintain their headquarters in Rangoon.

A new addition to the country's intelligence apparatus is the Office of
Strategic Studies (OSS).  A small body directly answerable to Khin Nyunt,
the OSS was initially believed to be a semi-academic institution similar to
the strategic studies institutes and think tanks found elsewhere in the
region (and further afield). Some commentators speculated that the OSS had
been created in part to give Burma a seat at various 'one and a half track'
(a mixture of both academics and officials) and a 'second track' (academic
only) talks on security issues that were then becoming common throughout the
Asia-Pacific region.  This seems to reflect confusion, however, between the
OSS and the Foreign Ministry's 'Myanmar Institute of Strategic and
International Studies' (MISTS), which was formed around the same timed A
more likely explanation for the creation of the OSS was that a new
'Strategic Command' was required within the defense hierarchy, to justify
Khin Nyunt's elevation in 1994 to lieutenant general rank.  If this is true,
then the OSS would be formally higher than the DDSI in the Defense Ministry
structure, equating roughly to a Bureau of Special Operations in the General
Staff Department. Even so, Khin Nyunt seems to have retained the titles of
both Chief of the OSS and Director of Defense Services Intelligence (as well
as being Director General of the NIB and Secretary (l) of the SLORC). On
this basis, it would be logical for the OSS also to be member of the NIB.

The OSS is divided into five departments. These cover international affairs,
narcotics, security, ethnic affairs, and science and the environment. Not
all positions of departmental head are currently filled, although some
senior officers have responsibility for more than one department. All OSS
officers are members of the armed forces and are drawn from the ranks of the
DDSI. Some retain their DDSI roles, even as members of the OSS.  Since its
creation in the early l990s, the OSS has demonstrated a close interest in
the activities of dissidents and opposition politicians, notably Aung San
Sun Kyi and the National League for Democracy (NED). Why Khin Nyunt does not
feel able to use the existing military intelligence apparatus to do this,
however, is not clear. 

Although the DDSI was already the largest and most powerful intelligence
agency in Burma before 1988, it has greatly expanded in numbers and is now
even more influential than before. It not only runs the MIS apparatus and is
a coordinating secretariat for the intelligence staffs of the three armed
services, but it also controls the NIB, and thus the activities of all other
Burmese intelligence agencies. A measure of the DDSI's increased power under
the SLORC is that, since 1992, DDSI/MIS branches and companies outside the
capital have once again been permitted to report directly to Rangoon,
without going through the regional military commands. Inevitably, this has
caused considerable friction with some Regional Commanders.

Under Lieutenant General Khin Nyunt, DDSI is reportedly managed by a
committee of about 25 loyal, but not particularly senior military officers,
ranging from captain to lieutenant colonel in rank. At the War Office level,
the DDSI is divided into about five or six Bureaus, each of which has
responsibility for the oversight of a broad area of interest. For example,
Bureau MI- 1 oversees combat intelligence, MI-3 covers foreign liaison, and
MI-4 covers the 'communist front' organizations. Although there is a
Directorate of Public Relations and Psychological Warfare in the Ministry of
Defense, the DDSI is believed to have its own 'psychological warfare and
propaganda department,' possibly organized as another MI Bureau.

DDSI also has branches at regional command level. These branches (also
designated numerically) control smaller MIS companies scattered around their
command areas of responsibility. Confusingly, for people who do not speak
Burmese, these companies too are designated by number, such as MI14, MI-20
etc.  In 1989 there were some 14 regional branches and 17 intelligence
companies spread throughout the country.  There were also separate branches
for each of the three armed services. By 1992 the number of branches had
almost doubled to 23.  According to Bertil Lintner:

The new intelligence units cover some urban centers hit by demonstrations
[in 1988]... together with border areas fronting on Bangladesh, China and India.

Some of these MIS companies are special units responsible for the
surveillance of armed forces personnel. A special MIS company has been
created to operate in the southern Tenasserim area.   The DDSI also
continues to rely on thousands of agents and informers who spy on
insurgents, dissident groups, students and members of the public. As Amnesty
International has stated, 'Surveillance by Military Intelligence officers of
critics or people connected with critics of the government is pervasive in
Myanmar."

As a Directorate in the Ministry of Defense, the DDSI is formally based at
the ministry compound in central Rangoon, but its headquarters appears to be
located in Kone Myint Thaya, Mayangon Township, in north Rangoon.  It also
has a depot on Boundary Road in the center of the capital. The DDSI also
administers a number of detention and interrogation centers across Burma,
including the
infamous Ye Kyi Aing (aka: Yai Kyi Aung) complex north of Rangoon. This
facility was reportedly opened following the 1962 military coup and has,
according to former detainees, 'been used continuously since then for the
interrogation and confinement of political prisoners.'  Amnesty
International has stated that many of the people arrested in Rangoon since
the September 1988 pro-democracy demonstrations, and particularly those
arrested since July 1989 in connection with the so-called 'communist and
'right- wing' plots, are thought to have been interrogated in this center.

The instruction provided to Burma's intelligence operatives in recent years
has been reported by some observers as 'elementary.' Yet, a greater effort
has clearly been made by the SLORC to increase the quality and scope of the
training provided. There have also been reports that several countries have
provided training and other assistance to Burma's intelligence services
since 1988. China in particular has reportedly provided technical equipment
and training to the SLORC's intelligence agencies. Singapore has developed a
close relationship with the SLORC in recent years and is thought to be
training large members of Burmese 'secret police' at an institution in
central Singapore. There have also been persistent rumors that Israel's
Central Institute for Intelligence and Security (otherwise known as Mossad)
has provided training for Burma's intelligence agencies. (Israel is also
believed to have trained Burma's new anti-terrorist squad and the SLORC's
personal bodyguards.) All these claims, however, are very difficult to verify.

The public statements made by Lieutenant General Khin Nyunt, and the
publications issued in connection with the 'communist' end 'right-wing'
plots, give a good indication of the DDSI's current interests and
capabilities. It is clear, for example, that a major effort is put into
gathering information about the structure, membership, policies and methods
of various 'underground' and 'above ground' organizations. These range from
the Communist Party of Burma, insurgent armies and illegal opposition
groups, to dissident student movements and openly declared political
parties. Enormous resources have been put into building up personal dossiers
on known and suspected dissidents in Burma, members of the diplomatic
community and even foreign critics of the regime who live abroad. For
example, a book entitled Burma Communist Party's Conspiracy to take over
State Power, published by the SLORC in 1989, reproduces dozens of
biographies of 'subversives,' together with illustrations of confiscated
documents, book and photographs. 'Leftist' Literature seized from the homes
of arrested dissidents and shown to journalists ranged from the official
biography of North Korean leader Kim-II-sung to Armies of the Night by
American novelist Norman Mailer. Other materials displayed at a press
conference about the 'plot' included surveillance photographs of particular
suspects, as well as pamphlets, leaflets and other campaign literature
distributed during the 1988 pro-democracy demonstrations. All had been
collected and filed by the DDSI to build up a comprehensive picture of an
alleged 'plot' by the CPB to infiltrate political parties and student
groups, and to cause civil unrest throughout the country, all with the aim
of seizing power.

Similarly, The Conspiracy of Treasonous Minions Within the Myanmar
Naing-Ngan and Traitorous Cohorts Abroad, another book, published by the
SLORC in 1989, also demonstrated the breadth of DDSI's interests.  To
support the SLORC's claim that it was the target of a "rightist plot,' this
book showed the results of what was described as a 'meticulous and careful
investigative operation' by Burma's intelligence agencies.  The book
reproduced numerous surveillance photographs, organizational charts,
dissident literature and intercepted correspondence. There were also
numerous illustrated biographies of insurgents, political dissidents and
critics of the regime. The people named in this publication covered a wide
range of positions and political opinions. They included US Senator Patrick
Moynihan, Rutgers University Professor Josef Silverstein, Burma scholar and
Far Eastern Economic Review correspondent Bertil Lintner, Kachin
Independence Organization (KIO) leader Brang Seng, Karen National Union (KNU)
leader Bo Mya, and Dr. Raymond Tint Wai, Chairman of the Committee for the
Restoration of Democracy in Burma (CRDB), who is based in Australia. All
this material was presented to invited journalists, to support the SLORC's
claim that there was a conspiracy to 'do great harm to the country' by
anti-government elements within Burma and abroad, including certain foreign
powers, by manipulating 'simple and honest people.'

>From the material illustrated in these two publications, and described at
related press conferences by Lieutenant General Khin Nyunt (in his capacity
as Director General of the NIB), a number of conclusions can be drawn. It
would appear, for example, that the Burmese intelligence agencies (primarily
the DDSI) have a considerable capacity to monitor organizations and
individuals believed to constitute a threat to the regime. They are also
able to collect large amounts of information, both within Burma and abroad.
Much of this material is photographic and documentary, including reports
lodged under a range of regulations and martial law decrees.  The
intelligence agencies still seem heavily dependent on HUMINT, however,
resulting from state and mobile surveillance, agents provocateurs, and the
use of informers and infiltrators to report from within suspect groups. It
would also appear that the DDSI employs the full range of
counter-intelligence techniques, including the installation of secret
listening devices, telephone taps, mail interception and unauthorized access
to bank accounts.  It is possible that the DDSI even interferes with
diplomatic bags. Outside Burma, the DDSI maintains a close watch over the
many 'politicized Burmese exiles' living in places like the United Kingdom,
West Germany, Thailand, Australia and the United States. It is commonly
assumed, for example, that such groups are infiltrated by SLORC agents, a
belief that is probably welcomed by the regime. As Bertil Lintner has
written, "Among the Burmese community abroad, no one was ever sure who was
an informer or not; mutual suspicion neutralized them as a political force."

In addition to the evidence offered by these official publications, it is
apparent to any informed visitor to Burma that the DDSI continues to mount a
major counter-intelligence effort against foreigners, including local
diplomatic missions and their staff.  Diplomatic personnel posted to Rangoon
still complain of being watched, and assume as a matter of course that their
phones are tapped. Even now, they must obtain permission to travel more than
25 kilometers from the Rangoon General Post Office, although fewer areas
than before are prohibited to them. Burmese officials still face
restrictions on their contacts with foreigners. Domestic servants are stir]
subject to interrogation about the activities and personal beliefs of
particular diplomats they know.  Burmese nationals who enjoy close relations
with foreign diplomats are sometimes questioned about the beliefs and the
activities of their friends.

This surveillance effort is still extended to other foreign residents and
visitors to the country, although the much larger number of people now in
this category probably means that the DDSI has to be more selective. (A
major effort is being made to attract tourists to Burma, and visas are now
valid for two months. Temporary residence permits for business purposes are
also much easier to obtain.) Official attention is paid mostly to those
foreigners who are known to be critical of the military regime, or who are
in a position to influence wider perceptions of events in Burma, such as
journalists and academics. Evidence of the old xenophobia remains, however,
as clearly demonstrated by Lieutenant General Khin Nyunt in a public address
in May 1997, during which he said:

It has become especially necessary to contain the undisciplined import of
foreign beliefs under the pretext of democracy and human rights, unfettered
freedom, and Western-style behavior, such as individualism, which determines
the family or Union spirit which the Myanmar people cherish. He said it was
necessary to contain efforts to promote the spread of Western behavior and
culture in the country.

Outside Rangoon, some regional airports still require visitors to register
their arrival and departure, and hotel owners are still required to report
foreign guests to the authorities within 24 hours of their arrival. 
Particular attention is paid by the DDSI to influential opposition figures
like Aung San Suu Kyi, (former) General Tin U and other senior members of
the NLD. For example, Aung San Suu Kyi's house on University Avenue in
Rangoon is kept under constant (and obvious) surveillance, both by uniformed
and plain-clothes officials. The crowd which [used to] gather outside her
gate on the weekends to hear her speak [were] usually photographed by DDSI
officers and, presumably, later identified for the DDSI's records. Anyone
actually paying a call on Aung San Suu Kyi is required to register their
name, occupation, nationality and passport details in a register maintained
by the DDSI at a small office just inside her compound.  Anyone speaking to
her on the telephone can expect to have their conversation monitored by the
DDSI and, if the conversation is not to the regime's liking, even
disconnected. This occurred in May 1996, for example, when the authorities
cut Aung San Suu Kyi's phone line in the middle of a live telephone
conversation interview with the BBC World Service in London. The opposition
leader had just finished commenting on the Tatmadaw's role in Burmese politics.

Under the SLORC, the DDSI appears to be responsible for most reported
arrests and investigations of political suspects in Burma. It is also most
often accused of brutality and atrocities.  Organizations like Amnesty
International and Human Rights Watch/Asia, for example, have documented
numerous cases of torture by different DDSI units. Those most often named
have been MI-6, MI-7 and MI-14, all based in Rangoon, and MI-16 in Mandalay,
but their reputation may derive simply from the fact that most public
reports have come from political activists and other dissidents captured and
interrogated in these population centers. For example, accusations of human
rights violations have also been levelled at MI-5, based in Hpa-an and MI-4
in Bassein.  Amnesty International has stated that prisoners have been
ill-treat ed not only by the DDSI and its MIS units, but also by the SID,
and BSI.36 Sometimes people have been taken in and beaten by military
intelligence officers before being handed over to the PPF, and formally
arrested.  Amnesty International has identified 20 detention centers across
Burma where brutal interrogations have taken place. These include prisons,
the main DDSI interrogation center at Ye Kyi Aing camp and over a dozen
other military intelligence centers located in Rangoon and seven other
divisions and states.  There are probably others which have not yet come to
the notice of international observers.
Although the DDSI/MIS has been described as 'one of Asia's most efficient
secret police forces,' and has clearly amassed enormous amounts of
information on particular Burmese organizations and personalities, its
coverage seems to be wider than it is deep. Even with all the personnel it
has at its command (including those of its sister agencies), it clearly
cannot cover everything it would like. It has in effect set itself the
target of monitoring the entire Burmese population, as well as everyone
outside the country who may conceivably constitute a threat to the regime.
This is an enormous task which would tax agencies much larger and better
equipped than DDSI. It also appears that the influence of the DDSI is
resented by other members of the SLORC, who draw parallels between Khin
Nyunt and ambitious chiefs of intelligence in the past. Should a power
struggle occur, then Khin Nyunt is unlikely to find any great support among
other parts of the Tatmadaw, which reportedly fears the DDSI's power and
resents its surveillance of their own activities.

The ability of the DDSI staff accurately to analyze all the information it
manages to obtain, is unclear. Over the years, the military regime has
repeatedly demonstrated its deep-seated insecurity and its ability to manage
criticism (both from within Burma and overseas) in a considered and rational
fashion. Sometimes, the regime's fears seem to border on paranoia, as
occurred in 1989 when the SLORC imagined that it was about to face a sea-
and airborne invasion by the United States.  In such a climate, balance and
self-critical assessments are likely to be difficult. The intelligence
agencies have been able to choose the best recruits, but political
reliability has often been judged more important than intellectual qualities
or a knowledge of the world outside of Burma. There will also be the
problem, in such a closed society, of intelligence officers being reluctant
to give honest views, for fear of themselves falling under suspicion. In
addition, the power and privileges enjoyed by the Tatmadaw, and the members
of the country's intelligence agencies in particular, set them apart from
the rest of the population. They clearly do not share the hardships, fears
and aspirations of most Burmese. Even with their vast networks of informers,
it seems difficult for the intelligence agencies accurately to gauge the
popular mood and predict the behavior of the average Burmese citizen in
certain circumstances.

As a consequence of all these factors, the DDSI has been guilty of some
remarkable lapses since 1988, requiring major reorganizations from time to
timed Following the massive internal unrest that year, for example,
surveillance of both the armed forces and civil population greatly
increased. The regime was badly shaken by the size and extent of the
pro-democracy demonstrations, and was particularly concerned that members of
all three armed services marched with the demonstrators.  Even some members
of the BSI reportedly joined the protests against continuing military rule.
The potential for dissident elements within the armed forces to provoke a
mutiny, or cause a major split, is something that has attracted the closest
attention from the DDSI. This concern grew even further after the 1990
general elections. The poll demonstrated among other things that a large
proportion of Burma's population, including many in the Tatmadaw itself,
supported a return to democratic ruled The fact that the regime permitted
free and fair elections to be held at all, suggests that it had intelligence
advice predicting either that the pro SLORC National Unity Party would win
outright, or that it could form a governing coalition with one or two
smaller parties which were sympathetic to military rule. Instead, the
elections resulted in a landslide victory for the opposition NED, forcing
the SLORC to renege on its promise to hand over power to an elected civilian
government.
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