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Burma and the US Congress, its a st
- Subject: Burma and the US Congress, its a st
- From: cd@xxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Fri, 08 Mar 1996 06:46:00
Subject: Burma and the US Congress, its a story about drugs!
check it out, dawn star, paris
http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/dosfan.html
gopher://dosfan.lib.uic.edu:70/0F-1%3A23308%3ABurma
State Dept International Narcotics Control Strategy Report
March 1996
Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs
INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL STRATEGY REPORT
MARCH 1996
SOUTHEAST ASIA AND THE PACIFIC
BURMA
I. Summary
Burma remains the world's largest producer of opium and heroin.
Burma lacks both the resources and commitment to undertake effective drug
control and is likely to remain one of the world's major sources of
drugs for many years to come.
In 1995 opium cultivation and production rebounded after a slight
decline due to poor weather in 1994. Opium poppy cultivation covered
154,000 hectares and yielded 2,340 metric tons
of opium gum -- enough opium to produce 230 tons of heroin and satisfy
the U.S. heroin market many times over.
There were few signs of improvement in the government's counternarcotics
performance during 1995. In early 1996 a two year offensive against the
Mong Tai Army (MTA, also know as the Shan United Army) of Khun Sa ended
with the Burmese Army occupation of the MTA headquarters. The Burmese,
however, have shown no willingness to use the opportunity brought about
by their cease-fire with the MTA to bring Khun Sa to justice or to take
effective action to suppress the heroin trade in the Shan state.
The drug trade in the Shan State continues virtually unchecked. Burmese
authorities lack the resources, the ability or the will to take action
against ethnic drug trafficking groups with whom they have negotiated
cease-fires. Groups known to be involved in the heroin trade, such as
the United Wa State Army and the Kokang militia, remain heavily armed
and enjoy complete autonomy in their base areas. Although the Burmese
Government claims that these groups have committed themselves to drug
control as part of their cease-fire agreements, the Burmese Government
has been either unwilling or unable to get these groups to reduce heroin
trafficking or opium cultivation.
Money laundering in Burma is also a growing problem and the laundering
of drug profits is thought by some analysts to have a wide-spread impact
on the Burmese economy. An underdeveloped banking system and lack of
enforcement against money laundering have created a business and
investment environment conducive to the use of drug-related proceeds in
legitimate commerce.
II. Status of Country
Burma continues to provide the bulk of the world's opium supply and is
the source of over 60 percent of the heroin seized on US streets. The
ethnic areas of Burma's Shan State, such as the Kokang and Wa
territories, produce most of Burma's opium. The State Law and Order
Restoration Council's (SLORC) cease-fire agreements with these drug-
trafficking armies have prevented the implementation of any meaningful
drug enforcement operations in areas under the control of ethnic armies.
As a result, these regions have become drug trafficking havens where
heroin is produced and trafficked without any risk. Leaders of these
drug-trafficking armies have benefited immensely from their good
relationships with the Rangoon regime; their businesses--legitimate and
illegitimate--have prospered. The top traffickers of these ethnic
groups are: U Sai Lin AKA Lin Ming-shing of the Eastern Shan State Army
(ESSA); Yang Mao-liang, Peng Chia-sheng, and Liu Go-shi of the Myanmar
National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA-Kokang Chinese); Pao Yu-chiang,
Li Tzu-ju, and Wei Hsueh-kang of the United Wa State Army (UWSA); and U
Mahtu Naw of the Kachin Defense Army (KDA). The SLORC has given these
ethnic traffickers significant political legitimacy and now refers to
them as "leaders of national races." Several major traffickers now
participate in the government's national constitutional convention in
the guise of ethnic leaders.
III. Country Actions Against Drugs in 1995
Burmese counternarcotics efforts remained woefully inadequate in 1995, a
situation that has not changed fundamentally since 1989. The SLORC
steadfastly maintains that only peaceful economic development will bring
about a reduction in drug production and trafficking. Many of the major
drug trafficking insurgent groups have been at peace with the SLORC
since 1989 and the surrender of the Mong Tai Army in early 1996 brought
an end to the last major insurgency by an army involved in drug
trafficking. During the past six years there has been no progress in
reducing opium cultivation or in stopping the heroin-trafficking
activities of ethnic armies now considered part of the "legal fold."
The SLORC's development program seems more intent on expanding and
strengthening its political position in the border areas than in
countering the narcotics trade.
The Burmese Government continues to look to United Nations International
Drug Control Program (UNDCP) and the United Nations Development Program
(UNDP) assistance to bolster its own development programs in ethnic Wa,
Kokang, and Shan areas of the Shan State. Nevertheless, Burmese
Government cooperation in implementing UNDCP projects declined in 1995.
The government also appeared intent on exerting greater control over UN
programs operating in the ethnic border areas. In the case of UNDCP,
the GOB has sought a say in UNDCP personnel assignments and has
restricted access by UNDCP personnel to project areas and leaders of
ethnic militias. The government has largely barred NGO involvement in
aid projects in these ethnic drug areas.
Policy Initiatives. The SLORC did not announce any new drug-control
policy initiatives during 1995. However, the Government continued to
implement its "northern border development program" which in part aims
to reduce and ultimately eliminate opium cultivation in the ethnic
border areas. This program was started in 1990 and refined in the
September 1994 unveiling of an eleven-year "Master Plan for the
Development of Border Areas and National Races." While large sums of
Burmese money reportedly have been allocated for development work in the
opium-producing areas of the Shan state, none of this aid has been
closely tied to reductions in poppy cultivation. In 1995, the UWSA
announced a unilateral plan to establish five "opium poppy-free zones"
in its area of control in order to bring about a gradual reduction of
opium cultivation. Though there is skepticism about the drug-
trafficking group's sincerity, the UNDCP hopes to test this purported
UWSA drug-control commitment through a planned five-year crop
substitution project due to start in mid-1996 in the Wa region.
Accomplishments. The government appeared to take fewer steps to counter
Burma's drug trade in 1995 than in other recent years. A counter-
insurgency campaign seen in the late dry season of February-April 1995
against Khun Sa's Mong Tai Army (MTA) ended in a brokered peace in
January 1996. Although the details of the peace arrangement are not yet
clear, it seems the MTA will be allowed to operate as an ethnic militia
in the same manner that the UWSA and MNDAA continue to operate in other
parts of the Shan state. It is unknown what, if any, impact the end of
the fight against Khun Sa will have on the heroin trade.
The Burmese effort to seize drugs and arrest traffickers remains
disappointing: less than 100 kilograms of heroin and less than 1.1
metric tons of opium gum were seized by Burmese authorities in 1995.
This represents more than an 80 percent and 53 percent decline,
respectively, from 1994 seizures. Seizures of acetic anhydride
increased by 6 percent to 1,261 gallons. In one particularly large
seizure, Burmese military intelligence and police on May 24 seized 721.5
gallons of acetic anhydride entering Burma from China's Yunnan province
and bound for the MTA.
Burmese police, who account for the bulk of Burma's drug seizures,
appear to be targeting low-level drug violators -- seldom seizing more
than one kilogram of heroin at a time -- while avoiding major
traffickers who are responsible for much larger heroin shipments.
The 1993 Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances law brought the
Burmese legal code into conformity with the 1988 UN Convention. As
such, the 1993 law contains useful legal tools for addressing money
laundering, the seizure of drug-related assets, and the prosecution of
drug conspiracy cases. However, these provisions remain largely unused
by Burmese police and judicial officials. Burmese authorities have been
slow to implement the law, and have targeted few, if any, major
traffickers. There have been few cases involving money laundering or
seizure of major assets acquired through drug crime. The Burmese
Government, however, continues to express its desire to give its
personnel better training and to make better use of its drug laws. In
November 1995, a UNDCP contractor visited Rangoon to conduct a legal
workshop for Burmese enforcement and judicial personnel.
Law Enforcement. The Burmese Government's coordinated drug enforcement
effort is led by the office of the Central Committee for Drug Abuse
Control (CCDAC), which includes the police, customs, military
intelligence, and the army. CCDAC now has 17 drug enforcement task
forces around the country, most located in major cities and along key
transit routes near Burma's borders with China, India and Thailand.
Though CCDAC and its task forces are responsible for the bulk of
narcotics seizures and arrests, the agency continues to suffer from a
lack of adequate resources. The UNDCP has provided various CCDAC units
with modest equipment and some training. DEA has also provided basic
drug enforcement training to CCDAC personnel. However, the SLORC's very
small budget allocations for narcotics enforcement do not give the
agency the resources needed to make a credible effort to combat Burma's
massive drug cultivation and trafficking problem.
Corruption. The SLORC's business relationships with some of Burma's top
narco-trafficking minority groups raise suspicion in the minds of some
observers that senior Burmese officials are profiting from narcotics
revenues. There is, however, no evidence that the Government, on an
institutional level or as a matter of policy, is involved in the drug
trade. But there are persistent reports that lower level officials,
particularly in the border regions, are involved in taking bribes in
return for ignoring drug smuggling. The lack of a vigorous enforcement
effort against money laundering leaves Burma vulnerable to the growing
influence of traffickers who will use drug proceeds in legitimate
business ventures, thereby gaining influence over investment and
commercial activities.
Agreements and Treaties. Burma is a party to the 1961, 1971 and 1988 UN
Drug Conventions. However, the Rangoon regime maintains its
reservations on two of the Convention's articles -- one on extradition
of Burmese citizens to third countries and one on the use of the
International Court of Justice to resolve disputes relating to the
Convention (articles 6 and 32, respectively). The United States does
not have a mutual legal assistance treaty (MLAT) with Burma. The
Burmese Government has disputed the continuing applicability of the US-
UK Extradition Treaty, which was accepted by the provisional Burmese
Government in 1947.
Cultivation and Production. Burmese opium production doubled with the
opium crop harvested in early 1989 -- the first crop harvested after the
SLORC's seizure of power. Since then Burma's output of opium has
remained at high levels -- near 2,300 metric tons per year. This is by
far the largest amount of opium produced in the world. The 1994 crop
saw a 21 percent decline in production due to poor weather during the
crop's growing season. In 1995, however, the crop rebounded, rising 18
percent to 2,340 metric tons. The bulk of Burma's opium cultivation
traditionally has been in the mountainous regions of the Shan plateau,
which extends the length of the Shan state, from the Chinese border to
the Thai border. Since 1989, however, cultivation has been expanding
into areas under at least nominal Burmese Government control on the west
bank of the Salween river. New cultivation has also been noted in the
Chin state, along Burma's border with India.
Drug Flow/Transit. Heroin is produced in large, relatively static
refineries well ensconced in ethnic enclaves protected by drug
trafficking armies in the Shan state. These labs, run by the ESSA,
MNDAA (Kokang), KDA, UWSA, and MTA, are out-of-bounds to Burmese law
enforcement and paramilitary efforts, under the terms of the SLORC's
cease-fire agreements with these drug militias. A growing amount of
methamphetamine is reportedly produced in labs co-located with heroin
refineries along the China and Thailand borders. Heroin produced by
Burma's ethnic groups is trafficked largely through the porous Chinese
and Thai borders, and to a lesser extent the Indian border. Though the
use of trafficking routes through China to move heroin to the
international market continues at a high level, Thailand remains the
primary route for Burmese heroin to exit Southeast Asia.
Traffickers continued a trend noted last year of moving a growing amount
of heroin through central Burma, often from Lashio, through Mandalay to
Rangoon or other seaports such as Moulmein, for seaborne export to
Singapore or Malaysia. Though some Burmese customs personnel in August
participated in a two-week U.S. Customs training course to help better
identify seaborne and airborne drug shipments, Burmese customs
registered no seizures of narcotics for all of 1995. Trafficking routes
leading through Kachin and Chin states and Sagaing division in northern
Burma to India continue to be used to a limited extent, but largely to
supply regional addict populations in India and Bangladesh. Acetic
anhydride, an essential chemical in the production of heroin, is
imported primarily from China and India and to a lesser extent from
Thailand.
US Policy Initiatives. Direct USG counternarcotics aid to Burma has
remained suspended since 1988, when the Burmese military brutally
suppressed the popular pro-democracy movement. Joint initiatives such
as an aerial eradication program, which had been effective in containing
the expansion of Burmese opium cultivation ended in 1988. Currently,
the USG engages the Burmese Government on a very limited level. DEA
shares drug-related information with the GOB and conducts joint drug
enforcement investigations with Burmese police and military personnel.
Various US agencies have twice joined Burmese counterparts in conducting
annual opium yield surveys in the mountainous regions of the Shan state.
Results from the surveys give both Governments a more accurate
understanding of the scope and magnitude of Burma's opium crop, which in
recent years has been the single largest component of the world's
illicit crop.
The U.S. Government continues to urge the SLORC to take serious steps to
curb Burma's runaway opium production and heroin trafficking.
Specifically, the Rangoon regime has been encouraged to:
--utilize more fully the money laundering and drug conspiracy tools of
Burma's new 1993 drug law in targeting major traffickers;
--target and destroy or confiscate heroin refineries in areas accessible
to Burmese security personnel;
--implement the counternarcotics components of its cease-fire agreements
with ethnic groups in drug producing areas, specifically pushing the
ethnic traffickers to reduce opium poppy cultivation;
--cooperate more fully with UNDCP and international NGOs in implementing
crop substitution and counternarcotics-related health projects.
Bilateral Cooperation. USG counternarcotics cooperation with the
Burmese regime will remain at a restricted level until there is progress
in the areas of human rights and political reform. DEA's liaison with
Burmese police and military -- conducted through DEA's three-man office
in Rangoon -- will continue at its limited level. In 1995, DEA
conducted one two-week training course on basic drug enforcement
techniques, and US Customs conducted a similar course on identifying and
seizing drug shipments.
The Road Ahead. The USG recognizes that no Burmese Government is
capable of effectively dealing with the country's huge drug trade alone.
Large-scale international aid, including developmental assistance and
law enforcement aid, will be needed to curb drug production and
trafficking. The SLORC will need to demonstrate a real commitment to
drug control before any meaningful progress in counternarcotics is
possible.
[Editor?s Note: EXCELL file; see Charts and Graphs Directory]