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BURMA RELATED NEWS - September
13, 2001.
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HEADLINES
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- AsiaWeek - Predictions, Observations and the
Power of Nine
AP - Some Land Mine Use
Persists
------------------------------------------------------------------------- AsiaWeek Webfiles: Predictions,
Observations and the Power of Nine
Why Myanmar confounds outside analysis By DOMINIC FAULDER Wednesday, September 12, 2001
Web posted at 01:50 p.m. Hong Kong time, 01:50 a.m. GMT "And now it's my turn to make a prediction," I announced to my small group
of newly found Burmese friends. It was payback time, and the astrologer looked
at me curiously. We were planted on stools so short we might just as well have
been squatting. My hands were resting palms up on his tiny table. For the best
part of 15 minutes he had minutely scrutinized them, carefully measuring each
line for his assistant to plot in a grubby notebook. Ancient charts had been
produced to cross-reference my time, date and place of birth. As the astrologer,
his assistant and a volunteer translator proceeded with the meticulousness of
scientists observing an experiment, curious passersby along Sule Pagoda Road had
settled down beside us to hear what my future held. The astrologer glanced
around our little group as I finally chose my moment. "My prediction is that if
we don't disperse, we will all be arrested."
The translator rendered this in Burmese and everybody laughed.
Nevertheless, they quickly disappeared into the evening darkness. This was
Rangoon in the late 1980s with martial law in force. There was a curfew and
congregations of more than a few people were forbidden. As one of the very few
foreigners in the city, I was quite possibly being watched by Military
Intelligence even as my horoscope was being charted. Maybe it's still in some
file there. Who knows?
In Myanmar, astrology and numerology play such important roles in daily
life that they have to be taken very seriously. Perhaps even more than Thais,
Laotians and Cambodians, Burmese believe in auspicious moments and the power of
numbers. Outsiders do not have to share these beliefs to see them at work. In
Myanmar, the most powerful number is nine (and its multiples). It is remarkable
how many key dates in the country's calendar and history include nine in one way
or another. Armed Forces Day is always marked on the 27th day of the 3rd month
(27/3=9). The State Law and Order Restoration Council staged its bloody coup on
the 18th day of the 9th month of 1988 (18+9=27). The secretary general of the
National League for Democracy, Aung San Suu Kyi, was locked up at home for six
years on July 20, 1989, the 20th day of the 7th month. It was the day after
Martyrs' Day, the anniversary of her father Bogyoke Aung San's assassination,
but also happened to be one of the best balanced days of the year (20+7=27;
1+9+8+9=27).
There are countless other examples of the power of nine in Myanmar,
including bank notes that at one time were denominated in bills of 45 and 90
kyats. This made counting your money harder than usual, and at the very least
was evidence of a different way of thinking. In the late 1980s, I decided to go
with the flow and treat all this as a perfectly rational method of ordering
one's life. Thereafter, I consciously timed my visits, whenever possible, to
coincide with "power" days when something momentous might occur. It worked
surprisingly well, particularly in July 1989. If I were expecting something to
happen in the next six months or so, I might consider the merits of Sept. 15
& 18, Oct. 14 & 17, Nov. 13 & 16, or Dec. 12 & 15. Early next
year, Jan. 4 is particularly interesting for a number of reasons. There is also
Jan. 22, Feb. 3 & 20, and March 2, 9, 20 & 27.
Of course, I am not making any predictions here, just noting that these
might be among the days on which some important development could occur in
Myanmar. No more than that. One reason for this caution is Myanmar's almost
limitless ability to confound rational foreign analysis, much of which is little
more than wishful thinking. There is nothing new at all about this. Readers of
foreign academic texts about Burma in the 1970s were constantly treated to
highly plausible explanations about why the closeted country was on the verge of
opening up, albeit slightly. They were always hopelessly wrong. Indeed,
interpretations that outsiders make about the Burmese political theater are
usually so far off the mark that to make a prediction almost invites its being
disproved. In recent decades, Myanmar's rulers seem to have positively reveled
in being contrary and doing the unexpected, whether it be suddenly changing the
side of the road vehicles must use, overnight demonetization or renaming the
country without any warning.
This unpredictability presents very special problems in bilateral relations
with other countries. When it comes to dealing with Myanmar, other countries can
hope and even prepare for change there, but they can never expect or predict
anything. Evidence of their contingency planning should certainly never be
mistaken for a mellowing or change of policy. That said, there is little
question that the dialogue which has been going on for nearly a year between the
junta and its most outspoken critic, Aung San Suu Kyi, is a more encouraging
development than almost anything since independence from Britain in 1948. Which
is not saying a lot. But what evidence is there of any substantive progress
beyond the release of nearly 200 political prisoners and the re-opening of some
party offices? The releases are laudable, but skeptics point out that many of
those detained had already reached or passed their release dates, and that at
this rate it could take the best part of a decade for all Myanmar's political
prisoners to be released. Remaining detainees include people like student leader
Min Ko Naing, who has been incarcerated since early 1989.
It the world of supposition, it is fair to assume that so long as Aung San
Suu Kyi believes she can secure the release of more of her supporters, she will
keep talking -- even if it is basically with the gun of their detention to her
head. Given the exceptionally fractious nature of Burmese politics, whatever she
does beyond that will invite criticism from one quarter or another. She is as
likely to be criticized for conceding too much as for being too stubborn. This
opens the debate as to what would constitute substantive progress in resolving
Myanmar's political standoff. Is it the release of more prisoners, recognition
of the NLD's election victory in 1990, reconvening of a constituent assembly to
thrash out a new constitution, setting a date for a fresh general election, or
some kind of combination of all of these?
That's very hard to answer, and there is good reason to be on the lookout
for an attempt at some kind of fudge. As an example, look no further than the
1990 general election. One of its most frequently overlooked features is that
its purpose was never made clear by the junta, certainly not before and much
less after, when the result was totally ignored. Was the NLD-dominated body
elected to be a constituent assembly drafting a new constitution, perhaps ahead
of another election, or a functioning parliament with the power to nominate a
cabinet? Whatever, neither came to pass and the issue might now best be left to
historians.
If the past is beyond improvement, at least the future is always amenable
to it. Looking ahead in the short term, the release of prisoners continues to
remain the most encouraging sign of a glacial thaw. It also establishes an
important principle: by releasing some, the junta has tacitly acknowledged that
all could be released in a general amnesty. There are amnesty precedents in the
Ne Win era, and such a mass release poses no real threat to national security.
After all, the people concerned may have been political activists to varying
degrees, but not even a handful could be termed terrorists. Almost perversely,
the junta has been much more inclined to trade peace accords and amnesties with
Myanmar's armed minorities.
An early general amnesty for political prisoners would be the clearest
possible sign of the junta's genuine intention to facilitate a meaningful
dialogue with a view to hammering out some kind of an accord for national
reconciliation. When such complex issues and historic animosities are in the
balance, accords just don't happen overnight. A general amnesty, on the hand, is
a relatively straightforward executive decision that could be made tomorrow or
at any auspicious time. That's an observation, not a prediction.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- Some Land Mine Use
Persists
The Associated Press, Wed 12 Sep 2001 GENEVA (AP) — Some countries
that signed a global treaty to ban land mines are still using the deadly
explosives responsible for maiming and killing thousands each year, an
international watchdog group said Wednesday.
Reports indicate that Uganda, Ethiopia and Sudan may still be using mines,
according to the 2001 edition of ``Landmine Monitor.'' The 1,175-page study also
said there were serious but unconfirmed allegations about Rwanda and Burundi.
All five governments deny use, the group says.
The study, produced by the Nobel Peace Prize-winning International Campaign
to Ban Landmines, will be presented next week in Nicaragua at a meeting of
countries that have ratified the 1997 treaty.
Landmine Monitor said several governments that have not signed the treaty
are thought to be using anti-personnel mines: Congo, Israel, Nepal and
Kyrgyzstan. In addition, there has been continued use of mines by nongovernment
forces in Afghanistan, India, the Philippines, Senegal, Uganda, Somalia, Georgia
and Yugoslavia.
Landmine Monitor said, however, that there had been major steps forward in
the fight to eradicate land mines, noting that trade of anti-personnel mines has
been almost completely halted, with no significant shipment since 1998.
``The 1997 Mine Ban Treaty and the ban movement more generally are having a
major impact globally,'' the report says.
Since the treaty came into force, more than 27 million anti-personnel mines
have been destroyed by over 50 nations, including about 5 million mines in the
past year, the group said. It estimated that up to 245 million remain stockpiled
by 100 nations.
China leads the list with 110 million mines, followed by Russia with 60
million to 70 million, the United States with 11.2 million, and Ukraine with 6.4
million, it said.
Land-mine injuries have been recorded this year in 73 countries. The
greatest number of victims were in Afghanistan, India, Angola, Cambodia, Iraq
and Myanmar, or Burma.
The land-mine treaty has been signed by 141 governments — nearly
three-quarters of the world's nations — and ratified by 119. Among those who
have not signed are the United States, Russia and China.
Washington maintains that land mines are needed on the Korean peninsula to
deter North Korea from invading South Korea. Russia and China say they need land
mines for defense.
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