13. Internally Displaced People and Forced Relocation
“If Burmese soldiers continue to burn down houses and torture villagers, nobody will dare live in the villages. The villages will be empty soon.” - Mon villager (Source: “Burmese Army Burns Down Three Mon Villages,” IMNA,
13.2 Causes of Displacement in Burma
13.3 Destinations of the Displaced and Forcibly Relocated
13.5 Situation in Arakan State
13.7 Situation in Kachin State
13.9 Situation in Karenni State
13.12 Situation in Tenasserim Division
In recognition of the plight of those forcibly displaced within their home countries, the international community has attempted to develop relevant protection mechanisms. Internally displaced persons (IDPs) covered under such mechanisms are defined by Article 2 of the 1998 UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement as:
“persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized State border.”
In principle, restrictions on forced displacement were first established as international norms under the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Article 12 protects against arbitrary interference or attacks on the home and Article 25(1) also accords the right to housing. These protections were reiterated in the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ECOSOC). Article 12(1) and 17(1) of ICCPR state respectively that:
“Everyone lawfully within the territory of a State shall, within that territory, have the right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his residence;” and
“No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his honour and reputation.”
Article 11(1) of ECOSOC recognizes “the right of everyone to an adequate standard of living for himself and his family, including adequate food, clothing and housing and to the continuous improvement of living conditions.”
The rights of IDPs were most explicitly stated in the 1998 UN Guiding Principles on Forced Displacement. This document elucidated wider IDP rights from previously established international humanitarian and human rights law. According to Principle 5, States’ authorities “shall respect and ensure respect for their obligations under international law, including human rights and humanitarian law, in all circumstances, so as to prevent and avoid conditions that might lead to displacement of persons.” Furthermore when displacement does occur Principle 5 dictates that States “have the primary duty and responsibility to provide protection and humanitarian assistance to internally displaced persons within their jurisdiction.” Enforced prohibitions against the forced displacement of persons and adequate provisions for their protection when such displacement does occur are necessary requisites for the fulfillment of the legal requirement of international human rights instruments.
Despite the panoply of international mechanisms established to protect the rights to non-displacement and protection after displacement, Burma has to date signed only the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC). These two international legal instruments, however, require that the authorities in Burma to take appropriate measures to ensure women and children have access to adequate housing under Article 14(2)(h) and 27(3) respectively.
Furthermore, Article 17 of the 1977 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), states that:
“1. The displacement of the civilian population shall not be ordered for reasons related to the conflict unless the security of the civilians involved or imperative military reasons so demand. Should such displacements have to be carried out, all possible measures shall be taken in order that the civilian population may be received under satisfactory conditions of shelter, hygiene, health, safety and nutrition.
2. Civilians shall not be compelled to leave their own territory for reasons connected with the conflict.”
Although Burma has neither ratified nor signed the Protocol II under the Geneva Convention, the principles of which are widely regarded as reflecting customary international law, thus making it binding on all States and non-state actors regardless of their ratification status.
In 2005, Burma continued to perpetrate abuses that violate both international human rights and principles of humanitarian law pertinent to freedom from forced displacement and the protection of those displaced. In the 12 August 2005 report to the UN General Assembly, the UN Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights in Burma Paulo Sergio Pinheiro stated explicitly that the practice of forced relocation was ongoing and that, “The requisitioning of possessions, forcible evictions, house destruction and the burning of civilian dwellings are more prevalent in counter-insurgency areas. A large number of villages in ethnic minority areas have reportedly been burnt down and the villagers forced to relocate as a result of military offensives against armed opposition groups.” (Source: “Interim Report of the Special Rapporteur on Human Rights in Myanmar,” Sixtieth session of the UN General Assembly, Item 73(c) of the Provisional Agenda, 12 August 2005).
Countrywide statistics on Burma’s IDP population are incomplete, although some estimates have placed the number at around one million (source: Visit to the Thai-Burmese Border, CSW, November 2005). Most forced relocation occurs in the ethnic minority areas. In such contexts, the SPDC military directly targets villagers as part of its ongoing campaign to assert military control over all areas of the country. According to Amnesty International, “Those who had fled from militarized areas in Myanmar were much more likely to have had their land confiscated by the Myanmar military…House destruction by the Myanmar military occurs more frequently in counter-insurgency areas than in peaceful ones” (source: Myanmar: Leaving Home, AI, 8 September 2005).
The displacement of villagers, ostensibly conducted as part of a wider ‘counter insurgency’ campaign, is most acute in eastern Burma among the Karen, Karenni, Shan and Mon ethnic groups (source: Burma: Displacement Continues Unabated in One of the World’s Worst IDP Situations, Global IDP Project, 27 June 2005). The Thailand Burma Border Consortium (TBBC) documented a rise of around 14,000 IDPs in this area to reach an estimated 540,000 individuals as of October 2005 (source: Internal Displacement and Protection in Eastern Burma, TBBC, October 2005). Those displaced within eastern Burma have either entered SPDC-designated resettlement sites, areas controlled by ethnic ceasefire groups, or fled into hiding in the jungle. Due to systematic military practices, two thirds of those displaced since 1995 continue to live as IDPs without a sustainable resettlement option (source: Internal Displacement and Protection in Eastern Burma, TBBC, October 2005).
Policies of forced displacement, whether through urban relocation programs or ostensible ‘counter insurgency’ campaigns, testify to the SPDC’s disregard for its internationally mandated ‘responsibility to protect.’ Furthermore, lack of regime assistance to IDPs obstructs the development of sustainable livelihoods for those displaced. Those displaced within Burma illuminate the high humanitarian costs of continuing policies of sustained military rule.
13.2 Causes of Displacement in Burma
Factors instigating forced displacement in Burma have their roots in attempts by the SPDC to further extend military control over the country. As such, forced displacement has been pursued to bolster the position of SPDC troops vis-à-vis ethnic armed opposition groups or coordinate urban ‘development’ programs. More specifically, the causes of forced displacement in Burma are primarily: violent conflict between SPDC or junta-supported troops and ethnic opposition groups, human rights violations committed largely against ethnic minority villagers, military directives as part of the ‘four cuts’ strategy; development projects, and landmine deployment in villages.
Conflict-Induced Displacement
Violent conflict between SPDC troops or SPDC-backed troops and the various armed resistance groups is a major cause of civilian displacement in Burma. The gradual expansion of SPDC campaigns further into areas of ethnic opposition has left few non-military controlled regions that are free from outbreaks of violence. Meanwhile disregard by the SPDC for the humanitarian fallout leaves villagers living in conflict zones in a highly insecure situation. Human Rights Watch documented in 2005 that conflict between SPDC and Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) troops has been a prime stimulus for the abandonment of villages in KNLA-patrolled territory. Villagers reported fleeing their homes upon learning of the impending arrival of SPDC military troops. In such cases, the evacuation process was arranged and carried out by members of the KNLA who assisted the movement of villagers to temporarily secure locations. (Source: “They Came and Destroyed Our Village Again:” The Plight of Internally Displaced Persons in Karen State,” HRW, June 2005). Further displacement occurred in Karen State as the result of conflict between the SPDC and KNU fighters. For example, on 11 January 2005, villagers abandoned their homes in Lawse village, Lawkhee region after more than 300 troops from SPDC IB 250 clashed with KNU Battalion 201 who were celebrating Karen New Year at the village (source: “Clash between KNU and Burmese Troops,” DVB, 11 January 2005). In the beginning of 2005, Mae Shwe Eu villagers fled their homes as the result of conflict between the SPDC and KNPP in Karenni State (source: “Nya-mo Military Camp Expected To Be Attacked Again,” Kantarawaddy Times, 3 August 2005). Continuing conflict between the SPDC and KNPP led to the displacement of 200 villagers on 17 December 2005 (source: “Fighting Continues in Karenni State,” Mizzima, 20 December 2005). An increasing number of Shan villagers abandoned their homes after hostilities escalated between UWSA troops supported by the SPDC and SSA-S fighters from January to April 2005.
Human Rights-Induced Displacement
Widespread violations of human rights have likewise incited mass displacement of civilians. Abuses such as extortion, torture, arbitrary detention, extrajudicial execution, and forced labor as causes of displacement are most prevalent is areas of ethnic opposition where SPDC and SPDC-backed troops harass villagers under the rubric of ‘counter-insurgency’ tactics. Such abuses are employed for the purposes of extracting information about armed opposition groups, punishing suspected resistance sympathizers, extorting money and property, enforcing military orders, and instilling a general fear in the civilian populace. (Source: “They Came and Destroyed Our Village Again”: The Plight of Internally Displaced Persons in Karen State, HRW, June 2005).
Commenting on the situation of human rights abuses, particularly in Burma's ethnic minority areas, the UN Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in Burma, Paulo Pinheiro, cited the extensive use of:
“forced labour, rape and other sexual violence, extortion and expropriation by Government forces…While those in areas where counter-insurgency operations are taking place are particularly badly affected, there are also reports of violations in ceasefire areas, where large contingents of Government forces continue to be present.” (Source: “Interim Report of the Special Rapporteur on Human Rights in Myanmar,” Sixtieth session of the UN General Assembly, Item 73(c) of the Provisional Agenda, 12 August 2005).
The continuation of human rights abuses in Burma's ethnic minority areas heightens pressure on villagers to flee their homes to search for some form of safe haven even if only in the transient security of internal displacement.
Military Directed Relocation
The SPDC perceives ethnic minority villagers as integral to the support of armed resistance groups and as possible elements of opposition in and of themselves. As a consequence, civilians in areas of armed opposition are targeted as part of the SPDC’s military strategy. More specifically, the SPDC’s ‘four cuts’ campaign has sought to undermine the support base of armed opposition groups by severing their connection to recruits, information, supplies and finances. This policy has been implemented by forcibly relocating villagers from ‘brown’ (contested) areas to ‘white’ (SPDC-controlled) areas, thereby isolating villagers from resistance forces and placing them more firmly under military control. (Source: Burma: Displacement Continues Unabated in One of the World's Worst IDP Situations, Global IDP Project, 27 June 2005).
The military typically gives villagers scheduled for relocation less than a week’s notice to abandon their homes. After this period, SPDC military troops enter the village, loot homes and businesses, and then destroy all buildings and crops as a means of dissuading the return of villagers. To further inhibit the return of villagers, troops frequently lay landmines throughout the abandoned village as well as along nearby paths and within agricultural fields. After the departure of villagers, the area becomes a ‘free fire’ zone where anyone found risks being shot. (Source: Burma: Displacement Continues Unabated in One of the World's Worst IDP Situations, Global IDP Project, 27 June 2005).
Development-Induced Displacement
Despite continuing claims by SPDC officials about positive trends in social and economic development, the actual alleviation of poverty remains negligible. Moreover, the junta's Border Areas Development Program, which ostensibly serves to improve the situation of those in Burma's ethnic minority areas, has in actuality been used as a means to extend military control over the country's contested border areas. Human Rights Watch has observed that “the most common causes of displacement include…land and crop confiscation––often in the context of junta-sponsored development projects.” (Source: “They Came and Destroyed Our Village Again:” The Plight of Internally Displaced Persons in Karen State, HRW, June 2005).
Development projects that have led to forced displacement in Burma include the construction of infrastructure, mines, irrigation systems, and natural gas and oil extraction facilities as well as commercial agricultural fields and military bases (sources: Internal Displacement and Protection in Eastern Burma, TBBC, October 2005; “They Came and Destroyed Our Village Again:” The Plight of Internally Displaced Persons in Karen State, HRW, June 2005). According to EarthRights International, an international human rights and environmental advocacy organization, “Dozens of large-scale dams (fifteen meters in height) have been already built or are currently under construction throughout Burma, especially in the central region of the country” (source: Flooding the Future: Hydropower and Cultural Survival in the Salween River Basin, ERI, 2005). The construction and resulting water displacement of such hydro-electric dams necessitate the mass relocation of those living in the affected area.
Erratic civil planning has also required the resettlement of urban communities to rural ‘satellite towns.’ Most notable in 2005 was the relocation of Burma’s capital from Rangoon to Pyinmana District, Mandalay Division, 400 km. north of Rangoon. In conjunction with the move, villagers and farmers have been forced off their land to make way for the building of new administrative offices, residential homes and military barracks. Many were forced into the suburbs of Pyinmana. (Source: “Burmese Junta Grabs Land From Farmers to Build Offices at Pyinmana,” DVB, 9 November 2005). The move to Pyinmana has also resulted in the destruction of people’s property. On 18 November 2005, the authorities ordered the destruction of 100 households along the U Razat and Maung Khin roads in Pyinmana to widen a road leading to the new capital. The U Razat and Maung Khin roads connect the train station and Kyetpyay, where the new capital is being constructed. The authorities also destroyed the living quarters built for railway workers situated on the new Pyinmana – Kyetpyay road. (Source: “100 Homes Dismantled by Burmese Authorities for New Capital,” DVB, 21 November 2005). On 6 December 2005, it was reported that 500 more homeowners lost their homes for road widening projects associated with the Pyinmana move. (Source: “More Homes Destroyed and Relocated at Burma's New Capital,” DVB, 6 December 2005).
Landmines
Although landmine use represents an element of conflict-induced displacement, it is a more multifaceted stimulus than overt violence between regime and armed resistance forces. The indiscriminant and durable nature of landmines as well as the targeted placement by the SPDC military in ethnic minority villages, croplands, and footpaths contributes heavily to the long-term displacement of villagers in the ethnic minority areas. On a similar vein, UN Special Rapporteur for Human Rights in Burma Pinheiro reported that the “continued practice of laying landmines in fields and forests, and the lack of mine clearance, has had a negative impact upon the freedom of movement of civilians and their economic right to earn a living” (source: “Interim Report of the Special Rapporteur on Human Rights in Myanmar,” Sixtieth session of the UN General Assembly, Item 73(c) of the Provisional Agenda, 12 August 2005).
Individuals interviewed by HRW who had been displaced within Burma cited the prevalence of landmines as a prime catalyst for abandoning their homes (source: “They Came and Destroyed Our Village Again:” The Plight of Internally Displaced Persons in Karen State, HRW, June 2005). Not only do landmines force villagers to flee, but their deployment in and around villages, agricultural fields, and travel routes prevents the return of those who are internally displaced. The widespread distribution of landmines constitutes a fundamental obstacle to any sustainable solution to internal displacement in Burma.
13.3 Destinations of the Displaced and Forcibly Relocated
Internal displacement in Burma has left civilians in varied circumstances. While some have chosen to flee into neighboring countries, or spontaneously relocate to urban centers the majority are pressured into one of three general contexts: (1) SPDC-designated relocation sites; (2) hiding sites; or (3) areas administered by ceasefire groups.
Relocation Sites
As a means of furthering the militarization of Burma’s border areas, the SPDC has implemented extensive relocation campaigns from areas occupied by armed resistance groups into areas more firmly under their control. In such cases, villagers living in politically sensitive border regions are transferred to a new residential center or required to join an already inhabited settlement, usually near a military base or roadway. Villagers are given no more than a few days notice as to their imminent transfer and are required to dismantle their homes and carry any transportable property or food supplies. Many villagers choose to flee into hiding rather than resettle to areas under SPDC control. After departing for relocation sites, SPDC military troops burn down and destroy structures of the former villages to thwart return. (Source: Internal Displacement and Protection in Eastern Burma, TBBC, October 2005).
In most cases the actual relocation site is typically a desolate patch of land lacking any pre-existing infrastructure. Relocated villagers are given no financial or in-kind assistance to establish their new lives in resettlement sites. They must construct simple huts out of materials they have to procure themselves. Limited access to clean water and sanitation facilities coupled with a lack of adequate health care facilities multiplies villagers’ propensities to illness and disease. Any educational facilities must be built and staffed by those resettled and most relocation sites lack access to any electrical supply. (Source: Burma: Displacement Continues in One of the World’s World IDP Situations, Global IDP Project, 27 June 2005). Military-designated relocation sites provide no sustainable solution for IDPs as they lack adequate means for civilians to establish their livelihood. What little agricultural land exists around relocation sites is usually confiscated for military use or already tended by local inhabitants. Furthermore, so long as IDPs are restricted from traveling outside of their assigned relocation sites, their new residences serve as prison camps.
Villagers are given no official recognition as to the legitimacy of their inhabitation in resettlement sites, thus perpetuating the insecurity of their lives. In order to travel outside of relocation sites to farm their land, conduct trade, or visit friends or relatives, IDPs are required to request travel passes from SPDC authorities. These may be issued for up to a week, but typically allow for no more than a day’s travel outside of relocation sites. Despite the provision of travel passes, villagers are guaranteed no security while venturing outside of relocation sites. In such situations, SPDC forces have leveled accusations that villagers are only traveling to support insurgent forces. Acts of rape against women outside of camps have been frequently documented and local military authorities are notoriously negligent in their investigation of such crimes.
The greater nearness of villagers to SPDC military troops increases the likelihood of human rights abuses. The most frequent violations committed against villagers in resettlement sites include forced labor, arbitrary taxation, and restrictions on movement (source: “Toungoo District: Civilians Displaced by Dams, Roads, and Military Control,” KHRG, 19 August 2005). Moreover, they must assist in the construction of military infrastructure and provide material for this construction as well. Forced labor has also been used for clearing bushes and trees from the roadsides both inside and outside the relocation sites, cleaning military buildings, cultivating military crops, hauling water, building fences around the military camps, digging bunkers, road construction, porter duty for the military and other general services.
The most extensive use of resettlement sites to detain IDPs has occurred in eastern Burma in Shan, Karen, Karenni and Mon States and Tenasserim Division. In 2005, roughly 108,000 individuals were displaced into resettlement sites in these areas. Within this figure, the largest groups were the 23,700 IDPs in southern Shan State and 56,600 IDPs in Tenasserim Division. There was thus an increase of 31,000 IDPs from TBBC’s estimates as of October 2004. Most of this increase, however, occurred within Tenasserim Division due to the use of adjusted data collection methods. (Source: Internal Displacement and Protection in Eastern Burma, TBBC, October 2005).
Hiding Sites
Villagers in remote border areas displaced as a consequence of harassment, abuse or the SPDC military’s ‘scorched earth’ policy often choose to remain in hiding within the vicinity of their abandoned or destroyed villages rather than flee into neighboring countries, SPDC-assigned relocation sites, or ceasefire areas. Those living in hiding are assumed to be supporters of resistance groups and therefore treated as military opponents. The SPDC military conducts search and destroy missions against IDP hiding sites and deploys landmines along paths and within abandoned villages and agricultural land. Villagers found in the ‘free-fire’ zones are subject to detention, torture, and summary executions. (Source: Seeing through the Smoke of Ceasefires, KHRG, 9 June 2005).
By their very nature, IDP hiding sites are wilderness areas lacking the most basic village infrastructure. The necessity of remaining undetected by SPDC military patrols forces these IDPs to perpetually relocate and limits the extent to which they can develop new facilities to meet their basic needs. As a consequence, villagers in hiding are unable to access clean water and healthcare facilities. Malaria, diarrhea and other preventable illnesses are commonplace leading to high mortality rates. According to IDPs interviewed by the Karen Human Rights Group (KHRG), the most pressing problem for those living in hiding is the lack of food security. SPDC troop patrols confiscate and destroy food stocks, crops and wild fruit trees in order to obstruct the possibility of surviving in the surrounding jungle. The deployment of landmines by SPDC troops also severely restricts the possibility of villagers returning to harvest their plantations. When IDPs do manage to continue farming, the necessity of evading military patrols means that then can only produce about three to four months worth of rice. Cash crops such as betel nut and cardamom are a more stable source of income as they can be cultivated on relatively small plots of land. Reliance on fish is also precarious as SPDC soldiers are known to shoot those found fishing and landmines are frequently laid along river banks (source: “Toungoo District: Civilians Displaced by Dams, Roads, and Military Control,” KHRG, 19 August 2005). Some IDPs have been able to arrange to be paid laborers to supplement their limited subsistence capacities. IDPs in hiding sites interviewed by TBBC indicated that their primary methods of coping with food insecurity and military patrols were to hide food stocks in various locations and “prepare alternative hiding sites in case of emergency evacuation.” (Source: Internal Displacement and Protection in Eastern Burma, TBBC, October 2005).
The available data suggests that the majority of IDPs living in hiding are located in eastern Burma. According to TBBC, there were 92,000 individuals in hiding within eastern Burma as of October 2005. This figure indicates a rise of 12,000 people over the course of the previous year. Most of this increase has been ascribed to SPDC offensives and attacks led by ceasefire groups against the SSA-S in southern Shan State. Displacement also continued in northern Karen State and eastern Pegu Division despite an informal ceasefire pact between the KNU and SPDC forces. Such continued displacement, led TBBC to conclude that “the human rights dividend of the ceasefire agreement has been negligible for internally displaced Karen persons hiding in the most remote areas.” (Source: Internal Displacement and Protection in Eastern Burma, TBBC, October 2005).
Systematic harassment and abuse of IDPs by military patrols, threats to livelihood through destruction of food sources, and the extensive deployment of landmines all “prohibit the possibility of a more sustainable return of resettlement” (source: Internal Displacement and Protection in Eastern Burma, TBBC, October 2005). The extent to which displaced persons choose to live in hiding reflects the fact that SPDC policies target civilian elements outside of their control. As KHRG has argued, “Burma’s conflict is not primarily between the SPDC and armed opposition groups, it is between the SPDC-controlled state wanting to control the entire population and every inch of sovereign territory, and anyone who resists that control” (source: Seeing through the Smoke of Ceasefires, KHRG, 27 June 2005).
Ceasefire Areas
According to TBBC, displaced civilians living within areas administered by ethnic ceasefire groups constitute the largest segment of IDPs in eastern Burma. Many flee to these areas because human rights abuses are generally less pervasive. However, this is not the case in all ceasefire areas. For example, in 2005, roughly 10,000 relocated villagers fled from areas administered by the UWSA in southern Shan State. (Source: Internal Displacement and Protection in Eastern Burma, TBBC, October 2005).
While ceasefire areas may provide temporary refuge for villagers fleeing conflict or human rights abuses, most ceasefire authorities are insufficiently equipped to provide adequately for the well being of IDPs under their administration. Resettlement in ceasefire areas is often unable to provide a sustainable solution due to the high population density, the limited availability of suitable agricultural land, SPDC restrictions on travel outside of ceasefire areas, and the inability of ceasefire authorities to provide financial assistance to those in need. (Source: TBBC, Internal Displacement and Protection in Eastern Burma, October 2005).
Estimates for 2005 indicate that approximately 340,000 IDPs lived in various ceasefire-controlled areas in eastern Burma. This figure indicates a decrease of 25,000 individuals displaced within ceasefire areas since 2004. The overall decline is attributable to villagers leaving relocation sites in southern Shan State administered by the UWSA due to severe constraints placed on them as well as limited access to an adequate means of livelihood, a reduction in the area administered by the DKBA, and heightened SPDC restrictions on ceasefire authorities and those living within their jurisdiction. Despite the overall reduction in IDPs living in ceasefire areas, some regions, such as those administered by the NMSP, saw an increase in IDPs who fled from SPDC controlled areas. Other ceasefire areas with significant IDP populations include areas controlled by the Karenni National People’s Liberation Front (KNPLF), the SSA-N and the DKBA, which administer roughly 65,000; 40,000; and 20,000 villagers respectively. (Source: Internal Displacement and Protection in Eastern Burma, TBBC, October 2005).
The obligation of the SPDC to protect those who have been internally displaced is derived from international standards of human rights and articulated within the UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement. Under principle 3(1), “National authorities have the primary duty and responsibility to provide protection and humanitarian assistance to internally displaced persons within their jurisdiction.” The adequacy of humanitarian assistance can be measured in its effectiveness in addressing the immediate harm faced in the short-term, supporting the longer recovery process of those harmed, and promoting positive change in the attitudes and structures that neglect human rights and contribute to such harm. The SPDC, however, fails to provide any humanitarian assistance to IDPs, primarily because IDPs are largely not unintended victims of conflict. Rather IDPs are mostly ethnic minority villagers who have been specifically targeted as part of the SPDC’s ongoing mission to militarize the country’s border areas. As such, humanitarian protection for IDPs is incongruous with the SPDC’s agenda.
Without protection from the regime or other sources, IDPs are in need of substantial humanitarian assistance. Severe threats to IDP health arise from restricted access to food supplies and the related nutritional deficiencies. Furthermore, unhygienic conditions in which many IDPs are located contribute to various types of infection. The most prevalent illness amongst IDP groups is malaria, while other illnesses include HIV/AIDS, “[g]astric problems, coughs, anemia, worms, chest infections and skin disease” as well as “common colds, respiratory infections, digestive problems…, diarrhoea, dysentery, skin infections, vitamin deficiencies, dizziness, fatigue, and depression” (sources: “Medical Mission to IDPs: Southern Karen State March/April 2005,” FBR, 28 August 2005; “Toungoo District: Civilians Displaced by Dams, Roads, and Military Control,” KHRG, 19 August 2005). Although IDPs are able to manage some illnesses with traditional herbal medicines, these are often insufficient.
Destruction of villagers’ crops and food stores, deployment of landmines, restriction on the movement of IDPs as well as the fear of encountering SPDC military troops all contribute to undermining food security. While some villagers are able to return to tend their crops many are forced into famine conditions. One pregnant displaced woman who spoke with medics from the Free Burma Rangers (FBR), a humanitarian relief organization, said, “I want to eat some noodles, do you have any? If only I could eat some noodles just once then I can die” (source: “Report of Relief Mission to Toungoo District, Karen State, Burma”, FBR, 31 January 2005). This desperation arises in direct correlation to specific SPDC policies targeting civilians.
The SPDC has consistently restricted the access of NGOs to conflict-affected areas because of the political sensitivity of these regions. Such restrictions have been heightened since the ouster of former Prime Minister Khin Kyunt in October 2004 and the 7 May Rangoon bombings (source: Internal Displacement and Protection in Eastern Burma, TBBC, October 2005). International NGO assistance to IDPs has been largely inhibited. Meanwhile, domestic NGOs operating inside Burma to provide humanitarian assistance to IDPs are organized under SPDC auspices and are highly restricted in their activities. Regardless, humanitarian assistance for IDPs remains minimal. (For more information see Chapter 12 Freedom of Assembly, Association and Movement).
The primary conduits for humanitarian assistance to IDPs in Burma are ethnic community-based organizations that work across national borders. Medecins Sans Frontiers (MSF), an international health organization, has also been involved in delivering emergency medical assistance to IDP communities in southern Burma by crossing over from Thailand (source: “Medical Workers Afraid of Treating Emergency Patients After MSF Withdrawal,” IMNA, 5 January 2006). This practice was however terminated in December 2005 when the Thai Ministry of the Interior refused to grant MSF continued permission for border crossings.
13.5 Situation in Arakan State
The SPDC has specifically targeted the populace of northern Arakan State in a concerted campaign to dilute the ethnic makeup of the region. Like other border areas, northern Arakan State is relatively remote and is furthermore separated on its eastern side from central Burma by a mountain chain running north-south. The population of northern Arakan State is estimated at around 800,000. (Source: Burma: Displacement Continues in One of the World’s Worst IDP Situations, Global IDP Project, 27 June 2005). Approximately 82 percent of those living in this region are identified as Rohingya Muslims and are concentrated in Maungdaw, Buthidaung and Rathedaung Districts. The remaining population of Arakan State comprises the majority Rakhine Buddhist population and small numbers of Mro, Daignet, Kamein, Thet and Chin (source: The Rohingya Minority: Fundamental Rights Denied, AI, May 2004). The origin of the Rohingya is a particularly salient issue in Burma and Bangladesh, as both countries refute claims that the group belongs within their borders. This dispute has particularly palpable effects in Burma as reflected in the denial of their legal citizenship by the authorities and targeted abuses. (For more information see Chapter 10 The Freedom of Belief and Religion).
Displacement in northern Arakan State typically occurs as villagers flee human rights abuses by SPDC forces or are forcibly relocated to make way for the construction of ‘model’ villages. In previous years, NaSaKa border patrol units were the primary culprits of human rights abuses. The dissolution of the NaSaKa in 2004 after the ouster and arrest of former Prime Minister Khin Nyunt, who oversaw their operation, led to expectations that human rights abuses in the region would subside. Reports of incidents from 2005 suggest that this has not been the case, as the units were reformed under the title of NaKaPa and incorporated within an adapted military hierarchy. (Source: Forum-Asia, 26 May 2005).
The forcible relocation of villagers for the purposes of securing land for the construction of ‘model’ villages continued in 2005. For example, in June 2005, it was reported that SPDC authorities were constructing over 30 more ‘modern’ villages in the northern part of Arakan State (source: “Villagers from Government's 'Modern' Villages Suffer Famine,” Narinjara News, 23 June 2005). Rohingya villagers, in particular, were frequently told that their houses had been built on land not assigned for residential construction. They were therefore required to abandon their homes, which were subsequently destroyed. Mosques and other village infrastructure were similarly destroyed. The cleared area was then designated as the location of a new ‘model’ village where Buddhist residents from central and northern Burma, members of ceasefire groups or surrendered armed resistance fighters were to be resettled. The ‘model’ village program serves to dilute the ethnic makeup of northern Arakan State and, in turn, lessen the social cohesion of any local opposition movements.
In some cases Rohingya villagers who had been displaced from their homes were made to porter construction materials for the new houses. In his August 2005 report to the UN General Assembly, Special Rapporteur Pinheiro said that he “remains very concerned about reports of ongoing discrimination against the Rohingya ethnic minority in northern Rakhine state, including the destruction of mosques by Regime forces and the forced labour practice of ordering civilians to construct “model villages” to resettle Buddhists onto Muslim land” (source: “Interim Report of the Special Rapporteur on Human Rights in Myanmar,” Sixtieth session of the UN General Assembly, Item 73(c) of the Provisional Agenda, 12 August 2005).
Forced Relocation in Arakan State - Partial List of Incidents for 2005
As of April 2005, 160 acres of land had been confiscated for the construction of around 80 houses in Nu Ru Lah, a new model village in Central Maungdaw Township. As of late May 2005, 12 houses had been built for 25 families who had already taken up residency. Although the materials used to build the houses were brought by the regime from outside the area, villagers had to provide porters to carry the construction material to the site. (Source: Forum-Asia, 26 May 2005).
In May 2005, Rakhine villagers abandoned their homes as a consequence of a SPDC ban on hillside cultivation in northern areas close to the Bangladesh border. Those who fled included members of the Mro, Mru and Khami ethnic groups, many of whom relocated to areas further inside Arakan State such as Kyauk Taw Township. (Source: “Arakanese Desert Border Homes After Hillside Cultivation Prohibited,” Narinjara News, 24 May 2005).
Between June and October 2005, large tracts of land were confiscated in several areas of Maungdaw and Buthidaung Townships ostensibly for new model villages. There are reports that a large area was confiscated along the river between Taung Bazaar and Ba Da Gar, and the authorities stated that 8,000 families would be brought from other parts of Burma. (Source: The Arakan Project, June to October 2005).
On 18 July 2005, SPDC troops ordered local hill farmers living in border areas to relocate following a battle between the ALA and the SPDC military which resulted in the death of a SPDC officer. (Source: “Armed Clash Occurs Between Arakan Liberation Army and SPDC,” Narinjara News, 12 August 2005).
On 7 August 2005, local SPDC authorities revealed that a total of 110 NaTaLa villages were to be constructed with 50 in Buthidaung Township and 60 in Maungdaw Township. The villages were reportedly going to be constructed east of the May-yu River. A VPDC chairperson indicated, “One village will be constructed on the roadside near the ferry harbor east of Buthidaung and another village will be constructed near the Da-blu River Bridge. There are 22 villages to be constructed east of the May-yu River and 25 villages to the west of the May-yu River.” (Source: “The SPDC Carry Out Na-ta-la Village Construction Project in Northern Arakan State,” Kaladan News, 25 September 2005).
Chin State, lying along Burma’s western border with India, is one of the country’s “most underdeveloped” regions. Although no reliable census has been conducted within Chin State in recent years, analysts estimate that the population lies at around 300,000 to 400,000. The larger Chin group is comprised of several tribes including the Asha, Cho, Kuki, Laimi, Lushai and Zomi. An estimated 90 percent of Chin people follow some branch of Christianity. Religious persecution has shaped much of the abuse committed against the Chin as the SPDC seeks to dilute the religious character of the state. (Source: Visit to the Thai-Burmese Border October 19 – November 4, CSW, November 2005).
Subsequent to the country-wide popular protests in 1988, the Chin National Front (CNF) established themselves in support of democracy and Chin self-determination. The SPDC military has sought to subvert the rise of the CNF through the increased militarization of the state since the 1990s. As of 2005, there were approximately 8,000 SPDC soldiers deployed within the state (source: Visit to the Thai-Burmese Border October 19 – November 4, CSW, November 2005). The intensified military presence has led to increased human rights abuses against local civilians and detrimental humanitarian fallout. Specific abuses committed against Chin villagers previously documented include forced labor, arbitrary taxation, destruction of homes, land confiscation, extortion, torture, and extra-judicial killing. Economic woes have compounded these issues and forced many villagers to abandon their homes.
The relative isolation of Chin State from international observers has restricted the flow of information regarding incidents of abuses involving IDPs or their current demographic breakdown. The most recent estimates suggest that several thousand Chin are displaced within Burma. (Source: Religious Persecution: A Campaign of Ethnocide Against Chin Christians in Burma, CHRO, February 2004).
13.7 Situation in Kachin State
The relative isolation of Kachin State in the most northern regions of Burma has constrained the dissemination of information about human rights abuses in general as well as the scale of internal displacement. As such, no accurate figures on internal displacement within Kachin State are currently available. The area has however seen a long history of armed resistance against the military authorities. Numerous armed groups, most notably the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO), struggled for autonomy from the 1960s to the 1990s. During this period the SPDC military forcibly relocated as many as 100,000 non-combatants as part of their counter insurgency campaign (source: “Kachin State,” BERG, September 2000).
More recently Kachin State has seen an increase in control by the SPDC military, especially since the KIO signed a ceasefire agreement in 1994. As a consequence, the SPDC has sought to intensify its exploitation of Kachin State’s vast mineral reserves including jade, gold, platinum and coal. Given the pattern of human rights abuses associated with the increased militarization of natural resource exploitation and ‘development’ projects, there is little doubt that villagers living around such resources face continuous harassment. At the close of 2004, EarthRights International reported on the displacement of local artisans by the increasingly industrialized mining program in Kachin State (source: Mining, Gender and the Environment in Burma, ERI, November 2004). The SPDC and private companies have previously worked together to forcibly evict villagers living in areas where the regime has granted mining concessions. This practice is consistent with the countrywide pattern of increased militarization of rural border areas, ostensibly for purposes of national ‘development.’
Non-combatants in Kachin State were also displaced during 2005 as a consequence of clashes between conflicting factions of the New Democratic Army-Kachin (NDA-K), a ceasefire group. On 21 September 2005, soldiers loyal to Zahkung Ting Ying, the recently deposed chairman of the NDA-K, captured the Kachin town of Hpimaw on the China-Burma border north of the NDA-K HQ in Pang Wah. Many Pang Wah residents fled the town anticipating fighting between the two sides. The villagers headed for the Kachin State capital of Myitkyina and to the nearby China border. (Source: “NDA-K Loyalists Take Hpimaw,” Irrawaddy, 22 September 2005).
Since independence in 1948, sections of Karen State have been in a continuous state of armed resistance. Conflict-induced displacement has thus remained pervasive. In conjunction with sustained military presence, the main causes of internal displacement are the various human rights abuses inflicted on Karen villagers by the SPDC military and its proxies. Of these, forced labor, extortion and land confiscation have been the most significant catalysts (source: Internal Displacement and Protection in Eastern Burma, TBBC, October 2005). A verbal ‘gentlemen’s agreement’ ceasefire arranged between former SPDC Prime Minister Khin Nyunt and a delegation led by former KNU President, Gen. Bo Mya, in January 2004 has done nothing to mitigate human rights violations inflicted by SPDC and DKBA troops. Violations of the ceasefire have been continuous since its inception. In 2005, the SPDC proceeded to construct new roads, deploy troops and construct new bases in order to further militarize Karen State. The ceasefire agreement has served to provide greater latitude to SPDC offensives under the pretense of peace. Furthermore, the ceasefire process has come to a halt since the ouster of Prime Minister Khin Nyunt. While the KNU has made repeated requests to continue discussions, the SPDC has been unwilling to consider anything less than full surrender from the KNU.
Events leading to internal displacement in 2005 mimic earlier patterns of civilian harassment, land confiscation, and direct attacks against villagers. For example, in January 2005, villagers were forced to flee their homes after SPDC troops attacked villages celebrating Karen New Year. In Thanduang Township in the far north of Karen State, increased militarization surrounding the reconstruction of a road connecting Toungoo to Mawchi in Karenni State has resulted in civilian abuses leading to displacement (source: Internal Displacement and Protection in Eastern Burma, TBBC, October 2005). Meanwhile the SPDC has conducted search and destroy missions on 3 villages leading to displacement along the Kyaukgyi to Saw Hta road east of the Yunzalin River in March and April. Furthermore, from March to June, SPDC military offensives in Nyaunglebin District against the KNLA were supplemented with attacks against villagers who were tortured and killed as well as being seriously wounded by landmines. (Source: “Proliferation of SPDC Army Camps in Nyaunglebin District Leads to Torture, Killings and Landmine Casualties,” KHRG, 7 July 2005). Such abuses prompt villagers to flee from their homes leading to a greater number of IDPs.
In 2005, plans for the construction of the Weigyi dam in Karen State continued. Villagers living near the area remained displaced and tens of thousands will have to be relocated if construction proceeds. The dam, which is being funded by investment from Thailand, is expected to flood an area up to 380 km. upstream in both Karen and Karenni States in order to export electricity to neighboring Thailand. (Sources: Visit to the Thai-Burmese Border, CSW, November 2005; Flooding the Future: Hydropower and Cultural Survival in the Salween River Basin, ERI, 2005). The Weigyi dam will likely cause even greater displacement in Karen State.
As of October 2005, estimates for Karen State indicate that 89,900 individuals remained internally displaced. This figure shows a marked decrease of 45,400 IDPs from October 2004. The SPDC-KNU informal ceasefire agreement likely contributed to a decrease in the number of IDPs in southern Karen State. A significant number of IDPs also moved out of areas controlled by the DKBA and Karen Peace Army ceasefire groups to resettle in areas of mixed-administration. (Source: Internal Displacement and Protection in Eastern Burma, TBBC, October 2005).
Forced Relocation in Karen State - Partial List of Incidents for 2005
As of 30 May 2005, about 8,000 villagers were still living as IDPs in the area around the Salween River on the Thai-Burma border. These villagers had been forcibly evicted from their homes by the SPDC military in order to clear the banks of the river in preparation for a proposed Salween Dam. The dam is to be constructed as a joint venture of the Thai government and the junta. (Source: “Mass Signature Campaign against Salween Dam,” Mizzima, 30 May 2005).
On 26 to 27 November 2005, SPDC military troops launched attacks on ethnic villages near the Thai-Burma border, setting fire to homes and forcing 1,000 civilians to flee. Regime forces raided 6 villages in Karen and Karenni states burning 100 homes and rice barns according to Mhan Shar La Pan, Sec. Gen. of the KNU. “They have arrested some villagers and fired artillery at civilians who had fled,” he said, adding that he had no reports of casualties. (Source: “Myanmar (Burma) Govt Attacks Ethnic Villages,” 1,000 Flee,” Reuters, December 2005).
Dooplaya District
On 10 January 2005, 350 villagers fled Kah Law Ghaw village fearing conflict between KNLA and SPDC forces after KNLA soldiers refused to leave the village during Karen New Year celebrations upon repeated demands by soldiers from SPDC IB 230, LIB 356, and LIB 545. The villagers spent the night hiding in caves on the Thai border. Most were without food, water, or blankets. (Source: “SPDC Violates the Ceasefire During Karen New Year Celebrations; the Attack on Kah Law Ghaw Village, Dooplaya District,” KHRG, 3 February 2005).
On 11 January 2005, villagers abandoned their homes in Lawse village, Lawkhee region after more than 300 troops from SPDC IB 250 clashed with KNU Battalion 201 who were celebrating Karen New Years at the village. Just prior to this incident, SPDC troops burned down 100 homes and rice barns belonging to Karen villagers in nearby Shwekyin District. (Source: “Clash between KNU and Burmese Troops,” DVB, 11 January 2005).
Nyaunglebin District
Between 1 and 22 April 2005, a column from SPDC LIB 111 began patrolling the Kheh Der, Ler Wah, and Kwih Lah village tracts in Kyauk Kyi Township causing most of villagers in the area to flee into hiding in the forests for several days while the troops remained in the area. (Source: “Proliferation of SPDC Army Camps in Nyaunglebin District Leads to Torture, Killings and Landmine Casualties,” KHRG, 7 July 2005).
From 14 November 2004 until January 2005, at least 5,736 villagers fled to the jungle following a series of offensives by SPDC LIB 20, 264, 350, 368, 382 and 589 against villagers in Nyaunglebin District. SPDC troops looted and burned down homes, and destroyed 388,000 kg of rice. (Source: Interim Report Card: July 2004 – February 2005: A Summary of Political and Human Rights Developments in Burma, Altsean, February 2005).
From 31 March to 4 April 2005, Column Comdr. Hla Thein Shwe and troops under his command came to Ler Klah area of Saw Ka Doe village tract (Region No. 4) of Mon Township. Fearing mistreatment, villagers fled to hide in the jungles. (Source: KIC, 9 April 2005).
On 12 June 2005, troops from SPDC IB 57 led by Tain Shwien forced 3 villages to relocate to the area of Shwien Da. The village leader begged and even paid the SPDC military 60,000 kyat for each village, but the military refused to excuse the villagers. (Source: “June 2005: Inhumane Treatment Continues in the Nyaunglebin District, Western Karen State in Eastern Burma,” FBR, 1 August 2005).
On 20 June 2005, SPDC LIB 351 forced Teh Htu village to move to Kler Ko village. The villagers refused to move, so the SPDC military fined each of the 94 families 10,000 kyat. After that, Column Comdr. Khin Soe forced the villagers to relocate again on 5 July. This time the Teh Htu villagers had to move to Kler Ko village. (Source: “June 2005: Inhumane Treatment Continues in the Nyaunglebin District, Western Karen State in Eastern Burma,” FBR, 1 August 2005).
On 6 July 2005 at 6:00 pm, SPDC Operation Command 2 Comdr. Khin Soe Naing ordered Pa Ta Lar village tract to relocate to a nearby motor road. The village was required to pay 150,000 kyat if they did not want to relocate and the commander prohibited the villagers from telling anyone. (Source: KIC, 2005).
On 5 August 2005, Bo Gyi Myint Thein of SPDC LIB 439 informed Thoo Ka Bee village elders that Pa Ta La, Wet Ler Daw, Noe Gaw, Thoo Ka Bee and Inn Net village tracts were required to relocate. (Source: KIC, 2005).
On 18 September 2005, villagers fled from Kwee Koo, Kyauk Kyi (Ler Doh) village after 2 SPDC military battalions, Columns 1 and 2 of LIB 4 and IB 12 under TOC 332, attacked KNLA forces. The number of IDPs was unknown. (Source: “SPDC Military Attacks IDPs and KNLA in Western Karen State, Closes Roads in the North. 18-21 Sept 2005,” FBR, 25 September 2005).
On 21 September 2005, SPDC Battalions LIB 4 and IB 4 conducted a raid on the HQs of the 9th KNLA battalion in Ler Wa, Kyauk Kyi, Nyaunglebin District causing 400 villagers to go into hiding in the area. (Source: “SPDC Military Attacks IDPs and KNLA in Western Karen State, Closes Roads in the North. 18-21 Sept 2005,” FBR, 25 September 2005).
From 21 September to 3 November 2005, 400 IDPs from Nyaunglebin District were forced to flee their temporary villages and hide for 1 and a half months when SPDC military IB 4, IB 42, IB 76 and LIB 12 advanced into the area. Some were able to return to their homes at the start of November, although IDPs from Kwee Lah village were unable to do so as their homes had been destroyed by SPDC troops. The soldiers also deployed 15 landmines prior to departing the village. The KNLA were attempting to de-mine the area at the time of this report in late November. Schools serving these IDPs closed during the previous month and a half and had not yet reopened as of the start of November. In addition to the destruction of homes, the SPDC military stole the thatch and walls from houses in order to make their own shelters. The SPDC military also stole or destroyed the villager’s property and materials such as cooking pots, water containers, and sleeping mats. (Source: “400 Villagers Forced to Flee - Village Destroyed,” FBR, 23 November 2005).
On 16 November 2005, 400 villagers fled from Ler Wah Township after the SPDC TOC 332 led by Myo Win and under the control of SPDC military Division 33 attacked and subsequently took control of the HQs of the 9th KNU Battalion. (Source: “Relief Mission Report 25 August – 30 August 2005,” FBR, 16 November 2005).
On 29 November 2005 at 6:00 pm, SPDC LIB 599 under the command of Myit Sone attacked and burned down Ter Kweh Lay Ko village in Mon Township, destroying 15 houses causing the displacement of 60 to 80 villagers. (Source: “Village Burned as Civilians are Attacked by the Burma Army,” FBR, 30 November 2005).
On 29 November 2005, SPDC LIB 599 from Ma La Daw camp under the command of Gen. Ko Ko, burned 15 houses in Ter Kweh Lay Ko village causing the following losses to the following villagers:
1. Naw Pwe Paw Htoo – 248,000 kyat;
2. Naw Khin La – 300,000 kyat;
3. Saw Kweh Say – 400,000 kyat;
4. Saw Mg Nyot – 500,000 kyat;
5. Saw Paw Hae – 390,000 kyat;
6. Saw Wei Say – 274,000 kyat;
7. Saw Keh Mg Puu -350,000 kyat;
8. Saw Ta Ku lu – 420,000 kyat;
9. Saw Hae Kgay – 460,000 kyat;
10. Sei Khin Mg 550,000 kyat;
11. Saw Chit Khin – 290,000 kyat;
12. Saw Klo Lay Htoo – 350,000 kyat;
13. Saw Taw Lay – 310,000 kyat;
14. Saw Ma La Ka – 430,000 kyat;
15. Saw Raw Ner – this house was not completely burnt down.
Fearing similar attacks, nearby villagers of Maw Keh Tha Per Ko and Ma La Daw villages packed all of their household goods and supplies and kept them outside their houses in case they were required to flee suddenly. (Source: “Burma Army Activities in Nyaunglebin District, Western Karen State,” FBR, 17 December 2005).
On 30 November 2005, villagers from Htee Hser Day, Kwe So Ko, Keh Ka Ko villages fled into the jungle after SPDC IB 76 led by Battalion Comdr. Lt. Col. Zaw Thu with 150 soldiers began patrolling in Saw Ka Der village tract. Without anyone to tend to the fields, some of the paddy farms were damaged. (Source: “Burma Army Activities in Nyaunglebin District, Western Karen State,” FBR, 17 December 2005).
Toungoo District
From 31 December 2004 to January 2005, villagers in the Mawdalaw, Mon Township area were forced to dismantle their homes and build new camps for SPDC LIB 599 on the site of their former homes. (Source: “Report of Relief Mission to Toungoo District, Karen State, Burma,” FBR, 31 January 2005).
In January 2005, 440 villagers comprising 70 households from Saw Wah Der village, Tantabin Township remained in hiding following an attack on their village by SPDC IB 73 and LIB 439 on 26 December 2004. Following the attack the SPDC military looted the village and captured Saw Ta Tan (age 38) and Saw Tu Kru (age 40). These 2 men were taken to the SPDC military camp at Kaw They Der where they were reportedly executed. The SPDC military continued to patrol the area into January. Displaced families had to sleep on the ground in the jungle. Night time temperatures in January were as low as 40 degrees Fahrenheit. IDPs from Saw Wah Der village joined others from Yaw Tha Bei and Wah Baw Kee villages that had fled earlier. The Free Burma Rangers reported that many were weakened by exposure and many were sick with malaria, respiratory infections, diarrhea and typhoid. (Source: “Report of Relief Mission to Toungoo District, Karen State, Burma,” FBR, 31 January 2005).
On 14 April 2005, Gen. Ko Ko, commander of SPDC Southern Command HQs, forced Taing-myok villagers and Kah-baung villagers to relocate to a place on the east side of a nearby motor road under the rationale that the Kah Baung and Pa The Chaung dams were in danger of flooding. (Source: KIC, April 2005).
On 21 July 2005, troops from SPDC IB 26 forced Maw La Daw villagers, except a few elderly, to return to their old village site in order to begin building a new military camp in Maw La Daw. (Source: “Human Rights Violation Update: Northern and Western Karen State,” FBR, 9 September 2005).
On 24 August 2005, troops from SPDC LIB 599 based at Swa Lo village ordered villagers living near Koon Chan village to relocate to Swa Hta village in 3 days threatening to destroy the houses and huts of those who failed to relocate. They also extorted 3,000 kyat from the owners of oxen or buffalo carts. (Source: KIC, 2005).
Between 26 and 28 November 2005, troops from Columns 1 and 2 SPDC IB 75 attacked Hee Daw Kaw village burned 32 houses and captured 7 villagers, including a 1-year-old baby, with the assistance of a small force of the Karenni breakaway faction, the Karenni National Solidarity Army (KNSA). The 300 villagers of Hee Daw Kaw and 600 from the surrounding villages of Hoki, Sho Ser, Wah Soe, and Ha To Per fled their homes on 26 November. A total of 159 families were displaced:
1. 51 families from Hee Daw Kaw;
2. 43 families from Hgo Khi;
3. 33 families from Shro Hser; and
4. 32 families from Wah Soe.
The SPDC military then burned down homes in Hee Daw Kaw on 28 November. After hearing of the attack, over 1000 more people living further west up to the Saw Wah Der village area fled as well. As of 30 November, the IDPs remained in hiding in the jungle without basic necessitates as SPDC IB 75 remained in the area. (Source: “Message from a Relief Team Leader: A response to Burma Army Attacks,” FBR, 30 November 2005).
13.9 Situation in Karenni State
Conflict between the regime and armed resistance forces has persisted in Karenni State since the 1950s. The KNPLF agreed to a ceasefire with the SPDC in 1994 and has since become an ally of the regime, often acting as a proxy for the SPDC military. The KNPP meanwhile formed a ceasefire pact with the junta in March 1995. However the agreement quickly broke down after the SPDC increased troop deployment in the area. In August 2005, the SPDC informed the KNPP that they wished them to reinstate the abandoned 1995 ceasefire agreement. Although the KNPP has continually expressed interest in establishing a lasting peace agreement with the SPDC, the regime remained unwilling to propose anything but a full surrender by the KNPP, which is unacceptable to the resistance movement. (Source: “Peace Broker Contacts Burma's KNPP for ‘Arms for Peace’ Deal,” Mizzima, 22 August 2005). As a result, Karenni villagers continue to be subject to sustained violent conflict between SPDC forces and the KNPP, causing constant levels of displacement from the Karenni community.
Internal displacement in Karenni State has primarily stemmed from military directives for civilian relocation and spontaneous flight from violent conflict. Relocation campaigns continued throughout 2005 as the SPDC forced villagers out of areas controlled by KNPP fighters. An increasing number of villagers fled conflict zones following reports of the SPDC’s use of chemical weapons against resistance fighters in Karenni State during 2005, which led to illnesses among exposed villagers (source: “Nya-mo Military Camp Expected to Be Attacked Again,” Kantarawaddy Times, 3 August 2005). There were also cases during 2005 of Karenni villagers from both Karenni and Shan States fleeing forced conscription into the Shan Nationality Liberated Group (SNLG). In other cases villagers fled resettlement sites after conditions in these areas proved unbearable.
In 2005 the number of IDPs in Karenni State rose by more than 4,000 over the previous year to reach a total of 92,000 individuals according TBBC. Out of this number, 75,000 were living in ceasefire areas, mostly under control of the KNPLF. A further 7,500 were living in SPDC-designated relocation sites while the remaining 9,500 were in hiding. (Source: Internal Displacement and Protection in Eastern Burma, TBBC, October 2005).
Forced Relocation in Karenni State - Partial List of Incidents for 2005
In the beginning of 2005, Mae-shwe-eu villagers fled from their homes as the result of military operations carried out by combined forces of the SPDC and KNPLF. (Source: “Nya-mo Military Camp Expected to Be Attacked Again,” Kantarawaddy Times, 3 August 2005).
In July 2005, 120 Karenni IDP families from Daw Ta Hay village, who were residing in an SPDC controlled compound since 2004, were forced to sign a contract by SPDC LIB 530 stating that fighting would not occur in the area if they were permitted to return to their former homes. Those who agreed to sign were allowed to return, while those who refused remained in the SPDC compound. (Source: “Military Government Demands That Villagers Sign Statement If They Want to Go Back to Their Native Village,” Kantarawaddy Times, 26 July 2005).
On 23 July 2005, 3 villages from SNLG controlled areas fled and other villages prepared to flee to Karenni State following an order requiring 2 to 10 villagers to report to SNLG HQs in Si-Sai City, Naung-Htaung battalion camp by 27 July in order to attend military training. In the last week of July, 10 family groups from the SNLG area attempted to cross the Than-lwin River and enter Thailand but were unable to do so for lack of a boat. The group subsequently returned to their village. (Source: “Authorities (Ya-la-la-pa) Forcibly Collected the Villagers to Attend the Military Training,” Kantarawaddy Times, 30 July 2005).
In December 2005, the following SPDC military battalions conducted operations to find and attack IDP hiding sites:
1. LIB 421 (70 SPDC troops, 6 KNSO troops), Maj. Myo Min Aung;
2. LIB 424, (110 SPDC troops) Maj. Myo Ting Aung;
3. LIB 426, (110 SPDC troops, 60 KNPLF troops), Maj. Taung Taung Win; and
4. LIB 428, (110 SPDC troops), Maj. Wing Zaw.
Karenni villages targeted in this operation included:
1. Papo,
2. Katho,
3. Kwa Thi,
4. Wi Wa,
5. Yaw Ah Ta Ka, and
6. Pu Klo LW. (Source: “Burma Army Kidnaps Three Women, Assaults Villagers and Attacks Karenni Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in Karenni State,” FBR, 27 December 2005).
On 17 December 2005, more than 200 villagers from 3 villages were forced to flee from their homes due to continued fighting between SPDC and KNPP soldiers. The IDPs were largely concentrated in the free fire zone near Mawchi, District 2. (Source: “Fighting Continues in Karenni State,” Mizzima, 20 December 2005).
Loikaw Township
In April 2005, SPDC troops ordered villagers from Daw Tahe and Konna villages to relocate to SPDC specified areas. Villagers were not provided with food or building materials. Villagers were reportedly allotted an 80 square foot area of land to live on without land for farming and were unable to exit the area for work or travel without possession of a permission document from the village headman. The relocation sites were reported to be overcrowded and without clean drinking water. In addition, villagers living in the site were subject to SPDC demands for forced labor to build military camps, clean gardens and construct fences. As a result of the conditions in the military controlled area, 32 people from 8 families fled. (Source: “The IDPs Who Were Forcibly Relocated to A Combined Village Site Fled to Border,” Kantarawaddy Times, 21 April 2005).
In mid-December 2005, SPDC troops from LIB 530 in Loikaw Township arrested local villagers and subsequently, forcibly relocated their village without reason. More than 700 villagers were forced to leave without their possessions. Furthermore, villagers were required to provide information about the KNPP activities to the SPDC's Lwoilinlay camp every week. (Source: “Residents in Lwai-kaw Township Are Arrested and Forcibly Relocate Their Village,” DVB, 21 December 2005).
Pruso Township
On 9 April 2005, all residents of Buko Village, Pruso Township were forcibly relocated to Nanpeh, situated on the Loikaw - Mawchi main road, by a local SPDC military commander. In total 23 families made up of 100 villagers were relocated. The villagers were provided with no assistance for the relocation. At around the same time, villagers from Lawkyiku, Khoraku, Markrawshe and Lawjar in Kaylya Township were ordered by the same commander to relocate their villages to Nanpeh in the near future. The forced relocations were reported to be a result of recent clashes between the SPDC military and the Karenni Army and subsequent accusations that Karenni villagers were supporting Karenni Forces. (Source: “New Forced Relocation of Villages by SPDC,” Kantarawaddy Times, 11 April 2005).
Sha Daw Township
In early 2005, SPDC troops from IB 424 and 94, based in Shan State, launched attacks after hearing of an alliance between the SSA and the Karenni Army. The attacks led to displacement of villagers in Sha Daw Township and along the Karenni and Shan border. (Source: “Karenni Relief Mission Report,” FBR, 6 September 2005).
In June 2005, 50 Karenni villagers from Daw Ta Naw village, Leh Du Khee village tract, Sha Daw Township, Daw Ta Hay area, and Wok Ngaw village in Lwoi-kaw Township abandoned their homes after being accused of collaborating with the KNPP and being forced to sign statements assuring there would be no more fighting. The villagers were told that their villages would be burned down if any fighting occurred nearby. Because they could not guarantee that no fighting would occur, the villagers fled in fear of attacks by SPDC military troops. (Source: “More Karenni Refugees Advanced to the Thai Border,” Kantarawaddy Times, 24 June 2005).
Areas of Mon State have been relatively free of overt armed conflict since the NMSP’s ceasefire agreement with the SPDC in 1995. Despite this ceasefire, violent conflict between SPDC military troops and Mon splinter groups continued to occur in Ye Township in southern Mon State as well as Thaton and Bilin Townships along the northern border with Karen State. As a consequence of such conflict and the occurrence of human rights abuses in SPDC controlled and mixed administration areas, internal displacement continued to occur. Most of those abandoning their homes fled to areas controlled by the NMSP. Internal displacement is also related to various violations human rights, committed mostly by SPDC troops. Specific human rights violations that lead to internal displacement in 2005 included land confiscation, forced portering, forced labor in SPDC construction projects, arbitrary taxes, destruction of homes, extortion, and fear of sexual assault. (Sources: Internal Displacement and Protection in Eastern Burma, TBBC, October 2005; “No Protection to Innocent Civilians and Population Displacement,” The Mon Forum, HURFOM, 31 January 2005).
2005 saw an increase of 17,700 IDPs over the previous year (source: Internal Displacement and Protection in Eastern Burma, TBBC, October 2005). In Ye Township alone TBBC documented the displacement of close to 10,000 people during the year leading up to the wet season of 2005. The situation was similar in KNLA patrolled areas. The Mon Relief and Development Committee (MRDC) reported that roughly 40,000 people were internally displaced in Mon State at the start of 2005 and over 12,000 returned refugees remained in NMSP controlled territory or a Mon refugee resettlement site (source: “No Protection to Innocent Civilians and Population Displacement,” The Mon Forum, HURFOM, 31 January 2005). TBBC documented a similar number of IDPs in Mon State. Out of a total of 48,700 IDPs, 2,500 were in hiding, 6,200 dwelt in relocation sites, and 40,000 were staying within areas controlled by the NMSP (source: Internal Displacement and Protection in Eastern Burma, TBBC, October 2005). Although a few families returned to their original homes in 2005 this was not feasible for the majority of those displaced.
Forced Relocation in Mon State - Partial List of Incidents for 2005
On 31 March 2005, Thai authorities, following an order by the SPDC, agreed to relocate approximately 50 houses belonging to Mon villagers in a disputed area of land along the Thai-Burma border at Three Pagodas Pass. Those living in the relevant houses had no legal citizenship registration within either country and many had lived in the area for more than 20 years. Upon learning of the impending relocation the villagers began leaving the area, many returning to Burma proper. (Sources: “Bomb Explodes at Three Pagoda Pass Border,” Kaowao News, 1 April 2005; “Disputed Houses at Three Pagodas Pass Relocated,” Kaowao News, 1 April 2005).
On 8 May 2005, the TPDC chairman in Three Pagoda Pass, No. 3 quarter, U Aung Kyaw Min ordered the relocation of all 50 houses from town quarters No. 3 and 4 by 23 May to make way for a road construction project and new guest houses for gambling businesses. The construction projects were proposed by a Thai businessman and agreed to by the SPDC township authorities. The villagers were forced to pay 750 baht in May and another 750 baht in June for a plot of land in Saw Khin, the relocation site, to build a 20 by 40 foot house. (Source: “50 House Relocations Forced for 3 Pagoda Pass Casino,” IMNA,
Ye Township
In January 2005, SPDC troops from Southeast Tactical Command No. 3 burned down about 40 houses in Pauk Pinkwin (Wae Kwao) and 60 houses in Ma Kyi (Mang Glong) and Hoay Kyar villages of southern Ye and Yebyu Townships accusing the villages of supporting a splinter faction of the NMSP. Hundreds of villagers fled. Many arrived in a Mon resettlement camp near the Thai-Burma border. (Source: “A Hundred Families Fled to Mon Resettlement Camp,” Kaowao News, 26 January 2005; “Burmese Army Burns Down Three Mon Villages,” IMNA,
During April 2005, SPDC troops drove farmers and families from their land by confiscating 600 plantations and private gardens in the Kay Halae area in Ye Township for the building of new artilleries for the SPDC military. (Source: “Farmland Seized: BA’s Destructive Land Use Policy,” Kaowao News, 19 April 2005).
The people of Shan State have experienced ongoing conflict since independence, as various armed groups have struggled for autonomy and control of the state’s vast natural resources. From 1989 onwards, patches of ceasefire areas throughout the north and east and regions of overt armed conflict in the south, where the SSA–S has remained actively resisting SPDC expansion, have mottled Shan State. (Source: Internal Displacement and Protection in Eastern Burma, TBBC, October 2005). Throughout 2005, conflict-induced displacement occurred in Shan State as the SPDC-aligned UWSA, backed by SPDC forces, conducted an extensive military offensive against SSA–S patrolled areas in the south and southeast of Shan State. In some areas, villagers were forced to abandon their homes when they were directly targeted during such attacks. The Shan State Nationalities People’s Liberation Organization (SSNPLO), an ethnic Pa-O ceasefire group, conducted military offensives in concert with SPDC forces against SSA-S positions in townships around Mawkmai. As a consequence of these attacks over 3,000 villagers fled their homes between March and April 2005. (Source: Internal Displacement and Protection in Eastern Burma, TBBC, October 2005).
Displacement caused by forced relocation and various human rights abuses has been, however, more substantial contributors to the flight of IDPs in Shan State. Shan State has seen some of the most extensive forced relocation in Burma. Since 1996, campaigns of forced relocation in Shan State have continued in line with the SPDC’s ‘four cuts’ strategy. Villagers suspected of supporting armed opposition groups such as the SSA–S have been relocated to areas securely under SPDC control. During 2005, 17 villages were relocated as the SPDC continued their strategy of severing connections between the SSA–S bases located along the Thai border and villagers within the more central areas patrolled by SSA–S troops (source: Internal Displacement and Protection in Eastern Burma, TBBC, October 2005). Extensive forced relocation has also been enforced under the pretense of eradication of poppy agriculture and drug production. Mass relocation of Wa villagers from northern Shan State into Mon Hsat Township continued in 2005 as Wa Supreme Leader Bao Youxiang continued with his stated intention of declaring a total ban on drugs in Wa regions by 26 June 2005, the International Day Against Drug Abuse and Illicit Trafficking (source: Report From Shan FBR Team, FBR, 1 June 2005).
The SPDC also bolstered their military presence in Mon Pan Township that serves as the point of entry for access to the 3,600 megawatt hydro-electric dam that is to be built at Ta Hsang. Analysts have estimated that the dam will run 188 meters wide and flood an area of hundreds of square kilometers. Prior to 2005, over 2,000 households had already been relocated to clear area for the dam’s construction and reservoir. (Sources: The Salween Under Threat: Damming the Longest Free River in Southeast Asia, Salween Watch and Southeast Asia Rivers Network (SEARIN), September 2004; Flooding the Future: Hydropower and Cultural Survival in the Salween River Basin, ERI, 2005).
Villagers have been subject to torture, extortion, rape, forced labor and other abuses of human rights, contributing to the forced displacement of civilians as they continue to flee areas of abuses in search of greater human security (source: FBR, 1 June 2005). The SPDC military incited displacement after SPDC forces arrested and punished villagers who had rallied in support of a 17 April declaration of independence by the newly formed in exile Interim Shan Government. The abuse associated with this crackdown led the estimated population of IDPs hiding in southern Shan State to more than double during 2005. (Source: Internal Displacement and Protection in Eastern Burma, TBBC, October 2005).
According to TBBC, the cumulative effects of forced displacement in Southern Shan State resulted in a total of 219,000 IDPs as of October 2005. This indicated an increase of just over 3,000 displaced persons from 2004. Of this number 20,800 were in hiding, 23,700 had been resettled in relocation sites, and 174,500 remained in ceasefire areas in southern Shan State. (Source: Internal Displacement and Protection in Eastern Burma, TBBC, October 2005).
Forced Relocation in Shan State - Partial List of Incidents for 2005
On 22 February 2005 between 3:00 and 5:00 am, 60 mm mortar shells bombarded Paker, an Akha village in Loi Tawkham village tract, Tachilek, resulting in the destruction of 21 of the 24 homes in the village as well as the flight of villagers. Subsequently, 5 households from the village fled to Piangfah IDP village, near the SSA’s Loi Kawwan base. It was believed that the mortars were launched from the SPDC IB 43 base in Mongpiang, however, SPDC forces claimed the incident was the result of a rebel attack. (Source: “Army Bombards Village of Allies,” SHAN, 28 February 2005).
In March 2005, villagers fled major military offensives in Shan State instigated by SPDC military and UWSA troops against the SSA-S. Thousands of villagers were affected by the fighting and attenuated human rights abuses, which included forcible relocations. (Source “Burma: Army and Proxies Attack Shan Civilians,” HRW, 26 May 2005).
In April 2005, shells landed near an IDP settlement during UWSA attacks on a SSA-S base at Loi Tai Lang. While no IDPs were injured in the attack, the SSA-S transferred over 1,000 IDPs, who had been living nearby, to safer positions in the western and southern region of Loi Tai Leng. (Source: “FBR Reports: Attacks Against the Shan,” FBR, 28 April 2005).
Kae-See Township
On 24 September 2005, a combined force of troops from SPDC Division 77 and LIB 286, based in Kae-See Township, forced villagers who had returned to their original villages to return to the Murng Nawng relocation site. Approximately 50 households from Wan Tong and Long Yaan villages as well as 8 households from Paa Kaang villages were subject to the order. (Source: “People Forced to Relocate Again in Lai-Kha and Kae-See,” SHRF Monthly Report, SHRF November 2005).
Laikha Township
From the end of April until 20 May 2005, close to 500 Shan villagers fled their homes in Laikha Township as a consequence of a SPDC military offensive targeting supporters of the Interim Shan Government. In one instance on 4 May 2005, troops from SPDC IB 64 and LIB 515 encircled Wanpang village in Wanheng village tract, burned down the local temple and detained village elders including Rev Tejinda. (Source: “Hundreds Fleeing from Shan State Hot Spot,” SHAN, 20 May 2005).
On 14 September 2005, troops from SPDC Division 77 forced the following villages in Wan Pung village tract to relocate to Wan Pung village in retaliation of support for the Interim Shan Government:
1. Wan Zan, 60 households;
2. Kun Keng, 40 households;
3. Si Kung, 30 households; and
4. Loi Saai, 25 households.
These villages had been subject to relocation orders in 1997-98, however, some had been allowed to return to their original villages in 2002. (Source: “People Forced to Relocate Again in Lai-Kha and Kae-See,” SHRF Monthly Report, SHRF, November 2005).
On 4 October 2005, the SPDC LIB 346, 372, 542, 544, 562, 563 and 566 ordered the 40 households of Koonkieng village and the 60 households of Wanzon village to relocate to Wanpong village tract causing many villagers to abscond into Thailand. The relocations were an attempt to break the connection between the Shan resistance and local population following fighting between SPDC forces and the former SSA-S 758th Brigade, which had recently aligned with the Interim Shan Government. Comparable incidents reportedly transpired in Kehsi, Mongkerng and Mongnawng Townships. (Sources: “Junta Launches New Scorched Earth Campaign,” SHAN, 16 October 2005).
Mok Mei Township
In April 2005, SPDC troops forcibly relocated over 250 families from villages in Kandoo village tract, Mok Mei Township. (Source: “Update on Shan IDPs,” FBR, December 2005).
Mong Ton Township
From December 2004 until mid-February 2005, over 3,000 Wa were resettled in Mong Ton along the Thai-Burma border under orders of the Wa leadership in preparation for the 26 June deadline for the establishment of a drug-free zone throughout the Wa region. Estimates of resettled villagers, along with their recipient village are as follows:
1. Mongjawd: 1,100;
2. Mongtaw-Monghta: 350;
3. Namyoom: 450;
4. Nawng Yahsai: 1,000; and
5. Namhu Jawnghtam: 100.
Those resettled were provided rice for 1 year and 1,000 baht. Nevertheless, many relocated villagers reportedly returned quickly to their former homes north of Mong Ton Township. According to Wa statistics, 50,000 - 60,000 had been resettled as of mid-February. At least 1 in 4 relocated villagers was ethnic Chinese. (Sources: “Wa Relocations Have Resumed,” SHAN, 5 January 2005; “More Wa Arrive on the Border,” SHAN, 16 February 2005).
On 26 April 2005, over 1,800 Shan villagers fled the Mong Ton area after UWSA troops attacked SSA-S soldiers based in eastern Shan State. During the fighting, several Shan villages were burned down by UWSA forces. (Source: “Burma Border Fighting Hits New Pitch,” Irrawaddy, 27 April 2005).
Namkham Township
In December 2005, villagers living in the Namkham area abandoned their homes as SPDC and SPDC-backed militias increased their use of forced portering and sentry duty, especially from among Namthi, Hopon and Nam villages. Combined forces from the USDA, local proxy-militias and SPDC troops were organizing sentry duty and enforcing a curfew around Namkham City. In addition, 40 villagers from Wanapon, Kwunpon, Wanpon and Waneh villages were forced to perform sentry duty for Shweli Bridge. (Source: “The SPDC Practice the Forced Labor in Namkham Area,” DVB, 30 December 2005).
Nam Zarng Township
In late May 2005, SPDC authorities forced villagers who had been permitted to go back to their original homes in Haai Laai village tract, Nam-Zarng Township to return to the Kho Lam relocation site. (Source: “More Restrictions and Extortion, and Forced Relocation in Central Shan State,” SHRF Monthly Report, SHRF, August 2005).
13.12 Situation in Tenasserim Division
The SPDC military began to intensify its presence within Tenasserim Division in 1988, when a policy shift towards an export economy induced the regime to further exploit the area’s natural resources. The local inhabitants, who base their livelihoods mostly around rubber, palm and orchid plantations; paddy farming, and fishing, have been treated as obstacles to the effective exploitation of the land. The result has been an increase to 46 battalions deployed throughout Tenasserim Division. Ten of these are situated in Yebyu Township alone to guard the SPDC’s Yadana natural gas pipeline and the 110-mile-long Ye-Tavoy railway. The increased militarization of Tenasserim Division has been followed by increased abuses against civilians and related internal displacement. (Sources: The Mon Forum, HURFOM, September 2005; Internal Protection and Displacement in Eastern Burma, TBBC, October 2005).
The resistance situated within northern Tenasserim Division has been a particular target of Burma’s ruling junta. Forced relocation programs in Yebyu, Tavoy, and Palaw have sought to undermine support for the KNU and NMSP, which are both active in these areas. The SPDC has applied its egregious ‘four cuts’ strategy to areas where the influence of opposition exists. In 1997, the SPDC military conducted an extensive campaign to dominate KNU-controlled land. In conjunction with military offensives, this campaign involved the forced relocation of rural inhabitants into military-controlled relocation sites. However, the effect of this program was the flight of tens of thousands of villagers into hiding in the surrounding areas or further into Thailand.
Despite the limited documentation of incidents of forced displacement, TBBC estimated that the total IDP population within Tenasserim Division during 2005 was about 68,600 persons. The vast majority of these individuals, 56,600 in all, were living in SPDC-controlled relocation sites. A further 5,000 people were dwelling in the areas in the north-east of the division controlled by the NMSP and 7,000 remained hiding in the land surrounding their abandoned villages. (Source: Internal Displacement and Protection in Eastern Burma, TBBC, October 2005).
Forced Relocation in Tenasserim Division - Partial List of Incidents for 2005
Yebyu Township
In January 2005, SPDC military troops from Southeast Tactical Command No.3 targeted villages in an attempt to uproot support for a Mon splinter group. The soldiers razed around 40 houses in Wae-Kwao (Paukpingwin) village in Yebyu Township causing displaced villagers to flee to a NMSP-administered IDP village in Tavoy Township. (Source: The Mon Forum, HURFOM, September 2005).
Mergui-Tavoy District
In February 2005, a unit of SPDC troops ordered Za Di Win villagers to relocate to Has Kwa village by the deadline of 20 February. As a result, 210 persons from 30 households of Za Di Win village abandoned their village and fled. (Source: KIC, 27 March 2005).
13.13 Forced Relocations in Other States/Divisions
Relocation of the Capital from Rangoon to Pyinmana
The sudden relocation of Burma's capital from Rangoon to Pyinmana in southern Mandalay Division beginning on 6 November 2005 introduced forced displacement and relocation in areas previously untroubled by such practices. Forced relocation connected with the move affected residents of both Mandalay and Rangoon Divisions. Land developed for the new capital's infrastructure was expropriated from villagers previously residing in Pyinmana District who were forced to relocate elsewhere. The SPDC initiated a vigorous development program on confiscated land involving the construction of new infrastructure including mansions for senior generals, regime offices, national HQs for ceasefire groups and the USDA, bunkers, tunnels, a large military hospital, apartments, airstrips, a golf course, two luxury hotels and two large supermarkets (source: “UN Takes Big Step to Address Myanmar (Burma) Issues,” Thai Press Reports, 7 December 2005). Civil servants working at regime ministries in Rangoon were ordered to transfer along with their departments to the new capital.
Following the initial transfer of civil servants on 6 November, the SPDC forbade the resignation of those required to move and stated that anyone caught abandoning their post would be charged and imprisoned under Article 5(j) of the 1950 Emergency Provisions Act for treason and insubordination (source: “Burmese Civil Servants Kept Within Barbed Wires at New Capital,” DVB, 23 November 2005). At the time of the initial arrival of relocated civil servants, infrastructure was still incomplete and regime employees were deposited in a large hall with provisions for only two days, although their were no adequate sources of supplementary food in the vicinity. Although communication lines out of the new capital complex were limited, some relocated workers managed to contact family members in Rangoon from whom they asked for food. One of those relocated said, “There is nothing to eat, drink and nothing to buy. Just nothing.” (Source: “SPDC's Leaders Take to the Hills,” Asia Times, 23 November 2005). In relation to the transfer, one civil servant said, “Government servants who refuse to move there are told they will be fired and therefore cannot expect any pension” (source: “Civilians to Be Moved for New Capital Site in Central Burma,” SHAN, 24 June 2005).
The land used for the capital was confiscated from thousands of villagers (source: “Burma's Rulers Take the Road to Mandalay,” The Independent, 8 November 2005). By October 2005, hundreds of residents living in the area around Ayelar and Leway, two towns south and southwest of Pyinmana respectively had been forcibly displaced. The confiscated land was to be used for the construction of an airport for the country’s new capital. The regime ministries of Forestry, Energy, Agriculture and Irrigation, and No.1 Industry and Irrigation received orders in June to resettle on the same land. (Source: “Civilians to Be Moved for New Capital Site in Central Burma,” SHAN, 24 June 2005). In mid-November, the authorities relocated, dismantled and destroyed 100 homes in Pyinmana in order to widen a road leading to the new capital at nearby Kyappyay region renamed Naypyidaw Military HQs. The majority of homes earmarked for relocation and destruction, situated on U Razat and Maung Khin Roads which connect the train station and Kyappyay. Moreover, the authorities also destroyed some living quarters and bungalows built for railway workers situated on the new Pyinmana-Kyappyay Road. Plans were also underway to remove a further 5,000 villagers from the area by the start of 2006. (Source: “Burma's Rulers Take the Road to Mandalay,” The Independent, 8 November 2005).
Displacement Following Fire in Hlaing Township, Rangoon Division
On 28 November 2005, a fire in Hlaing Township, Rangoon Division destroyed a large residential area. Those made homeless by the fire were initially transferred to provisional shelters at sports stadiums, interrogation centers and guest houses. Subsequently, they were moved without warning and taken to No.3 Ward near No.4 Hmawbi Road, approximately 20 miles away from their original homes. However, only some were provided with new living arrangements and some were provided with 35,000 kyat in compensation from the authorities. For lack of a place to reside, some remained in fields. (Source: “Rangoon Fire Victims Forcibly Relocated Out of Town, “ DVB, 13 December 2005).
13.14 Appendix I: IDPs in Eastern Burma
|
States and Divisions |
IDPs in Hiding |
IDPs in Relocation Sites |
IDPs in Ceasefire Areas |
Total IDPs |
||||
|
2004 |
2005 |
2004 |
2005 |
2004 |
2005 |
2004 |
2005 |
|
|
South Shan |
9,300 |
20,800 |
21,800 |
23,700 |
185,000 |
174,500 |
216,100 |
219,000 |
|
Karenni |
7,000 |
9,500 |
6,400 |
7,500 |
75,000 |
75,500 |
88,400 |
92,500 |
|
East Pegu |
13,500 |
13,400 |
4,500 |
7,900 |
0 |
0 |
18,000 |
21,300 |
|
Karen |
46,900 |
38,800 |
13,400 |
6,100 |
75,000 |
45,000 |
135,300 |
89,900 |
|
Mon |
2,300 |
2,500 |
3,800 |
6,200 |
25,000 |
40,000 |
31,100 |
48,700 |
|
Tenasserim |
5,000 |
7,000 |
27,100 |
56,600 |
5,000 |
5,000 |
37,100 |
68,600 |
|
Overall |
84,000 |
92,000 |
77,000 |
108,000 |
365,000 |
340,000 |
526,000 |
540,000 |
(Source: TBBC, Internal Displacement and Protection in Eastern Burma, October 2005)
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