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The Nation - June 22, 2000. Report reveals military brutality
A LARGELY-uncensored version of the May 1992 investigation report released yesterday yielded a more brutal picture of the military's clampdown on pro-democracy demonstrators. The report by the Pichit Kulavanijaya committee had been released earlier with heavy censorship. Sensitive parts regarding military operations had been blacked out. Following a public outcry, the Defence Ministry released the report again yesterday with much less censorship. Some of the most explicit information concerns testimonies by Maj Gen Thitipong Jennuwat, former commander of the First Infantry Division. He admitted being at the scene of shooting incidents in which dozens were killed. According to Thitipong, protesters hijacked buses and seized control of an oil truck on the night of May 18, one day after the first outbreak of violence. He said troops had to open fire as protesters tried to send burning vehicles crashing through defensive lines near the Public Relations Department. "It was impossible for soldiers to continue resorting to peaceful measures. The fire from the burning vehicles could have spread to public properties. We opened fire, aiming mainly at the vehicles. No more than 40 people were killed. Hundreds were injured," he said. Thitipong told the investigating committee the First Infantry Division was not involved in the shooting. The term "we" in his statement is understood to mean soldiers in general. "We acted in self-defence and there was no other choice. Some people could have been killed by deflecting bullets. To me, it was worth it. No human being could have responded in another way to this kind of situation." But another witness recalled Thitipong's aggression differently. Pol Maj Gen Uthai Asavavilai, former assistant commissioner of the Central Investigation Bureau, visited the Royal Hotel before dawn on May 19. Troops had raided the hotel, which, hours earlier, had been a sanctuary of disarrayed and wounded protesters. "I saw a very depressing scene. The soldiers' acts were ones that you would never imagine would be committed against our compatriots," he said. "Soldiers grabbed people by the hair and threw them against the counter. The protesters were kicked and stomped on. The soldiers told me the people were pains in the neck and they deserved this.'' Uthai said he walked up to Thitipong and warned the military officer the acts were inhumane, and the Thai government's image would suffer if the local and foreign media publicised the incident. "He wouldn't pay attention. Soldiers continued to step on people lying on the floor. Doctors were arrested," Uthai said. Commenting on the incident, Thitipong said Uthai showed him no respect in front of his military subordinates. He insisted he had to do what his superiors ordered him to. Col Prasong Boonthanom, Army intelligence officer, told the investigating panel troops started firing at protesters when rioters commandeered buses and were heading toward them. "There were a lot of people on the buses' roofs. About 50 metres before the buses reached the barb-wired barricades, soldiers opened fire. Some people fell off the buses. I don't know whether they were hit or they simply fell off or jumped down and tried to flee. It was a commotion and the noise of the guns was very loud. Some people also fell off or jumped from the awning of the Government Lottery Office building," he said. Lt Gen Chainarong Noonpackdee, First Army Region commander, told the Pichit committee reports about military trucks loaded with dead bodies leaving the Rajadamnoen Avenue were just rumours. "It was a military operation, in which the media were given total freedom. Press photographers and cameramen must have caught some action if scores or hundreds of bodies were really removed from the scene," he said. "If the military had gotten really tough, the death toll would have been far higher. And random shooting would have left numerous bullet holes on buildings on the avenue." An eight-page conclusion of the report made the following points: lThe Suchinda government tried to use only legal means to deal with a potentially explosive political situation. The government's attitude could have been caused by over-confidence in military backing and the majority control in Parliament. lThe government had a get-tough policy, bordering on provocation, toward the press. Subsequent attacks by the media inflamed public resentment against the administration. lIntelligence work failed completely, resulting in the magnitude of protest being under-estimated. The Capital Peacekeeping Command apparently assumed the anti-government protest involved only "organised mobs", not the middle-class or the people's power. lMost troops involved in the crackdown had no experience or training to deal with such big protests and rioting demonstrators. lThe government failed to counter "systematic" rumours that fuelled public resentment. lSome troops were made to believe communists or destructive elements were behind the protest. Lt Gen Thawal Sawangpak, former assistant Army chief, said some soldiers opened fire because they thought protesters were bent on overthrowing the country's political system. lA third party instigated the violence in which government buildings and vehicles were set alight to cause major confusion and inflame public hatred. People arrested for setting fire to the Nang Lerng police station were Ramkhamhaeng and Thammasat students. lThe Palang Dharma Party of protest leader Chamlong Srimuang tried to bail out students in police custody. This increased the possibility the Palang Dharma Party was involved in the instigation of violence. BY OPAS BOONLOM The Nation |