"“As a rule, the police are soft on the tough and tough on the soft,” recalled the veteran Chinese democracy activitist, Mr Zha Jianguo, of his time behind bars in China. In a New Yorker piece by his sister, Ms Zha Jiangying, published in December 2018, Zha said: “If they sense a weakness in you, it will bring out the bully in them.” It would be wise for Myanmar’s leaders from both the government and civil arenas to heed the implications of Zha’s observation. The Second Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation in April was followed by Myanmar and China inking three bilateral agreements: an agreement on economic and technical cooperation, an MoU on a five year economic and trade development cooperation plan, and an MoU on the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC) Plan spanning 2019 to 2030. However, caution has gradually emerged over the BRI, as shown by Myanmar’s recent approval of only nine of China’s 38 proposed “early harvest” projects. State Counsellor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s comment at the forum that projects need to “not only be economically feasible but also socially and environmentally responsible” and be fully supported by local communities, is an example of Myanmar’s growing wariness in dealing with China. Significantly, the MoU for the CMEC included provisions to allow Myanmar to seek financing from international financial institutions when implementing projects, invite international tenders for investment, and choose projects to maximise mutual benefit. These moves point to a shift in Myanmar’s approach to China that involves treading more gently and is a welcome development in bilateral relations. However, there are still many issues that need to be addressed. The public has not been told about where negotiations stand on the future of the much-despised Myitsone Dam – a situation not helped by a condescending comment from the outgoing Chinese ambassador, Mr Hong Liang, that “foreign forces” were involved in opposing the resumption of work on the project..."