|
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
HIMAL SOUTH ASIAN - October
2002 (Burma Special)
ESSAY - Deadlock in Burma - by Larry
Jagan
PERSPECTIVE - China and South Asia?s
east - by Bertil Lintner
PERSPECTIVE - ASEAN?s Burma tangle - by Kavi Chongkittavorn PERSPECTIVE - The Road Home to Pang Long - by Aung Naing Oo PERSPECTIVE - Bleak Burma - by Aung Zaw ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ HIMAL SOUTH ASIAN
October 2002 (Burma
Special)
ESSAY Deadlock in Burma by Larry Jagan For more than two years now Burma?s military leaders have been holding secret talks with the opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi and her party, the National League for Democracy (NLD). The dialogue started while Aung San Suu Kyi was still under house arrest. When she was released earlier this year, the international community and the people of Burma expected the process to move to the next stage ? substantive political negotiations. But instead it now looks as if the whole process has stalled. Progress needed to resolve the country?s political deadlock looks as far away as ever. Just a few months ago a political breakthrough seemed not only possible but also imminent. The United Nations special envoy, Razali Ismail, who brokered the talks between the two sides, in fact, believed that it was just a matter of a few weeks before something substantial was achieved to break the impasse that is now more than a decade old. But Burma?s generals have revealed their true colours. The military leaders have for long asserted that the country was going through a transition toward a multi-party democracy. Now, however, the country?s powerful intelligence chief, General Khin Nyunt, says, ?Such a transition cannot be done in haste or in a haphazard manner?. He warned, ?The world is full of examples where hasty transition from one system to another led to unrest, instability and even failed states?. In line with this, Burma?s generals have taken to making public pronouncements about their vision of democracy, and the hardline underlying that vision does not inspire much confidence. They have borrowed quite liberally from the political philosophy of one of their few uncritical supporters, Dr Mahathir Mohammad. The Malaysian prime minister has always maintained that Malaysia?s form of paternal democracy, which he believes incorporates what he terms ?Asian values?, is the most appropriate for Burma. He told the generals when he visited Rangoon earlier this year that they do not necessarily have to adopt a Western approach to democracy. More importantly, he has constantly warned the regime that it should not bow to international pressure and instead evolve a Burmese variant of democracy. But ?native democracy? seems to derive its more practical orientation not from Malaysia, but from the Chinese approach to politics. This is best exemplified by the intelligence boss? recent rhetoric. He has been saying, ?The democracy we seek to build may not be identical to the West but it will surely be based on universal principles of liberty, justice and equality?. It is therefore more than likely that Burma?s military rulers are now looking at the Chinese political model as the basis of their new constitution. General stranglehold Despite recent expectations to the contrary, what seems to be happening is that the country?s top military leader ? Senior General Than Shwe ? has actually strengthened his control over both the army and the administrative structure. Ever since the arrest of four members of the former military dictator General Ne Win?s family six months ago, allegedly for planning a coup against the current military regime, there have been growing signs that Than Shwe is intent on establishing his own dynasty. Even before Ne Win?s son-in-law and three grandsons were detained in March, Than Shwe had been reasserting his authority. He dismissed two top generals who had been accused of being heavily involved in corruption. He then made major changes within the army high command, transferring 10 out of 12 of the country?s regional commanders, who exert almost complete authority in the areas under their control, and stationing them in Rangoon instead. They were replaced by officers whose allegiance to Than Shwe is unquestioned. These actions have fuelled the growing suspicion in many quarters that Than Shwe, having secured his leadership position beyond question, is intent on staying in power. ?General intends to hold onto power for another 10 years?, says a senior military source close to Than Shwe. ?He is prepared to talk to the opposition leader, work with the NLD in an interim administration, and even consider power-sharing at some point, but his main strategy is to drag the dialogue process out and retain power as long as possible?. The trend of recent promotions in the army ? with Than Shwe?s two top lieutenants being promoted and one of them, General Maung Aye, also being appointed Deputy Senior General ? is a clear indication that this is an army top brass that does not intend retiring soon, despite being overtaken by old age . The suspicion that the generals are bent on consolidating power is strengthened by the death sentence awarded to the arrested members of Ne Win?s family, even though most observers believe this will be commuted to life imprisonment. Either way, the end of the Ne Win dynasty as a potential rival to the ruling combine in Rangoon is certain. Indeed, the fear in pro-democracy circles is that General Than Shwe is fashioning a lineage of his own on the model of the Ne Win dynasty. The Senior General is now often accompanied on his official travels around the country by his teenage grandson, who has on occasion even been paraded around in his military uniform. This was conveyed in a particularly stark manner when the state-owned media continuously showed pictures of the two, even as the Ne Win affair was getting full play. Those who know Than Shwe well say he is an avid sports follower. In fact many diplomats in Rangoon believe he spends much of his time watching international football games on satellite television. A senior Asian politician recently asked the general how he saw Burma?s political game ? between the army and the pro-democracy opposition ? working out in the future. ?You?ve got it all wrong?, he replied. ?We are the umpire not one of the teams in the match?. For the Burmese people, all this is par for the course. For them the past 14 years have been full of hopes being raised only to be dashed by the junta?s intransigence. Today, on the streets of Rangoon there is growing despondency. This is in stark contrast to the mood throughout the country six months ago, after the opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi was released from house arrest on 6 May. She had spent the previous 19 months confined to her residence for trying to visit party activists in Mandalay, central Burma, in defiance of a travel ban slapped by the State Peace and Development Council. For the residents of Rangoon, Aung San Suu Kyi?s release was a moment they had long waited for. Though the state-run media studiously avoided covering the event for hours, on the day she was freed people were watching satellite television and listening to overseas radio broadcasts. The official silence was to no avail, and by the time she arrived at the party headquarters everyone in Rangoon knew that she had been freed and large crowds had gathered to greet her. ?The country needs her free?, an old man buying rice in the shop a few doors down from the NLD office said back then. ?She will rebuild her party and win the next elections?. Others were looking to her for some relief in their daily struggle for survival. ?Now Daw Suu is free, things will get better ? we will get more meat and vegetables to eat?, said a young mother shopping in the market near the party headquarters. For the NLD and its key leaders, Suu Kyi?s release was an ecstatic moment. ?They are relieved?, a senior member of the party said. ?They have shouldered all the responsibility for the last 18 months and now Daw Suu is free, a great weight is lifted from their shoulders?. These three reactions encapsulate the range of expectations of the freed leader, but the political expectation is clearly the most demanding one. The leader?s release lifted the sagging morale of the opposition movement and transformed the headquarters into a hive of activity from the cemetery it had come to resemble during the period of her internment. On 6 May, the ramshackle office, near the famous Shwedagon Pagoda, was full of party activists preparing for the arrival of their leader. But what happened on that day in many ways exemplified the political process that was to unfold ? that the climate and agenda of opposition activity is still at least partially being dictated by the junta. On 6 May, the crowd outside the party office was destined to be disappointed. No sooner had Suu Kyi arrived than she was whisked into the building by NLD leaders who feared that the crowds outside might get out of hand, thus giving the military an excuse to place her under house arrest again. Her moment of arrival became also in a sense her moment of seclusion. Now, as time passes without any concrete progress towards negotiations the public euphoria over her release has been gradually dissipating. External mediation This discouraging recent history notwithstanding, the United Nations envoy Razali Ismail continues to be optimistic that progress towards real political discussions is still possible and that a meeting between Suu Kyi and a senior representative of the military government, probably General Khin Nyunt, is on the cards. This, despite the fact that many other concessions he expected from the regime are yet to materialise. Perhaps Razali?s optimism stems from the fact that external pressure has been consistently maintained on the Rangoon government to find a negotiated settlement. There is no doubt that international pressure has been largely responsible for diluting the junta?s intransigence. For more than 10 years, the world community has been trying to engage the Burmese generals in a dialogue through the UN, which has consistently demanded that the regime improve its human rights record and institute political negotiations. For the past 11 years a special rapporteur on human rights in Burma has compiled annual reports which have been tabled at the UN General Assembly. These reports have been among the principal bases for the UN resolutions adopted unanimously every year urging Burma?s government to respect human rights, free all political prisoners, start concrete tripartite talks with the opposition and the ethnic groups, and honour the election results of 1990. The 1990 elections remain, even after more than a decade, one of the most contentious unresolved issues of Burmese politics. Back then, the Burmese military had honoured the outgoing military dictator Ne Win?s 1988 promise to hold national elections. Despite the fact that the opposition leader had been under house arrest since July 1989, the NLD swept the elections on 27 May 1990, winning over 80 percent of the seats. But the military regime then refused to honour the election results and held onto power despite the barrage of international condemnation. This has always stood in the way of international engagement with the Burmese regime. Apart from monitoring the human rights situation in Burma, the UN has also tried periodically to help break Burma?s political stalemate by offering to facilitate discussions between the two main protagonists in the conflict. This was how Razali Ismail, a senior Malaysian diplomat, came to be appointed UN special envoy to try and break the Burmese deadlock. He has visited the country every three months since his appointment and held discussions with both Aung San Suu Kyi and the top military leaders, including General Than Shwe. Razali has not only had the weight of the UN behind him, but the active support of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), especially the Malaysian prime minister, Mahathir Mohammad, who is regarded by Than Shwe as Rangoon?s most important regional and international ally. On several occasions over the past three years the general has sought the Malaysian leader?s advice on a number of issues, including on how to reduce the country?s international isolation and develop the country?s economy. While international pressure has played its part in improving the situation, Razali Ismail?s own efforts at selling the idea of negotiations to both sides cannot be discounted. It was he who finally convinced the generals that they should release Suu Kyi if they entertained any hope of ending their international isolation. For her part, Suu Kyi was far from certain that being released would actually help the opposition?s cause. In fact, while under house arrest she often told visiting diplomats that her release was her only bargaining chip with the generals. Razali eventually persuaded the reluctant leader that her release was an important precondition for the negotiations to make substantive headway. Discussions between the two adversaries on the political future of Burma, he argued, would require Suu Kyi to rebuild the NLD and discuss crucial policy issues with other leaders of the party. The secret talks started shortly after the NLD leader was put under house arrest in September 2000. Since then, it has been a slow and tortuous process. The key priority was to build confidence between the two sides, to overcome mutual suspicion. For the NLD, the main demands were the immediate release of all political prisoners, the reopening of the party offices, and assurance that party members would be allowed to function without being harassed or intimidated by the military authorities. The general expectation was that with the release of Burma?s most prominent political figure, national reconciliation would graduate to the phase of substantive political dialogue. ?Both sides agree that the confidence-building phase is now over?, Suu Kyi told a news conference in Rangoon immediately after she was released. ?The authorities have said they look forward to moving to a more significant stage of the talks?. But things have turned out somewhat differently. During her captivity, Suu Kyi had met top generals, including Than Shwe, Maung Aye and Khin Nyunt, more than 70 times. But in the five months since her release, according to the NLD spokesman, U Lwin, there has been no meeting between Suu Kyi and the generals. The party and its perils As always, the generals seem to be calling the shots and stalling the talks. The opposition leader and the NLD still have their work cut out for them if they are to succeed in sustaining the pressure against the regime. They need to rebuild the party and rejuvenate its activities. Most party offices throughout the country have been defunct for years. The party headquarters has fallen into disrepair, and even today resembles a rundown mausoleum of democracy rather than a vibrant centre of political activity. Fortunately, the general despondency about the negotiations petering out seems not to have infected the NLD itself and some signs of revival at the party headquarters can be detected. On most mornings, there are education classes in session on the ground floor, where young activists study subjects ranging from public health to English language. In the afternoon, the party?s medical workers run a health clinic where babies are measured and weighed, and the mothers given powdered milk. There are regular meetings of the various sub-committees that have been established to revitalise the party and prepare the ground for it to function properly as a well-equipped political party when the situation changes in Burma and there is full political freedom. ?There are committees preparing policy on health, education, defence and the economy?, says U Lwin, ?but our most important task is to reopen all our offices in Rangoon and the divisional headquarters throughout the country?. While most offices in Rangoon have now been opened, only a small fraction of those outside the capital have been revived. Allowing the NLD to function is one of the government?s concessions to the political process. It is critical, at this juncture, for the NLD to show that it will be able to run the country in the future. Although the party won the 1990 elections convincingly, that victory was seen by many not so much as a vote for the NLD as an endorsement of its charismatic leader. NLD leaders even admit privately that the party would be nothing without her. The party has to be prepared to fight another election, in case the military allows polls to be held, and demonstrate that it has the organisational fire to match Suu Kyi?s personal charisma. Paradoxically enough, it is Suu Kyi?s popularity that fuels concern about the NLD leadership as a whole. The fear is that there really may be no one within the NLD who could replace her. The other top leaders ? U Lwin, Aung Shwe and Tin Oo ? are all in their 70s, and the party in the near future will feel acutely the lack of a new generation of leaders. Unlike the military, which is carefully grooming junior officers to occupy high office in the future, there is little succession-planning within the opposition movement. The party also faces the problem of inadequate cadre expansion. U Lwin admits that membership is falling. ?We once attracted the students, but we now have great difficulty in interesting them in joining us?, he says. He feels this will change though when there is greater freedom for political action. However, there may well be a deeper basis for this problem. Ever since the NLD was formed, there has always been tension between the young radical students and the old guard, most of whom were formerly soldiers under General Aung San and later General Ne Win. There has been resentment among young NLD activists over the past decade that Aung San Suu Kyi has appeared to favour the old guard. And there is also growing impatience among the younger rank and file, who would like more transparency and vigour in the negotiation process. ?We are frustrated by constantly being told to be patient and trust our leader?, says one young NLD member. The junta?s delay in taking the dialogue forward could potentially deepen the generational divide in the opposition. The party?s problems are compounded by the incipient and dangerous rift between the NLD and the pro-democracy opposition groups in exile, such as the National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma, which refuse to take the military?s sincerity at face value. That attitude is likely to conflict with Aung San Suu Kyi?s present political strategy, and if the divide becomes more pronounced it could diminish her ability to be the unifying force she currently is. For Suu Kyi and the NLD, one positive change that may help overcome these problems is that since her release there have been few restrictions on her movement or her political activity. She has even been allowed to visit government development projects and UN projects. In a calculated publicity ploy, the military regime has even told her that it welcomes suggestions from her. ?But they have been careful to tell her to send any comments or suggestions she might have in a letter?, says a Western diplomat. ?They certainly do not want to give an impression that she is being given any role in government at all, even in what would be seen as the legitimate role of an opposition?. No matter how slim the possibility may seem at present, Aung San Suu Kyi and the party need to prepare themselves for future political talks with the generals. This entails taking a substantial number of important policy decisions and clarifying the party?s explicit position on many issues. The two major issues are its stand on the status of the 1990 election results and the NLD?s participation in the National Convention, created by the military regime for formulating a constitution, which the party walked out of six years ago. The leadership will also have to formulate its position on an issue that has international implications, namely its attitude to trade sanctions and humanitarian aid. Any changes in the party?s policy will have to be based on a vigorous discussion both within the party central committee and with the rank and file. The biggest question that will confront the party, and one that gives the military regime the greatest scope for manipulation, is how to involve the ethnic leaders in any substantive talks about Burma?s political future. Ever since the secret talks between the opposition leader and the generals started, there has been pressure to involve the leadership of ethnic groups in tripartite talks. This is something that Aung San Suu Kyi has also been particularly concerned about. The NLD has always maintained good relations with the ethnic political parties. To emphasise Suu Kyi?s commitment to strengthening this relationship, on the day she was released, leaders of four ethnic political parties ? the Shan, Mon, Arakanese and Chin ? along with a Kokang representative were invited to join the NLD central committee members for a briefing by her. So far the NLD has been advising ethnic leaders that they need to organise themselves before they can directly participate in talks. The de facto leader of the ethnic groups, Khun Tun Oo ? who heads the Shan Nationalities League for Democracy (SNLD) ? says he wants the ethnic groups to form their own national convention to discuss their common concerns, political aspirations and, above all, to build trust and confidence between all the ethnic groups before they are even involved in the dialogue process, let alone in tripartite talks. This in itself is a major stumbling block, since a national convention of ethnic groups would involve legal political groups like the SNLD, political groups that have been de-registered by the military government, ethnic rebel groups which have signed cease-fire agreements with Rangoon, and armed ethnic guerrilla groups like the Karen National Union which are still fighting Burmese troops. So far the generals have tried to prevent political groups like the SNLD from meeting and talking with Shan rebel groups like the Shan State Army which have signed a ceasefire agreement with Rangoon. There is no doubt that Rangoon?s military chiefs know that only the ethnic groups can provide an answer to Burma?s decades of ethnic strife and political uncertainty. However, the military regime to date has not given up its talk of a unitary state, whereas the ethnic groups want a federal state. The NLD vision of Burma?s new constitution actually comes quite close to a federal structure, and talks may in fact lead Burma out of its decades-old morass, but the generals are adamant about not allowing a meeting among all the players in the game. So far they have kept the ethnic groups who have signed ceasefire agreements out of the national reconciliation process. It is likely that Burma?s military leaders see the ethnic groups as a pawn they can use against the NLD. The army?s resistance to ethnic autonomy and a federal system has been clear from the outset. When the army first seized power in 1962, it claimed that it had been forced to take control in order to prevent Burma from being split by ethnic rebel guerrillas demanding autonomy, and plunging the country into anarchy. In the circumstances today, if the generals do allow the ethnic question to be raised, it may well be to drive a wedge and pre-empt the possibility of a combined opposition. Consequently, the NLD will need to address these issues at the earliest, for though the talks have stalled for the present, the possibility of the regime returning to the negotiating table as a consequence of accentuated social unrest cannot be ruled out. At that juncture the NLD cannot afford to have permitted the situation to get out of its control. Rice and revolt The rapidly deteriorating social and economic situation has affected the NLD no doubt, but it is the government which may find its plan to cling to power for the long term undone by inflationary tendencies in the market and the accompanying collapse of law and order. In fact, what the government is confronted with today is an internal crisis of serious proportions. Though the public at large is despondent, some activist students have started a campaign demanding immediate political reform. In the wake of the recent arrest and release of some dissident students who had been protesting publicly in Rangoon, more students are planning a leaflet campaign demanding political change. There is a real danger of social unrest escalating throughout the country. The aborted political negotiations may be the focus of some of the current protests, but the underlying economic crisis will very likely amplify the disturbances to unmanageable proportions. Reports of looting from across the country are increasingly frequent now. Diplomatic sources in Rangoon say at least six rice warehouses in rural areas have been ransacked in the past few weeks. Several trucks transporting rice to the districts have been robbed on the highways and two rice boats were attacked on the Irrawaddy. These incidents are direct consequences of inflation and the shortage of basic necessities. Rice prices have been escalating rapidly as the government finds it increasingly difficult to procure sufficient stocks of rice to meet the domestic demand. A 50-kilogram bag of the lowest quality rice currently sells for more than 7000 kyat, an increase of more than 50 percent in the past two months. Better quality rice is now more than 1000 kyat for a kilogram. In Rangoon, the price of rice has registered a more than 100 percent increase since the beginning of the year, while in some rural areas, residents complain of a four-fold increase in price over the past five months. There is certainly a serious problem of supply in the domestic market. Analysts believe this is partly because of the government?s obsessive export drive; the junta has set a target of exporting more than a billion tonnes of rice this year. This export-induced domestic scarcity is accentuated by crop damage due to floods, which have severely disrupted the government?s distribution system. The flood forecast for the coming agricultural year is not very promising either. The fear that the rice shortage is going to reach unmanageable proportions because of long-term environmental factors next year is not unfounded. An independent agricultural expert doing preliminary research in Burma has privately warned the UN that there is a very real risk of famine in the year ahead because of the likelihood of crop failures due to massive soil degradation arising from over-cropping and acute lack of fertilisers. Burma?s generals have always been nervous about the prospect of civil disturbances as a result of rice shortages. In the past six months they have been selling rationed low grade rice at subsidised prices throughout the country but especially in urban areas like Rangoon. Residents there say people line up every day for hours to buy the small quantities of essential commodities being dispensed at these government outlets. These queues are getting longer even as the permitted ration is getting smaller in volume. Because of the low rice supplies available for distribution even the minimal relief being provided is shrinking as the number of stalls has been reduced in some areas of Rangoon. Inflation is now at over 50 percent a year. Even the bribes necessary to keep basic amenities like phone lines in working order have gone up. Medical costs have more than doubled over the last three months since the border with Thailand has been closed. Wages and salaries have not kept pace with the rise in prices. Burmese economists estimate that an average family of five needs more than 80,000 kyat (USD 80) a month to live, costs of food, medicine and transport included but not luxury goods. As against this, the average monthly income of professionals ? teachers, university professors, government officials ? is less than 10,000 kyat (USD 10). Many families, especially those living on the outskirts of Rangoon or in the poorer rural districts, can afford only one meal a day. They supplement this with a bottle of glutinous water that is left over from cooking and is available for less than a cent in roadside markets. Average Burmese living standards are declining rapidly and UN officials fear that a massive humanitarian crisis is looming. They estimate that already at least one child in three under the age of five suffers from malnutrition. If the situation remains unchecked, they fear that this could double in the next 12 months. Rice shortages have in the past brought people out onto the streets in protest against the government. According to senior military intelligence sources, the government fears the possibility of food riots and has already begun to form and train special military units to control civil disturbances. It is not surprising that there has been an inordinate increase in crime levels, especially in Rangoon. Some observers claim that the situation is worse than it was in 1987-88. This new spate of crime is certainly a reflection of Burma?s rapidly worsening economic conditions, especially in the cities, and could easily well up into political unrest. Compulsions and equations Political unrest sparked off by economic collapse will seriously compromise the government. But it is an outcome that the NLD does not want either. For the NLD, the process of building trust has come a long way, and it fears a return to the absolute repression of a few years ago. In September, on the anniversary of the founding of the NLD, Aung San Suu Kyi reiterated her willingness to cooperate with the military regime in the interests of the people. The real implication of this statement is still not clear, but it certainly was an invitation to the military to cooperate on social and humanitarian issues. If the dialogue process is to make any progress, the NLD and the military must at least be seen to be looking for common ground. ?Aung San Suu Kyi and the military must find ways of working together, the future of the country depends on it?, says Aung Naing Oo, a Burmese political analyst based in Thailand. ?The NLD needs the army because they do not have the necessary experience yet to run a country?. The first and most obvious step in this direction is the forming of a joint committee, involving representatives of both the military and the NLD, to set priorities in health and education and mobilise humanitarian aid to put these programmes into practice. But even this seems quite some way off. The NLD favours the idea, but so far UN envoy Razali Ismail has not been able to convince the generals to accept it. Burma?s political future is now critically poised. There is no doubt that most people in Burma are struggling to survive and need a change. Aung Sang Suu Kyi may be free, but the military is still in control. Both the generals and the opposition have their compulsions, and there is really no clear indication of how events will transpire in the coming months. For the junta in Rangoon, politics may be manageable, but the economy is evidently not. The resultant social unrest may spiral out of the control of both the government and the NLD. That cannot be a pleasing prospect for either side or for Burma as a whole. It is therefore incumbent on the NLD to set about rebuilding and mobilising its base against the government, without provoking violence. At the same time it will need to cooperate with the generals on issues of humanitarian concern, without weakening its cadre?s agitational resolve. Both sides are treading a fine line, and it increasingly looks as if the final arbitrator will be the ?international community?. When that final settlement will happen is anybody?s guess. But in the interim the threat mounted by spiralling inflation and social unrest have added to the difficulties of the regime in Rangoon. ?The generals must know they are running out of time?, says a UN official, ?and starting substantive political talks as soon as possible is essential if they want to ensure stability?. HIMAL SOUTH ASIAN
October 2002 (Burma Special) PERSPECTIVE China and South Asia?s east For economic and strategic reasons, Burma is crucial to both China and India. China has first-mover advantage but India has now woken up to the threat in the east. Meanwhile, the junta is looking less cohesive than it did. by Bertil Lintner While Burma remains largely shunned by the West for its human rights record and repressive political system, the country?s biggest neighbours, China and India, are jockeying for influence in Rangoon, with Pakistan actively supporting Beijing in the regional power play. To complicate matters, this has set off an internal power struggle within the junta in Rangoon. The outcome of this multi-layered regional competition is more likely to determine Burma?s political destiny than any move made by the West to pressurise it into a dialogue with the country?s pro-democracy opposition forces. The configuration of this conflict became clear when Pakistan?s military leader, General Pervez Musharraf, paid a landmark visit to Burma from 1 to 3 May 2001. Burma?s military government, the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), has consistently maintained that foreign naval vessels would not be permitted to visit the country?s ports. But prior to Musharraf?s arrival, no less than three Pakistani naval vessels ? a submarine, a tanker and a destroyer ? were seen in Rangoon. At the same time, a Chinese submarine was reportedly visiting the port city of Sittwe in western Burma ahead of a visit by a high-powered Chinese military delegation. These two countries would be keen to persuade Burma?s military leaders not to get too close to their common regional rival, India. New Delhi, for its part, has also been trying to improve ties with Burma since it normalised relations with the military junta in 1993. In February 2001, Jaswant Singh, the Indian foreign minister, visited Rangoon to discuss avenues for closer cooperation. This was preceded by Burmese army chief and SPDC vice chairman General Maung Aye?s two visits to India in 2000. Meanwhile, the powerful intelligence chief and first secretary in the SPDC, Lt General Khin Nyunt, seen as a rival to the army chief, is believed to be pro-China and he paid a highly publicised visit to Pakistan in July 2000. China and its ally, Pakistan, enjoy a considerable head start in the race to woo Rangoon?s military leaders over to their side. Burma began to formally develop into an important Chinese ally when, on 6 August 1988, the two countries signed a trade agreement. By then, the days of Mao?s support to the Communist Party of Burma (CPB), which holds the record for the longest running communist insurgency anywhere, were well and truly over and Dengist pragmatism was guiding Chinese policy. This agreement was the first of its kind that a hitherto isolated Burma had entered into with a neighbour. It was especially significant because the agreement was signed at a time when Burma was in turmoil: two days later, millions of people in virtually every city, town and village in the country took to the streets to demand an end to army rule and a restoration of the democracy the country had enjoyed prior to the first military coup in 1962. The Chinese, renowned for their ability to plan far ahead, had expressed their intentions, almost unnoticed, in an article in the official Beijing Review as early as 2 September 1985. Titled ?Opening to the Southwest: An Expert Opinion?, the article, which was written by the former vice-minister of communications, Pan Qi, outlined the possibilities of finding an outlet for trade from China?s landlocked provinces of Yunnan and Sichuan, through Burma, to the Indian Ocean. It mentioned the Burmese railheads of Myitkyina and Lashio in the northeast, and the Irrawaddy river, as possible conduits for the export of Chinese goods ? but it omitted to mention that all relevant border areas, at that time, were not under Burmese central government control. That situation changed in 1989 with the Wa mutiny within the CPB. The Wa is the hill tribe whose members formed the rank and file of the insurgent CPB, whose leadership of was primarily Burman. Subsequent to the revolt, the CPB split along ethnic lines into four different regional armies ? and all of them entered into ceasefire agreements with the government. By 1990, trade between the two countries was flourishing, and ties between Burma and China gradually gained strength. By 1990, Burma had become China?s principal political and military ally in the South Asian east. Chinese arms poured into Burma to help the survival of the extremely unpopular military regime, recipient of worldwide condemnation when it brutally crushed the 1988 pro-democracy uprising. In view of the Rangoon massacre of 1988, and the Tiananmen Square massacre the following year, it is hardly surprising that the two then isolated, internationally condemned neighbours would feel a great empathetic bond. On 30 September 1989, Burmese intelligence chief Khin Nyunt said in an address to a group of Chinese engineers working on a project in Rangoon: ?We sympathise with the People?s Republic of China as disturbances similar to those in Burma last year broke out in the People?s Republic of China [in May-June 1989]?. Brothers in arms Burma?s strategic importance to China was not lost on observers. By late 1991, Chinese experts were assisting in a series of infrastructure projects to spruce up the poorly maintained roads and railways. Chinese military advisers arrived in the same year, the first foreign military personnel to be stationed in Burma since the Australians had a contingent there to train the Burmese army in the 1950s. Burma was, in effect, becoming a Chinese client state. Ironically, what the insurgent CPB had failed to achieve for the Chinese on the battlefield had been accomplished by shrewd diplomacy and trade. The total value of Chinese arms deliveries to Burma in the 1990s is not known, but intelligence sources estimate it to be between USD 1 and 2 billion, most of it acquired on extremely generous terms. After crushing the 1988 uprising, and to prevent a recurrence of similar popular movements, Burma?s military regime has more than doubled the size of its armed forces. The number of men in the three services increased from 186,000 in 1988 to 450,000 in 2001, and all three branches underwent significant modernisation programmes. Military hardware delivered by China in a little more than a decade includes 80 Type 69II medium battle tanks, more than a hundred Type 63 light tanks, 250 Type 85 armoured personnel carriers, multiple launch rocket systems, howitzers, anti-aircraft guns, HN-5 surface-to-air missiles, mortars, assault rifles, recoilless guns, rocket-propelled grenade launchers, JLP-50 and JLG-43 air defence radars, heavy trucks, Chengdu F-7M Airguard jet fighters, FT-7 and FT-6 jet trainers, A-5C ground attack aircraft, SACY-8D transport aircraft, Hainan class patrol boats, Houxin-class guided missile fast attack craft, minesweepers and small gunboats. In 2000, China delivered 12 Karakoram-8 trainers/ground attack aircraft, which are produced in a joint venture with Pakistan. Pakistan, for its part, has also sold munitions to Burma, including 120mm mortar bombs and machine-gun ammunition. While one of the reasons why China has decided to arm Burma may be to provide a military umbrella to protect new trade routes through potentially volatile territory, some analysts view the support in a more long-term perspective. Access, even indirectly, to the Indian Ocean gives China a strategic advantage. The Strait of Malacca is, for instance, a key transit point for the bulk of Japan?s West Asian oil imports. But it is India, not Japan, that has reacted the strongest to China?s high-profile presence in Burma. Of particular concern has been the Chinese role in the upgrading of Burma?s naval facilities ? including at least four electronic listening posts along the Bay of Bengal and the Andaman Sea: Man-aung on an island off the coast of the western Arakan, or Rakhine, State; Hainggyi Island in the Irrawaddy delta, Zadetkyi (St Matthew) Island just north of the entrance to the Malacca Strait; and the strategically important Coco Island just north of India?s Andaman Islands. Chinese technicians have also been spotted at the naval bases at Monkey Point near Rangoon, and the Kyaikkami facility south of the port city of Moulmein. Although China?s presence in the Bay of Bengal is currently limited to instructors and technicians, the fact that the new radar equipment is Chinese-made ? and is most likely also operated at least in part by Chinese technicians ? has enabled Beijing?s intelligence agencies to monitor this sensitive maritime region. China and Burma have signed several agreements under which they have pledged to share intelligence that could be of use to both countries. The arrival of a Chinese submarine in a Burmese port also adds an important strategic element to Beijing?s arms sales to Burma, indicating that they were much more than purely commercial deals. In June 1998, India?s defence minister George Fernandes caused great uproar when he accused Beijing of helping Burma install surveillance and communications equipment on islands in the Bay of Bengal. Burma denied the accusations, while China?s foreign ministry expressed ?utmost grief and resentment? over the minister?s comments. New Delhi however, had good reason to be concerned. In August 1994, the Indian coast guard caught three boats ?fishing? close to the site of a major Indian naval base in the Andamans. The trawlers were flying the Burmese flag, but the crew of 55 was Chinese. There was no fishing equipment on board ? only radio communication and depth-sounding equipment. The crew was released at the intervention of the Chinese embassy in New Delhi. The incident was discreetly buried in the defence ministry files in New Delhi. But when China?s designs became more obvious, the new and more alert government in New Delhi began to pay greater attention to developments in Burma. In March 1997, the China News Agency in Beijing reported that a Sino-Burmese expert group had ?conducted a study on the possibility of land and water transport, via Yunnan and into the Irrawaddy valley in Burma?. On 5 May that same year, the official Xinhua news agency reported that Beijing and Rangoon had reached an agreement on developing this route. Xinhua said this route would be 5800 kilometres shorter than the older route of access to open waters which linked the Yunnanese capital Kunming and the nearest port on China?s east coast, Shanghai. Long before that agreement was reached, however, China had begun to construct a railway from Kunming to Xiaguan (near Dali), on its side of the Yunnanese frontier. By now, the old Burma Road from Kunming to Ruili on the Burmese border has also been upgraded, and Chinese engineers have completed work on the last 120-kilometre stretch of the road from Ruili across the border to Bhamo on the Irrawaddy river in Burma?s Kachin State. Bhamo is the northernmost port on the Irrawaddy that is accessible from the south. Intelligence sources in Burma say the plan was to use a fleet of barges to transport goods from there to Minhla, some 1000 kilometres downriver and 280 kilometres north of Rangoon. From Minhla, a road is being built across the Arakan Yoma mountain range, running via An to Kyaukpyu on the coast. Kyaukpyu had been chosen as the site for a new deepwater port rather than the silted mouth of the Rangoon river. It was to finalise this plan that army chief General Maung Aye went to China in June 2000, but it now seems certain that although he did agree to strengthen trade relations, Beijing may not have got all the concessions they had expected ? and it is believed that India may have played a role in this turn of events. Cultural calculus Historically, independent India had maintained extremely cordial relations with Burma. Jawaharlal Nehru and U Nu, the first prime ministers of the two countries, shared a common worldview, and India even lent some assistance to the government in Rangoon in the political crisis that followed on the heels of independence. Even after the coup in 1962, India kept up formal relations with Burma until 1988 when India?s stance changed with the military regime?s brutal crackdown on the pro-democracy demonstrators. India?s prime minister at the time, Rajiv Gandhi, came out in open support of the movement for democracy and it was stated policy that India would give shelter to genuine Burmese refugees. Supporting the country?s pro-democracy forces is thought to have been India?s way of countering China?s influence in Burma. However, around 1993 India began to re-evaluate its strategy out of concern that its policies had achieved little except push Burma closer to Beijing. The result was a dramatic policy shift aimed at improving relations with Rangoon. A senior Indian official says that the Burmese generals have been sending signals to New Delhi to take greater interest in development work to lessen their heavy dependence on China. In January 2000, the then Indian Army chief, General Ved Prakash Malik, paid a two-day visit to Burma, which was followed up by a visit by Maung Aye to the northeast Indian city of Shillong. The unusual nature of this visit by a foreign leader to a provincial capital was accentuated by the arrival of a group of senior Indian official from trade, energy, defence, home and foreign affairs ministries to hold talks with the general. In the aftermath of these meetings, India began to provide non-lethal military support to Burmese troops along the common border. Most of their uniforms and some other combat gear now come from India. India is also reported to have leased some helicopters to the Burmese. In November 2000, the Indian government felt confident enough about bilateral relations to invite Maung Aye to New Delhi as head of a delegation that also included several other high-ranking junta members and cabinet ministers, notably two of the secretaries of the SPDC, Lt Generals Tin Oo and Win Myint, foreign minister Win Aung and Col Kyaw Win, deputy head of the powerful Directorate of the Defence Services Intelligence. Conspicuous by his absence was the intelligence chief, Lt Gen Khin Nyunt ? who, tellingly, had taken off for a visit to Pakistan on the very same day that General Malik arrived for a second visit to the country in July 2000. In many ways, Burma?s military government has been caught on the horns of a dilemma. It had to accept Chinese aid when nobody else was prepared to support or do business with it ? but what began as a rather modest trade agreement developed into a heavy political and military dependence. Moreover, tens of thousands of illegal Chinese immigrants have moved across the border over the past 10 years and taken over local businesses in the north of the country. This illegal migration has caused friction with the local population, and some ethnic clashes have already taken place between Chinese immigrants and local tribesmen in the north. Maung Aye, a staunch Burmese nationalist, is said to be more concerned about these demo-graphic changes than defence and trade agreements with China. Mystery also surrounds the renewed presence of the Indian right-wing Hindu organisation Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) in Burma. The RSS first came to Burma in the 1940s to provide services for the country?s ethnic Indian minority, but it lay dormant after the military took over in 1962 and most Indians left. Now, a renewed effort to build up a Rangoon branch of the RSS is being made ? apparently with the blessings of General Maung Aye. The RSS (which in Burma is called the Sanatana Dharma Swayamsevak Sangh) has convinced some Burmese generals that Hinduism and Buddhism are ?branches of the same tree? ? and that ?the best guard against China is culture?, to quote a Calcutta-based RSS official. Although the RSS is the parent organisation of the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party, which leads the current coalition government in New Delhi, it is far from certain that the fundamentalists? Rangoon mission has the blessings of the Indian government. But, parallel to this development, New Delhi is actively encouraging Maung Aye to visit historic Buddhist sites in India, which seems to lend credence to the suggestion that this could indeed be part of a ?cultural diplomacy? drive on the part of India to woo Burma away from China, and to take advantage of the rift between the army and intelligence chiefs. But the question is also what Burma could do to loosen its dependence on China, if it were to decide to do so ? and if India is to have any chance of succeeding in its attempts. Intelligence analysts say that China?s economic, political and military grip over the country has already become so strong that it would be very hard for Rangoon to change its policies. Any major political change in Burma is also unlikely as long as its two most important leaders are still alive: the ageing strongman Ne Win, who established army rule in the country in 1962 ? and who is still regarded as the ?godfather? of the Burmese military establishment despite a court case brought against his daughter, son-in-law and grandsons earlier this year ? and General Than Shwe, the present chairman of the ruling junta. But Ne Win turned 91 in May 2002, and Than Shwe?s health is said to be deteriorating rapidly, although he is only 68. In May 2000, Than Shwe even wrote a letter to the junta, intimating his intention to retire from his post. Without Ne Win pulling strings from behind the scenes, and Than Shwe gone as junta chairman, observers believe that the rivalry between Maung Aye and Khin Nyunt could turn into a far more critical power struggle. Given their different opinions on foreign policy ? and their respective links to rival regional forces ? the outcome of that struggle could also determine Burma?s place in a broader regional security context. HIMAL SOUTH ASIAN
October 2002 (Burma Special) PERSPECTIVE
ASEAN?s Burma tangle Uneasy bedfellows they obviously are, but what are the dynamics of the ASEAN ? Burma relationship? by Kavi Chongkittavorn When the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was being established in 1967, Burma was approached to be a founding member. Rangoon declined, citing the principle of strict neutrality as a barrier to joining an organisation perceived to be an imperialist tool. That attitude persisted for two decades. But the emphatic international condemnation of the bloody crackdown on the pro-democracy movement of 1988 changed the mindset. The military junta, named the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) in 1997 before which it was known as the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC), realised that in order to survive it must end its self-imposed isolation and find regional friends.The fall of the Berlin wall in 1989 also altered the political landscape of Southeast Asia. In the region?s hotspot, Cambodia, a 14-year-old conflict was brought to an end two years later, enabling former foes such as Vietnam and the rest of the Indochinese states, including Cambodia and Laos, to reconcile their present and forget their past. Their admission to ASEAN in the late 1990s was a watershed event in regional politics, marking the closure of the ideological split forced by the Cold War. Burma?s return to the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) in 1992, after it had departed in 1979, was indicative of its desire to rejoin the international community. Almost three decades after the initial tentative contact, both Burma and ASEAN found themselves in need of each other for different reasons. Following the crackdown on the democratic movement, the Burmese regime wanted to shore up support within the region amid growing pressure from the West as well as international organisations. On the one hand, ASEAN?s cardinal principle of non-intervention in the domestic politics of member countries suited Burma?s diplomatic offensive very well. On the other hand, ASEAN?s interest in admitting Burma was prompted primarily by its serious concern with China?s expansion southward towards the Indian Ocean. Reports of a Chinese naval presence in Burma prompted senior ASEAN officials to conclude in a 1995 Bangkok meeting that the only way to counter Beijing?s growing influence was to embrace Rangoon regardless of its brutal regime and underdeveloped economy. This choice was influenced by ASEAN?s view that Burma constitutes a strategic junction in Asia, linking China and India, the world?s most populous countries. Therefore the inclusion of Burma was a better option than leaving it alone in the woods, open to the courting of the two Asian superpowers. Meanwhile, realising the geostrategic predicament of its immediate neighbours, the Rangoon regime has been playing one against the other. For years, Rangoon manipulated its China card effectively against India and ASEAN, playing on the fear of the enlargement of the Chinese sphere of influence. India, once a fervent supporter of the exiled Burmese pro-democracy movement, swit-ched its policy in the first half of the 1990s and began to appease the Rangoon regime in an attempt to neutralise China?s increased presence. Now, New Delhi too has acquired a toehold in Rangoon. Unfortunately for ASEAN, Burma?s entry into the organisation disrupted its traditionally strong ties with the West, which has been providing substantial aid and technical assistance to member countries. ASEAN?s regional interests notwithstanding, Western countries continue to be critical of Burma. They have been criticising the Burmese junta?s treatment of Aung San Suu Kyi, the opposition leader, and remain well aware of the harsh political oppression in the country. ASEAN, pushed to the defensive, has argued that it can handle the Burmese situation better than countries outside the region, through the so-called ASEAN way of consensus building and non-interference. The organisation?s hope clearly was that through peer pressure and discreet diplomacy, Burma would give in and cooperate with it on the more sensitive issues. But, for ASEAN it has been a wait in vain. Burma has not cooperated. Even so, the organisation?s optimism has not waned. Five years have elapsed since Burma?s inclusion but the organisation?s thinking has failed to evolve despite Rangoon?s calculated insult of refusing, in 2000, to welcome an ASEAN fact-finding mission, known as the ASEAN Troika. Instead, the Burmese regime went out of its way to welcome a similar team from the European Union a year later. And whatever change has happened in Burma has not really been at the behest of ASEAN. The process of political dialogue between the regime and the opposition made progress in October 2000 through the facilitation of the United Nations Special Envoy for Burma, Tan Sri Ismail Razali. Much credit has been given to his efforts for the release of Suu Kyi from house arrest. ASEAN?s case for a special role for itself in the unfolding Burmese political process is therefore not very credible. Meanwhile, Rangoon is back to playing the game it is now adept at. The junta leaders know full well that in order to revive their ailing economy and ward off growing pressure for political reform, they have to tussle with international opinion and the opposition. They have so far made the most from the minor concessions to the civilian political process. After Suu Kyi?s release last May, the regime managed to secure some financial gains. Japan, which is Burma?s biggest aid donor, has pledged more humanitarian aid as an incentive for the regime to loosen up. Lobbyists hired by Rangoon are active these days in the US Congress, working to stop possible legislation that seeks to impose an American trade embargo. It is clear that Burma will continue to drive wedges within the international community. As an ASEAN member, Rangoon now has the cover of regional respectability. The regime also now has an international forum and to that extent is no longer an international pariah. Political dialogue, brokered by Razali, is bound to proceed only very slowly as the regime consolidates its grip on the polity and attempts to undermine the popularity of the opposition. Without concerted effort from the larger international community and more sustained and sterner measures from ASEAN, the junta will overcome international and domestic challenges, succeed in reigning in civil political forces and continue its repression at home. HIMAL SOUTH ASIAN
October 2002 (Burma Special) PERSPECTIVE
The Road Home to Pang Long After the damage done by the generals, it is time for democrats to try and fashion a federal Burma. But the Rangoon regime is all for continuing the ?status quo of disunity? among the ethnic groups. by Aung Naing Oo My blood is of the Karen so I will kill the Burman if I capture them?, declared the tattoo on the chest of a young Karen guerrilla fighter. More than a decade ago, an encounter with such a determined mind was a chilling experience for a Burman. It was especially so because one had just arrived in a Karen rebel camp, fleeing the Burmese military dragnet. Things have changed over time, but this tattoo reflects an anger that the ethnic peoples of Burma still feel at having been subjected to unspeakable suffering by the Burmese army. This bitterness and animosity is deep-rooted and ubiquitous, and indicates the intractability of Burma?s ethnic conflicts. If there is one significant trait that Burma shares with her South Asian neighbours, this must be it. The relevance of ethnic identity in Burma is clear from just a glance at the country?s demographics. The Burman are the dominant group but ethnic minorities make up 40 percent of the country?s population and reside in 60 percent of its land area. Also, Burma has a significant colonial legacy. While conflict in multi-ethnic Burma has pre-modern antecedents, its present-day form dates back to the early years after it gained independence from Britain. Soon after the British left Burma in 1948, the country was plunged into bloody chaos as the democratically elected government of U Nu in Rangoon came under threat from various ethnic armies. The Karen were the first to rebel, their short-lived but historic military success becoming a precursor to a wave of independence movements across the country. This struggle for power was as extensive as it was intense, and by the late 1950s all but three ethnic groups had taken up arms. The military seized power in 1962 under the leadership of General Ne Win, the army chief, ostensibly to prevent the disintegration of the country. The reference was to the U Nu government?s attempts at redressing ethnic grievances by amending the constitution and possibly orienting the political system towards federalism. The military takeover meant an effective halt to any effort to tackle the ethnic problem within the legal and democratic framework. The 1947 constitution was abolished along with several other fledgling democratic institutions. And thus, the spirit and essence of the Pang Long Agreement, signed on 12 February 1947, was lost. In the Pang Long Agreement had been enshrined the principles of peaceful coexistence between the Burman and their ethnic brethren. It was signed by Burma?s independence hero General Aung San and ethnic leaders, and had been the basis of the 1947 constitution. The Burmese army tried to create a socialist utopia overnight. The ethnic armies continued their fight for autonomy from the centre, but their wars were largely ignored by Rangoon. The weight of heavy-handed military rule ? in the guise of homegrown state socialism ? all but completely buried the ethnic leaders? calls for a federated state. In a mock form of federalism, however, the socialist government divided the map of the country into Burman and ethnic areas. Seven administrative divisions were formed in predominantly ethnic Burman areas and seven states were established corresponding roughly to the homelands of the major ethnic groups. All real power, however, was in the centralised iron grip of the men in uniform in Rangoon. This situation was to last for 26 years as Burma?s socialist ideologues drove the country into self-imposed isolation. The nearly three decades of ?socialist? rule ended only in 1988 when pro-democracy protests swept the country. Unfortunately, the pro-democracy movement failed to secure victory during the uprising. Following the large-scale massacre of unarmed demonstrators by military forces, a new group of military officers calling themselves the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) assumed power. Despite the devastating oppression, the democracy movement in the summer of 1988 paved the way for a multiparty election in 1990. The opposition National League for Democracy (NLD) won hands down, capturing more than 80 percent of the vote. Though the SLORC rejected the results of the elections, the stage was set for political negotiations that were to come a full decade later. Most significantly, a dialogue between the military and civilian groups, and thus the discussion on federalism, was re-established. For the first time since 1962 the ethnic nationalities and Burmans sympathetic to their cause had a say in politics. Ceasefire complex The politics of ethnicity are not linear. A year after the uprising in 1988, the Communist Party of Burma collapsed due in part to a mutiny by its Wa members, who made up the bulk of the rank and file. The SLORC responded to the development with a bold step, concluding truce agreements with the communists who then returned to their own ethnic bases and formed armies of ethnic composition. Within six years, almost every ethnic army either had surrendered or signed a ceasefire agreement with the regime at Rangoon. As history has shown, the ceasefires were not comprehensive. Many of the armies were allowed to retain their arms and a portion of their territory, and were even granted business concessions by Rangoon. The regime, however, steadfastly refused to discuss politics with these groups. Complete surrender has been the only avenue to participation in the political process, which is effectively a non-starter due to the regime?s total lock on power. The regime?s attempt to write a constitution cementing its leadership in any future political system resulted in the NLD walking out of the constitutional convention in 1995, declaring the process and principles espoused in it unacceptable. Its demand for political dialogue was not accepted by the regime. Not surprisingly, as the uncertainty has lingered over the years, all major ethnic groups have chosen to retain their arms. The ethnic truces complicated the already complex nature of Burma?s ethnic problem. The major effect was the creation of different status among the various ethnic groups. A number of groups remain committed to political settlement, while others have settled for lesser gains. Some groups were transformed into local defence forces, and now essentially act as Rangoon?s agents. Others, such as the Pa-O and the Kokang, traded in their political identities for business deals and closer relations with the regime. Several ethnic armies, notably the Mon and the Kachin, have tried to strike a balance between local political autonomy and a relationship with the generals in Rangoon. Still others, such as the Karen, the Karenni (Kayah) and the Shan, have maintained an armed commitment to independence or federalism. Aside from increased complexity, another result of the ceasefires has been a breakdown in inter-ethnic unity. The junta, named the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) in 1997, has refused to declare a blanket nationwide ceasefire. It has instead continued with its policy of proposing individual ceasefires with the remaining insurgent ethnic groups. The aim, clearly, is to maintain the status quo of disunity, and it is certain that the SPDC will respond negatively to the recent call by representatives of several ethnic groups, sounded when they met in Copenhagen, to allow them ? whether as political parties, armed or unarmed, ?ceasefire? or ?non-ceasefire? ? to meet freely. Tripartite dialogue
For two years now, the Burmese junta has been in secret talks brokered by the United Nations with opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi. No tangible results have emerged from the negotiations. Suu Kyi has repeatedly expressed a willingness to cooperate with the generals, but since they have no political motivation to see these talks succeed, nothing concrete has emerged from the table yet. Recent reports even suggest that the talks have stalled. Nevertheless, when the time to tackle thorny issues comes, and hopefully it is a question of when rather than if, one of the trickiest is bound to be the ethnic question. Leaders of ethnic groups have repeatedly asked to be allowed to participate in the negotiations, but so far these calls have gone unheeded by the regime. Reminiscent of the suspicion of leaders of the African National Congress that Nelson Mandela had sold out the revolution in his negotiations with Pretoria?s apartheid government, Burma?s ethnic nationalities are concerned that they have been left out of the loop by an NLD conspiracy. The exclusion of ethnic representatives from the dialogue between the SPDC and the NLD, which commenced when Suu Kyi was under house arrest, led the ethnic leadership to conclude that the Burman were seeking a Burman solution, to the neglect of the interests of the minority peoples. But the fact is that the activism of the pro-democracy groups led by Aung San Suu Kyi has given the various ethnic minority groups some much-needed breathing space. ?Tripartite dialogue is our policy?, confirmed Suu Kyi in May 2002 upon her second release from house arrest. She was referring to a popular phrase for the participation of ethnic groups in the negotiations, alongside her group and the junta. Besides the NLD, the UN and other international pressure groups have supported a tripartite composition at the negotiating table. However, even if the junta were to allow it, the complexities of differences in formal status, aim and political commitment of the various ethnic communities will have to be sorted out. Furthermore, there is the question of who really represents the ethnic groups. For, apart from armed factions, there are recognised ethnic political parties working alongside the NLD as well. This provides an excuse for the regime to drag its feet at the bargaining table. The various ethnic groups have come to realise this and are now working hard to dispel the image of disunity. In the meantime, with the regime continuing to prevaricate and postpone a political showdown with the NLD, no one knows when the ethnic representatives will be taken on board. Federalism as Balkanisation Over the years, in Burma, the term ?federalism? has come to be regarded as synonymous with ?Balkanisation?. Forty years after the 1947 constitution was shredded and discarded, this belief is as strong as ever, especially among the Burman who continue as the politically dominant group. The concept of federalism is still not understood by the ordinary Burman or by the junta, although in the case of the latter it is perhaps a wilful lapse. In order to back up its anti-federal stance, the junta has argued over the years that Burma cannot be divided into 135 pieces, referring to the official list of main and sub-ethnic groups in the country. Proponents of ethnic reconciliation argue that ethnic conflict in Burma is unlike the situation that existed in Rwanda or Yugoslavia. They point to the fact that the army?s oppression is directed not only against the minority groups but also the ordinary Burman. They emphasise that the last episode of communal violence occurred as far back as during the Japanese occupation (1942-45) and even then it was not ordinary Burman that were responsible for the massacre of the Karen, but the Japanese-trained Burma Independence Army. The ethnic issue is as critical as that of democracy in a country where minority peoples comprise about two-fifths of the population and live in the larger portion of the national territory. The conflict therefore cannot be considered simply a ?minority question?. Wars have been fought, and precious resources and lives have been wasted over the years. The military policy of ?divide and conquer? was strategically feasible for a period of time, but is sooner or later bound to fail disastrously. The regime has already overextended itself in its obstinacy, and the results are there for all to see in the crippled economy. The time of reckoning is near, the ethnic peoples? legitimate demands will inevitably have to be addressed. Indeed, the ethnic issue has become more complicated the longer its resolution has been put off, to the extent that the junta is even using this as an excuse for forestalling on negotiations. Today, there is a possibility that the ethnic groups may settle for more modest concessions than they had previously sought, at least temporarily, if the negotiations are considered ?reasonable?. They are likely to do so if the federal goal is recognised as a long-term process rather than treated as an immediate solution to Burma?s ethnic conflict. However, despite this possible change of stance, the ethnic problem is likely to always haunt Burma?s leadership ? be it made up of Aung San Suu Kyi, the junta or any other person or entity. The debate over federalism will rage on, but it is this debate that will serve as the locus for peace and ethnic reconciliation in Burma. Four decades since the military seized power, Burma has not seen a day of freedom. Nor has it seen peace, with the ethnic crisis perpetually looming large over the political landscape. Ending this crisis is obviously the key to achieving both freedom and peace in Burma. The best way to do this is to return to Pang Long, where the founding fathers of the country placed their trust in each other, and agreed to coexist and cooperate. As it was the first time around, the road to Pang Long will be long and difficult, marked by deep-rooted distrust, hatred, suspicion ? all of them exacerbated by the Burmese army?s anti-federal stance. No matter how hard it may be, however, the road to Pang Long is the road home for Burma. HIMAL SOUTH ASIAN
October 2002 (Burma
Special) PERSPECTIVE
Bleak Burma The generals know they cannot improve the social and economic plight of the Burmese, but they will not let go. by Aung Zaw Fourteen years ago, Burma?s present junta came into power promising to bring about democracy and prosperity. The promises were never honoured. Now, trouble is brewing in military-ruled Burma. Rangoon-watchers and analysts warn that a repetition of the social unrest and political instability that took place in 1988 is looming on the horizon. As the social and economic situation deteriorates, people are acting out of desperation and frustration. ?We are on the brink of starvation?, a senior Rangoon-based journalist told this correspondent in early September. However, his warning will not reach the Burmese people or authorities. His dire prognosis will not be allowed into print by the notorious Press Censorship Board. Burma?s military leaders do not like to hear such things. Instead, they prefer to read reports prepared by bureaucrats and economists who deliberately amplify Burma?s GDP growth, while ignoring the realities facing the poverty-stricken country. But on the street in Rangoon, the journalist?s words have the inescapable ring of truth. In September, Burma?s currency, the kyat, plummeted to new all-time lows on the black market. By the end of that month, the beleaguered unit had hit an unprecedented low of 1100 kyat to the dollar, after losing some 10 percent of its value over a just a week. Those who felt that the worst had been reached were in for further bad news as the slide continued and the kyat reached 1200 to the dollar. At the time of writing, the bottom is still nowhere in sight. While this precipitous plunge will play havoc with the country?s medium- to long-term economic planning, which at the best of times is seldom better than farcical, in the here and now it is already pushing many citizens to the edge. Prices have skyrocketed, making even the most basic foodstuff prohibitively expensive. The price of eggs has reached outrageous levels. An egg costs 30-40 kyat, enough to put it beyond the reach of ordinary citizens. Burma?s opposition leaders are well aware of the deteriorating economic situation. In August, Aung San Suu Kyi, leader of the National League for Democracy (NLD), told this correspondent, ?When the economy is in shambles, the social conditions of the country only get worse. When both of these factors continue to worsen, it is the people who have to bear the brunt. Our country will suffer greatly if the current dismal economic situation is not reversed?. Deep denial Burma?s economic deterioration has been accompanied by an alarming increase in urban crime rates. Rangoon and Mandalay, Burma?s second largest city, appear to be the worst affected. There have been reports of looting by large crowds in the suburbs of Mandalay. At a press conference in end-September, a government official denied reports of the lootings but admitted that ?some people stole rice?. Reportedly, hunger-related crime has become so widespread that the generals have been unable to bring it under control. Ironically, the generals themselves are now living in a climate of fear and insecurity. To prevent the situation from unravelling, the government media has been instructed to avoid reporting instances of such crime. Despite the growing hardship of the people and simmering unrest, Burma?s generals have shown no signs of moving towards much-needed economic reforms. Instead, they have demonstrated once again that they are in deep denial about their incapacity to meet the country?s most basic needs. On 16 August 2002, at a regular weekly press conference, the deputy minister of home affairs, Brig-General Thura Myint Maung, went on the defensive when a foreign news service correspondent asked him about rising unemployment and the issue of human trafficking, which is fuelled by the desperate desire of the Burmese to look for work in neighbouring countries. Rather than answer the question, the general simply reiterated the myth that Burma is a land of plenty. ?If you step out of your home, you can catch fish and prawns?, he assured his incredulous audience. It is difficult to say if Thura Myint Maung?s off the cuff comments really reflect the government?s grasp of conditions facing the great majority of Burmese. Nevertheless it is clear enough that official statistics paint a picture of the economy that few Burmese can even begin to recognise. Burma?s minister for national planning and economic development, Soe Tha, recently claimed that the country had achieved an economic growth rate of nearly 11 percent in the fiscal year ending March 2002. He said the high growth rate was the result of opening up the economy and the adoption of a market-oriented system. However, according to one insider, UN envoy Razali Ismail, who is assisting in negotiations between the NLD and the military junta, expressed his ?disappointment? with the figures cited by Soe Tha when they met recently in Rangoon. Japanese experts and government officials who have been pushing for economic reform in Burma reportedly shared Razali?s dismay at the junta?s unrealistic assessment of the country?s economic performance. Sources in Tokyo and Rangoon say that foreign observers have been especially troubled by evidence that General David Abel, the junta?s economics czar, has been sidelined. According to well-informed sources, the move to marginalise Abel, who is regarded as open to reform proposals, was engineered by Senior-General Than Shwe, head of the military government. Than Shwe has begun to roll back some of the tentative reforms already in place. At a recent meeting between Burmese and Japanese officials in Tokyo, Abel?s absence was conspicuous. Instead, Than Shwe sent Dr Than Nyunt, the chairman of the civil service selection and training board, who wields little or no influence over economic policy. Than Nyunt?s sole qualification is that he can prepare reports that appeal to the head of the junta. Stubborn generals Sadly, after more than a decade of at least professing to want progress, it appears that the Burmese regime is intent on bringing about a regressive trend. ?We are heading back to the Ne Win era, when reports were prepared by puppet ministers and bureaucrats who did not dare to upset the Old Man?, commented one journalist. Economic mismanagement under the dictatorship of General Ne Win had forced Burma to seek Least Developed Country (LDC) status in 1987, a year before the country was rocked by massive social and political upheaval. Today, many observers fear that the regime?s misguided policies will set Burma up for more unrest, as the country?s social and economic crisis deepens against a backdrop of frustration with the slow pace of political change. Rangoon-based observers warn that looting and petty crime are unavoidable and say that the government should begin to treat the situation seriously. In an interview to the London-based Burma Campaign, Aung San Suu Kyi said, ?We do not think in terms of GNP and GDP, we are not thinking in terms of money flow and things like that. We are thinking in terms of the effect on everyday lives of people. The way the situation and the economy affect the health of people, the education of our young people, that is what we are thinking of. But the generals are not paying attention. Instead, they seem preoccupied with visiting temples and attending ribbon-cutting ceremonies. The fear among some observers and journalists in Rangoon is that the military may use Burmese Muslims as scapegoats if the situation gets out of control. In the past, authorities have diverted attention from political and social problems by creating anti-Muslim riots in this predominantly Buddhist country. Meanwhile, Burma?s military leaders show little sign of the political will required to enter into a substantive dialogue with the NLD. While numerous protests were organised in the West and in ASEAN nations on the occasion of the military regime?s 14th anniversary, Burma?s foreign minister, Win Aung, told the United Nations General Assembly that his government stands by the goal of introducing a multiparty political system. But the government has set no timetable for democratic reform. Over the last decade, despite international pressure and sanctions, the military government?s human rights record has shown little improvement. Over 1500 political prisoners still remain in custody. The notorious Insein prison, located in suburban Rangoon, has recently seen the addition of new inmates. Two activist students who were staging a peaceful protest in front of the city hall during the Malaysian prime minister, Mahathir Mohamad?s recent visit to Rangoon were apprehended by intelligence officials and thrown into the prison. Peaceful gatherings are still banned in Burma. Last year, a 76-year-old professor, staging a solo protest at the same location asking the regime to initiate political reform, was arrested by security officials and sentenced to seven years imprisonment. Quite apart from arrests, there is the urgent issue of the treatment of political prisoners. Recently, Aung May Thu, a 60-year-old political prisoner suffering from a perforated gastric ulcer, died after an unsuccessful eight-hour surgery. He had been arrested in 1989 on charges of being linked to the defunct Communist Party of Burma and sentenced to 20 years in prison. Although the sentence was commuted to 10 years, and he had served his term, he was kept in prison under a law allowing indefinite detention of persons considered a threat to the state. He will not be the last political détenu to die in prison, and he was not the first either. Dozens of political prisoners have died in detention as a result of maltreatment and medical neglect. As the political stalemate continues the people of Burma face the prospect of living through years of darkness. It seems the stubborn generals will carry on ruling the country with an iron fist, even though it is clear to all that they lack the political will to solve Burma?s long-standing problems. Sooner or later in Burma social and political unrest will erupt, at which point it is feared that the generals will resort to their old technique of unleashing repression and violence. The future of Burma looks bleak. |